Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals PDF

SiniIavilies and BiJJevences Ielveen LeJl-Wing and BigIl-Wing BadicaIs
AulIov|s) HevIevl McCIosI and Bennis CIong

Bevieved vovI|s)
Souvce BvilisI JouvnaI oJ FoIilicaI Science, VoI. 15, No. 3 |JuI., 1985), pp. 329-363
FuIIisIed I Cambridge University Press
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B.J. Pol. S.
I5,329-363
329
Printed in Great Britain
Similarities and Differences Between
Left-Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
HERBERT McCLOSKY AND DENNIS CHONG*
Political observers have for
years argued
about the
proper
location of the
radical left and the radical
right
on the familiar
left-right (or
liberal-
conservative)
continuum.
Although
the conventional view holds that the two
camps diverge sharply
and
belong
at
opposite
ends of the
continuum,
some
observers believe that
they
resemble each other so
closely
in certain crucial
political
and
psychological
characteristics that to
classify
them at
opposite
poles
is
grossly misleading.
Controversy
over this issue was fuelled
by
the
publication
in
I950
of The
Authoritarian
Personality.l
The authors of that research
believed,
in
effect,
that those who embraced the doctrines of the far
right
were
likely
to
score
high
on the F scale
(their key
measure of
'authoritarianism'),
while
those who leaned to the
ideological
left were
likely
to score low. In their
relation to
authoritarianism,
in
short,
the two
camps belonged
at
opposite
poles.
Critics of this conclusion and of the research on which it was based
complained
that the F scale was
obviously
biased in
identifying
authoritarian-
ism as characteristic
mainly
of the
right
while
failing
to
register
the authoritar-
ianism of the left. Edward
Shils,
for
example, argued
in a well-known
essay
that authoritarianism was not the exclusive
property
of the far
right,
but
mutatis mutandis was
equally
characteristic of the far left.2 Once one
adjusts
for
superficial
differences,
Shils
contended,
communists and other radicals of
the far left resemble
right-wing
radicals in
zealotry, susceptibility
to Man-
ichean
interpretations
of human
events,
implacable
hatred of
opponents,
intolerance toward dissenters and
deviants,
and an inclination to view
public
affairs as the outcome of
conspiracies
and secret
plots. According
to Shils and
other
critics,
the radical left and the radical
right may
differ in their choice of
allies and
enemies,
and in their
perceptions
of certain institutions as hostile or
friendly,
but
they
share a common
style
of
political thought
and
employ
similar
techniques
of
political engagement.
Shils's
charge
that the F scale revealed the authoritarianism of the
right
but
not of the left was echoed
by
other
prominent
critics. Milton Rokeach
argued
(and
sought
to demonstrate
through research)
that the characteristics which
*
Department
of Political Science,
University
of
California,
Berkeley.
1
T. W.
Adorno,
Else Frenkel-Brunswick,
Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt
Sanford,
The
Authoritarian
Personality (New
York:
Harper, I950).
2
Edward A.
Shils, 'Authoritarianism:
"Right"
and "Left"' in Richard Christie and Marie
Jahoda, Studies in the
Scope
and Method
of
the Authoritarian
Personality (Glencoe,
Ill.: Free
Press, 1954), Pp. 24-9.
B.J. Pol. S.
I5,329-363
329
Printed in Great Britain
Similarities and Differences Between
Left-Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
HERBERT McCLOSKY AND DENNIS CHONG*
Political observers have for
years argued
about the
proper
location of the
radical left and the radical
right
on the familiar
left-right (or
liberal-
conservative)
continuum.
Although
the conventional view holds that the two
camps diverge sharply
and
belong
at
opposite
ends of the
continuum,
some
observers believe that
they
resemble each other so
closely
in certain crucial
political
and
psychological
characteristics that to
classify
them at
opposite
poles
is
grossly misleading.
Controversy
over this issue was fuelled
by
the
publication
in
I950
of The
Authoritarian
Personality.l
The authors of that research
believed,
in
effect,
that those who embraced the doctrines of the far
right
were
likely
to
score
high
on the F scale
(their key
measure of
'authoritarianism'),
while
those who leaned to the
ideological
left were
likely
to score low. In their
relation to
authoritarianism,
in
short,
the two
camps belonged
at
opposite
poles.
Critics of this conclusion and of the research on which it was based
complained
that the F scale was
obviously
biased in
identifying
authoritarian-
ism as characteristic
mainly
of the
right
while
failing
to
register
the authoritar-
ianism of the left. Edward
Shils,
for
example, argued
in a well-known
essay
that authoritarianism was not the exclusive
property
of the far
right,
but
mutatis mutandis was
equally
characteristic of the far left.2 Once one
adjusts
for
superficial
differences,
Shils
contended,
communists and other radicals of
the far left resemble
right-wing
radicals in
zealotry, susceptibility
to Man-
ichean
interpretations
of human
events,
implacable
hatred of
opponents,
intolerance toward dissenters and
deviants,
and an inclination to view
public
affairs as the outcome of
conspiracies
and secret
plots. According
to Shils and
other
critics,
the radical left and the radical
right may
differ in their choice of
allies and
enemies,
and in their
perceptions
of certain institutions as hostile or
friendly,
but
they
share a common
style
of
political thought
and
employ
similar
techniques
of
political engagement.
Shils's
charge
that the F scale revealed the authoritarianism of the
right
but
not of the left was echoed
by
other
prominent
critics. Milton Rokeach
argued
(and
sought
to demonstrate
through research)
that the characteristics which
*
Department
of Political Science,
University
of
California,
Berkeley.
1
T. W.
Adorno,
Else Frenkel-Brunswick,
Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt
Sanford,
The
Authoritarian
Personality (New
York:
Harper, I950).
2
Edward A.
Shils, 'Authoritarianism:
"Right"
and "Left"' in Richard Christie and Marie
Jahoda, Studies in the
Scope
and Method
of
the Authoritarian
Personality (Glencoe,
Ill.: Free
Press, 1954), Pp. 24-9.
330
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
330
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
most
closely distinguished
authoritarians of
any ideological persuasion
from
non-authoritarians were
'dogmatism'
and what he called
'opinionation'
-
complex styles
of
thinking
marked
by
closed-mindedness,
intolerance towards
those with whom one
disagrees,
reluctance to entertain new or
conflicting
ideas,
and a
deep-seated unwillingness
to alter one's
system
of beliefs in
any
way.3
H. J.
Eysenck4
concluded from his research on
personality
and
ideology
that
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals -
or,
more
specifically,
communists and
fascists - resembled each other in various
ways,
but were
especially
alike in
their
'tough-mindedness'.
In
Eysenck's
view,
it was this
quality
above all that
distinguished
extremists of the left and
right
from the
political
moderates,
who were inclined to be more 'tender-minded'.
Despite
such
challenges,
various
investigators
who worked with the F scale
continued to
find,
as Adorno et al.
had,
that the
right
tended to score
high (or
authoritarian)
on the
measure,
while the left tended to score low. When
Roger
Brown reviewed the state of the research on authoritarianism in
I965,
his verdict was that the
proponents
of
left-wing
authoritarianism had not
proved
their case:
'My
conclusion, then,
is that it has not been demonstrated
that fascists and communists resemble one another in authoritarianism or in
any
other dimension of
ideology.
No one thus far has shown that there is an
authoritarianism of the left.'5 Brown
acknowledged,
nevertheless,
that 'the
impression persists
that such a
type
exists and that some communists
belong
to it.'
Stone,
in
updatirg
the review of the research on these
questions,
came to
an
essentially
similar conclusion.6
Examining
studies
by
Barker, DiRenzo,
Hanson, Knutson,
and Smithers and
Lobley,
and
finding
little
convincing
support
for the
arguments
made
by
Shils and other critics, Stone went so far
as to recommend that we not waste
any
more time
searching
for
left-wing
authoritarianism.7
Why,
then,
in
light
of the uncertain results from available research should
one return to the
inquiry
and
again
raise the
question
of the
possible parallels
between
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals?
3
Milton Rokeach, The
Open
and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books. 1960).
4
H. J.
Eysenck,
The
Psychology
of
Politics
(London: Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul, I954).
Roger
Brown, Social
Psychology (New
York: Free Press,
1965), p. 542.
6
W. F. Stone, 'The
Myth
of
Left-Wing
Authoritarianism', Political Psychology,
11
(I980),
3-19.
E. N. Barker,
'Authoritarianism of the Political
Right.
Center, and Left', Journal
of
Social
Issues, xlx
(1968). 63-74;
G. J. DiRenzo. Personality, Power, and Politics
(Notre
Dame. Ind:
University
of Notre Dame Press.
1967):
D. J. Hanson,
'Dogmatism Among
Authoritarians of
the
Right
and the Left'.
Psychological
Studies, xiv
(1969).
12-21; J.
N. Knutson,
'Psychological
Variables in Political Recruitment', mimeo
(Berkeley,
Calif.: The
Wright
Institute,
I974);
A. G. Smithers and D. M.
Lobley,
'The
Relationship
Between
Dogmatism
and
Radicalism/
Conservatism', in H. J.
Eysenck
and G. D. Wilson, eds, The
Psychological
Basis
of Ideology
(Lancaster:
MPT Press, 1978), pp. 263-72.
7For a
critique
of Stone, see
Eysenck, 'Left-Wing
Authoritarianism:
Myth
or
Reality?',
Politi-
cal
Psychology,
1ll (I982), 234-8;
and for a comment on both Stone and
Eysenck,
see J. J.
Ray,
'Half of All Authoritarians Are
Left-Wing:
A
Reply
to
Eysenck
and Stone', Political
Psycho-
logy,
v
(1983), 139-43.
most
closely distinguished
authoritarians of
any ideological persuasion
from
non-authoritarians were
'dogmatism'
and what he called
'opinionation'
-
complex styles
of
thinking
marked
by
closed-mindedness,
intolerance towards
those with whom one
disagrees,
reluctance to entertain new or
conflicting
ideas,
and a
deep-seated unwillingness
to alter one's
system
of beliefs in
any
way.3
H. J.
Eysenck4
concluded from his research on
personality
and
ideology
that
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals -
or,
more
specifically,
communists and
fascists - resembled each other in various
ways,
but were
especially
alike in
their
'tough-mindedness'.
In
Eysenck's
view,
it was this
quality
above all that
distinguished
extremists of the left and
right
from the
political
moderates,
who were inclined to be more 'tender-minded'.
Despite
such
challenges,
various
investigators
who worked with the F scale
continued to
find,
as Adorno et al.
had,
that the
right
tended to score
high (or
authoritarian)
on the
measure,
while the left tended to score low. When
Roger
Brown reviewed the state of the research on authoritarianism in
I965,
his verdict was that the
proponents
of
left-wing
authoritarianism had not
proved
their case:
'My
conclusion, then,
is that it has not been demonstrated
that fascists and communists resemble one another in authoritarianism or in
any
other dimension of
ideology.
No one thus far has shown that there is an
authoritarianism of the left.'5 Brown
acknowledged,
nevertheless,
that 'the
impression persists
that such a
type
exists and that some communists
belong
to it.'
Stone,
in
updatirg
the review of the research on these
questions,
came to
an
essentially
similar conclusion.6
Examining
studies
by
Barker, DiRenzo,
Hanson, Knutson,
and Smithers and
Lobley,
and
finding
little
convincing
support
for the
arguments
made
by
Shils and other critics, Stone went so far
as to recommend that we not waste
any
more time
searching
for
left-wing
authoritarianism.7
Why,
then,
in
light
of the uncertain results from available research should
one return to the
inquiry
and
again
raise the
question
of the
possible parallels
between
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals?
3
Milton Rokeach, The
Open
and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books. 1960).
4
H. J.
Eysenck,
The
Psychology
of
Politics
(London: Routledge
&
Kegan
Paul, I954).
Roger
Brown, Social
Psychology (New
York: Free Press,
1965), p. 542.
6
W. F. Stone, 'The
Myth
of
Left-Wing
Authoritarianism', Political Psychology,
11
(I980),
3-19.
E. N. Barker,
'Authoritarianism of the Political
Right.
Center, and Left', Journal
of
Social
Issues, xlx
(1968). 63-74;
G. J. DiRenzo. Personality, Power, and Politics
(Notre
Dame. Ind:
University
of Notre Dame Press.
1967):
D. J. Hanson,
'Dogmatism Among
Authoritarians of
the
Right
and the Left'.
Psychological
Studies, xiv
(1969).
12-21; J.
N. Knutson,
'Psychological
Variables in Political Recruitment', mimeo
(Berkeley,
Calif.: The
Wright
Institute,
I974);
A. G. Smithers and D. M.
Lobley,
'The
Relationship
Between
Dogmatism
and
Radicalism/
Conservatism', in H. J.
Eysenck
and G. D. Wilson, eds, The
Psychological
Basis
of Ideology
(Lancaster:
MPT Press, 1978), pp. 263-72.
7For a
critique
of Stone, see
Eysenck, 'Left-Wing
Authoritarianism:
Myth
or
Reality?',
Politi-
cal
Psychology,
1ll (I982), 234-8;
and for a comment on both Stone and
Eysenck,
see J. J.
Ray,
'Half of All Authoritarians Are
Left-Wing:
A
Reply
to
Eysenck
and Stone', Political
Psycho-
logy,
v
(1983), 139-43.
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FAR-LEFT AND FAR-RIGHT REGIMES
One
important
reason,
of
course,
is that the
findings
derived from the
available research
studies,
and
especially
those
using
the F
scale,
do not
correspond
to what is obvious from even the most casual observation of actual
political regimes
of the far left and far
right.
No
particular expertise
is
required
to discern the
striking
similarities in
political style, organization,
and
practice among,
on the one
side,
such
left-wing dictatorships
as the Soviet
Union,
Communist
China,
East
Germany,
Cambodia under Pol
Pot,
Cuba
under
Castro, Albania,
Bulgaria, Ethiopia
and
Angola;
and,
on the other
side,
such
right-wing dictatorships
as Fascist
Italy, Spain
under
Franco,
Nazi
Germany, Portugal
under
Salazar,
Argentina (especially
from
1976
to
I983),
Uruguay,
Zaire and Chile under Pinochet. One can
cite,
in
addition,
a
number of
highly repressive dictatorships
in which
left-wing
and
right-wing
elements
(or
at least
left-wing
and
right-wing rhetoric)
are so
heavily
intermingled
that even
experts might
find it difficult to decide whether to
place
them on the left or the
right.
Possible
examples
include
Ghana,
Libya
under
Khadaffi,
Syria, Iraq
and Iran under Khomeini.
Despite
variations in the institutions,
practices,
and
symbolic
identifications
encountered
among
such
regimes,
the
parallels among
them -
regardless
of
their nominal
ideological
classifications - are so
conspicuous
that one can
ignore
them
only by
a
supreme
effort of
suspending
disbelief. All of them are
(or
were) severely repressive.
All are
(or were) single-party political dictatorships
-
whether dominated
by
a
strong
man,
a
military junta,
a
party
movement or
some other
self-appointed oligarchy.
All are
essentially police
states,
relying
heavily
on
systematic
coercion, surveillance,
and the ruthless enforcement of
controls to maintain themselves in
power.
As
one-party systems,
all
prohibit
legal opposition, employ 'managed'
or
rigged
elections
(if any),
and crush
dissenters and
potential
critics
through censorship,
harassment,
arrests and
killings.
All
deny elementary
civil liberties -
including
freedom of
speech,
press,
association and
assembly,
as well as the
rights
of
juridical
defence,
due
process
and
privacy. Although they
differ somewhat in their reliance
upon
developed ideologies,
all set severe limits on the ideas that can
legally
be
disseminated and all strive to
maintain,
in
effect,
a
single
belief
system
and an
official
orthodoxy.
In
varying degree,
too,
they
all exhibit elements of an
apocalyptic,
chiliastic
perspective,
as
though they
had been authorized to rule
by
some
higher power (secular
or
otherwise)
in order to
bring
about the
salvation of mankind and the
kingdom
of heaven on earth. Even the most
pragmatic, self-aggrandizing military juntas
are not
entirely
free from such
grandiose
fantasies.8
'
Many
of the characteristics set out
by
Daniel J. Levinson, one of the authors of The
Authoritarian
Personality,
to describe authoritarianism of the
right
turn out to be
equally
appropriate
to a
description
of
regimes
of the far left. See his 'Conservatism and Radicialism', in
David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, Volume 12
(New
York:
Macmillan, 1968), p. 27.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FAR-LEFT AND FAR-RIGHT REGIMES
One
important
reason,
of
course,
is that the
findings
derived from the
available research
studies,
and
especially
those
using
the F
scale,
do not
correspond
to what is obvious from even the most casual observation of actual
political regimes
right.
No
particular expertise
is
required
to discern the
striking
similarities in
political style, organization,
and
practice among,
on the one
side,
such
left-wing dictatorships
as the Soviet
Union,
Communist
China,
East
Germany,
Cambodia under Pol
Pot,
Cuba
under
Castro, Albania,
Bulgaria, Ethiopia
and
Angola;
and,
on the other
side,
such
right-wing dictatorships
as Fascist
Italy, Spain
under
Franco,
Nazi
Germany, Portugal
under
Salazar,
Argentina (especially
from
1976
to
I983),
Uruguay,
Zaire and Chile under Pinochet. One can
cite,
in
addition,
a
number of
highly repressive dictatorships
in which
left-wing
and
right-wing
elements
(or
at least
left-wing
and
right-wing rhetoric)
are so
heavily
intermingled
that even
experts might
find it difficult to decide whether to
place
them on the left or the
right.
Possible
examples
include
Ghana,
Libya
under
Khadaffi,
Syria, Iraq
and Iran under Khomeini.
Despite
variations in the institutions,
practices,
and
symbolic
identifications
encountered
among
such
regimes,
the
parallels among
them -
regardless
of
their nominal
ideological
classifications - are so
conspicuous
that one can
ignore
them
only by
a
supreme
effort of
suspending
disbelief. All of them are
(or
were) severely repressive.
All are
(or were) single-party political dictatorships
-
whether dominated
by
a
strong
man,
a
military junta,
a
party
movement or
some other
self-appointed oligarchy.
All are
essentially police
states,
relying
heavily
on
systematic
coercion, surveillance,
and the ruthless enforcement of
controls to maintain themselves in
power.
As
one-party systems,
all
prohibit
legal opposition, employ 'managed'
or
rigged
elections
(if any),
and crush
dissenters and
potential
critics
through censorship,
harassment,
arrests and
killings.
