Constitutional Law 1 - Comprehensive Reviewer

Constitutional Law 1 | 1.
E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
P R E A M B L E
A R T I C L E I
National Territory
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
 Function | Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11, 22 (1905)

 The Preamble is not a source of rights or of obligations because it sets down the origin, cope and purpose of the
Constitution, it is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the Constitution. It is
thus a source of light.
 Origin, Scope and Purpose

 Its origin or authorship is the will of the “sovereign Filipino people”.
 It scope and purpose is “to build a just and humane society and to establish a government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality and peace.”
 Distinction
 It adds the final phrase “under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace.”
 “Love” is inserted as a monument to the love that prevented bloodshed in the February Revolution.
 The mention of “Truth” is a protest against the deception which characterized the Marcos regime.
 “Peace” is mentioned last as the fruit of the convergence of truth, justice, freedom, and love.
 “WE”
 The use of first person stresses the active and sovereign role of the Filipino people as author of the Constitution. The
language thus differs from that of the 1935 Constitution which used the third person “The Filipino People,” thereby
suggesting that another power was merely announcing that the Filipinos were finally being allowed to promulgate a
constitution.
 “ALMIGHTY GOD” v. “DIVINE PROVIDENCE”

 It is more personal and more consonant with personalist Filipino religiosity.
 “COMMON GOOD” v. “GENERAL WELFARE”

 “Common Good” projects the idea of a social order that enables every citizen to attain his or her fullest development
economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually.
 The phrase “General Welfare” was avoided because it could be interpreted as “the greatest good for the greatest number”
even if what the greater number wants does violence to human dignity, as for instance when the greater majority might
want the extermination of those who are considered inferior.
 “EQUALITY”
 It emphasizes that a major problem in Philippine society is the prevalence of gross economic and political inequalities.
 “The Rule of Law”

 This expresses the concept that government officials have only the authority given them by law and defined by law, and
that such authority continues only with the consent of the people. The statement is: “Ours is a rule of law and not of men.”
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and
other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
 Purpose of the Provision on National Territory

 Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution defines the national territory of the Philippines.
 1935 Constitution had a very special reason for defining the National Territory. To be effective, it had to be accepted by
the President of the United States. Since its adoption there was still some fear that the US government might dismember
Philippine territory, delegates to this Constitution believed that such dismemberment could be forestalled by including a
definition of Philippine territory in the Constitution. It was argued that acceptance of this one by the US President would
oblige the American government to keep the integrity of Philippine territory as defined.
 In the 1973 Constitution, no such special reason compelled the inclusion of a definition of National Territory should be
placed in this for the preservation of the national wealth, for national security, and as a manifestation of our solidarity as a
people. More importantly, it was the wish of some to project in the Constitution adherence to the “archipelagic principle”.
 1986 Constitutional Commission on the subject repeated much of the discussion of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In
the end there was recognition of the fact that an article on national territory would have an educational value. Moreover,
there was apprehension that it would be difficult to explain why after the 1935 and 1973 provisions on the national
territory the new Constitution should fail to provide for one.
 Force of the Assertion of a Territorial Claim

 The Constitution is a municipal law. As such, it binds only the nation promulgating it.
 Definition of national territory in the constitution will bind internationally only if it is supported by proof that can stand in
international law.
 Scope of the National Territory

1. The Philippine Archipelago.
 It is that body of water studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, as
modified by the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900 and the Treaty with Great Britain of January 2, 1930.
These are the same treaties which delineated Philippine territory in Article I of the 1935 Constitution.
 The 1973 Constitution omitted specific mention of these treaties because Constitutional Convention delegates
wanted to erase every possible trace of our colonial history from the new organic document. 1987 Constitution
follows the lead of the 1973 Constitution.
2. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
3. The territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas corresponding to (1) and (2). (1)
and (2) consist of terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains.
 “All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.”
 This includes any territory which presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of the
internationally accepted modes of acquiring territory. Foremost among these territories are what are referred to by the
1935 Constitution as “all territory over which the present (1935) Government of the Philippine Islands exercises
jurisdiction.” This had reference to the Batanes Islands which, although undisputedly belonging to the Philippines,
apparently lay outside the lines drawn by the Treaty of Paris.
 It also includes what was referred to under the 1973 Constitution as territories “belonging to the Philippines by historic
right or legal title,” that is, other territories which, depending on available evidence, might belong to the Philippines (e.g.,
Sabah, the Marianas, Freedom land).
 “Belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title”

 By dropping this phrase, the Constitution did not in effect dropped the Philippine claim to Sabah. It has, however, avoided
the use of language historically offensive to Malaysia and has used instead the clause “over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction.” This clause neither claims nor disclaims Sabah.
 It prescinds from an evaluation of the strength of the Philippine claim. The formula is recognition of the fact that unilateral
assertion in a constitution, which is municipal law, by themselves, do not establish an international right to a territory.
 Extent of the Philippine claim to its Aerial Domain, Territorial Sea, the Seabed, the Subsoil, the insular shelves and other
submarine areas.
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 The Philippine lays claim to them to the extent recognized by international law. The definition of these areas and right of
the Philippines over these areas are provided for in customary and conventional international law.
 For instance, the Philippine claims to parts of the seas, the seabed, the subsoil and the insular shelves are subject to the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea to which the Philippines is a signatory. As to air space, the Philippines claims
sovereignty over the airspace above its land mass and territorial sea up to the height where the outer space begins. It also
adheres to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.
 Special Claim made by the Philippines with respect to the “waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago”.
 The Philippines claims them as part of its “internal waters” irrespective of their breadth and dimension. This is one of the
elements of the archipelagic principle which is now recognized by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea does not exactly accept the entirety of the Philippine position on the archipelagic
principle. The vast areas of water between islands which the Philippine considers internal waters (and therefore not
subject t the right of innocent passage) the 1982 Convention calls “archipelagic waters” subject to the right of innocent
passage through passages designated by the archipelago concerned.
 However, the Philippines has not recognized this distinction because it is contrary to what Article I says about these waters
being internal. For this reason, the Philippines ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea with reservations.
 Other Element of the Archipelagic Principle.

 The other element is the straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea. This consists of drawing straight lines
connecting appropriate points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast. These baselines divide the internal waters from the territorial waters of an archipelago.
 Raegan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968 (1969) | PEOPLE V. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
The US military bases in the Philippines are still part of the Philippine territory. The precise reason why the Philippine government
could cede part of its authority over these bases to the United States was the fact that they were part of the Philippine territory over
which the government exercised sovereign control.
 PEOPLE V. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)

Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She
demolished the house and built another one in its place, without obtaining a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City. Gozo was
allegedly informed by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor’s office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was
not necessary for the construction of the house. Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance Number 14, Series of 1964, with City
Fiscal’s Office.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance 14, Series of 1964 is applicable to the Appellant.
Whether or not Olongapo City exercises administrative jurisdiction over the area concerned.
HELD
Yes, for both.
RATIO
In the first issue, ordinance is predicated under the General Welfare Clause. In the case of People v. Fajardo was cited by Appellant in her defense.
However, People v. Fajardo is clearly distinguishable from instant case because the conviction of Fajardo violated General Welfare Clause. Said
conviction was oppressive given that Fajardo badly needed a residence. In instant case, however, Appellant did not even bother compliance with the
ordinance.
In the second issue US Jurisdiction over the bases is purely a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. Philippine jurisdiction may have been
diminished by virtue of military bases agreement but it does not disappear. The US Naval Reservation cannot be a foreign terr itory.
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A R T I C L E I I
Declaration of Principles
&
State Policies
FUNCTION OF ARTICLE II
The function of Article II is a statement of the basic ideological principles and policies that underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions
shed light on the meaning of the other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in the
implementation of the Constitution.
ARTICLE II, SECTION 1

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
 Definition of State | Elements of a State

 It is a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of
external control, and possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual
obedience.
 Four Elements
1. People
2. Territory
3. Sovereignty
4. Government
 State v. Nation
 For the purpose of political sociology a state, which is a legal concept, may be distinguished from nation, which is an ethnic
concept, for the purpose of constitutional law the two terms are not distinct.
 The Constitution uses them interchangeably to designate the legal concept of state as defined above.
 People
 As an element of a state, people simply means a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining
the continued existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law. It is of no legal consequence if
they possess diverse racial, cultural or economic interests.
 Sovereignty
 Legal Sovereignty is the supreme power to affect legal interests either by legislative, executive or judicial action.
 This is lodged in the people but is normally exercised by state agencies.
 In terms of auto-limitation, sovereignty is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal determination and self-restriction.
 Political Sovereignty is the sum total of all the influences in a state, legal and non-legal, which determines the course of
law.
 Government
 As an element of a state, it is defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon
the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.”
 BACANI V. NACOCO, 100 Phil 468 (1956)

The functions of government were classified into constituent and ministrant functions. The former are the compulsory functions
which constitute the very bonds of society. For example, the keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery, or the fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children are
obligatory or constituent functions of government.
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Ministrant functions are the optional functions of government. The principles for determining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are:
1. That a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake.
2. That a government should do those things which why its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (1969)

The conceptual definitions of constituent and ministrant function are still acceptable. However, the growing complexities
of modern society can necessitate realignment.
PHHC v Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 269, 310 (1987)

Housing has been found to be a governmental function since housing is considered an essential service.
Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman, GR Nos. 55963 and 61045, February 27, 1991
But the undertaking to supply water for a price, as does the government corporation National Irrigation Authority, is
considered a trade and not a governmental activity.
DE JURE | The Gloria Macapagal-
 Classification of Governments according to Legitimacy Arroyo Government
1. DE JURE is established by authority of the legitimate sovereign. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 8

a. In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno, 210 SCRA 589, 598 (1992) In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or
The Government under Corazon Aquino and the Freedom resignation of the President, the
Constitution was a de jure government because it was established Vice-President shall become the
by authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent
revolutionary government established in defiance of the 1973 disability, removal from office, or
Constitution. resignation of both the President
and Vice-President, the President
of the Senate or, in case of his
The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary inability, the Speaker of the
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except House of Representatives, shall
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de then act as President until the
President or Vice-President shall
jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international have been elected and qualified.
law. The Congress shall, by law,
provide who shall serve as
President in case of death,
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003 permanent disability, or
During the interregnum between February 25, 1986 and March resignation of the Acting
24, 1986 when the Freedom Constitution took effect by President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President
presidential proclamation, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 shall have been elected and
Constitution was not operative. However, the protection qualified, and be subject to the
same restrictions of powers and
accorded to individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political disqualifications as the Acting
Rights and the Universal Declaration remained in effect under President.
international law during the interregnum.
2. DE FACTO is one established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign.

a. Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority.
b. Government that which is established and maintained by invading military forces.
c. Government that which is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state such as the government of the Southern Confederacy
in revolt against the Union during the was of secession.
 CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil 113 (1945)

The case at bar is a Petition for Mandamus or Writ of Execution to continue a Civil Case 3012. It is a case initiated
during the Japanese regime. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings on
the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. MacArthur. His declaration had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments under the Japanese regime.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings under the Japanese regime good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US.
Whether or not MacArthur’s declaration nullifies the judicial acts of the Philippines under the Japanese Regime.
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HELD
It is adjudged and decreed that a Writ of Mandamus issue, directed to the respondent, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in Civil Case 3012 of said court.
RATIO
In the first issue, though the conquerors are considered supreme and absolute, the laws regarding private issues
and without political complexion were adopted. The Japanese regime declared the use of this laws and rules that
were already established. These laws were not abrogated by the change of sovereignty. At the time of war, the
Japanese could not subject themselves to the tedious overhauling of the government. Therefore, laws that were not
affecting their stay in the Philippines were retained. Furthermore, the Philippines then was a de facto government
under the Japanese regime. Therefore, laws that are considered private and lacking of political complexion are
considered continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended
or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation.
In the second issue, it was not the intention of General MacArthur to mean that he will be abolishing entirely the
laws in force because that will result in removing even their own laws in the Philippines. After the war the
Philippines, issued EO 37, which made all pending cases under the CA during the Japanese period be settled by the
SC. In this act done by the Philippines, it is already an acknowledgement that the laws under the regime of the
Japanese regime were considered continuing in force even after the liberalization.
 Presidential Form of Government

 SEPARATION OF POWERS: principal identifying feature. This system is founded on the belief that, by establishing
equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony will result, power will not be concentrated, and thus tyranny will be
avoided.
 Legislative power is given to the Legislature whose members hold office for a fixed term.
 Executive power is given to a separate Executive who also holds office for a fixed term.
 Judicial power is held by an independent Judiciary.
 ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCED BY THE PHILIPPINES SINCE 1935

 Even the government of President Ferdinand Marcos under the 1973 Constitution, as revised in 1981, had
the distinguishing marks of a presidential form of government:
1. Separation of powers
2. Pre-eminence of the President.
 The President was “head of state and chief executive” (VII, 1)
 He inherited the powers of the President under the 1935 Constitution (VII, 16)
 He was superior to the Prime Minister by the fact that he nominated the Prime Minister (IX, 1)
 Approved the program of government to be administered by the Prime Minister (IX, 2)
 Terminated the term of the Prime Minister when he nominated the successor (IX, 4)
 Could delegate powers to the Prime Minister.
 He also had control over the ministries (VII, 7)
 Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor, 108 SCRA 757, October 30, 1981
While there was closer relationship between the executive and the legislature, thus manifesting “features of
parliamentarism,” there was separation between them. Separation from the Judiciary also conceptually
remained.
 Parliamentary Form of Government

 The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously members of the legislature.
 The government of cabinet consisting of the political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition, who are also members
of the legislature, is in effect a committee of the legislature.
 The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.
 The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature.
 Both government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate
political responsibility. In the hands of legislature is the vote of non-confidence (censure) whereby government may be
ousted. In the hands of government is the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections.
 Republican State
 State wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the
people.
 Democratic State
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 In the view of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but also shares some
aspects of direct democracy such as “initiative and referendum” in Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2. The
word “democratic” is also a monument to the February Revolution which re-won freedom through direct action of the
people.
 Constitutional Authoritarianism v. Republican State

 The first one, as understood and practiced in the Marcos regime under the 1973 Constitution, was the assumption of
extraordinary powers by the President, including legislative and judicial and even constituent powers. It is compatible with
a republican state if the Constitution upon which the Executive bases his assumption of power is a legitimate expression of
the people’s will and if the Executive who assumes power received his office through a valid election by the people
.
 State v. Government v. Administration
 State is the corporate entity.
 Government is one of the elements of a state exercises power.
 Administration consists of the set of people currently running the institution. It changes without a change in either state or
government.
 The transitions from the 1935 to 1973 Constitution and from 1973 to 1987 Constitutions involved changes
of government but not of state. The transition from President Joseph Estrada to President Arroyo did not
involve a change of government but only administration.

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
 Purpose of the Provision

 This is to qualify that the Philippine renounces aggressive war, not defensive.
 The affirmation of amity with all nations does not mean automatic diplomatic recognition of all nations. Amity with all
nations is an ideal to be aimed at. Diplomatic recognition, however, remains a matter of executive discretion.
 Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

 The right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting deportation when his failure to leave the country is due to the
fact that no country will accept him | Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil 70 (1951)
 The right of a country to establish military commission to try war criminals | Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Phil 171 (1949)
 Some generally accepted principles have been incorporated in treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals | Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195, 213 (1979)
 Duty to protect the premises of embassies and legations | JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366, October 25, 1983

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

 This is to institutionalize the principle of civilian supremacy through making the President, a civilian and precisely as
civilian, commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
 But this does not mean that civilian officials are superior to military officials.
 Civilian officials are superior to military officials only when a law makes them so.
 Raison d’être of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

 In order to secure the sovereignty of the State and to preserve the integrity of the national territory.
 In extraordinary circumstances they may also be called upon to protect the people when ordinary law and order forces
need assistance.

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.
 1973 Constitution v. 1935 & 1987 Constitutions
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 The 1973 and the 1935 versions spoke of “defense” of the State being a prime duty of government. It therefore easily lent
itself to interpretations which justified a national security state offensive to the people.
 The present version places the emphasis on service to and protection of the people.
 The phrase “under conditions provide by law” in the second sentence also emphasizes the primacy of serving the interest
of the people and protecting their rights even when there is need to defend the State

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
ARTICLE III, SECTION 5

 Schizophrenic Provision No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
 Framers should not have included this. worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
 It is better to be silent about this. religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
S T A T E P O L I C I E S

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

 For the government to maintain an independent foreign policy and give paramount consideration to national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest and self-determination.

The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

 The Constitution prescribes a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons, which includes the prohibition not only of the
possession, control and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also nuclear arms tests.
 Exception to this policy may be made by the political departments; but it must be justified by the demands of the national
interest.
 The policy does not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 The implication of this policy for the presence of American troops or for any American military base that might be established in the
Philippines is that any new agreement on bases or the presence of troops, if ever there is one, must embody the basic policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be well within the power of government to demand ocular inspection and
removal of nuclear arms.

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
 Underlying Premises
 Poverty and gross inequality are major problems besetting the nation and that these problems assault the dignity of the
human person.
 Social Justice
 Equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the
balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life.
 In the language of the 1935 Constitution, it means justice for the common tao; in the shibboleth of the 1973 Convention,
those who have less in life must have more in law.
 The 1987 Constitution reflects majoritarian values and protect the minoritarian rights.
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 The special impact of this provision in Philippine Jurisprudence has been chiefly instrumental in the socialization of the
state’s attitude to property rights thus gradually eradicating the vestiges of lasses faire in Philippine society.
 The promotion of social justice to be carried out in all phases of national development is specified under Article XIII.

The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
 Family | Stable heterosexual relationship

 Declaration of family autonomy accepts the principle that the family is anterior to the State and is not a creature of the
State. It protects the family from instrumentalization of the State
 Purpose of Protection of the Unborn

 Abortion is permissible.
 This is not an assertion that the unborn is a legal person.
 This is not an assertion that the life of the unborn is placed exactly on the level of the life of the mother.
 When necessary to save the life of the mother, the life of the unborn may be sacrificed; but not when the purpose is
merely to save the mother from emotional suffering, for which other remedies must be sought, or to spare the child from
a life of poverty, which can be attended to by welfare institutions.
 Protection from the Time of Conception
 The overriding purpose in asserting that the protection begins from the time of conception is to prevent the State from
adopting the doctrine in the US Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade, 401 US 113 (1973) which liberalizes abortion laws
up to the sixth month of pregnancy by allowing abortion any time during the first six months of pregnancy provided it can
be done without danger to the mother.
 The understanding is that life begins at conception, although the definition of conception can be a matter for science to
specify.
 Incidentally, the respect for life manifested by the provision harmonizes with the abolition of the death penalty and the
ban on nuclear arms.
 Respective Rights of Parents and of the State

 The primary and natural right belongs to the parents.
 The State may intervene in the relation of parent and child. As parens patriae the State has the authority and duty to step
in where parents fail to or are unable to cope with their duties to their children.
 The Constitution affirms the primary right of parents in the rearing of children to prepare them for a productive civic and
social life and at the same time it affirms the secondary and supportive role of the State.
 The principle is also rooted in the basic philosophy of liberty guaranteed by the due process clause.
 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1922)

The state cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign languages to children before they reach a certain age. Such restriction
does violence to both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510 (1925)

The state cannot require children to attend only public schools before they reach a certain age. The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which the government under the Constitution reposes excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 LW 4476 (May 15, 1972)

The State cannot require children to continue schooling beyond a certain age even against the honest and sincere claim of
parents that such schooling would be harmful to their religious upbringing. Only those interest of the state “of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance” the primary interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their
children.
9
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)

It was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the constitutionality of several Pennsylvania state regulations
regarding abortion were challenged. The Court's plurality opinion upheld the constitutional right to have an abortion but lowered the
standard for analyzing restrictions of that right, invalidating one regulation but upholding the others.
Five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act authored by Rep. Stephen F. Freind were being challenged as unconstitutional
under Roe v. Wade, which first recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
 The "informed consent" rule under the Act required doctors to provide women with information about the health risks and
possible complications of having an abortion before one could be performed.
 The "spousal notification" rule required women to give prior notice to their husbands.
 The "parental consent" rule required minors to receive consent from a parent or guardian prior to an abortion.
 The fourth provision imposed a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining an abortion.
 The fifth provision challenged in the case was the imposition of certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion
services.
When the case came before the Court, Pennsylvania defended the Act in part by urging the Court to overturn Roe as having been wrongly
decided.
The case was a seminal one in the history of abortion rights in the United States. It was the first case that provided an opportunity to
overturn Roe since the two liberal Justices, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, were replaced with the Bush-appointed
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Both were viewed as ostensible conservatives compared to their predecessors. This left the
Court with eight Republican-appointed justices - five of whom had been appointed by Presidents Reagan or Bush, both of whom were well
known for their opposition to Roe. Finally, the only remaining Democratic appointee - Justice Byron White - had been one of the two
dissenters from the original Roe decision.
At this point, only two of the Justices were obvious supporters of Roe v. Wade: Blackmun, the author of Roe, and Stevens, who had joined
opinions specifically reaffirming Roe in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Given these circumstances, some pro-choice advocates expected Roe to be overruled.
The case was argued by ACLU attorney Kathryn Kolbert for Planned Parenthood, with Linda J. Wharton serving as Co-Lead Counsel.
Pennsylvania attorney general Ernest Preate, Jr. argued the case for the State. In the Supreme Court oral arguments, Solicitor
General Kenneth Starr spoke for the Bush Administration.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING

The plaintiffs were four abortion clinics and a class action of physicians who provide abortion services, in addition to one physician
representing himself independently. They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin the state
from enforcing the five provisions and have them declared facially unconstitutional. The District Court, after a three-day bench trial, held
that all the provisions were unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against Pennsylvania's enforcement of them.
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations except for the husband
notification requirement. Then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito sat on that three-judge appellate panel and dissented from the court's
invalidation of that requirement.
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSIDERATION

At the conference of the Justices two days after oral argument, Justice Souter defied expectations, joining Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and
Blackmun, who had likewise refused to do so three years earlier in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. This resulted in a precarious
five Justice majority consisting of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Byron White, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas that favored upholding all the abortion restrictions. However, Kennedy changed his mind shortly thereafter and secretly joined
with fellow Reagan-Bush justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter to write a plurality opinion that would reaffirm Roe.
Except for three opening sections of the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion, Casey was a divided judgment, as no other sections of any
opinion were joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality decision jointly written by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is
recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each of its parts were concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit
different ones for each part.
The O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter plurality opinion

These three justices began their written opinion by noting the U.S. government's previous challenges to Roe v. Wade:
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the
respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to
overrule Roe."
10
The plurality opinion stated that it was upholding what it called the "essential holding" of Roe. The plurality asserted that the right
to abortion is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the plurality reiterated what the Court had
said in Eisenstadt v. Baird: "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
The plurality's opinion also included some controversial language about the doctrine of stare decisis - see the more recent
discussion from Justice Roberts on Stare Decisis in the Citizens United case. The plurality emphasized the need to stand by prior
decisions even if they were unpopular, unless there had been a change in the fundamental reasoning underpinning the previous
decision. It also acknowledged the need for predictability and constancy in judicial decision making. For example,
"Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely
divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the
normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."
The plurality went on to give society's rejection of the "Separate but Equal" concept as a legitimate reason for the Brown v.
Board of Education court’s rejection of the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine. Emphasizing the need to not be seen as overruling a
prior decision merely because the individual members of the Court had changed, O’Connor states,
"Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and because no
other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with
any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.”
Since the plurality overruled some portions of Roe v. Wade despite its emphasis on stare decisis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist in dissent argued that this section was entirely obiter dicta. All these opening sections were joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens for the majority. The remainder of the decision did not command a majority, but at
least two other Justices concurred in judgment on each of the remaining points.
The plurality then overturned the strict trimester formula used in Roe to weigh the woman's interest in obtaining an
abortion against the State's interest in the life of the fetus. Continuing advancements in medical technology meant
that at the time Casey was decided, a fetus might be considered viable at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28
weeks that was more common at the time of Roe. The plurality recognized viability as the point at which the state
interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the rights of the woman and abortion may be banned entirely "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother".
The plurality also replaced the heightened scrutiny of abortion regulations under Roe, which was standard for
fundamental rights in the Court's case law, with a lesser "undue burden" standard previously developed by
O'Connor in her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. A legal restriction posing an undue
burden was defined as one having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." The plurality also overruled Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), each of which applied "strict scrutiny" to abortion restrictions.
Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania Act under challenge, the plurality struck down the spousal
notification requirement, stating that it gave too much power to husbands over their wives and would worsen
situations of spousal abuse. The plurality upheld the State's 24-hour waiting period, informed consent, and parental
consent requirements, holding that none constituted an undue burden.
The Plurality, in section 5 of its decision, made a special note of the precedential value of Roe v. Wade, especially
how women's lives were changed by that decision:
The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any way
affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to
act in society, and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal
autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant.
—Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Notable by omission in the plurality is any mention of any right to privacy coming from the Constitution; while
O'Connor does use "privacy" a few times in her opinion, the usages are all in the context of a quotation or
paraphrase from Roe or other previous cases.
The concurrence/dissents
11
William Rehnquist, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas—the six
Justices who did not join the plurality opinion—wrote or joined opinions in which they partially concurred and
partially dissented from the decision.
Rehnquist and Scalia each joined the plurality in upholding the parental consent, informed consent, and waiting
period laws. However, they dissented from the plurality's decision to uphold Roe v. Wade and strike down the
spousal notification law, contending that Roe was incorrectly decided. Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's
concurrence/dissents, and White and Thomas, who did not write their own opinions, joined in both.
Blackmun and Stevens wrote opinions in which they approved of the plurality's preservation of Roe and rejection of
the spousal notification law. They did not, however, agree with the plurality's decision to uphold the other three
laws at issue. Blackmun went further, sharply attacking and criticizing the anti-Roe bloc of the Court.

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

 The provision is so worded as not to automatically dislocate the Civil Code and the civil law jurisprudence on the subject.
 What it does is to give impetus to the removal, through statutes, of existing inequalities.
 The general idea I for the law to ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in determining rights and duties.
 Nor is the provision meant to ignore customs and traditions.
 To no more than munificent bequests in a pauper's will – Justice Jackson

The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
 ON ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
 By authority of Section 16 embodying the people’s right to a balanced ecology and under various statutes, several
government agents were required by mandamus to undertake the cleaning of Manila Bay and its surroundings.
 Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Article II, Section 16, as worded, recognizes an enforceable “right”. Hence, appeal to it has been recognized as conferring
“standing” on minors to challenge logging policies of the government.
 Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995
On the basis of Oposa v. Factoran, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the empowerment of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Area from the deleterious effects of pollutants coming from
garbage dumping and the discharge of wastes in the area as against the local autonomy claim of local governments in the
area.
 ON NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS

 Some provisions in the Heath Sector Reform Agenda were challenged on the ground that they violate Sections 15 and 18
of the Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the
1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to
health and well-being. However, these provisions are not self-executing. They require implementing legislation (Tondo
Medical Center Employees v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007).

The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nation alism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.

 This does not mean that the government is not free to balance the demands of education against other competing and
urgent demands.

The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

12
 The clause, “a primary social economic force” means that the human factor has primacy over the non-human factors in
production, which are mainly discussed by Article XIII.

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

 This is a guide for interpreting provisions on the national economy and patrimony under Article CERTIORARI
A writ of common law
XII. issued by a superior
 Any doubt must be resolved in favor of self-reliance and independence and in favor of Filipinos. court to a common
 Defensive wording of the provision court requiring the
latter to produce a
certified record of a
 Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 particular case tried
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), w hich produces therein, It is issued in
order that the court
60% of the national output of naphtha. The corporation was highly supported by the Philippines because it helps in the
issuing it may inspect
development of the country’s petrochemical industry. BPC, in a letter delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion, the proceedings and
expressed their desire to amend the original registration certificate of its project by changing the job site from Limay, determine whether
Bataan to Batangas. This was greatly opposed by the President, Members of Congress, but BPC pushed through and filed there have been any
their request for the amendment to BOI. Petitioner, who is the Representative of Bataan, requested for copies of the irregularities.
amendment registration, but the investors refused to give their consent to release it. BOI then eventually approved the
request for amendment allowing them to transfer job sites. Petitioner filed for preliminary injunction and certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not BOI and DTI abused their discretion:
 In not observing due process in approving the requested revisions without hearing.
 In refusing to furnish the petitioner with requested documents.
 In approving the change in the site of BPC’s petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas, in violation of PD Nos. 949 and 1803, which
established Lamao, Limay, Bataan as the “petrochemical industrial zone.”
 In approving the change in feedstock from naphtha only, to naphtha and/or LPG.
 In showing gross partiality for BPC.
HELD
Granted. The Board of Investments (BOI) is ordered to:
 To publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC).
 To allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, excluding confidential
business information as prohibited by law.
 To set for hearing the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application.

The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
 Purpose of the Provisions

 Comprehensive rural development must include not only agrarian reform. It also encompasses a ULTRA VIRES
broad spectrum of social, economic, human, cultural, political and even industrial development. Latin for "beyond
 Agrarian reform is discussed under Article XIII, Sections 4 to 8 (issue on the “tiller of the land powers," in the law of
corporations, referring
should be the owner and on capital investment on farm lands). to acts of a corporation
 Incentives can be in the form of predictability, peace and order, lower labor cost, income tax and/or its officers
holiday, visa. outside the powers
and/or authority
 Some light are disinfectant: protection of the state. allowed a corporation
 Laissez faire: US Financial meltdown by law. Example:
Directors of Highfliers,
Inc. operate a small
 PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DUQUE, GR No. 173034, bank for its employees
October 9, 2007 and friends, which
The Supreme Court declared null and void sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the Department of Health’s Revised corporate law does not
permit without a bank
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Milk Code, which call for an absolute ban on advertising, charter, or sells shares
promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for breast milk substitutes and provides for of stock to the public
administrative sanctions not found in the law, respectively, for being ultra vires. before a permit is
issued.
13

The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

 Indigenous cultural communities are discussed under the National Economy and Patrimony under Local Governments
under Article XIII, Section 6 and Article XVI, Section 12.
 There are three (3) of this topic in Constitution: the framers should have placed it in one place, section or article.

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

 Section 23 is a very important component of Article XIII, Section 15-16; in Article XII, Section 11 it was further provided
that the State encourages these organizations rather than waiting for the government to discharge social services to
people.
 Section 24 is further supplemented in Article III , Section 7; Article XII, section 11, 17, 18; Article XVI, Section 11 (100%
ownership by Filipinos on media; 60% in real properties)
 Technology has made this Constitution obsolete.
 Section 25 is further discussed under Article X
 Issue on federalism, autonomy and unitary centralized form of government.
 To empower people to govern themselves.

The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

 To give substance to the desire for the equalization of political opportunities. However, the definition of “political
dynasties” is left to the legislature.
 Cure to corruption: leadership by example.
 Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Article II, Section 26 does not mean that everyone has a right to be a candidate for President. This provision is not self-
executory. It does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action. It is within the power of the state to limit the number of qualified candidates only to those who can
afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.

The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

 Section 27 is further discussed under Article XI

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
14
A R T I C L E V I
Legislative Department
FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS SYLLABUS
Section 1. Legislative power Section 11. Immunities

Initiative and referendum Immunity from arrest
Garcia v. COMELEC People v. Jalosjos
Non-delegability of legislative power Scope of privilege of speech
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Tablarin v. Gutierrez Antonino v. Valencia
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor Section 12. Disclosures
Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon Section 13. Disqualifications
Tatad. Energy Liban v. Gordon
People v. Dacuycuy Section 14. Prohibitions
Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission Puyat v. De Guzman
Penal Rules Section 15. Sessions
Separation of powers in local government Section 16. Officers and rules
Section 2. Composition of Congress Officers
Section 3. Qualification of Senators Avelino v. Cuenco
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board Santiago v. Guingona
Section 4. The term of Senators Arroyo v. De Venecia
Section 5. House of Representatives Internal discipline
Sectoral and party list representation Osmena v. Pendatun
Veterans v. COMELEC Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC Journals
Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW v. COMELEC US v. Pons
BANAT v. COMELEC Casco v. Gimenez
Apportionment Astorga v. Villegas
Tobias v. Abalos Section 17. Electoral Tribunals
Mariano v. COMELEC Angara v. Electoral Commission
Montejo v. COMELEC Abbas v. Senate
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC Bondoc v. Pineda
Section 6. Qualification of House members Guerrero v. COMELEC
Qualifications of District Representatives Garcia v. HRET
Qualifications of Party-list Representatives Pimentel v. HRET
Residence Qualification Vinzons- Chato v. COMELEC
Gallego v. Verra Limkaichong v. COMELEC
Romualdez- Marcos v. COMELEC Section 18. Commission on Appointments
Aquino v. COMELEC Daza v. Singson
Domino v. COMELEC Coseteng v. Mitra
Citizenship qualification Guingona v. Gonzales
Co v. HRET Section 19. Formation of Commissions
Bengzon v. Cruz Section 20. Records
Valles v. COMELEC Section 21. Legislative investigations
Section 7. Term of House members Bengzon v. Senate
Dimaporo v. Mitra Sabio v. Gordon
Farinas v. Executive Secretary Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Section 8. Date of election Senate v. Majaducon
Codilla v. De Venecia Section 22. Executive privilege
Section 9. Filling vacancies Senate v. Ermita
Tolentino v. COMELEC Neri v. Senate Committee
Section 10. Compensation Section 23. War and emergency powers
15
Section 24. Origin of bills Power to tax

Section 25. Appropriations Gerochi v. Department of Energy
Riders Exemption
Garcia v. Mata Garcia v. Executive Secretary
Transfer of funds System Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City
Demetria v. Alba Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian
Section 26. Subject and title of bills Reform
Tio v. VRB Commissioner of BIR v. Court of Appeals
PJA v. Prado Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos
Farinas v. Executive Secretary John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Victor Lim
Tan v. Del Rosario Section 29. Control of public funds
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Expenditure of public funds
Tobias v. Abalos Guingona v. Carague
Section 27. Passage of Bills Public purpose
Legislation Special fund
Item veto Osmena v. Orbos
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals Section 30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Gonzales v. Macaraig Fabian v. Desierto
Philconsa v. Enriquez Section 31. Title of royalty or nobility
Arroyo v. De Venecia Section32. Initiative and referendum
Section 28. Taxation
DEAN ANDRES BAUTISTA SYLLABUS
1. Legislative Power 5. Privileges

A. Possessor A. Salaries | Section 10
B. Kinds B. Arrest | Section 11
C. Scope C. Speech and Debate | Section 11
D. Limitations 6. Duties | Section 12
E. Delegation 7. Prohibitions | Section 13 & 14
2. Senate 8. Powers
A. Qualifications | Section 3 A. Enact Laws | Section 22, 25, 27, 28, 29
B. Term of Office | Section 4 B. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation | Section 21
3. House of Representatives C. Request Appearance of Executive Branch |
A. Qualifications | Section 5 & 6 Section 22
B. Term of Office | Section 7 D. Declare Existence of State of War |
4. Common Provisions Section 23
A. Regular Elections | Section 8 E. Determine Rule of Proceedings | Section 16
B. Vacancy | Section 9 9. Congressional Bodies | Section 19
C. Session | Section 15 A. Electoral Tribunals | Section 17
D. Officers | Section 16 B. Commission on Appointments |
E. Quorum | Section 16 Section 16, 18, 19
F. Journal and Record | Section 16 10. Limitations on Congressional Power
G. Adjournment | Section 16 A. Substantive | Section 30, 31
H. Records and Books of Accounts | Section 20 B. Procedural | Section 26, 27
JUSTICE NACHURA SYLLABUS
A. The Legislative Power Q. Electoral Tribunals

B. Congress R. Commission on Appointments
C. The Senate S. Powers of Congress
D. House of Representatives 1. General Plenary Legislative Power | Section 1,
E. Election Article VI
F. Salaries 2. Power of Appropriation | Section 29, Article VI
G. Privileges 3. Power of Taxation | Section 28, Article VI
H. Disqualifications 4. Power of Legislative Investigation | Section 21,
I. Other Inhibitions Article VI
J. Sessions 5. Question Hour | Section 22, Article VI
K. Officers 6. War Powers | Section 23(1), Article VI
L. Quorum 7. Power to act as Board of Canvassers in Election of
M. Rules of Proceedings President | Section 4, Article VII
N. Discipline of Members
O. Records and Books of Accounts
P. Legislative Journal and the Congressional Record
16
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 1

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Legislative power is a power of the government, which is different from inherent powers of the State. It is the authority to make laws and to
alter or repeal them. It is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
It is vested “in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum” in Section 32 in accordance to Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions).
POSSESSOR OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. People | Article VI, Sections 1 and 32 | Initiative and Referendum

 Republic Act 6735 | Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
 Approved by President Corazon Aquino on August 4, 1989
 Initiative: power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
 Three Systems of Initiative
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution
a. Article XVII, Section 2 | Amendments or Revisions may be directly proposed by an initiative
upon a petition of at least 12% of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. No amendment shall be
authorized oftener than once every five years thereafter.
b. Article XVII, Section 4 | Any amendment shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation
a. At least 10% of all registered voters.
b. Every legislative district represented by at least 3% of registered voters thereof.
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
 RA 6735, Section 2 | Indirect Initiative: the exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
local legislative body for action.
 RA 6735, Section 2(C) | Referendum: the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose
 Two classes
1. Referendum on Statutes: petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress.
2. Referendum on Local Laws: petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative.
 RA 6735, Section 10 | Prohibited Measures

 No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate and statutes involving
emergency measures, the enactment of which is specially vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
subject to Referendum until ninety (90) days after their effectivity.
 RA 6735, Section 13 | Local Initiative

 Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions.
 Not less than 1,000 registered voters in case of provinces and cities.
 Not less than 100 registered voters in case of municipalities.
 Not less than 50 registered voters in case of barangays.
 Limitations on Local Initiative

 The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
 Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies
to enact.
17
 If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled.
 However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative.
2. Congress | Bicameral
 Senate
 House of Representatives
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION RESTORED BICAMERALISM
 It allows for a body a body with a national perspective to check the parochial tendency of representatives elected by district.
 It allows for more careful study of legislation.
 It makes the legislature less susceptible to control by the Executive.
 It serves as training ground for national leaders.
 Unicameralism provides for simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency, facility in pinpointing responsibility for
legislation, and avoidance of complication.
KINDS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. Original Legislative Power is possessed by the sovereign people.

2. Derivative Legislative Power, which is the kind of power that is vested in Congress, is that which has been delegated by the
sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people.
Classification of Legislative Power

1. Constituent is the power to amend or revise the Constitution.
2. Ordinary is the power to pass ordinary laws. It is the power to make, alter and repeal laws.
 The people exercise both: constituent through amendatory process and ordinary through initiative and referendum.
Kinds of Limitations on Legislative Power

1. Substantive limits curtail the contents of a law and must not go against the Constitution (e.g. no law may be passed which impairs
freedom of speech or amending the Constitution from Republican).
2. Procedural limits curtail the manner of passing laws (e.g. a bill must generally be approved by the President before it becomes law).
The Congress must abide by the Constitutional Process on Internal Rules.
SCOPE | PLENARY
Congress may legislate on any subject matter. This is different from US Congress which consists only of the legislative powers enumerated in
the Federal Constitution.
ON IRREPEALABLE LAWS
The Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. It must remain plenary, which is limited only by the Constitution. When the Legislature attempts
to pass an irrepealable law, to that extent it attempts to limit the power of the future legislatures.
ON DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Theoretically by virtue of Separation of Powers, Congress cannot delegate legislative power. It must remain where the people have lodged it.
Delegated power should not be further delegated such that Congress cannot micromanage.
However, there are two (2) exceptions swallow the general rule.
1. Constitutional Delegation
 Constitution itself might in specific instances allow delegation of legislative power.
 Article VI, Section 23 (2) and 28 (2)
2. Local Government
 Immemorial practice legislative power may be delegated to local governments
 Article 10 | Local Government expressed this exception in plain language.
18
 RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD | 39 Phil 660 (1919)

Case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro on allegation that
the Petitioners are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province as they were alleged to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro and one Dabalos is said to be under the custody of the provincial sher iff
in the prison of Calapan for escaping.
In a resolution adopted by the Defendant, it was stated that there were failed attempts made for the advancement of non-
Christians in Mindoro such that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the province, no successful result will
be obtained for their education. Hence, it was deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place, designated in Tigbao, in
the interest of law and order. It also included imprisonment sanctions for violation thereof.
The resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior. The provincial governor subsequently approved the same in pursuant
of the Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by legislature, which orders the nn-Christians to take up their habitation on the
site provided and their inaction shall be ground for imprisonment.
Petitioner Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
under Section 2757 of Act 2711. The defendants compelled the Petitioners to take up their habitation in Tigbao. The former
challenged the validity of the said Administrative Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their freedom.
Whether or not Section 2145 of Administrative Order of 1917 is valid and constitutional.
HELD
The Supreme Court dismissed the Petition.
RATIO
Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty and freedom and that Section 2145 of Administrative
Order of 1917 is valid and constitutional.
Delegation of Legislative Power

Petitioners argued that the case at bar is an undue delegation of legislative power. The Court ruled that the Legislature mer ely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, and the department head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law and such discretion is indeed necessary. An exception to the general rule: sanctioned
by immemorial practice permits the central legislative to delegate powers to local authority because they are more familiar
with the context of selected sites that are favorable for improving the lives of “uncivilized” people or the non-Christians in their
community.
In Wayward v. Southard, it was established that “Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department
or official.”
The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. Judge Ranney
(Ohio case) stated that, “The true distinction therefore is between delegation of power to make the law which necessarily
involved discretion as to what is shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised un der
the pursuance of law. The first cannot be delegated: the latter no objection can be made.”
Police Power: Inherent power of the State

This is a power coextensive with self-preservation for the promotion of the general welfare and public interest. Section 2145 of
AO of 1917 is a pure exercise of police power and the Court cannot declare that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful
authority in enacting the said law.
3. Administrative Agencies
 Legislative power as a matter of practice is not delegated to administrative agencies.
 Not legislative or law-making power but rule-making or law execution.
 May be allowed to “fill up the details” of an already complete statute or to ascertain the facts necessary to bring
a “contingent” law into actual operation.
ON FORCE OF LAW
Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies have the force of law. They have the force of
penal law provided that the following conditions concur:
1. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the promulgation of penal regulations. – US v.
Grimmaud, 220 US 506 (1911)
2. The penalty must not be left to the administrative agency but must be provided by the statute itself. –
US v. Barrias, 11 Phil 327 (1908)
3. The regulation must be published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. –
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640 (1954)
19
PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION | Law-making v. Rule-making

Law execution to “fill up the details” and ascertain facts necessary to bring a contingent law into actual operation. The scope is only
as far as Congress allows it. Thus, delegated legislation may not violate a statute. (Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila
Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991)
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) – Section 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
 Assessment and collection of all internal revenue taxes, fees and charges.
 Enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of judgments in all cases
decided in its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts.
 It shall also give effect to and administer supervisory and police powers conferred to it by the National Internal Revenue
Code and special laws.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

 Commission organized by the Philippine government to resolve, investigate and settle disputes between employees and
employers.
 A subsequent part of the Department of Labor and Employment where its policies and programs are coordinated.
 The commission dates back to the commonwealth period, when the contract labor law act was passed in the United States
Congress on January 23, 1885, it was then implemented in the Philippines on June 6, 1899.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

 Judicial functions
 To exercise exclusive jurisdictions over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving all municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction.
 To decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
 To file petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters.
 To investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election fraud, offenses and malpractices.
 Ministerial functions
 To enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of and elections, plebiscites,
initiatives, referendum, and recalls.
 To deputize, with the concurrence of the President of the Philippines, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful credible elections.
 To register political parties, organizations or coalitions and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission.
 Reportorial function
 To submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, or recall.
 Recommendatory functions
 To recommend to Congress the enactment of effective measures to minimize election spending including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
 To recommend to the President the removal of any officer of employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
 Other functions
 To perform other functions as may be provided by law, including fiscal autonomy.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - Section 5 of the Securities Regulation Code
 Supervision over all registered business entities in the country, including suspensions and revocations of their
registrations.
 Policymaking with regard to the market in securities.
 Control over and approval of security registration statements.
 Power to investigate violations of securities laws and to impose sanctions for such violations.
 Power to issue subpoenas, punish for contempt, and issue cease and desist orders in furtherance of its law enforcement
mission.
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)

 Responsible for the supervision, adjudication and control over all telecommunications services throughout the Philippines.
20
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)

 To regulate, promote and develop the economic aspect of air transportation in the Philippines and to ensure that existing
CAB policies are adapted to the present and future air commerce of the Philippines.
 The Board has supervisory and jurisdictional control over air carriers, general sales agents, cargo sales agents, and
airfreight forwarders, as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises.
CHARACTERISTICS OF DELEGATING LAW
A. Complete in Itself
 It must set forth therein the policy to be carried out or implemented by the delegate.
 Expressed
 Implied
 Contained in another statute – “spring cannot be higher than the source”
B. Fix a Standard
 The limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
 Standard may not be formulated in precise declaratory language. It can be drawn from the declared policy of the law
and from the totality of the delegating statute.
 Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703, 711-713 (1993)
The authority of the of the Energy Regulatory Board to fix the domestic prices of petroleum products was found to be
sufficiently specified “by the general policy of the law to protect local consumers by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates,” by the authority given to impose additional amounts “to augment the resources of the *Oil
Price Stabilization] Fund.
 Chiongbian v. Orbos, G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995
The standard may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged law.
 Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)

The delegate could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make law, but also – and this is worse – to unmake it,
by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress.
 Contingent Legislation
The effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification by the executive of the existence of certain conditions. The
verification is delegated to the executive.
 ABAKADA GURU PARTY LIST OFFICERS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005
RA 9337: VAT Reform Act was enacted on May 24, 2005. Section 4 (Sales Of Goods And Properties), Section 5 (Importation of Goods) and
Section 6 (Services And Lease Of Property) of RA 9337, in collective, granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain:
a. Whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 2.8%.
b. Whether the national government deficit as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 1.5%
If either condition is met, the Secretary of Finance must inform the President who, in turn, must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%) effective
January 1, 2006. Petitioner maintained that Congress abandoned its exclusive authority to fix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniform
provision authorizing the President upon recommendation by the DOF Secretary to raise VAT to 12%. Senator Pimentel and Representative
Escudero maintained that RA 9337 constituted undue delegation of legislative powers and a violation of due process since the law was
ambiguous and arbitrary. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that the VAT reform was arbitrary, oppressive and confiscatory. Respondents countered
that the law was complete, that it left no discretion to the President, and that it merely charged the President with carrying out the rate
increase once any of the two conditions arise.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was undue delegation.
HELD
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
A. Constitution allows as under exempted delegation the delegation of tariffs, customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goods imported and
exported. VAT is tax levied on sales of goods and services which could not fall under this exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualified is
unconstitutional.
21
B. Legislative power is authority to make a complete law. Thus, to be valid, a law must be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
and it must fix a standard, limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable.
C. No undue delegation when congress describes what job must be done who must do it and the scope of the authority given. (Edu v. Ericta)
D. Secretary of Finance was merely tasked to ascertain the existence of facts. All else was laid out.
E. Mainly ministerial for the sec to ascertain the facts and for the President to carry out the implementation f or the VAT. They were agents
of the legislative department.
F. No delegation but mere implementation of the law.
 Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (L-49112, February 2, 1979)

A Letter of Instruction issued by the President requiring the use of “early warning devices” (EWD) and also the implementing
regulations are challenged as undue delegation of legislative power. However, it is enough to say that the standard of “safe
transit upon the roads” is sufficient. Moreover, the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which endorses the use of
EWD, is impressed with the character of a “generally accepted principle of international law” which our Constitution makes part
of the law of the land.
 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v. Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989
The collective bargaining agreement stipulates that in case of any wage adjustment decreed by law higher than the increase
given in the agreement, the company shall pay the difference. RA No. 6640 decreed a wage increase higher than the CBA
increase. DOLE, however, issued a regulation saying that salary increase granted pursuant to a CBA will not be considered in
determining compliance with the new law.
This regulation is not proper. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
 COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS V. BOARD, 34 Phil 136 (1916)

The delegation is invalid. The delegation is so general that it is no more precise than if it had just said the Board may require
every public utility to furnish annually a detailed report.”
The petitioner alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a
common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water; that on or about the 7th day of June, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
issued and caused to be served on petitioner an order to show cause why petitioner should not be required to present detailed annual reports
respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the
model attached to the petition.
On its return to the order to show cause before the Board of Public Utility Commissioners the petitioner denied the authority of the board to
require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if
construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to
the board.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Board’s issuance to the Petitioner of furnishing detailed annual report is a valid delegation of legislative power.
HELD
No. Delegation is invalid. As is apparent at a glance the provision conferring authority on the board is very general. It is also very
comprehensive. It calls for a detailed report of the finances and operations of the petitioning steamship company. That, it w ould seem, covers
substantially everything; for there is very little to a steamship company but its finances and operations. It would have been practically the same
if the statute had given the Board of Public Utility Commissioners power "to require every public utility to furnish annually a detailed report."
Such provision would have been but little broader and little less general than the present provision. It is clear that a statute which authorizes a
Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, th e contents thereof, the
general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of
the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to
impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such
public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question,
delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shal l proceed." nor
does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it
shall act upon.
22
 United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922)

The delegation is invalid because the law contains no standard that will guide the Governor General in determining whether
the rise is extraordinary and for determining what the price should be.
 TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

The law authorizing the Medical Board of Examinations to devise tests for entrance to medical schools is assailed as undue
delegation of legislative power because of lack of sufficient standards. However, the standard is sufficiently found in the law’s
desire for the “standardization and regulation of medical education” and in various other parts of the statute which make the
guidelines adequately clear.
 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA is challenged as unallowable delegation. POEA bases its authority to issue the regulation
on Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 97 which authorizes it to “promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.” It is alleged that there is no sufficient standard. However, the
standard is to be found in the Executive Order creating the Administration mandating it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to “fair and equitable employment practices.”
 Employers Confederation v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, G.R. No.9619, September 24, 1991
The power to fix wages may be delegated to an executive body provided that there are adequate standards.
 Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328 (1957)

A law authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to impose restrictions “on the use of any fishing net or
fishing devise for the protection of fish fry or fish eggs.” Pursuant to this a regulation is passed prohibiting the use of trawls. The
regulation is valid because it merely supplies the details for implementing the law which is already clear and complete in itself
and contains a standard to guide the administrative officer.
San Miguel Bay is located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon,
Navotas, and other places migrated to this region and settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur to fish by trawl nets. A general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay arose and prayed that the
President will regulate fishing in the said bay by declaring it close for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year.
The Municipal Mayor's League moved for such resolution and were likewise represented by social and civic organizations such as the NAMFREL
and the COMPADRE, further recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators. In response to such pleadings, the President
issued on April 5, 1954 Executive Order No. 22, which prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay. Such was later on amende d by Executive
Order No. 66, allowing the trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. And further amended by Executive Order No. 80, reviving Executive
Order No. 22 to take effect after December 31, 1954.
A group of Otter trawl operators therefore took this matter to the court and filed a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief. The
Secretary answered the complaint by alleging that of the 18 plaintiffs, only 11 were issued licenses to operate fishing boats for the year 1954
and that the EOs in question were issued in accordance with law. The Lower Court decided that EOs 22, 66 and 80 are invalid as they
constituted undue delegation of legislative power by the President. The Court said that the power to close any definite area of the Philippine
waters, falls primarily within the fields of legislation, not execution. It said that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot
be banned from SMB by executive proclamation.
Thus, this original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government
officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against them.
2. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay
OR Whether said EOs were issued in accordance with law.
3. Whether EOs 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
President.
HELD
1. Moot and academic.
2. YES.
3. YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI
 The action, being one against Secretary Araneta and other Government officials as such, is essentially one against the Govern ment,
and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or
damages that may be proved if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines. However, as the recor ds show
that the petitioners failed to put up the bond required by the lower court, allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor
General’s Office (giving the impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their
control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings were enforced, in accordance with section 4 of
1
Rule 39 , which is applicable to the case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a
23
bond, becomes moot and academic.

 Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution says that the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, shall exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code moreover says that administrative acts and commands of the
President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of
the districts, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of d uties by
public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders. For the foregoing reasons, the Court
decides that EOs 22, 66 and 80 are valid and issued by authority of law.
 With the promulgation of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Law), it is clear that Congress intended to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
device like trawl nets that could endanger the supply of sea food. In effect and to that end, it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities issued EO 80, he did nothing but show an
anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province. His actions were in consonance and strict conformity with
the law.
 Sec. 63 of the Revised Administrative Code states that “...all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by
public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders.”
 Sec. 74 of the Revised Administrative Code states that “...For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be
considered the Department Head of the Executive office.”
 One of the aforementioned executive departments is the Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed under the
direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of
the Philippines.
 The Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
 The President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued E.O. No. 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing to show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and str ict
conformity with the law.
 People v. Maceren, L-32166, 18 October 1977 (76 SCRA 450) – In contrast with Araneta Case
The Secretary of Agriculture passed a regulation penalizing electro fishing, which is not one of the forms of fishing punished in
the Fisheries Act. The regulation was beyond the scope of the Secretary’s authority.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner on Fisheries promulgated a regulation penalizing electro fishing
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. It was later on amended to cover only fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines. Private appellees (Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino, and Carlito del Rosario) were charged by
a Constabulary investigator for violating the law on electro fishing. The municipal court quashed the complaint upon motion of the accused.
On prosecution’s appeal, the Court of First Instance affirmed the order of dismissal, citing that electro fishing cannot be p enalized since it is not
covered by “obnoxious or poisonous substance” referred to in Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law. Prosecution contended that the prohibition of
electro fishing is in accordance with the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Law. It further averred
that it was the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations promulgated
hereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose of the development of the fisheries.
ISSUE
Whether the promulgation of the law against electro fishing constituted a violation of the non-delegability of legislative powers.
HELD
YES, it violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
 People v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 prescribes a penalty of “imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” No period is
specified. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service which must
be served within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such
exercise as undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion or assumption, of legislative power.
Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte filed a complaint against Celestino M. Zanoria et. al for violating RA 4670, also known as the “Magna Carta of
Public School Teachers”. The private respondents moved to quash the complaint due to lack of Jurisdiction over the correctional nature of the
penalty because Section 32 does not give a definite period for correctional penalty, it only states that “upon conviction… or by imprisonment as
determined by the courts.” The court denied the quash and respondents filed for a motion for reconsideration stating that section 32 of RA
4670 is unconstitutional, due to cruel and unusual punishment and undue delegation of legislative power. This again was denied by the court,
therefore respondents filed for a petition for certiorari against Judge Dacuycuy et. al.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 an undue delegation of legislative power, hence, unconstitutional.
HELD
No
24
RATIO DECIDENDI
 The prohibition of undue legislation is against the delegation of power to make laws, not to interpret it.
 RA 4670 vests in the courts the discretion to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed, not to fix the period of
imprisonment.
 An exercise of Judicial discretion is not an attempt to use legislative power, or to prescribe to create a law, but the administration of
justice.
 A general exception of forbidding discretion of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon.
 It was held in the SC of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting the courts discr etion as
to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. ( Ohio Ex Rel
Lloyd v. Dollison)
 Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,

G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 353-354
RA No. 8180 (Oil Deregulation Law) enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of
the President in effecting the full deregulation of oil industry, viz:
1. The time when the price of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining.
2. The time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Executive Order 392 considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in ordering the early implementation of full oil
deregulation. Petitioners contend that EO 392 misapplied RA 8180.
The Court held that the Executive Department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when t considered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. Such consideration amounts to a rewriting of the standards set forth in RA
8180. On the basis of the text of EO 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive Department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. In light of this uncertainty, the Court ruled that the early deregulation under EO 392 constitutes
misapplication of RA 8180.
 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 421, 444-445 (citing
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 [1989])
The rationale of the grant of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies is the result of the growing
complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.

The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
 Composed of 24 senators
 Elected at large
 Election mechanics as may be provided by law

No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
QUALIFICATIONS
 These may neither be added to nor subtracted from by Congress.
 “Day of the election” means on the day the votes are cast.
 Natural-born Citizen
Article IV, Section 1
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majori ty.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.

Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
25

Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
 35 on the day of elections

 Able to read and write
 Registered voter
 Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the election
 Gallego v. Verra | GR No. L-48641, November 24, 1941

Court of First Instance of Leyte declared illegal the Petitioner’s election to the office as Municipal Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the general elections of
December 1940 on the ground that he did not have the residence qualification. Respondent Vicente Verra was the unsuccessful opponent of the
Petitioner Pedro Gallego who is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. He ran for municipal mayor but lost, which made him go to Bukidnon, Mindanao to work
as nurseryman in the chichona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry. During his stay in Bukidnon from1938 to 1940, his wife an d children remained in
Abuyog where they own real property. In 1938, however, he registered himself as a voter in precinct 14 of Lanpantan, municipality of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon and voted there in the election for assemblymen held in December 1938. The trial Court of Appeals declared that the Gallego had acquired
residence or domicile of origin in the municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon and had lost his domicile of origin in the munici pality of Abuyog, Leyte at
the time he was elected mayor of the latter municipality.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner was a legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidnon and not Abuyog, Leyte at the time
of his election as municipal mayor of the latter municipality on December 10, 1940.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding the election of Petitioner to the office of the municipal
mayor of Abuyog, Leyte null and void ordering the exclusion of him from the office to which he was elected.
HELD
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs of this instance against the respondent.
RATIO
The term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with “domicile” which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil 645
In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi to wit:
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality. The fact of residence must be added the animus manendi.
2. An intention to remain there. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time.
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile. Acts of person must conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary, the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual.
Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil 36 | Mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality:
if, according to constant rulings the word “residence” is synonymous with “home” or “domicile” and denotes permanent dwelling place, to which an
absent person intends to return; if the right to vote in a municipality requires the concurrence of two things: 1) the act of residing coupled with the
intention to do so; and if herein respondent has always lived with his family in the municipality of Dumaguete and never in that of Bacong, he has
never lost his residence in the former. The fact that his registration as elector in the municipality of Bacong was cancelled only on April 5, 1934, upon
his petition, did not qualify him to be a candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality.
Yra v. Aba’o, 52 Phil 380 | Registration in the list of voters is not one of the conditions prescribed by Section 431 of the Election Law in order to be an
elector, neither does failure to register as such constitute one of the disqualifications prescribed in Section 432 of said law.