All
deny elementary
civil liberties -
including
freedom of
speech,
press,
association and
assembly,
as well as the
rights
of
juridical
defence,
due
process
and
privacy. Although they
differ somewhat in their reliance
upon
developed ideologies,
all set severe limits on the ideas that can
legally
be
disseminated and all strive to
maintain,
in
effect,
a
single
belief
system
and an
official
orthodoxy.
In
varying degree,
too,
they
all exhibit elements of an
apocalyptic,
chiliastic
perspective,
as
though they
had been authorized to rule
by
some
higher power (secular
or
otherwise)
in order to
bring
about the
salvation of mankind and the
kingdom
of heaven on earth. Even the most
pragmatic, self-aggrandizing military juntas
are not
entirely
free from such
grandiose
fantasies.8
'
Many
of the characteristics set out
by
Daniel J. Levinson, one of the authors of The
Authoritarian
Personality,
to describe authoritarianism of the
right
turn out to be
equally
appropriate
to a
description
of
regimes
of the far left. See his 'Conservatism and Radicialism', in
David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, Volume 12
(New
York:
Macmillan, 1968), p. 27.
331 331
332
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
332
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS
Parallels between the left and the
right
can be discerned not
only
in the
comparisons
of
left-wing
and
right-wing regimes,
but in the behaviour of
extreme movements of the left and
right
that have arisen in the United States
and other free nations. Both the far
right
and the far left
(New
Left as well as
Old)
have
obviously
been marked
by
zeal,
hostility
to
prevailing
institutions
and
unyielding
intolerance towards ideas and beliefs
they
consider inimical.
Their
antagonism
is
typically
fierce not
only
towards
political
'enemies' but
even towards rival
groups
with similar but not identical
ideologies
and
objectives.
When
Stalin,
for
example, proclaimed
the
theory
of 'social
fascism',
which held that the socialist movement was
really
a front for
fascism,
American Communists
eagerly
embraced the doctrine and
proceeded
to
embellish it so as to
distinguish
themselves from the socialists whom
they
now
portrayed
as enemies and traitors. As Max Schactman, a former
Trotskyite
leader,
observed:
Everything
and
everybody
outside the Communist
party
was
designated
as a
variety
of
fascism ....
Left-wing
socialists,
especially
those with a
friendly
attitude toward the
Communists,
could not deceive them for a
minute;
they
were
left
'Social Fascists' who
tried to hide their aid to fascism under the
cunning pretense
of
being
radical.
Anarchists and
syndicalists
. . . were
designated
henceforth as
nothing
but 'Anarcho-
Fascists' and
'Syndical-Fascists'.
As for
Trotskyists,
it
leaped
to the
eye
that
they
were
nothing
but
'Trotskyo-Fascists'.
The closer
any
of these
groupings
were, or seemed to
be, to the Communist
party,
the more
dangerous they
were to it, and the more
ruthlessly they
had to be
opposed,
denounced, and
destroyed.9
Although
the
Trotskyites
considered themselves 'defenders' of the Soviet
Union and the
champions
of its
original revolutionary
ideals,
they
were
denounced
by
the Communists as reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries - a
label that the
Trotskyites,
in turn,
gleefully pinned
on the Communists.
Any
Communist
party
member
suspected
of
sharing Trotsky's
views or
willing
to
discuss matters with the
Trotskyites (or,
at a later
point,
the
Maoists)
was
summarily expelled. Meetings
scheduled
by Trotskyites
were
violently
dis-
rupted by
Communist mobs 'armed with lead
pipes, blackjacks,
clubs, knives,
and similar
persuasive arguments'.l"
A similar fate befell numerous socialist
gatherings
in the course of this
perverse
Communist war on 'social fascism'.
Thus did the American Communists imitate and
acquiesce
in the factional
disputes
of their Soviet totalitarian
counterparts.
Their clashes with the
Trotskyites
and socialists
testify
not
only
to the
idolatry
with which
they
viewed the Soviet
leadership,
but also to their refusal to tolerate
dissenting
viewpoints
and their
eagerness
to crush all individuals and
groups
who
deviated from the
rigidly prescribed 'party
line'. Similar
responses
were
evident in the conduct of the
Trotskyites,
Maoists and other left revolutionar-
ies,
then and now.
Max Schactman, 'Radicalism in the Thirties: The
Trotskyist
View', in R. J. Simon, ed.. As
We Saw the Thirties
(Urbana: University
of Illinois Press.
1967)
pp. 1
2-13.
I' Schactman, 'Radicalism in the Thirties',
pp. 12-13.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS
Parallels between the left and the
right
can be discerned not
only
in the
comparisons
of
left-wing
and
right-wing regimes,
but in the behaviour of
extreme movements of the left and
right
that have arisen in the United States
and other free nations. Both the far
right
and the far left
(New
Left as well as
Old)
have
obviously
been marked
by
zeal,
hostility
to
prevailing
institutions
and
unyielding
intolerance towards ideas and beliefs
they
consider inimical.
Their
antagonism
is
typically
fierce not
only
towards
political
'enemies' but
even towards rival
groups
with similar but not identical
ideologies
and
objectives.
When
Stalin,
for
example, proclaimed
the
theory
of 'social
fascism',
which held that the socialist movement was
really
a front for
fascism,
American Communists
eagerly
embraced the doctrine and
proceeded
to
embellish it so as to
distinguish
themselves from the socialists whom
they
now
portrayed
as enemies and traitors. As Max Schactman, a former
Trotskyite
leader,
observed:
Everything
and
everybody
outside the Communist
party
was
designated
as a
variety
of
fascism ....
Left-wing
socialists,
especially
those with a
friendly
attitude toward the
Communists,
could not deceive them for a
minute;
they
were
left
'Social Fascists' who
tried to hide their aid to fascism under the
cunning pretense
of
being
radical.
Anarchists and
syndicalists
. . . were
designated
henceforth as
nothing
but 'Anarcho-
Fascists' and
'Syndical-Fascists'.
As for
Trotskyists,
it
leaped
to the
eye
that
they
were
nothing
but
'Trotskyo-Fascists'.
The closer
any
of these
groupings
were, or seemed to
be, to the Communist
party,
the more
dangerous they
were to it, and the more
ruthlessly they
had to be
opposed,
denounced, and
destroyed.9
Although
the
Trotskyites
considered themselves 'defenders' of the Soviet
Union and the
champions
of its
original revolutionary
ideals,
they
were
denounced
by
the Communists as reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries - a
label that the
Trotskyites,
in turn,
gleefully pinned
on the Communists.
Any
Communist
party
member
suspected
of
sharing Trotsky's
views or
willing
to
discuss matters with the
Trotskyites (or,
at a later
point,
the
Maoists)
was
summarily expelled. Meetings
scheduled
by Trotskyites
were
violently
dis-
rupted by
Communist mobs 'armed with lead
pipes, blackjacks,
clubs, knives,
and similar
persuasive arguments'.l"
A similar fate befell numerous socialist
gatherings
in the course of this
perverse
Communist war on 'social fascism'.
Thus did the American Communists imitate and
acquiesce
in the factional
disputes
of their Soviet totalitarian
counterparts.
Their clashes with the
Trotskyites
and socialists
testify
not
only
to the
idolatry
with which
they
viewed the Soviet
leadership,
but also to their refusal to tolerate
dissenting
viewpoints
and their
eagerness
to crush all individuals and
groups
who
deviated from the
rigidly prescribed 'party
line'. Similar
responses
were
evident in the conduct of the
Trotskyites,
Maoists and other left revolutionar-
ies,
then and now.
Max Schactman, 'Radicalism in the Thirties: The
Trotskyist
View', in R. J. Simon, ed.. As
We Saw the Thirties
(Urbana: University
of Illinois Press.
1967)
pp. 1
2-13.
I' Schactman, 'Radicalism in the Thirties',
pp. 12-13.
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
The virulence and intolerance exhibited towards each other
by
Stalinists,
Trotskyites
and Maoists are
legendary,
but
implacable
hatreds and
suspicions
towards
opponents,
critics and
competitors,
and even efforts to silence
them,
can also be detected
among
New Left militants and
right-wing
radicals.
Many
New Left
activists,
having
suffered setbacks in their
struggles against
racial
bigotry,
social
inequality,
and American involvement in
Vietnam,
and
frustrated in their efforts to transform or abolish
existing
institutions,
were
gradually
drawn into the
political
orbits of the old hard-core Marxist-Leninist
movements,
in which context
they increasingly
exhibited the anti-intellectual-
ism,
contempt
for
procedural rights
and
hostility
towards democratic avenues
of
change
that have
long
marked the Old Left."
Many
New Left radicals came to embrace the thesis of Herbert Marcuse
(a
hero of the New
Left)
that the liberation of American
society
necessitated the
suppression
of certain
points
of view considered
unacceptable.
2
A
policy
of
'repressive
tolerance'
required
the
silencing
of individuals and
groups
whose
opinions
on
important
social
questions
were,
from the
perspective
of radical
left
goals, egregious.
In
keeping
with these
views,
the New
Left,
like the more traditional
Marxist-Leninist movements and various movements on the
right,
took on an
increasingly
strident,
uncomprising,
and
repressive
tone toward
dissenting
viewpoints they
deemed to be incorrect or even immoral.'3 Hence
they
'persistently
shouted down or drowned out'
opposition speakers,
restricted
debate and
ejected opponents
from their own ranks.
They
'howled down'
dissent,
manipulated agendas
and credentials 'to eliminate "undesirable
elements"', and,
in imitation of the
organizational style
of the Old
Left,
suppressed
debate and smothered whatever remained of internal
democracy.'4
Nor should one overlook the
increasing
use of violence
against
external
enemies,
the fierce
protest
demonstrations, the
'trashings'
and
destruction of
property,
and, of course, the
growing
reliance all over the
world on terrorism as an
approved technique
of
political struggle.
Bomb-
ings, hijackings, kidnappings,
assassinations, robberies and random destruc-
tion,
once
regarded by revolutionary organizations
as ineffectual tactics of
political struggle,
have become
fairly
common in recent
decades,
and are
undertaken
by
militants on both the extreme left and the extreme
right.
Hofstadter's
description
of the
'paranoid style',
which he considered the
hallmark of
right-wing
radicals,
also
applies
in certain
key respects
to
left-wing
radicals, old-style
and new.15 In our
view,
both extremes are
characterized
by
a
tendency
to view
history
as the
product
of
malevolent,
"
Peter Clecak, Radical Paradoxes
(New
York:
Harper
and Row,
1973).
12
Herbert
Marcuse,
'Repressive
Tolerance', in R. P. Wolff et al., A
Critique of
Pure Tolerance
(Boston:
Beacon Press,
1969), pp. 81-123.
13
Nigel Young,
An
Infantile
Disorder? The Crisis and Decline
of
the New
Left (Boulder,
Colo:
Westview Press,
I977),
p.
341.
14
Young,
An
Infantile
Disorder?, p. 342.
1
Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style
in American Politics and Other
Essays (Chicago:
University
of
Chicago Press, 1964).
The virulence and intolerance exhibited towards each other
by
Stalinists,
Trotskyites
and Maoists are
legendary,
but
implacable
hatreds and
suspicions
towards
opponents,
critics and
competitors,
and even efforts to silence
them,
can also be detected
among
New Left militants and
right-wing
radicals.
Many
New Left
activists,
having
suffered setbacks in their
struggles against
racial
bigotry,
social
inequality,
and American involvement in
Vietnam,
and
frustrated in their efforts to transform or abolish
existing
institutions,
were
gradually
drawn into the
political
orbits of the old hard-core Marxist-Leninist
movements,
in which context
they increasingly
exhibited the anti-intellectual-
ism,
contempt
for
procedural rights
and
hostility
towards democratic avenues
of
change
that have
long
marked the Old Left."
Many
New Left radicals came to embrace the thesis of Herbert Marcuse
(a
hero of the New
Left)
that the liberation of American
society
necessitated the
suppression
of certain
points
of view considered
unacceptable.
2
A
policy
of
'repressive
tolerance'
required
the
silencing
of individuals and
groups
whose
opinions
on
important
social
questions
were,
from the
perspective
of radical
left
goals, egregious.
In
keeping
with these
views,
the New
Left,
like the more traditional
Marxist-Leninist movements and various movements on the
right,
took on an
increasingly
strident,
uncomprising,
and
repressive
tone toward
dissenting
viewpoints they
deemed to be incorrect or even immoral.'3 Hence
they
'persistently
shouted down or drowned out'
opposition speakers,
restricted
debate and
ejected opponents
from their own ranks.
They
'howled down'
dissent,
manipulated agendas
and credentials 'to eliminate "undesirable
elements"', and,
in imitation of the
organizational style
of the Old
Left,
suppressed
debate and smothered whatever remained of internal
democracy.'4
Nor should one overlook the
increasing
use of violence
against
external
enemies,
the fierce
protest
demonstrations, the
'trashings'
and
destruction of
property,
and, of course, the
growing
reliance all over the
world on terrorism as an
approved technique
of
political struggle.
Bomb-
ings, hijackings, kidnappings,
assassinations, robberies and random destruc-
tion,
once
regarded by revolutionary organizations
as ineffectual tactics of
political struggle,
have become
fairly
common in recent
decades,
and are
undertaken
by
militants on both the extreme left and the extreme
right.
Hofstadter's
description
of the
'paranoid style',
which he considered the
hallmark of
right-wing
radicals,
also
applies
in certain
key respects
to
left-wing
radicals, old-style
and new.15 In our
view,
both extremes are
characterized
by
a
tendency
to view
history
as the
product
of
malevolent,
"
Peter Clecak, Radical Paradoxes
(New
York:
Harper
and Row,
1973).
12
Herbert
Marcuse,
'Repressive
Tolerance', in R. P. Wolff et al., A
Critique of
Pure Tolerance
(Boston:
Beacon Press,
1969), pp. 81-123.
13
Nigel Young,
An
Infantile
Disorder? The Crisis and Decline
of
the New
Left (Boulder,
Colo:
Westview Press,
I977),
p.
341.
14
Young,
An
Infantile
Disorder?, p. 342.
1
Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style
in American Politics and Other
Essays (Chicago:
University
of
Chicago Press, 1964).
333 333
334
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
334
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
conspiratorial
forces.
Though
from different
perspectives, they
both see
America as
being
at the
mercy
of a
rising
tide of moral and
spiritual
debauchery.
Both tend to
vilify
the
enemy
as 'a kind of amoral
superman:
sinister,
ubiquitous, powerful,
cruel, sensual,
luxury-loving';
both hold a
Manichean and militant
conception
of
politics
as a
struggle
of 'whole
worlds,
whole
political
orders,
whole
systems
of human
values';16
and both
express
an
apocalyptic
sense of
urgency
about the need to act
quickly
and
decisively
to
halt the slide of a
society growing increasingly degenerate.
THE RIGHT-WING BIAS OF THE F SCALE
In
assessing
the failure of the research
findings
on
right-wing
and
left-wing
supporters
to exhibit similarities in their attitudes towards
democracy,
one
should also
keep
in mind the obvious
inappropriateness
of the F scale
(by
far
the most
frequently
used measure of
authoritarianism)
as an instrument for
identifying
the authoritarians of the left. Not
only
was the scale
primarily
designed
(as
Levinson
points out)
to select
right-wing
authoritarians,
but the
contents of the items
employed
in the scale
unmistakably
reflect or refer to
opinions,
social
outlooks,
or
target groups
to which the
right
is
prone
to
respond approvingly
and the left
disapprovingly.
Consider,
for
example,
such
items as the
following:
The businessman and the manufacturer are much more
important
to
society
than the artist and the
professor.
Every person
should have
complete
faith in some
supernatural power
whose
decisions he
obeys
without
question.
Young people
sometimes
get
rebellious
ideas,
but as
they grow up they ought
to
get
over them and settle down.
Sex
crimes,
such as
rape
and attacks on
children,
deserve more than mere
imprisonment;
such criminals
ought
to be
publicly whipped,
or worse.
There is
hardly anything
lower than a
person
who does not feel a
great
love,
gratitude
and
respect
for his
parents.
Homosexuals are
hardly
better than criminals and
ought
to be
severely
punished.
While
supporters
of the left will in some cases subscribe to items of this
type,
it is
plain
that these and certain other items in the F scale will
appeal
far
more
strongly
to
right-wing
than to
left-wing sympathizers.
The
measure,
to
be
sure,
does contain a few items that
might appeal
to the left as well as the
right,
but the
scale,
taken as a
whole,
is
sharply
slanted towards
opinions
and
values cherished
by
the
right
and
rejected,
for the most
part, by
the left.
Hence,
a research
finding showing
that the
right
scores
high
on the F scale and
that the left scores low demonstrates little if
anything
about the autoritarian-
ism of the left.
conspiratorial
forces.
Though
from different
perspectives, they
both see
America as
being
at the
mercy
of a
rising
tide of moral and
spiritual
debauchery.
Both tend to
vilify
the
enemy
as 'a kind of amoral
superman:
sinister,
ubiquitous, powerful,
cruel, sensual,
luxury-loving';
both hold a
Manichean and militant
conception
of
politics
as a
struggle
of 'whole
worlds,
whole
political
orders,
whole
systems
of human
values';16
and both
express
an
apocalyptic
sense of
urgency
about the need to act
quickly
and
decisively
to
halt the slide of a
society growing increasingly degenerate.
THE RIGHT-WING BIAS OF THE F SCALE
In
assessing
the failure of the research
findings
on
right-wing
and
left-wing
supporters
to exhibit similarities in their attitudes towards
democracy,
one
should also
keep
in mind the obvious
inappropriateness
of the F scale
(by
far
the most
frequently
used measure of
authoritarianism)
as an instrument for
identifying
the authoritarians of the left. Not
only
was the scale
primarily
designed
(as
Levinson
points out)
to select
right-wing
authoritarians,
but the
contents of the items
employed
in the scale
unmistakably
reflect or refer to
opinions,
social
outlooks,
or
target groups
to which the
right
is
prone
to
respond approvingly
and the left
disapprovingly.
Consider,
for
example,
such
items as the
following:
The businessman and the manufacturer are much more
important
to
society
than the artist and the
professor.
Every person
should have
complete
faith in some
supernatural power
whose
decisions he
obeys
without
question.
Young people
sometimes
get
rebellious
ideas,
but as
they grow up they ought
to
get
over them and settle down.
Sex
crimes,
such as
rape
and attacks on
children,
imprisonment;
such criminals
ought
to be
publicly whipped,
or worse.
There is
hardly anything
lower than a
person
who does not feel a
great
love,
gratitude
and
respect
for his
parents.
Homosexuals are
hardly
better than criminals and
ought
to be
severely
punished.
While
supporters
of the left will in some cases subscribe to items of this
type,
it is
plain
that these and certain other items in the F scale will
appeal
far
more
strongly
to
right-wing
than to
left-wing sympathizers.
The
measure,
to
be
sure,
does contain a few items that
might appeal
to the left as well as the
right,
but the
scale,
taken as a
whole,
is
sharply
slanted towards
opinions
and
values cherished
by
the
right
and
rejected,
for the most
part, by
the left.
Hence,
a research
finding showing
that the
right
scores
high
on the F scale and
that the left scores low demonstrates little if
anything
about the autoritarian-
ism of the left.
16
Hofstadter,
The Paranoid
Style
in American Politics, pp. 3I-2, 29.
16
Hofstadter,
The Paranoid
Style
in American Politics, pp. 3I-2, 29.
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
COMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM SAMPLING BIAS
Comparisons
of the left and
right
are further
complicated by sampling
bias. A
major- difficulty
here is that the
supporters
of the left - and
especially
the
hard-core left - almost
invariably
resist efforts to entice them to
participate
in
survey inquiries
that
probe
into their
opinions,
attitudes, motivations,
affiliations or activities. Our own efforts over the
years
to
persuade left-wing
militants to
co-operate
in the
surveys
we have conducted have
largely proved
fruitless - an outcome
which,
to
judge
from the
samples
discussed in the
published
research
literature,
has been
shared,
with
perhaps
a few
possible
exceptions, by
almost all other
investigators doing survey
research on far-left
radicals. 17
Thus,
of the American
left-wing respondents typically surveyed (or
other-
wise
interviewed) by
research
investigators,
few are hard-core revolutionaries
in the classical mould.
Nearly
all are
college-educated, young (mainly
students,
in
fact),
more intellectual than
most, secular,
cosmopolitan
in
orientation,
recently
recruited and
(very likely)
transient radicals who
because of their location in the social structure have been
repeatedly exposed
to the norms of the
prevailing
liberal democratic
political
culture - norms that
they
are bound to have absorbed to some extent and still retain to some
degree.
In their social characteristics and their relation to the
existing political
culture,
they
differ in
important ways
from the
respondents
who turn
up
in
most
surveys
of the radical
right
- the latter
being,
on
average,
less
educated,
older,
more
rural,
more
parochial,
more
religious
and less intellectual. Most
left-wing survey respondents
also differ from the hard-core revolutionaries of
the left in that the latter are
likely
to be older, no
longer students, engaged
in
political organizational
work of some
type,
radicals of
long standing
and
deeply
immersed in a Marxist-Leninist
(or
other
revolutionary)
subculture
that is
profoundly antagonistic
towards American mainstream values.
In
short, the
left-wing samples
whose
responses
are
reported
in most of the
17
There have been,
of course, some excellent studies of such radical
organizations
as the
American Communist
party
that draw
primarily
on historical and
documentary materials, along,
perhaps,
with the selective
interviewing
of certain individuals
(often,
former
members).
While
these studies are able to
provide significant insights
into the activities, social
composition,
leadership, tactics,
and historical
development
of certain radical movements, they
do not
sample
the
responses
of the
membership
as such and do not make it
possible,
for
example,
to
compare
systematically
the beliefs and values of
supporters
of the far left with those on the far
right.
Examples
of such studies include Theodore
Draper,
The Roots
of
American Communism (New
York:
Viking Press,
1957),
and American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York:
Viking
Press, 1960);
Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis
of
American Communism (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and
World, 196I); Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: The Social
Background
of
the Ameri-
can
Party
Elite
(Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1978),
and The
Heyday
of
American
Communism
(New
York: Basic Books, 1984);
and
Philip Selznick, Organizational Weapons:
A
Study of
Bolshevik
Strategy
and Tactics (New York:
McGraw-Hill,
1952).
Noteworthy
studies
that involve some measure of
interviewing party
members (or former
party members) are Gabriel
Almond, The
Appeals of
Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press,
1954),
and
Morris Ernst and David Loth, Report
on the American Communist (New York:
Henry Holt,
1952).
COMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM SAMPLING BIAS
Comparisons
of the left and
right
are further
complicated by sampling
bias. A
major- difficulty
here is that the
supporters
of the left - and
especially
the
hard-core left - almost
invariably
resist efforts to entice them to
participate
in
survey inquiries
that
probe
into their
opinions,
attitudes, motivations,
affiliations or activities. Our own efforts over the
years
to
persuade left-wing
militants to
co-operate
in the
surveys
we have conducted have
largely proved
fruitless - an outcome
which,
to
judge
from the
samples
discussed in the
published
research
literature,
has been
shared,
with
perhaps
a few
possible
exceptions, by
almost all other
investigators doing survey
research on far-left
radicals. 17
Thus,
of the American
left-wing respondents typically surveyed (or
other-
wise
interviewed) by
research
investigators,
few are hard-core revolutionaries
in the classical mould.
Nearly
all are
college-educated, young (mainly
students,
in
fact),
more intellectual than
most, secular,
cosmopolitan
in
orientation,
recently
recruited and
(very likely)
transient radicals who
because of their location in the social structure have been
repeatedly exposed
to the norms of the
prevailing
liberal democratic
political
culture - norms that
they
are bound to have absorbed to some extent and still retain to some
degree.
In their social characteristics and their relation to the
existing political
culture,
they
differ in
important ways
from the
respondents
who turn
up
in
most
surveys
of the radical
right
- the latter
being,
on
average,
less
educated,
older,
more
rural,
more
parochial,
more
religious
and less intellectual. Most
left-wing survey respondents
also differ from the hard-core revolutionaries of
the left in that the latter are
likely
to be older, no
longer students, engaged
in
political organizational
work of some
type,
radicals of
long standing
and
deeply
immersed in a Marxist-Leninist
(or
other
revolutionary)
subculture
that is
towards American mainstream values.
In
short, the
left-wing samples
whose
responses
are
reported
in most of the
17
There have been,
of course, some excellent studies of such radical
organizations
as the
American Communist
party
that draw
primarily
on historical and
documentary materials, along,
perhaps,
with the selective
interviewing
of certain individuals
(often,
former
members).
While
these studies are able to
provide significant insights
into the activities, social
composition,
leadership, tactics,
and historical
development
of certain radical movements, they
do not
sample
the
responses
of the
membership
as such and do not make it
possible,
for
example,
to
compare
systematically
the beliefs and values of
supporters
of the far left with those on the far
right.
Examples
of such studies include Theodore
Draper,
The Roots
of
American Communism (New
York:
Viking Press,
1957),
and American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York:
Viking
Press, 1960);
Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis
of
American Communism (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and
World, 196I); Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: The Social
Background
of
the Ameri-
can
Party
Elite
(Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1978),
and The
Heyday
of
American
Communism
(New
York: Basic Books, 1984);
and
Philip Selznick, Organizational Weapons:
A
Study of
Bolshevik
Strategy
and Tactics (New York:
McGraw-Hill,
1952).
Noteworthy
studies
that involve some measure of
interviewing party
members (or former
party members) are Gabriel
Almond, The
Appeals of
Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press,
1954),
and
Morris Ernst and David Loth, Report
on the American Communist (New York:
Henry Holt,
1952).
335 335
336
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
336
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
available research cannot be assumed to be
truly representative
of the
hard-core
revolutionary
left,
a circumstance that makes the
reported
com-
parisons
between the radical left and radical
right
less
revealing
than
they
might
otherwise be. Given what one can
intuitively
observe about the conduct
of hard-core
revolutionary
activists
(whether
members of the Old Left or New
Left),
one can
only
assume that
surveys
of a more
representative sample
of
such
left-wing
militants would reveal
that,
in their attitudes towards demo-
cracy
and
authoritarianism,
they
resemble the radical
right
more
closely
than
the available research has so far shown.
THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN LEFT AS A PERSECUTED MINORITY
One should
keep
in mind also that the
portrait
of the radical left that
emerges
from a
survey
of its American
supporters
is
strongly
coloured
by
the
way they
see themselves in relation to the
political system.
As an ineffectual revolution-
ary
sect
functioning
in a
society
that is
largely
hostile to its values and
activities,
the far left in the United States views itself as a
beleaguered,
persecuted minority,
as the actual or
potential
victims of
surveillance,
censorship
and
repression.
Unlike their left
revolutionary
confederates who
have seized
power
in other
countries,
and who retain it
through ideological
manipulation,
bureaucratic controls and
crushing
reliance on
force,
American
radicals are outsiders and deviants - victims
(in
their own
eyes),
rather than
persecutors,
the
targets
rather than the
perpetrators
of
repression.
This view
of themselves as an
oppressed political minority naturally
inclines them to
express greater support'
than
they
otherwise
might
for the
rights
of
speech,
assembly, publication
and due
process, especially
when these
rights
are
perceived
as
affecting
the treatment of
left-wing
radicals and the
groups
with
which
they identify.
As a deviant and
beleaguered minority, they
become
defenders of
nonconformity,
critics of
'police brutality',
and
champions
of
free elections and the
rights
of
opposition parties.
Since one has reason to
believe that radical
support
for these and other democratic stands is
largely
self-serving,
motivated
by
the
particular
circumstances in which
they
function
(their revolutionary
allies
abroad,
after
all,
overwhelmingly reject
these
democratic stands when
they
are in
power), any
assessment of what American
left-wing
radicals
'really'
believe about democratic
rights
or authoritarian rule
cannot be
reliably
inferred from their
public
statements on human
rights.
Such differences as one
might
encounter in
comparing
the views of the far left
and the far
right
with
respect
to,
say,
authoritarianism and civil
liberties,
are
doubtless,
to some
extent,
spurious,
the
products
of social location
and
political expediency
rather than
principle
or intellectual and moral
conviction.
HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
We cannot claim in the
present study
to have overcome all of the difficulties
involved in
comparing
the motivations and beliefs of the far left and far
right.
available research cannot be assumed to be
truly representative
of the
hard-core
revolutionary
left,
a circumstance that makes the
reported
com-
parisons
between the radical left and radical
right
less
revealing
than
they
might
otherwise be. Given what one can
intuitively
observe about the conduct
of hard-core
revolutionary
activists
(whether
members of the Old Left or New
Left),
one can
only
assume that
surveys
of a more
representative sample
of
such
left-wing
militants would reveal
that,
in their attitudes towards demo-
cracy
and
authoritarianism,
they
resemble the radical
right
more
closely
than
the available research has so far shown.
THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN LEFT AS A PERSECUTED MINORITY
One should
keep
in mind also that the
portrait
of the radical left that
emerges
from a
survey
of its American
supporters
is
strongly
coloured
by
the
way they
see themselves in relation to the
political system.
As an ineffectual revolution-
ary
sect
functioning
in a
society
that is
largely
hostile to its values and
activities,
the far left in the United States views itself as a
beleaguered,
persecuted minority,
as the actual or
potential
victims of
surveillance,
censorship
and
repression.
Unlike their left
revolutionary
confederates who
have seized
power
in other
countries,
and who retain it
through ideological
manipulation,
bureaucratic controls and
crushing
reliance on
force,
American
radicals are outsiders and deviants - victims
(in
their own
eyes),
rather than
persecutors,
the
targets
rather than the
perpetrators
of
repression.
This view
of themselves as an
oppressed political minority naturally
inclines them to
express greater support'
than
they
otherwise
might
for the
rights
of
speech,
assembly, publication
and due
process, especially
when these
rights
are
perceived
as
affecting
the treatment of
left-wing
radicals and the
groups
with
which
they identify.
As a deviant and
beleaguered minority, they
become
defenders of
nonconformity,
critics of
'police brutality',
and
champions
of
free elections and the
rights
of
opposition parties.
Since one has reason to
believe that radical
support
for these and other democratic stands is
largely
self-serving,
motivated
by
the
particular
circumstances in which
they
function
(their revolutionary
allies
abroad,
after
all,
overwhelmingly reject
these
democratic stands when
they
are in
power), any
assessment of what American
left-wing
radicals
'really'
believe about democratic
rights
or authoritarian rule
cannot be
reliably
inferred from their
public
statements on human
rights.
Such differences as one
might
encounter in
comparing
the views of the far left
and the far
right
with
respect
to,
say,
authoritarianism and civil
liberties,
are
doubtless,
to some
extent,
spurious,
the
products
of social location
and
political expediency
rather than
principle
or intellectual and moral
conviction.
HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
We cannot claim in the
present study
to have overcome all of the difficulties
involved in
comparing
the motivations and beliefs of the far left and far
right.
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
For
example, although
we have
managed
to collect excellent
samples
of
right-wing
activists,
we have not been able to enlist the
co-operation
of
hard-core
left-wing organizations
and their members in our
surveys,
and our
left-wing sympathizers' samples
are therefore less
'pure'
and less militant than
we would like.
Nevertheless,
we have been able to
identify
in each of several
of our national
samples
a small number of individuals
who,
by
their embrace
of various
left-wing
beliefs and values and their
rejection
of
right-wing
beliefs
and values
(as
shown
by
their scores on
carefully
devised far-left and
far-right
scales),
can be classified with some confidence as
sympathetic
to the far left.
Their
responses
to various issue and attitude
questions
also
correspond
to
what we know from
experience
and intuitive observation about
left-wing
beliefs on those
questions. (A
similar
procedure, appropriately adjusted,
was
used to select
samples
of the far
right.)
Other
respondents
can be
(and
have
been)
classified as
'moderates', i.e.,
respondents
who
reject
the views of both
the left and the
right,
and thus score 'low' on both the far-left and
far-right
scales.
Samples reflecting
each of these
ideological
tendencies have been
drawn from our
Opinions
and Values
survey (OVS I976-77),
our Civil
Liberties
survey (CLS 1978-79),
and our earlier
survey
of Political Affiliation
and Belief
(PAB I958).18
For reasons
already
stated,
we
expected
to find that far-left and
far-right
radicals,
if
properly
screened and selected
through appropriate procedures,
would resemble each other in a number of
important ways having
to do with
radical
zeal, tactics,
political style,
and
political
and
psychological
inflexibil-
ity.
We further
expected
them to exhibit distrust of democratic institutions
and
practices
and other
key aspects
of American
society;
to
express
reluct-
ance to
grant
civil liberties to critics and
opponents;
and to
display
intolerance
towards individuals and
groups
whose views conflict with their own. We also
anticipated,
however, that,
in the United States at
least,
the two extremes
would
diverge
on a number of
ideological
or
programmatic
values that
generally
divide liberals from
conservatives,
including egalitarianism,
religion,
chauvinism, ethnocentrism, tradition,
law and
order,
and free
enterprise capitalism.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-LEFT SCALES
The far-left scales
employed
in the
present study
were
designed
to locate
'hard-core'
left-wing
radicals whose beliefs
comport
with those held
by
the
"' The Civil Liberties
study employed
a national cross-section
sample
of
1,993
adult Americans
and
I,891 community
leaders drawn from various vocations. The OVS
study employed
a national
cross-section of
938 respondents
and a number of additional
samples
of
opinion
leaders drawn
from
twenty-three
national
organizations,
most of them
strongly ideological
and active in
public
affairs. The PAB
study
utilized a national cross-section
sample
of
1,484
adults and
3,020 political
leaders who served as
delegates
to the
1956
Democratic and
Republican
conventions. For a fuller
description
of the studies,
see Herbert
McClosky
and Alida Brill, Dimensions
of
Tolerance: What
Americans Believe About Civil Liberties
(New
York: Basic Books, Russell
Sage
Foundation,
1983), pp. 25-31, 467-73.
For
example, although
we have
managed
to collect excellent
samples
of
right-wing
activists,
we have not been able to enlist the
co-operation
of
hard-core
left-wing organizations
and their members in our
surveys,
and our
left-wing sympathizers' samples
are therefore less
'pure'
and less militant than
we would like.
Nevertheless,
we have been able to
identify
in each of several
of our national
samples
a small number of individuals
who,
by
their embrace
of various
left-wing
beliefs and values and their
rejection
of
right-wing
beliefs
and values
(as
shown
by
their scores on
carefully
devised far-left and
far-right
scales),
can be classified with some confidence as
sympathetic
to the far left.
Their
responses
to various issue and attitude
questions
also
correspond
to
what we know from
experience
and intuitive observation about
left-wing
beliefs on those
questions. (A
similar
procedure, appropriately adjusted,
was
used to select
samples
of the far
right.)
Other
respondents
can be
(and
have
been)
classified as
'moderates', i.e.,
respondents
who
reject
the views of both
the left and the
right,
and thus score 'low' on both the far-left and
far-right
scales.
Samples reflecting
each of these
ideological
tendencies have been
drawn from our
Opinions
and Values
survey (OVS I976-77),
our Civil
Liberties
survey (CLS 1978-79),
and our earlier
survey
of Political Affiliation
and Belief
(PAB I958).18
For reasons
already
stated,
we
expected
to find that far-left and
far-right
radicals,
if
properly
screened and selected
through appropriate procedures,
would resemble each other in a number of
important ways having
to do with
radical
zeal, tactics,
political style,
and
political
and
psychological
inflexibil-
ity.
We further
expected
them to exhibit distrust of democratic institutions
and
practices
and other
key aspects
of American
society;
to
express
reluct-
ance to
grant
civil liberties to critics and
opponents;
and to
display
intolerance
towards individuals and
groups
whose views conflict with their own. We also
anticipated,
however, that,
in the United States at
least,
the two extremes
would
diverge
on a number of
ideological
or
programmatic
values that
generally
divide liberals from
conservatives,
including egalitarianism,
religion,
chauvinism, ethnocentrism, tradition,
law and
order,
and free
enterprise capitalism.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-LEFT SCALES
The far-left scales
employed
in the
present study
were
designed
to locate
'hard-core'
left-wing
radicals whose beliefs
comport
with those held
by
the
"' The Civil Liberties
study employed
a national cross-section
sample
of
1,993
adult Americans
and
I,891 community
leaders drawn from various vocations. The OVS
study employed
a national
cross-section of
938 respondents
and a number of additional
samples
of
opinion
leaders drawn
from
twenty-three
national
organizations,
most of them
strongly ideological
and active in
public
affairs. The PAB
study
utilized a national cross-section
sample
of
1,484
adults and
3,020 political
leaders who served as
delegates
to the
1956
Democratic and
Republican
conventions. For a fuller
description
of the studies,
see Herbert
McClosky
and Alida Brill, Dimensions
of
Tolerance: What
Americans Believe About Civil Liberties
(New
York: Basic Books, Russell
Sage
Foundation,
1983), pp. 25-31, 467-73.