The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Term of Office
 Six years
th
 Starts June 30 unless otherwise provided by law – July 26, 4 Monday of July
Limitation
 Not serve more than two consecutive terms
 Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which elected (such was the case of Senator Teofisto Guingona when he assumed the position of Vice President.)
26

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of th eir respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives including those under the part y list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
 The total composition of the House of Representatives is not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.
 During the Martial Law, legislature was a parliament or the Batasang Pambansa (BP). Members thereof were called “assemblymen.”
 Classification of Members
1. District Representatives, each representing one congressional district – elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan area.
2. Party-list Representatives, elected through the “party-list system” of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations, shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives.
3. Sectoral Representatives – existed only until 1998. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
 Article XVIII, Section 7 | Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by
the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation.
 Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commission, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259 |
These appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS | Article VI, Section 5(3) and Section 5(4) Gerrymandering is a form of boundary delimitation
(redistricting) in which electoral district or
constituency boundaries are deliberately modified
1. Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 | The question of the validity of an for electoral purposes, thereby producing a
apportionment law is a justiciable question. contorted or unusual shape. The resulting district is
2. Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of known as a gerrymander; however, that word can
also refer to the process. It may be used to achieve
respective inhabitants (among provinces, cities and Metro Manila desired electoral results for a particular party, or may
area) on the basis of uniform and progressive ratio. be used to help or hinder a particular group of
 Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be constituents, such as a political, racial, linguistic,
religious or class group.
entitled to at least one representative.
 Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is When used to allege that a given party is gaining
entitled to at least one representative. disproportionate power, the term gerrymandering
 This entitles government to undergo census. has negative connotations. However, a gerrymander
may also be used for purposes that some perceive as
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, positive, notably in US federal voting district
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. This is to prevent boundaries which produce a proportion of
gerrymandering. constituencies with an African-American or other
minority in the majority (these are thus called
4. Congress to make reapportionment of legislative districts within "minority-majority districts").
three years following the return of every census.
The word gerrymander was coined by a newspaper
 MARIANO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 editor in reaction to a redrawing of Massachusetts
electoral boundaries under the then governor
The Court held that the Constitution does not preclude Elbridge Gerry, that included one sprawling
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law other supposedly salamander-shaped constituency. In
than a general apportionment law. 1812, Governor Gerry signed a bill into law that
redistricted his state to benefit his Democratic-
 Petitioners have not demonstrated that the Republican party. One of the resulting contorted
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of districts was said to resemble a salamander. The term
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The first appeared in the Boston Centinel on March 26,
importance of drawing with precise strokes the 1812.
territorial boundaries of a local government unit

cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
27
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
 Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. The existence of a boundary
dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining
with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
 The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, which are hypothetical issues such
as Mayor Binay will run again. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
 Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.
 The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the “one title one subject” rule so as not to impede
legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
 Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of 250,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbaniz ed
City) as unconstitutional.
GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code.
2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the ‘three-consecutive term’ limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52:
a. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) – violates the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following
the return of every census
b. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title
c. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution – the population of Makati is 450,000
GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforementioned.
ISSUE
Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.
HELD
Yes. Petitions dismissed.
 TOBIAS V. ABALOS, 239 SCRA 106

The Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law. To hold that
reapportionment can be made only through a general law would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That
intolerable situation would deprive the people in the new city of province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty
cannot admit of subtraction; it is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
 MONTEJO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

The Court held that while concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province brought about an imbalance in
the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) districts of Leyte, the issue involves reapportionment of
28
legislative districts, and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. The Court cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want.
 SEMA V. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008

The Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts, nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House
of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress. Accordingly, Section 19 of
Article VI of RA 9054 granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM | Republic Act 7941 (The Party List System Act)
Party-list System is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
 PARTY: either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

 POLITICAL PARTY: refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
 NATIONAL: constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
 REGIONAL: constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
 SECTORAL PARTY: refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor, peasant, fisher folk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals,
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
 SECTORAL ORGANIZATION: refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
 COALITION: refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
REGISTRATION: Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System
Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations. Those that have already
registered with the COMELEC need not to register anew, but shall file at the same period a manifestation of its desire to participate once
again.
REFUSAL | CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
 It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes.

 It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal.
 It is a foreign party or organization.
 It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes.
 It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
 It declares untruthful statements in its petition.
 It has ceased to exist for at least one year.
 It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
NOMINATION OF PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
 A list of not less than five names shall be filed not later than 45 days before the elections.
 A person may be nominated in one list only.
29
 No change shall be allowed after the list have been submitted except in cases where the nominee dies or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
 Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party list system shall not be
considered resigned.
QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY LIST NOMINEES
 Natural born citizen of the Philippines.

 Registered voter.
 Resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
 Able to read and write.
 Bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election.
 At least 25 years of age on the day of the election.
 For the youth sector, he must be at least 25 years of age but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. If he is 30
years old during his term, he shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
MANNER OF VOTING
 Every voter shall be entitled to two votes:

1. Vote for the candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district.
2. Vote for the party, organization or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives; provided that a vote
cast for a part, sectoral organization or coalition not entitled to be voted shall not be counted.
 Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party
list groups, citing Section 7, Article III of the Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern as
complemented by the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government.
NUMBER
 20% of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives, including those under the party list.
 For purposes of the may 1998 elections, the first five major political parties on the basis of the party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to representation in the
party list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The participants shall be rank from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The participants receiving at least 2% of the total number of votes cast shall be entitled to one seat each; provided that
those garnering more than 2% shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; provided
finally that each shall be entitled to not more than three seats.
 VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000

The Supreme Court reversed the COMELEC ruling that the 38 respondent participants were each entitled to a party list seat despite
their failure to obtain at least 2% each of the national vote in the 1998 elections.
The Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters:
1. 20% ALLOCATION: the combined number of all party list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under party list.
2. 2% THRESHOLD: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. THREE-SEAT LIMIT: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
 PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) AND BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, GR No. 164702, March
15, 2006
30
Petitioners party list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the COMELEC of their respective second nominee, claiming that
they were entitled to one (1) additional seat in the House of Representatives based on the number of votes they obtained and on
the formula used by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani case. The Court held that the formula used in the landmark case of
Veterans Federation Party, which is:
Votes cast for Qualified Party

Additional Seats = ------------------------------------x Alloted Seats for First Party
Votes cast for First Party
shall be followed. Ang Bagong Bayani, merely reiterated this formula for computing the additional seats which a party list group
shall be entitled to.
 ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 404 SCRA 719
The Supreme Court held that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate in the party list system.
They must show, however, that they represent the interests if the marginalized and underrepresented.
The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party registered under the party list system may be entitled to a
seat in the House of Representatives:
1. Must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
2. Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy.
3. Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the express constitutional prohibition against
religious sects.
4. The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941.
5. The party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the government.
6. The party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law.
7. The nominee must also represent a marginalized or underrepresented sector.
8. The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation.
On March 26, 2001, COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 approving the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party
list elections. On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from
the Certified List of Political Parties, Sectoral Parties, Organizations, Coalitions participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections.
They also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter’s nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, Bayan Muna also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of respondent. Six days later,
they also filed Petition challenging the COMELEC Resolution No. 3785.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No 3785.
HELD
The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby directed to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party list participants.
1. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party list elections, merely on the g round that they
are political parties. Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the House of Representatives may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Political parties may be registered under the
party list system under Sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C).
 RA 7941 provides for the definitions of the following:

 POLITICAL PARTY: an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
 SECTORAL PARTY: an organized group of citizens who belong to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article
VI Section 5(2).
 SECTORAL ORGANIZATION: a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
 COALITION: a group of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purpose.
2. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941.
 The marginalized and Underrepresented to become lawmakers themselves for proportional representations and lack of well-
defined constituencies, which refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district
or territorial unit of government.
31
 RA 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It
contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of the said RA may participate in the elections
 OSG asserts that party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented. This claim defies statutory principle
because the system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged ones.
3. What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents therein and all the 154 previously
approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
This is a motion for proclamation filed by various party list participants. On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated a decision requiring COMELEC to
commence hearings following the guidelines stated in the said decision. They are also directed by the Court to start the hear ing of those who look
like they have garnered a certain number of votes to qualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report
within 30 days from notice. Finally the May 9 Resolution refraining COMELEC from declaring any winner shall remain in force until after the COMELEC
itself will have complied and reported its compliance.
There are four unique parameters of the Philippine Party List System:
1. 20% ALLOCATION: the combined number of all party list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under party list.
2. 2% THRESHOLD: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. THREE-SEAT LIMIT: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.
On July 27, 2001, COMELEC recommended certain parties have passed the 8-point guideline and certain parties were disqualified. On August 14, the
Court issued a resolution partially lifting the May 9 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party list election. On August 24, the
Court again issued a resolution partially lifting the May 9 TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as winning party list groups. On January 29, 2002, the
Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by the COMELEC in its First Compliance Report. Thus, the Court lifted
the May 9 TRO to proclaim the two as winners. The COMELEC amended its Compliance Reports by adding four more party list parti cipants, namely,
BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA, and BAGONG BAYANI. To the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections. On November 25, OSG contended
that NCIA is not a qualified party under the July 27, 2001 report.
ISSUE
Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party list candidates that should be
proclaimed as winners?
Does the clause “total votes cast for the party list system” include only those ballots cast for qualified party list candidates?
HELD
Having obtained at least 2% of the total valid votes cast in the last party list elections, the following qualified participants are declared elected with
one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSEI PINAY.
RATIO
COMELEC made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. The report on the latter was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations; while
that of the former, the bylaws making the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has
already been deleted as early as May 1998. The primary purposes of COCOFED’s Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore
and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources. This statement does not by
itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government.
The votes obtained by disqualified candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party list system. In the present cases,
the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the 2001 elections.
Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes
they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The new figures representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party list
participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
There are only 46 qualified participants. The Commission recommended for qualification only 42 in its three Compliance Reports. The Court found
that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least 2% of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast.
CURRENT PARTY-LIST ALLOCATION

After the controversial application of the Panganiban formula (from VFP v. COMELEC) by the Abalos Commission (COMELEC), Party-list
candidates BANAT and Bayan Muna filed separate complaints on the proper allocation of seats in the party-list system. On April 23, 2009,
the Supreme Court declared the two percent threshold clause in relation to the distribution of the additional seats of Republic Act No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act unconstitutional.
Following Article VI, Section 5, Paragraph 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, 20% of all seats in the House of Representatives is reserved for
sectoral representatives elected in the party list system. This formula is called the Carpio formula.
32
To determine the number of seats for sectoral representatives, the formula for the quotient is:
where:
 S is the number of seats allocated for sectoral representation,
 D is the total number of district representatives, and
 D / 0.8 is the total number of members of the House.
First Round
To get the first guaranteed seat, a sectoral party or organization should at least get 2% of the total votes cast for partly list elections.
The formula for the quotient is:
where:
 g is the percentage of votes garnered by the sectoral organization,
 V is the total number of votes cast in the party list representation, and
 P is the total number votes of the sectoral organization.
Therefore:
Second Round
If the total number of guaranteed seats awarded is less than the total number of seats reserved for sectoral representatives (S), the
unassigned seats will awarded in the second round of seat allocation. To get the number of additional seats, this formula will be
followed.
where:
 R2 is the total number of additional seats awarded to the sectoral organization,
 S is the number of seats allocated for party-list representatives,
 T1 is the total number awarded seats (R1) in the first round of seat allocation, and
 g is the percentage of votes garnered by the sectoral organization.
Note: R2 should appear as whole integer.
Therefore, the seats awarded on the first round will be added on the seats awarded on the second round to get the final allocation
of seats for a sectoral organization.
</
Final/ Wild card Allocation
If the total number of seats awarded after two rounds is still less than the total number of seats reserved for sectoral
representatives (S), the remaining seats will be assigned to sectoral organizations next in rank (one seat each organization)
whose R2 result is 0 until all available seats are completely distributed.
where:
 T3 is the total number of sectoral organizations next in rank (in Round 2) to be given with one seat,
 S is the number of seats allocated for party-list representatives,
 T1 is the total number awarded seats in the first round of seat allocation, and
 T2 is the total number awarded seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Note:
 Each sectoral organization shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
 The succeeding party-list nominee(s) shall be given a seat if any of the initial party-list nominee(s) resign
or was given an expulsion by the general membership of the House through a majority vote.
 Applying the 2007 general election, there are 220 district representatives, and 15,950,900 votes cast for party list. That makes 55
seats reserved for sectoral representatives. After the Supreme Court ruling was released, the COMELEC proclaimed 28 additional
members. COMELEC however declared that there are only 219 district representatives (with the Supreme Court decision of the
33
election of the congressional seat of Shariff Kabunsuan void and the restoration of the first district of Maguindanao), reducing seats
to 54.
 It is however, a point of question on the constitutionality of the new congressional districts 201 to 220 (2nd district of Cagayan de
Oro City as the newest district as of 2007 elections to elect a representative) as the constitution only mandates a maximum of 250
seats (Article VI, Section 5 Paragraph 1) with 50 seats supposed to be reserved for sectoral representatives. As of May 1, 2009, the
House membership increased from 242 to 273. There are also proposals to create more congressional districts. Since the
constitution allows increasing membership through legislation, Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile filed Senate Bill No. 3123
increasing maximum membership from 250 to 350 members.
 BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 179271
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No.
07-041 (PL) before the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC). BANAT filed its petition because “the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.”
There were no interveners in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. On 9 July 2007, the C OMELEC, sitting as
the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed 13 parties as winners in the party-list elections. Pursuant to
NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07- 72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties.
Thereafter, acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 declaring BANAT’s petition as moot and academic. Hence,
this petition by BANAT. Meanwhile, on 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUES
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
HELD
1. No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the “House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-
list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans.
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-
list representatives. After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
2. Yes, but only insofar as allocation of additional seats is concerned. The two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first
50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the
votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
3. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections;
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each;
34
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated;
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
4. No. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as
either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will partici pate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize,
or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisher folk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisher folk wing can field its fisher folk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same
for the urban poor
CHOOSING PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVE
These are proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective participants to the COMELEC, according to their
ranking in the list.
EFFECT OF CHANGE OF AFFILIATION
Any elected party list representative who changes his political party during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes
his political party within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party list representative under his new
party or organization.
VACANCY
Vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same
party, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party concerned shall submit additional nominees.
TERM OF OFFICE
Party list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years and shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular
members of the House of Representatives.
 VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Our 1987 constitution introduced a novelty feature into our presidential system of government. Under the Party list system any national,
regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the COMELEC may participate in the election of party list representatives who upon
their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given 2 votes for the House -
1 for District Rep. and another for party list Rep. RA No. 7941 provides for how party list representatives are elected and the determination of
the number of seats in the House. On the May 11, 1998, election for party list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. COMELEC En banc proclaimed 13 party list reps from twelve parties and organizations.
On July 1998, PAGASA filed a petition to the COMELEC alleging that filling up of the 20% membership of party list representatives in the House
is mandatory. Such that instead of 25 declared party list reps declared winners, there should be a total of 52 party list reps that would actually
nd
sit in the house. COMELEC 2 division granted the said appeal thus declaring the 38 respondents as party list reps. The 12 parties earlier
proclaimed filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the proclamation of the respondents.
COMELEC En banc only resolved the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats, hence this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the 20% allocation for party list representatives mentioned in section 5(2), Art 6 of the constitution mandatory or is it ceiling?
Whether or not the 2% threshold requirement and the 3 seat limit provided in Sec 11 B of RA 7941 Constitutional? If the answer to issue 2 is in
35
the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD
(1) It is a ceiling
(2) Yes
(3) Determine additional seats for first party and apply proportionally to the rest.
RATIO
(1) The constitution states that the party list reps shall constitute 20 per centum of the total number of reps including those under the party list.
Sec 5 Art 6 of the constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party list system of representation. It explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
house of reps reserved for party list reps.
(2) The 2 percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the constitution and the law but with th e very essence of
representation under a republican or representative state all government authority emanates from the people but is exercised by reps chosen
by them. Party list system might result to the formation of groups that cant contribute much to legislation. And may pose as a detriment to the
stability of congress. The provision for the 2 percent requirement is therefore precise and conforms to proportional representation.
(3) Initial step is to rank all participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Next step, determine the no. of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Formula for determining Additional seats for the First Party:

Number of votes of first party divided by total number votes for the party list system equals the proportion of votes of first party relative to
total votes for party list system.
Formula for additional seats of other Qualified parties:

Number of votes of concerned party divided by No. of votes of first party multiplied by the no. additional seats allocated to the first party. No
rounding-off of decimals (Guingona v. Gonzales).

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
 Qualifications for District Representatives | Article VI, Section 6

 Natural-born Filipino citizen
 Twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election
 A registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
 A resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election
 Residence – the term is different and distinguishable from constitutional law and civil law such that residence with regards to
suffrage is different from running for office.
 COQUILLA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, GR No. 151914, July 31, 2002

The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior to the May
14, 2001 elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the same when he became a US citizen after enlisting in
the US Navy. From then on, until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation, Petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines.
In Caasi v. COMELEC, it was held that immigration to the US by virtue of the acquisition of a “green card” constitutes abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines.
AQUINO V. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

Petitioner Agapito Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati where he stated that his residency period as 0 years and 10 months. Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files a
petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification. COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify and the latter fi led a motion for
reconsideration.
Upon election, Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes. COMELEC grants the motion for
reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaini ng legible
candidates.
36
ISSUE
Whether or not Petitioner is legible to run for the said position.
Whether or not declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional.
HELD
No for both issues. The Court held that Petitioner failed to prove that he had established not just a residence but domicile of choice in
Makati. In his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, he indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52
years, a registered voter of same district and his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as birthplace. Thus, his domicile of origin was
Concepcion, Tarlac and his bare assertion of transfer of domicile from Tarlac to Makati is hardly supported by the facts of the case.
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year
before the elections. The Petitioner has always been a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a
condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of purchasing the unit is not evident of a strong
intention to establish a domicile.
Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner is unconstitutional because the choice of the
majority is disqualified and it is against the sovereign will of the people.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the first district of Leyte. Private Respondent Roy Montejo, incumbent
Representative of the first district of Leyte filed a petition for the disqualification of the Petitioner because she allegedly failed to meet the
Constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood,” which was not accepted for it was filed out of time.
nd
It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2 division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution:
1. Finding the private respondent’s Petition for Disqualification meritorious.
2. Striking off Petitioner’s Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995.
3. Canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.
Motion for Reconsideration to COMELEC was denied. Petitioner’s reasons for the change are the following:
1. It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
2. She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. This was also the time she met Ferdinand Marcos who was then
the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career.
3. Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace.
4. After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the
PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Petitioner met the one year residency qualification for election purposes.
2. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.
HELD
The Court upheld the qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IRM), despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy
that she had resided n the district for only seven months.
1. The following are the justification thereof:

2. A minor follows the domicile of her parents. Tacloban became IRM’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought the family to Leyte.
3. Domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive
proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
4. The does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When IRM married Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium.
5. Even when assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right t choose a new one only after
her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin,
as her domicile of choice.
Qualification on One-Year Residency

No. There are multiple reasons or opinions by virtue of jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of election law, the
residence is synonymous to domicile. IMR has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. Wh en she
got married, her husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when
her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no
interruption apart from she has every liberty to choose her new domicile upon her spouse’s death.
In Ong v. Republic, the Court’s definition of domicile is one’s “permanent home.” An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
37
To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate the following such that absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. Bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one.
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
The Petitioner argued that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC that has the jurisdictio n over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution.
Mandatory v. Directory Provision

The difference lies on grounds of expediency and less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law. Statute is construed to be merely directory when “the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect
the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.”
DOCTRINE
A statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute has intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.”

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of t hree years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than thre e consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
 Term of Office | Article VI, Section 7

 Three years: commencing at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.
 Limitation: Shall not serve for more than three consecutive terms.
 Voluntary Renunciation
 Dimaporo vs. Mitra
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed of this development by the C ommission on
Elections, respondents Speaker (Mitra) and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress”. Petitioner failed to regain his
seat, hence, this petition.
 Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected
ISSUE
Whether Section 67, Article IX, of B.P. Blg. 881 operative under the present Constitution; thus, shortening the term of those who exercises
“voluntary renunciation” of their office.
HELD
Dismissed for lack of merit. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change
the duration of the term of office.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed
to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
Rodriguez, Dissent
Filing a certificate of candidacy does not constitute voluntary renunciation. The Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the na me of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress. In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation,
the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.
38

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May.

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
 REGULAR: Unless otherwise provided by law, on the second Monday of May.

 SPECIAL: To fill a vacancy, but elected member shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.
 Lozada v. Commission on Elections, 120 SCRA 337

The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
 Determined by law
 No increase until expiration of full term
 Emoluments and allowances
 P 201,400.00 | Article XVIII, Section 17
Philconsa v. Mathay
Philconsa (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.) a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized under Philippine law, whose
members are taxpayers filed a suit against the Auditor General (Mathay) and Auditor of the Congress (Velasco) for authorizing or passing audit the
payment of increased salaries authorized in RA 4134 (Senate President and House Speaker, from 16,000 to 40,000 and the member of both houses
from 7,200 to 32,000.) Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution): “No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving the
increase.” Case at bar, RA 4134 approved in 1964, Senator’s term ends December 30, 1969 while Congressmen’s term expires December 30, 1 965.
Appropriation allowed by the respondents, granted salary increases to congressmen by December 30, 1965 without due consideration that senate’s
term has yet expire December 30, 1969.
ISSUE
Does Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution) require that not only the term if all the members of
the House but also that if of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
HELD
Writ of prohibition prayed was granted. Effectivity of increase shall be after December 30, 1969. The purpose of the provision is to place a legal bar
to the legislator yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher com pensation is lacking, but
with the length of time that the has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need
for it is clearly felt.
“All the member of the Senate and of the house of representative” particular or collective?
COLLECTIVE. The reason for specifying the component chambers was an emphasis of the transition of a unicameral to a bicameral legislature.
Bengzon concurs: the word term was used in the general sense, to cover for all these different terms.
Zaldivar concurs: Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution) provides for equal compensation of
Senate and Congress at all time, not only in amount, but also at the same time within their respective term of office.
Castro concurs: Section refers to full term of both and not either; conjunction “and”: means expiration of the full term of Senate inseparable from
the expiration of the full term of Congress; a specific rule of interpretation would allow “or” to be interchanged with “and but only if it doesn’t
pervert the plain intention of the writer of the context; section provides for parity of compensation to Senate and Congress.
39

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
FREEDOM FROM ARREST
 Punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment.

 While Congress is in session.
 Reinforced by Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.
REVISED PENAL CODE

Section Two. — Violation of parliamentary immunity
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
 PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, GR No. 132875, February 3, 2000

The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was
pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement
was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?
HELD
Instant motion is denied. No. Election to high government offices doesn’t free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The
constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6
years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6
of the Constitution states that the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate
one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations.
Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district
reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of
Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the
question of equal protection. Election to the position isn’t reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The Supreme Court denied the Motion of Representative Jalosjos that he be allowed to fully discharged the duties of a member of
the Congress, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite his having been convicted by the trial
court of a non-bailable offense.
The reasons are:

1. Membership in the Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons.
2. One rationale behind the confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is the
injury to the public, not the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal law seeks to redress.
3. It would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune from arrest during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same.
4. The accused-appellant is provided with an office at the House of Representative with a full complement of staff, as well as
an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore, been
discharging his mandate as member of the House of Representatives, and being a detainee, he should not even be allowed
by the prison authorities to perform these acts.
 TRILLANES IV V. JUDGE PIMENTEL, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

40
Petitioner Antonio Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC leave to attend Senate sessions and to convene his staff resource persons
and guests and to attend to his official functions as Senator. He anchored his motion on his right to be presumed innocent, and
claims that Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere detention prisoner and is not charged with a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Makati RTC denied the motion. Elevating the matter, the Supreme Court denied Trillanes’ petition on
the ground that Section 13 of Article III of the Constitution, explicitly provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua are non-
bailable. The Court further said that the presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND OF DEBATE
Member of Congress may be held to account for such speech or debate by the House to which he belongs.
 In Congress or in any committee.

 In any other place.
Osmena v. Pendatun | 109 Phil. 863

In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. Ho use Resolution no. 59
followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration.
House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s suspension was constitutional.
HELD
Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed
RATIO
Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary
immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.
The question of whether Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no
preliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang | 17 SCRA 876

The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress.
Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be publ ished in several
newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under
serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-up
of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational
plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, included are t he petitioners. It was
mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which
they may have absolutely no knowledge.
An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court
dismissed this complaint.
ISSUES
Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?
Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?
HELD
No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or
debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesn’t fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made
by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made w hile Congress was
presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasn’t
performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee.
No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way
exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogat ory to the petitioners to
entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested.
41

All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They
shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
DUTIES
 Full disclosure of financial and business interests.

 Notify of potential conflict of interest.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdiv ision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
PROHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
 Incompatible Office | Hold any other office in government during his term without forfeiting seat.
 Appointment to any office created or emoluments increased during the term elected.
 Personally appear as counsel in any government office.
 Direct of indirect interest in any government contract or franchise during term of office.
 Intervene before government office for his pecuniary benefit or called upon to act on account of his office.
 Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431
Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the member’s assumption of such other office deemed incompatible with
his seat in Congress. However, no forfeiture shall take place if the member of Congress holds the other government office in an ex
officio capacity, e.g., membership in the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines of the Chairman, Committee on
Education, in the Senate.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
The ban against appointment to the office created or the emoluments thereof increased shall, however, last only for the duration of the term
for which the member of Congress was elected.
OTHER INHIBITIONS
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
SESSION
 Regular Session begins on the 4th Monday of July, which is also the State of the Nation Address of the President.
 Special Session called forth by the President.
JOINT SESSIONS
42
 Voting separately on:

1. Choosing the President under Section 4, Article VII
2. Determine President’s disability under Section 11, Article VII
3. Confirming nomination of the Vice President under Section 9, Article VII
4. Declaring the existence of a state of war under Section 23, Article VII
5. Proposing constitutional amendments under Section 1, Article XVII
 Voting jointly to revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the Philippines
under martial law under Section 18, Article VII.
1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
2. A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may c ompel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
3. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
4. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall
also keep a Record of its proceedings.
5. Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
OFFICERS
Senate to elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary:
 Pro tempore
 Majority floor leader as the Chairman of Committee on Rules, who controls the agenda.
 Under the US Constitution, the Vice President is the Senate President

 There may be a contradiction on the separation of powers, however, it may be argued that this arrangement may illustrate
a government branches that are independence and interdependent on one another.
STANDING COMMITTEES
1. Accounts 19. Government Enterprises And 38. People Participation

2. Agrarian Reform Privatization 39. Population And Family Relations
3. Agriculture & Food 20. Government Reorganization 40. Poverty Alleviation
4. Appropriations 21. Health 41. Public Information
5. Aquaculture And Fisheries 22. Higher And Technical Education 42. Public Order And Safety
Resources 23. Housing And Urban Development 43. Public Works And Highways
6. Banks And Financial Intermediaries 24. Human Rights 44. Revision Of Laws
7. Basic Education And Culture 25. Information And Communications 45. Rules (Majority Floor Leader)
8. Civil Service And Professional Technology 46. Rural Development
Regulation 26. Interparliamentary Relations And 47. Science And Technology
9. Constitutional Amendments Diplomacy 48. Small Business & Entrepreneurship
10. Cooperatives Development 27. Justice (Ex Officio To The JBC) Development
11. Dangerous Drugs 28. Labor And Employment 49. Social Services
12. Ecology 29. Legislative Franchises 50. Suffrage And Electoral Reforms
13. Economic Affairs 30. Local Government 51. The Welfare Of Children
14. Energy 31. Mindanao Affairs 52. Tourism
15. Ethics And Privileges 32. Muslim Affairs 53. Trade And Industry
16. Foreign Affairs 33. National Cultural Communities 54. Transportation
17. Games And Amusements 34. National Defense And Security 55. Veterans Affairs And Welfare
18. Good Government And Public 35. Natural Resources 56. Ways And Means
Accountability 36. Overseas Workers Affairs 57. Women And Gender Equality
37. Oversight 58. Youth And Sports Development
43
SPECIAL HOUSE COMMITTEES
1. Bases Conversion 5. Globalization And WTO 10. Peace, Reconciliation And Unity
2. Bicol Recovery And Economic 6. Land Use 11. Reforestation
Development 7. Metro Manila Development 12. Southern Tagalog Development
3. East Asian Growth Area 8. Millennium Development Goals
4. Food Security 9. North Luzon Growth Quadrangle
QUORUM | Article VI, Section 16(2)
A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may determine.
 It is the basis for determining the Majority Floor Leader.

 It may vary depending on the number of warm bodies, which is usually 50% +1.
 Small number may compel attendance to rules.
 The Minority Floor Leader is a member of all Committees, who serves as the “dissenting opinion” of the House.
 AVELINO V. CUENCO, 83 Phil 17

Authority for the principle that the basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of
Senators who are in the country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.
Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus
Cuenco. On February 18, 1949, the request of Senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on February 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not
immediately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of Senator Sanidad and Tanada.
When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but Senator Tirona, Avelino’s follower, opposed the motion
because of the plan of Avelino’s group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct
broke out in the Senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino’s follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to
prevent Tanada’s privilege speech.
Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of
the session hall followed by Senators Francisco, Torres, Magalona, Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was
finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidad’s Resolution No. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to Senate President pro-
tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67 entitled “Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and
designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate.” Resolution No. 67 was approved.
ISSUE
Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were Resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
HELD
Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and
the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only
acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the Senate session hall and not in the Supreme Court.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of
the minority Senators does not prevent the remaining majority Senators from passing a Resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
 ARROYO V. DE VENECIA, GR No. 127255, June 26, 1998

The Supreme Court declared that the question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum is obviously
present, for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bi ll was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading
on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996.
At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proc eeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
44
of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared
the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the new spaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the
motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiora ri and/or challenging the
validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES
Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House.
HELD
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to
a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than m embers of that
House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS | Article VI, Section 16(3)
 Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
House may punish its members for disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend (for not more than sixty
days) or expel a member.
 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 118364, August 10, 1995

The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is different from the suspension prescribed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019). This is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for misbehavior as
a member of Congress.
 Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055, April 18, 2001

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 13 of RA 3019, where it appears to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue the order of
suspension upon a determination of the validity of the criminal information filed before it, does not state that the public officer
45
should be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts charged. The order of suspension provided in
RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of suspension encroach upon the
power of Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded the members of
Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions.
 OSMENA V. PENDATUN, 109 Phil 863

The Supreme Court said that the determination of the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary
authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not review such determination, the same being a political question.
ADJOURNMENT
Neither house during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. | Jimenez v. Castro
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
 MATTERS, which under the Constitution, are to be entered in the Journal:

1. Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill.
2. Veto message of the President.
3. Yeas and nays on the re-passing of a bill vetoed by the President.
4. Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.
 ENROLLED BILL THEORY

 Mababang v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 | ARROYO V. DE VENECIA, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1997
An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper officers of each, and
approved by the President. It is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. Court is bound under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly
authenticated measure of the legislature.
 CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO. V. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the President, the
remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not a judicial decree.
There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued
Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemica l Co., Inc,
engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the
production of its products and has paid the margin fee.
Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that
urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the
money on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA.
The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon
the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.
Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National
Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and
different from urea and formaldehyde
ISSUE
Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
HELD
Denied the petition. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and
approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and
formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.
 JOURNAL ENTRY v. ENROLLED BILL
46
Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the Journal. | Morales v. Subido, 26
SCRA 150
ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS, 55 SCRA 714

On March 30, 1964, House Bill No. 9266, which became RA 4065, “An act defining the powers, rights and duties of the vice-mayor of the city of
Manila, further amending for the purpose sections 10 and 11 of RA 409, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila”,
was filed in the House of Representatives.
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas suggested an amendment that instead of City Engineer, it be the President Pro-tempore of the Municipal Board who
should succeed the vice-mayor, in case if incapacity. Senator Arturo Tolentino also later made his own suggested amendments, which the Senate
recognized.
On May 20, 1964, same date of Sen. Tolentino's suggestion, the Secretary of Senate sent a letter to the Hous e of Representatives that House Bill No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate “with amendments” (the one recommended by Sen. Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments, were
approved) The bill was then attested by the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the two Secretaries of the House.
On June 16, 1964, the Secretary of the House gave 4 printed copies of the bill the President and the latter signed said bill, thereupon became RA No.
4065. However, Senator Tolentino later on released a press statement saying that the bill passed was the wrong version and didn't contain the
amendments approved by the Senate. The Senate President and the Secretary of the Senate then addressed a letter to the President explaining the
error committed as to the attested copy of the bill and their intent to withdraw their signatures affixed in the said bill, making the bill invalid and w/o
effect.
On July 31, 1964, the President sent a message to the House of Congress informing his withdrawal of his signature on the bill. As a consequence,
Mayor Antonio Villegas of Manila issued a circular within his municipality retracting the said bill's effectivity and a notic e to disregard the provisions
of RA 4065, and recalling the five city police force assigned to the vice-mayor in pursuance of said law. Vice-mayor Herminio A. Astorga then filed this
petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel the respondent mayor to
comply with RA 4065.
ISSUE
Whether the “enrolled bill doctrine” or the “journal entry rule” should be adhered to in this jurisdiction?
HELD
Petition is dismissed. In the absence or ineptness of the enrolled bill, the journals may be looked upon to verify the enact ment of a bill or law. Justice
Cesar Bengzon and Justice Sabino Padilla concurred in the opinion that, “enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
upon us.” The Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears as the only statutory bases of the enrolled bill, which reads:
“The proceedings of the Philippine Commissions....when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive-proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
The function of the attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses.
The law making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill of
cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of th e presiding officers that is
essential. The indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officers, other proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The withdrawal of signatures by the President of the Senate, Secretary of the Senate, and the
President, himself, shows the lack of intent to pass such erroneous bill and implies the absence of an enrolled bill.
 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD | Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings | Article VI, Section 16(4)
Matters which, under the Constitution, are to be entered in the Journal:
 Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill
 Veto message of the President
 Yeas and nays on the re-passing of a bill vetoed by the President
 Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.

The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of
its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
47
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS | Article VI, Section 17
 Composition
 Three (3) Supreme Court justices designated by the Chief Justice
 Six (6) members of the House concerned chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
 The Senior Justice shall be its Chairman.
Bondoc v. Pineda | 201 SCRA 792

The HRET was created as a non-partisan court. It must be independent of Congress and devoid of partisan influence and
consideration. “Disloyalty to the party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member. HRET members enjoy security of tenure. Their membership may not be terminated except for a just cause such
as the expiration of congressional term, death, resignation from the political party, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid causes.
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal | 166 SCRA 651

On the disqualification of the senator-members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, where the Supreme Court held that it
cannot order the disqualification of the Senator-members of the Electoral Tribunal simply because they were themselves
respondents in the electoral protest, considering the specific mandate of the Constitution and inasmuch as all the elected
Senators were actually named as respondents.
Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal | GR No. 141489, November 29, 2002
The Supreme Court said that even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed
to designated common nominees to the HRET and Commission on Appointments, their primary recourse clearly rests with
the House of Representatives and not with the Court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and Commission on Appointments can the
party-list representatives seek recourse from this Court through judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before the petitioners may bring the case to Court.
 Power | Electoral Tribunals of the Houses of Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
Sampayan v. Daza | 213 SCRA 807

Involving a petition filed directly with the Supreme Court to disqualify Congressman Raul Daza for being allegedly a green
card holder and a permanent resident of the United States, the Court held that is it without jurisdiction, as it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of its members. Furthermore, the case
is moot and academic, because Daza’s term of office as member of Congress expired on June 30, 1992. The proper remedy
should have been a petition filed with the Commission on Elections to cancel Daza’s certificate of candidacy, or a quo
warranto case filed with the HRET within ten (10) days from Daza’s proclamation.
Aquino v. Commission on Elections | 248 SCRA 400

The HRET may assume jurisdiction only after the winning candidate who is a party to the election controversy shall gave
been duly proclaimed, has taken his oath of office and has assumed the functions of the office, because it is only then that
he is said to be a member of the House.
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 172131, April 2, 2007

The Court said that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election protest relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal | GR No. 123037, March 21, 1997
Angara v. Electoral Commission | 63 Phil 139
Morrero v. Bocar | 66 Phil 429
The Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Houses of Congress and its decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court.
48

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
COMMISSION ON APPPOINTMENTS | Article VI, Section 18
 Composition
 The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman who shall not vote except in case of a tie.
 Twelve (12) Senators, elected on the basis of proportional representation from political parties
 Twelve (12) Members of the House of Representatives, elected on the basis of proportional representation from political
parties registered under the party-list system represented therein.
Guingona v. Gonzales | 214 SCRA 789

The Supreme Court held that a political party must have at least two (2) elected senators for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments. Thus, where there are two or more political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition with a
single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It is not mandatory to
elect 12 Senators to the Commission. What the constitution requires is that there must be at least a majority of the entire
membership.
 Powers | The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty (30) session days of Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of its members. The Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members
Sarmiento v. Mison, supra | Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, supra
Bautista v. Salonga, supra
 The Commission is independent of the two Houses of Congress: its employees are not, technically, employees of Congress.
It has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.

The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS
 Preserved and open to the public in accordance with law.

 Books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
 Itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member to be published annually

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS | Article VI, Section 22
 Voluntary, subject to executive privilege

 To check if the laws they passed before are being implemented well
 Over sight function of the Senate
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION | Article VI, Section 21
49
 Mandatory but with exception.

 In accordance with published internal rules.
 Rights of persons appearing or affected shall be respected.
 Miguel v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006

Executive Order which provides that no PCGG staff shall be required to testify in any proceedings concerning PCGG matters is
unconstitutional. During the Aquino administration, it was a practice, nonetheless unconstitutional.
 Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions & Currencies,
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
Petitioner was being investigated but Senate cannot do so because the Bank argued that there is already a pending criminal case.
The Supreme Court ruled that the criminal case and the inquiry in aid of legislation are completely different. Mere filing of a criminal
or an administrative complaint before a court pr a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of a legislative
inquiry.
1. General Plenary Legislative Power | Section 1, Article VI ARTICLE VI, SECTION 30

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
A. Limitations Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
1. Substantive
EXPRESS ARTICLE VI, SECTION 31
No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
 Article III | Bill of Rights enacted.
 Article VI, Sections 25, 29(1), 29(2) | On appropriations
 Article VI, Sections 28, 29(3); Article XIV, Section 4(3) | On ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 4(3)
All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
taxation educational institutions used actually, directly, and
 Article VI, Section 30 | On constitutional appellate exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such
 Article VI, Section 31 | No law granting a title of royalty or institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
nobility shall be passed manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those

IMPLIED cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to
 Non-delegation of powers such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided
 Prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. by law, including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
2. Procedural
a. ONLY ONE SUBJECT | to be expressed in the title thereof –
Article VI, Section 26 ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Commission | 151 SCRA 208
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall
Philconsa v. Gimenez | 15 SCRA 479 embrace only one subject which shall be
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections | 21 SCRA 496 expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on
Chiongbian v. Orbos, supra separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
It was held that the title is not required to be an index of final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except
the contents of the bill. It is sufficient compliance if the title
when the President certifies to the necessity of
expresses the general subject, and all the provisions of the its immediate enactment to meet a public
statute are germane to that subject. calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
Mariano v. Commission on Elections, supra immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
It was declared that the creation of an additional legislative entered in the Journal.
district need not be expressly stated in the title of the bill.
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, supra

It was held that a law having a single, general subject indicated in its title may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how adverse they may be, so long as they are no inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 128096, January 20, 1999

RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but allegedly expands said jurisdiction, does not
violate the one-title-one-subject requirement. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must have
one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include
subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
50
Farinas v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003

The Supreme Court said that RA 9006, Section 14, which repealed Section 67, but left intact Section 68,
Omnibus Election Code, is not a rider, because a rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill, and the title and objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67,
Omnibus Election Code. It need not be expressed in the title, because the title is not required to be a complete
index of its contents.
b. THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS | printed copies of bill in its final form distributed to Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency; upon last reading, no amendment allowed and vote thereon taken immediately and yeas and nays
entered in the Journal (Article VI, Section 26)
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra

It was held that the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing
with the second requirement in the “unless” clause would not only violate the rules of grammar, it would also
negate the very premise of the “except” clause. The necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill
which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. This interpretation is also supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
B. Legislative Process All appropriation, revenue or tariff
1. Requirements as to Bills bills, bills authorizing increase of the
a. Only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof public debt, bills of local application,
b. Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the House of
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate Representatives, but the Senate may
exclusively in the House of Representatives | Article VI, Section 24 propose or concur with amendments.

It was held that RA 7716 – Expanded VAT Law did not violate this provision. It is important to emphasize that it
is not the law, but the bill, which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, because the
bill may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole.
As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute, not just a bill,
must be substantially the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only “to concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would violate the coequality of legislative power of the
Senate. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bi from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
This was reiterated in the Supreme Court Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995.
Alvarez v. Guingona | 252 SCRA 695

RA 7720, converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent, component city, was declared
valid, even if it was Senate Bill 1243 which was passed by the Senate, because HB 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first. Furthermore, HB 8817 was already approved on third reading and duly transmitted to the
Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on SB 1243. The filing of
a substitute bill in the Senate in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
2. Procedure | No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. |
Article VI, Section 26(2)
Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra

The Supreme Court noted that the challenge to the validity of the enactment of RA 8240 (amending certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” was premised on alleged violations of internal rules
of procedure of the House of Representatives rather than of constitutional requirements. Decided cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of
constitutional requirements or the rights of private individuals.
51
In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in the same case, June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that it is well
settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with the internal rules of the House.
Osmena v. Pendatun, supra

It was held that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them. Furthermore, parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

The Supreme Court declared that the Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing and
distribution but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
It is within the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not
found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. And if the Committee can propose an amendment consisting one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as “an amendment in the
nature of a substitute,” so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the Committee.
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado | 227 SCRA 703

Jurisdiction of the Conference Committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House
versions of the bill. It may propose an entirely new provision.
3. Approval of Bills | The bill becomes a law in any of the following cases: ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27
a. When the President approves the same and signs it. 1. Every bill passed by the
b. When Congress overrides the Presidential veto. Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented
If the President disapproves the bill, he shall return the same, with his to the President. If he
objections thereto contained in his Veto Message, to the House of origin approves the same he shall
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal. The Veto is sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his
overridden upon a vote of 2/3 of all members of the House of origin and objections to the House where
the other House. Yeas and nays entered in the Journal of each House. it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to
NO POCKET VETO reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of
PARTIAL VETO all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it
As a rule, a partial veto is invalid. It is allowed only for particular items in shall be sent, together with the
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill | Article VI, Section 27(2) objections, to the other House
by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved
Bengzon v. Drilon | 208 SCRA 133 by two-thirds of all the
The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the veto made by Members of that House, it shall
President Aquino of appropriations intended for the adjustment of become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House
pensions of retired justices – pursuant to AM 91-8-225-CA under RA 910, shall be determined by yeas or
as amended by RA 1797, as this is not an item veto. The President cannot nays, and the names of the
set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court, neither can the veto power Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal.
be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. The veto also impairs the The President shall
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, and deprives retired justices of the right communicate his veto of any
to a pension vested under RA 1797. bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt
LEGISLATIVE VETO thereof, otherwise, it shall
A congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or become a law as if he had
signed it.
modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of 2. The President shall have the
legislative control in the implementation of particular execution action. power to veto any particular
The form may either be negative, subjecting the executive action to item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or
disapproval by Congress, or affirmative, requiring approval of the tariff bill, but the veto shall not
executive action by Congress. A congressional veto is subject to serious affect the item or items to
questions involving the principle of separation of powers. which he does not object.
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra

On the issue whether Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Funds on the appropriation for the modernization of
the AFP, GAA of 1994, which requires prior approval of Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of legislative veto; but
instead, ruled that any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
52
approval for executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Thus, since SP No. 2 is an
inappropriate provision, the President properly vetoed the same.
c. When the President fails to act upon the bill for thirty (3) days from receipt thereof, the bill shall become a law
as if he had signed it.
4. Effectivity of Laws
 Article 2, Civil Code
 Tanada v. Tuvera, supra
 Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987
2. Power of Appropriation | Section 29, Article VI ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29

1. No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in
A. Need for appropriation pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
 Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra 2. No public money or property
shall be appropriated, applied,
On the issue of whether the power given to members of Congress (under the 1994 paid, or employed, directly or
GAA) to propose and identify the projects to be funded by the Countrywide indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
Development Fund was an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. The support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian
Supreme Court stated, “the spending power, called the power of the purse, belongs to institution, or system of religion,
the Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. While it is the President or of any priest, preacher,
who proposes the budget, still, the final say on the matter of appropriation is lodged in minister, other religious teacher,
or dignitary as such, except
Congress. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project of when such priest, preacher,
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as minister, or dignitary is assigned
Congress wants it to be. to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
 Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano- Padilla & Photokina Marketing | GR No. 3. All money collected on any tax
151992, September 18, 2002 levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and
The Supreme Court said that the existence of appropriations and the availability of paid out for such purpose only. If
funds are indispensible requisites to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution of the purpose for which a special
fund was created has been
government contracts. The import of the constitutional requirement for an
fulfilled or abandoned, the
appropriation is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditure within the balance, if any, shall be
appropriations made by law for each fiscal year. In this case, since the bid of Photokina transferred to the general funds
of the Government.
(P.6.588B) was way beyond the amount appropriated by law (P1B) or funds certified to
be available (P1.2B), there is no way the COMELEC should enter into the contract. The
Bids and Awards Committee of the COMELEC should have rejected the bid of Photokina
for being excessive.
B. DEFINITION | Appropriation Law

A statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the Treasury.
C. Classification
1. GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW
Passed annually, intended to provide for the financial operation of the entire government during one fiscal period.
2. SPECIAL APPROPRIATION LAW

Designed for a specific purpose.
D. Implied or extra-constitutional limitations on appropriation measures
 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications | 110 Phil 331

Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose.
 Guingona v. Carague | 196 SCRA 221

The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least determinable. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service under the 1990 General Appropriations Act. According to the
Court, the legislative intent in RA 4860, Section 31, PG 1177 and PD 1967, is that the amount needed should be automatically
set aside in order to enable the state to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credit,
indebtedness when they become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
Although the decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
53
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges when the shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact
amounts as shown by the books in the Treasury.
E. Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures 1. The Congress may not increase
1. Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended. the appropriations
2. Article VI, Section 25(4) recommended by the President
for the operation of the
Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Government as specified in the
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein. budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by
F. Constitutional rule on general appropriations law law.
1. Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for 2. No provision or enactment
the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill
2. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by unless it relates specifically to
law. some particular appropriation
3. No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited its operation to the
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. This is intended to prevent appropriation to which it
relates.
riders or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its approval. Garcia v.
3. The procedure in approving
Mata | 65 SCRA 520 appropriations for the
4. Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the Congress shall strictly follow
the procedure for approving
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. This
appropriations for other
is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by Congress. departments and agencies.
5. Prohibition against transfer of appropriations | Article VI, Section 5(5) | Demetria 4. A special appropriations bill
shall specify the purpose for
v. Alba |148 SCRA 208 on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of PD 1177
which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or to be
On the constitutionality of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a raised by a corresponding
member of Congress to realign his allocation for operation expenses to any other revenue proposal therein.
expense category, the Supreme Court said that the members of Congress only 5. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of
determine the necessity of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their appropriations; however, the
operational expenses, because they are in the best position to do so, being President, the President of the
knowledgeable of the savings available in some items of the operational expenses, Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the
and which items need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President or the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve Court, and the heads of
the realignment/ hence, the special provision adverted to is not unconstitutional. Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the
Court also upheld the Presidential veto of a provision – in the appropriation for the general appropriations law for
AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA – which authorized the Chief of Staff to their respective offices from
savings in other items of their
use savings to augment the pension fund, on the ground that under Article VI, respective appropriations.
Section 25(5), such right must an can be exercised only by the President of the 6. Discretionary funds
Philippines. appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only
for public purposes to be
6. Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit | Article VI, Section 29(2) supported by appropriate
Aglipay v. Ruiz, supra | Garces v. Estenzo, supra vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year,
The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general
was deemed not violative of the provision. The Supreme Court said that the appropriations bill for the
attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little ensuing fiscal year, the general
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be
casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The deemed re-enacted and shall
practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of INC than by remain in force and effect until
most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains to be the general appropriations bill
is passed by the Congress.
merely incidental and secondary in nature.
7. Automatic reappropriation | Article VI, Section 25(7)
G. Impoundment
 Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra
54
The refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any tape. This power of the President is derived from Section 38, Administrative Code of 1987 on
suspension.
 Appropriation Reserves
Section 37, Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the Budget Secretary to establish reserves against appropriations to
provide for contingencies and emergencies which may arise during the year. This is merely expenditure deferral, not
suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook improves.
3. Power of Taxation | Section 28, Article VI ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28

1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
 Limitations progressive system of taxation.
Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Congress shall evolve a 2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits,
progressive system of taxation. and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | 14 SCRA 292 import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or
Province of Abra v. Hernando | 107 SCRA 104 imposts within the framework of the
Charitable institutions, etc. and all lands, building and improvements actually, national development program of the
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and
shall be exempt from taxation. personages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
Article XIV, Section 4(3) | Abra Valley College v. Aquino | 162 SCRA 106 and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and
All revenues and assets of non stock, non-profit educational institutions used exclusively used for religious, charitable,
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties. from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall
be passed without the concurrence of a
Article VI, Section 28(4) majority of all the Members of the
No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence Congress.
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
4. Power of Legislative Investigation | Section 21, Article VI
 MIGUEL V. GORDON, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006

Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1, issued by President Corazon Aquino on February 28, 1986, which provides that “no member of
staff of the Commission (PCGG) shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceedings concerning matters within its official cognizance” is repugnant to Section 21, Article VI and is deemed repealed.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or abolish.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional
basis. Furthermore, Section 4(b), EO 1, being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1, which states
that “public office is a public trust,” as it goes against the grain of public accountability and places PCGG members and staff beyond
the reach of the courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.
 This power encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.
 Limitation
 In aid of legislation
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

The inquiry was not held in legislation. The Court declared that the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of Section 5, RA 3019. There
appears to be no intended legislation involved. To allow the Committee to investigate would only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments, but if the Committee’s judgment is reached before the Sandiganbayan’s, the possibility that its
influence may be made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted. The SBRC’s probe
and inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
55
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative inquiry. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a complaint. The exercise of legislative authority of which the power of
legislative inquiry is essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
 In accordance with duly published rules of procedure
NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEES, GR No. 180843, March 25, 2008

By a majority vote, the Supreme Court declared that the conduct of the investigation by the Senate Committees did not
comply with the Constitution, for failure to publish the ruled of procedure on legislative inquiries.
 Rights of persons appearing in, or affected by such, inquiry shall be respected
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, supra

It was held that legislative inquiry does not violate one’s right to privacy. Neither does the inquiry violate the petitioners’
right against self-incrimination, because the officers of the Bank are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding;
they are merely summoned as resource persons, or as witnesses. Likewise, they will not be subjected to any penalty by
reason of their testimony.
MIGUEL V. GORDON, supra

Court said that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right
to the privacy of ordinary financial transactions.
Morfe v. Mutuc, supra

Employing the rational basis relationship test laid down by the Court, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to
privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose. In this case, to ensure that the government
agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
 Power to Punish Contempt

 May include imprisonment, for the duration of the session. The Senate being a continuing body, may order imprisonment
for an indefinite period, but principles of due process and equal protection will have to be considered (Arnault v.
Nazareno, 87 Phil 29; Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil 358)
MIGUEL V. GORDON, supra

The Supreme Court underscored the indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry.
Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also top
their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of the power to the committees. A reasonable conclusion is
that the conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
5. Question Hour | Section 22, Article VI
 SENATE V. ERMITA, supra

A distinction has to be made between the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation, and the power to conduct question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function.
Thus, the requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential consent under Section 1, EO 464, which is limited only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. It cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made either by the President or Executive Secretary.
 When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, the department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty.
 In keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, the provision states that Congress may only request the appearance of
department heads, with the consent of the President. However, when the appearance is in aid of legislation, the appearance is
mandatory.
56
 When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of executive privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may
be exempted from this power – the President – on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
6. War Powers | Section 23(1), Article VI ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23

1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds
of both Houses in joint session
 By a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, declare assembled, voting separately, shall
the existence of war. have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national
7. Power to act as Board of Canvassers in Election of President | Section 4, Article VII emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such
 RUY ELIAS LOPEZ V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, supra restrictions as it may prescribe, to
In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint national policy. Unless sooner
Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and withdrawn by resolution of the
the Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions ARTICLE VI, SECTION 32
and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately. referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can
 Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part
constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election results thereof passed by the Congress or local
without the need of any call for a special session by the President. The joint public legislative body after the registration of a
session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered
VII to canvass votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice President voters, of which every legislative district
has not, and cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionality must be represented by at least three per
mandated tasks. centum of the registered voters thereof.
57
A R T I C L E V I I
Executive Department
DEAN ANDRES BAUTISTA SYLLABUS
1. Possessor of Executive Power (Section 1)

2. Qualifications of President and Vice President (Sections 2 & 3)
3. Term (Section 4)
1. President
2. Vice President
4. Election (Section 4)
1. Mechanics
2. Duties of Congress
3. Duties of Supreme Court en banc
5. Oath of Office (Section 5)
6. Perks (Section 6)
7. Vacancies
1. Before beginning of the term (Section 7)
2. After beginning of the term (Section 8)
3. Duties of Congress
4. Temporary Incapacity
5. Prohibitions (Section 13)
8. Executive Powers
1. Appointing Power
2. Power of Control / Faithful Execution of Laws (Section 17)
3. Commander-in-Chief Powers (Section 18)
4. Executive Clemency Powers (Section 19)
5. Foreign Relations Powers
6. Other Powers
1. The President
A. Qualification | Section 2
B. Election | Section 4
C. Term of Office | Section 5, Article XVIII
D. Oath of Office | Section 5
E. Privileges | Section 6
a. Official Residence
b. Salary
c. Immunity from Suit
d. Executive Privilege
F. Prohibitions and Inhibitions | Section 6 & 13
G. Rules on Succession
H. Removal of the President | Section 2 & 3, Article XI
2. The Vice President
3. Powers of the President
A. Executive Power | Section 1
B. Appointment | Section 16
C. Control | Section 17
D. Military Powers | Section 18
E. Pardoning Power | Section 19
F. Barrowing Power | Section 20
G. Diplomatic Power | Section 21
H. Budgetary Power | Section 22
I. Informing Power | Section 23
J. Other Powers
58
FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS SYLLABUS
Section 1. Executive power Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments

Executive power Calderon v. Carale
Marcos v. Manglapus Matibag v. Benipayo
Executive immunity Rufino v. Endriga
Estrada v. Desierto Section 17. Power of Control
Soliven v. Makasiar Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano
Head of State Ang-angco v. Castillo
Chief Executive NAMARCO v. Arca
The Cabinet De Leon v. Carpio
Executive Privilege Blaquera v. Alcasid
Section 2. Qualifications of President Dadole v. COA
Tecson v. COMELEC DENR v. DENR Employees
Section 3. The Vice President Section 18. The Commander in Chief
Section 4. Election and term of President and Vice President Commander in Chief
Macalintal v. COMELEC Martial Law
Lopez v. Senate and House IBP v. Zamora
Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee Lacson v. Perez
Fernando Poe Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
Section 5. Oath of Office Randolf David v. Ermita
Section 6. Residence and emoluments Section 19. Executive clemency
Section 7. Assumption of office Executive clemency in general
Vacancy situations at the beginning of the term Pardon
Section 8. Vacancy situations during the term Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.
Estrada v. Desierto Torres v. Gonzales
Estrada v. Arroyo In Re: Torres v. Director of Bureau of Prison
Section 9. Vacancy in the office of the Vice President Garcia v. COA
Section 10. Procedure Llamas v. Orbos
Section 11. Temporary disability of the President Drilon v. CA
Estrada v. Desierto Amnesty
Section 12. Serious illness of President Limits on executive clemency
Section 13. Prohibitions People v. Salle, Jr.
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
CLU v. Executive Secretary Section 20. Foreign loans
Bitonio v. COA Section 21. International agreements
Public Interest Center v. Elma Foreign relations power
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President International agreements
Section 15. Prohibited Appointments Deportation of aliens
In Re: Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta Pimentel v. Ermita
De La Rama v. Court of Appeals Lim v. Executive Secretary
Section 16. Presidential Appointments Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Government v. Springer Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Section 22. Budget appropriation
Flores v. Drilon and Gordon Section 23. State of the nation address
Sarmiento v. Mison
59
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 1