337 337
338
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
338
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
more militant revolutionaries of the
past
few decades. For
example,
the items
in the
left-wing
scale of the OVS
survey express many
of the standard radical
perspectives
on American
society, including
the belief that unconventional or
illegal
methods are
necessary
to
put
the
country
on the
right
course;
that the
United States stands to benefit from the
example provided by
Communist
nations;
that the American form of
government
is 'one of the worst' and is
'rotten to the
core';
that the United States has
systematically pursued
a
policy
of
imperialism
and world domination in the
past quarter century;
that
individual terrorist or
guerrilla
acts 'are often the
only way
an
oppressed
group
can win its
rights';
that the best
way
to solve this
country's problems
'is
to overturn the whole
society
from
top
to
bottom';
and that violence will
probably
be needed to
change
the
system.19
These are
strong
statements,
obviously
extreme in the context of American
political
discourse,
as evidenced
by
the
tiny proportions
of
respondents
in our
various elite and mass
samples
who endorse the radical alternative included in
each of the items. In the
present paper,
we have focused
only
on
respondents
from the elite
samples
in
OVS,
since these
samples
contain the most
ideologically
intense and
politically
active individuals. Our
purpose
here was
to
compare
in the most
meaningful way
available to us the far
left,
the far
right
and the
political
moderates. This was
accomplished by including
in the
far-left
group
all
respondents
who selected a radical
response
on at least
eight
of the fourteen far-left scale items.
Although
it resulted in a smaller
sample
than we
desired,
we chose a
relatively high
cut-off
point
in order to ensure
that we had identified
respondents
who
actually
endorsed
significant aspects
of radical left
ideology
and who therefore were not
simply 'relatively'
left
within the context of the
larger sample.2"
Our concern to obtain
'pure' samples had, however, to
give way
to a
measure of
expediency
when we selected a far-left
group
out of the Civil
Liberties
survey.
While the far-left scale from the Civil Liberties
survey
includes some of the same items that are in the far-left scale of the
Opinions
and Values
survey,
it also contains several items that are less extreme in their
radicalism.
Furthermore,
in order to
acquire
a sufficient number of cases for
analysis,
we included in the far-left
sample
of the CLS all
respondents
who
19
For a full list of items in the far-left scale, see
Appendix
I.
201
It should be noted that all of the far-left
respondents
in the OVS and Civil Liberties
surveys
scored 'low' on the
far-right scale; similarly,
all of the
far-right respondents
in these two studies
scored 'low' on the far-left scale. In the PAB
study,
there were a small number of
respondents
who scored
'high'
on both the far-left and
far-right
scales. We have eliminated such
respondents
by selecting
out for
purposes
of
analysis only
those extreme believers who scored
high
on one of
the radicalism scales and low on the other. The reason for this was to screen out
respondents
whose careless response
tendencies led them to answer not
only inconsistently
but
chaotically.
While there is, of course, a
degree
of
overlap
between the left and the
right
in certain of their
values,
attitudes and tactical
perspectives,
we concluded, after
inspection,
that
scoring high
on
both scales was less a measure of a
meaningful ideological
statement than a
sign
of carelessness
and even mindlessness in
response style. Hence we chose,
though
with some
misgivings,
to
exclude those
respondents
from the
analysis.
more militant revolutionaries of the
past
few decades. For
example,
the items
in the
left-wing
scale of the OVS
survey express many
of the standard radical
perspectives
on American
society, including
the belief that unconventional or
illegal
methods are
necessary
to
put
the
country
on the
right
course;
that the
United States stands to benefit from the
example provided by
Communist
nations;
that the American form of
government
is 'one of the worst' and is
'rotten to the
core';
that the United States has
systematically pursued
a
policy
of
imperialism
and world domination in the
past quarter century;
that
individual terrorist or
guerrilla
acts 'are often the
only way
an
oppressed
group
can win its
rights';
that the best
way
to solve this
country's problems
'is
to overturn the whole
society
from
top
to
bottom';
and that violence will
probably
be needed to
change
the
system.19
These are
strong
statements,
obviously
extreme in the context of American
political
discourse,
as evidenced
by
the
tiny proportions
of
respondents
in our
various elite and mass
samples
who endorse the radical alternative included in
each of the items. In the
present paper,
we have focused
only
on
respondents
from the elite
samples
in
OVS,
since these
samples
contain the most
ideologically
intense and
politically
active individuals. Our
purpose
here was
to
compare
in the most
meaningful way
available to us the far
left,
the far
right
and the
political
moderates. This was
accomplished by including
in the
far-left
group
all
respondents
who selected a radical
response
on at least
eight
of the fourteen far-left scale items.
Although
it resulted in a smaller
sample
than we
desired,
we chose a
relatively high
cut-off
point
in order to ensure
that we had identified
respondents
who
actually
endorsed
significant aspects
of radical left
ideology
and who therefore were not
simply 'relatively'
left
within the context of the
larger sample.2"
Our concern to obtain
'pure' samples had, however, to
give way
to a
measure of
expediency
when we selected a far-left
group
out of the Civil
Liberties
survey.
While the far-left scale from the Civil Liberties
survey
includes some of the same items that are in the far-left scale of the
Opinions
and Values
survey,
it also contains several items that are less extreme in their
radicalism.
Furthermore,
in order to
acquire
a sufficient number of cases for
analysis,
we included in the far-left
sample
of the CLS all
respondents
who
19
For a full list of items in the far-left scale, see
Appendix
I.
201
It should be noted that all of the far-left
respondents
in the OVS and Civil Liberties
surveys
scored 'low' on the
far-right scale; similarly,
all of the
far-right respondents
in these two studies
scored 'low' on the far-left scale. In the PAB
study,
there were a small number of
respondents
who scored
'high'
on both the far-left and
far-right
scales. We have eliminated such
respondents
by selecting
out for
purposes
of
analysis only
those extreme believers who scored
high
on one of
the radicalism scales and low on the other. The reason for this was to screen out
respondents
whose careless response
tendencies led them to answer not
only inconsistently
but
chaotically.
While there is, of course, a
degree
of
overlap
between the left and the
right
in certain of their
values,
attitudes and tactical
perspectives,
we concluded, after
inspection,
that
scoring high
on
both scales was less a measure of a
meaningful ideological
statement than a
sign
of carelessness
and even mindlessness in
response style. Hence we chose,
though
with some
misgivings,
to
exclude those
respondents
from the
analysis.
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
chose the radical
response
to
only
six or more of the fourteen far-left items. In
addition,
the far-left
respondents
in the CLS were drawn from the
general
population sample,
in contrast to the
highly participant,
elite
respondents
in
the
OVS,
who are
actively
involved in
political advocacy
and
public
affairs
and
who,
from all available evidence,
are inclined to embrace
political
ideas
more
intensely
and to find
ideological
issues more salient than do
respondents
in the
general population.
Hence,
we have reason to believe that the far-left
sample
in the CLS is less
intensely
radical and militant than the far-left
sample
in the OVS
study.
These differences in the nature of the
samples
in the two
surveys
should be
kept
in mind when
interpreting
the data to be
presented
shortly,
since,
as a
result,
the
degree
of
similarity
between
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals will
usually
be smaller in the Civil Liberties
survey
than in
the OVS. Likewise, the contrast between the far-left
respondents
and the
moderates in the Civil Liberties
survey
will also be reduced.
The ten items chosen for the far-left scale in the Political Affiliation and
Belief
survey closely
resembled in content the items
employed
in OVS.
They
differ in
format, however,
in that the PAB items are in the
agree-disagree
form while the OVS
(and CLS)
items are of the
sentence-completion/forced-
choice
type (see Appendix I).
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-RIGHT SCALES
Like the far-left scales, the OVS
far-right
scales are
designed
to select out
right-wing
radicals
among
our
samples
of
opinion
leaders and
activists, while
the CLS version serves the
purpose
of
identifying sympathizers
of the radical
right
in the
general population.
The OVS
far-right
scale consists of fourteen items which reflect
many
of the
standard views associated with the radical
right, including
such beliefs as the
following:21
Communism is so evil that we should
go
to
any length
to
destroy
it.
The United States was meant to be a Christian nation.
Any
American who shows
disrespect
for the
flag
should be turned over to
patriots
to
be
taught
a lesson.
An American who doesn't believe that this is the best
country
in the world doesn't
deserve to live here.
Most
campus protests
and anti-war demonstrations . . . are
secretly organized by
foreign agents.
War is
cruel,
but it does teach
people something
about
honor,
loyalty,
and
courage.
As these
examples suggest,
the items we
designed
for the
far-right
scale
were
strongly
flavoured and somewhat
provocative
in
tone,
on the
assump-
tion that traditional conservatives but not
right-wing
radicals
might
be
deterred from
endorsing
them.
Presumably, although
conservatives share
many
of the same values as the radical
right
(as our data
show), they
will be
less
likely
to
approve
of statements that
are,
so to
speak, 'beyond
the
pale'.
21
For the full list of scale items, see
Appendix
II.
chose the radical
response
to
only
six or more of the fourteen far-left items. In
addition,
the far-left
respondents
in the CLS were drawn from the
general
population sample,
in contrast to the
highly participant,
elite
respondents
in
the
OVS,
who are
actively
involved in
political advocacy
and
public
affairs
and
who,
from all available evidence,
are inclined to embrace
political
ideas
more
intensely
and to find
ideological
issues more salient than do
respondents
in the
general population.
Hence,
we have reason to believe that the far-left
sample
in the CLS is less
intensely
radical and militant than the far-left
sample
in the OVS
study.
These differences in the nature of the
samples
in the two
surveys
should be
kept
in mind when
interpreting
the data to be
presented
shortly,
since,
as a
result,
the
degree
of
similarity
between
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals will
usually
be smaller in the Civil Liberties
survey
than in
the OVS. Likewise, the contrast between the far-left
respondents
and the
moderates in the Civil Liberties
survey
will also be reduced.
The ten items chosen for the far-left scale in the Political Affiliation and
Belief
survey closely
resembled in content the items
employed
in OVS.
They
differ in
format, however,
in that the PAB items are in the
agree-disagree
form while the OVS
(and CLS)
items are of the
sentence-completion/forced-
choice
type (see Appendix I).
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAR-RIGHT SCALES
Like the far-left scales, the OVS
far-right
scales are
designed
to select out
right-wing
radicals
among
our
samples
of
opinion
leaders and
activists, while
the CLS version serves the
purpose
of
identifying sympathizers
of the radical
right
in the
general population.
The OVS
far-right
scale consists of fourteen items which reflect
many
of the
standard views associated with the radical
right, including
such beliefs as the
following:21
Communism is so evil that we should
go
to
any length
to
destroy
it.
The United States was meant to be a Christian nation.
Any
American who shows
disrespect
for the
flag
patriots
to
be
taught
a lesson.
country
in the world doesn't
deserve to live here.
Most
campus protests
and anti-war demonstrations . . . are
secretly organized by
foreign agents.
War is
cruel,
but it does teach
people something
about
honor,
loyalty,
and
courage.
As these
examples suggest,
the items we
designed
for the
far-right
scale
were
strongly
flavoured and somewhat
provocative
in
tone,
on the
assump-
tion that traditional conservatives but not
right-wing
radicals
might
be
deterred from
endorsing
them.
Presumably, although
conservatives share
many
of the same values as the radical
right
(as our data
show), they
will be
less
likely
to
approve
of statements that
are,
so to
speak, 'beyond
the
pale'.
21
For the full list of scale items, see
Appendix
II.
339 339
340
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
340
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
As in the classification of the far-left
respondents,
the choice of a
cutting
point
to decide who should be included
among
the far
right
involved a
balancing
of
practical
criteria: one had to ensure not
only
that
enough
respondents
were included for
purpose
of
analysis,
but also that the
right-
wing respondents,
as classified
by
the
far-right
scale,
were 'extreme' or
'radical' in their
political
beliefs. With these considerations in
mind,
we
decided that
any respondent
who endorsed ten or more of the fourteen items
belonged
in the
far-right group.
The nine-item
far-right
scale in the Civil Liberties
study
is
very
similar in
composition
to the
far-right
scale in the
Opinion
and Values
survey,
containing
four of the same items. In
classifying respondents
in the Civil
Liberties
survey, any person endorsing
the
right-wing
alternative on at least
eight
of the items was considered a
supporter
of the far
right.
The twelve
items in the
far-right
scale of the PAB
survey
also resemble in content the
items in
OVS,
though they
were cast in the
agree-disagree
format.
In all of the
subsequent
tests,
we also
provide
data on the
responses
of
political
moderates,
in addition to the data on the two radical
camps.
The
responses
of the moderates
provide
us with a baseline
against
which to
evaluate the scores of
right-wing
and
left-wing
radicals.22
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
There are
many
overt
ways
in which
left-wing
and
right-wing politics
stand in
sharp
contrast to each other. The left harbours the notion that the
people
are
trapped by
the
oppressive., dehumanizing
institutions of
capitalist society,
and
it
plans
to 'liberate' these
people by making
them aware of their
impoverished
existence. The
left, therefore,
exhorts
people
to
question
their 'slavish'
acceptance
of the status
quo,
to renounce their materialist
aspirations,
and to
become aware of their 'true' needs as
opposed
to the 'false consciousness' and
artificial desires created
by
a
manipulative, profit-seeking,
commercial cul-
ture.
As
perceived by
the
right wing,
the
aspirations
of the left constitute
today's
reality
and its
nightmare,
so to
speak.
Whereas the left's
message
is
liberation,
the
right's
call is for
control,
self-abnegation
and the reversal of
decadent trends. In contrast to the conservatives'
respect
and
praise
for the
existing
social order,
the extreme
right repudiates many
current
practices
and
seeks dramatic and often drastic measures to set
society
on a more
acceptable
course.
The fundamental
philosophical
and
programmatic
differences between the
far left and far
right
are reflected in the scores of the two extreme
camps
on a
number of attitude measures
reported
in
Figure I.2'
For
instance,
on the
22
In addition to the far-left and
far-right
scales, a number of scales were constructed to assess
responses
to the
dependent
variables considered in this
study.
The
findings
on these scales,
and on some of the items
they
include, are
presented
below.
23
We
might
observe,
parenthetically.
that the differences between the far left and far
right
on
these measures lend a
degree
of construct
validity
to the far-left and
far-right
scales and
help
to
clarify
the
appropriateness
of the far-left and
far-right responses.
As in the classification of the far-left
respondents,
the choice of a
cutting
point
to decide who should be included
among
the far
right
involved a
balancing
of
practical
criteria: one had to ensure not
only
that
enough
respondents
were included for
purpose
of
analysis,
but also that the
right-
wing respondents,
as classified
by
the
far-right
scale,
were 'extreme' or
'radical' in their
political
beliefs. With these considerations in
mind,
we
decided that
any respondent
who endorsed ten or more of the fourteen items
belonged
in the
far-right group.
The nine-item
far-right
scale in the Civil Liberties
study
is
very
similar in
composition
to the
far-right
scale in the
Opinion
and Values
survey,
containing
four of the same items. In
classifying respondents
in the Civil
Liberties
survey, any person endorsing
the
right-wing
alternative on at least
eight
of the items was considered a
supporter
of the far
right.
The twelve
items in the
far-right
scale of the PAB
survey
also resemble in content the
items in
OVS,
though they
were cast in the
agree-disagree
format.
In all of the
subsequent
tests,
we also
provide
data on the
responses
of
political
moderates,
in addition to the data on the two radical
camps.
The
responses
of the moderates
provide
us with a baseline
against
which to
evaluate the scores of
right-wing
and
left-wing
radicals.22
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
There are
many
overt
ways
in which
left-wing
and
right-wing politics
stand in
sharp
contrast to each other. The left harbours the notion that the
people
are
trapped by
the
oppressive., dehumanizing
institutions of
capitalist society,
and
it
plans
to 'liberate' these
people by making
them aware of their
impoverished
existence. The
left, therefore,
exhorts
people
to
question
their 'slavish'
acceptance
of the status
quo,
to renounce their materialist
aspirations,
and to
become aware of their 'true' needs as
opposed
to the 'false consciousness' and
artificial desires created
by
a
manipulative, profit-seeking,
commercial cul-
ture.
As
perceived by
the
right wing,
the
aspirations
of the left constitute
today's
reality
and its
nightmare,
so to
speak.
Whereas the left's
message
is
liberation,
the
right's
call is for
control,
self-abnegation
and the reversal of
decadent trends. In contrast to the conservatives'
respect
and
praise
for the
existing
social order,
the extreme
right repudiates many
current
practices
and
seeks dramatic and often drastic measures to set
society
on a more
acceptable
course.
The fundamental
philosophical
and
programmatic
differences between the
far left and far
right
are reflected in the scores of the two extreme
camps
on a
number of attitude measures
reported
in
Figure I.2'
For
instance,
on the
22
In addition to the far-left and
far-right
scales, a number of scales were constructed to assess
responses
to the
dependent
variables considered in this
study.
The
findings
on these scales,
and on some of the items
they
include, are
presented
below.
23
We
might
observe,
parenthetically.
that the differences between the far left and far
right
on
these measures lend a
degree
of construct
validity
to the far-left and
far-right
scales and
help
to
clarify
the
appropriateness
of the far-left and
far-right responses.
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
OVS Scales
Traditional
family
values
(% High)
OVS Scales
Traditional
family
values
(% High)
100
0
100
0
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(48)* (1,334) (151)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(48)* (1,334) (151)
Racial
equality
(% High)
Racial
equality
(% High)
100 100
Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far
left
right
left
right
(48) (1,334) (151) (48) (1,334) (151)
left
right
left
right
(48) (1,334) (151) (48) (1,334) (151)
Women's
rights
(% High)
Women's
rights
(% High)
Welfare
(% High)
Welfare
(% High)
1
98
100 1
98
100
0 0
left right
left
right
(48) (1,334)
(151) (48) (1,334) (151)
left right
left
right
(48) (1,334)
(151) (48) (1,334) (151)
Business attitudes
(% High)
Business attitudes
(% High)
PAB Scales
Chauvinism
(% High)
PAB Scales
Chauvinism
(% High)
100
0
100
0
43 43
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(48) (1,334) (151)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(48) (1,334) (151)
Religiosity
(% High)
Religiosity
(% High)
100
0
100
0
42 42
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
Far Mod. Far
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243)
*
Sample
size
*
Sample
size
Fig.
1.
Differences
between the
far left
and the
far right Fig.