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
THE PRESIDENT
ON QUALIFICATIONS
 The Executive Power is unique as it is vested on only one individual, who is the President serving Why is the requirement for a
both as Head of State and Chief Executive as contrasted with Legislative Power that is vested on a college degree not stipulated?
Congress of multiple individuals and Judicial Power that is vested on one Supreme Court and What does “able to read and
write” mean?
other lower courts. It is rational for a democratic
state, where majority rules, to
 Head of State would mean the ceremonial head of the government who must take part with real consider the population of the
people who can avail a college
or apparent enthusiasm in a range of activities that would keep him running and posing from degree so as for proper
sunrise to bedtime if he were not protected by a cold-blooded staff – The American Presidency, representation. History tells us
Clinton Rossiter. that elected Presidents were not
really marginalized; in fact they
belong to the elite, rich class.
 Chief Executive means that he is executive and no one else is. In Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
67 Phil 451, 464 (1939), it was said that the President is the executive of the government of the
The need for “natural-born
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political position and citizenship” and “residency”
hold office in an advisory capacity, and in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the requirement.
President’s bosom confidence” and in the words of Atty. Cushing, “are subject to the direction of It is presumed that it reflects one’s
allegiance to the country. In
the President.” reality it is not true. It may be
argued that aliens who are
 The enumeration of specific powers does not exhaust the totality thereof. Tradition recognizes naturalized to become Filipinos
are proven to be more loyal to the
that the powers of the President are more than the sum of them, which brings about the country as it is their choice to
existence of “residual powers.” become one. The residency is
required as it is premised on the
person representing the entire
 Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) state as a person who is physically
The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole knowledgeable and aware of
will. Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress. issues and concerns in his own
territory. Moreover, in the US
Constitution, residency
 Qualifications | Section 2 requirement is 14 years.
 Natural- born citizen
 Registered vote In this era of technological
 Able to read and write advancement, are these
 Forty years of age on the day of the election qualifications still applicable
and valid?
 Resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election It may be argued that changing
times may necessitate amendment
 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004 of the Constitution. For instance, if
the sole reason of the residency
In the case of Fernando Poe Jr. being an illegitimate child of an American mother and a Filipino requirement is for the awareness
father, it was held that he is still a natural-born citizen provided that paternity is clearly proved, an of problems of society which the
President belongs, then with the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
advancement in technology, even
an alien may be fully aware of
 ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE | Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 other countries’ problems and
issues even if he does not belong to
Executive Order 464 imposed a gag on executive officials summoned to a Senate legislative
that society.
investigation. In simplest terms, it is the power of the President to withhold certain types of
information from the courts, the Congress, and ultimately the public.
The types of information include those which are of nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or
information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations
comprising the process by which government decisions are reached.
Section 2(a) of EO 464, upheld as valid by the Supreme Court, enumerated the following as privileged. These are taken from earlier
decisions:
60
1. Conversational and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive
order.
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged.
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements.
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings.
5. Matters affecting national security and public order.
Ermita said, “Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest, in enforcing the obligation in a particular case. Put differently, the Court said that a claim
of privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is claimed. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.”
From this the Court concluded that it is not for one claiming executive privilege to “unilaterally determine that respondents’ duly-
issued privilege Subpoena should be totally disregarded.”
One must also see executive privilege vis-à-vis the power of Congress to use compulsory process. “While the executive branch is a
co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the President.
Another point which the Court emphasized in the case was that a claim of privilege must be stated with sufficient particularity to
enable Congress or the court to determine its legitimacy. “Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive
privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances
in which it is made, it should be respected.” The lack of specificity renders and assessment of the potential harm resulting from
disclosure impossible. However, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
Senate v. Ermita was followed by Neri v. Senate. In a Senate hearing involving a contract with a Chinese firm, Neri in his capacity as
Chairman of NEDA was asked three questions:
a) Whether the President followed up the NBN project;
b) Whether the President directed him to prioritize the ZTE;
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe.
Neri claimed executive privilege. This type was “presidential communication privilege.” Presidential communication is presumptively
privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever challenges it, must show good and valid reasons related to the
public welfare.
The Court ruled that the Senate failed to convert the presumption. Communications between the President and “operationally
proximate” advisers are presumed to be privileged and one challenging it must show cause why it should not be considered so. But
these must be limited to communications with the President. Moreover, the decision itself, once reached, can become a matter of
public concern. Certainly, for instance, if a decision reached is criminal, it cannot be privileged.
The Court could have asked for an in camera session for Neri to explain his claim within the hearing of the Court alone. Such a
procedure, followed by American practice, could have enabled the Court to sift what was privileged and what was not and then to
allow the revelation of what was not privileged. But the Court did not use the procedure, and relied instead on presumption. Thus,
the Chief Justice commented that executive privilege was established by guesswork.
The decision, if applied to criminal cases, has the dangerous effect of blocking discovery of wrongdoing by the mere claim of
presumptive privilege.
A lesser anomaly in the decision is its rejection of the manner in which the Senate approved its show cause order to Secretary Neri.
The Senate approved the order through the collection of a sufficient number of signatures and not in a meeting. The Court found
this t be an invalid procedure. But is it for the Court to tell the Senate what its voting procedure should be? As our own Court said in
1960:
61
Courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the court have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Provided, of course, private rights are not violated. The Court too does modify or even dispense with its own rules. What is good for
the goose should be good for the gander.
 ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Although the 1987 Constitution has not reproduced the explicit guarantee of presidential immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution, presidential immunity during tenure remains as part of the law. What has been rejected by the 1987 Constitution is the
expansive notion of immunity in the Marcos Constitution. Once out of office, however, even before the end of the six year term,
immunity for non-official acts is lost. Such was the case of Joseph Estrada. The cases filed against him were criminal in character.
They involved plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination could these crimes, especially plunder
which carried the death penalty, be covered by a mantle of immunity for a non-sitting president. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespassers. (Estrada v. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificat ions of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 Election | Section 4
IRRELEVANT PROVISION | Article VII,
 Mechanism: By direct vote of the people. Section 4(4)
 Regular: Second Monday of May.
“The person having the highest
number of votes shall be proclaimed
 Congress as National Canvassing Board
elected, but in case two or more shall
In theory, all of the votes from the election returns when added must be equal to the votes have an equal and highest number of
canvassed by Congress coming from the city/provincial Certificate of Canvass (COC). The votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all
function of Congress is not merely ministerial. It has authority to examine the certificates the Members of both Houses of the
of canvass for authenticity and due execution. For this purpose, Congress must pass a law Congress, voting separately.”
governing their canvassing functions. This was only copied from the US
Constitution. We do not use electoral
voting, which this scenario may anticipate.
Returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of Philippine election voting is of millions and
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the it is highly impossible for a situation
wherein a tie would happen.
Senate President who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate ON CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by What is the mindset of the framers on
this?
law, canvass the votes. Congress shall promulgate its rules for canvassing of the Mindset of Constitutional Commission is
certificates. In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest number of that Certificate of Canvass (COC) is just a
votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members of Congress. piece of paper. Before, it takes several days
before. In these times, it should be in tune
with the technological advancements such
After voters had finished voting, the counting machines will then count the votes received that it may be transmitted electronically
or physically, that is the actual paper.
by each candidate in each position. For positions elected on a national basis (president,
COMELEC can make a parallel count but it
vice president, senators and party-list representatives), the counting machine will then is not really their duty.
print an election return for that precinct, and will transmit the results to the municipal/city
board of canvassers, Congress, Commission on Elections, the citizen's arm authorized by
the commission, political parties, and others.
62
The city or municipality will then tally the votes for all positions and will issue two documents at its conclusion: a statement of votes
where the votes obtained by candidates in each precinct in a city/municipality is stated; and a certificate of canvass (COC), a
document in electronic and printed form containing the total votes in figures obtained by each candidate in the city or municipality.
The city or municipal COC will either be sent electronically to Congress (if the city is an Independent city with its own legislative
district) or to the provincial board of canvassers in which the process is repeated; this time the provincial COC will be sent to
Congress.
 Presidential Election Contest

The authority to decide presidential election contests is given by Section 4 to the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. The Rule in such contests is that only two persons, the second and third placers, may contest the election. The Rule
effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate. The power of the Court as Tribunal includes the power to correct manifest
errors on the statements of votes and certificates of canvass.
 Makalintal v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003 on the Section 18.5 of RA 9189 | Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003
Insofar as the RA grants sweeping authority to the COMELEC to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is
repugnant to Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning candidates
for the positions of President and Vice President.
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in
essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people,
considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
1. That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the
residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
2. That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party
list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress;
and
3. That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same
section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD
1. NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not to the votes of
the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing Congress to
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
 Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004
In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution
of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both
Houses of Congress, voting separately.
 Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for President and Vice President, GR No.
163783, June 22, 2004
Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions. Even after Congress has adjourned its regular
session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election
results without need of any call for a special session by the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress
convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
63
newly-elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus
officio.
 Brillantes v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 163193, June 15, 2004

There is no constitutional or statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results,
whether manually or electronically. By conducting such, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization,
spending public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
“unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns and the election returns
themselves. Thus, if the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes, it is with more reason,
prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.
 Duties of Supreme Court En Banc | Presidential Electoral Tribunal

In the event of a contest “relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President,” the Supreme Court
shall be the sole judge who shall promulgate rules.
It shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two other justices to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be chosen as follows: three to be nominated by the majority party from
among its Members in the Batasang Pambansa, and three to be nominated by the minority party from among its Members. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be its Chairman.
Any vacancy in the Tribunal shall be filed by nomination by the Chief Justice, the majority party or the minority party in the Batasang
Pambansa, as the case may be.
 Fernando Poe Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
Susan Roces, widow of Petitioner cannot intervene and/or substitute for him, assuming arguendo that the protest could
survive his death. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is under Rule 14 of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal Rules, which provides that only the registered candidate for President or Vice President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons may contest the election.
 Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005

The validity, authenticity and correctness of the Statement of Votes (SOV) and ON AQUINO | 2010 Elections
Certificate of Canvass (COC) are under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The constitutional
function as well as the power and duty to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the In the event that Aquino wins
the elections, who may file an
election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice President is expressly election protest?
vested in the PET in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty It is necessary to consider if the
to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs. proclamation has already
happened. If so, any registered
candidate for President or for Vice-
 Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996 President of the Philippines who
With her election and assumption of office as Senator she is deemed to have received the second and third
highest number of votes may
abandoned her protest. A Senator’s term is six years. It is a public trust. She has made a contest the election of the
pact with the people that she would serve for six years. President or the Vice-President, as
the case may be, by filing a verified
petition of contest with the Clerk of
 Term of Office | six (6) years the Tribunal within thirty days
 No Re-election | No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for after the proclamation of the result
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. of the election of a purported
winner.
 This is to prevent anyone from monopolizing the position.
 It could have been good if the Supreme Court ruled on Estrada’s bid for In case the protestant is declared
election on 2010 whereas he has already ran for the same office in 1998 (in the winner, he shall assume office
by taking his oath in accordance
the same way as the Supreme Court to rule on Mike Arroyo’s Jose Pidal case with Constitution as soon as the
in his invoking his right to privacy for he cannot invoke executive privilege of judgment has become final.
his wife, former President Gloria Arroyo.) The problem of Estrada is on
If there is no contest, such that
qualification and not his actions. there was no proclamation yet, the
protest shall be filed with the
 Osmena v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 Commission on Elections.
The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended at noon of
June 30, 1992 under Section 5 of Article XVIII.
64
 Oath of Office | Section 5, Article VII

 Swear or Affirm Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
 This may be the case of separation of church and state. President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
 This could have been copied from the US Constitution shall take the following oath or affirmation:
wherein a re-election is permissible. "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
 Fulfill duties conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President
 Preserve and defend the Constitution or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
 Execute laws consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God."
 Do justice to every man (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
 Consecrate person to the service of the nation
 Privileges | Section 6, Article VII

 Official Residence
The President shall have an official residence. The
 Salary salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
Determined by law, shall not be decreased during tenure. No determined by law and shall not be decreased during
increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the term of the
the incumbent during which such increase was approved. incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other
Executive officials cannot receive any other emolument, which is emolument from the Government or any other source.
a form of monetary reimbursement, advantage or profit from the
Government or any other source.
 Under Article XVIII, Section 17 | Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an
annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred
forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty
thousand pesos each.
 Immunity from Suit | For no interference in exercise of duties.

 During Tenure
 Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other
person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. It was held that while the President is immune from suit, she may not be
prevented from instituting suit.
 Clinton v. Jones, 167 SCRA 393

The US Supreme Court held that a sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit for unofficial
acts committed before his term.
 In Re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160
 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534
The Supreme Court said that the President is immune from civil liability.
 After Tenure
 Estrada v. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of
acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.
 Gloria v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000
Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but
merely those of a department Secretary.
65
 Executive Privilege
 The right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the
courts and the public.
 Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006

Presidential conversation, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts or executive session of either of the two Houses,
are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a coequal branch of
government.
 Neri v. Senate Committees, GR No. 180843, March 25 2008

Only the President may invoke executive privilege. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as in the area of military and foreign relations. The President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of power, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Most members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal f the petitioner to answer the three questions asked
during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions is properly covered by the
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege was validly claimed by the President, through the
Executive Secretary.
Communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President. This was received by a
close advisor of the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity
test”, he is covered by executive privilege. There was also no adequate showing by the respondents of the
compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
 Prohibitions and Inhibitions | Sections 6 and 13, Article VII -- Paragraphs A to D ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13
apply to Vice President; B to D also apply to members of the Cabinet, their The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
deputies or assistants. During tenure: Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
1. Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly
other source. or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July 15, 2003 interested in any contract with, or in any
The Court noted that the total accumulated salaries of the franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Marcos couple amounted to P 2,319,583.33 which when Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
converted to dollars at the exchange rate then prevailing owned or controlled corporations or their
would have an equivalent value of $ 304,372.43. This sum subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
should be held as the only known lawful income of the interest in the conduct of their office.
respondent Marcos since they did not file any Statement of The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
net worth could be determined. President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
2. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, shall not hold any as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
other office or employment. heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
 Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet without and their subsidiaries.
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council.
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

Court declared Executive Order No. 284, which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in the
government, as unconstitutional as it is a direct contravention of Section 13, Article VII.
 National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 156982, September 8, 2004

Prohibition must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity. The position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to the principal office.
66
 Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 147392, March 12, 2004

The Secretary of Labor, who is an ex officio of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone
(PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation attached to his principal office. Petitioner is merely a
representative of DOLE; hence, he cannot receive any compensation from PEZA.
3. Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business or be financially interested in any
contract with or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or –controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
4. Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
5. May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as members of
Constitutional Commissions or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or –controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
 Rules on Succession
 President has vast powers and vacancy matters a lot. Everyone has to know who the boss is.
 There is no law on Presidential Succession unlike in the United States.
 The law is silent on the possibility that the President-apparent dies before the proclamation. There is problem on
succession: who takes over – the second front runner or the Vice President?
 Acting President does not relinquish his original position: he serves double function.

The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect
shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have
died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of
the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
1. Vacancy at the beginning of the term

 Death of permanent disability | Vice President shall take over.
 President –elect fails to qualify | Vice President shall act as President until the former shall have qualified.
 President shall not have been chosen | Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
 No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died or become permanently
disabled | the President of the Senate or in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have ARTICLE VII, SECTION 8
been chosen and qualified. In the event of inability of the officials In case of death, permanent disability,
mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall
one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a become the President to serve the
Vice President shall have qualified. unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the
2. Vacancy during the term President and Vice-President, the
 Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President of the Senate or, in case of his
the President, the Vice President shall become the President. inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-
 Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. President shall have been elected and
146738, March 2, 2001 qualified.
The Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President The Congress shall, by law, provide who
Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving shall serve as President in case of death,
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, permanent disability, or resignation of
the Acting President. He shall serve until
67 the President or the Vice-President shall
have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of
powers and disqualifications as the
Acting President.
a. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President.

b. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process.
c. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President.
d. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country.
e. He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are present which are:
1. Intent to resign.
2. Act of relinquishment.
 Lozano v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 146579, February 6, 2001

Four related petitions were filed: 1) asking that Estrada stop “exercising the powers and authority of the
President under the Constitution” and “to yield the Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Arroyo; 2)
that “the occupation of the Office of the President by Vice President Gloria Arroyo is constitutional and legal with
the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries”; 3) asking for a “definitive ruling on whether
or not Joseph Estrada is still the President” and hence “exempt from all criminal suits”; and 4) praying “that the
proclamation and oath-taking of Arroyo be declared null and void” or that she be “declared acting President and
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave”.
1. Petitions are essentially for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction.
2. As petitions for prohibition and mandamus they fail to allege, much less show, lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of “any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,” which Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires to be
alleged and proven before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may be issued.
3. Petitioners have no legal standing.
4. They may not be treated as quo warranto because a plea for such must be commenced by a) solicitor
general, b) by a public prosecutor, and c) by “a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.” None of the petitioners qualify in law to
commence the action.
 Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President
until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner
in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.
3. Temporary Disability
 When the President transmits to the Senate President and the ARTICLE VII, SECTION 14
Appointments extended by an Acting
Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to President shall remain effective, unless
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he revoked by the elected President, within
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary: such ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.
power and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
68
 When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet ARTICLE VII, SECTION 11
Whenever the President transmits to the President of
transmit to the Senate President and Speaker of the the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
House their written declaration that the President is Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
and duties of the office as Acting President. shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
 Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President.
Senate President and Speaker his written Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
declaration that no inability exists, he shall transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge
 Meanwhile, should a majority of the Members the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
of the Cabinet transmit within five (5) days to shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
the Senate President and Speaker their written
declaration that the President is unable to Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
discharge the powers and duties of his office, President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that
Congress shall decide the issue. no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
 For this purpose, the Congress shall convene, if duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
not in session, within 48 hours. the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
 And if within ten (10) days from receipt of the the House of Representatives, their written
last written declaration or, if not in session, declaration that the President is unable to discharge
within 12 days after it is required to assemble, the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight
Houses, voting separately, that the President is hours, in accordance with its rules and without need
unable to discharge powers and duties of his of call.
office, the Vice President shall act as President; If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
otherwise, the President shall continue written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
exercising the powers and duties of his office. days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and
4. Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President and Vice President President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
 At 10:00 in the morning of the third day after the vacancy
occurs, Congress shall convene without the need of a call, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 12
and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The
to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not members of the Cabinet in charge of national security
earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
such call. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied
access to the President during such illness.
become law upon its approval on third reading by
Congress. The convening of Congress cannot be ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
months before the date of the next presidential election. accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
 Removal of the President | By Impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than
Article XI sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution
Article XI, Section 2 and shall become law upon its approval on third
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office special election shall be charged against any current
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, appropriations and shall be exempt from the
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of
this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not cannot be suspended nor the special election
by impeachment. postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the
Article XI, Section 3 date of the next presidential election.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
Two months immediately before the next presidential
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order temporary appointments to executive positions when
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by service or endanger public safety.
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
69
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall presi de, but shall not
vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and puni shment,
according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the Presi dent. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
 Function | His only constitutional function is to be on hand to act as President when needed or to
succeed to the presidency in case of a permanent vacancy in the office. The President may also appoint Whenever there is a
him as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment does not need the consent of the Commission on vacancy in the Office of
Appointments. the Vice-President
during the term for
which he was elected,
 Qualifications | Election | Term of Office | Removal the President shall
 The same as the President | Section 3, Article VII nominate a Vice-
President from among
 No Vice President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. the Members of the
 May be appointed as Member of the Cabinet, which requires no confirmation by the Senate and the House of
Commission on Appointments. Representatives who
shall assume office upon
confirmation by a
 Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President majority vote of all the
 Section 9, Article VII | The President shall nominate a Vice President among the members of Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office by confirmation by a separately.
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT | THE EXECUTIVE POWER as first power of the President
1. The Executive Power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17
The President shall
2. National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 143481, February 15, 2002 have control of all
the executive
The Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with departments,
the power to execute, administer and carry out laws into practical operation. Executive Power, then, is bureaus, and offices.
the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully
executed.
3. Authority to reorganize the Office of the President
1. Domingo v. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003
The Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President. This is to recognize the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity,
economy, and efficiency.” This office is the nerve of the Executive Branch, which must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped in the manner deemed fit to carry out directives and policies.
This should be distinguished from the Power to Reorganize the Office of the President Proper, such that under Section
31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize this by abolishing, consolidating or merging units or by transferring functions
from one unit to another. In contrast under Section 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies and vice versa.
4. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 | Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62 | Myers v. United States, 271 US 52
70
The Supreme Court declared that the President is the Executive of the Government and no other, and that al executive authority is
thus vested in him. In the third case, it was announced that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a
limitation upon the general grant of executive power.
 Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil 456 | Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil 143

The Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power such that his power of general supervision over
local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law.
 Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 688

On certain “residual powers” of the President. This case is unique and should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country
and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
5. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines Inc. (MEWAP) v. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
It was held that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution
and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of the President’s power of control under Article VII, Section 1 and 17 and it is also an
exercise of his “residual powers”. However, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch
or agency of the executive department.
6. It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a
law is declared unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion
would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive depa rtments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
This section provides for the second power of the President, which is the power of appointment.
1. APPOINTMENT
 It is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the commission in that he latter is the written
evidence of the appointment.
 The power to appoint includes the power to decide who among various choices is the best qualified, provided that the
person chosen has the qualifications provided by law.
 Appointments that need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are only those enumerated in Section 16,
Article VII. This is different from the law under the 1935 Constitution where the general rule was that all appointments
made by the President needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointments unless exempted by Congress from the
need for confirmation. Moreover, “ad interim appointments” under paragraph 2 are immediately effective.
 The power to appoint may be vested by law in officers other than the President “in courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.” However, when the law is silent as to who should appoint corresponding officers in
created office, the President shall appoint.
 Government v. Springer, 50 Phil 259

The nature of the appointing power is executive in nature.
 Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil 903, 911 (1954)

Since appointment to office is an executive function, the clear implication is that the legislature may not usurp such
function. The legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the person who may hold the office, but it
may neither specify who shall be appointed to such office nor actually appoint him. The “appointing power is the exclusive
71
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the
limited exercise of power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.”
NOTE: The appointing authority of the President should not be confused with the authority of the legislature to impose
additional duties on existing offices. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution, while it was clearly the prerogative of the
President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court, Roxas v. Lopez, 17 SCRA 756 (1966) upheld the authority of
Congress to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld that the act did not create a new office nor specify who should hold the office but merely
imposed additional duties and powers upon the Supreme Court and consequently upon whoever may be the incumbent
Chief Justice and Associate Justices.
 Bermudez, et al. v. Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999

The absence of recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President is not fatal to the appointment of respondent
Conrado Quiaoit for prosecutor. The answer pivots on the proper understanding of the provision of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (Book IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that, “All provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”
Appointment calls for discretion on the part of the appointing authority. The power to appoint prosecutors is given to the
President. The Secretary of Justice is under the control of the President. Hence, the law must be read simply as allowing
the Secretary to advice the President. The doctrine in San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 is not applicable because the stress
there was on the constitutional mandate on local autonomy.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF APPOINTMENTS
1. Permanent or Temporary
 Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibly
and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
 Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the
necessity of just cause or a valid investigation, made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet
decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent
choice is made.
 Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 682

A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Such confirmation, if given, will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee.
 Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154

It was held that where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on
the person named.
2. Regular or Ad Interim
 Regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of
the appointee.
 Ad Interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately,
but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment is
deemed “by-passed” through inaction. It is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government services that
would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.
This appointment refers to positions which need confirmation by the Committee on Appointments while an
appointment in an acting capacity is also given to those which do not need confirmation. The former may be
given only when Congress is not in session whereas the latter may be given even when Congress is in session.
 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22

Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
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 Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Ad interim appointment is not temporary. Petitioner posits the view that this can be withdrawn or revoked by
the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims than this is temporary in character and consequently prohibited
by the last sentence of Section 1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution but it is indeed permanent in nature.
Ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution:
1. Disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments
2. Adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on it.
There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the
appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval
is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-
passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final
decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment.
3. OFFICIALS WHO ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT
 First Sentence:
 Heads of executive departments
 Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
 Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
 Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution
 Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

The Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. In this case it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of
Customs needs no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, because the Commissioner of the Customs is not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Section 16, Article VII.
 Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259

The appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the Philippines is specifically provided for in Section 7,
Article XVIII of the Constitution. Thus, the appointment of a sectoral representative falls under the fourth category above.
 Soriano v. Lista, GR No. 153881, March 24, 2003

The Supreme Court said that because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), a
civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Obviously, the clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain” refers to military officers alone.
 Second Sentence
 All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
 Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
 Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16

The Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise
provided for in the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed upon by the
Commission on Appointments.
 Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254

The Congress cannot expand the list of those whose appointment needs confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman and commissioners, is
unconstitutional, because it violates Section 16, Article VII.
 Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999

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The Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of appointments of government officials
other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII with reference to the appointment of the head
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The promotion of senior officers of the PNP is not subject to the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments as required by the PNP law. PNP officers are not members of the Armed Forces but are
civilians.
 Tarrosa v. Singson, supra QUO WARRANTO, remedies.

The Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner as a “taxpayer” By what authority or warrant.
questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng The name of a writ issued in the
name of a government against
Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as provided any person or corporation that
in RA 7653, calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. Carale. The petition was usurps any franchise or office,
dismissed, however, primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto commanding the sheriff of the
county to summon the
proceeding, which can be commenced only by the Solicitor General or by “a person
defendant to be and appear
claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by before the court whence the
another.” writ issued, at a time and place
therein named, to show "quo
warranto" he claims the
 Rufino v. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006 franchise or office mentioned in
The Supreme Court declared that a statute cannot circumvent the constitutional the writ
provisions on the power of appointment by filing vacancies in a public office through
It is the name for a writ (order)
election by the co-workers in that office. This manner of filing vacancies in public office
used to challenge another's
has no constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged section of the law is right to either public or
unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue of Section corporate office or challenge
16, Article VII, which provides that the President has the power to appoint officers whose the legality of a corporation to
its charter (articles).
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
4. STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS
a. Nomination by the President

b. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
c. Issuance of the Commission
d. Acceptance by the Appointee
 Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740
The Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance. Pending
such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn.
Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes of defense of the
State under Section 4, Article II, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.
5. DISCRETION OF APPOINTING AUTHORITY
 Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the
minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This discretion
also includes the determination of the nature of character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary
or permanent.
 Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327
 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106
 Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738
 PIMENTEL V. ERMITA, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005

The President made appointments of Acting Department Secretaries while Congress was in session. Several senators,
including members of the Commission on Appointments questioned the constitutionality of the appointments issued by
the President to respondents as Acting Department Secretaries of their respective departments, and to prohibit them from
performing the duties of Department Secretaries. The appointments were challenged on the grounds that:
1. The administrative Code says that, in the absence of a Secretary, the Undersecretary performs his
functions.
2. Appointments of acting secretaries need confirmation.
3. For its part, respondent says that since the petitioner-Senators are not members of the Commission on
Appointments, they have no standing to challenge the act of the President.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature.
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1. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position
of great trust and confidence. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices, but if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent
from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess
of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
2. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of a department secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee. Moreover, the law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 7, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “The President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch.”
3. As to standing, the Supreme Court held that the Commission on Appointments is independent of the
Senate; senators who are not members of it may not act in their behalf.
In case of a vacancy in an office, occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.
6. SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER
 The Presidential Power of Appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for
public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or has
not been validly confirmed.
 Under Section 13 of Article VII, the President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or –controlled corporations.
 Section 14 of Article VII states that appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by
the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office.
 In Article VII, Section 15, it provides that two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
 De La Rama v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 131136, February 28, 2001

Petitioners seek the recall of the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on the ground that these were “midnight appointments” by the Mayor forbidden under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that
prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
 In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, AM No.98-5—01-SC, November 9, 1998

During this period, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the
courts within the time frames provided therein, unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. While the filling up
of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.
7. THE POWER OF REMOVAL
 This may be implied from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him
where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service. For instance,
Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment, or judges who
are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the
President, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed
administrative procedure.
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 Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710

Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly disciplined by him,
provided that the same if for cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
 Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683 | Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231
Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the President may be
replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term.

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This section provides for the third power of the President, which is the power of control.
1. CONTROL
 It is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter (Mondano v. Silvosa, supra).
 It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such
action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
 Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While
the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the
executive branch, which may incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present laws.
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title
I, Book II, Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended PD 1416, grants
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services, and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. RA 6656 enumerates the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of
reorganization:
a. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned.
b. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created.
c. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit.
d. Where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices.
e. Where the removal violates the order of separation.
2. THE ALTER EGO PRINCIPLE
 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

The doctrine, recognizing that the Constitution has established a sine and not a plural executive, postulates that “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution of law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
76
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v.
Secretary of Interior, supra)
 Demaisip v. Court of Tax Appeals, 106 Phil 237 (1959)

A decision of a department secretary, when not reprobated by the Executive, is the last step in the process of “exhausting
administrative remedies.”
 Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967)

The Executive Secretary when acting “by authority of the President,” may reverse the decision of another department
secretary.
 Maceda v. Macaraig Jr., 197 SCRA 771 (1991)

By authority of the President, he also has the power to modify, alter or reverse a construction of a statute given by the
Secretary of Justice.
 Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976

An Assistant Executive Secretary, acting for the President, may reverse a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Resources.
 De Leon v. Carpio, October 12, 1989

The acts of the Secretary of Justice in the ordinary course of the performance of his duties are acts of the President which
are controlling over all executive officers. Hence, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation must obey the order
of the said Secretary.
 NAMARCO v. Arca, 29 SCRA 648 (1969)

The President has control over officers of government-owned corporations. However, it is submitted that such power over
government-owned corporations comes not from the Constitution but from statute. Hence, it may also be taken away by
statute.
NOTE: Constitution now made a distinction between government-owned corporations with original charter from those
with derivative charter.
 DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, GR No. 149724, August 19, 2003
This doctrine recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly delegated to his
Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary
can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be
the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
 Blaquera v. Alcala, GR Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056 and 119597, September 11, 1998, pp. 59-60
Section 31 of EO No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provided an incentive award system for government employees.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO No. 268 enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without
prior approval of the President. On January 19, 1992, President Ramos issued AO No. 29, which limited the amount of
incentive benefits for 1992m enjoined head of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior
approval from him, and directed the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount.
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits
for 1992. They assail the constitutionality of AO Nos. 29 and 268 on the ground that:
1. They violate the provisions of EO No. 292 and, since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive
issuances.
2. They encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and reward system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing
the incentive awards system of the Civil Service.
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The Supreme Court held that both AO nos. 29 and 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments. “The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing
limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his
power of control of modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government
resources.
The President did not encroach upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits to government personnel. AO Nos. 29 and
268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits, but merely regulated the grant and amount
thereof. Fixing the amount of the incentives is not the duty of the CSC. Such function belongs to the President or his duly
empowered alter ego.
 City of Iligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158 | Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328
President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate executive officers.
 Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895

Even when the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed
and reversed by the Executive Secretary.
 Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582

It was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN, since
he was acting on behalf of the President who had the power to negotiate such agreement.
 Gloria v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000

But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a
case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President.
3. APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT FROM DECISIONS OF SUBORDINATE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
 Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 | Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
Appeal to the president from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet members, completes
exhaustion of administrative remedies, except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies; in
which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the President and there is no need to
appeal the decision to the President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies.
4. DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
 Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619, 629 (1963)

Control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the actor. Power of Control, however, “merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate in the performance of his duties. It only means that the
President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.”
The power of control, therefore, is not the source of the Executive disciplinary power over the person of his subordinates.
Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint: the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.
This inherent disciplinary power has been made subject to limitation by the legislature through the latter’s power to
provide for a civil service system one of whose main features is security of tenure: No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law. Article IX-B, Section 2(3). Hence, it can be
said that while the Executive has control over the “judgment” or “discretion” of his subordinates, it is the legislature which
has control over their “person”.
5. Hutchinson Ports Phils. Ltd. V. SBMA, GR No. 131367, August 31, 2000 | Respondent is under control of the Office of the President.
All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2M or above require the approval of the President under LOI 620.
6. POWER OF CONTROL OF JUSTICE SECRETARY OVER PROSECUTORS
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 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra

It was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of despite the filing of criminal information in Court, and in his
discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify or reverse the resolution of his subordinates.
The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice exercises
his power of review only after information is filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other proceedings
until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment, however, does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court is not lost despite the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
 Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, GR No. 140863, August 22, 2000
 Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47
 Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11
 David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842
7. THE PRESIDENT EXERCISES ONLY THE POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
 Power of Supervision | Article X, Section 4 and 16

It is the power of a superior officer to “ensure that the laws are faithfully executed” by inferiors. It does not include the
power of control; but the power of control necessarily includes the power of supervision.
 Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 125350, December 2, 2002

On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President on any of his alter egos,
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and
the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local
autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations.
 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135

Section 187, RA 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance
– and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds – is valid, and does not confer the power of control over local
government units in the Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his
own judgment for that of the local government unit.
 Pimentel v. Aguirre, GR No. 132988, July 19,2000

Supreme Court held that Section 4, Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) of local government units, is unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local governments is only one of
general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares
in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
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The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts o r legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
This section provides for the fourth power of the President, which is the military power.
ON SUBJECTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

It may be gathered from the broad grant of power that the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is, unlike the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not subject to judicial review. He is authorized “whenever it becomes necessary, to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
What was said by the American Supreme Court in Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat 19 US (1827) which Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) said
was not applicable to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be considered applicable to the broad power to make
use of the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. The authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President, and his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.
1. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CLAUSE
 Article II, Section 3 | Article VII, Section 18

The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President holds supreme
military authority and is the ceremonial, legal, and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the
power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Fleming v. Page, 9 How 603, 615 US (1850)

As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.
 Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006

The Senate Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP officers to testify on matters related to the conduct
of the 2004 elections. AFP Chief of Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee, that “no
approval has been granted by the President to the AFP officer to appear” at the Senate hearing. This notwithstanding,
General Gundani and Colonel Balutan attended and both testified at the hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the
Provost Marshal General, General Gundani and Colonel Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of War 65, on
willfully disobeying a superior officer, on conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. Gundani and Balutan
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the order of PGMA preventing petitioners from testifying be
declared unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents be
permanently enjoined from proceeding against the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a
wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority – the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By
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tradition and jurisprudence, these powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach
to executive privilege or executive control.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of
life, to civil supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The
Court quoted Kapunan v. De Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline.
It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the
effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline
within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter.”
On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the
conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an
audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Gen. Francisco Gudani and Col. Alexander Balutan, who were designated as commander and member,
respectively, of the “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, tasked
with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections, received invitations to attend the said Senate hearing.
In the evening of September 27, a message was transmitted from the office of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga, stating that: “per
instruction of her excellency PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her appr oval.
Inform BGen Francisco F Gudani AFP and LTC Alexander Balutan PA (GSC) accordingly.” On the day of the hearing, President Arroyo issued
Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464) which enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing
in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Despite E.O. 464 and despite the order from Gen. Senga, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
appeared and testified during the Senate hearing.
The Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) recommended that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan be charged with violation of Article
of War 65, for willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, for conduct prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline. The day after Gen Gudani and Col. Balutan were required to appear before the OPMG, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired
from service. Thereafter, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and injunction, claiming that E.O. 464 is
unconstitutional and seeking that the charges against them be quashed. Furthermore, it is stressed that Gen. Gudani was no longer
subject to military jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the violation of directive of the President could lead to any investigation for court-martial of Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan.
2. Whether or not the court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani in view of his compulsory retirement
HELD
NO. The petition is DISMISSED. AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer
superior in rank.
A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court – that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers are exempt from
the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and
deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in
the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the
sway of the officer’s own sense of what is prudent and ash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself
as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the “ills” of participatory democracy.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to the
commander-in-chief powers of the President. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the
organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.
The commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military
officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers
of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or exec utive
control. Any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any military officer whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, the attendanc e or non-attendance in
legislative inquiries.
The court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani since proceedings were initiated against him before his compulsory retire ment.
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The Court has already declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to
Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily
retired.
 To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion whenever it becomes
necessary.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra
Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power,
by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. Court noted the Solicitor General
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified issuing PP 1017, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the
seriousness of the incidents, President was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Under the calling-out of power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond this is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her power. She
cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser one.
General Order No. 5 issued to implement PP 1017 is valid. It is an order issued by the President, acting as
commander-in-chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it
provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found
in the GO, had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress, and thus, should be deemed deleted
to the GO.
However, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate ”decrees”,
because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of
Section 17, Article II of the Constitution is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. Section 17,
Article XII, must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a delegation
from Congress.
It is pertinent to the state that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of
rebellion (Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While the authority to declare a
state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Section 4, Chapter
2 of Book II, Administrative Code of 1997) and the declaration was deemed harmless and without legal
significance, in declaring a state of emergency in PP 1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII, but also on Section 17, Article XII calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be
deemed as harmless or without legal significance.
 Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

Supreme Court recognized, as part of the military powers of the President, the conduct of “saturation drives” or
“areal target zoning” by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Petitioners argue that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” by President Arroyo is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to “determine or interpret” what took place in EDSA III on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
It was held that the factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the President to
decide. He has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on the spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Although the Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power, on the basis of its power to determine grave abuse of discretion, this is no longer feasible when
the proclamation has already been lifted. (Lacson v. Secretary Perez, supra | Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
supra)
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Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or
invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule
the President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the
President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
 Lacson v. Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001

Supreme Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare “state of rebellion”. The Court may
only look into sufficiency of factual basis for the exercise of the power.
 Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra

Court held that the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, a mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no
basis for the apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests.
As held in Lacson v. Perez, supra, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrest of persons suspected of
rebellion as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
“The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.”
 The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces, create military commissions
for the punishment of war criminals.
 Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875 | Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 OG 4282
 Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144

It held that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning.
 Quilona v. General Court Martial, 206 SCRA 821

The Supreme Court held that pursuant to RA 6975, members of the Philippine National Police are not within the
jurisdiction of the military court.
 Navales v. General Abaya, GR No. 162318, October 25, 2004

Supreme Court said that in enacting RA 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts
jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the
military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General
Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Article 63 (Disrespect Toward the President
etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny of Sedition), 96 (Conduct of Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as “service-
connected offenses or crimes” under Section 1 of RA 7055.
 Gundani v. Senga, supra

On the issue of whether the court martial could still assume jurisdiction over General Gundani who had been
compulsorily retired from service, the Court quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it was held that an officer
whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service.
Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.
2. SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
ARTICLE III | SECTION 15

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it.
 Writ of Habeas Corpus
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It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the
writ is actual deprivation of personal liberty.
 Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. The writ is never
suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, i.e. once the officer
making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension,
the court may not enquire any further.
 Grounds or Requisites for the validity of the suspension

 Existence of actual invasion or rebellion.
 When public safety requires it.
NOTE: The 1987 Constitution has removed “insurrection” and “imminent danger” of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion as grounds for suspension.
 Duration: Not to exceed sixty days following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.
 Duty of President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours, personally or in writing.
 Congress may revoke or extend on the request of the President the effectivity of proclamation by a majority vote of all its
members, voting jointly.
 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to bail under Section 13, Article III.
 The suspension only applies to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
 During the suspension, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise, he
shall be released.
 Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233, 238 (1986)

Habeas corpus is still a proper remedy when released temporarily; petitioner was nevertheless subjected to certain
conditions limiting his movements. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must
be one which is free from involuntary restraints.
 Dizon v. Eduardo, 158 SCRA 470 (1988)

Respondents’ defense in a petition for habeas corpus is that they released the detainees for whom the petition was filed.
However, allegation of release is disputed by petitioners, and it is not denied that the detainees have not been seen or
heard from since their supposed release. Where there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release, particularly
where the standard and prescribed procedure in effecting release has not been followed, the burden of proof falls on the
respondents. Release is an affirmative defense, like self-defense, and each party must prove his affirmative allegation.
If respondents have the burden of proving, the evidence needs further study. The Court is not a trier of facts. If
respondents have not satisfied that burden, the case must be referred to the Commission on Human Rights for relief.
3. MARTIAL LAW
It is essentially police power. This is borne out by the constitutional text which sets down “public safety” as the object of the exercise
of martial law. Public safety is the concern of police power, which is normally a function of the legislature executed by the civilian
executive arm. Martial law, however, is exercised by the executive with the aid of the military and in place of “certain governmental
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty.
 Justice Black | Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304, 323 (1946)

It authorizes “the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government.
84
 Justice Stone
The exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the Gumaua v. Espino, 96 SCRA 403, 403-407
government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of February 29, 1980
emergency, when other branches of the government are unable to function,
Due to this amorphous shape of martial law
or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety. It is the law of
power, the Marcos Supreme Court arrived at
necessity to be prescribed and administered by the executive power. Its the following conclusions:
object, the preservation of the public safety and good order, defines the
scope, which will vary with the circumstances and necessities of the case. The 1. That the proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the
exercise of the power may not extend beyond what is required by the writ of habeas corpus.
exigency which calls it forth.
2. That the President of the Philippines, “as
Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or
 Scope of Martial Law Powers as a Fixed Concept administrator of martial law can promulgate
Martial law is a flexible concept, which is something that can be insinuated proclamations, orders and decrees during the
from the text of the Constitution. It depends on two (2) factual bases: period of martial law essential to the security
1. The existence of actual invasion or rebellion. and preservation of the Republic, to the
defense of the political and social liberties of
2. The requirements of public safety. the people, and to the institution of reforms to
Necessity creates the conditions for marital law and at the same time limits prevent the resurgence of rebellion or
the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state of insurrection or secession or the threat thereof
as well as to meet the impact of a world
invasion would be different from those created by rebellion. Necessarily, recession, inflation or economic crises which
therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action needed to meet presently threatens all nations including highly
the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all developed countries.
conditions.
3. That the President of the President, as
legislator during the period of martial law, can
 Limitations on the power to suspend the privilege and the power to impose legally create military commissions or courts
martial law under the 1987 Constitution. martial to try not only members of the armed
forces but also civilian offenders for specified
1. The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
offenses.
are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law. This has a maximum
of 60 days.
2. The President shall submit report to Congress within 48 hours. Congress, The 1987 Constitution rejects the above
voting jointly, by a vote of at least majority, may revoke or extend the Marcos Court pronouncements and now
says categorically: “A state of martial law
proclamation.
does not suspend the operation of the
3. Any citizen may question the factual basis of the proclamation by filing a case Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
with the Supreme Court which must decide within 30 days. This posits that the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege is not a authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
political question. military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the
State of Martial Law does not:
writ.”
 Suspend the operation of the Constitution
 Suspend the functioning of the Courts or legislative assembly
 Authorize military courts to enforce jurisdiction over civilians
 Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
 Suspension of Writ
 Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
 Any person arrested or detained during the suspension shall be judicially charged within 3 days otherwise he shall be
released.
 Aberca vs. Ver | GR L-69866, April 15, 1988

The case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of Rogelio Aberca,
Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino, Noel Etabag, Danilo De La Fuente, Belen Diaz-Flores, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jazminez,
Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando
Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo Tabara, Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila.”
Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number
of purely personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
85
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et. al. were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish
them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.’s constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria,
Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo
Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to
P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney’s fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss.
On 8 November 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding,
issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental
motion for reconsideration was filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983, respectively. On 15
December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, “to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun)
cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs
assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion.” This order prompted Aberca, et.
al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini
Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In an order dated 11 May
1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983,
issued an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al. for failure to move for reconsideration nor
to interpose an appeal therefrom.
Assailing the said order of 11 May 1984, Aberca, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21
September 1984, the court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984 declaring that with respect to
certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8 November
1983 granting Ver, et. al.’s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985, Aberca, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional
rights or liberties of another in general.
HELD
No. It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as
they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch
pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license
or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which
renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned
task or carrying out their mission with vigor. However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee
or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension.
No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought
that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that
the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
86
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tort feasors.
Further, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.’s right and cause of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the
following to its text: “However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of
any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.”
Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.’s right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of Ver, et. al.’s confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
This section provides for the fifth power of the President, which is the pardoning power.
 Rationale: human fallibility.

 Purpose
It is a tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there are infirmities in the administration of justice. The power
therefore exists as an instrument for correcting these infirmities and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too
strict application of the law.
 Forms of Executive Clemency
1. Reprieves
2. Commutations
3. Pardons
4. Remission of Fines and Forfeitures
5. Amnesty
 LLAMAS V. ORBOS, GR No. 99031, October 15, 1991

The President may extend executive clemency for administrative penalties. The Constitution makes no distinction with regard to the
extent of the pardoning power except with respect to impeachment.
 People v. de Gracia, supra

This power exercised by the President is discretionary and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, unless
there is a constitutional violation. Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject Paragraph 2; Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, recommending the grant of pardon after the convict shall serve a jail term of 5 years, considering that this was
a prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a pardon is within the President’s exclusive prerogative.
 DRILON V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 91626, October 2, 1991

After serving sentence for six years, accused was released and placed under house arrest. His sentence was effectively commuted to
six years. Commutation does not have to be in any specific form. The fact that he was released after six years and the fact that house
arrest is not a penalty leads to the conclusion that the penalty had been shortened.
 Limitations on Exercise
 Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment | Section 19, Article VII
 Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without favorable recommendation of the Commission on
Elections | Section 5, Article IX-C
87
 PEOPLE V. SALLE JR., GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995 | 250 SCRA 581 People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, 110 (1937)
Pardon can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. This power A reprieve “postpones the execution of an
offense to a day certain.” And a commutation “is
cannot pre-empt the Courts since pardon can be extended only to one a remission of a part of the punishment; a
whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws substitution of a less penalty for the one
his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final. This corrects People originally imposed.” Remission of fines and
forfeitures is a self-explanatory term. However,
v. Crisola, March 2, 1984 | 126 SCRA 1, which said that clemency terminates
it should be noted that remission of fines and
the appeal. forfeitures merely prevents the collection of
fines or the confiscation of forfeited property; it
People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44 cannot have the effect of returning property
which has been vested in third parties or money
The Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, in the public treasury.
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Any application for a United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (US 1833)
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the
pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant should not
power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
begin, unless the appeal is withdrawn. which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN, 170 SCRA 190 for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate,
This ruling, which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution is now delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987 Constitution. intended and not communicated officially to the
Court. It is a deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
Petitioner was a teacher with the rank of Principal I. Convicted of a criminal
without acceptance. It may then be rejected by
offense; he was sentenced to one year imprisonment and disqualification to the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be
hold public office. Subsequently he was given absolute pardon and restored rejected, we have discovered no power in a
to “full civil and political rights” he applied for reinstatement and was given court to force it on him.
the position merely of classroom teacher. Cabantog v. Wolfe, 6 Phil 273, 278 (1906)
It is submitted that a distinction must be made
It is true that one who is given absolute pardon has no demandable right to between absolute and conditional pardon.
Absolute pardon is complete even without
reinstatement. However, since the petitioner in this instance was actually
acceptance; whereas a conditional pardon has
reinstated and there are no circumstances that would warrant the no force until accepted by the condemned. The
diminution of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his former reason is obvious. The condition may be less
rank. acceptable to him than the original punishment,
and may in fact be more onerous..
Sabello v. DECS, 180 SCRA 623  PARDON is an act grace which exempts
A pardoned elementary school principal, on consideration of justice and the individual on whom it is bestowed
from the punishment that the law inflicts
equity, was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of
for the crime he has committed.
principle and not to the lower position of classroom teacher.  COMMUTATION is the reduction or
mitigation of the penalty.
People v. Catido, GR No. 116512, March 7, 1997  REPRIEVE is the postponement of a
sentence or stay of execution.
It was held that while the pardon was void for having been extended during  PAROLE is the release from prison, but
the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by final judgment, and without full restoration of liberty, as
therefore a violation of Section 19, Article VII, the grant of amnesty, applied parolee is still in the custody of the law
although not in confinement.
for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.  AMNESTY is the act of grace, concurred in
by the legislature, usually extended to
 Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt as it would violate the groups of persons who committed political
separation of powers, or civil contempt as the State is without interest in the offenses, which puts into oblivion the
offense itself.
same.
 People v. Nacional, GR No. 11294, September 7, 1995

Pardon cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. The Court said that the
grant of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not relieve the accused of civil liability.
 On Executive Clemency regarding administrative decisions

 GARCIA V. CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 226 SCRA 356
If a pardon is given because he was acquitted on the ground that he did not commit the crime, reinstatement and back
wages would be due.
 Classification of Pardon
1. Plenary or Partial
2. Absolute or Conditional
88
 TORRES V. GONZALES, 152 SCRA 273

Where the conditional pardon has been granted, the President alone determines whether the condition has
been violated. The convict’s acceptance of the conditional pardon carries with it acceptance of the President’s
authority. (In Re: Torres v. Director of Bureau of Prisons)
 In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo Sumulong, supra

Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal; by
pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardoned complies with
the conditions of the pardon.
 Section 64(i), Revised Administrative Code

This provision authorizes the President to order the arrest and re-incarceration of such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon. This is beyond judicial scrutiny.
 Amnesty
 This can only be done with the concurrence of the majority of the members of the Congress.
 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 85 Phil 642 (1949)

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive as and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted t ne after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offense, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. And it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. (Article 36, Revised Penal
Code)
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed the offense.
NOTE: The distinctions made here should be understood in the light of the later cases of Monsanto and Garcia, which hold
that pardon can have the effect of restoring rights such as the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage.
 Villa v. Allen, 2 Phil 436, 439 (1903)

Amnesty commonly denotes the general pardon to rebels for their treason and other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subject of another, who have offended by some breach of the law of nations.
 De Vera v. Animas, L-48176, August 14, 1978

A convicted prisoner claims to be covered by a general amnesty. However, the Court cannot order his release in a habeas
corpus petition. His proper remedy is to submit his case to the proper amnesty board, in this case, the Commission on
Elections.
 People v. Patriarca, GR No. 135457, September 29, 2000

It was held that the person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had no
committed no offense. Paragraph 3, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.
 Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152 | People v. Pasilan, 14 SCRA 694 (1965)
It was held that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of offense covered by the
proclamation.
 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 69344, April 26, 1991, quoting Commission of Internal Revenue v.
Botelho Corporation, 20 SCRA 487
89
The legal nature of a tax amnesty is that it is a general pardon or intentional overlooking of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of revenue or tax law, [and as such] partakes of an absolute
forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its rights to collect what otherwise would be due it.
 Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, GR No. 58289, July 24, 1982

The President may grant tax amnesty without legislative intervention under the 1973 Constitution. By Presidential Decree
No. 1840 the President granted tax amnesty. Under the 1973 Constitution, the Court answered this in the negative. What
the President did by issuing PD No. 1840 is exercise his legislative power under Amendment 6 which does not require the
concurrence of the Batasan but is not
AMNESTY PARDON
concurrent with the legislative power of
Addressed to political offenses. Infractions of peace of the state.
the Batasan. Classes of persons. Individuals.
No need for distinct act of acceptance. Acceptance necessary.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution, the Requires concurrence of Congress. Does not require concurrence of Congress.
A public act which the courts may take judicial Private act which must be pleased and proved.
President cannot grant tax amnesty notice of.
without the concurrence of the Congress. Looks backward and puts into oblivion the Looks forward and relieves the pardonee of
offense itself. the consequences of the offense

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled
corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
This section provides for the sixth power of the President, which is the borrowing power.
 Monetary Board
 It has expertise and consistency to perform the mandate and since such expertise or consistency may be absent among the
Members of Congress. In order to allow Congress to act on whatever legislation may be needed to protect public interest
 Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR No. 106064, October 13, 2005

The Financing Program for foreign loans instituted by the President extinguished portions of the country’s pre-existing loans through
either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond-
conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the
proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original loan. Petitioners contend that buyback or bond conversion is not
authorized by Article VII, Section 20.
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more
onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers
of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the
full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and
change the meaning of the organic act.

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
This section provides for the seventh power of the President, which is the diplomatic power.
 Foreign Relations Powers of the President

 The power to negotiate treaties and international agreements.
 The President negotiates treaties and international agreements. In the negotiation phase of treaty-making, the
executive may completely exclude Congress.
 However, the fruit of the executive’s negotiation does not become binding treaty without the concurrence of “at
least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate.
 The power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, and consuls.
 The power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers accredited to the Philippines.
 The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic.
 The power to deport aliens.
 This also includes power to contract or guarantee foreign loans | Section 22, Article VII
90
 In general, it can be said that agreements that are permanent and original should be embodied in a treaty and
need Senate concurrence. Agreements, however, which are temporary or are merely implementations of
treaties or statutes do not need concurrence.
 USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc. v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil 1030
While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be
entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body.
 World Health Organization v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 | Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco and Sons,
148 SCRA 36, 39-40 (1987)
The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is a valid and binding international agreement even without the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been
recognized by this Court as legally binding on Philippine authorities.
 Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351

The Supreme Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements. Thus,
1. International agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of
details carrying out well established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature take the form of executive agreements.
2. In treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become binding through executive action.
 BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. 128570, October 10, 2000

The Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) was concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus complying with Section 21, Article VII and Article XVIII, Section 25. As to the
manner of ratifying the treaty, Article VII, Section 21 applies. As to whether the agreement needs Senate ratification, Article XVIII,
Section 25 applies because it covers not just bases but also troops.
The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that
would be giving a strict construction to the phrase, “recognize as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the
VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTION, GR No. 139465, October 17, 2000

Pursuant to the extradition treaty with the United States, a request was made by the US for the extradition of Mark Jimenez. While
the petition for extradition was being evaluated by the Department of Justice and before the filing of an extradition case in the
proper court, a request was made by Jimenez that documents coming from the US related to the extradition request are made
available to him. The request was granted by Judge Lantion; whereupon the Secretary of Justice asked the Court to reverse the
lower courts order.
During the evaluation stage in the office of the Department of Justice the subject of the extradition request does not have the right
to notice and hearing. PD No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when as extradite shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty. As an extradition
proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
In an extradition proceeding, the subject of extradition does not have a right of access to evidence in the hands of the executive
department. It is during the judicial phase that he has the right.
 Tan Tong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil 934, 936 (1955)

The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is vested in the
Executive by virtue of his office; subject only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to
such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject. (In Re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil 41)
There is no provision in the Constitution or act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the intention of the law
to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence in the country is so undesirable as to effect
or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which the deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
91

The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
This section provides for the eighth power of the President, which is the budgetary power.
 Basis for the general appropriations bill passed by Congress.
 The budget receipts and expenditures prepared by the President.
 Source of Financing
 Financing can come from sources other than revenue measures.

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
This section provides for the ninth power of the President, which is the informing power.
OTHER POWERS
1. To submit a budget
 Section 22, Article VII | Section 25, Article 6
2. Residual Powers
 Marcos v. Manglapus, supra
3. Call Congress to a special session
 Section 15, Article VI
4. State of the Nation Address (SONA)
 To address to appear before Congress | Section 23, Article VII
5. Power to approve or veto bills
 Section 27, Article VI
6. To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections
 Section 2(4), Article IX-C
7. To discipline such deputies
 Section 2(8), Article IX-C
8. By delegation from Congress, emergency powers and tariff powers
 Section 23(2) and 28(2), Article VI
9. Emergency Powers
 Article VI, Section 23 | Article XII, Section 17
10. General supervision over local government and autonomous regional governments
 Article X
 Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 125350, December 2, 2002
92
A R T I C L E V I I I
Judicial Department
1. The Judicial Power

2. Constitutional Safeguards to Insure the Independence of the Judiciary
3. Power of Judicial Review or Inquiry
4. Appointment to the Judiciary
5. The Supreme Court
FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Section 1. Judicial power Political Questions: Cases

Santiago v. Bautista Marcos v. Manglapus
Marcos v. Manglapus Daza v. Singson
Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice Santiago v. Guingona
United States v. Nixon The Davide Impeachment
Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
Section 2. Creation of courts Rule-making power
Congress and judicial power Bustos v. Lucero
Cases In Re: Cunanan
Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. Javellana v. DILG
Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy Review of death penalty
Radiowealth v. Agregado People v. Mateo
Section 4. The Supreme Court BAR integration
Fortich v. Corona In Re: Petition to disqualify Atty. De Vera
People v. Dy Section 6. Supervision of courts
People v. Ebio Maceda v. Vasquez
Section 5. Powers of Supreme Court People v. Gacott
Powers of the Supreme Court classified Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman
Judicial review Section 7. Qualifications
Judicial review: Cases and controversy In Re: JBC v. Judge Quitain
Marbury v. Madison Kilosbayan v. Ermita
Angara v. Electoral Commission Section 8. Judicial and Bar Council
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Section 9. Appointment
Tan v. Macapagal Section 10. Salary
PACU v. Secretary of Education Nitafan v. Commission of Internal Revenue
Judicial review: locus standi Section 11. Security of tenure
Joya v. PCGG Vargas v. Rilloraza
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority De la Llana v. Alba
Mariano v. COMELEC Section 12. Prohibited designation
Oposa v. Factoran Section 13. Decision process
Kilosbayan v. Guingona Certification
Tatad v. Garcia Section 14. Content of decisions
Kilosbayan v. Morato Decisions and petitions, minute resolutions
TELEBAP v. COMELEC Air France v. Carrascoso
Gonzales v. Narvasa Valdez v. Court of Appeals
Del Mar v. PAGCOR People v. Lizada
Matibag v. Benipayo Velarde v. Social Justice Society
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy Section 15. Time frame for decisions
Bayan v. Executive Secretary Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before The
IBP v. Zamora Sandiganbayan
Macalintal v. COMELEC Court Administrator v. Quinanola
Whit e Light Corp v. City of Manila Section 16. Annual report.
Political Questions
93
THE JUDICIAL POWER ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1

The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower
 To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to courts as may be established by law.
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
 This effectively limits the “political question area which, heretofore, was controversies involving rights which
forbidden territory for the courts. are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
 Tocao v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127405, September 20, 2001 abuse of discretion amounting to lack
The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders to as to or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
make them conformable with the law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
especially when, in its honest opinion, it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2
The Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the
 De Leon v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127182, December 5, 2001 jurisdiction of the various courts but
The Court is not precluded from examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of may not deprive the Supreme Court of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
justice to technicality.
No law shall be passed reorganizing
 Where vested: In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
law.
 Jurisdiction
It is defined as the power to hear and decide a case.

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its
advice and concurrence.
 Fabian v. Desierto | GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Villavert v. Desierto | GR No. 13371, February 13, 2000
The Supreme Court held that REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770, SECTION 27 which authorizes an appeal to the Supreme Court from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared unconstitutional, because the provision
was passed without the advice and consent of the Supreme Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO INSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 6
The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature. courts and the personnel thereof.
2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 12
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate The Members of the Supreme Court and
jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and of other courts established by law shall
concurrence. not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or
4. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and administrative function.
personnel.
5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges or justices of inferior ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 3
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
7. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi- be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous
judicial or administrative functions. year and, after approval, shall be
8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. automatically and regularly released.
 In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and

Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy | AM No. 01-1-04-SC-Philja, 481 SCRA 1
The Supreme Court said that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. In downgrading the positions and salary grades of
94
two positions in the Philippine Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over court personnel, as enshrined in the Constitution.
9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.
11. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OR INQUIRY ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4

1. The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and
1. Definition of Judicial Review fourteen Associate Justices. It may
The power inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven
powers. Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the
 Angara v. Electoral Commission | 63 Phil 139 occurrence thereof.
The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of 2. All cases involving the
their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the constitutionality of a treaty,
courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be
the Constitution. heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which
 Aquino v. Enrile | 59 SCRA 183 under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc,
The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or
 Bondoc v. Pineda | 201 SCRA 792 operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders,
That duty is part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under instructions, ordinances, and
Article VIII, Section 1. other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who
2. Who may Exercise the Power actually took part in the
Article VIII, Section 4(2) recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to decide deliberations on the issues in the
constitutional questions. case and voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a

 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 148 SCRA 659 division shall be decided or
Article VIII, Section 5(2) which prescribes the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of resolved with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who
the Supreme Court, and implicitly recognizing the authority of the lower courts to actually took part in the
decide questions involving the constitutionality of laws, treaties, international deliberations on the issues in the
agreements, etc. The Supreme Court said that the lower courts should not shy away case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at
from the task of deciding constitutional questions when properly raised before them. least three of such Members.
When the required number is not
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals | 195 SCRA 444 obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that
It was held that the fact that the constitutional question was properly raised by a no doctrine or principle of law
party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of laid down by the court in a
constitutionality. Every court should approach a constitutional question with grave decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or
care and considerable caution. reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
 Mirasol v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 128448, February 1, 2001
It was held that the Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the
Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Court (RTC). Furthermore, BP 129 grants RTCs the authority to rule on the conformity
of laws and treaties with the Constitution. However, in all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order or proclamation – and not just in actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies – notice to the Solicitor General
is mandatory, as required in Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of this mandatory notice is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice
would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court.
3. Functions of Judicial Review

 Checking
 Legitimating
 Symbolic (Salonga v. Pano | 134 SCRA 438)
4. Requisites of Judicial Review or Inquiry
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
 Guingona v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 125532, July 10, 1998

95
A conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be

resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
 John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim | GR No. 119775, October 24, 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, other
2003 public ministers and consuls, and
It was held that the controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon over petitions for certiorari,
the legal relations of parties who are pitied against each other due to their prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
adverse legal interests.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or
 Davis v. Federal Election Commission | 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may
It is not enough that the controversy exists at the outset. To qualify for provide, final judgments and
adjudication, it is necessary that the actual controversy be extant at all stages of orders of lower courts in:
the review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.
a. All cases in which the
constitutionality or
 PACU v. Secretary of Education | 91 Phil 806 validity of any treaty,
international or
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections | 95 SCRA 392
executive agreement,
Perez v. Provincial Board | 113 SCRA 187 law, presidential
A request for an advisory opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an decree, proclamation,
order, instruction,
action for declaratory relief is proper for judicial determination.
ordinance, or
regulation is in
 Province of Batangas v. Romulo | GR No. 152774 May 27, 2004 question.
b. All cases involving the
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr. | GR No. 132795, legality of any tax,
March 10, 2004 impost, assessment, or
Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board | GR No. 103055-56, toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation
January 26, 2004 thereto.
Lacson v. Perez | GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001 c. All cases in which the
The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or because of jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue.
subsequent developments, have become moot and academic. A moot and d. All criminal cases in
academic case is one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by virtue of which the penalty
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on e. All cases in which only
ground of mootness. an error or question of
law is involved.
 Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Pimentel | GR No. 132986, May 19, 3. Assign temporarily judges of
2004 lower courts to other stations as
Because the term of the contested position had expired on June 30, 1998, the public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not
electoral contest had become moot and academic, and thus, there was no exceed six months without the
occasion for judicial review. consent of the judge concerned.
Lacson v. Perez | GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001
4. Order a change of venue or place
Where cases were filed questioning the declaration of President of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila justice.
(under General Order No. 1), the Supreme Court dismissed the
5. Promulgate rules concerning the
petitions because on May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of protection and enforcement of
the “state of rebellion”, and thus, the issue raised in the petition had constitutional rights, pleading,
become moot and academic. practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar,
Gonzales v. Narvasa | GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000 and legal assistance to the under-
Where the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was questioned, the inexpensive procedure for the
Court dismissed the petition because by then the PCCR had ceased to speedy disposition of cases, shall
exist having finished its work and having submitted its be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not
recommendations to President Estrada. Subsequent events had diminish, increase, or modify
overtaken the petition and the Court had nothing left to rule upon. substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by
Guingona v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 125532, July 10, 1998 the Supreme Court.
The Court declared that since witness Potenciano Roque had already
6. Appoint all officials and
been admitted into the Witness Protection Program and had actually employees of the Judiciary in
finished testifying, the petition contesting the side opinion of the accordance with the Civil Service
Court of Appeals that the admission of Roque into the program could Law.
be made only if his testimony is substantially corroborated on

96
material points, was held to have raised an issue which had become moot and academic.
Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform | GR No. 93100, June 19, 1997
Because Congress had already passed amendatory laws excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage
of CARL, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions had become moot and academic, and
therefore, not ripe for judicial review.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo | GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

The Supreme Court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of Presidential Proclamation 1021 (recalling
Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a “state of emergency”) did not render the petitions moot and academic.
There remained the need to determine the validity of Proclamation No. 1017 and GO No. 5 because during the
eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it and only in resolving the issue can it be determined if the acts committed by the implementing
officers were justified.
 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (and other companion cases)
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Relative to the validity of the declaration by President Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” after the Oakwood incident was
similarly decided on the fourth ground below. Courts will decide cases otherwise moot and academic if:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
b. There is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved.
c. The constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and
the public.
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evasive review.
Alunan III v. Mirasol | GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 | 276 SCRA 501, 511
The court decided because it raised a question, otherwise moot, but “capable of repetition yet evading review”.
In a US case, it was held that the application of this principle presupposes that: 1) the life of the controversy is
too short to be fully litigated prior to its termination; and 2) that there is a reasonable expectation that the
plaintiff will again be subjected to the same problem.
Salonga v. Pano | 134 SCRA 438

The Court also exercised the power of judicial review even when the issue had become moot and academic,
where it held that the Court had the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines or rules, and the symbolic function to educate the bench and the bar on the extent of protection given
by the constitutional guarantees.
Acop v. Guingona | GR No. 134855, July 2, 2002

Although the issue had become moot and academic because the policemen (alleged whistle-blowers) had
already been removed from the Witness Protection Program, the Court still decided the case for the future
guidance of the bench and the bar on the application of RA 6981, and for the proper disposition of the issue on
whether the two policemen should return whatever monetary benefits they may have received under the
program.
 Tanada v. Angara | 272 SCRA 18

Some cases showing the existence of an actual case or controversy. On the challenge posed by the petitioners that the
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement violated the Constitution, particularly Article II, Section 19 (which
mandates the development of self-reliant and independent national economy), the Supreme Court held that this was a
justiciable controversy, because where an action of the Legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but the duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Ople v. Torres | 293 SCRA 141
It was held that the petition’s ripeness for adjudication was not affected by the fact that the implementing rules
of Administrative Order No. 308 (Adopting a National Computerized Identification Reference System) had not yet
been promulgated, because Senator Ople assailed AO 308 as invalid per se and infirm on its face; thus, his action
was not premature. After all, the implementing rules could not cure the fatal defects of the Administrative
Order.
 Montesclaros v. COMELEC | GR No. 152295, July 9, 2002

Some cases held not ripe for judicial determination. It was held that a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review,
because it creates no rights and imposes no duties enforceable by the courts.
97
Mariano v. COMELEC | 242 SCRA 211

The petition to declare RA 7854 (converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City) as
unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was premised on many contingent events the happening of which
was uncertain. Petitioner, thus, posed a hypothetical issue which had not yet ripened into an actual case or
controversy.
Fernandez v. Torres | 215 SCRA 489

For failure of the petitioners to allege that they had applied for exemption, or that it would have been futile to
apply for exemption, from DOLE Circular No. 1-91 (banning deployment outside the Philippines of Filipino
performing artists below 23 years of age), the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as having been prematurely
filed. Thus, there is no actual case or controversy.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC | 244 SCRA 272

The Court noted that PPI failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of the COMELEC designed to
enforce or implement Section 8, Resolution No. 2772. Thus, the case was deemed not ripe for judicial review for
lack of an actual case or controversy.
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority | 224 SCRA 236

Because the petitioner had not shown that he was prevented from performing his duties as Consultant of the
DPWH by the challenged provisions of RA 7279, it was held that there was no actual case or controversy.
Board of Optometry v. Colet | 260 SCRA 88

Inasmuch as respondents Optometry Practitioners Association of the Philippines, Cenvis Optometrist
Association, et.al. failed to show that they are juridical entities (as certified by the Securities and Exchange
Commission), they cannot be deemed real parties in interest in whose name the action may be prosecuted.
Neither can some individuals be considered parties in representation of the optometrists, as their names do not
appear in the registry list of the Board. Thus, there is no actual case or controversy yet, because an actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE RAISED BY THE PROPER PARTY

A proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. To be a
proper party, one must have “legal standing”, or locus standi.
 Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
Salonga v. Warner Barnes | 88 Phil 125

In private suits, standing is governed by the real parties in interest rule, as contained in Section 2, Rule 3, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits where the plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing
the validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative of the general public. To establish legal standing,
he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and securing relief as a citizen of
taxpayer.
People v. Vera | 65 Phil 56

To determine legal standing, the Court adopted the direct injury test, which states that a person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result.
IBP v. Zamora | GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000

It was clarified that the term, “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the challenged
official act, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
 In numerous decisions particularly in recent ones, the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal attitude and recognized the
legal standing of petitioners who have invoked a public right allegedly breached by a governmental act.
98
The Supreme Court summarized its earlier rulings and declared that petitioners may be accorded standing to sue
provided that the following requirements are met:
1. The case involves constitutional issues.
2. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the
national government or by government-owned or –controlled corporations allegedly in contravention
of law – Abaya v. Ebdane | 515 SCRA 720)
3. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question.
4. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early.
5. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.
 People v. Vera | 65 Phil 56

The Supreme Court declared that the Government of the Philippines is a proper party to question the validity of its own
laws, because more than any one, it should be concerned with the constitutionality of its acts. In this case, it was held that
the government has substantial interest in having the Probation Law declared as unconstitutional, because more than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo | GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

The Court held that all the petitioners were proper parties. David and Llamas, as they alleged “direct injury” from the
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by the police officers in the enforcement of PP 1017. The opposition
Congressmen who alleged usurpation of legislative powers by the President. The Alternative Law Group, under the
liberality rule as the issue involved a public right. KMU as an organization for asserting the rights of their members; and the
other petitioners, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised.
Chavez v. Gonzales | GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Even as petitioner Chavez had not met the requisite legal standing, the Court took cognizance of the case
consistent with the principle that it will not wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest.
Senate v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006

On the issue of the validity of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), Bayan Muna was held to have locus standi
because it is a party-list group with three seats in the House of Representative entitled to participate in the
legislative process. The three Bayan Muna representatives, on the basis of their allegation that their right and
duties as members of the House of Representatives had been infringed. Chavez, for having asserted a public
right, his being a citizen is sufficient.
Akbayan v. Aquino | GR No. 170516, July 16, 2008

The Court declared that non-governmental organizations, Congress persons, citizens and taxpayers have legal
standing to fie petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to produce a copy of the Japan Philippines
Economic Package Agreement (JPEPA), as the petition is anchored upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern which is a public right.
Anak Mindanao Party List Group (AMIN) v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 166052, August 29, 2007
It was held that AMIN, as member of Congress, had legal standing to institute the suit questioning the validity of
Executive Order No. 364 placing the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) under the supervision
and control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
 Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) v. Commission on Human Rights (CHR) | GR No. 155336,
November 25, 2004
The petitioner, as association consisting of rank-and-file employees in the Commission on Human Rights, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of position benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission, resulting in
the demoralization of rank-and-file employees. This, according to the Supreme Court, meets the injury test.
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) | GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003
The petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, were declared proper parties because they stood
to lose their source of livelihood by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. The financial
prejudice brought about by the said PIATCO contracts on them are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on
them the requisite standing to file instant petitions.
99
Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra

The Province of Batangas was held to have legal standing to question the validity of the provisions of the General
Appropriation Act and the guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution relative to projects
funded from the internal revenue allotment, inasmuch as the petitioner had an interest in its share in the
national taxes.
 Ople v. Torres | 293 SCRA 141

The Supreme Court held that Senator Blas Ople was a proper party to question the constitutionality of AO 308 in his
capacity as Senator, as taxpayer and as a member of the GSIS. As Senator he had the requisite standing to bring suit
assailing the issuance of the AO as a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and GSIS member, he could impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of the GSIS to implement the AO.
Philconsa v. Enriquez | 235 SCRA 506

It was held that where the Presidential veto is claimed to have been made in excess of authority, the issue of
impermissible intrusion by the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises. To the extent that the power
of Congress is impaired, so is the power of each member thereof. An act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by any
member of Congress.
Del Mar v. PAGCOR | GR No. 138298, November 29, 2000

Members of Congress sought to prevent PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating jai alai.
Jaworski v. PAGCOR | 419 SCRA 420

Senator Jaworski was held to have legal standing to question the operation of a jai alai fronton by PAGCOR on
the ground that it needs a legislative franchise.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra

A similar conclusion was reached where Representatives Suplico, et.al. and Senator Pimentel were considered as
proper parties to contest the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s proclamation of a “state of rebellion” after
the Oakwood incident.
 Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization | 246 SCRA 334

Even as it was held that the petitioners, as members of Congress, did not have locus standi to question the bidding and
sale of the 40% block of Petron shares to Aramco in the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights
of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, nonetheless, they were allowed to bring action
in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, infra.
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia | 239 SCRA 386

The Court held that KMU members who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys every day are directly
affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increases in passenger fares. They are, therefore, proper arties to
contest the validity of DOTC memoranda, etc., authorizing provincial bus and jeepneys operators to increase or
decrease transportation fares. In the same vein, an association of registered recruitment agencies had legal
standing to question the constitutionality of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, in order to assert
the concern of its constituents.
 Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo | GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005
The petitioners, composed of ten labor unions, seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 185, dated March 10,
2003, which transfer administrative supervision over the NLRC from the NLRC Chairman to the Secretary of Labor, could
not show that their members sustained or were in danger of sustaining injury from EO 185. This was because the authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor did not extend to the power to review, revise, reverse or modify the decisions of
the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra

Petitioners Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa were declared to be without legal standing.
Lacson v. Perez | GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001

Supreme Court said that petitioners are juridical persons not subject to arrest. Even if they were “people’s
organizations”, they still would have no requisite personality, as held in Kilosbayan v. Morato, infra neither were
petitioners Social Justice Society Officers/Members, in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, proper parties.
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Domingo v. Carague | GR No. 161065, April 15, 2005

The petitioners failed to show any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan.
There was no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its implementation, and they admitted that “they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any
improper or improvident act against the respondents.” Clearly, then, they do not have any legal standing to file
the instant suit.
Cutaran v. DENR | GR No. 134958, January 31, 2001

The Supreme Court refused to give due course to a petition seeking to enjoin the DENR from processing the
ancestral land claim of private respondent over a property located at Camp John Hay reservation in Baguio, on
the ground that there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioner’s asserted right. Courts will not touch
an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that
has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its legality. Until such time, petitioners are
simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at a future time.
Joya v. PCGG | 255 SCRA 568

The petitioners having failed to show that they were the owners of the masters’ paintings and antique
silverware, were not deemed proper parties to enjoin the PCGG from selling at public auction the aforesaid items
seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum as allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections | 289 SCRA 337
It was held that the petitioner, an association of lawyers of radio and television broadcast companies, was not a
proper party, because the members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered any injury as a result
of Section 92, BP 881. They do not have any interest as registered voters, because the case does not involve the
right of suffrage. Neither do they have an interest as taxpayers because the case does not include the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. However, a co-petitioner, a broadcast company, was deemed to have
locus standi because it would suffer losses from the implementation of Section 92, BP 881, since it would be
required to give free airtime to the COMELEC.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) v. Zamora | GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
The petition seeking to nullify the order of President Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join
the PBP in visibility patrols around the Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the ground that the IBP had no legal
standing to question the presidential act.
 Kilosbayan v. Guingona | 232 SCRA 110

A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which may be set aside by the Court in view of the importance of
the issues involved. Thus, where the issues raised by the petitioners are of paramount public interest, the Court may, in
the exercise of its discretion, brush aside the procedural barrier.
Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy | GR No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Lagman v. Torres | GR No. 127867
Where, because of the far-reaching importance of the validity of RA 8180 deregulating the downstream oil
industry, the Supreme Court brushed aside technicalities and took cognizance of the petition.
Lim v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002

The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s submission that the petitioners, by their being lawyers,
are not invested with sufficient personality to institute the action, aside from their having failed to demonstrate
the requisite showing of direct personal injury. But because of the paramount importance and the constitutional
significance of the issues raised in the petition, the Court in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushed aside
the procedural barrier and took cognizance of the petitions.
Information Technology Foundation v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
It was held that the subject matter of the case is “a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest”. In
other words, it is of “paramount public interest” and of “transcendental importance”. The nation’s political and
economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections; accordingly, the
award for the automation of the electoral process was a matter of public concern, imbued with the public
interest. This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society.”
 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections | 41 SCRA 702

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Sanidad v. Commission on Elections | 73 SCRA 333

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari | GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
A taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is a proper party to question the validity of a law appropriating public funds. The
Supreme Court said that the petitioner has legal standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petitioner seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. In this case, there were two constitutional issues involved: first, the
right of the citizen to information on matters of public concern; and second, the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens.
Tatad. Garcia | 243 SCRA 436

It was held that the prevailing doctrine in taxpayer suits is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into
by the national government or government-owned or –controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law
(citing Kilosbayan ruling).
Information Technology Foundation v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
This case reiterated the principle that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement
of public funds”, or if public money is being “deflected to any improper purpose”, or when petitioners seek to
retain respondent from “wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.” In
this case, the individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, asset a material interest in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully used, claiming that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity,
and the award of the contract contrary to law and regulations.
Brillantes v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 163193, June 15, 2004

The Supreme Court ruled that the representatives of political parties and the citizens’ arms authorized to
conduct an unofficial quick count are proper parties to question the COMELEC resolution directing the
transmission to it electronically by computers of the results of the elections in the precincts, to be used for
advanced unofficial tabulation.
Jumamil v. Café | GR No. 144570, September 21, 2005

The petitioner, as taxpayer, was held to be a proper party to question the constitutionality of several municipal
resolutions and ordinances appropriating certain amounts for the construction of stalls in a public market, as
well as the lease contracts entered into pursuant thereto. Considering the importance to the public of the suit
assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take
cognizance of the case.
 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority | 224 SCRA 236

It was held that the Court has discretion on whether a taxpayer suit may be given due course.
 FACIAL CHALLENGE
The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional.
The exception is the so-called “facial challenge”. But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it
operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Justice Mendoza’s concurring opinion in Cruz v. DENR | GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as applied”, is permitted in the interest of preventing a
“chilling effect” on freedom of expression.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001

A facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenge
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo, supra

The Court held that a facial review of PP 1017 using the overbreadth doctrine is uncalled for. First, the
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their face statutes in free speeches cases, not
for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered “harmful” and “unconstitutionally protected conduct”. The incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second,
facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly ad only as a last
resort, thus, is generally disfavored. A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
102
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, the petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
 VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
Related to “overbreadth”, this doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence, must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is subject to the same principles governing the overbreadth
doctrine.
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo, supra cited in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 167011, April 30,
2008
For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications.
The test to determine whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice. The Court has stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Thus, Section 45(J) of RA 8189 which provides that violation of any of the provisions of the law is an election
offense is specific enough since as held in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “a statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them, much less do we have to define every word we use.
As to the issue of vagueness, the petitioners did not attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in its application.
They failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP
1017.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY
 Matibag v. Benipayo | GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

It was held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent
court that can resolve the same, such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Estrarija v. Ranada | GR No. 159314, June 26, 2006

Where the petitioner, who had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman for dishonesty and
grave misconduct, raised the issue of constitutionality of the provision in RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) for the first
time before the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that the petitioner raised the issue at the earliest
opportunity. He could not raise it in his motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, because the Office
of the Ombudsman is without jurisdiction to entertain questions of the constitutionality of a law.
Umali v. Guingona | GR No. 131124, March 21, 1999

The question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was
not entertained because the issue was raised by the petitioner only in his motion for reconsideration before the
RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the issue for the first time at that stage of the proceedings.
People v. Vera | 65 Phil 56

Zandueta v. de la Costa | 66 Phil 115
In criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court. In civil cases, the question
can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case itself. And in every
case, except when there is estoppels, it can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.
103
THE DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINATIVE OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 7
THE CASE ITSELF 1. No person shall be appointed
Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he
Because of the doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect be
is a natural-born citizen of the
accorded the other departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions Philippines. A Member of the
as long as there is some other basis that can be sued for a decision. The constitutional Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for
issue must be the lis mota of the case.
fifteen years or more, a judge of a
Zandueta v. de la Costa, supra lower court or engaged in the
De la Llana v. Alba, supra practice of law in the Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the

 Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corporation | GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008 qualifications of judges of lower
Where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund of the capital recovery courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is
component it had paid to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under a citizen of the Philippines and a
LOI No. 1465 by challenging the validity of the LOI, the Supreme Court held member of the Philippine Bar.
that the issue of constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in the
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a
complaint. It is the lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot person of proven competence,
determine the claim without resolving the issue of constitutionality. integrity, probity, and
independence.
 Tarrosa v. Singson | 232 SCRA 553 ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 9
The Court refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of the assailed The Members of the Supreme Court and
provision in RA 7653 (which provided that the appointment of the Governor judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas should be confirmed by the Commission on three nominees preferred by the Judicial
Appointments) because the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensible to the appointments need no confirmation.
determination of the case. For the lower courts, the President shall
issue the appointment within ninety days
Ty v. Trampe | 250 SCRA 500 from the submission of the list.
The Court stressed that it will not pass upon a question of ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8
constitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be 1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the
statute or the general law. Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 128448, February 1, 2001 representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of
Since the issue was primarily for accounting and specific the Integrated Bar, a professor of
performance which could be resolved without having to rule on the law, a retired Member of the
constitutionality of PD 579, the Court refused to exercise the power Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
of judicial review.
2. The regular members of the Council
 Arceta v. Judge Mangrobang | GR No. 152895, June 15, 2004 shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the
In a new challenge to the constitutionality of BP 22, the Supreme Court did consent of the Commission on
not find the constitutional question to be the very lis mota presented in the Appointments. Of the Members first
controversy. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, appointed, the representative of the
Integrated Bar shall serve for four
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of years, the professor of law for three
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. years, the retired Justice for two
years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
5. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
A. Orthodox View 3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall
An unconstitutional act is not a law. It confers no rights. It imposes no duties, be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its
it affords no protection, it creates no office, it is inoperative, as if it had not proceedings.
been passed at all. Article 7, NCC
B. Modern View 4. The regular Members of the Council
shall receive such emoluments as
Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine the rights of the may be determined by the Supreme
parties as if the statute had no existence. Certain legal effects of the statute Court. The Supreme Court shall
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Thus, a provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
public officer who implemented an unconstitutional law prior to he
declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be held liable. 5. The Council shall have the principal
Manila Motors v. Flores | 99 Phil 738 function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may
Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB | 35 SCRA 429 exercise such other functions and
Republic v. Herida | 119 SCRA 411 duties as the Supreme Court may
Pelaez v. Auditor General | 15 SCRA 569 assign to it.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 148 SCRA 659
104
6. Requisites of Partial Unconstitutionality

A. The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the
law.
B. The valid portion can stand independently as law.
In Re: Cunanan | 94 Phil 534
Salazar v. Achacoso | 183 SCRA 145
APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY
1. Qualifications for all Members of the Judiciary

 Proven competence
 Integrity
 Probity
 Independence
 Qualifications for Members of the Supreme Court

 Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
 At least 40 years of age
 For 15 years or more a judge of lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
 Qualifications for Members of the Lower Collegiate Courts

 Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
 Member of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications
 Qualifications for Members of the Lower Courts

 Citizen of the Philippines
 Member of the Philippine Bar, but Congress may prescribe other qualifications
2. Procedure for Appointment

Appointment by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. The appointment shall need no confirmation.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4(1)

Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof.

For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety (90) days from the submission by the JBC of such list.
 In Re: Mateo Valenzuela | AM No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

This is related to the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments under Article VII, Section 15, which states that
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or acting President
shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
It was held that during this period, the President is not required to make appointments to the courts, nor allowed to do so.
While the filling up of vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling
reason to justify the issuance of the appointment during the period of the ban.
3. The Judicial and Bar Council
 Composition | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8(1)

 Ex-officio members: Chief Justice as Chairman; Secretary of Justice; and a Representative of Congress.
 Regular Members: a Representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a Professor of Law, a Retired Justice of
the Supreme Court; and a Representative of the Private Sector.
 Secretary Ex-officio: The Clerk of the Supreme Court.
 Appointment | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8(2)
105
 Regular members shall be appointed by the President for a term of four (4) years, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. They shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
 Powers & Functions | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 8(5)

 Recommendation of members of Judiciary.
 May exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
THE SUPREME COURT
1. Composition | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4(1)

 A Chief Justice
 Fourteen (14) Associate Justices
 It may sit en banc or in its divisions of three, five or seven members
 Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof
2. En Banc | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4(2)

 All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law.
 All other cases which, under the Rules of Court, are to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations.
 These cases are decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues and voted thereon.
3. Division | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4(3)

 Other cases or matters may be heard in division.
 Decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues and voted thereon, but in no case without the concurrence of at least three (3) such members.
 No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
 Fortich v. Corona | GR No. 131457, August 19, 1999

When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc. The Supreme Court interpreted the
provision by drawing a distinction between “cases” on the one hand, and “matters” on the other hand, such that cases are
“decided”, while matters are “resolved.” On the basis of this distinction, only “cases” are referred to the Supreme Court en
banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
 Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals | 261 SCRA 464

The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Court is purely an internal matter in which the petitioner has no business
at all. With its new membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party’s case when, after
its re-examination, the rectification appears proper and necessary.
4. Powers | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 5

 Original Jurisdiction
 Over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
 Appellate Jurisdiction
 Review, revise modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
 All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question.
 All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
 All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
 All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
 All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
 Ruffy v. Chief of Staff | supra

Note that this power does not include the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of administrative bodies,
but is limited to final judgments and orders of lower courts.
 People v. Redulosa | 255 SCRA 279
106
Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial court forward the records of the case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction.
 Garcia v. People | GR No. 106531, November 18, 1999

Where the penalty imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal the decision of conviction,
otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final and executory.
 Fabian v. Desierto | GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Article VI, Section 30 provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its concurrence. RA 6770, which provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was declared
unconstitutional, because it expands the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence.
Namuhe v. Ombudsman | GR No. 124965, October 29, 1998
Tirol v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 135913, November 4, 1999
Villavert v. Desierto | GR No. 133715, February 13, 2000
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 135789, January 31, 2002

It was held that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
 Temporary Assignment of Judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require; but the assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
 Order Change of Venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice.

People v. Gutierrez | 39 SCRA 173
 Rule Making Power

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
 Limitations on the Rule-Making Power

The rules must provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. They must be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Primicias v. Ocampo | 93 Phil 451

Authority for the principle that trial by assessors is a substantive right and may not be repealed by the Supreme
Court.
First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 110571 (1994)

It was held that Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91, which orders that appeals from decisions of administrative
bodies shall now be filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal EO 226 and did not diminish, increase or
modify the substantive right to appeal. It merely transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of said
agencies to the Court of Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from notice), both of which are
merely procedural in character.
 In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division | AM No. 02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002
It was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules
governing the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case
against former President Joseph Estrada.
 In Re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines | 49 SCRA 22

An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from a bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. The integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of
every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.
107
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues | BM No. 1370, May 9,
2005
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long one’s
membership in the IBP remains regardless of lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged
in.
In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon | AC No. 1928, August 3, 1978

The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of
law. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
 THE WRIT OF AMPARO | Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15
(1993)
The nature and time-tested role of Amparo has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the
protection of constitutional rights. Amparo, literally “to protect”, originated in Mexico and spread throughout the
Western Hemisphere where it gradually evolved into various forms, depending on the particular needs of each
country.
Rule on the Writ of Amparo | Resolution AM No. 07-9-12-SC (October 24, 2007)
Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition for a Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity.
Section 14 of the Rule allows the grant by the Court of interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary
protection order, inspection order, production order or a witness protection order.
Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association | GR No. 182795, June 5, 2008

No Writ of Amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected. Petitioners right to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore,
no legal basis for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
Tapuz v. Del Rosario | GR No. 182484, January 17, 2008

The Writ of Amparo shall not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when
it will inordinately interfere with these processes.
 THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

The Writ of Habeas Data is an independent remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to
informational privacy. The essence of the constitutional right to informational privacy. The essence of the
constitutional right to informational privacy goes to the very heart of a person’s individuality, an exclusive and
personal sphere upon which the State has no right to intrude without any legitimate public concern. The basic
attribute of an effective right to informational privacy is the right of the individual to control the flow of information
concerning or describing them.
Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data | Resolution AM No. 08-1-16-SC (February 2, 2008)
Section 1 thereof provides: “The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice | GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court declared: “But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 5(5)

Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
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 Power of Appointment | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 5(6)

The Supreme Court appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
 Power of Administrative Supervision | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 6

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
 Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao | GR No. 124295, October 23, 2001

The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a
judge; he must first endorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
 Maceda v. Vasquez | 221 SCRA 469

Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman | 265 SCRA 819
In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the
former’s certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
 Godinez v. Alano | AM RTJ-98-1409, February 18, 1999

Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are confidential in nature The Supreme Court shall,
in order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out to be innocent of within thirty days from
the charges. It can take years to build a reputation and only a single accusation, the opening of each
regular session of the
although unfounded, to destroy it. Congress, submit to the
President and the
 Annual Report | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 16 Congress an annual report
on the operations and
Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of activities of the Judiciary.
Congress, to the President and to Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.
5. Consultations & Decisions of Supreme Court | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 13 & 14

The conclusions of the
 Conclusion in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before Supreme Court in any case
the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification submitted to it for the
decision en banc or in
to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued. This requirement is applicable also division shall be reached
to lower collegiate courts. in consultation before the
 Prudential Bank v. Castro | 158 SCRA 646 case the case assigned to a
Member for the writing of
This requirement does not apply to administrative cases. the opinion of the Court. A
 Cruz v. Secretary, DENR | GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000 certification to this effect
When the votes are equally divided and the majority vote is not obtained; then signed by the Chief Justice
shall be issued and a copy
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition shall be thereof attached to the
dismissed. record of the case and
served upon the parties.
Any Member who took no
 The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision
 Mendoza v. CFI | 66 SCRA 96 or resolution must state
the reason therefor. The
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals | 186 SCRA 1 same requirements shall
This requirement does not apply to a minute resolution dismissing a petition for be observed by all lower
habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, provided a legal basis is given therein. collegiate court.
Neither will it apply to administrative cases. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14
No decision shall be
 Solid Homes v. Laserna | GR No. 166051, April 8, 2008 rendered by any court
without expressing
This constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of “memorandum therein clearly and
decisions”, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law distinctly the facts and the
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. “Memorandum decisions” are a law on which it is based.
species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the No petition for review or
provisions of Section 40, BP 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, motion for
practically, convenience and docket status of our courts. But to be valid, it cannot reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only be refused due course or
by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not denied without stating the
easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum legal basis therefor.
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed. It must provide for
109
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of
law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensible part of the decision.
 Dizon v. Judge Lopez | AM No. RTJ-96-1339, September 5, 1997

A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly
and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. However, it is
imperative that the decision not simply be limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case,
summarize the facts with reference to the record, and contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and
the tribunal’s statement and conclusions on the case. The decision, which consisted only of the dispositive portion
(denominated a sin perjuicio judgment) was held invalid.
 People v. Baring | GR No. 137933, January 28, 2002

Supreme Court said that the trial court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of the accused, not by the lack of direct
evidence against the accused but by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or
admissibility of the evidence, the assessments made from the evidence, and the conclusion drawn therefrom, after
applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.
De Vera v. Judge Dames | AM RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999

Because the respondent judge had precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without sufficiently
explaining why, he was deemed to have violated ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 and although there was no clear
proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration, the Judge must be sanctioned.
 No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
 Fr. Martinez v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 123547, May 21, 2001

The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in this wise: “Evidently, the motion poses
nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been considered and passed upon in the decision
sought to be reconsidered. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the same.” The Supreme Court held that there was
adequate compliance with the constitutional provision.
 Prudential Bank v. Castro | 158 SCRA 646

The Supreme Court ruled that “lack of merit” is sufficient declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition for review
or motion for reconsideration.
 Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127682, April 24, 1998

 Tichangco v. Enriquez | GR No. 150629, June 30, 2004
It was held that when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments or motion, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states – in a minute resolution – that the
questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision is shown or some other legal
basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
TENURE OF JUDGES & JUSTICES
1. Supreme Court | ARTICLE XI, SECTION 2

Justices may be removed only by impeachment.
 In Re: First Endorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez | AM No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988
The Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) is without authority to conduct an investigation on charges
against a member of the Supreme Court with the end in view of filing a criminal information against him with the
Sandiganbayan. This is so, because if convicted in the criminal case, the Justice would be removed, and such removal would
violate his security of tenure.
2. Lower Courts | ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 11

Judges shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office.
 The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.
 People v. Judge Gacott | 246 SCRA 52

110
It was held that the first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It did not intend that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority”. Thus, only
cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.
 Maceda v. Vasquez | 221 SCRA 469

In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the
former’s certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
 Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman | GR No. 132177, July 17, 2001

Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao | GR No. 124295, October 23, 2001
It was held that because of Article VIII, Section 6, vesting in the Supreme Court exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge or court employee involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it referred to the Supreme Court.
 Office of the Judicial Administrator v. Pascual | AM No. MT-93-783, July 29, 1996
The Supreme Court, reiterating Raquiza v. Castaneda, declared that the grounds for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt, particularly where the charges on which the removal is sought are
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetence.
De Vera v. Judge Dames | AM RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999

The Supreme Court said that judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous ARTICLE XI, SECTION 2
The President, the Vice-
order or decision rendered in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, President, the Members of
malice or bad faith. This, however, is not license for them to be negligent or the Supreme Court, the
abusive in performing their adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad Members of the
Constitutional Commissions,
faith or malice will not totally exculpate them from charges of incompetence and the Ombudsman may be
and ignorance of the law when they render decisions that are totally bereft of removed from office on
factual and legal bases. impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution,
Dayot v. Judge Garcia | AM No. MTJ-00-1282, March 1, 2001 treason, bribery, graft and
Where the judge was nonetheless taken to task for issuing an order corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public
discrediting the period served by the prisoner outside the jail without giving trust. All other public
the prisoner a chance to be heard, thus betraying his ignorance of the officers and employees may
cardinal principles of due process. be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
De Guzman v. Judge Sison | AM No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001
The Supreme Court said that the respondent had shamed the judiciary by ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 11
The Members of the
deliberately applying not only patently inapplicable but also already repealed Supreme Court and judges of
laws. The judge was dismissed from the service, because according to the the lower court shall hold
Court, when the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it office during good behavior
until they reach the age of
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge
Spouses Antonio & Elsa Fortuna v. Judge Penaco- Sitaca | AM No. RTJ-01- the duties of their office.
1633, June 19, 2001 The Supreme Court en banc
Because the judge accepted at face value a mere machine copy of the bail shall have the power to
bond issued by another court, the judge was subjected to administrative discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their
sanction, because it is highly imperative that judges should be conversant dismissal by a vote of
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative majority of the Members
doctrines. who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted in
Agulan v. Judge Fernandez | AM No. MTJ-01-1354, April 4, 2001 thereon.
For receiving the deposit of cash as bail and keeping the same in his office,
the judge was held administratively liable, even after the complainant
executed an affidavit of desistance.
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 In Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 10
Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of A Suspected Drug Queen | The salary of the Chief Justice
and of the Associate Justices of
AM No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001 the Supreme Court, and of
The Supreme Court said that although every office in government service is a judges of lower courts shall be
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and fixed by law. During the
continuance in office, their
uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of salary shall not be decreased.
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the
Judiciary so indispensible in an orderly society cannot be preserved. There is ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 15
1. All cases or matters filed
simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards after the effectivity of this
of judicial conduct and integrity. Constitution must be
decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from
In Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC Branch 54 Manila, of an date of submission for the
Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense | AM No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001 Supreme Court, and, unless
Where the judge, despite opposition from the prosecution, simply issued an reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for
order submitting for resolution the motion and the opposition without the all lower collegiate courts,
same being heard, and later, granting the motion for extension of medical and three months for all
confinement for two months, the Supreme Court found the judge guilty of other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be
gross misconduct for being utterly inefficient and for manifest partiality. And deemed submitted for
it is said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic decision or resolution
and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he memorandum required by
holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately the Rules of Court or by the
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the
corresponding period, a
 ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 | No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it certification to this effect
undermines the security of tenure of its members. signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued
 De la Llana v. Alba | 112 SCRA 294 and a copy thereof
It was held that BP 129 was a valid reorganization law, and that, therefore, the attached to the record of
the case or matter, and
abolition of then existing judicial offices did not violate security of tenure. served upon the parties.
NOTE: In view of the clear declaration of Article VIII, Section 2, the ruling in The certification shall
De la Llana, as well as that in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice | L-7918, state why a decision or
resolution has not been
January 18, 1955, may be said to have been modified accordingly. rendered or issued within
said period.
4. Despite the expiration of
SALARIES the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without
 Nitafan v. Tan | 152 SCRA 284 prejudice to such
responsibility as may have
Salaries are fixed by law and may not be decreased during their continuance in office. In this case, it been incurred in
was held that imposition of income tax on salaries of judges does not violate the constitutional consequence thereof, shall
prohibition against decrease in salaries. decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted
thereto for determination,
without further delay.
PERIODS FOR DECISION
1. All cases filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved, from date of
submission, within: 24 months – Supreme Court; 12 months – lower collegiate courts; and 3 months – all other lower courts; unless,
in the two latter cases, the period is reduced by the Supreme Court. A certification to be signed by the Chief Justice or Presiding
Justice shall be issued stating the reason for delay.
 Young v. Judge De Guzman | AM No. RTJ-96-1365, February 18, 1999

While it is truly the duty of the Judge to decide cases with good dispatch, he must not sacrifice for expediency’s sake the
fundamental requirements of due process, nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to
know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to
every party.
 Dizon v, Judge Lopez | AM No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997

Respondent Judge was held to have violated Article VIII, Section 15, because although she promulgated her decision within
three months from submission, only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation, and it took one year and 8 months
more before a copy of the complete decision was furnished the complainant.
What respondent did was to render a “sin perjuicio” judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support
of its conclusions, to be later supplemented by the final judgment. As early as 1923, the Supreme Court already expressed its
112
disapproval of the practice of rendering “sin perjuicio” judgments. What should be promulgated must be the complete
decision.
 Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 27 of Lapulapu City | AM Case No. 97-9-282-RTC, April 22, 1998
Article VIII, Section 15, is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, and judges are repeatedly reminded that
failure to decide cases within the prescribed period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.
Sanchez v. Judge Vestil | AM No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1998

The Supreme Court said that judges who cannot comply with this mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in
their request the reasons for the delay.
Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista | AM MTJ-98-1161, August 17, 1999

The Supreme Court said that a judge cannot be allowed to blame her court personnel for her own incompetence or
negligence. She ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own
record of cases so that she may act on them promptly.
Gonzales- Dacano v. Judge Siapno | AM No. MTJ-00-1279, March 1, 2001

Neither does delay in the transcription of stenographic notes excuse such failure, nor do additional assignments or
designations make him less liable for the delay.
2. Despite expiration of the mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it without further delay.
 The court does not lose jurisdiction over the case, despite the lapse of the mandatory period, but the erring judge or justice
may be subjected to administrative sanctions for the delay.
3. Marcelino v. Cruz | 121 SCRA 51

Interpreting a similar provision in the 1973 Constitution as reiterated in New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502, the Supreme
Court held that the provision is merely directory, being procedural in nature.
 Bernardo v. Judge Fabros | AM No. MTJ-99-1189, May 12, 1999

The Supreme Court said that the failure of the judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross
dereliction of duty the gravity of which depends on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on time, the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Other cases where administrative sanctions were imposed by the Supreme Court on judges for failure to decide or resolve cases
or matters within the periods prescribed in the Constitution.
Pros. Robert Visbal v. Judge Ramos | AM No. MTJ-00-1306, March 20, 2001
Atty. Montes v. Judge Bugtas | AM No. RTJ-01-1627, April 27, 2001
Maquiran v. Judge Lopez | AM No. RTJ-00-1606
Canada v. Judge Montecillo | AM No. RTJ-01-1664
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Branch 69, Silay City, Judge Arinday, respondent | AM No. 99-5-162-
RTC, May 11, 2001
Report on the Judicial Audit in the MTC’s of Calasiao, Binmaley, Sta. Barbara and Mapandan and in the MCTC of Tayug-San
Nicolas, all in Pangasinan | AM No. MTJ-01-1375, November 13, 2001
Arap v. Judge Mustafa | AM No. SCC-01-7, March 12, 2002
 In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan | AM No. 00-8-05-SC, November 08, 2001
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena was fined P20,000 and was relieved of his powers, functions and duties as
Presiding Justice, so that he may devote himself exclusively to decision-writing. His motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 31, 2002.
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A R T I C L E I X
Constitutional Commissions
1. General Provisions 9. Right to Self-Organization

1. Scope 10. Protection of Temporary Employees
2. Safeguards in Insuring the Independence of the 11. Standardization of Compensation
Commissions 12. Double Compensation
3. Inhibitions and Disqualifications 13. Oath of Allegiance
4. Rotational Scheme of Appointments
5. Decisions 3. The Commission on Elections
6. Enforcement of Decision 1. Composition
2. Constitutional Powers and Functions
2. The Civil Service Commission 3. Statutory Powers of the Commission on Elections
1. Composition 4. Party System
2. Constitutional Objectives and Functions 5. Election Period
3. Scope of the Civil Service 6. Judicial Review of the Commission on Elections
4. Classes of Service Decisions
5. Appointments in the Civil Service
6. Disqualifications 4. Commission on Audit
7. Security of Tenure 1. Composition and Appointment
8. Partisan Political Activity 2. Powers and Duties
I. Common Provisions EIIB v. CA

Section 1. The Commissions CSC v. PAGCOR
Independent Commissions Canonizado v. Aguirre
Macalintal v. COMELEC Secretary Gloria v. CA
Section 2. Prohibitions Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary
Section 3. Salary Dimayuga v. Benedicto II
Section 4. Appointment of officials and employees Miranda v. Carreon
Independent Seneres v. COMELEC and Robles
Section 5. Fiscal Autonomy Competitive and non-competitive positions
Automatic Release of Funds NASECO v. NLRC
Section 6. Procedure Samson v. CA
Rules of Procedure Hernandez v. Villegas
Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals Achacoso v. Macaraig
Antonio v. COMELEC Briones v. Osmena
Section 7. Decisions Mayor v. Macaraig
Judicial Review Binamira v. Garrucho
Cua v. COMELEC – League of Cities, People v. Gacot Luego v. CSC
(relate, compare and contrast) Santiago v. CSC
Mison v. COA Astraquillo v. Manglapus
Mateo v. Court of Appeals SSS v. CA
Ambil v. COMELEC Aquino v. CSC
Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC PNOC v. NLRC
COMELEC Decisions Lapinid v. CSC
Section 8. Temporary appointments
Section 3. Personnel agency
II. The Civil Service Commission Mass appointments
Section 1. Organization Section 4. Oath
Gaminde v. COA Section 5. Standardization of compensation
Section 2. Scope Section 6. Lame ducks
Scope and purpose of system People v. Sandiganbayan
114
Section 7. Prohibited appointments Sanidad v. COMELEC

Flores v. Drilon and Gordon ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
Section 8. Compensation SWS v. COMELEC
Section 5. Executive Clemency
III. The Commission on Elections Section 6. Multi-party system
Section 1. Organization Section 7. Invalid votes
Brillantes v. Yorac Section 8. Political parties
Cayetano v. Monsod Section 9. Election period
Section 2. Powers and Functions Section 10. Protection of candidates
Nature of COMELEC Powers Section 11. Funds
Galido v. COMELEC
People v. Delgado IV. The Commission on Audit
People v. Inting Section 1. Organization
Corpus v. Tanodbayan Section 2. Powers and Function
Tan v. COMELEC Dingcong v. Guingona, Jr.
Reyes v. RTC Danville Maritime, Inc. v. COA
Kilosbayan v. COMELEC Ramos v. Aquino
Buac and Bautista v. COMELEC Mamaril v. Domingo
LDP v. COMELEC Sambeli v. Province of Isabela
Mananzala v. COMELEC Osmena v. COA
Power to Annul Bustamante v. COA
Power to call special elections Orocio v. COA
COMELEC non-powers Caltex Philippines v. COA
Registration of political parties Polloso v, Gangan and COA
Section 3. En Banc or division DBP v. COA
Baytan v. COMELEC Parreno v. COA
Balindong v. COMELEC Section 3. Coverage
Section 4. Election period powers Section 4. Annual Report
Supervision of media and public utilities
DEAN ANDRES BAUTISTA
I. Common Provisions
A. Scope
B. General Characteristics
C. General Powers
D. General Prohibitions
II. Civil Service Commission

A. Composition
B. Appointment
C. Scope
D. Functions of the Commission
E. Civil Service Appointment
F. Prohibitions
G. Basic Rights of Civil Servants
III. Commission on Elections

A. Composition
B. Appointment
C. Powers
D. Administrative Matters
E. Party Matters
F. Other Matters
IV. Commission on Audit

A. Composition
B. Appointment
C. Powers
D. Cases
115
GENERAL PROVISIONS ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 1

The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are
 The independent constitutional commissions are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission the Civil Service Commission, the
on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit.
 Safeguards in Insuring the Independence of the Commissions ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 3

There are independent offices specifically authorized by the Constitution to appoint their The salary of the Chairman and
officials. This does not imply that their appointment will not be subject to Civil Service Law and the Commissioners shall be fixed
by law and shall not be
Rules. If otherwise, these independent bodies would arrogate upon themselves a power that decreased during their tenure.
properly belongs to the Civil Service Commission. Had the intention of the framers of the
ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 4
Constitutional Commissions in the matter of appointments, it would have been so provided. But
The Constitutional Commissions
that is not the case. And since all matters pertaining to appointments are within the realm of shall appoint their officials and
expertise to the CSC, all laws, rules and regulations it issues on appointments must be complied employees in accordance with
with. law.
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005 ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 5
The Commission shall enjoy
 They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute. fiscal autonomy. Their approved
annual appropriations shall be
 Each is expressly described as “independent”. automatically and regularly
 Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute. released.
 The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
 The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years. Each Commission en banc may
 The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting promulgate its own rules
capacity. concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any
of its offices. Such rules,
Brillantes v. Yorac | 192 SCRA 258 however, shall not diminish,
It was held that the designation of Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the increase, or modify substantive
rights.
Commission on Elections was a violation of this provision.
Matibag v. Benipayo | GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 Each Commission shall perform
such other functions as may be
The Supreme Court said that when an ad interim appointment (of the Chairman of the provided by law.
Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it was by-passed, or that there was not
ample time for the Commission on Appointments to pass upon the same), another ad
interim appointment may be extended to the appointee without violating the
Constitution.
 The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in office.
 The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections perform key functions in the
government. In order to protect their integrity, they have been made constitutional bodies. Because they perform vital
functions of government, it is essential that their independence be protected against outside influences and political
pressures. Hence, they enjoy fiscal autonomy; the salary of Commissioners may not be diminished during their
continuance in office; the Commissioners have a fixed term; and they are removable only by impeachment.
Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management | GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005
The petitioner, via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. CSC claims that the reason for the withholding was the “no report, no
release” policy. Budget Department, however, claims that the failure to release the fund in full is because of shortage of
funds.
Respecting respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the
same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming
that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate above-quoted Article IX-A,
Section 5. If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall of revenues,
thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.
The Supreme Court said that the “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, without violating Article IX-A, Section 5. The “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be construed to mean that no condition
to fund releases to it may be imposed. However, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress below
116
the amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected. Article VIII, Section 3,
prohibiting the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary below the amount appropriated for the previous year, does
not appear in Article IX-A, Section 5. The plain implication of this omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights | GR No. 155336, November 25,
2004
The Supreme Court said that the Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
 Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase of modify substantive
rights – though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court.
 The Constitutional Commissions are independent bodies. Hence, the power of the Supreme Court over rules issued by
quasi-judicial bodies found in Article VIII, Section 5(5) does not apply to them. The Court, however, in appropriate
cases, may exercise “judicial review” over them.
 Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals | October 20, 1993

In case of conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by a Commission and a Rule of Court, the rule of the
Commission should prevail if the proceeding is before a Commission. But if the proceeding is before a court, the Rule
of Court prevails.
 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

The Congress may not assume power to review rules promulgated by the ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 2
No member of a Constitutional
Commission. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, Commission shall, during his tenure,
and revise the Implementing Rules for the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of hold any other office or employment.
2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the active management or control of any
COMELEC. business which, in any way, may be
affected by the functions of his office,
nor shall he be financially interested,
 The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to directly or indirectly, in any contract
strengthen their integrity. with, or in any franchise or privilege
 The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or
with Civil Service Law. instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled
 Inhibitions and Disqualifications corporations or their subsidiaries.
 Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.
 Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.
 Shall not engage in the active management or control of any business which in ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 7
any way may be affected by the functions of his office. Each Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its Members, any
 Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in case or matter brought before it
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, within sixty days from the date of its
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or –controlled submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted
corporations or their subsidiaries. for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules
 Rotational Scheme of Appointments of the Commission or by the
The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five and three years, respectively. After the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
first commissioners are appointed, the rotational scheme is intended to prevent the provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of
possibility of one President appointing all the Commissioners. each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by
Gamide v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000 the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
It was held that in order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution,
the rotational plan requires two conditions:
1. The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common date.
2. Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term.
 Decisions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution.
117
Orocio v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 75959, August 31, 1992

Bustamante v. Commission on Audit | 216 SCRA 134 (1992)
Since the Commissions are collegial bodies, the decisions are made by the body and not by individual members of the
body. No individual member may make a decision for the Commission. Much less may cases be decided by subordinates of
the Commission. Not even the Commission’s legal counsel may make a decision for the Commission.
Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582 (1987)

Estrella v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 160465, May 27, 2004
The Court had ruled that “the three (3) members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional
provision.” This obviously contradicts Section 7, which says: “Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.”
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations.
Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC | GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

Commissioner Guiani, before his retirement from the COMELEC, might have signed a draft ponencia in a case. He vacated
his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulgated. The ponencia does not have any value. Before
that resolution or decision to speak of. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not
before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is
promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much less could he be the ponente of the resolution or
decision.
The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the members, not only of those
who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon in order that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional
Commissions. Under rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v.
Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582
Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

Two Commissioners who participated in the consideration of the case retired before the promulgation of the COMELEC
decision but after they cast their vote. Four Commissioners were left. Their votes should be automatically withdrawn.
There is no decision until it is promulgated. The remaining four Commissioners constituted the total membership and
constituted a quorum.
Because two Commissioners who had participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the promulgation of the
decision, the Supreme Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if
they had not signed the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy. Unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or
against a party is concerned, there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity. In this case, the withdrawal of the votes of
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners, still constituting a
quorum at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 and thus, be a vote of the majority, in favor
of the respondent.
Alvarez v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001

As to the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-day period for decision, the Supreme Court said that the
Commission on Elections has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering the
Commission’s manpower and logistical limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines
realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by
reason of lack of material time. This is not what the framers had intended.
Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Aratuc v. Commission on Elections | 88 SCRA 251

The Supreme Court held that when it reviews a decision of the Commission on Elections, the Court exercises extraordinary
jurisdiction; thus, the proceeding is limited to issues involving grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and does not ordinarily empower the Court to review the factual findings of the Commission.
Loong v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 133676, April 14, 1999
118
The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed
Commission on Elections resolutions such as final orders, rulings and decisions of the Commission on Elections rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Reyes v. Commission on Audit | GR No 125129, March 29, 1999

The Court said that under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders of the Commission
on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Even before the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to the
Supreme Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the Constitution. The judgments and final
orders of Commission on Audit, are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Only when the Commission on Audit acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Mahinay v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 152457, April 30, 2008

In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-91, as amended by
Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, which took effect on June 1, 1995, provides that final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court held that the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission is a petition for
review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
Because the petitioner imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discretion” for ruling that he had no legal standing
to contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
grounds alleged shall be deemed “reversible errors”, not “grave abuse of discretion”.
 Enforcement of Decision
Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals | 212 SCRA 235
It was held that final decisions of the Civil Service Commission are enforceable by a writ of execution that the Civil Service
Commission may itself issue.
119
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 1

1. The civil service shall
be administered by the
 Composition Civil Service
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the Commission composed
of a Chairman and two
same time of their appointment, at least thirty-five (35) years of age, with proven capacity for public
Commissioners who
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the election shall be natural-born
immediately preceding their appointment. They shall be appointed by the President with the citizens of the
Philippines and, at the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
time of their
In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. appointment, at least
Brillantes v. Yorac, supra thirty-five years of age,
with proven capacity
for public
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000 administration, and
The common starting point for appointees to the Commission was on February 2, 1987, the date the must not have been
candidates for any
1987 Constitution take. This true even if Article XVIII, Section 15 provided for an extension of the elective position in the
tenure of the incumbents when the Constitution took effect. The extension of the tenure did not elections immediately
affect the term. Thus, in reckoning the seven year term, the starting point is always a February 2. preceding their
appointment.
Through this rotational system the staggering of the terms is preserved. This rule also applies to all 2. The Chairman and the
three Commissions. Commissioners shall
be appointed by the
President with the
 Nature of Powers consent of the
The Commission is an administrative agency, nothing more. As such, it can only perform powers Commission on
proper to an administrative agency. It can perform executive powers, quasi-judicial powers, and Appointments for a
term of seven years
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. without
reappointment. Of
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124374, December 15, 1999 those first appointed,
the Chairman shall
PD 51 created certain offices and they were promptly filled. After martial law, Mayor Simon of hold office for seven
Quezon City also filled them by appointment. In 1990, however, PD 51 was declared never to have years, a Commissioner
been published and therefore was not law. To save the workers therein, the sanggunian passed an for five years, and
another Commissioner
ordinance declaring the “personnel” absorbed in the department of public order and safety. But for three years,
since there were not enough position, Simon made them contractual employees. When Mathay without
became Mayor, he also renewed the contracts once but refused to renew them thereafter. The reappointment.
Appointment to any
Commission on Civil Service ordered Mathay to take them saying that their reappointment was vacancy shall be only
automatic pursuant to the ordinance. The ordinance was invalid. Ordering the absorption of the for the unexpired term
personnel is an act of appointment. The city council has no power to appoint. of the predecessor. In
no case shall any
Member be appointed
 Constitutional Objectives & Functions or designated in a
 As the central personnel agency of the Government, to establish a career service and temporary or acting
capacity.
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness
and courtesy in the civil service. To strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 3
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and to institutionalize a The Civil Service
Commission, as the central
management climate conducive to public accountability. personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish
 The general objective of a civil service is to establish and promote professionalism and a career service and adopt
measures to promote
efficiency in public service. morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness,
progressiveness, and
Secretary Orbos v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 92561, September 12, 1990 courtesy in the civil service.
Chang v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 86791, November 26, 1990 It shall strengthen the merit
When there are more than one person qualified for a position, the CSC may not dictate to and rewards system,
integrate all human
the appointing authority who among those qualified should be appointed. The power of resources development
the CSC is limited to attesting to the eligibility or ineligibility of the appointee. programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate
Lazo v. Civil Service Commission | 236 SCRA 469, 472 (1994) conducive to public
As central personnel agency of the government, the CSC may revoke a certificate of accountability. It shall
eligibility motu proprio. The power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the submit to the President and
the Congress an annual
power to revoke one that has been given. Whether or not hearing is required for report on its personnel
revocation depends on the circumstances of a case. Thus, where the case “simply involves programs.
the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than a re-evaluation of
documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key previously
set by it, notice and hearing is not required. Instead, what would apply in such a case is the
rule of res ipsa loquitor.
120
GSIS v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 87146, December 11, 1991

CSC has automatic review jurisdiction, not original, over personnel cases given by statute to the jurisdiction of
the Merit System Board.
Torregoza v. Civil Service Commission | 211 SCRA 230

In the exercise of its powers to implement RA 6850, which is the law granting civil service eligibility to employees under
provisional or temporary status who have rendered seven (7) years of efficient service, the Civil Service Commission enjoys
wide latitude of discretion, and may not be compelled by mandamus to issue such eligibility.
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 115863, March 31, 1995

The Commission cannot validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) because it was created by law, it can only
be abolished by Legislature.
Mathay v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 130214, August 9, 1999

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission has the power to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments. The Omnibus Rules implementing the
Administrative Code provides, among others, that notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may
be recalled for violation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission | 237 SCRA 184

It was held that the power of the Civil Service Commission includes the authority to recall an appointment initially
approved in disregard of applicable provisions of the Civil Service law and regulations.
Cruz v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 144464, November 22, 2001

The Commission has original jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint for cheating in the Civil Service examinations
committed by government employees. The fact that the complaint was filed by the Civil Service Commission itself does not
mean that it cannot be an impartial judge.
Olanda v. Bugayong | GR No. 140917, October 10, 2003 citing Mantala v. Salvador 206 SCRA 264
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure, that decisions of lower
level officials in cases involving personnel action be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission.
The Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over such personnel actions.
Ontiveros v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 145401, May 7, 2001

The Commission does not have an appellate jurisdiction over a case of
separation from government service made pursuant to Article II, Section 2 ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2
of the Provisional Constitution, which provided: “All elective and appointive 1. The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office agencies of the Government, including
until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order, or upon the government-owned or controlled
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is corporations with original charters.
2. Appointments in the civil service shall
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.” be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as
 Scope of the Civil Service practicable, and, except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily
Embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the confidential, or highly technical, by
Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original competitive examination.
charters. 3. No officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
PNOC Energy Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations 4. No officer or employee in the civil
Corporation | 201 SCRA 487 (1991) service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or
The Civil Service system under the new Constitution covers only partisan political campaign.
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charter. 5. The right to self-organization shall not
Moreover, even if a case arose under the 1973 Constitution but is to be be denied to government employees.
6. Temporary employees of the
decided under the 1987 Constitution, the applicable rule is that of the 1987 Government shall be given such
Constitution. The moment, however, that a corporation ceases to be protection as may be provided by law.
government controlled, for instance, if it is privatized, it ceases to fall under
the Civil Service.
121
Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation v. Leogardo | GR No. 58494, July 5, 1985
The test is the manner of its creation. Corporations created by special charter are subject to the Civil Service, whereas
corporations incorporated under the Corporation Law are not.
Tanay Water District v. Gabaton | GR No. 63742, April 17, 1989

Tanay Water District, created by PD 198, comes under the Civil Service.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. National Labor Relations Commission & Odin Security Agency | GR No.
94825, September 4, 1992
Entities under the civil service system are not completely beyond the reach of the Department of Labor or labor laws.
When a government entity that is under the Civil Service enters into a contract such as with a security agency or a
janitorial agency, it becomes an indirect employer of the security guards or the janitors. In such a situation, under the
Labor Code, the liabilities for wages are joint and solidary with the contractor. The law on wages in the Labor Code
specifically provides that “employer” includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to employees.
Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission | GR Nos. 95237-8, September 13, 1991
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton | 172 SCRA 253 (1989)
Local Water Districts incorporated are under PD 198 government owned corporations with original, which means
corporations created by special law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines and therefore under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service.
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention debates, when this provision was first introduced, government-owned
corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in
the various branches of government. It was pointed out that the capital of these corporations belongs to the government
and that government money is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster and they should therefor come under
the strict surveillance of the civil service system.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 93396, September 30, 1991
PAGCOR is under the Civil Service since it was created by PD 1869, July 11, 1983.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation (1990)
National Service Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission | 168 SCRA 122
It was held that the NHC is not embraced in the civil service, and that employer-employee relationship therein is governed
not by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission | GR No. 98107, August 18, 1997
It was held that employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC,
but the CSC, even if the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held in NASECO v. NLRC, supra, it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision which governs. In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “with original
charter” refers to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code.
University of the Philippines v. Regino | 221 SCRA 598