1.
Differences
between the
far left
and the
far right
Conventionality
(% High)
Conventionality
(% High)
100 100
341 341
Sexual freedom
(% High)
Sexual freedom
(% High)
100
0
100
0
100
0
100
0
100
0
100
0
342
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
342
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
'conventionality'
scale,
which assesses attitudes towards traditional
practices
and
customary
forms of
behaviour, 71 per
cent of the
far-right sample
score
in the
'high' category, compared
to o
per
cent of the far-left
sample.
The
sample
of
political
moderates is the intermediate
group, although
it tends
to be closer to the far left than to the far
right
on this dimension.
The same
pattern
of
responses
turns
up
on the
'family
values'
scale,
which
measures
preference
for either
firm,
authoritarian
child-rearing practices
or a
more democratic
approach.
Here the far
right clearly
leans in the direction of
strong parental
control
(71 per cent)
while the
overwhelming majority
of the
far left
(92 per cent) support
an
approach
in which children are
granted
a
voice in
family
matters.
This
sharp
division between the left and the
right
also surfaces in their
responses
to the measure of attitudes towards 'sexual
freedom',
which
includes
questions
on
homosexuality,
sexual content in
movies,
sex education
for schoolchildren and freedom of sexual conduct between adults. On this
dimension,
there is a
precipitous
decline in
support
for sexual freedom as we
go
from far left to far
right
on the
ideological
continuum.
Ninety-eight per.
group
fall in the
'high support' category, compared
with
78
per
cent of the
moderates, while,
in stark
contrast,
none of the
far-right
respondents
can be found in the
'high' category.
As for racial
equality
and women's
rights,
the far left
again
stands in
sharp
opposition
to the far
right, expressing greater support
for both forms of
equality.
The
political
moderates,
as befits their
label,
fall towards the middle
of the distribution
but,
once
again,
hold attitudes which are somewhat closer
to the far left than to the far
right.
In their attitudes towards social welfare
policies,
the contrast between
the far left and the far
right,
as one
might expect,
is almost
total,
with
98
per
cent of the far left
expressing strong support
as
against
a mere i
per
cent
of the far
right. Similarly,
on a measure
assessing support
for
laissez-faire
economic
practices,
the left and
right
are almost 80
per
cent
apart
in their
endorsement of these
practices,
with each
group scoring
in the
expected
direction.
The marked contrast between left and
right
in their scores on social and
economic issues is
repeated
on measures of national chauvinism or
super-
patriotism
and
religious
devotion. Over
40 per
cent of the far
right
score
high
on the chauvinism scale, compared
to
only
2
per
cent of the moderates and
none of the far
left,
with
'high'
scores
reflecting
intolerance towards immi-
grants,
inordinate concern over the
potential
contamination of America by
foreign
ideas,
fervent
allegiance
to the 'American
way
of
life',
and
underlying
suspicions
about the trustworthiness of America's allies.
Finally,
the much
higher
scores of the far
right
on the
religiosity
measure
reflects their
greater propensity
to believe in the Bible as the word of God,
the second
coming
of
Christ,
the
relationship
between
godlessness
and social
disorder,
and the
importance
of
religious
belief to the well-being
of
society.
'conventionality'
scale,
which assesses attitudes towards traditional
practices
and
customary
forms of
behaviour, 71 per
cent of the
far-right sample
score
in the
'high' category, compared
to o
per
sample.
The
sample
of
political
moderates is the intermediate
group, although
it tends
to be closer to the far left than to the far
right
on this dimension.
The same
pattern
of
responses
turns
up
on the
'family
values'
scale,
which
measures
preference
for either
firm,
authoritarian
child-rearing practices
or a
more democratic
approach.
Here the far
right clearly
leans in the direction of
strong parental
control
(71 per cent)
while the
overwhelming majority
of the
far left
(92 per cent) support
an
approach
in which children are
granted
a
voice in
family
matters.
This
sharp
division between the left and the
right
also surfaces in their
responses
to the measure of attitudes towards 'sexual
freedom',
which
includes
questions
on
homosexuality,
sexual content in
movies,
sex education
for schoolchildren and freedom of sexual conduct between adults. On this
dimension,
there is a
precipitous
decline in
support
for sexual freedom as we
go
from far left to far
right
on the
ideological
continuum.
Ninety-eight per.
group
fall in the
'high support' category, compared
with
78
per
cent of the
moderates, while,
in stark
contrast,
none of the
far-right
respondents
can be found in the
'high' category.
As for racial
equality
and women's
rights,
the far left
again
stands in
sharp
opposition
to the far
right, expressing greater support
for both forms of
equality.
The
political
moderates,
as befits their
label,
fall towards the middle
of the distribution
but,
once
again,
hold attitudes which are somewhat closer
to the far left than to the far
right.
In their attitudes towards social welfare
policies,
the contrast between
the far left and the far
right,
as one
might expect,
is almost
total,
with
98
per
cent of the far left
expressing strong support
as
against
a mere i
per
cent
of the far
right. Similarly,
on a measure
assessing support
for
laissez-faire
economic
practices,
the left and
right
are almost 80
per
cent
apart
in their
endorsement of these
practices,
with each
group scoring
in the
expected
direction.
The marked contrast between left and
right
in their scores on social and
economic issues is
repeated
on measures of national chauvinism or
super-
patriotism
and
religious
devotion. Over
40 per
cent of the far
right
score
high
on the chauvinism scale, compared
to
only
2
per
cent of the moderates and
none of the far
left,
with
'high'
scores
reflecting
intolerance towards immi-
grants,
inordinate concern over the
potential
contamination of America by
foreign
ideas,
fervent
allegiance
to the 'American
way
of
life',
and
underlying
suspicions
about the trustworthiness of America's allies.
Finally,
the much
higher
scores of the far
right
on the
religiosity
measure
reflects their
greater propensity
to believe in the Bible as the word of God,
the second
coming
of
Christ,
the
relationship
between
godlessness
and social
disorder,
and the
importance
of
religious
belief to the well-being
of
society.
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
The
strength
of these and other
programmatic
differences between the radical
left and radical
right frequently
act to obscure the characteristics that are
shared
by
the two
camps.
These similarities are
essentially
of two varieties.
Certain of them result from the mutual
estrangement
of the radical left and
right
from the
political
mainstream,
while others reflect the common
political
and
psychological style
that infuses and colours
right-wing
and
left-wing
rhetoric and
activity.
In the first
category
we would
place
the dissatisfaction of
the two
camps
with the status
quo,
their resentment towards mainstream
politicians
and
political practices,
and their
support
of
populist campaigns
that
promise
the return of
political power
to the 'masses'
(so
labelled
by
the
left)
or the 'common
people' (so
labelled
by
the
right).
The characteristics in
the second
category
include intolerance of
ambiguity,
intolerance towards
political opponents,
attraction to totalitarian measures and
tactics,
intoler-
ance of human
frailty,
and
paranoid
tendencies -
including
a belief in
conspiracy
and
feelings
of
persecution.
ESTRANGEMENT FROM GOVERNMENT
While the far left and far
right disagree strongly
about the
proper
role of
government
in
society, they
share a common
antipathy
towards
politicians
as
well as towards the
ways
in which the
government operates.
As the Political
Affiliation and Belief data in
Figure
2
reveal,
radicals at either extreme are
more
likely
than
political
moderates to be
cynical
and
suspicious
about
politics.
Both extreme
groups
also have less faith in the
workings
of
democracy.
As their
responses
to the
specific
items in Table i
indicate,
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals tend to believe that
politicians
covet
public
office for reasons of
personal gain
rather than service to their constituents.
They
are also more
likely
than moderates to believe that
politicians
conceal
their true aims and will tell voters
anything
that
helps
to
get
them elected.
Faith in
democracy
Faith in
politics
Faith in
politicians
(% High) (% High) (% High)
100 100 100
71
79
54
29 28
36
40
16 16
0
I 0
Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far Far Mod. Far
left
right
left
right
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243)
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FAR LEFT AND FAR RIGHT
The
strength
of these and other
programmatic
differences between the radical
left and radical
right frequently
act to obscure the characteristics that are
shared
by
the two
camps.
These similarities are
essentially
of two varieties.
Certain of them result from the mutual
estrangement
of the radical left and
right
from the
political
mainstream,
while others reflect the common
political
and
psychological style
that infuses and colours
right-wing
and
left-wing
rhetoric and
activity.
In the first
category
we would
place
the dissatisfaction of
the two
camps
with the status
quo,
their resentment towards mainstream
politicians
and
political practices,
and their
support
of
populist campaigns
that
promise
the return of
political power
to the 'masses'
(so
labelled
by
the
left)
or the 'common
people' (so
labelled
by
the
right).
The characteristics in
the second
category
include intolerance of
ambiguity,
intolerance towards
attraction to totalitarian measures and
tactics,
intoler-
ance of human
frailty,
and
paranoid
tendencies -
including
a belief in
conspiracy
and
feelings
of
persecution.
ESTRANGEMENT FROM GOVERNMENT
While the far left and far
right disagree strongly
about the
proper
role of
government
in
society, they
share a common
antipathy
towards
politicians
as
well as towards the
ways
in which the
government operates.
As the Political
Affiliation and Belief data in
Figure
2
reveal,
radicals at either extreme are
more
likely
than
political
moderates to be
cynical
and
suspicious
about
politics.
Both extreme
groups
also have less faith in the
workings
of
democracy.
As their
responses
to the
specific
items in Table i
indicate,
left-wing
and
right-wing
radicals tend to believe that
politicians
covet
public
office for reasons of
personal gain
rather than service to their constituents.
They
are also more
likely
than moderates to believe that
politicians
conceal
their true aims and will tell voters
anything
that
helps
to
get
them elected.
Faith in
democracy
Faith in
politics
Faith in
politicians
(% High) (% High) (% High)
100 100 100
71
79
54
29 28
36
40
16 16
0
I 0
left
right
left
right
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243) (71) (1,592) (243)
Fig. 2.
Estrangement from politics (PAB
scale
scores)
Fig. 2.
Estrangement from politics (PAB
scale
scores)
343 343
344
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
344
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TABLE I
Estrangement
from
Politics
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
Item Far left Moderate Far
right
No matter what the
people
think,
a few
people
will
always
run
things anyway 29-2
19'7
51I0
It seems to me that whoever
you
vote
for,
things go
on
pretty
much the same
19-2 14.5
36.6
The
people
who
really
'run' the
country
do not even
get
known to the voters
74'0
27-2
59'3
No
politician
dares tell the voters
exactly
how he
really
feels
43.8
20 I
47'9
Politicians do not care much about what
they say,
so
long
as
they get
elected
57'5 I9-8 56-3
The best
way
to
get
elected is to
put
on a
good
show
6I.I 35'6
62.8
Most
politicians
are in
politics
for
what
they
can
get
out of it
personally 40-0
2I-8
50-0
Most
political parties
care
only
about
winning
elections and
nothing
more 36. I
193
52-I
(N)
(72) (I,587) (243)
TABLE I
Estrangement
from
Politics
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
No matter what the
people
think,
a few
people
will
always
run
things anyway 29-2
19'7
51I0
It seems to me that whoever
you
vote
for,
things go
on
pretty
much the same
19-2 14.5
36.6
The
people
who
really
'run' the
country
do not even
get
known to the voters
74'0
27-2
59'3
No
politician
dares tell the voters
exactly
how he
really
feels
43.8
20 I
47'9
Politicians do not care much about what
they say,
so
long
as
they get
elected
57'5 I9-8 56-3
The best
way
to
get
elected is to
put
on a
good
show
6I.I 35'6
62.8
Most
politicians
are in
politics
for
what
they
can
get
out of it
personally 40-0
2I-8
50-0
Most
political parties
care
only
about
winning
elections and
nothing
more 36. I
193
52-I
(N)
(72) (I,587) (243)
Furthermore,
radicals are more inclined to believe that electoral outcomes
are
meaningless, having
little
bearing
on the
policies subsequently pursued by
the victors.
Similar
findings, reported
in Table
2,
turn
up
in the
Opinions
and Values
survey, although
here the
antagonism
towards the
government
is
clearly
stronger among
the far left.
Large majorities
of the radical
left,
often
approaching unanimity,
feel that
government
leaders cannot be taken at their
word,
and that the
government
is
unresponsive
to the wishes and needs of the
people. Although
the far
right
is also more disenchanted with
government
than are the moderates,
the
degree
of its alientation is less intense than that of
the radical left.
As their
responses
to the items in Table 2
indicate,
the
political cynicism
of
the radical left and radical
right goes beyond
discontent with current office
holders to a more fundamental dissatisfaction with the
system
itself. It is
evident from Table
3A,
for
example,
that both
groups
share a
conspiratorial
interpretation
of American
politics. By large margins, left-wing
and
right-
wing
radicals are more
likely
than moderates to believe that the
important
political
decisions are made in secret
by people
beyond
the
public eye,
and
that
people
are
duped
into
thinking
that
they govern
themselves
when,
in
fact,
'they really
don't'.
By margins greater
than two to
one,
the far left and
Furthermore,
radicals are more inclined to believe that electoral outcomes
are
meaningless, having
little
bearing
on the
policies subsequently pursued by
the victors.
Similar
findings, reported
in Table
2,
turn
up
in the
Opinions
and Values
survey, although
here the
antagonism
towards the
government
is
clearly
stronger among
the far left.
Large majorities
of the radical
left,
often
approaching unanimity,
feel that
government
leaders cannot be taken at their
word,
and that the
government
is
unresponsive
to the wishes and needs of the
people. Although
the far
right
is also more disenchanted with
government
than are the moderates,
the
degree
of its alientation is less intense than that of
the radical left.
As their
responses
to the items in Table 2
indicate,
the
political cynicism
of
the radical left and radical
right goes beyond
discontent with current office
holders to a more fundamental dissatisfaction with the
system
itself. It is
evident from Table
3A,
for
example,
that both
groups
share a
conspiratorial
interpretation
of American
politics. By large margins, left-wing
and
right-
wing
radicals are more
likely
than moderates to believe that the
important
political
decisions are made in secret
by people
beyond
the
public eye,
and
that
people
are
duped
into
thinking
that
they govern
themselves
when,
in
fact,
'they really
don't'.
By margins greater
than two to
one,
the far left and
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right-
Wing
Radicals
TAB L E 2 Political
Cynicism (OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
Most of the
things government
leaders
tell us:
-Can't
really
be believed
91'7
26-8
47-0
-Are true o-o
19-9 15'9
(Decline
to
choose) 8-3 53'3 37-1
Most of the time our
system
of
government:
-Disregards
what the
people
want
85'4 I3.9 26-5
-Tries to do what the
people
want
o0o
52.5 52.3
(Decline
to
choose) 14-6 33-5 2I-2
People
with
my point
of view who
go
to a
government
official with
a
problem:
-Are not
likely
to be listened to
85-4 I7-2 37-7
-Can
expect
a fair
hearing
o.o
5I-0 45-0
(Decline
to
choose) 14.6
31.7 I7.3
(N) (48) (1,334) (I5I)
TABLE
3A
Paranoid Tendencies
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
We'd be much better off now if our
foreign
affairs were conducted out
in the
open,
for all to
see,
rather
than
secretly 66-7 26-4 51.7
Most of the news we
get
from the
press
and the radio is
deliberately
slanted to mislead us
60-o0
I64 3I.8
I often feel that the
really
important
matters are decided
behind the scenes
by people
we never
even hear about
77.8
32-0
69-4
The
people
think
they govern
themselves,
but
they really
don't
54-8
II-2
.515
(N) (72) (1,576) (242)
TAB L E 2 Political
Cynicism (OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
Most of the
things government
leaders
tell us:
-Can't
really
be believed
91'7
26-8
47-0
-Are true o-o
19-9 15'9
(Decline
to
choose) 8-3 53'3 37-1
Most of the time our
system
of
government:
-Disregards
what the
people
want
85'4 I3.9 26-5
-Tries to do what the
people
want
o0o
52.5 52.3
(Decline
to
choose) 14-6 33-5 2I-2
People
with
my point
of view who
go
to a
government
official with
a
problem:
-Are not
likely
to be listened to
85-4 I7-2 37-7
-Can
expect
a fair
hearing
o.o
5I-0 45-0
(Decline
to
choose) 14.6
31.7 I7.3
(N) (48) (1,334) (I5I)
TABLE
3A
Paranoid Tendencies
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
We'd be much better off now if our
foreign
affairs were conducted out
in the
open,
for all to
see,
rather
than
secretly 66-7 26-4 51.7
Most of the news we
get
from the
press
and the radio is
deliberately
slanted to mislead us
60-o0
I64 3I.8
I often feel that the
really
important
matters are decided
behind the scenes
by people
we never
even hear about
77.8
32-0
69-4
The
people
think
they govern
themselves,
but
they really
don't
54-8
II-2
.515
(N) (72) (1,576) (242)
345 345
346
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
346
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TA B L E
3B
Paranoid Tendencies
(PA
B scale
scores)
Percentage reading
down
Score Far left Moderate Far
right
Low
20-5 65-9 25'9
Middle
38-4 25.8
42-0
High
41-1 8-4
32I1
(N)
(73) (I,592) (243)
far
right
are more
likely
than the
political
moderates to
say
that our
foreign
policy
is
being 'secretly'
formulated. Both are also far more
likely
than
moderates to assert that radio broadcasts and
newspaper
stories are 'deliber-
ately
slanted' to deceive the
public.
These
political suspicions
and
conspiratorial
notions seem to be manifesta-
tions of a more basic
paranoid tendency
which both
camps
exhibit in a
variety
of contexts. Our data show that in
everyday interpersonal
matters,
radicals at
both extremes
strongly
believe that
they
are not
given
their
proper
due and
that
they
are often mistreated and misunderstood
by people. They
are also
more
prone
to feel
slighted
and
persecuted by
others and to believe that few
people
in the world can
really
be trusted 'when
you get right
down to it'.
On the overall
'paranoid
tendencies' scale
(see
Table
3B),
the
similarity
between the radical
right
and radical
left,
and the contrast between the
moderates and both
extremes,
are
high-lighted
with
striking clarity.
Over
40
per
cent of the far left and
32 per
cent of the far
right
score
'high'
on
paranoid
tendencies,
compared
to
only
8
per
cent of the moderates.