It was held that the University of the Philippines, having been created by a special law and having an original charter, is
clearly part of the Civil Service.
Mateo v. Court of Appeals | 247 SCRA 284

It was held that the Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198, is a government-owned
corporation with an original charter. Accordingly, its employees fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission,
and the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees in the said
water district.
Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed only by the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 65. Now, however,
it is provided (June 1, 1995) in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, pursuant to RA No. 7902, that judgments or final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies may be appealed to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
change is pursuant to Section 7 which says, “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law.” Mathay, Jr. v.
Commission on Civil Service, supra
122
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court | GR No. 108886, May 5, 1995

Rule 65, Section 1 says that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. But
reconsideration is a speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a case may be brought to the Supreme Court only after
reconsideration. As a consequence, in the case of decisions of the COMELEC, only decisions en banc may be brought to the
Court by certiorari since Article IX-C-3 says that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
The kind of decisions of Constitutional Commissions may be elevated to the Supreme Court through Rule 65 are only grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, “the case or matter referred to by the
Constitution may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX-C are those that relate to the
exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” In the case of COMELEC, these must be cases involving “elective,
regional, provincial, and city officials.”
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC | 323 SCRA 611

The Supreme Court dispensed with the need for reconsideration since elections were already very close and there was no
more time for another speedy remedy. The case was about “exit polls.”
EIIB v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 129133, November 25, 1998

The Economic Intelligence and Information Bureau is a government agency within the scope of the coverage of the Civil
Service.
Department of Health v. National Labor Relations Commission | 251 SCRA 700

The Jose M. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital is a government hospital exercising governmental functions, it falls within the
scope of the coverage of the Civil Service.
Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission & Philippine National Red Cross | GR No. 129049, August 6,
1999
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned and –controlled corporation with an original charter
under RA No. 95, as amended. Paid staff of the PNRC are government employees who are members of the GSIS and
covered by the Civil Service Law.
 Classes of Service
Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based
on highly technical qualifications; opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and security of tenure.
The positions included in the career service are:

1. Open career positions, where prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required.
2. Closed career positions, such as scientific or highly technical in nature.
3. Career Executive Service, such as undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc.
4. Career officers other than those belonging to the Career Executive Service who are appointed by the President, such as
those in the foreign office.
5. Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although governed by a separate merit system.
6. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled.
Career Executive Service (CES)

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21 series of 1994, identifying the positions covered
by the Career Executive Service, as well as “all other third level positions of equivalent category in all branches and instrumentalities
of the national government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters” provided that the
position is a career position, is above division chief level, and the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance
of executive managerial functions.
Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who
hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion
or transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.
The petitioner, who was already holding the position of Department Manager of the Legal Services Department of EPZA
(with appropriate ELM eligibility required at that time) had the right to remain in his position even after the same had
123
been declared a CES position in 1994. However, when he retired as such Department CLASSIFICATION OF
Manager in 1996, his government service ended, and his right to remain in the CES position, POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL
notwithstanding his lack of CES eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment in January SERVICE UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE CODE – PD 807
1999 at Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority as Department Manager III, it was necessary for
him to comply with the CES eligibility prescribed at the time for that position. Not being a CAREER SERVICE
CES eligible, he could not validly challenge the disapproval of his appointment by the Civil 1. Entrance based on
merit and fitness to
Service Commission. be determined as
far as practicable
De Leon v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127182, January 22, 2001 by competitive
examinations, or
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Executive Service does not automatically based on highly
confer security of tenure on the applicant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his technical
appointment which, in turn, depends on his eligibility of lack of it. A person who does not qualifications.
2. Security of tenure.
have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place 3. Opportunity for
or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it only in an acting capacity in the advancement to
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as higher career
positions.
permanent even if it may be so designated. Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. NON-CAREER SERVICE
1. Entrance on bases
other than those of
Security of Tenure in the Career Executive Service the usual tests of
The two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may merit and fitness
attain security of tenure are: utilized for the
career service.
1. Career executive service eligibility 2. Tenure which is
2. Appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank. limited to a period
specified by law, or
which is co-
It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service except first terminous with
and second level employees in the civil service pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the that of the
position to which they may be appointed. appointing
authority or subject
to his pleasure, or
The importance of security of tenure in the system is for the efficiency of a civil service system, which which is limited to
depends largely on the morale of the officers and employees in the service. Morale, in turn, can be the duration of a
particular project
fatally undermined when the security of officers in the possession of their office is unprotected against for which purpose
the arbitrary action of superior officers. Hence, the basic in any civil service is a guarantee of security employment was
of tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment, whether total or partial, of the right to continue made.
in the position held.
This classification and
General v. Roco | GR Nos. 143366 & 143524, January 29, 2001 the classification in
Section 2(2) are not
A career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to mutually exclusive.
another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. Rather, they overlap and
In fact, a career executive service officer suffers no diminution in salary even if assigned to a complement each other.
The classification in the
CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not Code is for purposes of
on the basis of the position or office which he occupies. determining tenure. The
classification in Section
2(2) is for purposes of
determining the manner
Cuevas v. Bacal | GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000 of testing merit and
fitness.
Respondent Josefina Bacal, who held CES Rank Level III, Salary Grade 28, could not claim that
she had a valid and vested right to the position of Chief Public Attorney (CES Rank Level IV,
Salary Grade 30). Inasmuch as respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect to that position.
Non-Career Service
Characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career service; tenure limited to a period
specified by law, or which is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. The officers and employees embraced in the non-
career service are:
1. Elective officials, and their personal and confidential staff.
2. Department heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their personal and
confidential staff.
3. Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff.
124
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with the minimum direction and supervision.
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 131954, June 28, 2001

The Supreme Court said that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission is expressly empowered to
declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential. This signifies that the enumeration in the Civil Service decree,
which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list. The Commission can supplement this enumeration, as it did when
it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22 s. 1991, specifying positions in the Civil Service which are considered primarily
confidential and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminus with the officials they serve.
Office of the President v. Buenaobra | GR No. 170021, September 8, 2006

Under RA 7104, the respondent Chairman of the Komisyon ng Wikang Pilipino (KWP) has a fixed tenure of seven (7) years.
Respondent is a non-career service personnel whose tenure is fixed by law, and thus, her tenure in office is not at the pleasure
of the appointing authority. She enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed without just cause and without observing
due process.
 Appointments in the Civil Service

This is made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
Appointment to a competitive position must be made according to merit and fitness as determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examination. Merit and fitness in appointments to non-competitive positions are not determined by competitive
examinations. But merit and fitness are required.
Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 81467, October 27, 1989 CLASSES OF NON-COMPETITIVE
POSITIONS
The appointing authority is not bound by the restrictions of a statutory next-in-rank
rule. One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to The non-competitive positions
the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be are those which by their nature
appointed. The rule neither guarantees a vested right to the holder nor imposes a are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher technical.
position. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion
Early jurisprudence on this
subject established that it is the
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza | GR No. 141141, June 25, 2001 nature and not just the label of
Three important points were underscored: the position which makes it con-
competitive. Thus “much more
1. The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily than ordinary confidence is
confidential or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or reposed in the occupant of a
legislative declaration that is no conclusive upon the courts the true test position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase
being the nature of the position. denotes not only confidence in
2. The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from the aptitude of the appointee for
competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which
civil service. insures freedom of intercourse
3. Section 16, PD 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as without embarrassment or
primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts. freedom from misgivings or
betrayals of personal trust on
confidential matters of state.”
Darangina v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 167472, January 31, 2007 DE LOS SANTOS V.MALLARE | 87
A permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the PHIL 289, 298 (1950)
requirements for the position to which he is appointed. An exception to this rule is
A policy-determining position is
where, in the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to the one charged with the duty to
position merely in a temporary capacity for a period of twelve (12) months, unless “formulate a method of action
for the government or any of its
sooner terminated by the appointing authority. Such a temporary appointment is made
subdivisions.” A position is
not for the benefit of the appointee; rather it seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge highly technical if the occupant
of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the is required “to possess a
technical skill or training in the
selection of a permanent appointee. supreme or superior degree.
Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall
surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. Such
125
termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of
the appointing power. Accordingly, the Court held that where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his
replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited.
Exempt from the competitive examination requirement – to determine merit and fitness – are positions
which are:
1. Policy determining: where the officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules; or formulate
a method of action for government or any of its subdivision, such as department head.
2. Delos Santos v. Mallare | 87 Phil 289 (1950)

Salazar v. Mathay | 73 SCRA 285
Primarily confidential: denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of state; or one declared to be so by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission.
Civil Service Commission and PAGCOR v. Salas | GR No. 123708, June 19, 1997
The Supreme Court clarified this, as follows: Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were
two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential, namely:
1. When the President, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential.
2. In the absence of such a declaration, when from the nature of the functions of the office, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing authority which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential
matters of State.
When RA 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that “the non-competitive or
unclassified service shall be composed of positions declared by law to be in the non-competitive or
unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature.” Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position
which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution textually support the Pinero v. Hechanova | 18 SCRA 417 (1966)
doctrine that it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The 1987 Constitution deleted the phrase “in nature”.
This doctrine is still controlling.
The primary purpose of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in providing for the declaration of a position as
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is “to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. This is not mean to exclude them
from security of tenure.
The PROXIMITY RULE states that, “every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary
confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes
not only confidence in aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
The meaning of “for cause provided by law” is a guarantee both procedural and substantive due process.
Hence, not only must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but
also they can only be made on the basis of a valid cause provided by law. The phrase “for cause” has
acquired a well-defined meaning in Philippine jurisprudence. It means for reasons which the law and sound
public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the
appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be
removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without cause. Moreover, the
cause must relate to and effect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
126
Hernandez v. Villegas | 14 SCRA 544, 548 (1965)

Persons permanently occupying non-competitive positions are covered by the guarantee of security of
tenure. The distinction between competitive and non-competitive positions is significant only for purposes
of appointment. However, “officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only
for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the
ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but the
expiration of the term of office – two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in
the Law of Public Officers.”
Larin v. Executive Secretary | 280 SCRA 713

The extent of the President’s disciplinary authority over presidential appointees who belong to the career
service is limited. Specifically, Section 36, PD 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be
removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law.
In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority
the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career
service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for
cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
Gloria v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000

The transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position without the consent of the employee
violate security of tenure.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to
lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office
of those who are in the Civil Service.
Astraquillo v. Manglapus | October 3, 1990

Appointees to the foreign service who do not belong to the Career Corps do not enjoy security of
tenure like the Career Corp. those who are non-career “enter bases other than those of the usual test
of merit and fitness utilized for the career service” and possess “tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purposes employment
was made.” Political appointees in the foreign services possess “tenure coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure.”
Binamira v. Garrucho | GR No. 92008, July 23, 1990

Binamira was “designated” by the Secretary of Tourism as Manager of the Tourism Authority. The law,
however, requires that the Manager be appointed by the President. Binamira did not acquire security
of tenure because he did not receive a valid appointment.
Octot v. Ybanez | GR No. 48643, January 18, 1982

Petitioner was dismissed as notoriously undesirable, pursuant to the summary procedure found in PD
6 because he had been convicted of libel by the CFI. Later acquitted by the Court of Appeals, he asked
for reinstatement and back wages. He was instead offered reappointment but with no back wages. The
Court held that he is not entitled to back wages. Dismissal was done in good faith in compliance with
PD 6.
GSIS v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 86083, September 24, 1991

Section 40, PD 807 on Summary Proceedings states that, “No formal investigation is necessary and the
respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
a) when the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.”
The provision can be saved from invalidation only if it is read to require that:
1. The employee is informed of the charges against him by furnishing him with a copy of the
charges against him.
2. The employee must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter.
127
Dimayuga v. Benedicto II | GR No. 144153, January 16, 2002

One who does not have qualifications for a position cannot acquire security of tenure. Security of
tenure in an office is acquired only by one who has the qualifications for that office.
Pinero v. Hechanova | 18 SCRA 417

It was declared that executive pronouncements, such as PD 1869, can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict; otherwise, it would lie within the discretion of the
Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the constitutional protection of security of tenure.
This rule prevails even with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987,
despite the fact that the phrase “in nature” was deleted.
The proximity rule enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, is still authoritative, such that the
occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason
why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of State. Where the position
occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant, and therefore, cannot be classified as primarily confidential.
Laurel v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 71562, October 28, 1991

A determination by the President that a position is not policy determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical conclusive. Whether a position is policy determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical is
determined by the nature of the functions attached to it.
Grino v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 91602, February 26, 1991

The position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates or assistants is primarily
confidential in nature so that their services can be terminated upon loss of confidence. However, the
positions of the legal staff are not.
Hilario v. Civil Service Commission | 243 SCRA 206

This case reiterates previous rulings of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, and the appointee thereto
holds office at the pleasure of, and coterminous with, the appointing authority.
PAGCOR v. Rillaraza | GR No. 141141, June 25, 2001

It was held that the respondent’s position of Casino Operations Manager (COM) is not primarily
confidential. In this case, the duties and responsibilities of respondent, as COM, show that he is a tier above
the ordinary rank-and-file employees, and that faith and confidence in his competence to perform his
assigned tasks are reposed upon him. However, the degree of confidence of the appointing power, which is
that intimacy that insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment, or freedom from misgivings of
betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state, is not present. In fact, respondent does not
report directly to the appointing authority, but to a Branch Manager.
Highly technical: which requires possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
Besa v. Philippine National Bank | 33 SCRA 330

The position of legal counsel of the PNB was declared to be both primarily confidential and highly technical,
with the former aspect predominating.
Cadiente v. Santos | 142 SCRA 280

The position of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, requiring the utmost degree of confidence on the
part of the Mayor.
Borres v. Court of Appeals | 153 SCRA 120

It was held that the positions of Security Officer and Security Guards of the City Vice Mayor are primarily
confidential positions.
In every case, the ultimate test is the nature of the responsibilities of the position, not the administrative or
legislative description that is given to the position; that is, the nature of the office must be such as to
require close intimacy between the appointee and appointing authority which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on confidential
128
matters of state. Executive pronouncements as to the nature of the office can be no more than initial
determination of the nature of the office.
Discretion of the Appointing Authority ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 6

No candidate who has
lost in any election,
Luego v. Civil Service Commission | 143 SCRA 327 shall within one year
Even in the career service of the Civil Service, where the appointee possesses the after such election, be
minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position, the appointed to any
office in the
appointing authority has discretion who to appoint.
Government or any
Government-owned
Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz | GR No. 158737, August 31, 2004 or controlled
corporations or in
The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
any of their
according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among subsidiaries.
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. Not only is the
appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of his
The purpose of the
office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective prohibition of
appointees can effectively discharge the functions of the position. Thus, the final appointment of “lame
choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. ducks” in Section 6 is
the extirpation of the
“spoils system.”
Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission | 171 SCRA 744

ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 7
Uy v. Court of Appeals | 286 SCRA 343
No elective official
Even if officers and employees in the career service of the Civil Service enjoy the right shall be eligible for
to preference in promotion, it is not mandatory that the vacancy be filled by appointment or
designation in any
promotion. The appointing authority should be allowed the choice of men of his capacity to any public
confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible. The CSC cannot direct the office or position
appointment of its own choice, even on the ground that the latter is more qualified during his tenure.
than the appointing authority’s choice. Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by
For disregarding this doctrine, the CSC drew a stern rebuke from the Court in Lapinid the primary functions
of his position, no
v. Civil Service Commission | 197 SCRA 106; warned in Guieb v. Civil Service appointive official
Commission | 229 SCRA 779; and, again “duly warned; henceforth, it disobeys at its shall hold any other
peril,” in Mauna v. Civil Service Commission | 232 SCRA 388 office or employment
in the Government or
any subdivision,
The Civil Service may not disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of agency or
another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position. The appointing instrumentality
thereof, including
authority is given ample discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified Government-owned
persons to vacant positions among those who are qualified. or controlled
corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Aquino v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 92403, April 22, 1992
It is well-established that the Commission may not substitute its judgment for an
executive’s appointment of a qualified appointee. It is a different matter, however, Exceptions to the rule
when, after having extended an appointment that is immediately accepted, the against appointment
of elective officials:
appointing authority withdraws the same and extends it to someone else. In such a
situation, the Civil Service is within its authority when it orders the reinstatement of 1. The Vice President
the first appointee. The withdrawal of an appointment already accepted would be may be appointed
member of the
tantamount to removal and would violate security of tenure. Cabinet.
2. A Member of
Congress is
designated to sit in
Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals | 246 SCRA 281 the Judicial and Bar
The discretion of the appointing authority is not only in the choice of the person who Council.
is to be appointed, but also in the nature and character of the appointment issued,
such that whether the appointment is permanent or temporary.
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that Civil Service Commission cannot convert a temporary
appointment into a permanent one, as it would constitute an arrogation of a power properly belonging to the
appointing authority. The Civil Service Commission may, however, approve as merely temporary an appointment
intended to be permanent where the appointee does not possess the requisite eligibility and the exigency of the
service demands that the position be filled up, even in a temporary capacity.
129
Role of the Civil Service Commission

Lopez v. Civil Service Commission | 194 SCRA 269
The Supreme Court held that, “All that the Commission is authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses
the qualifications and appropriate eligibility. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.
Section 6 of RA 6656 on government reorganization merely provides that the selection of placement
should be done through the creation of a Placement Committee the members of which are the
representatives of the head of the agency as well as representatives of the employees. The
committee’s work is recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding the mode of
choosing among the candidates.
University of the Philippines and Alfredo Torres v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 132860, April 3, 2001
The Supreme Court said that the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager or surrogate administrator of
government offices and agencies, its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments
to determine their compliance with requirements of the Civil Service Law. On its own, the Commission does not
have the power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.
Oriental Mindoro National College v. Macaraig | GR No. 152017, January 15, 2004
Inasmuch as alleged appointment of the respondent was submitted to the Civil Service Commission only after
two years and twelve days after its issuance, there was no valid appointment.
A substantive requirement under Section 11 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations is that
an appointment should be submitted to the Civil Service Commission within thirty (30) days from
issuance; otherwise, it shall be ineffective.
Despite the CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides that only the appointing authority has the
right to challenge the CSC’s disapproval of an appointment, the Supreme Court said that both the appointing
authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have legal standing, in a suit assailing a CSC
order disapproving an appointment. The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the appointing
authority’s discretion: thus, the appointing authority has the right to contest the disapproval, as he stands to be
adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment. Although the appointee has no vested right to the
position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. He should ,therefore, be granted the opportunity to
prove his eligibility. He has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC
act which denied his permanent appointment.
 Disqualifications ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 7(2) is

No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election, be appointed to related to ARTICLE VII,
any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their SECTION 13 and see Civil
subsidiaries. Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra, which
declared Executive Order No.
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public 284 unconstitutional.
office or position during his tenure.
The above rule on appointive
on appointive officials is not
Flores v. Drilon, supra applicable to members of the
For violating this constitutional prohibition, the Supreme Court declared that the provision cabinet. For them, the
in the law creating the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, which mandated the applicable rule is the stricter
appointment of the City Mayor of Olongapo City as the first Administrator of the SBMA, prohibition in Article VII,
Section 13.
unconstitutional.
Flores v. Drilon & Gordon | GR No. 104732, June 22, 1993

The Congress, may not, by law, authorize the appointment of elective officials. Section 7, par. 1 governs elective officials.
Unlike the provision for members of Congress in Article VI, Section 13, which does not prohibit acceptance of an
appointment but merely causes the forfeiture of the congressional seat if the holder accepts an appointment, the present
provision prohibits elective officials other than members of Congress from accepting appointment during their tenure. If
the elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning his elective position, the appointment is invalid.
Neither, however, does he thereby forfeit his elective seat.
Moreover, unlike in the case of appointive officers in the following paragraph, Congress may not create an exception to
this rule.
130
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Public Interest Center v. Elma | 494 SCRA 53 (2006)

The Supreme Court held that an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel (CPLC). The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the
Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to review of the CPLC. Thus, the concurrent
appointments of respondent Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC violate Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 156982, September 8, 2004

Where the other posts are held by a public officer in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law or as required by the primary
functions of his position, there is no violation, because the other posts do not comprise “any other office” but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on the said public officer. However, he is prohibited from receiving any
additional compensation for his services in the said position, because these services are deemed already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
Bitonio v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 147392,March 12, 2004

It follows that a representative designated by the Secretary of Labor, who is ex officio member of the Board of Directors of
PEZA, to attend the meetings of the PEZA Board, may not claim any additional compensation for such attendance.
Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal.
 Security of Tenure
The grounds and the procedure for investigation of charges and the discipline of career service officers and employees are provided
in the Civil Service Law. Non-compliance therewith constitutes a denial of the right to security of tenure.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(3)
Villaluz v. Zaldivar | 15 SCRA 710

A Presidential appointee is under the direct disciplinary authority of the President.
Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz | 160 SCRA 751

Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary, is a violation of the security of tenure clause in
the Constitution.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals | 183 SCRA 555
Where the appointment of a principal does not refer to any particular school, reassignment does not offend the
constitutional guarantee.
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban | 193 SCRA 520

It was held that since the appointment of private respondent Yap was that of District Supervisor at large, she could be
assigned to any station as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station.
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 112513, August 21, 1997
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to
payment of back salaries.
Balitaosan v. Secretary, DECS | GR No. 138238, September 2, 2003

Where the reinstatement is ordered by the Court not as the result of exoneration but merely as an act of liberality of the
Court of Appeals, the claim for back wages for the period during which the employee was not allowed to work must be
denied. The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to compensation is he has not rendered any service.
Brugada v. Secretary of Education | GR Nos. 142332-43, January 31, 2005
131
Where the petitioners were no longer pleadings for exoneration from the administrative charges filed against them, but
were merely asking for the payment of back wages computed from the time they could not teach pursuant to Secretary
Carino’s dismissal order minus the six months suspension until their actual reinstatement, the Supreme Court said that the
petitioners have no right to back wages because they were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. In a host of
cases, the Supreme Court had categorically declared that the payment of back wages during the period of suspension of a
civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper only if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is
unjustified.
General v. Roco, supra

Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the employee may be
appointed.
De la Llana v. Alba, supra

Valid abolition of office does not violate the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia | 158 SCRA 1

Rama v. Court of Appeals | 148 SCRA 496
Pretended abolition of office is a flimsy excuse to justify dismissal.
Dario v. Mison, supra

Mendoza v. Quisumbing | 186 SCRA 108
Gabriel v. Domingo | 189 SCRA 172
Reorganization of office does not necessarily result in abolition of the office, and does not justify the replacement of
permanent officers and employees.
Cabagnot v. Civil Service Commission | 223 SCRA 59

Where, as a result of the reorganization, employees were effectively demoted by their assignment to positions lower than
those they previously held, there is violation of security of tenure, and the Civil Service Commission may order their
reinstatement.
Under the Rules of Court, a career service officer or employee who has been unlawfully ousted from his office has one year within
which to file an action in court to recover his office, otherwise the right to recover the same prescribes.
Cristobal v. Melchor | 78 SCRA 175

Where the Supreme Court, on grounds of equity, allowed a suit filed nine years from date of unlawful dismissal.
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law provides for summary dismissal – when the charge is serious and evidence of guilt is strong;
when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the
present charge; and when respondent is notoriously undesirable – and is reproduced verbatim in the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which took effect in 1989.
Abalos v. Civil Service Commission | 196 SCRA 81

This provision is deemed repealed by Republic Act 6654, approved May 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on
May 30, 1988.
Section 37(a), PD 807, as amended, provides for appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission only over the Merit System
Protection Board’s decisions in administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension, fine,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission | 204 SCRA 965

Navarro v. Civil Service Commission | 226 SCRA 522
This provision is not over MSBP decisions exonerating the respondent.
University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission | 228 SCRA 207

Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission | 241 SCRA 317
Appeal to the Civil Service Commission may be made only by the party adversely affected by the MSBP decision; and the
employer is not a party adversely affected.
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy | GR No. 135805, April 29, 1999

However, the principle laid down in these decisions in Mendez, Magpale, Navarro and Del Castillo, that the Civil Service
Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges was
132
abandoned in this case. The Supreme Court considered the factual situation in the case at bench: The CSC found Dacoycoy
guilty of nepotism and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dacoycoy, at the party adversely affected by the
CSC decision, could go to the Court of Appeals for the review of the CSC decision, impleading the CSC as public respondent,
being the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil
service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CSC, and held Dacoycoy not guilty of nepotism.
At that point, the CSC had become “the party adversely affected” by such a CA ruling which seriously prejudices the civil
service system. Accordingly, as an aggrieved party, the CSC may appeal the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.
Philippine National Bank v. Garcia | GR No. 141246, September 9, 2002
Where the employer PNB was allowed to elevate on appeal the decision of the CSC exonerating the employee.
It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the
first office and his title thereto is thereby terminated without any other act of proceeding.
Canonizado v. Aguirre | GR No. 133132, February 15, 2001

This rule on incompatibility was not applied. Supreme Court declared Section 8, RA 8551, unconstitutional, for violating
the security of tenure clause in the Constitution. It appears that petitioners were removed as National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) Commissioners by virtue of the law. Thus, petitioner’s acceptance of the position of Inspector General during
the pendency of this case – precisely t assail the constitutionality of his removal as Commissioner – cannot be deemed to
be abandonment f his claim for reinstatement to the position of Commissioner. The removal of the petitioners from their
positions by virtue of a constitutionally infirm act necessarily negates a finding of voluntary relinquishment.
Canonizado v. Aguirre | GR No. 133132, January 25, 2000

Petitioners were members of the National Police Commission. They were separated from office by virtue of RA 8551 –
Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998. They challenged the law as a violation of their security
of tenure. Public respondents, however, insist that the express declaration in Section 8, RA 8551 that the terms of
petitioners’ offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM created under
RA 6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more civilian in nature, in compliance with the
constitutional mandate.
It is exceedingly apparent to the Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are
two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that
is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress. The basic structure of the
NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and
responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices
constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a
reorganization. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it
declares the terms of office of the incumbent as expired must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Abrogar v. Garrucho | GR No. 95773, August 6, 1991

Blaquera v. Civil Service Commission | September 10, 1993
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 115863, March 31, 1995
Abolition of office, even if arising from reorganization mandated by law, must be justified by good faith and
public need. Moreover, abolition of an office created by law can only be done also by law.
Mayor v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig | GR No. 87211, March 5, 1991

Section 35, RA 6715 declared all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters of the present
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) vacant. Petitioners question its constitutionality. The Supreme
Court held that the said provision is unconstitutional. While abolition by law as a result of reorganization is a
recognized cause for termination of a Government employee, it is not the same as a declaration that the office is
vacant. RA 6715 has effected no express abolition of the positions, neither an implied abolition (i.e. an
irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners’ offices under the old
rules and those the new law, RA 6715).
Mama, Jr. v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 86517, April 30, 1991

Where a city general hospital is closed for valid reasons but is, few months later, opened as a maternity and
children’s hospital in order not to violate the condition of the donation of the land that it be used for the
hospital, was there an unlawful abolition of office.
133
Good faith is presumed. In the absence of proof of bad faith and considering that the new hospital is not exactly
the same as the first and considering likewise the desire to preserve the donated property, there is no unlawful
abolition of office.
UP Board of Regents v. Rasul | GR No. 91551, August 16, 1991

The Board of Regents of UP effected a reorganization of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) transforming it
into UP PGH Medical Center. As part of the reorganization, the position of Director of PGH was transformed into
Medical Director of UP PGH Medical Center. The incumbent Director of PGH was replaced by a Medical Director
of UP PGH Medical Center. The functions of the two offices, however, are found to be substantially the same.
The replacement was not valid because it was tantamount to removal without due cause.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary | GR Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
The President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. And this can include deactivation of
offices. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power
of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
The new Constitution now

Tobias v. Veloso | 100 SCRA 177, 184 | L-40224, September 23, 1980
says: “ Temporary employees
An officer who is simply given a “reprimand” is not exonerated. A reprimand is of the Government shall be
a “public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in given such protection as may
fault by his superior officer of a body to which he belongs.” Unlike a “warning” be provided by law.”
Obviously the provision is not
(putting on guard) or an “admonition” (a friendly reproof), a reprimand is an self-executory. Moreover, it
administrative penalty. was approved in lieu of a
proposal to make temporary
Mendiola v. Tancinco | 52 SCRA 66 (1973) appointees permanent after
the lapse of a certain period
Temporary appointees are not protected by the guarantee of security of of time.
tenure. They may be removed anytime without cause.
Achacoso v. Macaraig | GR No. 93023, March 13, 1991

Tomas Achacoso, Administrator of POEA, tendered his courtesy resignation in compliance with the request of
the President of the government officials. His resignation was accepted and his replacement appointed.
Achacoso refuses to vacate his office, invoking security of tenure as his position is one in the Career Executive
Service. Petitioner is not correct because he failed to take the Career Service Examination. “The mere fact that a
position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications.
Luego v. Civil Service Commission | 143 SCRA 327, August 5, 1986

A permanent appointment is extended. The CSC cannot approve it as temporary in the belief that somebody else
is better qualified. The sole function of the CSC is to attest to the qualification of the appointee.
Briones v. Osmena | 104 Phil 588, 592 (1958)

While abolition of office does not imply removal of the incumbent officer, this is true only where the abolition of office is done in
good faith and not merely as a cover for a removal otherwise not allowed by the Constitution.
Roque v. Ericta | 53 SCRA 156, 162-163 (1973)

Thus, abolition of office to escape the taint of unconstitutionality, it must be made under the following conditions:
1. In good faith;
2. Not for personal or political reasons; and
3. Not in violation of the law.
 Partisan Political Activity

The Civil Service Law prohibits engaging directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or taking part in any election except to
vote, or to use official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any person or body. But this does not prevent
expression of views on current political problems or issues, or mention of the names of candidates for public office whom the public
officer supports.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign
 DEFINITION & SCOPE | Partisan Political Campaign
134
 Partisan political activity, which is the phrase used in previous Constitutions, includes “every form of solicitation
of the elector’s vote in favor of” a specific candidate. People v. De Venecia | 14 SCRA 864, 867 (1965)
 It includes contribution of money for election purposes and distribution of handbills.
 However, this provision does not “prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports.” Section
29, RA 2260
 The prohibition does not apply to department secretaries.
 A proposal in the 1935 Constitutional Convention to include department secretaries was disapproved. Santos v.
Yatco | 106 Phil (1959)
Cailles v. Bonifacio | 65 Phil 328

The military establishment is covered by this provision. Section 5(3), Article XVI, provides that no member of the military
shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity except to vote. But this prohibition applies only to those
in the active military service, not to reservists.
Santos v. Yatco | 106 Phil 745

Exempt from this provision are members of the Cabinet and public officers and employees holding political offices who are
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities, except to solicit contributions from their subordinates or commit
acts prohibited under the Election Code – Section 45, Civil Service Law
 Right to Self-Organization
The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(5), ARTICLE III, SECTION 8
 Three provisions which serve as bases for the right of Civil Service to unionize
 Article III, Section 8: guarantees the right of all, “including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions.”
 Article XII, Section 3: guarantees “the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”
 Article IX-B, Section 2(5)
Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Carino | 200 SCRA 323

Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio | GR No. 95445, December 18, 1990
SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals | 175 SCRA 686
Alliance of Government Workers v. MOLE | 124 SCRA 1
But while the right to organize and join unions, associations or societies cannot be curtailed, government employees may
not engage in strikes to demand changes in the terms and conditions of employment because the terms and conditions of
employment are provided by law.
Resort to the intent of the framers points to the understanding that the
right to organize does not include the right to strike. The Constitution, The Congress shall provide for the
however, does not say that government employees may not be given standardization of compensation of
the statutory right to strike. On this point, the SSS Case is vague. government officials and
employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) v. Secretary of corporations with original
Education | GR No. 95445, August 6, 1991 charters, taking into account the
nature of the responsibilities
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the pertaining to, and the
public school teachers on their right to petition the government for qualifications required for, their
positions.
redress of grievances.
This provision is in relation to RA 6758 –
Bangasilan v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124678, July 23, 1997 An Act Prescribing a Revised
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals | GR No.. 124540, November 17, 1997 Compensation and Classification
System in the Government.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. The right of
sovereign to prohibit strikes, either by statute or judicial decision, simply
incorporate or reassert the common law rules.
 Protection to Temporary Employees

Temporary employees f the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.
135
 Standardization of Compensation
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.
Intia v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 131529, April 30, 1999

It was held that the discretion of the Philippine Postal Corporation Board of Directors on matters of personal compensation is not
absolute; the salary structure of its personnel must still strictly conform with RA 6758, in relation to the General Appropriations Act.
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | GR No. 148208, December 15, 2005
It was challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause is the provision in RA 7693 – The Central Bank Act, which creates two
classes of employees in the BSP:
1. The BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), which is the exempt
class.
2. The rank-and-file (Salary Grade 19 and below, which is the non-exempt class.
The Supreme Court said that while the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment between the BSP
rank-and-file employees and those of other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) – who in their respective charters, are exempt
from the provisions of SSL. These rank-and-file employees of BSP and GFIs are similarly situated. Thus, the classification made in the
Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.
 Double Compensation
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 8
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, No elective or appointive
public officer or
any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or employee shall receive
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. additional, double, or
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 8 indirect compensation,
unless specifically
authorized by law, nor
 PURPOSE | Peralta v. Mathay | 38 SCRA 256, 258 (1967) accept without the
This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public consent of the Congress,
any present, emolument,
trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind
office, or title of any kind
the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled from any foreign
to be rewarded for the performance of the function entrusted to him, but that should not government.
be the overriding consideration.
Pensions or gratuities
shall not be considered
 DEFINITION | Peralta v. Mathay | 38 SCRA 256, 258 (1967) as additional, double, or
indirect compensation.
While the terms “additional” and “double” compensation are used interchangeably, it is,
perhaps, best to draw a distinction between the two. ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 4
All public officers and
 Additional Compensation exists when for one and the same office for which a employees shall take an
oath or affirmation to
compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra uphold and defend this
reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a Constitution.
law specifically authorizing such extra reward. Thus, where an officer’s pay
provided by law was a fixed per diem, the Supreme Court disallowed additional
compensation in the form of cost of living allowances as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses. The Court,
however, was careful to point out that when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for expenses
incident to the discharge of an officer’s duties, it is not an additional compensation prohibited by the
Constitution.
 Double Compensation more properly refers to two sets of compensation for two different offices held
concurrently by one officer. In the instances when holding a second office is allowed, when an officer accepts a
second office, he can draw the salary attached to such second only when he is specifically authorized by law to
receive double compensation.
 DEFINITION: “specifically authorized by law” | Sadueste v. Municipality of Surigao | 72 Phil 485 (1941)
The authority required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority given to a
particular employee or officer of the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of
extra or additional compensation.
Quimson v. Ozaeta | 98 Phil 705 (1956)
136
The above interpretation of the constitutional provision seems to be too strict. It seems in effect to require a special law
for every instance of additional or double compensation. An obiter dictum in this later case approves of a more liberal and
perhaps administratively more rational approach.
The Court said, “According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some
cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar
examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government corporations, and in such
cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed. If the President approves the double compensation,
well and good. The appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning could receive extra
compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the
appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection.
Santos v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 139792, November 22, 2000

The Supreme Court declared that the second sentence simply means that the retiree can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even after he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. But he cannot credit his
years of service in the Judiciary – for which he now receives his pension under RA 7924 – in the computation of the separation pay
to which he may be entitled under RA 7924 for the termination of his last employment. To allow this would be countenance double
compensation for exactly the same service.
Upon optional retirement from the judiciary on April 1, 1992, Santos was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under RA 910, as
amended. For five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension. Thereafter he was appointed Director III of the defunct
MMA as Director III thereof.
He can continue to receive his pension while receiving salary as Director. Section 8, par. 2 means that a retiree receiving pension or
gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another
compensation is attached.
Upon separation from the MMA, his separation pay under RA 7294 cannot include his years of service in the judiciary. That would be
double compensation for the same service in the judiciary for which he has already been paid. Section 11, RA 7924 does not
specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
 Oath of Allegiance
All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
This is in relation to ARTICLE XI, SECTION 18, which provides that public officers and employees owe the State ad this
Constitution allegiance at all times.
137
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 1

1. There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a
 COMPOSITION | En Banc & Division Cases Chairman and six
A Chairman and six (6) Commissioners who shall be natural born Filipino citizens, at least 35 Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the
years of age, holders of a college degree, and have not been candidates in the immediately Philippines and, at the time
preceding election. of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree,
Majority, including the Chairman, must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been and must not have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years. candidates for any elective
positions in the immediately
preceding elections.
They shall be appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission on However, a majority thereof,
Appointments for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment. No member shall be including the Chairman,
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice
NOTE of law for at least ten years.
The common starting point for appointees to the Commission on Elections is on 2. The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be
February 2, 1987, the day the new Constitution took effect. Thus, in reckoning the appointed by the President
seven year term, counting must always start from a February 2 even if the with the consent of the
appointee took office later. This way the staggering of the terms is preserved. Commission on
Appointments for a term of
seven years without
Cayetano v. Monsod | GR No. 100113, September 3, 1991 reappointment. Of those
Supreme Court ruled that, taking into consideration the liberal interpretation intended by the first appointed, three
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a Members shall hold office
for seven years, two
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a Members for five years, and
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional the last Members for three
requirement – that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. years, without
reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy
For the purposes of this provision, the meaning of “engaged in the practice of law” is engaging shall be only for the
unexpired term of the
in “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
predecessor. In no case shall
knowledge, training and experience.” Moreover, in the instant case, Monsod had been any Member be appointed
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and the argument was used that there was no or designated in a
temporary or acting
abuse of discretion in the confirmation.
capacity.
Brillantes v. Yorac | GR No. 93867, December 18, 1990

In the absence of a Chairman of the COMELEC, the President cannot designate Commissioner
Yorac as Acting Chairman. Article IX-C, Section 1(2) prohibits the appointment of Members in a temporary or acting capacity.
Moreover, Article IX-A, Section 1 provides for the independence of the Commissions. The choice of a temporary chairman falls
under the discretion of the Commission and cannot be exercised for it by the President.
En Banc & Division Cases

ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 3
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its The Commission on Elections may sit
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre- en banc or in two divisions, and shall
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
election cases, including pre-
en banc. proclamation controversies. All such
ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 3 election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of
Cases which must first be heard and decided in division decisions shall be decided by the
1. All election cases, including pre-proclamation contests, originally cognizable by the Commission en banc.
Commission in the exercise of its powers under ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 2(2)
Sarmiento v. COMELEC | 212 SCRA 307

Supreme Court set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC in this and several companion cases, because the COMELEC en
banc took original cognizance of the cases without referring them first to the appropriate Division.
2. Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy rests with the COMELEC in division, not the COMELEC en banc.
Garvida v. Sales | GR No. 122872, September 10, 1997, reiterated in Bautista v. COMELEC | GR Nos. 154796-97, October 23,
2003
138
3. Even cases appealed from the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court have to be heard and decided in Division before
they may be heard en banc upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the Division decision. And, although not raised as
an issue, the Supreme Court may motu proprio consider and resolve this question of jurisdiction. Abad v. COMELEC | GR No.
128877, December 10, 1999
4. A petition for certiorari filed with the Commission from a decision of the RTC or MTC is likewise to be resolved in Division
before the same may be heard en banc.
Soller v. COMELEC | GR No. 139853, September 5, 2000

The COMELEC en banc does not have jurisdiction to decide election cases. This power pertain to the divisions of the
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and
void.
Zarate v. COMELEC | GR No. 129096, November 19, 1999

Where the appeal from the decision of the MTC in an election case involving the SK Chairman of Barangay Ican, Malasigui,
Pangasinan, was directly taken cognizance of by the COMELEC en banc, the Supreme Court set aside the COMELEC
decision because the appeal should have been referred first to the appropriate Division.
Exceptions
1. A petition for the correction of manifest of errors alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the
Statement of Votes by precinct. Such as error in the tabulation of results, which merely requires a clerical correction without
opening the ballot boxes or examining the ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc may properly assume jurisdiction.
Jaramilla v. COMELEC | GR No. 155717, October 23, 2003

Torres v. COMELEC | 270 SCRA 583
Ramirez v. COMELEC | 270 SCRA 590
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC en banc may directly assume jurisdiction over a petition to correct manifest errors
in the tabulation or tallying of results (Statement of Votes) by the Board of Canvassers. While it is settled that election cases,
including pre-proclamation contest, must first be heard and decided by the COMELEC in division – and a petition for correction
of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes is a pre-proclamation controversy – SECTION 5, RULE 27 of the 1993 RULES OF
COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies involving correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates, as reflected in the election
returns. What is involved is simple arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation, the BOC acts in an administrative
capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to its constitutional function, to decide questions
affecting elections, the COMELEC en banc has the authority to resolve any question pertaining to proceedings of the BOC. This
ruling was reiterated in Matsura v. COMELEC | 285 SCRA 493
2. The power of the COMELEC to prosecute cases of violation of election laws involves the exercise of administrative powers
which may be exercised directly by the COMELEC en banc.
Baytan v. COMELEC | GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003

Balindong v. COMELEC | GR Nos. 153991-92, October 16, 2003
The hearing by division is required only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is
mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. The
conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in court does not involve the exercise of adjudicatory
function.
Salazar, Jr. v. COMELEC | GR No. 85742, April 19, 1990

A motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal for lack of interest due to the failure of petitioner or counsel to appear for
hearing may be reviewed by the COMELEC in division. What the Constitution says must be heard en banc are motions for
reconsideration of “decisions” that is resolutions of substantive issues. The described dismissal was not a decision.
Alvarez v. COMELEC | GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001

The rule on preferential disposition of election cases suggested by Section 7, Article IX-C and the requirement in Section 257.
Omnibus Election Code that COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of
submission is not a hard and firm rule. Considering the tribunal’s manpower and logistics limitations, it is sensible to treat the
procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the COMELEC to resolve
139
election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since
a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to
disenfranchisement of voters.
The rule that all election cases, including pre-proclamation cases, should first be heard and decided by the COMELEC in
division applies only when the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, not when it exercises purely
administrative functions.
Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC | GR No. 150946, October 23, 2003
Jaramilla v. COMELEC, supra
Canicosa v. COMELEC | GR No. 120318, December 5, 1997
COMELEC Decisions Reviewable by the Supreme Court

1. Only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari – as a special civil action under Rule
65, Rules of Court.
Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro | 244 SCRA 41

It was held that the failure of the petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration from the decision of the COMELEC first
division is fatal to the petition filed with the Supreme Court.
2. Only decisions of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power may be brought to Supreme
Court on certiorari.
Garces v. Court of Appeals | 259 SCRA 99

Where what was assailed in the petition for certiorari was the COMELEC choice of an appointee, which is a purely
administrative duty, the case is cognizable by the RTC or the CSC, as the case may be.
Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer | 135 SCRA 25

Indeed, determinations made by the COMELEC which are merely administrative, not quasi-judicial in character, may be
challenged in an ordinary civil action before trial courts.
The COMELEC en banc shall promulgate rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, but
they must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 6
1. This power is subject to Section 5(5), Article VIII, which provides that rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
2. Procedural Rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an expeditious determination of the
popular will of the electorate. The nature of an election case differs from an ordinary civil action. Because of this difference, the
Rules on Civil Procedure on demurer to evidence cannot apply to election cases, even by analogy or in a suppletory character,
especially because the application of the Rules would not be practicable and convenient.
3. The COMELEC has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by its rules, or the requirement of certificate of
non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases. The COMELEC is likewise not constrained to
dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, supra; Barot v. COMELEC | GR No.
149147, June 18, 2003
4. It was held in Penaflorida v. COMELEC | 206 SCRA 754 that the fingerprinting of the Chairman and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors is an internal matter, and may be done even without prior notice to the parties.
 Constitutional Powers and Functions
 NATURE OF POWERS | Article IX-C, Section 3

Like the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections is an administrative agency. As such, therefore, the powers it
possesses are executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative.
By exception, however, it has been given judicial power as judge with exclusive original jurisdiction over “all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.”
140
Carlos v. Judge Angeles | GR No. 142907, November 29, 2000 ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 2
The COMELEC has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
warranto or habeas corpus, but only to aid of its appellate jurisdiction over following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by regulations relative to the conduct of an
courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX-C, Section 2. This election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
point was settled in Relampagos v. Cumba. This means that its jurisdiction and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section all contests relating to the elections, returns,
5(1). and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving
 SUMMARY OF JURISPRUDENCE ON POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON elective municipal officials decided by trial
ELECTIONS courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
1. Nacionalista v. COMELEC | 85 Phil 149 (1949) Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Utulan v. COMELEC | 15 SCRA 465, 469 (1965) Commission on election contests involving
Functions of the Commission under the Constitution are elective municipal and barangay offices
shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
essentially executive (enforcement) and administrative 3. Decide, except those involving the right to
(administration) in nature. vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of
2. Abes v. COMELEC | L-28348, December 15, 1967 election officials and inspectors, and
This case could say that there “has been neither deviation nor registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the
retreat” from this doctrine. President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government,
Subsequent decisions, however, showed that the characterization including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
of the COMELEC’s power by the Nacionalista Case as being ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
“preventive only and not curative also” was, perhaps, less than credible elections.
accurate. The Supreme Court, in acknowledging the broad sweep 5. Register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions
of the COMELEC’s constitutional power to insure free, orderly, which, in addition to other requirements,
and honest elections, recognized in the Commission a power must present their platform or program of
which already partook of the “curative” power to nullify government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious
improperly made canvass. denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve
3. Lagumbay v. COMELEC | 16 SCRA 175 (1966) their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
The divided Court upheld the Commission’s authority to exclude this Constitution, or which are supported by
what the Court characterized as statistically improbable returns. any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
4. Antonio, Jr. v. COMELEC | 32 SCRA 319 (1970) governments and their agencies to political
The Court upheld the power of the COMELEC to exclude returns parties, organizations, coalitions, or
which were the product of coercion even if they be clean on their candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when
face. accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with
5. Usman v. COMELEC | 42 SCRA 667 (1971) the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
Upheld the authority of the COMELEC to entertain the testimony 6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
of handwriting experts as proof of the falsity of the returns. initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
At the core of most of these cases, and other similar cases, was election laws, including acts or omissions
the problem of determining where the jurisdiction of the constituting election frauds, offenses, and
Commission ended and where the authority of the Electoral malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective
Tribunals and the courts began. Under the 1973 Constitution, measures to minimize election spending,
this aspect of the problem largely disappeared because aside including limitation of places where
from its administrative power of deciding all cases relative to the propaganda materials shall be posted, and
conduct of election, the Commission then was given the judicial to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
power of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the candidacies.
elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the 8. Recommend to the President the removal of
Batasang Pambansa and the elective provincial and city any officer or employee it has deputized, or
the imposition of any other disciplinary
officials. action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or
The problem of conflict of jurisdiction could then arise only in decision.
the election of municipal and other minor elective officials. This 9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of
problem will continue under the new Constitution because the each election, plebiscite, initiative,
COMELEC continues to have original jurisdiction over election referendum, or recall.
contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over municipal and barangay officials.
141
Moreover, with the return of jurisdiction over election contests involving members of Congress to the Electoral
Tribunals, the problems under the 1935 Constitution will also return.
1. ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF AN ELECTION, PLEBISCITE, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM OR
RECALL.
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation
through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) system of initiative, namely: Initiative on the Constitution;
Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and Initiative on local legislation
which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. SECTION 2(a), RA 6735.
Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes:
a. Referendum on statutes, which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress.
b. Referendum on local law, which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Recall is the termination of official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his
term through the will of the electorate.
Plebiscite is the submission of constitutional amendments or important legislative measures to the people for ratification.
Broad Powers
Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo | 218 SCRA 253, 263-264 (1993)

The 1987 Constitution has granted the Commission on Elections broader power than its predecessors. It implicitly grants
the Commission the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the enforcement of laws relative to elections.
Accordingly, where the subject of the action is the enforcement of provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, the case is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC, not the regular courts.
The COMELEC may promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of election laws. Such power is deemed
implicit in the power to implement regulations.
Aruelo, Jr. v.. Court of Appeals | October 20, 1993

Moreover, should there be conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by the Commission and a Rule of
Court, if the proceeding is before the Commission, the Commission rule should prevail; but if the proceeding is in
court, the Rules of Court should prevail.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC | GR No. 161265, February 24, 2004

This power includes the “the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers.
The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate
officers” is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is not other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the OCMLEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means to and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.”
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC needs only to return the root of the conflict between the party
officials. It needs only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.
Kalaw v. COMELEC | GR No. 80218, November 5, 1987

The Supreme Court said that the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,
decide all questions affecting elections, register and regulate political parties, and ensure orderly elections,
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts
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and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into
two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be the president of the entire party. The COMELEC erred in
resolving the controversy by granting official candidate status to LDP candidates under either the “Angara Wing”
or the “Aquino Wing”, because clearly, it is the Party Chairman, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party,
who has the authority to represent the party and in all external affairs and concerns, and to sign documents for
and in its behalf.
Cipriano v. COMELEC | GR No. 158830, August 10, 2004

But this broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
the elections does not authorize the COMELEC, motu proprio, without the proper proceedings, to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.
Alunan III v. Mirasol | GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 | 276 SCRA 501, 511
The power of direct control and supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) over
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections does not contravene the constitutional grant of powers to the COMELEC.
Inasmuch as the election, and contests involving election, of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. Thus, it was within the authority of the DILG Secretary to exempt a local government unit from
holding SK elections.
Section 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 placed the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections under the direct
control and supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government. This does not contravene the
Constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall have the power to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. Elections for SK
officers are not subject to supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as the Court recently held in
Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors | 243 SCRA 422 (1995), contests involving elections of SK officials do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Taule v. Secretary Santos | GR No. 90336, August 12, 1991

The COMELEC does not have the authority to review contests involving the election of officers of a barangay
federation. The power of the COMELEC is over popular elections.
Maquinay v. Bleza | 100 SCRA 702 | L-54230, October 30, 1980

A defeated mayoralty candidate files a protest with the Court of First Instance. Dismissal of the protest is sought
on the ground that the petitioner did not allege that he filed a certificate a candidacy, a jurisdictional fact. It may
be that he did not allege so in so many words; but such jurisdictional fact need not be expressed in a fixed
formula. It can be deduced from the tenor of the allegations.
Buac & Bautista v. COMELEC | GR No. 155855, January 26, 2004

Consistent with these broad powers, the COMELEC has the authority to annul the results of a plebiscite.
Obviously, the power of the COMELEC is not limited to the mere administrative function of conducting the
plebiscite. The law is clear; it is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite.
Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the Board of Canvassers erroneously
or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the true results of the plebiscite either through
a pre-proclamation case or through revision of ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the
true results of the plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated
power to enforce laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscites. The case at bar involves the determination of whether the
electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly
urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose. This is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and not
of regular courts.
The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its
enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the
vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality to a
highly urbanized city.
Antonio v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 135869, September 22, 1999

Article IX-A, Section 6 grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal. Significantly,
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Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides in part that “rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Regulatory power over media of transportation, communication and The Commission may, during
information. the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or
National Press Club v. COMELEC | 207 SCRA 1 permits for the operation of
Adiong v. COMELEC | 207 SCRA 712 transportation and other
public utilities, media of
During the election period, the COMELEC may regulate enjoyment or utilization of all communication or
franchises and permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, information, all grants,
media of communication or information, grants, special privileges, concessions – to special privileges, or
concessions granted by the
ensure equal opportunity, time, space, right to reply, etc. – with the objective of holding Government or any
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Article IX-C, Section 4 subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof,
including any government-
Unido v. COMELEC | 104 SCRA 17, 39, April 3, 1981 owned or controlled
The power to regulate media during “election period” also extend to the period of a corporation or its subsidiary.
plebiscite or referendum. Of essence to plebiscite and referenda is “fair submission.” Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to
Moreover, the formulation of the Constitution is more important in a sense than the ensure equal opportunity,
choice of men who will implement that charter. Evidently, therefore, regulatory power time, and space ,and the right
to reply, including
during the period of plebiscite or referendum, is also intended.
reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public
Chavez v. COMELEC | GR No. 162777, August 31, 2004 information campaigns and
forums among candidates in
On the basis, among others, of this constitutional authority, the Supreme Court
connection with the objective
upheld the validity of Section 32, Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004, of holding free, orderly,
providing that all materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequently to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately
removed, otherwise, the person and the radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to
have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. The issuance
of the resolution was, likewise, considered as a valid exercise of the police power.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC | GR No. 119654. May 22, 1995 | 244 SCRA 272
The Supreme Court invalidated the COMELEC Resolution requiring newspapers to give, for free, one-half page
newspaper space for use by the COMELEC. This was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, there
being no imperious public necessity for the taking of the newspaper space.
Print media may not be compelled to allocate free space to the COMELEC. Such would amount to a prohibited
taking of property without just compensation.
Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC | GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001

Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Section 5.4 of RA 9005 prohibiting publication of election survey
results, among others, because the grant of authority to the COMELEC to regulate the enjoyment and utilization
of franchises for the operation of media of communications is limited to ensuring “equal opportunity, time,
space and the right to reply,” as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
facilities for “public information campaigns for and among candidates.”
Sanidad v. COMELEC | GR No. 90878, January 29, 1990 | 181 SCRA 529
The Supreme Court held that this power may be exercised only over the media, not over practitioners of the
media. Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated a COMELEC resolution prohibiting radio and TV commentators and
newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues involved in the forthcoming plebiscite for the ratification
of the organic law establishing the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
On the occasion of the ratification campaign for the Autonomy Act for the Cordillera, the COMELEC, issued a
resolution prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from using their columns or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite during the period of the campaign. Reliance was made on the
Election Code and on Article IX-C, Section 4 authorizing the COMELEC to “supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media communication or information.” Sanidad, a
columnist, challenged the validity of the resolution as a violation of freedom of expression.
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The resolution is unconstitutional. The authority given by the Constitution is over holders of franchises. The
purpose is to assure candidates equal opportunity and equal access to media. Sanidad is not a candidate and in
fact in a plebiscite there are no candidates. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and the people’s right
to be informed must be preserved. Moreover, the people’s choice of forum for discussion should not be
restricted.
No pardon, amnesty, parole, etc., for violation of election laws shall be granted by the President without its
favorable recommendation. Article IX-C, Section 5
Commission on Elections cannot exercise the power of apportionment.
Montejo v. COMELEC | 242 SCRA 415 (1995)

While Section 2 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution empowered the COMELEC to “make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment made herein,” the Ordinance did not vest in it the authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another. And while the Ordinance grants COMELEC the power to adjust the number of
members (not municipalities) “apportioned to the province out of which a new province was created,” the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when, in its Resolution No. 2736, it transferred the Municipality of Capoocan in the
2nd District and the Municipality of Palompon in the 4th District to the 3rd District of Leyte. The COMELEC is without
authority to reapportion the congressional districts, as only Congress is vested with such power.
The Commission does not have the power to transfer municipalities from one congressional district to another for the
purpose of preserving proportionality. This is not one of the broad powers granted by Section 2(2). Neither is it what is
referred to by the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, Sections 2 & 3, authorizing the Commission to make “minor
adjustments.” The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the subject clearly excluded the power to transfer
whole municipalities.
Makalintal v. COMELEC | GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

For violating the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC, Sections The COMELEC has the power to
17.1, 19 and 25 of RA 9189 – Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, insofar as they annul an entire municipal election on
the ground of post-election terrorism.
relate to the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, and the grant It may be true that there is no
to it of the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and specific provision vesting such
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, were declared unconstitutional. authority in the COMELEC, but there
is no doubt that the body has
extensive powers given by the new
Constitution under the general rubric
of its authority to “enforce and
Power to Declare Failure of Elections
administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections” under Article
Joseph Peter Sison v. COMELEC | GR No. 134096, March 3, 1999 IX-C, Section 2(1). Moreover,
Section 185, 1978 Election Code
Pasandalan v. COMELEC | GR No. 150312, July 18, 2002
accords it exclusive charge of the
The Supreme Court said that under pertinent provisions of BP 881, there are only enforcement and administration of
three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of insuring
2. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on free, orderly and honest elections.
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous Election returns which are coerced
causes. returns are no returns at all and the
COMELEC has the power to reject
3. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
them.
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. True, earlier decisions under the
1935 Constitution denied this power
4. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the to the COMELEC such as Abes v.
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election results in COMELEC | 21 SCRA 1252 (1967).
a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes The new Constitution has expanded
the powers of the COMELEC. In
Biliwang v. COMELEC | GR No. 55642,
Mitmug v. COMELEC | 230 SCRA 54 June 19, 1982 the COMELEC had
The Supreme Court held that for the COMELEC to conduct a hearing on a verified found that it was impossible to
distinguish the illegal from the valid
petition to declare a failure of election, it is necessary that the petition must show on returns. Note that the COMELEC
its face two conditions: annulled the elections after
1. That no voting has taken place in the precinct on the date fixed by law proclamation.
or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in a

failure to elect; and
2. The votes was not cast would affect the results of the election. Thus, in
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this case, for failure of the petition to show the existence of the first condition, the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition even without a hearing.
Soliva v. COMELEC | GR No. 141723, April 20, 2001

Applying the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court upheld the COMELEC Resolution, that there was failure of election in
the Municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan del Norte in the local elections of May 11, 1998, on the basis of the
finding that the counting of votes and the canvassing of election returns were clearly attended by fraud, intimidation,
terrorism and harassment. The counting of the votes was transferred from the polling places to the multi-purpose
gymnasium without the knowledge and permission of private respondents or their representatives, and the canvassing of
election returns was done without the latter’s presence. The transfer was made without authority of the COMELEC as
required by law, and was not even recorded by the BEI.
Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC | GR No. 147066, March 26, 2001

The Court upheld the resolution of the COMELEC denying the petitioners’ request for special registration of voters in the
youth sector who failed to register before the deadline set by the COMELEC under RA 8189. The Supreme Court noted that
respondent COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law n the matter and simply performed its
constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
The COMELEC is not authorized to make an unofficial quick count of presidential election results.
Brillantes v. COMELEC | GR No. 163193, June 15, 2004

The assailed resolution usurps, in the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of the President and Vice
President.
What is the difference between the

2. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND jurisdiction of the COMELEC before
QUALIFICATIONS OF ALL ELECTIVE REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND CITY OFFICIALS. EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE proclamation and its jurisdiction after
JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTESTS INVOLVING ELECTION MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS DECIDED BY THE RTC, proclamation? Or, put it differently,
what is the difference between the
OR INVOLVING ELECTIVE BARANGAY OFFICIALS DECIDED BY THE MTC, AND DECISIONS THEREIN SHALL
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over a pre-
BE FINAL, EXECUTORY AND UNAPPEALABLE. proclamation controversy and its
jurisdiction over a “contest”?
Exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation cases.
Its jurisdiction over a pre-proclamation
The COMELEC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversy is administrative or quasi-
controversies under Section 242, BP 881. The possibility of a conflict of jurisdiction judicial and is governed by the less
between the COMELEC and the House of Representatives or Senate Electoral stringent requirements of administrative
due process (although the Supreme Court
Tribunal regarding contests involving congressional elections has been foreclosed by has insisted that question on
Section 15, RA 7166, which prohibits pre-proclamation controversies in national “qualifications” should be decided only
offices, except on questions involving the composition and proceedings of the after a full-dress hearing) whereas its
jurisdiction over “contests” is judicial and
Board of Canvassers. No further conflict is anticipated with the decision of the is governed by the requirement s of
Supreme Court in Aquino v. COMELEC | 248 SCRA 400, when it said that the judicial process. Hence, even in the case
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is exercised over the members of the House of of regional or provincial or city offices, it
does not make a difference whether the
Senate, and a party to the election controversy is a member of the House or the COMELEC will treat it as a pre-
Senate only after he has been proclaimed, has taken his oath and has assumed the proclamation controversy or as a
functions of the office. This is reiterated in Vinzons- Chato v. COMELEC. contest.
Broad Scope of Powers; Limitation
Javier v. COMELEC | 144 SCRA 194

In making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide
those cases from beginning to end, and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of
the winners.
Bince v. COMELEC | 218 SCRA 782

The COMELEC I without the power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or to suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing, as this would constitute a violation of the due process clause.
Aggabao v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 163756, January 26, 2005

146
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Arcenas v. Commission on Elections, supra

Paderanga v. Commission on Elections, supra
Moreover, in the case of municipal offices, even if the case began with the COMELEC before proclamation, if there should
be proclamation before the controversy is resolved, it ceases to be a pre-proclamation controversy and becomes a contest
cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
Power to Issue Writs of Certiorari Prohibition, etc.
Relampagos v. Cumba | 243 SCRA 690

Edding v. COMELEC | 246 SCRA 502
In the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC has the power to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus
and certiorari, because the last part of Section 50, BP 697, remains in full force and effect, and had not been repealed by
BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, the ruling in Veloria v. COMELEC | 211 SCRA 907 and Garcia v. de Jesus | 206
SCRA 779 is now abandoned.
Acosta v. COMELEC | 290 SCRA 578

Supreme Court said that the COMELEC exceeded its authority when it affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
declaring respondent the winner, even as the pending petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner with the
COMELEC merely questioned the order of the MTC denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file his answer to
the election protest filed by the respondent in the MTC.
Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction
Flores v. Commission on Elections| GR No. 89604, April 20, 1990 | 184 SCRA 484; reiterated in Guieb v. Fontanilla | 247
SCRA 48, and in Calacag v. COMELEC | 274 SCRA 405
RA 6679, insofar as it grants appellate jurisdiction to the RTC over decisions of Municipal Trial Courts and/or Metropolitan
Trial Courts in electoral cases involving elective barangay officials is unconstitutional.
Section 9, RA 6679 which makes decisions of a municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay appealable to the regional
trial court was declared unconstitutional. The COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
barangay elective officials decided by trial court of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC, however, is over
questions of fact; questions of law go to the Supreme Court.
Veloria v . COMELEC, supra

Appeal to the COMELEC from the Regional Trial Court must be filed within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision.
A motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision is a prohibited pleading, and does not interrupt the running of the period
for appeal.
Rodillas v. COMELEC | 245 SCRA 702

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the mere filing of the Notice of Appeal is not enough; it should be accompanied
by payment of the correct amount of appeal fee, in order that the appeal may be deemed perfected. In this case, Supreme
Court held that the payment of the full amount of docket fee is an indispensible step for the perfection of an appeal to the
COMELEC. Payment of the same to the RTC produces no valid effects because the RTC is without appellate jurisdiction over
the case.
Sunga v. COMELEC | 288 SCRA 76

The Supreme Court called attention to the fact that Section 8, Rule 42 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provides that
if the docket fee is not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action on the petition for disqualification until the docket fee
is paid or may dismiss the case. The use of the word, “may” indicates that the provision is merely permissive, and if the
COMELEC gives due course to the petition, the subsequent payment of the docket fee could cure the procedural defect.
Jaramilla v. COMELEC | GR No. 155717, October 23, 2003
147
It was held that the COMELEC has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by its rules, or the
requirement of non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases. The COMELEC is likewise not
constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees.
Execution Pending Appeal
Edding v. COMELEC | 245 SCRA 502

The COMELEC cannot deprive the Regional Trial Court of its competence to order execution of judgment pending appeal,
because the mere filing of an appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and the authority to
resolve pending incidents. Since the court had jurisdiction to act on the motion (for execution pending appeal) at the time
it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved, and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party.
Uy v. COMELEC, cited in Santos v. COMELEC | GR No. 155618, March 26, 2003

The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases, as stated in Gophol v. Riodique, is “to give as much
recognition to the worth of the trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation of the
board of canvassers.” Indeed, to deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution ending appeal would “bring back
the ghost of the grab-the proclamation, prolong-the-protest techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the
past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold on an elective public office.
Navarosa v. COMELEC | GR No. 157957, September 18, 2003

It was held that the RTC may grant a motion for execution pending appeal when there are valid and special reasons to
grant the same such as:
1. The public interest involved or the will of the electorate.
2. The shortness of the remaining portion of the term.
3. The length of time that the election contest has been pending.
Gutierrez v. COMELEC | 270 SCRA 413

The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that only a short period is left of the term of office is a good ground for execution
pending appeal. This was reiterated in Ramas v. COMELEC | 286 SCRA 189
Camlian v. COMELEC | 271 SCRA 757

It was held that the provision which allows execution pending appeal must be strictly construed against the movant, as it is
an exception to the general rule. Following civil law jurisprudence, the reasons allowing for immediate execution must be
of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should such party secure a reversal of the
judgment on appeal. Absent such, the order must be stricken down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion. Not every
invocation of public interest with particular reference to the will of the electorate can be appreciated as a good reason,
especially so if the same appears to be self-serving and has not been clearly established. Public interest will be best served
only when the candidate voted for the position is finally proclaimed and adjudged winner in the election.
Relampagos v. Cumba | 243 SCRA 690

Note that the motion for execution pending appeal should be filed before the expiration of the period for appeal.
Asmala v. COMELEC | 289 SCRA 746

The Supreme Court said that the parties had five days from service of judgment within which to appeal, and although the
respondent had filed his appeal on time, the appeal was deemed perfected as to him only. This did not deprive the
petitioner of the right to avail himself of the five-day period to appeal, if he so desired. Accordingly, during this five-day
period, petitioner may file a motion for execution pending appeal.
Balajonda v. COMELEC | GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005 cited Batul v. Bayron | GR No. 157959, February 26, 2004
Judgment which may be executed pending appeal need not only be those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC
as well.
Power to Cite for Contempt

148
Guevara v. COMELEC | 104 Phil 269

The COMELEC has the statutory power to cite for contempt, but the power may be exercised only while the COMELEC is
engaged in the performance of quasi-judicial functions.
Power of Supreme Court to Review Appellate Decisions of the COMELEC
Galido v. COMELEC | 193 SCRA 78

The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of a special
civil action for certiorari. Article IX-C, Section 2(2) – stating that decisions of the COMELEC in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials are final, executory and non-appealable – does not preclude the right to go to the
Supreme Court on certiorari granted by Article IX-A, Section 7.
Lazatin v. Lingad | 134 SCRA 1, January 4, 1985

The Supreme Court may intervene in the supervisory function of the COMELEC, but only in those rare instances where the
imminence of the elections calls for prompt determination lest the constitutional right of suffrage be rendered futile.
Ambil v. COMELEC | GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

However, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC involves only final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must
be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not of a division, and certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division.
People v. Hon. Delgado | GR Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990

The COMELEC is given authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the election law and Section 7 says that
decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court on certiorari. After the
preliminary investigation conducted by COMELEC lawyers and after the COMELEC approves the report and orders the filing
of a criminal case, the trial court may order a reinvestigation made by the COMELEC
The “final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance by said body in the exercise of
the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.”
The regional trial court, on the other hand, is given exclusive authority to try and decide criminal cases involving elections.
When the COMELEC as prosecutor files a case before a trial court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and all subsequent
dispositions of the case must be subject to approval by the court. Hence, the court may order reinvestigation and require
submission of records of the preliminary examination to satisfy itself that there is probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
3. DECIDE, SAVE THOSE INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE, ALL QUESTIONS AFFECTING ELECTIONS, INCLUDING DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND
LOCATION OF POLLING PLACES, APPOINTMENT OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AND INSPECTORS AND REGISTRATION OF VOTERS.
Cawasa v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 150469, July 3, 2002

It was held that while changes in the location of polling places may be initiated by the written petition of the majority of
the voters, or by agreement of all the political parties, ultimately, it is the COMELEC that determines whether a change is
necessary after due notice and hearing. Court characterized as a grave electoral irregularity the appointment of military
personnel as members of the BEI. There is no legal basis for the replacement of the duly constituted members of the BEI
who were public school teachers. If there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in
the civil service, or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed.
As an incident to its duties concerning registration of voters, it may decide a question involving the right to vote, but its
decision shall be subject to judicial review. In this regard, read also appropriate chapter in Election Laws relative to
inclusion and exclusion proceedings.
Guevara v. Commission on Elections | 104 Phil 268 (1958)

Masangcay v. Commission on Elections | 6 SCRA 27 (1962)
149
When exercising its purely administrative powers under this paragraph, the COMELEC may not punish contempt.
There are certain powers which even under the new Constitution still clearly do not belong to the Commission. Thus, it is
not empowered to decide questions “involving the right to vote.”
The power to determine whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage is a
judicial question, Pungutan v. Abubakar | 43 SCRA 1, 12 (1972), and the power to resolve such question has been
excluded from the Commission’s power to be judge of election contests. Finally, while the Commission may punish for
contempt, such power may not be exercised in connection with its purely executive or ministerial functions but only in
furtherance of its quasi-judicial and now also judicial functions.
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 119976, September 18, 1995

(Dissenting opinion of Justice Chief Justice Narvasa)
Before proclamation, any problem should be resolved in a “pre-proclamation” proceeding by the Commission because of
its powers under Section 2(1) & (3). The only questions that may not be touched by the Commission are “those involving
the right to vote.” Hence, before proclamation, the Commission has the authority to decide whether a person has the
constitutional qualifications needed to be voted for even on the national level.
Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer | 135 SCRA 25

Garces v. Court of Appeals | 259 SCRA 99
Decisions or determinations made by COMELEC in the exercise of this power, being merely administrative (not quasi-
judicial) in character, may be questioned in an ordinary civil action before trial courts.
Salva v. Makalintal | GR No. 132603, September 18, 2000

The case questioning the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite relative to the ordinance abolishing a barangay – being merely an incident of the COMELEC’s inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites – may be taken cognizance of by the Regional Trial Court.
Loreto v. Brion | GR No. 130681, July 29, 1999

If a proclaimed winner is subsequently declared to be disqualified, the second placer cannot take his place. As early as
Geronimo v. Ramos | 136 SCRA 435, the Court has held that, “The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office
or maintain him there.
The rationale of the rule is explained in Benito v. COMELEC | 235 SCRA 436, as follows: “For to allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to
elect officials of their choice.
4. DEPUTIZE, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PRESIDENT, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF
ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS.
Tan v. Commission on Elections | 237 SCRA 253, 358-359 (1994)

May recommend to the President the removal of any officer it has deputized, or the imposition of any other sanction, for
disobedience, violation or disregard of its orders – Article IX-C, Section 2(8)
The power of the Commission over deputized officers under Section 2(6) covers not just criminal cases but also
administrative cases. Thus, where the Commission has deputized a City Prosecutor as election canvasser, such Prosecutor
cannot claim immunity from the power of the Commission on the argument that he comes under the executive
department. The Commission has the power over all persons required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. However, under Section 2(8), the Commission may merely issue a recommendation for disciplinary action to the
President.
The Court said that the authority of the COMELEC is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The
administrative case against the petitioner, taken cognizance of by the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his
duties as election canvasser and not as City Prosecutor. In order to ensure that such duly deputized officials and
150
employees of the government carry out their assigned tasks, the law also provides that upon COMELEC’s
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from
office the officer or employee who may, after due proves, be found guilty of violation of election laws. It is the COMELEC,
being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform, that should conduct the
administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound
exercise of its recommendatory power.
5. REGISTER, AFTER SUFFICIENT PUBLICATION, POLITICAL PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS OR COALITIONS WHICH MUST PRESENT THEIR PLATFORM OR
PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT; ACCREDIT CITIZENS’ ARMS.
RA 7941 – The Party-List System Act

A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency
is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. A sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. A sectoral
organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Article IX-C, Section 2(5)

Groups which cannot be registered as political parties:
1. Religious denominations or sects.
2. Those who seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means.
3. Those who refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution.
4. Those supported by foreign governments.
Generally, all political parties and organizations which present their platform or program of government and which satisfy
requirements prescribed by law may register. However, religious denominations and sects and organizations which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means or refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution, or which are
supported by foreign governments, may not be registered.
Lay organizations with religious affiliations or political parties which derive their principles from religious beliefs may be
registered. The ban is only on religious denominations and sects, such as the Catholic Church, or the Anglican Church, or
the Iglesia ni Kristo, or the Muslim denomination. This prohibition is made in the spirit of separation of Church and State
and is intended to prevent churches as churches from wielding political power.
Grounds For Cancellation of Registration
Article IX-C, Section 2(5)

Accepting financial contributions from foreign governments or their agencies. Under RA 7941, COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes.
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal.
3. It is a foreign party or organization.
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes.
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections.
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition.
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one year.
8. It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections, or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it was registered.
151
RA 8173 – An Act Granting All Citizens’ Arms Equal Opportunity to be Accredited by the Commission on
Elections
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC, supra

The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolution dividing the LDP into “wings,” each of which may nominate
candidates for every elective position and be entitled to representation in the election committees that the COMELEC may
create.
Racabo, Jr. v. COMELEC | GR No. 134293, June 21, 1999

The Court declared that the electoral process envisions one candidate from a political party for each position, and disunity
and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery thereof. By according both
wings representation in the election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance of political parties and
effectively divided the opposition.
AKLAT v. COMELEC | GR No. 162203, April 14, 2004

Supreme Court declared that the authority of the COMELEC to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to enforce
and administer all election laws includes the determination, with the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for
the accomplishment of pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system.
In the same case, the Supreme Court also upheld the action of the COMELEC in denying the registration of AKLAT, for
failure to comply with the eight guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC |
GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001, which are:
1. The political party, sectoral organization or coalition must represent a marginalized or underrepresented sector or
group identified in Section 5, RA 7941.
2. Major political parties must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.
3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
4. A party or organization must not be disqualified under Section 6, RA 7941.
5. The party must not be an adjunct or, or a project organized, or an entity funded or assisted by the Government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, its nominees must likewise do so.
7. The party’s nominees must also represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
8. While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must also be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation which will benefit the nation as a whole.
6. FILE, UPON A VERIFIED COMPLAINT, OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, PETITIONS IN COURT FOR THE INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF VOTERS; INVESTIGATE
AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE PROSECUTE CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION LAWS.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 128054, October 16, 1997 | 280 SCRA 892, 917
The import of the constitutional (Article IX-C, Section 2(7)) and statutory (Section 265, BP 881 – Omnibus Election Code)
mandate for the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws is that it “translates, in effect, to
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing
an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of
arrest should be issued.
Petitioner contends that, since the 1987 Constitution empowered the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases
involving election offenses, it is the obligation of the COMELEC to search for the evidence needed to judicially indict the
respondents identified in petitioner’s letter-complaint as the government officials who disbursed public finds allegedly for
electioneering purposes during the May 1992 elections.
Erroneous contention. “The task of COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint,
is not physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense.
A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the
burden, as it is his responsibility to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint.”
De Jesus v. People | 120 SCRA 760

Corpus v. Tanodbayan | 149 SCRA 281, 283 (1987)
The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases for violations of election laws, not the Fiscal or
Special Prosecutor in the Ombudsman office.
152
People v. Judge Inting | GR No. 88919, July 25, 1990 | 187 SCRA 788
The trial court was in error when it dismissed an information filed by the Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City because
the latter failed to comply with the order of the court to secure the concurrence or approval of the Provincial Fiscal
(Prosecutor) in the filing of the information. Indeed, such concurrence is not necessary not required.
Preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses does not have to be
coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court may not take cognizance of the investigation
and determine whether or not probable cause exists. It is because prosecution of election offenses is exclusively under the
COMELEC. If the Provincial Prosecutor performs any role at all, it is by delegation by the COMELEC. The court therefore
may rely on the investigation conducted by the Provincial Election Supervisor for purposes of determining the existence of
probable cause to issue a warrant.
People v. Judge Basilia | GR Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989 | 179 SCRA 87

The COMELEC may validly delegate this power to the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor), as it did when it issued Resolution No.
1862, dated March 2, 1987.
Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal for an election offense as an aftermath of the elections of May 1987. The
judge dismissed the information on the ground that prosecuting election offenses is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections. While indeed the COMELEC is vested with exclusive power to prosecute election offenses, the
Constitution in Article IX-C, Section 2(4) likewise authorizes the COMELEC to deputize, with the consent of the President,
other law enforcement agencies. This the COMELEC has done and the consent of the President was given in EO 134 dated
February 27, 1987. The acts of the delegated officers are in legal contemplation acts of the COMELEC.
Baytan v. COMELEC | GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003

It is well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC’s sound
discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for
violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election fraud, offenses and malpractices.
COMELEC v. Silva | 286 SCRA 177

This power includes the authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court. The
Chief State Prosecutor – who may have been designated by the COMELEC to prosecute a criminal action – merely derives
his authority from the COMELEC. It is beyond his power to oppose the appeal made by the COMELEC.
7. RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO MINIMIZE ELECTION SPENDING, INCLUDING LIMITATION OF PLACES WHERE PROPAGANDA
MATERIALS SHALL BE POSTED, AND TO PREVENT AND PENALIZE ALL FORMS OF ELECTION FRAUDS, OFFENSES, MALPRACTICE, AND NUISANCE
CANDIDATES.
8. SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF EACH ELECTION, PLEBISCITE, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM
OR RECALL.
 Statutory Powers of the Commission on Elections

Sections 52 and 57, BP 881, enumerate, among others, as the statutory powers of the COMELEC, to exercise supervision and control
over officials required to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections, promulgate rules and regulations, punish contempt,
inquire into financial records of candidates, groups, etc., prescribe forms to be used in elections, procure supplies and materials
needed for the election, enlist non-partisan groups to assist it, fix periods for pre-election requirements, etc. Dumarpa v. Dimaporo
| 177 SCRA 478
Power to declare failure of election; call for special elections

Section 4, RA 7166, provides that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, by a majority vote of its members, may declare failure of elections
and call for special elections as provided in Section 6, BP 881. The COMELEC may exercise such power motu proprio or upon a
verified petition, and the hearing of the case shall be summary in nature
Joseph Peter Singson v. COMELEC | GR No. 134096, March 3, 1999

Supreme Court said that there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely:
1. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes.
2. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
153
3. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 5
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election results in a failure to No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by
causes. the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
Mitmug v. COMELEC, supra
Loong v. COMELEC | 257 SCRA 1 A free and open party system shall be
Hassan v. COMELEC | 264 SCRA 125 allowed to evolve according to the free
Batabor v. COMELEC | GR No. 160428, July 21, 2004 choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.
However, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking a declaration of
failure of election, two conditions must concur, namely:
1. No voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law, or Importance of registration of a political party:
even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect. 1. Registration confers juridical personality on the
party.
2. The votes cast would affect the results of the election 2. It informs the public of the party’s existence.
3. It identifies the party and its officers for
Borja v. COMELEC | 260 SCRA 604 purposes of regulation by the COMELEC.
A petition to declare a failure of election is neither an election protest nor a pre-
proclamation controversy. To register for purposes of the electoral process,
an organization may not be a political party.
Loong v. COMELEC, supra Section 2(5)
The Supreme Court denied the petition to declare failure of election, because when
the COMELEC resorted to manual count after the automated machines failed to read The concept of accreditation no longer appears in
the ballots correctly, it did not do so arbitrarily. The Court found that there was, after the new Constitution. For purposes of the
all, compliance with due process clause because the petitioner and the intervenor electoral process, all parties, organizations and
coalitions are considered equal.
were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count, and the result of the said
count was reliable.
No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid,
For the validity of an election, it is essential that the voters have notice in except for those registered under the party-
some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place, and purpose list system as provided in this Constitution.
thereof. The time must be authoritatively designated in advance.
In effect, Section 7 prohibits block-voting “except
Hassan v. COMELEC | 264 SCRA 125 for those registered under the party-list system.”
The requirement of notice becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was
called by some authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least,
there must be substantial compliance therewith, so that it may fairly and reasonably ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 8
Political parties, or organizations or
be said that the purpose of the statute had been carried into effect. The sufficiency of coalitions registered under the party-list
notice is based on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and system, shall not be represented in the
purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
express their will. other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in
Lucero v. COMELEC, supra accordance with law.
It was held that in fixing the date of the special elections, the COMELEC should see to ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 9
it that: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
1. It should not be later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of the special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
2. It should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in failure to elect. ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 10
Bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
Loong v. COMELEC | 257 SCRA 1
No law provides for a reglementary period within which to file a petition for the This provision does not give candidates immunity
annulment of an election if there has been no proclamation yet. from suit.
An example of discrimination is unequal treatment

Special Election in the availment of media facilities.
Sambarani v. COMELEC | GR No. 160427, September 15, 2004

The prohibition on conducting special elections after 30 days from the cessation of the
cause for failure of election is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the
COMELEC has residual powers to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline
154
prescribed by the law. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of the special ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 11
elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law. Funds certified by the
Commission as necessary to
defray the expenses for holding
Since there was failure of elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay regular and special elections,
chairmen of the respective barangays in a holdover capacity. They shall continue to discharge plebiscites, initiatives, referenda,
and recalls, shall be provided in
their powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. While it is the regular or special
true that Section 43C of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay appropriations and, once
officials to three years, Section 5, RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay official approved, shall be released
automatically upon certification
may continue in office in a holdover capacity under their successors and elected and shall have by the Chairman of the
qualified. Commission.
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in an action for annulment of election results or for a declaration of failure of
elections.
Loong v. COMELEC, supra

The COMELEC may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’ signatures and
fingerprints in order to determine whether the elections had, indeed, been free, honest and clean.
 Party System
A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people. Article IX-C, Section 6
 DEFINITION | Political Parties

Geronimo v. COMELEC | 107 SCRA 614, 627, September 26, 1981
Section 80, 1965 Election Code and Section 22, 1971 Election Code defined a political party as “an organized group of
persons pursuing the same political ideals in a government and includes its branches and divisions.” The 1978 Election
Code adopted the aforequoted definition by providing in Section 199 that “any other group of persons pursuing the same
political ideals in government may register with the Commission and be entitled to the same rights and privileges.”
Sevillaje v. COMELEC | 107 SCRA 141, 156, August 31, 1981

Laban v. COMELEC | 82 SCRA 196, March, 25, 1978
For the purpose of the Interim Batasang Pambansa elections in April 1978, the KBL was not considered a political party but
merely as “an umbrella organization”. After the 1978 elections, however, the KBL became a party as shown by the
actuations of its members. Hence, since that time, affiliation with or departure from it became covered by Section 10 on
“turncoatism”
No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system. Article IX-C, Section 7
This is related to Article VI, Section 5(2), providing for 20% of the seats in the House of Representatives being allocated to party-list
representatives and RA 7941 – An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System
Article IX-C, Section 8

Parties registered under the party-list system shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
History of the “two-party system” under the 1935 Constitution

 The 1935 Constitution and the 1971 Election Code both gave a preferred position to the two major political parties.
 The 1935 Constitution gave proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments to the various parties –
proportional, that is, to the membership strength of the parties in the Senate and House of Representatives.
 In both the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, only the two major parties enjoyed representation. Since there was no
Commission on Appointments or Electoral Tribunal in the 1973 Constitution, these constitutional advantages enjoyed by
the two major parties were absent in that Constitution.
 Under the new Constitution, representation is given not just to the two major parties but to all parties proportionally.
 Under the 1971 Election Code, only the two major parties had representation in the Registration Board, in the Board of
Election Inspectors, in the Committee on Printing of Official Ballots, and in the provincial body charged with the duty to
verify the official ballots sent to the provinces by the Bureau of Printing.
155
 These advantages disappeared with the adoption in 1973, Section 9(2), “No party or candidate shall have membership in
the registration board, board of election inspectors, board of canvassers, other similar bodies.
 Moreover, such accredited parties “may by law be granted other rights or privileges and the consequent advantages of
accredited parties disappeared.
 Moreover, Section 8 now says, “Political parties or organizations or coalition registered under the party list system, shall
not be represented in the voters’ registration boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.”
 Thus, there is again a leveling of all political parties.
 In fact, the purpose of Section 8 and Section 7 is to allow the growth of a multi-party system.
 Note, however, that the multi-party systems was responsible for the proliferation of candidates during the 1992 national
elections.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC, supra

This policy envisions a system that shall “evolve according to the free choice of the people,” not one molded and whittled by the
COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi-party system, it does not contemplate the COMELEC splitting parties into two.
 Election Period
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the
election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Article IX-C, Section 9
 Judicial Review of Commission on Elections Decisions

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court, filed with the Supreme Court within 30 days from receipt of a copy of final
order, ruling or decision of the Commission en banc.
Aratuc v. COMELEC | 88 SCRA 251
Filipinas Engineering v. Ferrer | 135 SCRA 25
156
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 1

1. There shall be a Commission on Audit
composed of a Chairman and two
 Composition & Appointment Commissioners, who shall be natural-born
A Chairman and two (2) Commissioners, who shall be natural born Filipino citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
citizens, at least 35 years of age, CPAs with not less than ten (10) years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less
auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar with at least ten (10) than ten years of auditing experience, or
years of practice of law, and must not have been candidates in the election members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
immediately preceding the appointment. They shall be appointed by the years, and must not have been candidates for
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of any elective position in the elections
seven years without reappointment. immediately preceding their appointment. At
no time shall all Members of the Commission
belong to the same profession.
 Powers & Duties 2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
 General Function appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of
It is the function of the Commission on Audit to examine the seven years without reappointment. Of those
accuracy of the records kept by accountable officers and to first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
determine whether expenditures have been made in conformity with for seven years, one Commissioner for five
years, and the other Commissioner for three
law. It is therefore through the Commission on Audit that the people years, without reappointment. Appointment to
can verify whether their money has been properly spent. any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or
 Classification of Functions designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
1. To examine and audit all forms of government revenues.
2. To examine and audit all forms of government ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 2
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the
expenditures. power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
3. To settle government accounts. and settle all accounts pertaining to the
4. To promulgate accounting and auditing rules “including revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
expenditures.” instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with
5. To decide administrative cases involving expenditures of original charters, and on a post- audit basis:
public funds. a. constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
 Uy, et. al. v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 130685, March 21, 2000 b. autonomous state colleges and
The COA, in the exercise of its auditing function, cannot disallow the universities;
c. other government-owned or
payment of backwages to employees illegally dismissed and say that controlled corporations and their
the responsibility belongs to the official who dismissed them in bad subsidiaries; and
faith. COA cannot say that the responsibility belongs to the official d. such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity,
who made the illegal dismissal when such official has not been heard. directly or indirectly, from or
Besides, payment of backwages is not an irregular, unnecessary, through the Government, which are
excessive or extravagant expense. required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity.
 Davao City Water District, et. al. v. Civil Service Commission and However, where the internal
Commission on Audit | GR No. 95237-8, September 13, 1991 control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the
Local Water Districts incorporated under PD 198, government-owned Commission may adopt such
corporations with original charter and therefore are under the measures, including temporary or
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. special pre-audit, as are necessary
and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the
 Mamaril v. Domingo | 227 SCRA 206 general accounts of the
The Commission has authority not just over accountable officers but Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve
also over other officers who perform functions related to accounting the vouchers and other supporting
such as verification of evaluations and computation of fees papers pertaining thereto.
collectible, and the adoption of internal rules of control. An 2. The Commission shall have exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this
Evaluator/Computer, for instance, is an indispensible part of the Article, to define the scope of its audit and
process of assessment and collection and comes within the scope of examination, establish the techniques and
the Commission’s jurisdiction. methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit | 231 disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
SCRA 202 (1994) excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties.
157
Even in cases where pre-audit is allowed and pre-audit has already been performed, the Commission is not estopped from
making a post-audit.
 Examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property owned or held in trust or pertaining to, the Government.
On post-audit basis: Constitutional Commissions and bodies or offices granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution;
autonomous state colleges and universities; other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
and non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government.
Orocio v. Commission on Audit | 213 SCRA 109

The Supreme Court held that the COA has the power to overrule the National Power Corporation General Counsel on post-
audit measures relative to the determination of whether an expenditure of a government agency is irregular, unnecessary,
extravagant or unconscionable.
Osmena v. Commission on Audit | 238 SCRA 463

The Participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution
of a compromise agreement relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation, and
a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but
even encouraged by law. Thus, COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the City’s appropriation of
P30,000 made conformably with the compromise agreement.
Temporary or special pre-audit: where the internal control system of the audited agency is inadequate.
Gonzales v. Provincial Board of Iloilo | 12 SCRA 711

The duty to pass in audit salary voucher is discretionary.
Guevarra v. Gimenez | 6 SCRA 813

Supreme Court said that the authority of the Auditor General is limited to auditing such that to determine whether there is
a law appropriating funds for a given purpose, whether there is a contract, whether the goods or services have been
delivered, and whether payment has been authorized. When all these are found to be in order, then the duty to pass a
voucher in audit becomes ministerial.
In settling accounts, such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given
purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law;
whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions
thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the
corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor
General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment.
NOTE, however, that under the 1987 Constitution, with its expanded powers, the COA may validly veto appropriations
which violate rules on unnecessary, irregular, extravagant or unconscionable expenses.
Compania General de Tabacos v. French and Unson | 39 Phil 34, 42 (1919)

The power of the Commission to “settle accounts” means that the power to settle liquidated accounts, that is, those
accounts which may be adjusted simply by an arithmetical process. It does not include the power to fix the amount of an
unfixed or undetermined debt.
 Dincong v. Commissioner Guingona, Jr. | 162 SCRA 782 (1988)

The Commission on Audit has the authority to reduce the amount that was passed in audit on the ground that the original
amount was “excessive and disadvantageous to the government.” This is on the basis of its authority in Article IX-D,
Section 2(1). This extends to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in an
accountable capacity. The Court, however, reversed the factual decision that the original amount was excessive.
 Polloso v. Gangan | GR No. 140563, July 14, 2000

The National Power Corporation hired the services of a lawyer without complying with the requirement which prior
written approval of the Solicitor General should be observed. When COA disallowed payment to the lawyer, it was argued
that the circular requiring approval by the Solicitor General was unconstitutional because it restricted the practice of law.
158
The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular unnecessary, excessive and extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures.
 Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 85285, July 28, 1989
Where regulations require public bidding for the sale of government property, the Commission on Audit have the
authority to interpret the meaning of “public bidding” and what constitutes its “failure” for as long that there is no clear
evidence of abuse of discretion, the decision of COA will not be disturbed. “No less than the Constitution has ordained that
the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of
government funds and properties.
 Ramos v. Aquino | 39 SCRA 641 (1971)

If the Commission has already passed an account in audit, the fiscal may still look into it for the purpose of determining
possible criminal liability because the Commission’s interest is merely administrative and not criminal.
The COA has audit jurisdiction over government-owned and controlled corporations ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 3
with original charters, as well as government-owned and controlled corporations No law shall be passed
without original charters. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiaries
determining COA’s audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a in any guise whatever, or any
corporation, whether under a general or special law. investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 147402, January 14, 2004
Local Water Districts (LWD) are not private corporations because they are not created ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 4
under the Corporation Code; they exist by virtue of PD 198, the special enabling The Commission shall submit
charter which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. COA, therefore, exercises to the President and the
Congress, within the time fixed
audit jurisdiction over LWDs. by law, an annual report
covering the financial
 Keep the general accounts of Government, and preserve vouchers and supporting condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions,
papers for such period as provided by law. agencies, and
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or
 Authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques and controlled corporations, and
methods required therefor. non-governmental entities
subject to its audit, and
recommend measures
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 88435, January necessary to improve their
15, 2002 effectiveness and efficiency. It
The Supreme Court said that the power of the Commission to define the scope of its shall submit such other reports
as may be required by law.
audit and to promulgate auditing rules and regulations and the power to disallow
unnecessary expenditures, is exclusive, but its power to examine and audit is not
exclusive.
Public corporations under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit may employ private auditors. The clear
unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA’s power to examine and audit is non-
exclusive. On the other hand, the COA’s authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
However, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA’s findings and conclusions
necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned.
 Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, expensive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds or property.
Sambeli v. Province of Isabela | 210 SCRA 80

It was held that COA may stop the payment of the price stipulated in government contracts when found to be irregular,
extravagant or unconscionable.
Bustamante v. Commission on Audit | 216 SCRA 134

COA Circular No. 76-6, prohibiting the use of government vehicles by officials who are provided with transportation
allowance was held to be a valid exercise of its powers under Article IX-D, Section 2; and the prohibition may be made to
apply to officials of the National Power Corporation.
159
 Jurisdiction of the Commission

No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of
public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 3
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 149154, June 10, 2003

The Court already ruled in several cases that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special
charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, PD 198. The COA has the authority to investigate whether directors, officials or
employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, receiving additional allowances and bonuses are entitled to such
benefits under applicable laws. Thus, water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the COA.
Philippine Airlines v. Commission on Audit | 245 SCRA 39

Philippine Airlines, having ceased to be a government-owned or –controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit.
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, supra

The Court, interpreting COA Circular No. 89-296 that there is failure of bidding when (a) there is only one offeror, or (b) when all the
offers are non-complying or unacceptable, declared that the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids, but of offerors , without
distinction as to whether they are disqualified or qualified. Thus, since in the bidding of the 40% block of Petron shares, there were
three offerors, namely Saudi Aramco, Petronas and Westmont – although the latter two were disqualified – then, there was no
failure of bidding.
160
A R T I C L E X
Local Government
GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 9. Sectoral Representation.

Section 1. Territorial and political subdivisions. Supangan, Jr. v. Santos
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local Section 10. Creation, abolition, mergers.
autonomy. Tan v. Commission on Elections
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission Padilla, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals League of Cities v. Commission on Elections
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Section 11. Metropolitan political subdivisions.
Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililla MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association
Dadole v. Commission on Audit Section 12. Classification of Cities.
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Victor Lim Abella v. Commission on Elections
Leynes v. Commission on Audit Section 13. Local groupings.
Batangas CATV v. Batangas City Section 14. Regional development councils.
Section 3. Local Government Code. Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit
Sanchez v. Commission on Elections
Garcia v. Commission on Elections AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Section 4. Power of President. Section 15. Two autonomous regions.
Drilon v. Mayor Lim Section 16. Power of President.
Section 5. Local Finances. Section 17. Powers not granted.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna Section 18. Organic Act.
NPC v. Cabanatuan City Abbas v. Commission on Elections
Petron Corporation v. Mayor Tiangco Cordillera Regional Assembly v. Commission on Elections
Section 6. Share in national taxes. Leonor v. Cordillera Bodong Administration
Pimentel v. Aguirre Section 19. Enactment of Organic Act.
Section 7. Share in national resources. Section 20. Powers granted.
Section 8. Term of elective officials. Pandi v. Court of Appeals
Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections Section 21. Peace and order, national defence.
David v. Commission on Elections
I. Common Provisions
A. Scope
B. Implementing Legislation
C. Supervisory Authority
D. Powers
E. Rights
F. LGU Officials
G. Cities
II. Autonomous Regions

A. Scope
B. Organic Act
C. Powers
161
GENERAL PROVISIONS G E N E R A L
P R O V I S I O N S
 Constitutional Significance of Section 1 ARTICLE X, SECTION 1

The constitutional significance of Article X, Section 1 is that provinces, cities, and municipalities The territorial and political
and barangays have been fixed as the standard territorial and political subdivisions of the subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the
Philippines. This manner of subdividing the Philippines cannot go out of existence except by a provinces, cities,
constitutional amendment. municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao
 There are only two (2) autonomous regions allowed by the Constitution. Should a third and the Cordilleras as
one be desired, a constitutional amendment is needed. hereinafter provided.
ARTICLE X, SECTION 2
 Reasons of Constitutional Commission retained the word barangay in spite of its links with the The territorial and political
previous regime: subdivisions shall enjoy local
 It has a historical significance in Asia. autonomy.
 Existing laws use the term.
 There are continuing references to it in public discussions. As Section 3 states, the Local
Government Code must be characterized by decentralization.
 Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 79956, January 29, 1990
EO 220 dated July 15, 1987 creates the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) creating a temporary administrative agency pending
the creation of the CAR. EO 220 does not thereby create a territorial and political subdivision. What is created is not a public
corporation but an executive agency under the control of the national government. It is more similar to the regional development
councils which the President may create under Article X, Section 14.
LOCAL AUTONOMY
 Significance of declaration of local autonomy

It is meant to free local governments from the well-nigh absolute control by the legislature which characterized local government
under the 1935 Constitution. Thus, although a distinction is made between local governments in general and autonomous regions,
even those outside the autonomous regions are supposed to enjoy autonomy.
 AUTONOMY & DECENTRALIZATION | DEFINITION

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns.
Limbona v. Conte Mangelin | GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared
to be autonomous. In that case the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-
immolation” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
 LOCAL AUTONOMY | JURISPRUDENC

 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties | 234 SCRA 255 (1994)
It means that local governments have certain powers given by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by the national
government, but that, outside of these, local governments may not pass ordinances contrary to statute. The government
of Cagayan de Oro City contended that, under its authority to prohibit gambling, the city would prevent the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from operating a casino in the city. PAGCOR, however, had authority
under PD 1869 to centralize and regulate all games of chance under the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In ruling
that CDO could not curtail PAGCOR’s authority the court in no uncertain terms said, “Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body.
162
 Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals | GR Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995
The Supreme Court denied to the municipalities around Laguna Lake the power to authorize the construction or
dismantling of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corals and the like in Laguna Lake. The municipalities claimed the authority
under general provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code, specifically Section 149. The LLDA, however, claimed power
under RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court ruled that the specific
power of the LLDA must prevail over the general power of local governments. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
power given by the Local Government Code to local governments was a revenue generating power and not a regulatory
power. Hence, the Court, while denying regulatory authority to the municipalities, recognized their authority to impose
fees for purposes of generating revenue.
 Tan v. Perena | GR No. 149743, February 18, 2005

This violated the statutory limit on the number of cockpits was declared invalid.
 Batangas CATV v. Court of Appeals & Batangas City | GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004
Local governments do not have power to grant franchise to operate CATV system.
 San Juan v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
The law says that the budget officer shall be appointed by the Department head upon the recommendation of the head of
local government subject to civil service rules and regulations. If none of those recommended by the local government
head meets the requirements of law, the Department head may not appoint anyone he chooses. He must return the
recommendations of the local government head explaining why the recommendees are not qualified and ask for new
recommendations. In other words, the recommendation of the local government head is a condition sine qua non of the
Department’s appointing authority. This is the only way local autonomy can be given the recognition the Constitution
wants it to have. When in doubt, favor autonomy.
 Dadole v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 125350, December 3, 2002

Leynes v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 143596, December 11, 2003
The COA may not reduce the allowance given to judges by local governments. Since the Local Government Code authorizes
local governments to give allowance to judges and decide how much this should be, local autonomy prohibits the COA
from interfering with the authority of the local government by reducing what has been decided by the local government.
PRESENT FORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ARTICLE X, SECTION 3

The Congress shall enact a
local government code which
 The present form consists of an executive distinct from the legislative body. This is different from shall provide for a more
the form of government under the old Metro Manila Commission where a Commission exercised responsive and accountable
both legislative and executive powers. local government structure
instituted through a system of
 The 1973 Constitution contained a provision which said that, “No change in the existing form of decentralization with effective
government shall take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for mechanisms of recall,
the purpose. The provision was considered too limitive of the power of the Congress. initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different
local government units their
 INITIATIVE & RECALL powers, responsibilities, and
 Garcia v. Commission on Elections | 237 SCRA 279, 290 (1994) resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election,
The 1991 Local Government Code now provides for “initiative and referendum” on the appointment and removal,
local level which it defines as “the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local term, salaries, powers and
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.” The Court has functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters
ruled that, even as worded, the statute authorizes initiative and referendum not just on relating to the organization
ordinances but also on resolutions arguing that to narrow the meaning to only and operation of the local
ordinances would subvert the intent of Article VI, Section 32, which includes “any act units.
passed by local legislative body.”
The current law on “recall” is now found also in the LGC of 1991. The constitutionality of one method of recall adopted by
the Code was tested in this case. Section 70, LGC authorized provinces, cities, legislative districts and municipalities to
have a “preparatory recall assembly” authorized to initiate the recall of an elective official. The contention of Governor
Enrique Garcia was that “the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or
withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not.”
The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit
the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by Article X, Section 3 is for Congress to
“enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
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through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION ARTICLE X, SECTION 4

The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision
 It is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in over local governments. Provinces
accordance with law. It does not include the power to substitute one’s judgment for that of a with respect to component cities
lower officer in matters where a lower officer has various legal alternatives to choose from. and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to
 The supervisory structure in the local government means that the President has general component barangays, shall ensure
supervision over all local government units. But his direct supervisory contact is with that the acts of their component
autonomous regions, provinces, and independent cities. The rest follow in hierarchical order units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
as indicated in Article X, Section 4.
 Drilon v. Lim | 235 SCRA 135, 141 (1994)

When Section 187, LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to pass judgment on the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance or
revenue measures, he does exercise the power of control. He does not thereby dictate what the law should be but merely ensures
that the ordinance is in accordance with law.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 93252, August 5, 1991

Petitioner challenges the right of the President, through the Secretary of Interior, to suspend him on the ground that the
removal of the phrase “as may be provided by law” from the constitutional provision has stripped the President and
legislature of the power over local governments. Corollarily, he argues that the new Constitution has effectively repealed
existing laws on the subject. The power of general supervision of the President includes the power to investigate and
remove. Moreover, Article X, Section 3 provides that LGC may provide for “removal” thus indicating that laws on the
subject are not out of the compass of the legislature. Autonomy does not transform local governments into kingdoms unto
themselves. The important distinction is between the power of general supervision, which the President has, and the
power of control, which the President does not have.
Taule v. Secretary Santos | GR No. 90336, August 12, 1991

The Secretary of Local Government cannot annul the election of officers of a federation of barangay officials. Such
annulment would amount to control and therefore in excess of executive supervisory powers.
LOCAL POWER TO TAX REVENUE GENERATION ARTICLE X, SECTION 5

Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenues
 Basco v. Philippine Gaming and Amusement Corporation | 197 SCRA 52, 65 (1991) and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to
It is contended that the exemption of PAGCOR from tax violates the right of local such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the
governments to create its own source of revenue. The power of the local basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
Congress may provide by law. PAGCOR is exempted by PD 1869 which is still extant. the local governments.
 Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium | GR No. 154993, October 25, 2005

The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which
recognizes the power of these units “to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. These guidelines and
limitations as provided by Congress are main in contained in the LGC.
For Makati to impose a business tax, it must be shown that the Condominium is engaged in business. The City Treasurer has not
posited the claim that the Corporation is engaged in business activities beyond the statutory purposes of a condominium
corporation. The assessment appears to be based solely on the Corporation’s collection of assessments from unit owners, such
assessments being utilized to defray the necessary expenses for the Condominium Project and the common areas. There is no
contemplation of business, no orientation towards profit in this case. Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the LGC
or the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the city in its collection of the void tax constitutes an attempt at deprivation of
property without due process of law.
 Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililla | 198 SCRA 82, 89 (1991)

The power of local governments to raise revenues cannot be limited by administrative order. Under Article X, Section 5, only
guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments.
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim | GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
The power to tax of local governments may not be negated by executive order through a grant of exemption absent a
statute granting such exemption.
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Batangas Power v. Batangas City | GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004

Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with fiscal
constraints faced by LGUs. It widen the tax base of LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws.
Batangas Power cannot rely for exemption on the Basco Case as this was decided prior the effectivity of the LGC when
there was still no law empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national government.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna | GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999

Under the new prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be
deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current
rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the
constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made
more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that:
1. The taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions.
2. Each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources.
3. The resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed.
4. Local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
EQUAL SHARE ON NATIONAL TAX ARTICLE X, SECTION 6

Local government
units shall have a
 Pimentel v. Aguirre | GR No. 132988, July 19, 2000 just share, as
Administrative Order 372, of President Fidel Ramos states that, “Section 1. All government departments determined by law,
in the national
and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and taxes which shall
local government units will identify and implement measures in Fiscal Year 1998 that will reduce total be automatically
expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services released to them.
items, along the following suggested areas…” and in “Section 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to
10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.” The AO is challenged as an attempt to control
local governments and to encroach on their autonomy.
Section 1 can be read as merely advisory and therefore cannot be proscribed as an attempt to exercise control over local
governments. Section 4, however, is “in contravention of Section 286, LGC, providing for the automatic release of each of these
units its share in the national internal revenue.
 Batangas v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004

The Congress may not impose conditions on the release of the share of local governments. This provision mandates that:
1. The LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes.
2. The “just share” shall be determined by law.
3. The “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Under the assailed provisos in the GAA of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five (5) billion pesos was
earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that “such amount shall be released to the local government
units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and
distribution of said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee
on Devolution.”
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee’s prior approval. To the Court’s mind,
the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA
or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the OC from time to time, as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation
of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically released to them.”
 Alternative Center v. Zamora | GR No. 144256, June 8, 2005

Respondents argue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same
does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA. As the Constitution lays upon the executive
the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute –
a proposition which is patently absurd. Moreover, if it were the intent of the framers to allow the enactment of statutes making the
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release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 would have been worded to say “shall be automatically
released to them as provided by law.”
FUND SOURCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARTICLE X, SECTION 7

Local governments shall be
entitled to an equitable share
 Fund sources of local governments: in the proceeds of the
 Local taxes, fees, and charges. utilization and development of
the national wealth within
 Its share in the national taxes. their respective areas, in the
 Its share in the proceeds of the utilization of natural resources within their respective manner provided by law,
areas. including sharing the same
with the inhabitants by way of
 Other “sources of revenues” which they may legitimately make use of either in their direct benefits.
public or governmental capacity, or private or proprietary capacity.
 Scope of their power to levy taxes, fees, and charges

They are subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide. However, such guidelines and limitations to be imposed
by Congress must not be such as to frustrate the “basic policy of local autonomy.”
 National government has no share in local taxes, fees, and charges.

 Local governments can either have shares from revenues accruing through fees and charges or they can receive direct
benefits such as lower rates for consumption of electricity generated within their locality.
TERM OF OFFICE ARTICLE X, SECTION 8

The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay
 Except for Barangay officials, the term of elective local officials is three years; and no such officials, which shall be
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. determined by law, shall be
three years and no such
official shall serve for more
 Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 133495, September 3, 1998 than three consecutive terms.
Due to the incumbent mayor’s death, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor by Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time
operation of law and serves the remainder of the mayor’s term. He is not considered to have shall not be considered as an
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Article X, Section 8 embodies two (2) policies:
1. To prevent political dynasties.
2. To enhance the freedom of choice of the people.
First, historical examination of this provision reveals that two ideas emerge from the Constitutional Commission proceedings:
1. The notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of prolonged
stay in office.
2. The idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whim they wish to govern
them be preserved.
Moreover, the Commission discussed term limits “on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
To recapitulate, the term limit of elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three (3) consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The three-term limit of local elective officials apply only when these two conditions concur:
1. The local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times.
2. He has fully served three consecutive terms.
Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice elected
after that, he can run for one more term in the next election because he has served only two full terms successively. Suspension
does not interrupt his term nor in fact his tenure because the office still belongs to him during suspension.
 Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999

Lonzanida was elected Mayor to a third term. His election was challenged, however, and he lost and had to abandon his office. He
could still run in the next election year because he did not serve three (3) full terms.
 Adormeo v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 147927, February 4, 2002

Talaga lost when he ran for a third term. The winner, however, lost to him in a recall election and he served the rest of the former
winner’s term. At the end of this term he could run again because he had not served three full terms.
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 Socrates v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 154512, November 12, 2002

Hagedorn served as Mayor for three full terms. In the first year after the end of his third term, he ran in a recall election. He is
qualified because between the end of his third term and the recall election there was an interruption thus breaking the
successiveness.
 Latasa v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 154829, December 10, 2003

During the third term of a Mayor of a municipality, the municipality was converted to a city. The Mayor was allowed to finish the
third term. He could not run as Mayor of the city in the next election. There has been no change in territory nor in constituency.
Thus the three term limit applies.
 David v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997 | 271 SCRA 90, 104
RA 7160 – Local Government Code of 1991 approved on October 10, 1991, took effect on January 1, 1992, Section 43-C limits the
term of office of Barangay officials to three (3) years. Petitioners argue that Article X, Section 8 “by excepting Barangay officials
whose terms shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of elective local officials at three years,”
impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three-year term for such officers. Thus, Section 43-C, RA 7160 is unconstitutional.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for Barangay officials. It merely left
the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
SECTORAL REPRESENTATION ARTICLE X, SECTION 9

Legislative bodies of local
governments shall have
 Supangan, Jr. v. Santos | GR No. 84663, August 24, 1990 sectoral representation as
Section 9 says “as may be provided by law.” The LGC says that sectoral representatives in local may be prescribed by law.
legislative are appointed by the President. “But the Secretary of Local Government may, by
authority of the President inform the sectoral representatives of their appointments. Otherwise stated, it is actually the President
who has made appointments in the cases involved herein, and the Secretary of Local Government is only the transmitter or
communicator of said appointments.
The phrase, “as may be provided by law” is not prospective. Hence, it can refer to law already existing at the time the Constitution
was enacted or to future laws.
Since the Constitution does not prescribe the qualifications, these are prescribed by law. And in making the appointments, the
President must observe the qualification requirements.
PLEBISCITE ARTICLE X, SECTION 10

No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created,
 League of Cities v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 176951, December 21, 2009 divided, merged, abolished, or
The Supreme Court held that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law and that Congress cannot with the criteria established in
write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. This was reversed on the local government code and
reconsideration which ruled that the spirit of the law prevails over the letter and that the intent subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a
of the law was to exempt the sixteen municipalities from the income requirement for the plebiscite in the political units
creation of cities. directly affected.
 Tan v. Commission on Elections | 142 SCRA 727, July 11, 1986

All political units affected should participate in the plebiscite. If what is involved is a Barangay, the plebiscite should be municipally
or city-wide; if a municipality or component city, province-wide. If a portion of province is to be carved out and made into another
province, the plebiscite should include the mother province.
This case was decided on the basis of the 1973 Constitution which prescribed that the plebiscite should be “in the unit or units
affected,” the Court had said that where a portion of an existing province was being lopped off to form a new province, both the
mother province and the proposed new province should participate and not just the proposed new province. Certainly, the mother
province is affected because its boundary is substantially altered.
 Camid v. Office of the President | GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

Andong was one of the barangays made into a municipality by the executive order which was nullified by Pelaez v. Auditor General
in 1965. It is claimed that, however, that it never ceased to exercise corporate. It therefore claim to be a de facto corporation. There
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is no evidence to support the claim of its continued existence as a corporation. To uphold the claim would mean upholding defiance
of the decision which nullified its existence as a municipality.
 Torralba v. Municipality of Sibagat | 147 SCRA 390, 394 (1987)

The requirement that the LGC shall contain the criteria for the creation of municipalities before the passage of the law. The
Constitution “contains no requirement that a LGC is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality. What the
constitutional provision means is that, once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government unite
should conform to the criteria thus laid down.”
This decision was based on the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. A similar provision is found in the 1987 Constitution. However, it
is submitted that the freedom which Congress has in departing from the LGC is wider now than under the 1973 Constitution because
the LGC is now just like any other statute.
METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS ARTICLE X, SECTION 11

The Congress may, by law,
create special metropolitan
 This provision is not intended to preserve the Metropolitan Manila Commission but is an political subdivisions, subject to
attempt to preserve part of it as a supra-municipal authority with limited jurisdiction thereby a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10 hereof. The
saving the National Capital Region from relegation to a constitutional limbo. The provision also component cities and
authorizes the creation of similar authorities in other metro-political regions. The area of municipalities shall retain their
jurisdiction would not be the totality of municipal government but only basic services. basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local
 As such, it would be a juridical entity with municipal powers – police, eminent domain, and executive and legislative
taxation powers exercised by a legislative assembly – needed for providing basic services. assemblies. The jurisdiction of
 Congress would supply the details, but it was contemplated that the Mayors of the component the metropolitan authority that
will thereby be created shall be
units would form the metropolitan authority. The effect of this would also be to restore the limited to basic services
Mayor-Council set-up for the cities and towns of the National Capital Region and thus restore to requiring coordination.
them their lost autonomy. Moreover, the entity Metro Manila created by PD 824 will continue to
exist until a new law is passed.
 Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village | GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units – 12 cities and 5 municipalities. With the
passage of RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared a “special development and administrative region” and the
administration of “metro-wide” basic services affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the
MMDA.
“Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising
Metro Manila. There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following:
1. Development planning
2. Transport and traffic management
3. Solid waste disposal and management
4. Flood control and sewerage management
5. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning and shelter services
6. Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control
7. Public safety
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
1. Formulation
2. Coordination
3. Regulation
4. Implementation
5. Preparation
6. Management
7. Monitoring
8. Setting of policies
9. Installation of a system of administration
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in the RA
7924 that empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare” of the inhabitants of the Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development authority.” It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
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organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is not a municipal corporation endowed with police
power. Its creation was never submitted to a plebiscite.
MMDA cannot order the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to open Jupiter Street to the public considering that Jupiter Street is
owned by BAVA. MMDA is not a local government unit with police power. It is different from the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
which was the central government of a local government unit. Neither is it a metropolitan political subdivision under Section 11
because its creation was never submitted to a plebiscite. MMDA therefore does not possess police power.
 Metro Manila Development Authority v. Garin | GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005
Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –an in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise if its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. Without such law,
the MMDA has no power.
CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES ARTICLE X, SECTION 12

Cities that are highly urbanized,
as determined by law, and
 Kinds of Cities component cities whose
1. Highly urbanized cities as may be determined by law charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial
Changes in the conditions may necessitate their demotion to a lower category. elective officials, shall be
independent of the province.
2. Cities not raised to the highly urbanized category but whose existing charters prohibit The voters of component cities
within a province, whose
their voters from voting in provincial elections charters contain no such
It is envisioned as an ad hoc category to take care of existing charters; but these cities can prohibition, shall not be
become highly urbanized or they may be demoted to component cities qualified to vote in deprived of their right to vote
for elective provincial officials.
provincial elections.
3. Component cities – cities which still are under a province in some way
May rise to the level of highly urbanized cities.
 Since cities in 1 & 2 do not vote in provincial elections, they are independent of the province; but since cities in 3 are under
a province, they cannot be denied a vote in the election of provincial officials.
 Abella v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 100710, September 3, 1991

A resident of “component cities whose charter prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials” cannot run for a
provincial elective office.
LOCAL GROUPINGS ARTICLE X, SECTION 13

Local government units may group themselves,
consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services,
 Grouping does not create a new juridical entity. and resources for purposes commonly beneficial
 Local government units may create these groupings even without prior enabling to them in accordance with law.
law.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS ARTICLE X, SECTION 14

The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies
 PURPOSE | To foster administrative decentralization as a complement to political composed of local government officials, regional
decentralization in order to make possible bottom-to-top planning. heads of departments and other government
offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the regions
for purposes of administrative decentralization
to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth
and development of the units in the region.
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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS A U T O N O M O U S

R E G I O N S
 Reason behind the creation of autonomous regions ARTICLE X, SECTION 15

 One of the riches of the Filipino nation is its cultural diversity. There shall be created
 A major purpose of the creation of autonomous regions is the creation of a situation, autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the
which will allow each culture to flourish unhampered by the dominance of other Cordilleras consisting of
cultures and thereby to contribute more effectively to national progress. provinces, cities,
 Hence, a requisite for the creation of an autonomous region is a certain distinctive municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing
regional commonality is found in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera. common and distinctive
 As to the areas between those two, they are not characterized by distinctive historical and cultural
characteristics but are practically a homogeneous culture. heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant
 Hence, they all come under one category and are not allowed to form an autonomous characteristics within the
region. framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as
 Another purpose is to furnish a possible solution to the regional conflicts that have
well as territorial integrity of
arisen from cultural diversity. the Republic of the Philippines.
 Meaning of Muslim Mindanao

 The phrase is a short-hand expression to designate those areas of Mindanao which are
predominantly Muslim.
 It is not meant to characterize all of Mindanao as Muslim.
 An autonomous region is organized “within he framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty,” and not an
independent nation within a nation.
POWER OF PRESIDENT ARTICLE X, SECTION 16

The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
 The President exercises general supervision as the authority over
autonomous regions.
LIMITS TO POWER OF AUTONOMOUS REGIONS ARTICLE X, SECTION 17