CONFLICTING SOURCES OF POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT
Despite
the
suspicions
of both the left and
right
towards the
government,
their
anti-system responses
are
usually triggered by
different issues. In
responding,
for
example,
to a series of items
concerning
the influence of the
wealthy
and
powerful
on the
courts,
the nation's
laws,
the
newspapers
and the
political parties,
the far left was the most
willing
of the
ideological groups
to
condemn these institutions as
pawns
of the rich. None of this is
surprising,
of
course,
since
hostility
to
capitalist
elites and the establishment has
long
been a
dominant feature of radical-left
politics.
But the radical
right
is also disenchanted with these
institutions,
though
for
different reasons. Its
anger
is
detonated,
not
by
the institutions'
alleged
association with wealth or 'business',
but
by
their
supposed susceptibility
to
the influence of an entrenched liberal establishment. In their view,
govern-
ment
offices,
the
press,
the foundations and other
powerful
institutions are
overflowing
with technocrats and academics trained at liberal
colleges
and
universities. These universities are also the 'farm
system'
that stocks the
judiciary
and various other
professions.
Thus,
paradoxically, despite
their
patriotic
fervour,
spokesmen
of the
TA B L E
3B
Paranoid Tendencies
(PA
B scale
scores)
Percentage reading
down
right
Low
20-5 65-9 25'9
Middle
38-4 25.8
42-0
High
41-1 8-4
32I1
(N)
(73) (I,592) (243)
far
right
are more
likely
than the
political
moderates to
say
that our
foreign
policy
is
being 'secretly'
formulated. Both are also far more
likely
than
moderates to assert that radio broadcasts and
newspaper
stories are 'deliber-
ately
slanted' to deceive the
public.
These
political suspicions
and
conspiratorial
notions seem to be manifesta-
tions of a more basic
paranoid tendency
which both
camps
exhibit in a
variety
of contexts. Our data show that in
everyday interpersonal
matters,
radicals at
both extremes
strongly
believe that
they
are not
given
their
proper
due and
that
they
are often mistreated and misunderstood
by people. They
are also
more
prone
to feel
slighted
and
persecuted by
others and to believe that few
people
in the world can
really
be trusted 'when
you get right
down to it'.
On the overall
'paranoid
tendencies' scale
(see
Table
3B),
the
similarity
between the radical
right
and radical
left,
and the contrast between the
moderates and both
extremes,
are
high-lighted
with
striking clarity.
Over
40
per
cent of the far left and
32 per
cent of the far
right
score
'high'
on
paranoid
tendencies,
compared
to
only
8
per
cent of the moderates.
CONFLICTING SOURCES OF POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT
Despite
the
suspicions
of both the left and
right
towards the
government,
their
anti-system responses
are
usually triggered by
different issues. In
responding,
for
example,
to a series of items
concerning
the influence of the
wealthy
and
powerful
on the
courts,
the nation's
laws,
the
newspapers
and the
political parties,
the far left was the most
willing
of the
ideological groups
to
condemn these institutions as
pawns
of the rich. None of this is
surprising,
of
course,
since
hostility
to
capitalist
elites and the establishment has
long
been a
dominant feature of radical-left
politics.
But the radical
right
is also disenchanted with these
institutions,
though
for
different reasons. Its
anger
is
detonated,
not
by
the institutions'
alleged
association with wealth or 'business',
but
by
their
supposed susceptibility
to
the influence of an entrenched liberal establishment. In their view,
govern-
ment
offices,
the
press,
the foundations and other
powerful
institutions are
overflowing
with technocrats and academics trained at liberal
colleges
and
universities. These universities are also the 'farm
system'
that stocks the
judiciary
and various other
professions.
Thus,
paradoxically, despite
their
patriotic
fervour,
spokesmen
of the
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
radical
right
are
towards the status
quo. They
continually
lash out
against
what
they
consider to be the
government's
conciliatory
stance towards Communism, its
support
for welfare
programmes
(which,
in their view,
rewards laziness and lack of
initiative),
its
encourage-
ment of moral
depravity (sexual
licence, tolerance of abortion,
homosexual-
ity, etc.),
and its lenient treatment of criminals.
Both extremes also
vilify
the media for
providing
biased versions of
political
and social
reality, catering
to
special
interests and
collaborating
with
government
officials to mislead the
public.
However,
whereas the left believes
the media to be the
captives
of the
right
and the servants of a
reactionary
state,
the
right
sees them as
blatantly left-wing, purveyors
of
filth,
porn-
ography,
a decadent
morality
and
bankrupt
liberal or radical
programmes.
Thus,
the source of current
right-wing
anti-establishment rhetoric stems
from the
right's
conviction that the establishment
perpetuates
an immoral
leftist
philosophy
and not so much that it caters to
corporate
interests. Such
anti-corporate
sentiments were far more
prevalent
in the
populist
movements
of,
say,
the
People's party
and
Huey Long
than in the current incarnation
of the radical
right.
The different bases for
radical-right
and radical-left
antagonism
towards
American
society
is
brought
out
dramatically by
their
responses
to an item in
Table
4
which asks whether
they
believe the American
system
in recent
years
has been
drifting
either 'to the
right,
toward
fascism',
or 'to the
left,
toward
communism'. Whereas
political
moderates tend to
say
that neither is the
case,
large majorities
right continually
warn that the
country
is
moving
towards the
opposite political
extreme.
Thus,
in contrast to a
judicious
assessment that American
society may
have moved somewhat in
either a liberal or a conservative
direction,
the radicals of the left and
right
insist on the more dire conclusion that America is
approaching
the
abyss
represented by
either communism or fascism -
depending
on the
ideological
vantage point
of the
doomsayer.
Such
apocalyptic forebodings symbolize
the
crude and indiscriminate
political analysis
habitual
among
extremists on both
sides.
Witness,
for
example,
the conviction on the far
right
that the
government
is the
pawn
of the communists and the
parallel
conviction
among
the far left that it is the
pawn
of the
capitalists.
Moreover,
their
eagerness
to
label as 'fascist' or 'communist'
any competing ideology
or
any
social
change
that
departs
from their
programmatic goals
is consistent with the
findings
we shall
present
on their intolerance of
ambiguity
and their unbounded hosti-
lity
towards
opponents.
In Table
4,
we see that the adherents of the radical
right go
so far as to
accuse liberals and
left-wing
radicals
actually
of
having
'sold America out' to
the communists.
They
also
protest
that too much
money
is
being spent
on
social welfare
programmes
and not
enough
on
military
defence,
whereas the
far left holds the
contrary
view.
Similarly,
the two
camps
also differ in
criticizing
the
government
and the courts for
being
too
hard,
or too
easy,
on
lawbreakers and
protesters.
radical
right
are
towards the status
quo. They
continually
lash out
against
what
they
consider to be the
government's
conciliatory
stance towards Communism, its
support
for welfare
programmes
(which,
in their view,
rewards laziness and lack of
initiative),
its
encourage-
ment of moral
depravity (sexual
licence, tolerance of abortion,
homosexual-
ity, etc.),
and its lenient treatment of criminals.
Both extremes also
vilify
the media for
providing
biased versions of
political
and social
reality, catering
to
special
interests and
collaborating
with
government
officials to mislead the
public.
However,
whereas the left believes
the media to be the
captives
of the
right
and the servants of a
reactionary
state,
the
right
sees them as
blatantly left-wing, purveyors
of
filth,
porn-
ography,
a decadent
morality
and
bankrupt
liberal or radical
programmes.
Thus,
the source of current
right-wing
anti-establishment rhetoric stems
from the
right's
conviction that the establishment
perpetuates
an immoral
leftist
philosophy
and not so much that it caters to
corporate
interests. Such
anti-corporate
sentiments were far more
prevalent
in the
populist
movements
of,
say,
the
People's party
and
Huey Long
than in the current incarnation
of the radical
right.
The different bases for
radical-right
and radical-left
antagonism
towards
American
society
is
brought
out
dramatically by
their
responses
to an item in
Table
4
which asks whether
they
believe the American
system
in recent
years
has been
drifting
either 'to the
right,
toward
fascism',
or 'to the
left,
toward
communism'. Whereas
political
moderates tend to
say
that neither is the
case,
large majorities
right continually
warn that the
country
is
moving
towards the
opposite political
extreme.
Thus,
in contrast to a
judicious
assessment that American
society may
have moved somewhat in
either a liberal or a conservative
direction,
the radicals of the left and
right
insist on the more dire conclusion that America is
approaching
the
abyss
represented by
either communism or fascism -
depending
on the
ideological
vantage point
of the
doomsayer.
Such
apocalyptic forebodings symbolize
the
crude and indiscriminate
political analysis
habitual
among
extremists on both
sides.
Witness,
for
example,
the conviction on the far
right
that the
government
is the
pawn
of the communists and the
parallel
conviction
among
the far left that it is the
pawn
of the
capitalists.
Moreover,
their
eagerness
to
label as 'fascist' or 'communist'
any competing ideology
or
any
social
change
that
departs
from their
programmatic goals
is consistent with the
findings
we shall
present
on their intolerance of
ambiguity
and their unbounded hosti-
lity
towards
opponents.
In Table
4,
we see that the adherents of the radical
right go
so far as to
accuse liberals and
left-wing
radicals
actually
of
having
'sold America out' to
the communists.
They
also
protest
that too much
money
is
being spent
on
social welfare
programmes
and not
enough
on
military
defence,
whereas the
far left holds the
contrary
view.
Similarly,
the two
camps
also differ in
criticizing
the
government
and the courts for
being
too
hard,
or too
easy,
on
lawbreakers and
protesters.
347 347
348
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
348
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TABLE
4
Sources
of Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Political
Disaffection
(OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
In recent
years
the American
system
has
been
drifting
-To the
right,
toward fascism
8I13 24-1
2-6
-To the
left,
toward communism o.o
14'7 8i-5
(Decline
to
choose) I8-8 6I12
I5-9
The
spread
of communism after
World War II
-Can't be blamed on
any
American
group
in
particular
70-8
77.I
4.6
-Was the fault of certain liberals
and
left-wing
radicals who sold
America out oo 6o
89-4
(Decline
to
choose) 29-2 16'9
6-o
Too much of our
money
is
going
for:
-Military
defence
Ioo.o
65-5 o.o
-Social welfare
programs
0.o
14-2
97'4
(Decline
to
choose)
o-o 20-2 2.6
One reason modern
government
has
grown
so
big
and
complicated
is that:
-They
do so
many things
that
people
need and want
41'7 57'9
2-0
-They
do
things
that
people
should
do for themselves
4'2 I9.5
96-o
(Decline
to
choose) 54.2
22.6 2-0
In
your opinion
the courts are:
-Too hard
25-0 4'9
o0o
-Too
easy
on
people
who break
the law
8-3
36.6 98-0
(Decline
to
choose) 66-7 58-5
2-0
In
handling protest
demonstrations,
the
government
has
usually
been:
-Too
tough 89'6
42 7 o-7
-Too
easy
o0o
7-7
92-1
(Decline
to
choose) I0-4 49'6 7'3
(N) (48) (I,334) (i5i)
POPULISM
Elements of traditional
populist
mistrust of American institutions can also be
discerned in the rhetoric of both the far left and the far
right.
It
is, however,
evident from the OVS data
presented
above that the
populist suspicion
of
big
TABLE
4
Sources
of Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Political
Disaffection
(OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
In recent
years
the American
system
has
been
drifting
-To the
right,
toward fascism
8I13 24-1
2-6
-To the
left,
toward communism o.o
14'7 8i-5
(Decline
to
choose) I8-8 6I12
I5-9
The
spread
of communism after
World War II
-Can't be blamed on
any
American
group
in
particular
70-8
77.I
4.6
-Was the fault of certain liberals
and
left-wing
radicals who sold
America out oo 6o
89-4
(Decline
to
choose) 29-2 16'9
6-o
Too much of our
money
is
going
for:
-Military
defence
Ioo.o
65-5 o.o
-Social welfare
programs
0.o
14-2
97'4
(Decline
to
choose)
o-o 20-2 2.6
One reason modern
government
has
grown
so
big
and
complicated
is that:
-They
do so
many things
that
people
need and want
41'7 57'9
2-0
-They
do
things
that
people
should
do for themselves
4'2 I9.5
96-o
(Decline
to
choose) 54.2
22.6 2-0
In
your opinion
the courts are:
-Too hard
25-0 4'9
o0o
-Too
easy
on
people
who break
the law
8-3
36.6 98-0
(Decline
to
choose) 66-7 58-5
2-0
In
handling protest
demonstrations,
the
government
has
usually
been:
-Too
tough 89'6
42 7 o-7
-Too
easy
o0o
7-7
92-1
(Decline
to
choose) I0-4 49'6 7'3
(N) (48) (I,334) (i5i)
POPULISM
Elements of traditional
populist
mistrust of American institutions can also be
discerned in the rhetoric of both the far left and the far
right.
It
is, however,
evident from the OVS data
presented
above that the
populist suspicion
of
big
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
TABLE
5 Populism
(PA B)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
The East has
always
had far too much
say
about the affairs of this
country 26-4 I6-o 55.8
One of our main troubles is that
the
big
Wall Street
money
men still
have
things
too much their own
way
in this
country 90'4 29-0 I7-7
We could
probably
solve most of our
big
national
problems
if
government
could
actually
be
brought
back to the
people
at the
grassroots 56'9
3888
85-I
Most
people
know
enough
to be able
to hold down the
job
of a
congressman 37'5
i8 i 28-0
In the
long
run,
I'll
put my
trust in
the
'simple
down-to-earth'
thinking
of
ordinary people
rather than
'the theories of
experts
and
intellectuals' 36.6
45.
88-o
(N) (72) (1,583) (243)
business is more characteristic of the left
wing
than the
right wing
- a
finding
corroborated
by
the PAB results
presented
in Table
5.
On the other hand, the
right's populist
fervour surfaces in its attacks on such favourite
targets
as
intellectuals,
the
(liberal)
Eastern
establishment,
mainstream
politics
and
politicians,
and
big government
in
general.
Of
particular
note are the items in Table
5
that have to do with the
special
virtues of the
mythical
common man and the
superiority
of
'grass
roots'
government.
Here we find that when
populist
sentiments
exalting
the
superiority
of the
average
man are untainted
by
obvious
ideological
cues -
such as references to business or intellectuals which tend to
polarize
the left
and
right
-
they
tend to be endorsed
by
both the extreme
right
and extreme
left.
In contrast to the
policies
of the
contemporary
American
right,
both the
nineteenth-century populism
of the
People's party
and
Huey Long's
iron-
fisted version of
populist
rule in the
1930s
contained broad streaks of
economic liberalism. Unlike these earlier
populist
movements,
the contem-
porary
American
right (with
the
exception
of the
George
Wallace
movement)
has few liberal economic
planks.
Indeed,
the New
Right
calls,
in
effect,
not
only
for the abolition of the welfare state but for the virtual
dismantling
of
much of the
governmental apparatus,
with the
exception
of the
police
and the
defence establishment.
TABLE
5 Populism
(PA B)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
The East has
always
had far too much
say
about the affairs of this
country 26-4 I6-o 55.8
One of our main troubles is that
the
big
Wall Street
money
men still
have
things
too much their own
way
in this
country 90'4 29-0 I7-7
We could
probably
solve most of our
big
national
problems
if
government
could
actually
be
brought
back to the
people
at the
grassroots 56'9
3888
85-I
Most
people
know
enough
to be able
to hold down the
job
of a
congressman 37'5
i8 i 28-0
In the
long
run,
I'll
put my
trust in
the
'simple
down-to-earth'
thinking
of
ordinary people
rather than
'the theories of
experts
and
intellectuals' 36.6
45.
88-o
(N) (72) (1,583) (243)
business is more characteristic of the left
wing
than the
right wing
- a
finding
corroborated
by
the PAB results
presented
in Table
5.
On the other hand, the
right's populist
fervour surfaces in its attacks on such favourite
targets
as
intellectuals,
the
(liberal)
Eastern
establishment,
mainstream
politics
and
politicians,
and
big government
in
general.
Of
particular
note are the items in Table
5
that have to do with the
special
virtues of the
mythical
common man and the
superiority
of
'grass
roots'
government.
Here we find that when
populist
sentiments
exalting
the
superiority
of the
average
man are untainted
by
obvious
ideological
cues -
such as references to business or intellectuals which tend to
polarize
the left
and
right
-
they
tend to be endorsed
by
both the extreme
right
and extreme
left.
In contrast to the
policies
of the
contemporary
American
right,
both the
nineteenth-century populism
of the
People's party
and
Huey Long's
iron-
fisted version of
populist
rule in the
1930s
contained broad streaks of
economic liberalism. Unlike these earlier
populist
movements,
the contem-
porary
American
right (with
the
exception
of the
George
Wallace
movement)
has few liberal economic
planks.
Indeed,
the New
Right
calls,
in
effect,
not
only
for the abolition of the welfare state but for the virtual
dismantling
of
much of the
governmental apparatus,
with the
exception
of the
police
and the
defence establishment.
349 349
350
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
350
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
PAB OVS PAB
Intolerance of Intolerance of
Psychological
ambiguity ambiguity rigidity
(% High) (%
High)
(%
High)
100 100
81
100
75
63
49
33 39
25 - 27
0
0
.
O ~,
O
r . ,0
0 I19
left
right
left
right
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243) (48) (1,334) (151) (73) (1,592) (243)
Fig.
3.
Intolerance
of ambiguity
and
rigidity
(scale scores)
Hence,
the
major
focus of the
contemporary
far
right
-
reminiscent of
certain strains of the
populist
tradition - is on the moral
disintegration
of
American
society. Today,
the far
right
sees this
disintegration
manifested in
the
legalization
of
abortion,
the
prohibition
of
organized prayer
in the
public
schools,
the
weakening
of
patriotism,
the increase in
drug
abuse,
premarital
sexual
activity, homosexuality,
divorce and the
alleged
decline of
family
values,
and the
proliferation
of
pornography.
INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY
Evidence from the OVS and PAB
survey
reveals that both
left-wing
and
right-wing
extremists show
high
levels of intolerance of
ambiguity
and
psychological rigidity (see Figure 3).
On these
dimensions,
both the far
right
and far left are
substantially
more
rigid
and intolerant of
ambiguity
than the
moderates.
This
finding
is
expressed
with
particular clarity
in their
responses
to the
items in Table 6. Both the left and the
right,
for
instance,
are much more
likely
than moderates to believe that in
politics,
there is no middle
ground
-
people
are 'either with
you
or
against
you'. They prefer
to take a stand on the
issues rather than to remain
uncommitted,
even if it means
being wrong. They
tend to believe that there is
only
one answer to
important
social and
philosophical
issues. And
they
are less
willing
to settle for
compromises
in the
political
arena,
as indicated
by
their
greater tendency
to
agree
to the
statement that 'in
politics
you
should settle for
nothing
less than total
victory'.24
24
Further
analysis
shows that left radicals are also more intolerant of
ambiguity
than
conservatives. Liberals are the most tolerant of
ambiguity,
but it is the conservatives who rank
second.