All powers,
functions, and
 Powers not given to autonomous regions responsibilities not
 Jurisdiction over national defense and security granted by this
Constitution or by
 Foreign relations and foreign trade law to the
 Customs and tariff autonomous regions
 Quarantine shall be vested in
the National
 Currency Government.
 Monetary affairs
 Foreign exchange
 Banking and quasi-banking
 External borrowing
 Posts and communications
 Air and sea transport
 Immigration and deportation
 Citizenship and naturalization
 General auditing
ORGANIC ACT
 The charter of the autonomous regions will be the Organic Act that will be passed by Congress in the manner and according to the
substantive specifications contained in Section 18.
 The creation of the autonomous regions become effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite held for the purpose.
 Only the provinces, cities and geographic areas which vote favorably become part of the autonomous region. This means that it is
possible for a cluster of municipalities or barangays within one province to belong to an autonomous region while the others might
not.
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 It is submitted that constituent units that vote negatively in the first plebiscite may through
ARTICLE X, SECTION 18
a subsequent plebiscite join the autonomous region at some future time. The language of The Congress shall enact an organic
the last paragraph of Section 18 does not put a time limit and the evident intent of the act for each autonomous region with
Constitution is to honor the free choice of constituent units. the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative
commission composed of
 Pandi v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002 representatives appointed by the
An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides President from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The
for an autonomous region which under the Constitution may only be created, and therefore organic act shall define the basic
changed, through a plebiscite called for the purpose. structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive
department and legislative
 Ordillo v. Commission on Elections | HR No. 93054, December 4, 1990 assembly, both of which shall be
The Province of Ifugao, which was the only province which voted for a Cordillera elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The
Autonomous Region (CAR), cannot constitute the CAR. The Constitution says that an
organic acts shall likewise provide
autonomous region shall consist of provinces, cities and municipalities, and, therefore, not for special courts with personal,
just of one province. Moreover, RA 6766, the Organic Act which was the subject of the family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this
referendum, itself contains provisions which can be implemented only if the new political
Constitution and national laws.
entity would consist of more than one province.
The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when
 Spouses Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration | GR No. 92649, February 14, 1991
approved by majority of the votes
A tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration cannot render a valid executory cast by the constituent units in a
decision in a land dispute. In the January 23, 1990 plebiscite, the creation of CAR was plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities,
rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province. Hence, and geographic areas voting
the CAR did not come to be. Therefore, no autonomous region was created. As a logical favorably in such plebiscite shall be
consequence of that, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under EO 220, Section included in the autonomous region.
13, as well as the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of
the Cordillera region (RA 6776, Article VII, Section 1) do not exist.
Such tribal court are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which
have been established by law (Article VIII, Section 1). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels
created by PD 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the
parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
 Abbas v. Commission on Elections, supra

The legality of RA 6734, the Organic Act of Mindanao is challenged and the plebiscite called in thirteen provinces of Mindanao for
ratification of the Organic Act is challenged for being illegal in that aspects of the Act violate the Tripoli Agreement which is a valid
international agreement. Even if the Tripoli Agreement were an international agreement, the fact would not affect the validity of the
OA. International agreements as internal law are on the same legal level as statutes and whichever as between the two,
international agreement of statute, comes later supersedes the other.
The approval of the OA does not automatically create autonomous region. As the Constitution says, the creation of the autonomous
region takes effect only after it is ratified in a plebiscite.
For the effective creation of the autonomous region, it is not required that the total votes cast in all the units where the plebiscite is
called must yield a majority of affirmative votes. It is enough for the creation of the autonomous region that some “provinces, cities,
and geographic areas” vote favorably. In other words, as an examination of the constitutional text shows, for effective ratification it
is not necessary to achieve a “double majority.” Political subdivisions which did not vote favorably remain the administrative Region
to which they initially belong.
PASSAGE OF ORGANIC ACT ARTICLE X, SECTION 19

The first Congress elected
under this Constitution shall,
 If the first Congress fails to pass the Organic Act within 18 months, the failure of Congress to act within eighteen months from
cannot be allowed to frustrate the clear intent of the electorate. The relatively short period is the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic
prescribed in order to emphasize the urgency of creating autonomous regions as a means toward acts for the autonomous
solving existing serious peace and order problems and foreclosing secessionist movements. regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras.
171
PASSAGE OF ORGANIC ACT ARTICLE X, SECTION 20

Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
 Enumeration in Section 20 is not exhaustive of what the Organic Act autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
may give to the autonomous regions. It is intended as a political signal 1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
that indeed the Constitution takes the matter of regional autonomy
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
seriously. 4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
 Legislation passed by the autonomous regions can come into conflict
7. Educational policies;
either with the Constitution or with national laws. 8. Preservation and development of the cultural
 As to conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution should always heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
prevail. For instance, the full gamut of religious freedom must be the promotion of the general welfare of the people
recognized even in an area where a principal basis for the autonomy is of the region.
religious homogeneity.
 When the conflict is between national statutes and local laws, however, there is no easy answer to the question as to which should
prevail. The matter could not only very well necessitate the serious weighing of the values involved but even the adjustment of
national laws in order to accommodate the constitutional desire for local autonomy in its various aspects. This could be especially
crucial in the application of personal and property laws for those belonging to autonomous regions but acting outside the
autonomous territory, and vice versa. Thus, conflict of law principles could develop within our one national municipal law.
PEACE AND ORDER ARTICLE X, SECTION 21

The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be
the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
 Autonomous regions are not beyond range of the organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President because the with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall
autonomous regions are still part of one Republic. be the responsibility of the National Government.
172
A R T I C L E X I
Accountability of Public Officers
1. Statement of Policy C. Decisions or Review

2. Impeachment
A. Definition 4. The Ombudsman
B. Impeachable Officers A. Composition
C. Grounds for Impeachment B. Qualifications
D. Procedure for Impeachment C. Appointment of the Ombudsman and his Deputies
1. Initiating Impeachment Case D. Disqualifications or Inhibitions
2. Limitation on Initiating of Impeachment E. Powers and Duties
Case F. The Special Prosecutor
3. Trial and Decision
4. Effect of Conviction 5. Ill-gotten Wealth
6. Restriction on Loans
3. The Sandiganbayan 7. Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
A. Composition 8. Allegiance to the State and to the Constitution
B. Jurisdiction
Section 1. Public office a public trust. Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Ombudsman

Hipolito v. Mergas Laurel v. Desierto
Section 2. Impeachable officers. Azarcon v. Guerrero
Section 3. Impeachment rules. Section 8. Qualifications.
Romulo v. Yniguez Section 9. Appointment.
In Re: Gonzales Section 10. Rank.
Francisco, et. al. v. House Speaker, et. al. Section 11. Term.
Section 4. The Sandiganbayan. Section 12. Powers.
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan Section 13. Powers and Responsibilities of Ombudsman and Deputies.
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan Section 14. Fiscal autonomy.
Section 5. The Ombudsman. Section 15. Recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Section 6. Section 16. Prohibitions.
Section 7. The Special Prosecutor. Section 17. Declaration of assets and liabilities.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan Section 18. Allegiance.
I. Rationale
II. Removal
III. Impeachment
IV. Impeachment Process
V. Impeachment Safeguards
VI. Sandiganbayan
VII. Office of the Ombudsman
VIII. Prohibition on Impeachable Officers
IX. Statement of Assets and Liabilities
173
STATEMENT OF POLICY ARTICLE XI, SECTION 1

Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be
 Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
 Cornejo v. Gabriel | 41 Phil 188, 194 (1920) RATIONALE

As expressed by Justice Malcolm, the basic idea of government in the Philippines “is  Accountable
 Serve with responsibility, integrity,
that of a representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of loyalty and efficiency, patriotism and
the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right justice.
to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of law  Lead modest lives – this phrase is
and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents.” undefined by the Constitution. This may
be taken relatively and may cause
conflicting values and issues. According
to Father Joaquin Bernas, the point of
command is that, even if the public
IMPEACHMENT officer is independently wealthy, he
should not live in a manner that flaunts
 Definition his wealth.
A national inquest into the conduct of public men. REMOVAL

 For cause.
 Purpose  Career service or coterminous.
The purpose of impeachment is not to punish but only to remove an officer who does This is in relation to RA 6713 and Liability of
not deserve to hold office. Public Officers.
 Penalty
ARTICLE XI, SECTION 2
Because the only purpose of impeachment is to remove, the penalty that may be The President, the Vice-President, the
imposed upon conviction on impeachment “shall not extend further than removal Members of the Supreme Court, the
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic.” This is broader Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
than the old 1935 and 1973 formula of disqualification “to hold any office of honor, removed from office on impeachment for,
trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines.” This penalty, moreover, is and conviction of, culpable violation of the
beyond the reach of the President’s power of executive clemency, but does not place Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
the officer beyond liability to criminal prosecution. When criminally prosecuted, public trust. All other public officers and
therefore, for the offense which warranted his conviction on impeachment, the officer employees may be removed from office as
cannot plead the defense of double jeopardy. provided by law, but not by impeachment.
 Impeachable Officers – Exclusive Enumeration

 President
 Vice President
 Chief Justice
 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
 Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions
 The Ombudsman
In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez | AM No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988
The Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) cannot conduct investigation into alleged misconduct of a
Supreme Court justice, with the end in view of filing a criminal information against him with the Sandiganbayan, as this would
violate the security of tenure of Supreme Court justices.
Jarque v. Desierto | 250 SCRA 11

An impeachable officer who is a member of the Philippine Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached.
 Grounds for Impeachment – Exclusive Enumeration

 Culpable violation of the Constitution
 Treason
 Bribery
 Graft and corruption
 First added by the 1973 Constitution to the grounds found under 1935 Constitution.
 Other high crimes
 Betrayal of the public trust.
 1987 Constitution added this, which means any form of violation of the oath of office even if such violation may
not be a criminally punishable offense.
174

 Procedure for Impeachment 1. The House of Representatives
 Initiating Impeachment Case shall have the exclusive power
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
impeachment. 2. A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by
Francisco v. House of Representatives | GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003 any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any
The Constitution prohibits the initiation of more than one “impeachment citizen upon a resolution or
proceeding” within one year. The “impeachment proceeding” is not initiated when endorsement by any Member
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of
House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Business within ten session
Neither is the “impeachment proceeding” initiated when the House deliberates on days, and referred to the
proper Committee within
the resolution passed on to it by the Constitution, because something prior to that
three session days thereafter.
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the The Committee, after hearing,
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
report to the House within
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. sixty session days from such
referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The
The Supreme Court ruled that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
resolution shall be calendared
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed for consideration by the House
initiated: within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
a. If there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the 3. A vote of at least one-third of
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance. all the Members of the House
b. Once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is with the Articles of
not sufficient in substance. Impeachment of the
c. By the filing or endorsement before the Secretary General of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of of each Member shall be
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House clearly recorded.
contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution, as they give 4. In case the verified complaint
or resolution of impeachment
the term “initiate” a meaning different from is filed by at least one-third of
“filing.” The Supreme Court then said that the impeachment case is all the Members of the House,
deemed initiated when the complaint – with accompanying the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and
resolution of indorsement – has been filed with the House of trial by the Senate shall
Representatives and referred to the appropriate Committee. forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the
same official more than once
1. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
power to try and decide all
a resolution of endorsement by any member thereof. cases of impeachment. When
2. Included in the Order of Business within 10 session days, and sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or
referred to the proper Committee within 3 session days. If the affirmation. When the
verified complaint is filed by at least one-third of all members of President of the Philippines is
the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside,
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. but shall not vote. No person
3. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its shall be convicted without the
members, shall submit its report to the House within 60 session concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
days from such referral, together with the corresponding 7. Judgment in cases of
resolution. impeachment shall not extend
4. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be further than removal from
office and disqualification to
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the hold any office under the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its Republic of the Philippines,
contrary resolution. The vote of each member shall be recorded. but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and
This procedure will prevent the recurrence of the incident in subject to prosecution, trial,
Romulo v. Yniguez | 141 SCRA 263 and in De Castro v. and punishment, according to
Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa | GR No. 71688, law.
8. The Congress shall
September 3, 1985 promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively
 Limitation on Initiating of Impeachment Case carry out the purpose of this
section.
Not more than once within a period of one year against the same official.
175
Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra

The Supreme Court said that considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. along with seven associate justices of this Court on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Edilberto
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003, violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
 Trial and Decision

The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all members of the
Senate.
 Effect of Conviction
Removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines. But the party convicted
shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARTICLE XI, SECTION 4

The present anti-graft court
known as the Sandiganbayan
The present anti-graft court known as Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction shall continue to function and
as now or hereafter may be provided by law. The Sandiganbayan is not a constitutional court, but a exercise its jurisdiction as now
or hereafter may be provided
statutory court; that is, it is created not by the Constitution but by statute, although its creation is by law.
mandated by the Constitution.
 Composition
Under PD 1606, it is composed of a Presiding Justice and Eight Associate Justices, with the rank of Justice of the Court of Appeals. It
sits in three (3) divisions of three members each. RA 8249
 Rationale
The 1971 Constitutional Convention was fully aware of the continuing need to combat the evils of graft and corruption; hence, this
provision. In fact, as early as 1955 an anti-graft law, RA 1379, was already thought necessary. This was followed in 1960 by the Anti-
Graft Act, RA 3019, whose validity was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc | 22 SCRA 424 (1968) and Nunez v. Sandiganbayan | 111 SCRA
433 (1982).
 Jurisdiction
Did not the accused
The following requisites must concur in order that a case may fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the become a public
Sandiganbayan. officer and therefore
 The offense committed is a violation of RA 3019, RA 1379, Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II became subject to
the Sandiganbayan’s
of the Revised Penal Code, Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986, or other jurisdiction when the
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes. BIR designated him
 The offender committing the offenses violating RA 3019, RA 1379, the RPC provisions, and other as custodian?
No. Although Section
offenses, is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a, 206 of the National
Section 4, RA 8249. Internal Revenue
 The offense committed is in relation to the office. Lacson v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 128096, Code “authorizes the
BIR to effect a
January 20, 1999
constructive distraint
by requiring ‘any
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan | 128 SCRA 324 (1984) person’ to preserve a
distrained property,”
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is not limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt there is no provision
practices of public officers. Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution gave to the legislature broad in the said statute
discretion to grant jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan not only over graft and corrupt practices but also “constituting such
person a public
over “such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government officer by reason of
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.” Pursuant to such requirement.
this, broad powers were given to the Sandiganbayan through PD 1486. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private
individual to act as
Balmadrid v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan | GR No. 58327, March 22, 1991 depository cannot be
The Superintendent and Cashier of the Government-owned Catanduanes Agricultural and Industrial stretched to include
the power to appoint
College (CAIC) were indebted to Jesus and Mila Balmadrid, suppliers of school construction materials. him as a public
The Superintendent and Cashier fraudulently issued 4 CAIC checks to the Balmadrids. The officer.
Superintendent, Cashier, and the Balmadrids were tried and found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of
176
violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Balmadrids allege that as private citizens, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them.
The contention is not correct. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees (Section 4, PD 1606). Private persons
may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against
conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private person may
be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the present petitioners.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 116033, February 26, 1997 | 268 SCRA 747, 758
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after
the said individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property. Section 4, PD
1606, in enunciating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, “unequivocally specifies the only instances when the Sandiganbayan
will have jurisdiction over private individual, i.e., when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The
Information does not charge petitioner of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 140199-200, February 6, 2002

It was held that, because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) has no original charter, petitioner, an officer
of PNCC, is not a public officer. As such, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the
Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, supra

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the case shall be determined by the
allegations in the information, specifically on whether or not the acts complained of were committed in relation to the official
functions of the accused. It is required that the charge be set forth with particularity as will reasonably indicate that the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed is one in relation to his office. Thus, the mere allegation in the
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer “in relation to his office” is a conclusion of law, not a
factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties by the
accused.
Binay v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 120281-83, October 1, 1999

The Supreme Court discussed the ramifications of Section 7, RA 8249 as follows:
1. If the trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of RA 8249, the law
does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of RA 8249, then the law applies,
and the rules are:
1. If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
2. If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
3. If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
4. If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
177
 Decisions or Review
The unanimous vote of all the three members shall be required for the pronouncement of judgment by a division. Decisions of the
Sandiganbayan shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan | 235 SCRA 103

It is settled that Section 13, RA 3019, makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of that law, or any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property is filed.
The only ground that may be raised in order to avert the mandatory preventive suspension is the invalidity of the criminal
information,
Republic v. Sandiganbayan | GR N. 135789, January 31, 2002

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.
THE OMBUDSMAN ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5

There is hereby created the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
 Composition Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one
An Ombudsman to be known as the Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military Deputy for the military establishment may
establishment may likewise be appointed. likewise be appointed.

There are two (2) distinct offices created under Sections 5, 6, and 7: Ombudsman or The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
Tanodbayan and that of the Special Prosecutor. The Special Prosecutor inherits the natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and
prosecutorial responsibility of the Tanodbayan of the 1973 Constitution but is no at the time of their appointment, at least forty
years old, of recognized probity and
longer called Tanodbayan. independence, and members of the Philippine
Bar, and must not have been candidates for
The Ombudsman inherits the title Tanodbayan and acts as champion of the people, any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must
independent of and not beholden to the President, and functions according to the have, for ten years or more, been a judge or
enumeration in Section 13. Relying on the prestige of his office, he will have engaged in the practice of law in the
persuasive powers plus the ability to require that proper legal steps are taken by the Philippines.
officers concerned. But the final say as to whether to prosecute or not will belong to During their tenure, they shall be subject to
the executive department, although the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan may seek to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
compel the fiscal to prosecute by mandamus in proper cases. What is envisioned is a provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this
Constitution.
champion capable of lending assistance especially to those who would normally not
even know how to go about filing a complaint. For these reasons, Sections 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 14 are intended to strengthen his independence.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan & Gonzales | 160 SCRA 843 (1988)

Raul Gonzales was Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution and continued as such even after the ratification of the new
Constitution. Section 7 makes the Tanodbayan the Special Prosecutor. However, he may not exercise those powers “conferred on
the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.” Hence, since the power to investigate has been given to the Ombudsman by
Section 13, paragraph 1, the Special Prosecutor may investigate and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman.
Acop v. Ombudsman | GR No. 120422, September 27, 1995

This case reaffirms the doctrine in Zaldivar that the power to investigate, including preliminary investigation, belongs to the
Ombudsman and not to the Special Prosecutor. But, while the Ombudsman’s power to investigate is primary, it is not exclusive and,
under the Ombudsman Act of 1989, he may delegate it to others and take it back any time he wants to.
The power of the Military Deputy to investigate members of the civilian police has also been affirmed because the power of the
Ombudsman is broad and because the Deputy Ombudsman acts under the direction of the Ombudsman.
Natividad v. Felix | 229 SCRA 680, 688 (1994)

Also traces the statutory history of the powers of the Ombudsman.
Deloso v. Domingo | 191 SCRA 545, 550 (1990)

Charged with murder, the Governor challenges the authority of the office of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation. He
argues that the authority of the Ombudsman is limited to “crimes related to or connected with an official’s discharge of his public
functions.”
178
The Ombudsman has authority. Section 12 says that he may “investigate any ARTICLE XI, SECTION 9
act or omission of any public official when such act or omission appears to The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least six nominees
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” This is set out in greater detail in prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a
Section 16, RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act. Murder is illegal. And since it was list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
allegedly committed by a public official it comes within the jurisdiction of the Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
Ombudsman. occur.
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate is very broad especially as it ARTICLE XI, SECTION 10
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank
has been expanded by the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He can investigate “any of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
illegal act or omission of any public official” even if the offense committed by Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the
the official is not related to the performance of his functions. same salary which shall not be decreased during their
term of office.
 Qualifications ARTICLE XI, SECTION 11

The Ombudsman and his Deputies must be natural born citizens of the The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment. They shall
Philippines, at least 40 years of age, of recognized probity and not be qualified to run for any office in the election
independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The
Ombudsman must have been a judge or engaged in the practice of law for The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
ten years or more. people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
 RA 6770 – Ombudsman Act empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
conduct preliminary investigations and to directly undertake criminal or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
prosecutions. cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and
the result thereof.
 Appointment of the Ombudsman and his Deputies ARTICLE XI, SECTION 13

By the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
Bar Council, and from a list of at least three nominees for every vacancy 1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
thereafter. All vacancies to be filled in three months. person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
Term of Office or inefficient.
Seven years without reappointment. 2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
Rank and Salary thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank and salary of controlled corporation with original charter, to
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
Commissions, and their salary shall not be decreased during their impropriety in the performance of duties.
term of office. 3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
Fiscal Autonomy demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be
 Disqualifications or Inhibitions provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
 During their tenure, shall not hold any other office or employment. documents relating to contracts or transactions
 Shall not engage in the practice of any profession or in the active entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or
management or control of any business which in any way may be properties, and report any irregularity to the
affected by the functions of his office. Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
 Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any 5. Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
Government, or any of its subdivisions, etc. pertinent records and documents.
 Shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election 6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation
when circumstances so warrant and with due
immediately succeeding their cessation from office. prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
 Powers and Duties – Ombudsman Law: RA 6770 mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for
their elimination and the observance of high
Camanag v. Guerrero | GR No. 121017, February 17, 1997 standards of ethics and efficiency.
Supreme Court declared that Sections 17 & 18 of RA 6770 were valid and 8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or
constitutional. duties as may be provided by law.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan | 146 SCRA 137

The Supreme Court held that the Tanodbayan has jurisdiction over officials
179
and employees of Petrophil Corporation, even if Petrophil does not have an original May a claim of confidentiality bar the
charter. Ombudsman’s power to investigate?
Even the claim of confidentiality will not prevent
the Ombudsman from demanding the production of
Leyson v. Ombudsman | GR No. 134990, April 29, 2000 documents needed for the investigation.
It was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over “government-owned or –
controlled corporations” should be understood in relation to paragraph 13, Section Almonte v. Vasquez | GR No. 95367, May 22, 1995
The Court said that where the claim of
2, Administrative Code of 1987, which defines government-owned or –controlled confidentiality does not rest on the need to
corporations. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely: protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on general public interest in
preserving confidentiality, the courts have
1. An agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. declined to find in the Constitution an absolute
2. Vested with functions relating to public needs, whether governmental privilege even for the President. Moreover, even
or proprietary. in cases where matters are really confidential,
inspection can be done in camera.
3. Owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities,
either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock Buenaseda v. Flavier | 226 SCRA 645 (1993)
corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. The power to investigate also includes the power
to impose preventive suspension. This is different
from the suspension referred to in Section 13(3).
In this case, since there is no showing that Gran Export and/or United Coconut are This latter is suspension as a penalty; preventive
vested with functions related to public needs, whether governmental or proprietary, suspension is not a penalty.
unlike Petrophil, then the said corporations do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
Khan v. Office of the Ombudsman | GR No. 125296, July 20, 2006

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate employees of
government-owned or –controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Based on Section 13(2), Article XI, the
Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction only over public officials or employees of GOCCs with original charters.
Orap v. Sandiganbayan | 139 SCRA 252

It was held that the Special Prosecutor may prosecute before the Sandiganbayan judges accused of graft and corruption, even if they
come under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
Inting v. Tanodbayan | 97 SCRA 494

It was held that pursuant to PD 1607, the Tanodbayan could review and reverse the findings of the City Fiscal, and order him to
withdraw certain charges, inasmuch as the President’s power or control (in this instance) is exercised not by the Secretary of Justice
but by the Tanodbayan because the offense/s charged were alleged committed by a public functionary in connection with her office.
But the prosecution of election offenses is a function belonging to the COMELEC and may not be discharged by the Tanodbayan. De
Jesus v. People, supra and Corpus v. Tanodbayan, supra
Almonte v. Vazquez, supra

It was held that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of any anonymous letter does not violate the
equal protection clause.
Garcia v. Miro | GR No. 148944, February 5, 2003

For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint “in any form or manner” is
sufficient.
Diaz v. Sandiganbayan | 219 SCRA 675

It was held that Section 12, Article XI mandates the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government. Accordingly, even if the complaint against a particular official or employee is not
drawn up in the usual form, the Ombudsman may still take cognizance of the case.
Buenaseda v. Flavier | 226 SCRA 645

Under Section 24, RA 6770, the Ombudsman or his deputy is authorized to preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation irrespective of whether such officer or employee is employed in the Office of the Ombudsman or
in any other government agency.
Lastimosa v. Vazquez | 243 SCRA 497
180
Supreme Court said that whether the evidence of guilt is strong to warrant preventive suspension is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman. There is no need for a preliminary hearing such as that required in a petition for bail.
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman | 248 SCRA 566

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman shall have other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Accordingly, the Congress
can, by statute, prescribe other powers, functions and duties to the Ombudsman. Thus, because he is authorized under RA 6770 to
utilize the personnel of his office to assist in the investigation of cases, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military
personnel for investigation by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs.
Vasquez v. Alino | 271 SCRA 67

The Ombudsman can also investigate criminal offenses committed by public officers
which have no relation to their office. RA 6770 – Ombudsman Act empowers the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigations and to directly
undertake criminal prosecutions.
Lastimosa v. Vasquez | 243 SCRA 497
The Ombudsman is also granted by law the power to cite for contempt, and this 1. What is the constitutional basis of this
power? Does it have no constitutional basis and
power may be exercised by the Ombudsman while conducting preliminary contradict the intent of the 1986 Constitutional
investigation because preliminary investigation is an exercise of quasi-judicial Commission?
functions. Article XI, Section 13(8) means that
Ombudsman may be validly empowered with
prosecutorial functions by the legislature, and
this the latter did when it passed RA 6770.
Villavert v. Desierto | GR No. 133715, February 13, 2000 Camanag v. Guerrero | GR No. 121017, 269 SCRA
473, 491
Namuhe v. Ombudsman | GR No. 124965, October 19, 1998
Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman | GR No. 149148, April 5, 2002 2. Does it not violate the principle of separation
But Section 27, RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to the Supreme Court from of powers since the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is exclusive to the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, is unconstitutional
executive branch?
for violating Section 30, Article VI, which prohibits a law increasing the appellate If it is authorized by the Constitution it cannot
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court passed without its advice or concurrence. be logically argued that such power or the
Henceforth, all such appeals shall be made to the Court of Appeals in accordance with exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative
of the principle of the separation of powers.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Does it not directly contravene Article XI,
Fabian v. Desierto | GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998 Section 7 by diminishing the authority and
power lodged in the Office of the Special
The Court issued Circular AM No. 99-2-02-SC, providing that any appeal by Prosecutor?
way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Court upheld not only the power of Congress to
Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such so place the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Ombudsman, but also the power of the
decision, resolution or order of the Ombudsman filed with this Court after Congress to remove some of the powers granted
March 15, 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but to the then, Tanodbayan, now Office of the
must be forthwith denied or dismissed, respectively. Special Prosecutor under PD 1630, and transfer
them to the Ombudsman. Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman | 248 SCRA 566
Coronel v. Desierto | GR No. 149022, April 8, 2003
The Court suspended its application of the said Circular and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits because it
appeared prima facie from the petitioner’s allegation that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
Uy v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 105965-70, March 20, 2001

Raro v. Sandiganbayn | GR No. 108431, July 14, 2000
The accused claims that the complaints against him were sworn to before a notary public and the affidavits before a provincial fiscal
not deputized by the Ombudsman. Section 12 tells the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed in any manner. It was held that under
Sections 11 & 15, RA 6770, the Ombudsman is clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all
criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of regular courts as well. The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public officer or employee. This Court derogate the power by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
If the Ombudsman refers a case to the National Bureau of Investigation for investigation and the NBI recommends prosecution.
Accused cannot complain that the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to investigate. Section 13(2) allows him to direct cases for
investigation to other officers. Besides, what was referred to the NBI was fact finding; preliminary investigation would still be
conducted by the Ombudsman.
181
Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc | GR No. 145957-68, January 28, 2002

Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Office of the Ombudsman | GR No. 115103, April 11, 2002
Laurel v. Desierto | GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
The Supreme Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and to prosecute, as granted by law, is plenary and
unqualified. It pertain to any act or omission of any public officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make any distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts.
For purposes of determining the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, a public officer is one to whom some of the sovereign
functions of the government has been delegated. The National Centennial Commission performs executive power which “is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice | GR No. 159747, April 13, 2004
The fact that the petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position – so that the case against him falls exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan – does not mean that only the Ombudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of the charge of coup d’état against him. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is not an exclusive
authority, but rather a shared or concurrent authority with the Department of Justice Panel of Investigators, “in respect of
the offense charged.”
The powers of the Ombudsman are delegable. The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
Olairez v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 148030, March 10, 2003

It has been consistently held that it is not for the Court to review the Ombudsman’s paramount discretion in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before his office. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutor powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discernment on the part
of the fiscal or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint filed by a
private complainant.
There is, however, one important exception to this rule: when grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in
either prosecuting or dismissing a case before it is evident. In this event, the act of the Ombudsman can justifiably be
assailed.
People v. Velez | GR No. 138093, February 19, 2003

The Supreme Court said that when the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed the Motion to
Withdraw Information on its finding that there was no probable cause against respondents, except City Engineer, the
Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Case law holds that this Court is
loathe to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its powers.
But while the Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether an information should be withdrawn and
a criminal case should be dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal of such information or dismissal of a criminal case,
the final disposition of the said motion and of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan, subject
only to the caveat that the action of the Sandiganbayan must not impair the substantial rights of the accused and the right
of the People to due process of law.
Maquez v. Desierto | GR No. 135882, June 27, 2001

Under RA 1405 – Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits – before an in camera inspection of bank accounts may be allowed, there must be
a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the
subject matter of the pending case before the court. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In this case, there is only an
investigation being done by the Ombudsman. There is, therefore, no valid reason to compel the production of the bank documents,
or to hold the bank manager in contempt for refusing to produce said documents. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in
our laws.
182
Office of the Ombudsman v. Judge Ibay | GR No. 137538, September 3, 2001

The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief filed by Marquez
when the Ombudsman threatened to cite her for contempt for her refusal to produce the bank documents demanded in the
investigation.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006
It is now clear that pursuant to Section 25, RA 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to impose penalties in administrative cases.
And in connection with this administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges, in accordance with Section 24, RA 6770.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 168079, July 17, 2007
The Court reiterated Estarija v. Ranada, supra, where it upheld the constitutionality of Sections 15, 21 and 25, RA 6770, and ruled
that the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official, other than a
Member of Congress or of the Judiciary.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Madriaga | GR No. 164316, September 27, 2006

The Supreme Court reiterated that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. The
Ombudsman’s authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory; it is
mandatory within the bounds of law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman | GR No. 129124, march 15, 2002

The above decisions have modified, where the Court said that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the office concerned the
removal of a public officer or employee found to be administratively liable. They also reiterate, clarify and strengthen the Court’s
pronouncement in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 161629, July 29, 2005, where it held that the refusal, without just cause, of
any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action; that the Ombudsman’s recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The Court said that this should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any
officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority, but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra

The legislative history of RA 6770 bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full
administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution of a public officer of the employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be
“an active watchman, not merely a passive one.”
 The Special Prosecutor

The existing Tanodbayan – at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution – shall hereafter be known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter provided by law, except those conferred
on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Constitution.
Zaldivar v. Gonzales | 160 SCRA 843
Salvador Perez v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 166062, September 26, 2006

The Tanodbayan called the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. The right to
do so was lost when the 1987 Constitution became effective on February 2, 1987.
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
 The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
 Republic Act 1379 – An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor.
 Presidential Ad-hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto | GR No. 130140, October 25, 1999
183
This provision applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to ARTICLE XI, SECTION 6
criminal cases. Thus, prosecution of offenses arising from, relating, or incident to, or The officials and employees of the Office of
involving ill-gotten wealth in the said provision may be barred by prescription. the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman,
according to the Civil Service Law.
RESTRICTION ON LOANS
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be
 No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
controlled bank or financial institution to the President, Vice President, the Members be provided by law, except those conferred
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional on the Office of the Ombudsman created
Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have under this Constitution.
controlling interest, during their tenure. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 14
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORT appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
 A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, The right of the State to recover properties
and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the unlawfully acquired by public officials or
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
Does Section 15 prevent the prescription of the

ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE AND TO THE CONSTITUTION crime?
No. The right to prosecute criminally can
 Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all prescribe.
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be ARTICLE XI, SECTION 16
dealt with by law. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose
may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any
 Caasi v. Court of Appeals & Miguel | GR No. 88831, November 8, 1990 government-owned or controlled bank or
Miguel is a holder of a “green card” entitling him to be a resident of the United States financial institution to the President, the
permanently. In his application for the card he put down his intention to reside in the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
United States “permanently.” He actually immigrated to the United States in 1984 Constitutional Commissions, the
and thereby assumed allegiance to the United States. He however returned to the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in
Philippines in 1987 to run for mayor of a municipality. Article XI, Section 18 is not which they have controlling interest, during
their tenure.
applicable because it has reference to “incumbents.” What is applicable is Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code which bars “a permanent resident of or an immigrant ARTICLE XI, SECTION 17
to a foreign country” unless he waives his status as a permanent resident of the A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter
foreign country. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not the required as may be required by law, submit a
waiver. It must be by a special act done before filing a certificate of candidacy. declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of
the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
What is the objective of Sections 16 & 17?

They are intended to strengthen the concept of
public office as a public trust.

Public officers and employees owe the State
and this Constitution allegiance at all times
and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
184
A R T I C L E X I I
National Economy and Patrimony
1. Goals
2. Natural Resources
3. Private Lands
4. Preference for Filipino Labor, etc.
5. Practice of Profession
6. Cooperatives
7. Monopolies
8. Central Monetary Authority
Section 1. The goals of national economy Halili v. Court of Appeals

Section 2. Development of natural resources Frenzel v. Catito
The Regalian Doctrine Right of former Filipinos
Limits imposed on Jura Regalia Section 9. Economic planning agency
The IPRA case Section 10. Filipinization of investments
Cruz v. Secretary of DENR Foreign investment
Filipinization of natural resources Garcia v. BOI
Alienation of natural resources Nationalism
Santa Rosa Mining Co. v. Leido, Jr. Manila Prince v. GSIS
San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals Tanada v. Angara
Chavez v. Pea and Amari Section 11. Franchises
Laurel v. Garcia Public utilities
Utilization of natural resources Albano v. Reyes
Miners Association v. Factoran, Jr. Tatad v. Garcia
Republic v. Rosemoor Iloilo Ice and Storage v. Public Utility Board
La Bugal B’laan Tribal v. DENR Associated Communications v. NTC
La Bugal B’laan Tribal v. DENR (R) JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA
Philippine Geothermal v. NAPOCOR Section 12. Preferential use of Filipinos labor and materials
Section 3. Land of public domain Section 13. Trade policy
Classification of lands Section 14. Practice of professions
Director of Lands v. Aquino Section 15. Cooperatives
Republic v. Court of Appeals Section 16. Formation of corporations
Disposition and exploitation of agricultural lands of public National Development Co and New Agrix v.
domain Philippine Veterans Bank
Right of corporations to acquire land Section 17. Emergency takeovers
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Court of Appeals Section 18. Expropriation of public utilities
Ten Forty Realty v. Lorenzana Telephone interconnections
Acquisition by private individuals Republic v. PLDT
Section 4. Forest lands and parks PLDT v. NTC and CellCom, Inc.
Section 5. Rights of indigenous cultural communities Business affected with public interest
Ancestral lands Agan v. PIATCO
Cruz and Europa v. Secretary Section 19. Monopolies and Restraint of Trade
Section 6. Social character of property Eastern Assurance v. LTFRB
Property and the Common Good Section 20. Central monetary authority
Section 7. Capacity to acquire private lands Section 21. Foreign loans
Section 8. Former Filipinos Restriction on contracting of foreign loans
Private lands Section 22. Circumventions
Aliens and private lands
Ramirez v. Vda de Ramirez
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Recovery of invalidly sold private land
185
I. Goals VI. Protectionist Provisions

 More equitable distribution of opportunities, incomes and wealth  Exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
 Sustained increase in amount of goods and services produced by  State may enter into co-production, joint venture or
nation production sharing agreements
 Expanded productivity  Not longer than 25+25
 Raise quality of life, especially the underprivileged  Marine Wealth
 Industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural  Use and enjoyment exclusively for Filipinos citizens
development and agrarian reform  Certain Areas of Investment | Section 10
 Promote competitive industries  Recommendation of NEDA
II. Public Land  When national interest dictates
 Lands of Public Domain  Foreign Investment Act
 Agricultural  Public Utility Franchise | Section 11
 Forest or timber  Not exclusive in character
 Mineral lands  Not longer than 50 years
 National parks  Subject to amendment or alteration
 Agricultural Lands | Section 3  Participation of foreign investors in governing body
 Public not private limited to proportionate share in its capital
 Alienable  Executive and managing officers must be Filipino
 May be further classified by law according to uses citizens
 Private corporation may lease not to exceed 1000  Practice of Profession | Section 14
hectares for a period not exceeding 25 years  Limited to Filipinos citizens save in cases provided by
renewable for not more than another 25 years law
 Filipinos citizens may acquire not more than 12 VII. Economic Policies
hectares or lease more than 500 hectares  Filipino First
 Forest Lands and National Parks | Section 4  Protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
 Congress to determine specific limits competition and trade practices | Section 1
 Conserved and not increased nor diminished except  In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
by law covering the national economy and patrimony, the
 Measures to prohibit logging State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos |
 Ancestral Lands | Section 5 Section 10
 State to protect rights of indigenous cultural  Promotion of preferential use of Filipino labor,
communities domestic materials and locally produced goods and
 Congress may provide for applicability of customary adopt measures that help them make competitive |
law governing property rights or relations Section 12
III. Private Land  Promote sustained development of a reservoir of
 May be transferred conveyed only to Filipino citizens or national talents of scientists, entrepreneurs,
corporations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public professionals, managers, high level technical
domain | Section 7 manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen
 Except in cases of hereditary succession and natural  Laissez Faire
born citizens who lost Philippine citizenship, subject  Private corporations to be formed under general law
to limitations provided by law | Section 8 except for GOCCs created in the interest of the
 Dual Citizenship Law common good and subject to the test of economic
IV. Other Natural Resources viability | Section 16
 Waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all  State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, public interest so requires, no combinations in
flora and fauna restraint of trade of unfair competition shall be
 Owned by the State and shall not be alienated allowed | Section 19
V. Economic Agencies  Trade Policy
 National Economic Development Authority | Section 9  Serves the general welfare and utilizes arrangements
 Independent economic and planning agency of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity |
 Headed by the President Section 13
 Recommend to Congress and implement continuing  Creation of agency to promote viability and growth of
integrated programs for national development cooperatives | Section 15
 Congress may replace VIII. Inherent Powers
 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | Section 20  Police Power
 Independent central monetary agency  In times of national emergency when the public
 Provide policy direction in the areas of money, interest requires the State may temporarily take over
banking and credit or direct the operation of any privately owned public
 Supervision over the operation of banks utility or business affected with public interest |
 Regulatory powers over finance companies and Section 17
entities  In the interest of national welfare of defense,
 Regulatory power over foreign loans | Section 21 establish and operate vital industries | Section 18
 Qualifications  Eminent Domain
 Natural born citizen  Upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
 Known probity, integrity and patriotism public ownership utilities and other private
 Majority from private sector enterprises to be operated by the Government |
 Other qualifications and disabilities provided by law Seciton 18
186
GOALS ARTICLE XII, SECTION 1

The goals of the national economy are a
more equitable distribution of
 For the attainment of these goals, the State shall promote industrialization and full opportunities, income, and wealth; a
employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are nation for the benefit of the people; and
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. The State shall protect Filipino an expanding productivity as the key to
enterprises from unfair competition and trade practices. raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
1. More equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth. The State shall promote
2. Sustained increase in amount of goods and services produced by the nation for industrialization and full employment
the benefit of the people.] based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform,
3. Expanding production as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the through industries that make full of
unprivileged. efficient use of human and natural
resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets.
 The national policy on industrialization and agricultural development is not necessarily However, the State shall protect
agriculturally related industrialization but rather industrialization that is a result of Filipino enterprises against unfair
releasing through agrarian reform capital locked up in land. This therefore is necessarily foreign competition and trade
practices.
related to the article on social justice. Moreover, this does not mean a hard-bound rule
that agricultural development must have priority over industrialization. What is envisioned In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors
is a flexible and rational relationship between the two as dictated by the common good. of the economy and all region s of the
country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. Private
 The phrase, “unfair foreign competition and trade practices” is not to be understood in a enterprises, including corporations,
limited legal and technical sense but in the sense of anything that is harmful to Philippine cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to
enterprises. At the same time, however, the intention is not to protect local inefficiency. broaden the base of their ownership.
Nor is it the intention to protect local industries from foreign competition at the expense
of the consuming public.
NATURAL RESOURCES
1. Regalian Doctrine | Jura Regalia
 The consequence of Regalian Doctrine of Section 2 is that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be
able to show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title.
 Carino v. Insular Government | 41 Phil 935 (1990)

The universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown. When the regalian doctrine was introduced into the Philippines
by colonizers, the colonizers did not strip the natives of their ownership of lands. In the case at bar, the Court declared that, “when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed that to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”
 Oh Cho v. Director of Lands | 75 Phil 890

Land of the public domain become private land when it is acquired from the government either by purchase or by grant. As held in
this case, “all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 57667, May 28, 1990
Prescription can transform public land into private land, if it is alienable land. “Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Such open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years must, however, be conclusively
established. This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of actually fictitious claims of possession over the
property in dispute.
187
Almeda v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 85322, April 30, 1991

ARTICLE XII, SECTION 2
In computing the thirty year period for acquisitive prescription under Section 49(9) of the All lands of the public domain, waters,
Public Land Law, the period before the land such as forest is converted into alienable minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
public land cannot be included. The thirty year period only begins to toll only from the mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
time the land is converted into alienable public land. wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the
Director of Lands v. Kalahi Investments, Inc. | GR No. 48066, January 31, 1989 quoting State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall
Santa Rosa Mining Co. v. Leido, Jr. | 156 SCRA 1 (1987) not be alienated. The exploration,
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining development, and utilization of natural
claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State
other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the may directly undertake such activities,
minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing
to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or
agreements with Filipino citizens, or
sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should corporations or associations at least 60
faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be
improvements in the located mining claims.
for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than
 Lee Hong Kok v. David | 48 SCRA 372 twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may provided by law.
Recognized in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution; but ownership is vested in the State
In cases of water rights for irrigation,
as such rather than in the head thereof. water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of
waterpower, beneficial use may be the
In public law a distinction is made between imperium and dominium. Imperium is the measure and limit of the grant.
government authority possessed by the State expressed in the concept of sovereignty.
Dominium is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property. Dominium, which was The State shall protect the nations
marine wealth in its archipelagic
the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
that all lands were held from the Crown, is also the foundation of the first sentence of economic zone, and reserve its use and
Section 2. As adopted in a republican system, however, the medieval concept of jura enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
regalia has been stripped of regalia overtones; ownership is vested in the State, not in
the head of the State – be the President or Prime Minister. The Congress may, by law, allow small-
scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
 Limitations imposed by Section 2 on the jura regalia of the state. fish farming, with priority to
1. Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. subsistence fishermen and fish workers
2. The exploration, development, and utilization of all natural resources shall be under in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
the full control and supervision of the State either by directly undertaking such The President may enter into
exploration, development, and utilization or through co-production, joint venture, or agreements with foreign-owned
production-sharing agreements with qualified persons or corporations. corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale
3. All agreements with the qualified private sector may be for only a period not exploration, development, and
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years. Twenty-five utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
year limit is not applicable to “water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided
industrial uses other than the development of water power,” for which “beneficial by law, based on real contributions to
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.” the economic growth and general
4. The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic waters, territorial welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the
sea, and exclusive economic zone shall be reserved for Filipino citizens. It would development and use of local scientific
seem, therefore, that corporations are excluded or at least must be fully owned by and technical resources.
Filipinos.
The President shall notify the Congress
5. Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons may be allowed on of every contract entered into in
a “small scale” to Filipino citizens or cooperatives – with priority for subsistence accordance with this provision, within
fishermen and fish-workers. The bias here is for the protection of the little people. thirty days from its execution.
 The nature of reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands is that they are lands of the Aliens cannot lease land of the public
public domain and, unless classified as alienable, may not be disposed of. domain, because that would involve
enjoyment of the natural resources of the
public domain.
 Requisites for reclaimed land to be registered as private property:
1. Since reclaimed land is part of the inalienable public domain, there must be proof
that the land had been classified as alienable.
2. The person seeking registration must show proof of having acquired the property
such as by prescription.
Inalienable land, however, cannot be acquired by prescription. Republic v. Enciso | GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005
 Sunbeam Convenience Food v. Court of Appeals | 181 SCRA 443

188
The Supreme Court declared: “We adhere to the Regalian Doctrine wherein all agricultural, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3
timber and mineral lands are subject to the dominion of the State.” Thus, before any land may Lands of the public domain are
be classified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for classified into agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands and
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. The mere national parks. Agricultural lands
fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer ownership over the of the public domain may be
property covered by such title where the property is part of the public forest. further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the
Republic v. Sayo | 191 SCRA 71 public domain shall be limited to
Seville v. National Development Company | GR No. 129401, February 2, 2001 agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may
It was held that in the absence of proof that property is privately owned, the presumption is not hold such alienable lands of
that it belongs to the State. Thus, where there is no showing that the land had been classified the public domain except by lease,
as alienable before the title was issued, any possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more
cannot ripen into ownership. And all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within than twenty-five years, and not to
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 219 SCRA 339 hundred hectares, or acquire not
United Paracale v. de la Rosa | 221 SCRA 108 more than twelve hectares
thereof, by purchase, homestead,
The Court said that consonant with the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
or grant.
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It is also on the basis
of this doctrine that the State has the power to control mining claims, as provided in PD 1214. Taking into account the
requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and
 Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon | 244 SCRA 537 subject to the requirements of
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately owned agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of
are presumed to belong to the State. In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and lands of the public domain which
disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands and, ultimately, the may be acquired, developed, held,
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. The classification of public lands is, thus, an or leased and the conditions
therefor.
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President. Courts
have no authority to do so. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Section 2 speaks of “co-production,
joint venture, or production sharing
agreements” as modes of exploration,
Ituralde v. Falcasantos | GR No. 128017, January 20, 1999 development, and utilization of
Forest land is not capable of private appropriation and occupation in the absence of a positive inalienable lands. This effectively
act of the Government declassifying it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or excludes the lease system, with
other purposes. Accordingly, where there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in respect to mineral and forest lands.
Agricultural lands may be the subject
question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land, petitioner cannot lawfully of lease.
claim ownership of the land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
The following are qualified to take part
in the exploration, development, and
2. Imperium and Dominium utilization of the natural resources:
 In public law, there exists the well-known distinction between government authority
possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in sovereignty, and its capacity to Filipino citizens, and corporations or
associations at least 60% of whose
own or acquire property.
capital is owned by Filipino citizens.
 The former comes under the heading of imperium, and the latter of dominium. Note, however, that as to marine
 The use of the term dominium is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its wealth, only Filipino citizens are
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands qualified. This is also true of natural
resources in rivers, bays, lakes, and
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. lagoons, but with allowance for
cooperatives.
3. Citizenship Requirements
 Article XII, Section 2
How much of the lands of the public
Co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements for exploration, development domain is open to acquisition,
and utilization, development and utilization of natural resources: Filipino citizens, or exploration, development and
corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital is Filipino owned. Agreements utilization?
shall not exceed a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The last paragraph of Section 3 as
well as Section 4 authorize Congress
 Article XII, Section 2 to fix the available area taking into
Use and enjoyment of the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea consideration “the requirements of
and exclusive economic zone – PD 1599 (June 11, 1978); UN Convention on the Law of the conservation, ecology and
development and subject to the
Sea – ratified by Philippines in August, 1983: Exclusively for Filipino citizens. principles of agrarian reform.”
Section 4 also adds a note of urgency
Tano v. Socrates | GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997 to the need to fix “the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks.”
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore
189
– Article XII, Section 7. A “marginal” fisherman is defined by the Supreme Court as an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward from his harvest of fish, as measured by The Congress shall, as soon
existing price levels, is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish; while as possible, determine, by
a “subsistence” fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their
Section 131 of the Local Government Code defines a “marginal farmer or fisherman” as one boundaries on the ground.
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing, which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of Thereafter, such forest lands
and national parks shall be
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. The preferential conserved and may not be
right granted to them is not absolute. increased nor diminished,
except by law. The Congress
shall provide for such period
Alienable lands of public domain, which shall be limited to agricultural lands. as it may determine,
Only Filipino citizens may acquire not more than 12 hectares by purchase, homestead or grant; or measures to prohibit logging
lease not more than 500 hectares. Private corporations may lease not more than 1,000 hectares in endangered forests and
watershed areas.
for 25 years, renewable for 25 years.
Article XII, Section 10 The State, subject to the
provisions of this
Certain areas of investment – as Congress shall provide when the national interest so dictates: Constitution and national
Reserved for Filipino citizens or corporations 60% of whose capital is Filipino owned, although development policies and
Congress may prescribe a higher percentage of Filipino ownership. programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System | GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997 | ancestral lands to ensure
267 SCRA 408, 434 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. O’Malley | 342 Mo 641 their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The Supreme Court said that the term “patrimony” The Congress may provide
pertains to heritage – and for over eight decades, the Manila Hotel has been mute witness to the for the applicability of
customary laws governing
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipino. It existence is impressed with public property rights or relations
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and in determining the
nationhood. Verily, the Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony, and ownership and extent of
ancestral domain.
51% of its equity comes with the purview of the constitutional shelter, for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock. Consequently, the Filipino First Policy provision is applicable. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court said that this provision is a positive command which is complete in itself and What is the difference between
needs no further guidelines or implementing rules or laws for its operation. It is per se enforceable. “ancestral domain” and
“ancestral lands”?
It means precisely that Filipinos should be preferred, and when the Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right. Ancestral domain is an all-
embracing concept which refers
to lands, inland waters, coastal
In the dispute whether the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel should be awarded to a Malaysian bidder areas, and natural resources
corporation or to a Filipino corporation, the Malaysian bidder corporation or to a Filipino therein and includes ancestral
corporation, the Malaysian bidder contended that, since the first and third paragraphs of Section lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and
10, Article XII are not self-executory, the second paragraph, by implication, is also not self- other lands individually-owned
executory. whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. The of water and other natural
second paragraph is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs resources. They include lands
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. indigenous cultural
communities but to which they
In light of this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the GATT treaty which places had traditionally had access for
their subsistence and
aliens on the same footing as Filipinos by distinguishing the two (2) cases by saying that the traditional activities.
provision was mandatory and enforceable “only in regard to the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and Ancestral lands is a narrower
concept. It refers to those held
commerce.“ The suggestion is that there are some aspects of trade and commerce which do not under the same conditions but
form part of the national economy. For what reason we are not told. Then the Court continued: ancestral domain but limited to
“The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Section 10, Article XII is self-executing or not.” lands that are not merely
occupied and possessed but are
That, after all, had been settled in Manila Prince. But the Court continued: “Rather, the issue is also utilized by cultural
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to communities under the claim of
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.” In other individual or traditional group
ownership. These include but
words, the Senate may play around with a mandatory provision through a balancing of values. are not limited to residential
Tanada v. Angara | GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997. My suspicion s that this is the Court’s polite way lots, rice terraces or paddies,
of distancing itself from the divided decision in Manila Prince. private forests, farms and tree
lots.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 10083, December 2, 1991
190
The constitutionality of RA 7042, the Foreign Investment Law, on the ground that Compare the rule under the 1987
provisions in it which liberalize the rules for the entry of foreign investors is detrimental Constitution with those of the 1935 and 1973
to the interest of Filipinos. The Solicitor General, however, and intervenor Senator Constitutions.
Vicente Paterno argue otherwise. The debate here is on the wisdom and on the efficacy
The 1987 Constitution rule is more strict
of the law. The case as presented as yet poses no constitutional issue. than the 1935 and 1973 rules. What the new
rule says is that whenever natural resources
Article XII, Section 11 are involved, particularly in the case of
inalienable natural resources, the State must
Franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public always have some control of the exploration,
utility: Only citizens of the Philippines, or corporations at least 60% of whose capital is development and utilization even if the
Filipino-owned. individual or corporation engaged in the
operation is Filipino. Thus, for instance, in
the words of Commissioner Davide, “no
 First sentence prescribes that public utility franchises be granted only to timber or forest concessions, permits or
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least 60% of the capital of which authorization can be exclusively granted to
any citizen of the Philippines nor to any
is owned by citizens. corporations qualified to acquire lands of the
 Second sentence enjoins the State to encourage equity participation by the public domain.” But this rule is not
general public. retroactive.
 Last sentence, first introduced in 1973, which authorizes foreign investors to The non-retroactivity of this rule is respected
participate in the governing boards of public utilities proportionately to their in the Executive Order No. 211 issued by
share in capital, is a reversal of the Filipinization trend which had found support President Aquino in the exercise of legislative
powers and in Executve Order No. 279
in King v. Hernaez | 4 SCRA 792 (1962) and Luzon Stevedoring Co v. Anti- which authorized the Secretary of Natural
Dummy Board | 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The 1987 Constitution, however, has Resources to conclude joint venture, co-
added that “executive and managing officers must be citizens of the production, or production sharing
agreements for the exploration, development
Philippines.” and utilization of mineral resources
applicable to contracts entered into after the
 Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utility Board | 44 Phil 551 (1923) effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
A public utility is a utility corporation which renders service to the general
public for compensation. Its essential feature is that its service is not confined Miners Association of the Philippines v.
to privileged individuals but is open to an indefinite public. The public or Factoran, Jr. | 240 SCRA 100
private character of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who
In upholding the administrative regulations
avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve all members of the issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
public who may require it. this case recognized that the new
Constitution assumes a more dynamic role in
relation to natural resources. “ No longer is
 Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization and Philippine National Oil Company the utilization of inalienable lands of public
| GR No. 112399, July 14, 1995 domain through “license, concession or
A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one lease.” “The options open to the State are
organized “for hire or compensation” to serve the public. Under this definition, through direct undertaking or by entering into
co-production, joint venture, or production
PETRON, the refining company of the government, was not considered a public sharing agreements.”
utility coming under Section 11 because it does not engage in oil refining for
hire or compensation.
Distinguish Filipinization of an aspect of the
economy from nationalization.
 JG Summit Holdings v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, November 20, 2000
A shipyard comes under the definition of a public utility found is Section 13(b), There is Filipinization when ownership is
CA 146. But PD 666 said that a shipyard was not a public utility; but this was limited to Filipino citizens or Filipino
corporations; there is nationalization when
repealed by BP 391, which was repealed by Omnibus Investment Code but in ownership is reserved to the State.
so doing it did not revive PD 666.
NOTE: CA 146, Section 13(b) defines a public utility as:

The term; public service includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental,
and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, sub-way motor
vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both with or without fixed route and whether may be its classification, freight
or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat or steamship line, pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in
the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine railways, marine repair shop, [warehouse] wharf
or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power water supply and
power, petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications system, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and
other similar public service: Provided, however, That a person engaged in agriculture, not otherwise a public service,
who owns a motor vehicle and uses it personally and/or enters into a special contract whereby said motor vehicle is
offered for hire or compensation to a third party or third parties engaged in agriculture, not itself or themselves a public
service, for operation by the latter for a limited time and for a specific purpose directly connected with the cultivation of
his or their farm, the transportation, processing, and marketing of agricultural products of such third party or third
parties shall not be considered as operating a public service for the purpose of this Act.
191
Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission | GR

No. 138295, August 28, 2003 No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
A franchise, certificate or authorization shall not be exclusive nor for a period more authorization for the operation of a public
than 50 years, and shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or
All executive and managing officers must be Filipino citizens. It was held that a associations organized under the laws of the
franchise to operate a public utility is not an exclusive private property of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
franchisee. No franchisee can demand or acquire exclusively in the operation of a whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor
shall such franchise, certificate, or
public utility. Thus, a franchisee cannot complain of seizure or taking of property authorization be exclusive in character or for
because of the issuance of another franchise to a competitor. a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall
any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Department of Environment and Natural amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Resources | GR No. 127882, December 1, 2004 (On Reconsideration) and February 1, Congress when the common good so
2005 requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the
The State may enter into service contracts with foreign owned corporations, but general public. The participation of foreign
subject to strict limitations in the last two paragraphs of Section 2. Financial and investors in the governing body of any public
technical agreements are a form of service contract. Such service contracts may be utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the
entered into only with respect to minerals,, petroleum and other mineral oils. The executive and managing officers of such
grant of such service contracts is subject to several safeguards, among them: corporation or association must be citizens
1. That the service contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting of the Philippines.
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements.

2. The president be the signatory for the government. On the basis of their capacity “to acquire or hold
3. The president report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty (30) lands of the public domain,” the following may
days. acquire private lands:
1. Filipino citizens;
When technical and financial assistance agreement is entered into under 2. Filipino corporations and associations as
Section 2, can it include some management role for the foreign corporation? defined in Section 2; and, by exception,
3. Aliens, but only by hereditary succession, and
4. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
To the extent that management is incidental to financial and technical has lost Philippine citizenship (but only under
assistance agreements, management may be included. the terms of Section 8.)
Filipino citizens can both “acquire” or otherwise

Applying familiar principles of constitutional construction to the phrase, “hold” lands of the public domain; Filipino
“agreements involving either technical or financial assistance,” the corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
framers’ choice of words does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of domain but they can “hold” such ands by modes
assistance, but rather implies that there are other things being included or other than acquisition, such as lease.
possibly being made part of the agreement, apart from financial or technical
assistance. The drafters avoided the use of restrictive and stringent Bermudo v. Court of Appeals | 155 SCRA 8, 17
phraseology; a verbal legis scrutiny of Section 2 of Article XII discloses not (1987), citing Register of Deeds v. Ung Siu Si
even a hint of a desire to prohibit foreign involvement in the management or Temple | 97 Phil 58, 61
operation of mining activities, or to eradicate service contracts. The purpose and spirit of the 1935 Constitution
demands that in the absence of a capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of
Furtheremore, a literal and restrictive interpretation of this paragraph Filipino citizens.
leads to logical inconsistencies. A constitutional provision specifically
allowing foreign-owned corporations to render financial or technical
assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly Republic v. Court of Appeals | 235 SCRA 567
(1994)
unnecessary; the provision was meant to refer to more than mere financial or The time to determine whether the person
technical assistance. Also, if paragraph 4 permits only agreements for acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to
financial or technical assistance, there would be no point in requiring that they own it is acquired and not the time to register
be based on real contributions to the economic growth and general ownership. Thus, a foreign national who, while still
Filipino citizen, acquired land from a vendor who
welfare of the country. had complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act ( CA 141)
And considering that there were various long-term service contracts still in prior to the purchase, can validly register his title
force and effect at the time the new Charter was being drafted, the absence of to the land.
any transitory provisions to govern the termination and closing-out of the then
existing service contracts strongly militates against the theory that the mere
omission of “service contracts” signaled their prohibition by the new
Constitution.
Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is therefore unavoidable, and a careful scrutiny thereof
conclusively shows that the ConCom members discussed agreements involving either technical or financial assistance in
the same sense as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably. The drafters in fact knew that the agreements with
foreign corporations were going to entail not mere technical or financial assistance but, rather, foreign investment in and
management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration development and utilization of minerals.
192
The framers spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their
discussions that they did not intend to band or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on crafting provisions to
put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.
In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors – but with safety measure to
prevent abuses – as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII, which
reserves or limits to Filipino citizens the exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. This was
prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral
resources.
From the foregoing, it is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance referred to in
paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand, and on the other hand government as principal or “owner” (of the works), whereby the foreign
contractor provides the capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation
of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full
control and supervision over the entire enterprise.
Albano v. Reyes | 175 SCRA 264

The Supreme Court said that Congress does not have the exclusive power to issue such authorization. Administrative bodies such as
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, Energy Regulatory Board, etc. may be empowered to do so.
The Philippine Port Authority awarded the contract to operate the container service to International Container Terminal Services, a
private entity. It is contended that since this involves the operation of a public utility a special franchise from Congress is needed.
Under applicable laws, a special franchise is not needed. PD 857 specifically authorizes the Philippine Port Authority to provide
services within the Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise.” PPA contracted ICTS to operate the Manila
International Container Terminal. This is enough to satisfy the law. Even if MICT is a public utility, or a public service on the theory
that it is a “wharf” or “dock” as contemplated under the Public Service Act, its operation does not necessarily call for a franchise
from Congress. That the Constitution provides that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply that only
Congress has the authority to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified agencies power to
issue such authorization.
Philippine Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board | GR No. 119528, March 26, 1997
Where it was held that Section 10, RA 776, reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the authority to regulate the
issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services.
Associated Communications & Wireless Services – United Broadcasting Networks v. National Telecommunications
Commission | GR No. 144109, February 17, 2003
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a trend towards delegating the legislative power to authorize the
operation of certain public utilities to administrative agencies and dispensing with the requirement of a congressional
franchise. However, in this case, it was held that in view of the clear requirement for a legislative franchise under PD 576-
A, the authorization of a certificate of public convenience by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for the
petitioner to operate television Channel 25 does not dispense with the need for a franchise.
Likewise, the power to issue franchises for radio and television systems is legislative in nature but is delegable. We believe
that EO 546 is one law which authorizes an administrative agency, the NTC, to issue authorizations for the operation of
radio and television broadcasting systems without need of a prior franchise issued by Congress.
Eastern Telecom v. Telecom Technologies | GR No. 125992, July 23, 2004

Public utility franchise cannot be exclusive. Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive “franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization” to operate a public utility. In Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., the Court held
that “the Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive.” So Section 11, Article
XII provides.
Tatad v. Garcia, supra

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of public utilities. However, it does not require a
franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
What private respondent, in this case, owns are rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and power plant,
not public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to the public.
193
The prohibition in the Constitution is against foreigners and foreign corporations being given a franchise to operate a public utility.
But they may own the facilities. The Court held that a foreign corporation could construct and own the facilities for a light rail transit
system but it may not be given the franchise to operate the system.
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, supra

The Court held that Petron is not a public utility; hence there is no merit to petitioner’s contention that the sale of the
block of shares to Aramco violated Section 11, Article XII. A public utility is one organized “for hire or compensation” to
serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil refining for hire or
compensation to process the oil of other parties.
JG Summit Holdings v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, September 24, 2003, January 31, 2005
Foreign corporation may buy shares in excess of 40% of the shares of the corporation. There is no law against that. But the
effect would be that the corporation would lose its capacity to hold.
A public utility is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public
consequence, such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service. To constitute a public utility,
the facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of the residents. As the name indicates, “public
utility” implies public use and service to the public. A shipyard is not a public utility. Its nature dictates that it serves but a
limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its discretion. It has no legal obligation to render the services sought by
each and every client.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections | 289 SCRA 337
All broadcasting, whether radio or television stations, is licensed by the Government. Radio and television companies do not own
the airwaves and frequencies; they are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. A franchise is a privilege subject to
amendment, and the provision of BP 881 granting free airtime to the COMELEC is an amendment of the franchise of radio and
television stations.
JG Summit Holdings v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, November 2, 2000

A joint venture falls within the purview of an “association” pursuant to Section 11, Article XII; thus, a joint venture which would
engage in the business of operating a public utility, such as a shipyard, most comply with the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalizations
requirement.
4. Classification of Lands of the Public Domain

 Republic v. Imperial | GR No. 130906, February 11, 1999
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the Director of Lands, now the
Director of the land Management Bureau. The decision of the Director, when approved by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as to questions of fact, is conclusive upon the courts.
Foreshore land is that part of the land which is between the high and low water, and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is
part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals | 129 SCRA 689 (June 22, 1984)
The Court said, “The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the
Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
It should be noted, however, that he power of the executive is delegated power by virtue of CA No. 141.
The classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon recommendation of the pertinent
department head. Therefore, they are the ones who may change the classification of public lands, e.g., from inalienable to
alienable.
194

Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino | GR No. 31688, December 17, 1990 The Congress may
The classification of land does not change automatically when the nature of land changes. establish an independent
A positive act of the executive is needed. Anyone who claims that the classification has economic and planning
agency headed by the
been changed must be able to show the positive act of the President indicating such President, which shall,
positive act. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature and not of what the land after consultations with
actually looks like. Hence, for instance, that a former forest has been denuded does not by the appropriate public
agencies, various private
that fact mean that it has ceased to be forest land. sectors, and local
government units,
Republic v. Court of Appeals | 160 SCRA 228 (1988) recommend to Congress,
and implement
Land cannot have a mixed classification, e.g., partly mineral, partly agricultural. “The Court continuing integrated and
feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half coordinated programs
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical: the land must be either and policies for national
development.
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the
land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and Until the Congress
completely mineral – once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations provides otherwise, the
National Economic and
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become Development Authority
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated shall function as the
by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. independent planning
agency of the government.
If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership ARTICLE XII, SECTION 10
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong. This is an application of the economic and planning
Regalian Doctrine. Thus, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to agency, when the national
which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable interest dictates, reserve
to citizens of the
it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is Philippines or to
thus converted to mineral land. For the loss sustained, the owner is entitled to corporations or
compensation under the Mining Law or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. associations at least sixty
per centum of whose
capital is owned by such
Director of Forestry v. Villareal | GR No. 32266, February 27, 1989 citizens, or such higher
Are mangrove swamps or Manglares agricultural or forest lands? The classification by the percentage as Congress
may prescribe, certain
Administrative Code of Manglares as forest lands has not been changed. areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact
 Rules on the disposition and exploitation of agricultural lands of the public domain measures that will
encourage the formation
 Private corporations or associations may not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. and operation of
 Qualified individuals may acquire a maximum of 12 hectares (down from 24 of the 1973 enterprises whose capital
Constitution) of alienable lands of the public domain. is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
 Private corporations may hold alienable lands of the public domain by lease up to a
maximum of 1,000 hectares and for a period of twenty-five (25) years renewable for In the grant of rights,
another twenty-five (25) years. privileges, and
concessions covering the
 Qualified individuals may lease land of the public domain up to a maximum of 500 national economy and
hectares. patrimony, the State shall
give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate

and exercise authority
 Republic v. Court of Appeals | 148 SCRA 480 over foreign investments
Ungay Malebago Mines v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 154 SCRA 504 within its national
Palomo v. Court of Appeals | 266 SCRA 392 jurisdiction and in
accordance with its
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. It was determined that the national goals and
lands subject of the decree of the Court of First Instance were not alienable lands of the public priorities.
domain, being part of the reservation for provincial park purposes and thus part of the forest zone.
Forest land cannot be owned by private persons; it is not registrable, and possession thereof, no
Ichong v. Hernandez | 101
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private land, unless the land is reclassified and considered Phil 1155 (1957)
disposable and alienable. The provision allowing the
nationalization of certain
businesses is not a new
Republic v. Candymaker, Inc. | GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006 doctrine, and neither is it
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must necessary. This case already
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential definitely established that
proclamation or an executive order or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Filipinization of business may
be done without violating the
Lands Investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect equal protection clause.
title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
195
(CENRO) in the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the What is the difference between the
alienable and disposable site in a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show provision of Section 15, Article XIV
(1973 as amended) and Section 8 of
the real character of the land subject of the application. the 1987 Constitution relative to
natural born citizens who lost their
citizenship?
 Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome | 114 SCRA 799 The 1981 amendment to the 1973
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain Constitution limited the right of such
except by lease. The Court held that as between the State and Meralco, the land is still public persons to the acquisition of private
lands “for use by him as residence”. No
land. It would cease to be public and only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any such limitation appears in the 1987
Filipino citizen qualified to acquire the same. Meralco, being a juridical person, is disqualified. Constitution. However, Congress may
add such limitation as we as
limitation on size. Moreover, the size
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. | 146 limitation imposed by statute under
SCRA 509 the 1973 Constitution still holds.
The ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome was abandoned where the Supreme Court
declared that the 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Where the land was acquired
What is the current law on the
in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares, the subject?
same may be registered in 1982, despite the constitutional prohibition against corporations
acquiring ands of the public domain. This is the controlling doctrine today. Section 5, RA 8179, amending
Section 10, Foreign Investment Act,
says:
Where public land was acquired within the maximum limit of the Constitution in effect at the
time of acquisition, such land may be registered even if the area is beyond the new land limit “Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen
Pursuant to the Provisions of Article
in a later Constitution. the validity of acquisition is determined as of the time land was XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. –
acquired. Any [former] natural born citizen who
has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be
When does public land become private land: upon issuance of the certificate of a transferee of a private land up to a
registration or upon completion of all steps necessary to entitle one to maximum area of five thousand
registration? (5,000) square meters in the case of
urban land or three (3) hectares in the
Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors case of rural land to be used by him
in interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period for business or other purposes. In the
of thirty years is converted to private property by the mere lapse of completion of case of married couples, one of them
may avail of the privilege herein
said period, ipso jure. granted: Provided, that if both shall
avail of the same, the total area
Lausan Ayog v. Judge Cusi | GR No. 46729, November 19, 1982 acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.
One purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage “owner- In case the transferee already owns
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm” and to prevent a recurrence of huge urban or rural land for business or
other purposes, he shall still be
landholdings. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social entitled to be a transferee of
unrest. additional urban or rural land for
business or other purposes which
when added to those already owned
The prohibition which prevents private corporations from acquiring and of the public domain by him shall not exceed the maximum
is not retroactive. The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the areas herein authorized.
corporation which “had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
A transferee under this Act may
1973 Constitution took effect. acquire not more than two (2) lots
which should be situated in different
NOTE: Under the 1935 Constitution, the limit on the area of public land which may be municipalities or cities anywhere in
acquired by private individuals was 144 hectares. The 1973 Constitution, however, set the the Philippines: Provided, That the
total land area thereof shall not
limit at 24 hectares. The 1987 Constitution has further reduced this to 12 hectares.
exceed five thousand (5,000) square
meters in the case of rural land for use
Republic v. Intermediate Court of Appeals | GR No. 75042, November 29, 1988 by him for business or other purposes.
Qualified corporations may acquire land, but only private land. The prohibition on acquisition A transferee who has already acquired
urban land shall be disqualified from
of public lands apply to corporations sole, to the same extent that the prohibition is acquiring rural land area and vice
applicable to private corporations. Even is a corporation sole is different from other versa.
corporations in other respects, in the matter of acquisition of public land they are treated like
other corporations.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority | GR No. 133250, November 11, 2003

The 1987 Constitution prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Amari, being a private
corporation, is barred from such acquisition. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is not an end user agency with respect to the
reclaimed lands under the amended Joint Venture Agreement, and PEA may simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of
hectares to a single private corporation in one transaction.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI | GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
196
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 6
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is The use of property
necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No. 141, which states, “but the land so granted, donated or bears a social function,
and all economic agents
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be shall contribute to the
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when common good.
authorized by Congress.” Individuals and private
groups, including
corporations,
When such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and cooperatives, and similar
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA collective organizations,
shall have the right to
to sells its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban own, establish, and
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative operate economic
authority could only benefit private individuals. enterprises, subject to
the duty of the State to
promote distributive
However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution the Court clarified that “reclaimed lands of the public domain if justice and to intervene
sold or transferred to a public of municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become when the common good
so demands.
patrimonial property and may be sold to private parties, whether Filipinos citizens or qualified
corporations.
La Union Electric
Laurel v. Garcia | GR Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990 Cooperative v. Judge
Yaranon | GR No. 87001,
The nature of the Roppongi property in Japan is that the subject property in this case is one of the four December 4, 1989
(4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service In the facts of this case the
Court saw no proof of direct
is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the injury to petitioner. Hence it
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese did not want to rule directly
government. on the constitutionality of
the law authorizing NEA to
override a board. However,
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property the Court observed that
has become patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of Article XII, Section 6 of the
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and Constitution says that
cooperatives are subject to
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The the duty of the State to
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common intervene when the
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. common good demands.
5. The Stewardship Concept | Article XII, Section 6

 Article XIII, Section 6 Save in cases of
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in hereditary succession,
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed
the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, except to individuals,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. corporations, or
The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own agricultural estates which shall associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of
be distributed to them in the manner provided by law. the public domain.
 Cruz v. Secretary | GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000 ARTICLE XII, SECTION 8

RA 8371 – Indigenous Peoples Rights Act is assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 7 of
the State its ownership over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. The vote of this Article, a natural-
the Supreme Court on the subject was equally divided. born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship
The opinion defending constitutionality held the following: may be a transferee of
1. Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of public domain. They are private lands, subject to
private and belong to indigenous people. Section 5 commands the State to protect the rights limitations provided by
law.
of indigenous people. Carino v. Insular Government | 212 US 449 recognized native title
held by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded from the concept of jura regalia.
2. The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right to negotiate Private land means any land
of private ownership. This
terms and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure includes both lands owned
environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. by private individuals and
3. The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Section 2, lands which are patrimonial
Article XII. property of the State or of
municipal corporations.
4. What is given is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from
entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements with private
entities.
197
The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following:
1. The law amounts to an abdication of the authority over a significant are of the country’s patrimony.
2. It relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people.
3. The law contravenes the provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.
PRIVATE LANDS
1. Rule | Article XII, Section 7

 Muller v. Muller | GR No. 149615, August 29, 2000
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and private lands
is the conservation of the national economy and patrimony. In this case, the respondent is disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute, no trust can result in favor of the guilty party. To allow
reimbursement would, in effect, permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of the property which he is not allowed to own. The sale of
land as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has not capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such theory would permit indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition.
 Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals | 239 SCRA 341

Any sale or transfer in violation of the prohibition is null and void. It was held that even if the petitioner proves that the Deed of Sale
in his favor us is in existence and duly executed, nonetheless, being an alien, petitioner is disqualified from acquiring and owning real
property.
Frenzel v. Catito | GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003

The Supreme Court said that inasmuch as the petitioner is an alien, he is disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land was null and void. Neither can the petitioner recover the money he had spent for
the purchase thereof. Equity, as a rule, will follow the law, and will not permit to be done indirectly that which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly.
The alien petitioner claims that the sales of real property in question were entered into by him as the real vendee. He claims that
therefore he is entitled to compensation for the properties. The said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null
and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction
which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain action for his losses.
 Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She | 21 SCRA 52

An action to recover property sold filed by the former owner will lie, the pari delicto ruling having been abandoned as early as this
case where the Supreme Court declared that a lease for 99 years, with a 50-year option to purchase property if and when Wong
Heng would be naturalized, is a virtual surrender of all rights incident to ownership, and therefore, invalid.
 Register of Deeds of Rizal v. Ung Sui Temple | 1955

Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao Diocese, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission | 1957
Land tenure is not indispensible to the free exercise of religious corporation sole to acquire lands, it must appear that at least 60% of
the faithful or its members are citizens of the Philippines in order to comply with the citizenship requirement. This is so regardless of
the citizenship of the incumbent inasmuch as a corporation sole is merely an administer of the temporalities or properties titled in
its name and for the benefit of its members.
 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Gonvalvez | 175 SCRA 398

United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian | 159 SCRA 446
Yap v. Grajeda | 121 SCRA 244
Godinez v. Pak Luen | 120 SCRA 223
Halili v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 113539, March 12, 1997
Lee v. Director of Lands | GR No. 128195, October 3, 2001
However, land sold to an alien which was later transferred to a Filipino citizen – or where the alien later becomes a Filipino citizen –
can no longer be recovered by the vendor, because there is no longer any public policy involved.
Halili v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 113539, March 12, 1997

S, an American citizen, died leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs widow, H, and his son, D, both of whom are
American citizens. H executed a deed of quitclaim conveying to D all her rights, titles and interests in 6 parcels of lands she inherited
198
from S. thereafter, D sold the disputed lot to C, a Filipino citizen. Petitioners, owners of the adjoining lot, questioned the
constitutionality and validity of the 2 conveyances –between H and D, and between D and C.
H’s deed of quitclaim in favor of her son violated Article XII, Section 7 which limits the transfer or conveyance of private lands to
those who are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. As to the effect of a subsequent sale by D to a Filipino,
“jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
The rationale of the principle that the invalid transfer of land to an alien is cured when the alien subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen is that the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos. That aim
is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
2. Exception to the Rule
 Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez | 111 SCRA 704

Hereditary Succession. This does not apply to testamentary dispositions.
Ramirez, a Filipino national, willed usufructuary rights over real property to an Austrian national. This was challenged on the basis of
Section 14 (now 7), but the lower court upheld the validity of the usufruct on the ground that the exception in favor of
“testamentary succession” applies to both to succession by operation of law and to testamentary succession. The will is valid but not
for the reason given by the lower court. Its validity rests on the fact that “a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land
in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to the land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
NOTE: But the Court also said, “We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the provision will be for naught and meaningless. The same decision
allowed the legitime in favor of the alien widow.
 Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 193 SCRA 93 (1991)

When husband and wife purport to buy land, and the husband is alien while the wife is Filipino, is the property conjugal such that it
may not be disposed of without the consent of the husband?
Assuming that it was (the husband’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase, and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution.
The sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him
to have.
Even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof.
 Moss v. Director of Lands | L-27170, December 22, 1977 | 80 SCRA 269

Moss, an American citizen, acquired coconut land on January 20, 1945. He can be a registered owner. The Ordinance appended to
the 1935 Constitution on November 10, 1939 said that until final withdrawal of United States sovereignty. Americans and American
corporations could enjoy the same civil rights as Philippine citizens. Moreover, after the withdrawal of sovereignty on July 4, 1946,
Moss did not lose his right which was protected under Article XVII, 1(1) of the 1935 Constitution.
 Zaragoza v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 106401, September 29, 2000

During the lifetime of Flavio, he partitioned and distributed his properties among his three (3) children, excepting one daughter who
had become an America. It was admitted, however, that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the exempted daughter. It is
basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced (Article 1080, Civil
Code).
199
The legitime of compulsory heirs, however, is determined only after collation. Article 1061
states that, “Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring The State shall promote the
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the preferential use of Filipino labor,
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures
in order that it may computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the that help make them competitive.
account of the partition.”
The State shall pursue a trade policy
Unfortunately, however, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition that serves the general welfare and
for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The utilizes all forms and arrangements of
petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
proceeding where all the indispensible parties are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 14
The sustained development of a
reservoir of national talents
 Article XII, Section 8 consisting of Filipino scientists,
A natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a entrepreneurs, professionals,
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. managers, high-level technical
manpower and skilled workers and
craftsmen in all fields shall be
Republic v. Court of Appeals | 235 SCRA 567 promoted by the State. The State shall
This section is similar to Article XIV, Section 15 – 1973 Constitution, pursuant to which BP encourage appropriate technology
and regulate its transfer for the
185 was passed. BP 185 provided that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who lost his national benefit. The practice of all
Filipino citizenship maybe the transferee of private land up to a maximum of 1,000 square professions in the Philippines shall be
meters, if urban, or one hectare, if rural, to be used by him as his residence. Thus, even if limited to Filipino citizens, save in
cases prescribed by law.
private respondents were already Canadians when they applied for registration of the
properties in question, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 15
considering that it is undisputed that they were formerly natural-born Filipino citizens. The Congress shall create an agency to
promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social
BP 185 has now been amended by RA 8179 which has increased the maximum area of justice and economic development.
private land which the former natural born Filipino citizen may acquire to 5,000 square
meters for urban land and 3 hectares for rural land. Furthermore, such land may now be The Congress shall not, except by
used for business and for other purposes. general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-
 Americans hold valid title to private lands as against private persons owned or controlled corporations
may be created or established by
Republic v. Quasha | 46 SCRA 160 (1972) special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test
The Parity Amendment of 1946 did not authorize Americans to acquire private lands. of economic viability.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds | 79 Phil 461, 481 (1947)

The purpose of the first sentence of
The Supreme Court held that American citizens and American-owned and controlled Section 16 is to insulate the legislature
corporations cannot validly acquire private agricultural lands under the Party Amendment, against pressures from special interests.
since the exceptional rights granted to them under the said Amendment refer only to “To permit the lawmaking body by special
agricultural, mineral and timber lands of the public domain and natural resources, and law to provide for the organization or
formation or regulation of private
conduct and operation of public utilities. corporations, it was believed in the
committee, would be in effect to offer to it
However, this ruling was effectively modified by Article XVII, Section 11 (Transitory the temptation in many cases to favor
certain groups to the prejudice of others or
Provisions) of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: “Titles to private lands acquired by such to the prejudice of the interests of the
persons before such date (July 3, 1974) shall be valid as against private persons only.” country.”
Thus, a previous owner may no longer recover the land from an American buyer who
National Development Co. and New Agrix
succeeded in obtaining title over the land. Only the State has the superior right to the land,
v. Philippine Veterans Bank | GR Nos.
through the institution of escheat proceedings – as a consequence of the violation of the 84132-33, December 10, 1990
Constitution – or through an action for reversion – as expressly authorized under the Public
Land Act with respect to lands which formerly formed part of the public domain. PD 1717 was passed to rehabilitate the
Agrix Group of Companies which was a
corporation neither owned nor controlled
To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an by the government. As part of the
alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. rehabilitation process, the Agrix Group was
dissolved by the decree and the decree
created New Agrix Inc. likewise neither
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds | 79 Phil 461, 481 (1947) owned nor controlled by the government.
This violates Article XIV Section 4 of the

1973 Constitution now modified as Article
XII, Section 16.
200
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She | No. L-17587, September 12, 1967 ARTICLE XII, SECTION 18
JG Summit v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, January 31, 2005 The State may, in the interest of
Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for national welfare or defense, establish
and operate vital industries and, upon
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
payment of just compensation, transfer
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the to public ownership utilities and other
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and private enterprises to be operated by
the Government.
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by Section 11 deals with Filipinization, meaning
virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this Filipino ownership, whereas Section 18
deals with Nationalization or state
to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership.
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it (jus disponendi) – rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is While Section 18 deals with state ownership
of public utilities and industries, Section 17
just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day deals merely with the temporary state
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are takeover of “the operation of any privately-
consolidated in the alien.” This is circumvention of the constitution. owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.” Hence, no
compensation is involved in Section 17.
In the case of JG Summit v. Court of Appeals, it was held that aliens are not disqualified
from owning every kind of real property. The prohibition of the Constitution applies
only to ownership of land. It does not extend to all immovable or real property as Republic v. PLDT | 26 SCRA 620, 628 (1969)
defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code, that is, those which are considered Under Section 18 the state may compel a
public utility to render service in the public
immovable for being attached to land, including buildings and construction of all kind interest, provided just compensation is paid
attached to the soil. therefor.
Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun | 93 Phil 827 (1953)

Nebba v. New York | 291 US 502, 536
Under Article XVII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution, which does not appear in the (1934)
1987 Constitution, only the State could question the American’s title where a Filipino Generally speaking, the phrase “affected
vendor cannot recover private land invalidly sold to an American because he was in pari with public interest can, in the nature of
delicto with the disqualified vendee. things, mean no more than that an industry,
for adequate reason, is subject to control for
the public good.”
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She | 21 SCRA 52 (1967)
This case reversed Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun. It should be noted, however, Or again, “thus understood, ‘affected with a
public interest’ is the equivalent of ‘subject
that the reversal is not couched in terms that sweep in all cases of sale to to the exercise of the police power.’”
aliens. The Court said, “To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with However, for purposes of Section 17, the
that laid down in Rellosa and other subsequent cases, the latter must be phrase “business affected with public
considered pro tanto qualified.” interest” refers to businesses which involve
characteristics of public utilities, such as
mass-based consumers, even if they are not
This case singled out two reasons for not applying the pari delicto rule: in fact operated as public utilities.
1. The original parties guilty of the violation had already died and had
NOTE
been succeeded by administrators to whom it would have been Section 18 is a textual acceptance of the
unjust to impute guilt. question of the concept of “public use” with
2. Recovery would enhance the declared public policy of preserving the broader concept of “public welfare” or
lands for Filipinos. “national welfare” as elaborated in the
jurisprudence on expropriation of land for
re-sale under Section 4, Article XIII.
Hence, in the case of sales to aliens, this case does not exclude the
possibility of barring recovery by the Filipino vendor where the Thus, Section 18 has also been used to
justify compulsory interconnection of a
buyer has acquired Philippine citizenship or where the land has private telephone company with a
come to the hands of a qualified transferee in good faith. government system.
Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen | L-30523, May 4, 1977 (not in SCRA) PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. | GR No. 94374, August 27,
On June 27, 1956, the rule was established that a Filipino seller could not, 1992
because of pari delicto, recover the land from an alien buyer. Twelve years Eastern was not allowed to interconnect
later, the rule was reversed in Lui She. Cases prior to Lui She can be relitigated with PLDT, but this was on the ground that
Eastern had no franchise to operate a
not when res judicata applies. telephone system.
3. Remedies to recover private land from disqualified alien. On reconsideration, however, in PLDT v.
NTC | 241 SCRA 486 (1995), Eastern case
was reversed.
 Escheat proceedings
 Republic v. Intermediate Court of Appeals | GR No. 74170, July 18, 1989

201
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, an alien, acquired private lands in 1934. Upon his death in 1946, his properties were taken over by Chua Kim,
an adopted son, whose title to the land was confirmed in a compromise agreement approved by judgment in 1970 which recognized
him as heir of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. In 1977, Chua Kim took his oath as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Chua Kim is entitled to acquire
the property under this Constitution, for two reasons:
1. His predecessor, Gregorio Reyes, acquired the property in 1934 when there was as yet no prohibition against aliens
acquiring private land.
2. Even if Chua Kim acquired the land when he was not qualified to do so, now that he is a Filipino citizen public policy will
not be served by dispossessing him
 Republic v. Court of Appeals | 172 SCRA 1

Action for Reversion under the Public Land Act. The Director of lands has the authority and the specific duty to conduct
investigations of alleged fraud in obtaining free patents and the corresponding titles alienable public lands, and, if facts disclosed in
the investigation warrant, to file the corresponding court action for reversion of the land to the State.
Baguio v. Republic | GR No. 119682, January 21, 1999

The action of the State for reversion to public domain of land fraudulently granted to private individuals is imprescriptible.
Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127833, January 22, 1999

But it is the State, alone, which may institute reversion proceedings against public lands allegedly acquired through fraud and
misrepresentation pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Private parties are without legal standing at all to question the
validity of respondents’ title.
Tankiko v. Cezar | GR No. 131277, February 2, 1999

It was held that where the property in dispute is still part of the public domain, only the State can file suit for reconveyance of such
public land. Respondents, who are merely applicants for sales patent thereon, are not proper parties to file an action for
reconveyance.
 The State can be put in estoppel by the mistake or errors of its officials or agents. Estoppel against the State is not favored; it may be
invoked only in rare and unusual circumstances as it would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect
the public. However, the State may not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 226 SCRA 314

The Court declared that the State may be held in estoppel for irregular acts and mistakes of its officials.
Republic v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 116111, January 21, 1999

Because for nearly 20 years starting from the issuance of the titles in 1966 to the filing of the complaint in 1985, the State
failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of the titles issued, the prolonged inaction strongly
militates against its cause, tantamount to latches, which means the “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.” It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either abandoned it or declined to assert it.
 An action for recovery filed by the former Filipino owner, the pari delicto doctrine having been abandoned, unless the land is sold to
an American citizen prior to July 3, 1974 and the American citizen obtained title thereto.
PREFERENCE FOR FILIPINO LABOR, ETC.
 Tanada v. Angara | 272 SCRA 18

The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures
that help make them competitive. Article XII, Section 12
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
 Article XII, Section 14

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.
Board of Medicine v. Yasuyuki Ota | GR No. 166097, July 14, 2008
202
The Supreme Court, while upholding the principle that the license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government, declared that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the
State or its agent in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
COOPERATIVES ARTICLE XII, SECTION 17

In times of national
emergency, when the
 Article XII, Section 15 | RA 6939 – An Act Creating the Cooperative Development Authority public interest so
The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as requires, the State may,
during the emergency and
instruments for social justice and economic development. under reasonable terms
prescribed by it,
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative | GR No. temporarily take over or
direct the operation of
137489, May 29, 2002 any privately-owned
The Supreme Court said that, after ascertaining the clear legislative intent of RA 6939, it now rules public utility or business
that the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to affected with public
interest.
adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly, disputes related to the election of
officers and directors of cooperatives. It may, however, conduct hearings and inquiries in the exercise
of its administrative functions. Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, supra
Public interest on the
occasion of a national
MONOPOLIES emergency is the primary
consideration when the
government decides to
 DEFINITION temporarily take over or
 The simplest form of monopoly exists when there is only one seller or produces of a product direct the operation of a
or service for which there are no substitutes. public utility or a business
affected with public interest.
 In its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the joint acquisition or maintenance by The nature and extent of the
members of a conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the power to control and dominate emergency is the measure of
trade and commerce in a commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a group, to the duration of the takeover
exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied with the intention and as well as the terms thereof.
It is the State that prescribes
purpose to exercise such power. such reasonable terms which
will guide the
 POLICY | Article XII, Section 19 implementation of the
temporary takeover as
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations dictated by the exigencies of
in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. the time. This power of the
State cannot be negated by
any party nor should its
 Garcia v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 132451, December 17, 1999
exercise obligate the State to
It is contended that the implementation of the Oil Deregulation Act – RA 8479 only a few months compensate for the value of
after the effectivity of the law will result in the continued stranglehold of the oil industry by the Big the property.
Three – Shell, Caltex, Petron. From this it is contended that the implementation will lead to a violation
NOTE: Now, however, that
of Section 19. the State has decided to
takeover the operation of the
RA 8479 was enacted precisely to enhance competition. Towards this end, deregulation of the airport facility permanently,
industry has been chosen as the tool. Whether or not the choice of deregulation as the favored tool is just compensation is due.
wise is not for the Court to decide. On the other hand, petitioner has not shown that deregulation will
result in monopoly. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 19
The State shall regulate or
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, supra prohibit monopolies
when the public interest
RA 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free so requires. No
competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled combinations in restraint
that its provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit of trade or unfair
competition shall be
fair competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of allowed.
the market forces.
RA 84 79 deliberately avoids the objectionable provisions of RA 8180.
 Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, supra

A monopoly is “a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or
power) to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a particular commodity.”
Clearly, monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution but may be permitted to exist to aid the government in carrying on
an enterprise or to aid in the performance of various services and functions in the interest of the public. However, because
monopolies are subject to abuses than can inflict severe prejudice to the public, they are subjected to a higher level of State
regulation than an ordinary business undertaking.
203

Philippine Port Authority v. Mendoza | 138 SCRA 496 The Congress shall establish an
The Constitution does not absolutely prohibit monopolies. Thus, for example, an award for independent central monetary
authority, the members of whose
stevedoring and arrastre services to only one corporation is valid. governing board must be natural-
born Filipino citizens, of known
 Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy | GR No. 124360, November 5, 1997 probity, integrity, and patriotism,
the majority of whom shall come
Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 113079, April 20, 2001 from the private sector. They
But that as it may, the Supreme Court declared that Article XII, Section 19, is anti-trust in shall also be subject to such other
history and spirit; it espouses competition. Only competition which is fair can release the qualifications and disabilities as
may be prescribed by law. The
creative forces of the market. Competition underlies the provision. The objective of anti-trust authority shall provide policy
law is “to assure a competitive economy based upon the belief that through competition direction in the areas of money,
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations
fewest resources. Competition among produces allows consumers to bid for goods and of banks and exercise such
services and, thus matches their desires with society’s opportunity costs.” Additionally, there is regulatory powers as may be
a reliance upon “the operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be provided by law over the
operations of finance companies
produces, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom various and other institutions performing
products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and similar functions.
how much shall be produced, and on competition, among produces who will manufacture it.
Until the Congress otherwise
provides, the Central Bank of the
The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the Philippines operating under
reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for the prohibition of existing laws, shall function as
the central monetary authority.
unmitigated monopolies. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a
handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will ARTICLE XII, SECTION 21
prevail. In this case, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and Foreign loans may only be
incurred in accordance with law
controlled by an oligopoly, foreign oligopoly at that. So, if only to help the many who are poor and the regulation of the
from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in the prices of oil products due to monetary authority. Information
deregulation, it us a must that RA 8180 be repealed completely. on foreign loans obtained or
guaranteed by the Government
shall be made available to the
 Tanada v. Angara | 272 SCRA 18 public.
However, the Supreme Court said that the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement does
not violate Article II, Section 19 nor Article XII, Sections 12 & 19 because these sanctions Restrictions with respect to the
should be read and understood in relation to Article XII, Sections 1 & 13, which requires the contracting of foreign loans:
pursuit of a trade policy that “serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.” 1. They must be in accordance with
law;
2. They must be in accordance with
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority | GR No. regulations of the Monetary Board
110526, February 10, 1998 and with the prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board (Article VII,
Supreme Court declared that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
Section 20).
nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever necessary for the
promotion of the general welfare, as reflected in Article XII, Sections 6 & 19. These restrictions were enacted
under the influence of the centrality
of foreign loan problems during the
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque | GR No. 173034, drafting of the 1987 Constitution.
October 9, 2007
The Court said that the framers of the Constitution were well aware that trade must be
subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be held over ARTICLE XII, SECTION 22
Acts which circumvent or negate
business interests. any of the provisions of this
Article shall be considered
Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority | GR No. inimical to the national interest
and subject to criminal and civil
156041, February 21, 2007 sanctions, as may be provided by
It was held that “free exercise does not call for the removal of protective regulations; it must law.
be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in restraint of trade.
CENTRAL MONETARY AUTHORITY
 Article XII, Section 20 in relation to RA 7653
204
A R T I C L E X V I
General Provisions
I. Flag
II. Name
III. Armed Forces of the Philippines
IV. National Police Force
V. Mass Media and Advertising Industry
Section 1. The Philippine flag. Statutory waiver.

Section 2. Name, anthem and seal. Suability v. Liability.
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. Immunity in International Law
State Immunity from Suit Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon
Metran v. Paredes GTZ v. Court of Appeals
National Airports Corporation. Teodoro Section 4. The Armed Forces.
Philrock v. Board of Liquidators Section 5. Oath of Affirmation of Armed Forces.
Republic v. Feliciano Section 6. The National Police.
Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre Service Quilona v. The General Court Martial
Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court Carpio v. Executive Secretary
Festejo v. Fernando The Integrated National Police
Ministerio v. Court of First Instance Section 7. War veterans.
Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme Section 8. Retirees.
Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Section 9. Consumer protection.
Commission Section 10. Communication structures.
PNR v. Intermediate Appellate Court Section 11. Ownership of mass media and advertising agencies.
Republic v. Sandoval Section 12.Indigenous cultural communities.
I. Republic of the Philippines

II. State may not be sued without its consent
III. Armed Forces of the Philippines
IV. Other Interest Groups
V. Communication
205
ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 1

The flag of the Philippines shall be
FLAG red, white, and blue, with a sun and
three stars, as consecrated and
 The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white and blue, with a sun and three stars, as honored by the people and
recognized by law.
consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law. Article XVI, Section 1
The Congress may, by law, adopt a
NAME new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which
shall all be truly reflective and
 The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a symbolic of the ideals, history, and
national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law
traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in shall take effect only upon its
a national referendum. Article XVI, Section 2 ratification by the people in a
national referendum.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 3

The State may not be sued without its
consent.
 The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall
undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular The Armed Forces of the Philippines
force necessary for the security of the State. Article XVI, Section 4 shall be composed of a citizen armed
force which shall undergo military
training and serve as may be
1. All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
provided by law. It shall keep a
Constitution. regular force necessary for the
2. Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its security of the State.
members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5
partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan 1. All members of the armed
political activity, except to vote. forces shall take an oath or
3. No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or affirmation to uphold and
defend this Constitution.
designated in any capacity to any civilian position in the Government, including government- 2. The State shall strengthen the
owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military,
4. Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their services. and respect for people's rights
5. The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited in the performance of their
proportionally from all provinces and cities as far as practicable. duty.
3. Professionalism in the armed
forces and adequate
NATIONAL POLICE FORCE remuneration and benefits of
its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed
 The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope forces shall be insulated from
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police partisan politics. No member of
the military shall engage,
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall directly or indirectly, in any
be provided by law. Article XVI, Section 6 partisan political activity,
except to vote.
 Carpio v. Executive Secretary | 206 SCRA 290 4. No member of the armed forces
in the active service shall, at
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 6975, establishing the Philippine any time, be appointed or
National Police (PNP) under a reorganized department, the Department of Interior and Local designated in any capacity to a
Government. civilian position in the
Government, including
government-owned or
 Alunan v. Asuncion | GR No. 115824, January 28, 2000 controlled corporations or any
The Supreme Court said that RA 6975 created the new Philippine National Police which of their subsidiaries.
5. Laws on retirement of military
absorbed the members of the former National Police Commission, Philippine Constabulary officers shall not allow
and the Integrated National Police, all three of which were accordingly abolished. The law extension of their service.
had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substituting a new unified one 6. The officers and men of the
regular force of the armed
in its place. forces shall be recruited
proportionately from all
provinces and cities as far as
MASS MEDIA AMD ADVERTISING INDUSTRY practicable.
7. The tour of duty of the Chief of
Staff of the armed forces shall
 Mass Media | Ownership shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or corporations not exceed three years.
wholly-owned and managed by such citizens. Congress shall regulate or prohibit However, in times of war or
monopolies in commercial mass media. Article XVI, Section 11(1) other national emergency
declared by the Congress, the
President may extend such tour
 Advertising Industry | Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least 70% of duty.
Filipino-owned shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry. All executives and
206
managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. Article XVI, Section 11(2)
 Article XVIII, Section 23

Advertising entities affected shall have five (5) years from the ratification of this Constitution to comply on a graduated
and proportionate basis with the minimum Filipino ownership requirement.

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of
military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given
them in the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of natural
resources.

The State shall, from time to time, review to increase the pensions and other benefits due to retirees of both the government and
the private sectors.

The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out o f,
and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.

1. The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
2. The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers
and the promotion of the general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of
the Philippines.

The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, th e
majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.
207
A R T I C L E X V I I I
Transitory Provisions
I. Elections
II. Existing Laws and Treaties
III. Reserved Executive Powers
IV. Career Civil Service
V. Sequestration
Section 1. First elections. Security of Tenure

Purpose of the Transitory Provisions Dario v. Mison
Section 2. Term of Senators and Congressmen. Mendoza v. Quisumbing
Section 3. Continuity of Decrees Section 17. Compensation of National Officials.
Section 4. Treaties. Section 18. Salary Scales.
Section 5. Term of President and Vice President. Section 19. Disposition of Office Properties.
Section 6. Legislative Power of President. Section 20. Free Secondary Schools.
Section 7. Sectoral Representatives Section 21. Reversion of Ill-gotten Lands.
Section 8. Metropolitan Authority. Section 22. Expropriation.
Section 9. Sub provinces. Section 23. Advertising Entities.
Section 10. Continuity of Courts. Section 24. Private Armies.
Section 11. Tenure of Judiciary Members. Section 25. US Military Bases.
Section 12. Unclogging the Courts. Section 26. Power of Sequestration.
Section 13. Case. Sequestration, freeze order, provisional takeover
Section 14. Filed Before New Constitution. Extent of PCGG’s power
Legal Effects of the Lapse of the Applicable Period Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas
Section 15. The Constitutional Commissions. Section 27. Date of Effectivity.
Section 16. Reorganization of Civil Service. De Leon v. Esguerra
I. Elections
Date
National
Local
II. Laws
Statutes, Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders, Proclamations, etc.
Operative until amended, repealed or revoked | Section 3
Treaties and International Agreements
Not reviewed or extended without concurrence of 2/3 of Senate | Section 4
Foreign military bases, troops or facilities need a treaty | Section 25
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
208
III. Courts
Status Quo
Continue to exercise jurisdiction
Rules of Court remain operative
Incumbent members remain until 70, incapacitated or removed for cause
Back Log
Systematic plan to expedite
Legal effect of lapse of period for cases filed before ratification of the 1987 Constitution | Article VIII, Section 15(3), (4) apply in
certification and penalties
IV. Constitutional Commissions

Extension of one year unless removed for cause, incapacitated or appointed to a new term.
Term not to extend beyond 7 years.
V. Civil Service
Reorganization
Allowed provided it is done in good faith | Dario v. Mison
Appropriate separation pay and retirement benefits
Considered for employment
VI. Salaries
Top officials | Section 17
Other officials | Section 18
VII. Lands
Illegally acquired | Section 21
Violation of Constitution, public land laws or through corrupt practices
Adequate remedies for reversion
No transfer until after 1 year from ratification
Idle or abandoned agricultural lands | Section 22
Expropriate for distribution under agrarian reform program
VIII. Ill-gotten Wealth | Section 26

Issuance of sequestration or freeze orders by PCGG operative for 18 months more
Difference with search warrant
Administrative authority
Prima facie case not probable cause
Power over sequestered property is administrative power | Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Issued only upon showing of prima facie case
Judicial action or proceeding must be commenced within 6 months from ratification or filing
IX. Other Matters

Section 24 | Private Armies
CHDF: dismantled or absorbed
Section 8 | Metropolitan Authority
President to constitute until Congress provides
Section 9 | Sub-provinces
Continue to operate until converted into regular province or component municipalities are reverted to another province
X. Effectivity
February 2, 1987
209
ELECTIONS ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 1

The first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be
 First elections under this Constitution of members of Congress shall be held on the held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
second Monday of May, 1987. First local elections shall be held on a date to be
The first local elections shall be held on a
determined by the President. Article XVIII, Section 1 date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the
 Synchronization of elections. The members of Congress and the local officials first election of the Members of the Congress. It
shall include the election of all Members of
elected shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Article XVIII, Section 2
the city or municipal councils in the
 Of the twenty four (24) Senators elected in 1992, twelve (12) were given a Metropolitan Manila area.
term of only three (3) years. The purpose was to establish a staggered system
ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 2
of electing Senators. Every three (3) years only twelve (12) new Senators are
The Senators, Members of the House of
elected. Continuity is thus achieved. Representatives, and the local officials
first elected under this Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
 The six year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 elections is extended until noon of June 30, 1992. Article XVIII, Of the Senators elected in the elections in
Section 5 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three years.
 The first regular election for President and Vice President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Article XVIII, ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 3
Section 5 All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive
 Osmena v. Commission on Elections | 199 SCRA 750 issuances not inconsistent with this
The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that the elections for President Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.
and Vice President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
local officials must be synchronized in 1992. Accordingly, RA 7056, which ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 4
provided for de-synchronized elections, was declared unconstitutional. All existing treaties or international
agreements which have not been ratified
shall not be renewed or extended without
EXISTING LAWS AND TREATIES the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
 All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 5
The six-year term of the incumbent
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain President and Vice-President elected in
operative until amended, repealed or revoked. Article XVIII, Section 3 the February 7, 1986 election is, for
 People v. Gacott | 242 SCRA 514 purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
It was held that President Marcos’ Letter of Implementation No. 2 dated
March 18, 1972, which abolished the Anti-Dummy Board, not having been The first regular elections for the
revised, revoked or repealed, continues to have the force and effect of law. President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second
Thus, the accused may not validly claim that the power to prosecute
Monday of May, 1992.
violations of the Anti-Dummy Law is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy
Board and the City Prosecutor is without authority to file and prosecute the ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 6
same. The incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
 All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall
not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all members of ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 7
Until a law is passed, the President may fill
the Senate. Article XVIII, Section 4 by appointment from a list of nominees by
 After the expiration in 1992 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the respective sectors, the seats reserved
the United States, foreign military bases shall not be allowed in the for sectoral representation in paragraph
(2), Section 5 of Article V1 of this
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Constitution.
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in
a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 8
the other contracting State. Article XVIII, Section 25 Until otherwise provided by the Congress,
the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Manila Authority to be
 Bayan v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 composed of the heads of all local
government units comprising the
Metropolitan Manila area.
210
The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Government had

complied with the constitution in that the Visiting Forces ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 9
A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate
Agreement was concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus until it is converted into a regular province or
following the requirement of Article VII, Section 21. But the until its component municipalities are reverted to
Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to the mother province.
submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, because ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 10
that would constitute a very strict interpretation of the phrase, All courts existing at the time of the ratification of
“recognized as treaty.” Moreover, it is inconsequential whether this Constitution shall continue to exercise their
jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The
the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
provisions of the existing Rules of Court, judiciary
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with
treaty. this Constitution shall remain operative unless
amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or
the Congress.
RESERVED EXECUTIVE POWERS
The incumbent Members of the Judiciary shall
 Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of continue in office until they reach the age of
nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office or are removed
representatives in Article 6, Section 5(1). Article XVIII, Section 7 for cause.
 Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, supra ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 12

The Supreme Court shall, within one year after
The appointment of sectoral representative required confirmation the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a
by the Commission on Appointments because they fell under the systematic plan to expedite the decision or
clause “other officers whose appointments are vested in him in resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the
this Constitution.” effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall
be adopted for all special courts and quasi-
However, there are no more sectoral representatives because judicial bodies.
party-list representatives have taken their place. ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 13
The legal effect of the lapse, before the
 Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable
period for the decision or resolution of the cases
Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local or matters submitted for adjudication by the
government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area. Article XVIII, courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court
Section 8 as soon as practicable.

LEGAL EFFECT OF THE LAPSE OF THE APPLICABLE PERIOD The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section
15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to
cases or matters filed before the ratification of
 Two Rules on the Subject this Constitution, when the applicable period
 One for those where the period lapsed before the ratification of lapses after such ratification.
this Constitution. ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 15
Applicable rule is that found in the 1973 Constitution, but since The incumbent Members of the Civil Service
jurisprudence on this subject is unclear and even conflicting, Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit shall continue in office
Section 13 says that the Supreme Court must establish a clear rule for one year after the ratification of this
as soon as practicable through the resolution of cases pending Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
before it. cause or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office or appointed to a new term
thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve
 Another for those where the period lapsed after the ratification of longer than seven years including service before
this Constitution. the ratification of this Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 15(3) and Section 15(4) of this Constitution ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 16
shall apply. Career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
CAREER CIVIL SERVICE dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution shall
be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to
 Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but retirement and other benefits accruing to them
as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated under the laws of general application in force at
March 25, 1986, and the reorganization following the ratification of the the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the
option of the employees, they may be considered
Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay, and to for employment in the Government or in any of its
retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
application in force at the time of their separation. Article XVIII, Section 16 including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This
 In lieu of separation pay, at the option of the employees, they provision also applies to career officers whose
may be considered for employment in the government, or in any resignation, tendered in line with the existing
of its subdivisions, etc. policy, had been accepted.
211
 This provision shall also apply to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 17
with the existing policy, had been accepted. Ortiz v. Commission on Elections | Until the Congress provides
162 SCRA 812 otherwise, the President shall
receive an annual salary of three
hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-
 Dario v. Mison | 176 SCRA 84 (1989) President, the President of the
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for “automatic” vacancies. They Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Chief
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free Justice of the Supreme Court, two
from the fetters of due process and security of tenure. The Court distinguished removals hundred forty thousand pesos each;
from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of this Constitution) as a result the Senators, the Members of the
House of Representatives, the
of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In Associate Justices of the Supreme
the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals Court, and the Chairmen of the
undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not Constitutional Commissions, two
hundred four thousand pesos each;
hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it, and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one
Article XVIII, Section 16 is critical for two reasons: hundred eighty thousand pesos
each.
1. It is the only provision – insofar as it mentions removals not for cause – that
would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice. ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 18
2. It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification At the earliest possible time, the
Government shall increase the
of 1987 Constitution, except RA 6656, which came much later on June 10, 1988. salary scales of the other officials
and employees of the National
Government.
SEQUESTRATION
 Authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders relative to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth All properties, records, equipment,
buildings, facilities, and other assets
shall remain operative for not more than 18 months after the ratification of this Constitution. of any office or body abolished or
However, Congress may extend such period. reorganized under Proclamation No.
3 dated March 25, 1986 or this
 Sequestration or freeze orders shall be issued upon showing of a prima facie case.
Constitution shall be transferred to
The corresponding judicial action shall be filed within 6 months from ratification of the office or body to which its
this Constitution, or, if issued after ratification, within 6 months from such issue. powers, functions, and
responsibilities substantially
The order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is pertain.
commenced as provided therein.
The first Congress shall give priority
Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 240 SCRA 376
to the determination of the period
The Court said that there is no particular description or specification of the kind or for the full implementation of free
character of “judicial action or proceeding,” much less an explicit requirement for public secondary education.
the impleading of the corporations sequestrated or of the ostensible owners of the ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 21
property suspected to be ill-gotten. The only qualifying requirement in the The Congress shall provide
Constitution is that the action or proceeding be filed “for” orders of sequestration, efficacious procedures and adequate
remedies for the reversion to the
freezing or provisional take-over. What is apparently contemplated is that the
State of all lands of the public
action or proceeding must concern or involve the matter or sequestration, freezing domain and real rights connected
or provisional take-over of specific property – and should have, as objective, the therewith which were acquired in
violation of the Constitution or the
demonstration by competent evidence that the property is indeed “ill-gotten public land laws, or through corrupt
wealth” over which the government has a legitimate claim for recovery and other practices. No transfer or disposition
relief. of such lands or real rights shall be
allowed until after the lapse of one
year from the ratification of this
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 125788, June 5, 1998 Constitution.
It was held that the mere issuance of the writ of sequestration, without the
corresponding service thereof, within the 18-month period, does not comply with
At the earliest possible time, the
the constitutional requirement. Government shall expropriate idle
or abandoned agricultural lands as
may be defined by law, for
distribution to the beneficiaries of
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan | GR Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001 the agrarian reform program.
For failure of the PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the
respondents therein within the period prescribed by the Constitution, the Advertising entities affected by
sequestration orders issued against the respondents were deemed automatically paragraph (2), Section 11 of Article
lifted. But the lifting of the sequestration orders does not ipso facto mean that XV1 of this Constitution shall have
five years from its ratification to
sequestered property are not ill-gotten. The effect of the lifting will merely be the comply on a graduated and
termination of the role of the government as conservator of the property. proportionate basis with the
minimum Filipino ownership
requirement therein.
212
Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 258 SCRA 865 ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 24

The Supreme Court held that a writ of sequestration may be issued only upon Private armies and other armed groups
not recognized by duly constituted
authority of at least two (2) PCGG Commissioners. Accordingly, the authority shall be dismantled. All
sequestration order issued by the PCGG Task Force Head in Region VII is not paramilitary forces including Civilian
valid, not only because the Task Force Head in Region VII is not valid, not only Home Defense Forces not consistent
with the citizen armed force
because the Task Force Head did not have specific authority to act on behalf established in this Constitution, shall
of the Commission, but also because, even assuming that he was authorized, be dissolved or, where appropriate,
PCGG may not validly delegate its authority to sequester. converted into the regular force.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 119292, July 31, 1998 After the expiration in 1991 of the
It was held that in Republic v. Provident, the sequestration order signed by Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of
only one Commissioner was considered valid only because the order was America concerning military bases,
issued on March 19, 1986, before the promulgation of the PCGG Rules and foreign military bases, troops, or
Regulations requiring the signatures of two Commissioners. facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people
 Cojuangco v. Roxas | 195 SCRA 797 in a national referendum held for that
The Supreme Court held that the PCGG cannot perform acts of strict purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
ownership of sequestered property. The PCGG is a mere conservator. It may the other contracting State.
not vote the shares in a corporation and elect the members of the Board of ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 26
Directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of take-over of a The authority to issue sequestration or
business belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the
public funds but which landed in private hands such as in Bataan Shipyard recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
and Engineering Corporation (BASECO). remain operative for not more than
Reiterated in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators | 207 SCRA eighteen months after the ratification
of this Constitution. However, in the
659, Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 116941, May 31, 2001 national interest, as certified by the
and PCGG, Ocean Wireless Network, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan | GR President, the Congress may extend
No. 119609-10, September 21, 2001 such period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be

PCGG v. Cojuangco | GR No. 133197, January 22, 1999 issued only upon showing of a prima
Sequestration does not automatically deprive the stockholders of their right facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall
to vote their shares of stocks. Until the main sequestration case is resolved, forthwith be registered with the proper
the right to vote the sequestered shares of stocks of SMB depends on a two- court. For orders issued before the
tiered test, the guidelines of which are: ratification of this Constitution, the
corresponding judicial action or
3. Whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares proceeding shall be filed within six
are ill-gotten and thus belong to the State. months from its ratification. For those
4. Whether there is an immediate danger of dissipation thus issued after such ratification, the
judicial action or proceeding shall be
necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG commenced within six months from the
while the main issue depends with the Sandiganbayan. issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is

Republic v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 107789, April 30, 2003 deemed automatically lifted if no
The two-tiered test, however, does not apply in cases involving funds of judicial action or proceeding is
“public character.” In such cases, the government is granted the authority to commenced as herein provided.
vote said shares, namely: ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 27
1. Where government shares are taken over by private persons This Constitution shall take effect
or entities who/which registered them in their own names; immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
and held for the purpose and shall
2. Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired by supersede all previous Constitutions.
public funds somehow landed in private hands.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines was
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 258 SCRA 685 approved by the Constitutional
The Sandiganbayan can review the validity of sequestration orders. Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day
of October, Nineteen hundred and
eighty-six, and accordingly signed on
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 173 SCRA 72 the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen
The Supreme Court held that in the absence of express prohibition, the rule on hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary
Hall, National Government Center,
amicable settlements or compromise agreements in the Civil Code is applicable to Quezon City, by the Commissioners
PCGG cases pending before the Sandiganbayan. whose signatures are hereunder
affixed.
213
Benedicto v. Board of Administrators | 207 SCRA 659

The PCGG’s authority to enter into compromise agreements involving ill-gotten wealth and to grant immunity in civil and
criminal cases, without need of prior Congressional approval, was sustained anew in this ruling.
 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan | 244 SCRA 152

Upon the theory that Romualdez failed to file his annual statement of assets and liabilities from 1962-1985, the PCGG conducted a
preliminary investigation, and finding a prima facie case, filed 24 identically-worded information. On the challenge made against the
PCGG’s authority to conduct such investigation and to file the corresponding criminal information, the Court said that for penal
violations to fall within the jurisdiction of the PCGG under Section 2(a), EO No. 1, the following elements must concur:
1. It must relate to ill-gotten wealth.

2. Of the late President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
3. Who took advantage of their public office and/or their power, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
The other violations of the Anti-Graft Law not otherwise fulfilling these elements are not within the authority of PCGG t investigate,
but within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies.
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, supra

However, the invalid preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the criminal information or otherwise render
them defective; much less did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court; the only effect being the imposition on the latter of
the obligation to suspend the proceedings and to require the holding of preliminary investigation.
Araneta III v. Sandiganbayan | 242 SCRA 482

A mere allegation in the anti-graft complaint that the accused is a relative of then President Marcos will not suffice to
enable the PCGG to take cognizance of the case. As held in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan | 194 SCRA 474, there must, in addition,
be a showing that the accused has unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of such close relation with the former
President. In this case, it is clear from the allegations that Araneta used his power, influence, connections or relationship as
son-in-law of the late President Marcos and, that by reason of the manner in which the acquisition was effected, the assets
contemplated in the complaint are ill-gotten.
 PAGCOR v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 108838, July 14, 1997

Supreme Court held that while it is true that the Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) was sequestered, the fact of
sequestration alone did not automatically oust the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of its jurisdiction under BP 129 to decide the question
of ownership of the gaming and office equipment sought to be recovered by PAGCOR. In order that the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive
jurisdiction may be invoked, the PCGG must be a party t the suit. The instant case involves only PAGCOR, PCOC and Marcelo.
 Virata v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 114331, May 27, 1997

The Office of the Solicitor General may validly call the PCGG for assistance and ask it to respond to a motion for a bill of particulars,
considering that PCGG has the complete records of the case, and, being in charge of the investigation, is more knowledgeable and
better informed of the facts of the case than the OSG.
214

Constitutional Law 1 - Comprehensive Reviewer

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Constitutional Law 1 - Comprehensive Reviewer

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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.

 Function | Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11, 22 (1905)

 Origin, Scope and Purpose

 “ALMIGHTY GOD” v. “DIVINE PROVIDENCE”

 “COMMON GOOD” v. “GENERAL WELFARE”

 “The Rule of Law”

 Purpose of the Provision on National Territory

 Force of the Assertion of a Territorial Claim

 Scope of the National Territory

 “Belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title”

 Other Element of the Archipelagic Principle.

 PEOPLE V. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)

ARTICLE II, SECTION 1

 Definition of State | Elements of a State

 BACANI V. NACOCO, 100 Phil 468 (1956)

ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (1969)

PHHC v Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 269, 310 (1987)

1. DE JURE is established by authority of the legitimate sovereign. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 8

2. DE FACTO is one established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign.

 CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil 113 (1945)

 Presidential Form of Government

 ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCED BY THE PHILIPPINES SINCE 1935

 Parliamentary Form of Government

 Constitutional Authoritarianism v. Republican State

ARTICLE II, SECTION 2

 Purpose of the Provision

 Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

ARTICLE II, SECTION 3

 Purpose of the Provision

 Raison d’être of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

ARTICLE II, SECTION 4

ARTICLE II, SECTION 5

 1973 Constitution v. 1935 & 1987 Constitutions

ARTICLE II, SECTION 6

ARTICLE III, SECTION 5

ARTICLE II, SECTION 7

 Purpose of the Provision

ARTICLE II, SECTION 8

 Purpose of the Provision

ARTICLE II, SECTION 9

ARTICLE II, SECTION 10

ARTICLE II, SECTION 11

ARTICLE II, SECTION 12

ARTICLE II, SECTION 13

 Family | Stable heterosexual relationship

 Purpose of Protection of the Unborn

 Respective Rights of Parents and of the State

 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1922)

 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510 (1925)

 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 LW 4476 (May 15, 1972)

 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSIDERATION

The O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter plurality opinion

—Planned Parenthood v. Casey

ARTICLE II, SECTION 14

 Purpose of the Provision

ARTICLE II, SECTION 15

ARTICLE II, SECTION 16

 Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

 ON NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS

ARTICLE II, SECTION 17