Nevertheless,
liberals are
considerably
more tolerant of
ambuiguity
than conservatives
(39 per
cent of the liberals in OVS score 'low' on the scale
compared
to
only I9 per
cent of the
conservatives).
PAB OVS PAB
Intolerance of Intolerance of
Psychological
ambiguity ambiguity rigidity
(% High) (%
High)
(%
High)
100 100
81
100
75
63
49
33 39
25 - 27
0
0
.
O ~,
O
r . ,0
0 I19
left
right
left
right
left
right
(71) (1,592) (243) (48) (1,334) (151) (73) (1,592) (243)
Fig.
3.
Intolerance
of ambiguity
and
rigidity
(scale scores)
Hence,
the
major
focus of the
contemporary
far
right
-
reminiscent of
certain strains of the
populist
tradition - is on the moral
disintegration
of
American
society. Today,
the far
right
sees this
disintegration
manifested in
the
legalization
of
abortion,
the
prohibition
of
organized prayer
in the
public
schools,
the
weakening
of
patriotism,
the increase in
drug
abuse,
premarital
sexual
activity, homosexuality,
divorce and the
alleged
decline of
family
values,
and the
proliferation
of
pornography.
INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY
Evidence from the OVS and PAB
survey
reveals that both
left-wing
and
right-wing
extremists show
high
levels of intolerance of
ambiguity
and
psychological rigidity (see Figure 3).
On these
dimensions,
both the far
right
and far left are
substantially
more
rigid
and intolerant of
ambiguity
than the
moderates.
This
finding
is
expressed
with
particular clarity
in their
responses
to the
items in Table 6. Both the left and the
right,
for
instance,
are much more
likely
than moderates to believe that in
politics,
there is no middle
ground
-
people
are 'either with
you
or
against
you'. They prefer
to take a stand on the
issues rather than to remain
uncommitted,
even if it means
being wrong. They
tend to believe that there is
only
one answer to
important
social and
philosophical
issues. And
they
are less
willing
to settle for
compromises
in the
political
arena,
as indicated
by
their
greater tendency
to
agree
to the
statement that 'in
politics
you
should settle for
nothing
less than total
victory'.24
24
Further
analysis
shows that left radicals are also more intolerant of
ambiguity
than
conservatives. Liberals are the most tolerant of
ambiguity,
but it is the conservatives who rank
second.
Nevertheless,
liberals are
considerably
more tolerant of
ambuiguity
than conservatives
(39 per
cent of the liberals in OVS score 'low' on the scale
compared
to
only I9 per
cent of the
conservatives).
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
TABLE 6 Intolerance
of Ambiguity (OVS
and PAB)
Percentage reading
down
right
On
important public
issues, I believe
you
should:
-Always keep
in mind that there is
more than one side to most issues
417 80o9 46-4
-Either be for them or
against
them
and not take a middle course
39.6 8-4 47'0
(Decline
to
choose) I8-7 IO-7
6.6
Which is better:
To remain undecided 20-8
44-5 28-5
To take a stand on an issue even
if it's
wrong 43-8 27-2
45'0
(Decline
to
choose) 35.4 28.3 26-5
When it comes to the
really important
questions
about
religion
and
philosophy
of life:
-It doesn't
especially
bother me
to leave them undecided
29-2
42-I I4.6
-A
person
must decide
them,
one
way
or the other
58-3 37'3 79'5
(Decline
to
choose) I2-5 20-5 5'9
In
trying
to
accomplish anything
in
politics
you
should:
-Settle for
nothing
less than
total
victory
I6.7 1.3 25.8
-Try
to achieve the best
possible
compromise
45.8
88-2
60-3
(Decline
to
choose) 37-5 io-5
13'9
(N
for OVS
items) (48) (I,334) (151)
People
who
say they
are
'open-minded'
are
just looking
for an excuse to
avoid
making up
their minds
514 29'6
6I-o
I believe that
you're really for
something
or
against
it,
and
anything
in between is
just
an
excuse to avoid the issue 6I'I 38.9 77.8
People
who
try
to steer a 'middle
course' are
usually just
afraid to
take a stand
63'0 24-8 53'9
(N
for PAB
items) (72) (1,584) (241)
TABLE 6 Intolerance
of Ambiguity (OVS
and PAB)
Percentage reading
down
right
On
important public
issues, I believe
you
should:
-Always keep
in mind that there is
more than one side to most issues
417 80o9 46-4
-Either be for them or
against
them
and not take a middle course
39.6 8-4 47'0
(Decline
to
choose) I8-7 IO-7
6.6
Which is better:
To remain undecided 20-8
44-5 28-5
To take a stand on an issue even
if it's
wrong 43-8 27-2
45'0
(Decline
to
choose) 35.4 28.3 26-5
When it comes to the
really important
questions
about
religion
and
philosophy
of life:
-It doesn't
especially
bother me
to leave them undecided
29-2
42-I I4.6
-A
person
must decide
them,
one
way
or the other
58-3 37'3 79'5
(Decline
to
choose) I2-5 20-5 5'9
In
trying
to
accomplish anything
in
politics
you
should:
-Settle for
nothing
less than
total
victory
I6.7 1.3 25.8
-Try
to achieve the best
possible
compromise
45.8
88-2
60-3
(Decline
to
choose) 37-5 io-5
13'9
(N
for OVS
items) (48) (I,334) (151)
People
who
say they
are
'open-minded'
are
just looking
for an excuse to
avoid
making up
their minds
514 29'6
6I-o
I believe that
you're really for
something
or
against
it,
and
anything
in between is
just
an
excuse to avoid the issue 6I'I 38.9 77.8
People
who
try
to steer a 'middle
course' are
usually just
afraid to
take a stand
63'0 24-8 53'9
(N
for PAB
items) (72) (1,584) (241)
351 351
352
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
352
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TABLE
7
TABLE
7
Tolerance
of Left-Wing Expression (CLS
and
OVS)
Tolerance
of Left-Wing Expression (CLS
and
OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
Protesters who mock the
president
by
wearing
death masks at one of his
public speeches:
-Should have the
right
to
appear
in
any
kind of
costume
they
want
47.4 52'3 IO-5
-Should be removed from the
audience
by
the
police
31.6
22.3 80-7
(Decline
to
choose)
21-0
25.4
8-8
(N
of CLS
sample) (19) (I97) (57)
When it comes to free
speech,
extremists:
-Should have the same
rights
as
everyone
else
87-5 9I13 391I
-Should not be allowed to
spread
their
propaganda
o.o
o -8
44'4
(Decline
to
choose) I2-5 7' 9 I6-5
'Crackpot'
ideas:
-Have as much
right
to be heard
as sensible ideas 70.8
85-4
29-8
Sometimes have to be censored
for the
public good 8-3 5'7
57'0
(Decline
to
choose) 20-9
8'9
13-2
(N
of OVS
sample) (48) (I,334) (I5I)
Percentage reading
down
right
Protesters who mock the
president
by
wearing
death masks at one of his
public speeches:
-Should have the
right
to
appear
in
any
kind of
costume
they
want
47.4 52'3 IO-5
-Should be removed from the
audience
by
the
police
31.6
22.3 80-7
(Decline
to
choose)
21-0
25.4
8-8
(N
of CLS
sample) (19) (I97) (57)
When it comes to free
speech,
extremists:
rights
as
everyone
else
87-5 9I13 391I
-Should not be allowed to
spread
their
propaganda
o.o
o -8
44'4
(Decline
to
choose) I2-5 7' 9 I6-5
'Crackpot'
ideas:
-Have as much
right
to be heard
as sensible ideas 70.8
85-4
29-8
Sometimes have to be censored
for the
public good 8-3 5'7
57'0
(Decline
to
choose) 20-9
8'9
13-2
(N
of OVS
sample) (48) (I,334) (I5I)
SUPPORT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
While it is
widely
assumed that the left
diverges sharply
from the
right
in its
support
of civil
liberties,
there are
reasons,
many
of them
already suggested,
to
question
this
assumption.
We
have,
for
example, previously
noted the far
left's
arguments
for
'repressive
tolerance',
which counsels intolerance to-
wards
groups
the far left
regards
as inimical to its cherished values.
Hence,
we
should
expect
the far left to
parcel
out tolerance in a
very
instrumental
fashion,
supporting
civil liberties for those with whom
they agree
or
sym-
pathize,
but not for those whose beliefs or conduct
they regard
as
egregious.
These
expectations
are
strongly
borne out
by
the data. When we examine
the tolerance of
left-wing
radicals towards
atheists,
political
'extremists',
'crackpots',
and critics of the
government,
we find that
they
are almost as
permissive
as the
moderates,
while the radical
right
is the least tolerant.
(See
Table
7
for
examples.)
However,
the far left is much less libertarian when confronted with
groups
or individuals of whom it
disapproves.
This contrast is
brought
out,
for
example,
on items
measuring support
for academic freedom in the
university.
SUPPORT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
While it is
widely
assumed that the left
diverges sharply
from the
right
in its
support
of civil
liberties,
there are
reasons,
many
of them
already suggested,
to
question
this
assumption.
We
have,
for
example, previously
noted the far
left's
arguments
for
'repressive
tolerance',
which counsels intolerance to-
wards
groups
the far left
regards
as inimical to its cherished values.
Hence,
we
should
expect
the far left to
parcel
out tolerance in a
very
instrumental
fashion,
supporting
civil liberties for those with whom
they agree
or
sym-
pathize,
but not for those whose beliefs or conduct
they regard
as
egregious.
These
expectations
are
strongly
borne out
by
the data. When we examine
the tolerance of
left-wing
radicals towards
atheists,
political
'extremists',
'crackpots',
and critics of the
government,
we find that
they
are almost as
permissive
as the
moderates,
while the radical
right
is the least tolerant.
(See
Table
7
for
examples.)
However,
the far left is much less libertarian when confronted with
groups
or individuals of whom it
disapproves.
This contrast is
brought
out,
for
example,
on items
measuring support
for academic freedom in the
university.
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
TABLE 8 Tolerance
of Right-Wing Expression (CLS)
Percentage
of
replies
to each item
right
A humor
magazine
which ridicules or
makes fun of
blacks, women,
or other
minority groups:
right
as
any
other
magazine
to
print
what it wants 42-1
73-0 40-4
-Should lose its
mailing
privileges
36.8 6-6
33-3
(Decline
to
choose)
I II
20-4 I6-3
If the
majority
in a referendum votes
to
stop publication
of
newspapers
that
preach
race hatred:
-No
one,
not even the
majority
of voters, should have the
right
to close down a
newspaper 27-8 51I3
36-8
-Such
newspapers
should be
closed down
50-0 21-3
42-I
(Decline
to
choose)
22-2
27'4
21I-
The movie
industry:
-Should be free to make movies
on
any subject
it chooses
63-2 70-9 I5-8
-Should not be
permitted
to
make movies that offend certain
minorities or
religious groups
36.8 6-6
491I
(Decline
to
choose)
o0o
22.4 351
A
group
that wants to
buy advertising
space
in a
newspaper
to advocate war
against
another
country:
-Should have as much
right
to
buy advertising space
as a
group
that favors world
peace
21-1
37-9 17-5
-Should be turned down
by
the
newspaper 68-4 31'3
70-2
(Decline
to
choose) Io-5
30.8
I2-3
(N) (19) (196) (57)
Asked whether one is ever
justified
in
refusing
to hire a
professor
because of
his 'unusual
political
beliefs',
left radicals are more
likely
than
any
other
group
to
say
such action cannot be
justified.
In this
case,
presumably, they
recognize
that their own interests are
likely
to be at stake. In
contrast,
on the
issue of whether a
university
should refuse to hire a
professor
because 'he
believes certain races are
inferior',
radicals of the left and
right
are more
likely
than the moderates to assert that such action
'may
be
necessary
if
his
views are
really
extreme'.
TABLE 8 Tolerance
of Right-Wing Expression (CLS)
Percentage
of
replies
to each item
right
A humor
magazine
which ridicules or
makes fun of
blacks, women,
or other
minority groups:
right
as
any
other
magazine
to
print
what it wants 42-1
73-0 40-4
-Should lose its
mailing
privileges
36.8 6-6
33-3
(Decline
to
choose)
I II
20-4 I6-3
If the
majority
in a referendum votes
to
stop publication
of
newspapers
that
preach
race hatred:
-No
one,
not even the
majority
of voters, should have the
right
to close down a
newspaper 27-8 51I3
36-8
-Such
newspapers
should be
closed down
50-0 21-3
42-I
(Decline
to
choose)
22-2
27'4
21I-
The movie
industry:
-Should be free to make movies
on
any subject
it chooses
63-2 70-9 I5-8
-Should not be
permitted
to
make movies that offend certain
minorities or
religious groups
36.8 6-6
491I
(Decline
to
choose)
o0o
22.4 351
A
group
that wants to
buy advertising
space
in a
newspaper
to advocate war
against
another
country:
-Should have as much
right
to
buy advertising space
as a
group
that favors world
peace
21-1
37-9 17-5
-Should be turned down
by
the
newspaper 68-4 31'3
70-2
(Decline
to
choose) Io-5
30.8
I2-3
(N) (19) (196) (57)
Asked whether one is ever
justified
in
refusing
to hire a
professor
because of
his 'unusual
political
beliefs',
left radicals are more
likely
than
any
other
group
to
say
such action cannot be
justified.
In this
case,
presumably, they
recognize
that their own interests are
likely
to be at stake. In
contrast,
on the
issue of whether a
university
should refuse to hire a
professor
because 'he
believes certain races are
inferior',
radicals of the left and
right
are more
likely
than the moderates to assert that such action
'may
be
necessary
if
his
views are
really
extreme'.
353 353
354
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
354
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TABLE
9
Tolerance
of
Nazis and the Klan
(CLS)
Percentage reading
down
right
When
groups
like the Nazis or other
extreme
groups require police
protection
at their rallies and
marches,
the
community
should:
-Supply
and
pay
for whatever
police protection
is needed
26'3 27.2 17'5
-Prohibit such
groups
from
holding
rallies because of the
costs and
dangers
involved
57'9 36'9 77'2
(Decline
to
choose)
15'8 35'9 5'3
If some students at a
college
want
to form a
'Campus
Nazi Club':
-They
should be allowed to do so
2.11 33'8
7.0
-College
officials should ban
such clubs from
campus 68-4 38-5 89-5
(Decline
to
choose) 10-5 27'7 3'5
Should
groups
like the Nazis and
Ku Klux Klan be allowed to
appear
on
public
television to state their
views?
-Yes,
should be allowed no matter
who is offended 36.8 38-I
22.8
-No, because
they
would offend
certain racial or
religious
groups
36-8
23-4 57'9
(Decline
to
choose) 26-4 38'6 19'4
(N) (19) (195) (57)
As can be seen in Table
8,
both the far left and the far
right
are much more
inclined than the moderates to allow a
majority
to close down
newspapers
that
preach
race
hatred;
both are also far more
willing
than moderates to take
away
the
mailing privileges
of a humorous
magazine
that makes fun of blacks,
women and other
minorities;
both would
prevent
film-makers from
producing
films that offend minorities or
religious groups,
and both would
prohibit
a
group
from
purchasing advertising space
in order to advocate war
against
a
foreign country.
Similarly,
on a series of
questions
asked in the Civil Liberties
survey
concerning
the
rights
of Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan to
appear
on
public
television,
to establish a
campus organization,
to receive
police protection
for
a
public rally,
etc.,
the far left exhibits less tolerance than moderates.
(See
Table
9.)
TABLE
9
Tolerance
of
Nazis and the Klan
(CLS)
Percentage reading
down
right
When
groups
like the Nazis or other
extreme
groups require police
protection
at their rallies and
marches,
the
community
should:
-Supply
and
pay
for whatever
police protection
is needed
26'3 27.2 17'5
-Prohibit such
groups
from
holding
rallies because of the
costs and
dangers
involved
57'9 36'9 77'2
(Decline
to
choose)
15'8 35'9 5'3
If some students at a
college
want
to form a
'Campus
Nazi Club':
-They
should be allowed to do so
2.11 33'8
7.0
-College
officials should ban
such clubs from
campus 68-4 38-5 89-5
(Decline
to
choose) 10-5 27'7 3'5
Should
groups
like the Nazis and
Ku Klux Klan be allowed to
appear
on
public
television to state their
views?
-Yes,
should be allowed no matter
who is offended 36.8 38-I
22.8
-No, because
they
would offend
certain racial or
religious
groups
36-8
23-4 57'9
(Decline
to
choose) 26-4 38'6 19'4
(N) (19) (195) (57)
As can be seen in Table
8,
both the far left and the far
right
are much more
inclined than the moderates to allow a
majority
to close down
newspapers
that
preach
race
hatred;
both are also far more
willing
than moderates to take
away
the
mailing privileges
of a humorous
magazine
that makes fun of blacks,
women and other
minorities;
both would
prevent
film-makers from
producing
films that offend minorities or
religious groups,
and both would
prohibit
a
group
from
purchasing advertising space
in order to advocate war
against
a
foreign country.
Similarly,
on a series of
questions
asked in the Civil Liberties
survey
concerning
the
rights
of Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan to
appear
on
public
television,
to establish a
campus organization,
to receive
police protection
for
a
public rally,
etc.,
the far left exhibits less tolerance than moderates.
(See
Table
9.)
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
TABLE I Tolerance
of Right-Wing Expression (OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
If a
speaker
at a
public meeting
begins
to make racial slurs, the
audience should:
-Let him have his
say
and then
answer him
39.6 84-3
70.2
-Stop
him from
speaking 39'6 4'3
15-2
(Decline
to
choose)
20-8 I I4 I4.6
Any
television station that recommends
the use of
military
action
against
demonstrators:
-Has a
right
to
express
its views
on
public
affairs
27-I 67-5
76-2
-Should have its licence taken
away 37-5
I
I5 4'0
(Decline
to
choose) 35-4
2I-0 I9-8
Meetings urging
America to make war
against
an
enemy
nation:
-Have as much
right
to be held as
meetings
that
support peace 43'8 85'8 74'8
Are so inhuman that we should not
allow them to be held 22-9
2.8
9'9
(Decline
to
choose) 333
1
I.3 15-3
A radio or TV station that
always speaks
for the rich and
powerful against
the
poor
and
oppressed:
-Should have the
right
to favor or
oppose any group
it chooses
4'2 23-2 25-5
-Should be
required by
law to
present
a more balanced
picture 77.1 58-7 49'7
(Decline
to
choose) 18-7
i8
I
251I
(N) (48) (I,334) (I5i)
A
stronger
test of
left-wing
and
right-wing
tolerance can be made
by
examining
several
questions
from the OVS
survey
of
ideological
elites. The
more hardcore radical left in this
survey
turns out to be the least tolerant of
the three
groups
when
asked,
for
example,
about a
speaker
who utters racial
slurs;
a
group
which meets in order to
urge
America to
go
to war
against
another
country;
a television station that advocates the use of the
military
to
combat demonstrators;
and a radio or television station that favours the rich
and
powerful
at the
expense
of the
poor
and
oppressed (see
Table
io).
While we have focused attention in this section on the
expediency
of
left-wing support
for freedom of
expression,
we should note that the
right
is
TABLE I Tolerance
of Right-Wing Expression (OVS)
Percentage reading
down
right
If a
speaker
at a
public meeting
begins
to make racial slurs, the
audience should:
-Let him have his
say
and then
answer him
39.6 84-3
70.2
-Stop
him from
speaking 39'6 4'3
15-2
(Decline
to
choose)
20-8 I I4 I4.6
Any
television station that recommends
the use of
military
action
against
demonstrators:
-Has a
right
to
express
its views
on
public
affairs
27-I 67-5
76-2
-Should have its licence taken
away 37-5
I
I5 4'0
(Decline
to
choose) 35-4
2I-0 I9-8
Meetings urging
America to make war
against
an
enemy
nation:
-Have as much
right
to be held as
meetings
that
support peace 43'8 85'8 74'8
Are so inhuman that we should not
allow them to be held 22-9
2.8
9'9
(Decline
to
choose) 333
1
I.3 15-3
A radio or TV station that
always speaks
for the rich and
powerful against
the
poor
and
oppressed:
-Should have the
right
to favor or
oppose any group
it chooses
4'2 23-2 25-5
-Should be
required by
law to
present
a more balanced
picture 77.1 58-7 49'7
(Decline
to
choose) 18-7
i8
I
251I
(N) (48) (I,334) (I5i)
A
stronger
test of
left-wing
and
right-wing
tolerance can be made
by
examining
several
questions
from the OVS
survey
of
ideological
elites. The
more hardcore radical left in this
survey
turns out to be the least tolerant of
the three
groups
when
asked,
for
example,
about a
speaker
who utters racial
slurs;
a
group
which meets in order to
urge
America to
go
to war
against
another
country;
a television station that advocates the use of the
military
to
combat demonstrators;
and a radio or television station that favours the rich
and
powerful
at the
expense
of the
poor
and
oppressed (see
Table
io).
While we have focused attention in this section on the
expediency
of
left-wing support
for freedom of
expression,
we should note that the
right
is
355 355
356
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
356
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
similarly partisan
in its
responses
on issues that
engage
its bias.
Witness,
for
example,
its
responses
to the items in Table
io,
which show
that,
when
confronted with
right-wing
causes and
groups,
the far
right may
be as tolerant
as the moderates and more tolerant than the far left.
Furthermore,
the
supporters
of the radical
right
are far more
likely
than the radical left
(48 per
cent to 21
per cent)
to
permit
an elected
congressman
to take office even if he
advocates violence
against
minorities.
(Over
68
per
cent of the left would
deny
him the
right
to
office.)
Thus,
despite
its overall
pattern
of
intolerance,
the far
right
exhibits a fair measure of tolerance on issues that
clearly
reflect
its
ideological preferences.
In this
aspect,
as in
others,
it resembles the far
left.
The bias with which the far left and far
right apply
the
principle
of tolerance
is
neatly
summed
up by
their
responses
to the
question
that
appears
in Table
I on the
principle
which should
guide
the
granting
of free
speech.
On this
item we find that the
political
moderates,
by
a
margin
of
approximately 30 per
cent,
are more
likely
than either the far left or the far
right
to favour the
unconditional extension of free
speech.
similarly partisan
in its
responses
on issues that
engage
its bias.
Witness,
for
example,
its
responses
to the items in Table
io,
which show
that,
when
confronted with
right-wing
causes and
groups,
the far
right may
be as tolerant
as the moderates and more tolerant than the far left.
Furthermore,
the
supporters
of the radical
right
are far more
likely
than the radical left
(48 per
cent to 21
per cent)
to
permit
an elected
congressman
to take office even if he
advocates violence
against
minorities.
(Over
68
per
cent of the left would
deny
him the
right
to
office.)
Thus,
despite
its overall
pattern
of
intolerance,
the far
right
exhibits a fair measure of tolerance on issues that
clearly
reflect
its
ideological preferences.
In this
aspect,
as in
others,
it resembles the far
left.
The bias with which the far left and far
right apply
the
principle
of tolerance
is
neatly
summed
up by
their
responses
to the
question
that
appears
in Table
I on the
principle
which should
guide
the
granting
of free
speech.
On this
item we find that the
political
moderates,
by
a
margin
of
approximately 30 per
cent,
are more
likely
than either the far left or the far
right
to favour the
unconditional extension of free
speech.
TABLE ii Free
Speech
(CLS)
Percentage reading
down
right
Free
speech
should be
granted:
-To
everyone regardless
of how 42 I
711I 40'4
intolerant
they
are of other
people's opinions
-Only
to
people
who are
willing
to
47.4 I6.5
38.6
grant
the same
rights
of free
speech
to
everyone
else
(Decline
to
choose) 10-5 12-4
21-0
(N) (I9) (I94) (57)
TABLE ii Free
Speech
(CLS)
Percentage reading
down
right
Free
speech
should be
granted:
-To
everyone regardless
of how 42 I
711I 40'4
intolerant
they
are of other
people's opinions
-Only
to
people
who are
willing
to
47.4 I6.5
38.6
grant
the same
rights
of free
speech
to
everyone
else
(Decline
to
choose) 10-5 12-4
21-0
(N) (I9) (I94) (57)
TOTALITARIANISM, AUTHORITARIANISM AND INTOLERANCE OF
HUMAN FRAILTY
The
greater willingness
of both extremes to
trample
on the
rights
of indivi-
duals in order to achieve their
goals
is further demonstrated in Table 12
by
their scores on a scale
measuring support
for totalitarian aims and tactics.
Almost
50 per
cent of the far left and 60
per
cent of the far
right
score 'middle'
or
'high'
on this
measure,
compared
to
23 per
cent of the moderates. Their
responses
to several of the items in Table
13
reveal the
tough-minded
and
ruthless attitudes of
right-wing
and
left-wing
extremists. For
example,
the two
radical
camps
are more
likely
than the moderates to endorse the use of unfair
and brutal methods to achieve what
they perceive
to be a
higher purpose.
TOTALITARIANISM, AUTHORITARIANISM AND INTOLERANCE OF
HUMAN FRAILTY
The
greater willingness
of both extremes to
trample
on the
rights
of indivi-
duals in order to achieve their
goals
is further demonstrated in Table 12
by
their scores on a scale
measuring support
for totalitarian aims and tactics.
Almost
50 per
cent of the far left and 60
per
cent of the far
right
score 'middle'
or
'high'
on this
measure,
compared
to
23 per
cent of the moderates. Their
responses
to several of the items in Table
13
reveal the
tough-minded
and
ruthless attitudes of
right-wing
and
left-wing
extremists. For
example,
the two
radical
camps
are more
likely
than the moderates to endorse the use of unfair
and brutal methods to achieve what
they perceive
to be a
higher purpose.
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
TA B L E 2 Totalitarianism
(PA
B scale
scores)
Percentage reading
down
right
Low
54-8 76-5 39'5
Middle
35-6 2I-5
42.8
High
9-6
1-9 I7'7
(N) (73) (I,592) (243)
TABLE
I3
Totalitarianism
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
We
might
as well make
up
our minds that
in order to make the world better a lot
of innocent
people
will have to suffer 26-0
I9-2
37'3
To
bring
about
great changes
for the
benefit of mankind often
requires
cruelty
and even ruthlessness 26-4 12.6
23.6
Soft and idealistic
people
can never
be the doers of
great
events 26-8
I3.8 58-4
Almost
any
unfairness or
brutality
may
have to be
justified
when some
great purpose
is
being
carried out
I5.3
8-I
13'7
The
unhappiness
of a few
people simply
doesn't matter when it is a
question
of a
step
forward for the
majority
of the
people 65.3
46-2
65.7
Sometimes,
when a new
society
is in
its
early stages,
the masses have to
be ruled with an iron hand for their
own
good 32-4 20-3
32.8
(N) (73) (1,584) (24I)
TA B L E 2 Totalitarianism
(PA
B scale
scores)
Percentage reading
down
right
Low
54-8 76-5 39'5
Middle
35-6 2I-5
42.8
High
9-6
1-9 I7'7
(N) (73) (I,592) (243)
TABLE
I3
Totalitarianism
(PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
We
might
as well make
up
our minds that
in order to make the world better a lot
of innocent
people
will have to suffer 26-0
I9-2
37'3
To
bring
about
great changes
for the
benefit of mankind often
requires
cruelty
and even ruthlessness 26-4 12.6
23.6
Soft and idealistic
people
can never
be the doers of
great
events 26-8
I3.8 58-4
Almost
any
unfairness or
brutality
may
have to be
justified
when some
great purpose
is
being
carried out
I5.3
8-I
13'7
The
unhappiness
of a few
people simply
doesn't matter when it is a
question
of a
step
forward for the
majority
of the
people 65.3
46-2
65.7
Sometimes,
when a new
society
is in
its
early stages,
the masses have to
be ruled with an iron hand for their
own
good 32-4 20-3
32.8
(N) (73) (1,584) (24I)
Both the left and the
right express
disdain for
people
whom
they regard
as
'soft and
idealistic',
showing
a
greater preference,
relative to
moderates,
for
unsentimental
leadership
that deals
strictly,
and
callously
if
necessary,
with
the
people being
led. Left and
right
radicals are also more
likely
to
agree
to
statements that endorse intolerance of
non-conformity
and the
prerogatives
of the
majority
to
ignore
the
rights
and concerns of the
minority.
Both the left and the
right express
disdain for
people
whom
they regard
as
'soft and
idealistic',
showing
a
greater preference,
relative to
moderates,
for
unsentimental
leadership
that deals
strictly,
and
callously
if
necessary,
with
the
people being
led. Left and
right
radicals are also more
likely
to
agree
to
statements that endorse intolerance of
non-conformity
and the
prerogatives
of the
majority
to
ignore
the
rights
and concerns of the
minority.
357 357
358
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
358
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
TABLE
I4
Intolerance
of
Human
Frailty (PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
Item
Far left Moderate Far
right
A
person
who lets himself be
pushed
around has no
right
to
expect
sympathy
when
things
turn out
badly
for him
58-3 43.9 81-4
A
person's
emotions should
always
be held in check
by
the moral code 68
I
53-8 66-3
It's all
right
to have
friends,
but
you
shouldn't let
yourself get
so
attached that
you're always having
to do
things
for them
57'5 36-9 65.8
(N) (72) (1,567) (24I)
TABLE
15
F-Authoritarianism
(PAB
Scale
Scores)
Percentage reading
down
right
Low
54-8 68-5 12-3
Middle
39.7 27.8 49.8
High 5'5 3.7 37.9
(N) (73) (1,592) (243)
TABLE
I4
Intolerance
of
Human
Frailty (PAB)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
Item
Far left Moderate Far
right
A
person
who lets himself be
pushed
around has no
right
to
expect
sympathy
when
things
turn out
badly
for him
58-3 43.9 81-4
A
person's
emotions should
always
be held in check
by
the moral code 68
I
53-8 66-3
It's all
right
to have
friends,
but
you
shouldn't let
yourself get
so
attached that
you're always having
to do
things
for them
57'5 36-9 65.8
(N) (72) (1,567) (24I)
TABLE
15
F-Authoritarianism
(PAB
Scale
Scores)
Percentage reading
down
right
Low
54-8 68-5 12-3
Middle
39.7 27.8 49.8
High 5'5 3.7 37.9
(N) (73) (1,592) (243)
The
self-professed toughness
of the extreme left and
right
is further
elucidated
by
their
responses
to a set of items
measuring
'intolerance of
human
frailty'. (See
Table
I4.) Although
the differences are not
large, they
reveal the
willingness
of the two extreme
camps
to forsake
personal
friendships
in the service of 'truth' or
'greatness'
and to assume an
unyielding,
aggressive
and
emotionally
detached
posture.
When we turn to the F
scale,
the most familiar measure of authoritarian-
ism,
the
left,
for reasons we discussed
earlier,
do not score
very high
in
comparison
to the far
right,
although
they
do
register
a
slightly higher
score
than the
political
moderates. As can be seen in Table
I5,
almost
38 per
cent of
the far
right
score
'high'
on the F scale
compared
to fewer than 6
per
cent of
the far left.
An examination of
specific
F-scale items in Table I6 indicates that the
far-left
supporters respond
more
favourably
to some items than
others,
depending
on the
explicit
content of the items. Certain of the items reflect
The
self-professed toughness
of the extreme left and
right
is further
elucidated
by
their
responses
to a set of items
measuring
'intolerance of
human
frailty'. (See
Table
I4.) Although
the differences are not
large, they
reveal the
willingness
of the two extreme
camps
to forsake
personal
friendships
in the service of 'truth' or
'greatness'
and to assume an
unyielding,
aggressive
and
emotionally
detached
posture.
When we turn to the F
scale,
the most familiar measure of authoritarian-
ism,
the
left,
for reasons we discussed
earlier,
do not score
very high
in
comparison
to the far
right,
although
they
do
register
a
slightly higher
score
than the
political
moderates. As can be seen in Table
I5,
almost
38 per
cent of
the far
right
score
'high'
on the F scale
compared
to fewer than 6
per
cent of
the far left.
An examination of
specific
F-scale items in Table I6 indicates that the
far-left
supporters respond
more
favourably
to some items than
others,
depending
on the
explicit
content of the items. Certain of the items reflect
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
TABLE 16 F-Authoritarianism
(PAB items)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
Sex
crimes,
such as
rape
and attacks
on
children,
imprisonment;
such criminals
ought
to be
publicly whipped,
or worse
31.5 33'9 72-0
Most
people
don't realize how much
our lives are controlled
by plots
hatched in secret
places 59'7 25-I 67-8
Young people
sometimes
get
rebellious
ideas,
but as
they grow up they
ought
to
get
over them and settle
down
47.2 58-5 89-3
People
can be divided into two
distinct classes: the weak and
the
strong 30-1 I9-2 56-4
There is
hardly anything
lower than
a
person
who does not feel a
great
love, gratitude,
and
respect
for
his
parents 57-1 56-2 83-0
Obedience and
respect
for
authority
are the most
important
virtues children
should learn
47.2 517 8I-8
(N) (1,579) (243)
TABLE 16 F-Authoritarianism
(PAB items)
Percentage agreeing
with each item
right
Sex
crimes,
such as
rape
and attacks
on
children,
imprisonment;
such criminals
ought
to be
publicly whipped,
or worse
31.5 33'9 72-0
Most
people
don't realize how much
our lives are controlled
by plots
hatched in secret
places 59'7 25-I 67-8
Young people
sometimes
get
rebellious
ideas,
but as
they grow up they
ought
to
get
over them and settle
down
47.2 58-5 89-3
People
can be divided into two
distinct classes: the weak and
the
strong 30-1 I9-2 56-4
There is
hardly anything
lower than
a
person
who does not feel a
great
love, gratitude,
and
respect
for
his
parents 57-1 56-2 83-0
Obedience and
respect
for
authority
are the most
important
virtues children
should learn
47.2 517 8I-8
(N) (1,579) (243)
values that have a
transparently greater appeal
to adherents of the far
right
than of the far left.
Among
these are items
pertaining
to the treatment of
perpetrators
of sex
crimes,
the need for
young people
to control their
rebellious
ideas,
the
great
virtue of
expressing 'love,
gratitude,
and
respect
for one's
parents',
and the
paramount importance
of
instilling
in children
obedience and
respect
for
authority.
Given the values reflected in these
statements,
it is not a
surprise
that
left-wing respondents
are the least
likely
to
agree
with them. On the other
hand,
when the content of the F-scale items
reflects intolerance of
ambiguity
or a
suspicion
of
conspiracies,
we
again
find
that the far left and far
right,
in their
responses
to these
items,
are
significantly
more authoritarian than the moderates.
SUMMARY
Although
some scholars have
argued
that authoritarianism is characteristic
only
of the
right
and not of the
left,
persuasive
reasons exist for
doubting
this
values that have a
transparently greater appeal
to adherents of the far
right
than of the far left.
Among
these are items
pertaining
to the treatment of
perpetrators
of sex
crimes,
the need for
young people
to control their
rebellious
ideas,
the
great
virtue of
expressing 'love,
gratitude,
and
respect
for one's
parents',
and the
paramount importance
of
instilling
in children
obedience and
respect
for
authority.
Given the values reflected in these
statements,
it is not a
surprise
that
left-wing respondents
are the least
likely
to
agree
with them. On the other
hand,
when the content of the F-scale items
reflects intolerance of
ambiguity
or a
suspicion
of
conspiracies,
we
again
find
that the far left and far
right,
in their
responses
to these
items,
are
significantly
more authoritarian than the moderates.
SUMMARY
Although
some scholars have
argued
that authoritarianism is characteristic
only
of the
right
and not of the
left,
persuasive
reasons exist for
doubting
this
359 359
360
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
360
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
claim. Intuitive observation of
left-wing
and
right-wing regimes
as well as
radical
political
movements of the left and
right
reveals
striking parallels
in
their
styles
of
political engagement,
their reliance
upon
force,
their disdain
for democratic ideals and
practices
and their violations of civil liberties. In
addition,
systematic inquiry
into the similarities and differences between
far-left and
far-right
radicals in the United States has been
hampered by
various
methodological
difficulties. One
can. list,
among
these,
such
problems
as the obvious
inappropriateness
of the F scale
(owing
to its
strong right-wing
content)
as a measure for
identifying left-wing
authoritarians;
the
difficulty
of
obtaining adequate samples
of true believers of the extreme left and
right;
the
self-image
of the American left as a
persecuted minority
which,
for reasons of
self-interest,
spuriously
inflates the
degree
of
support expressed by
its
members for individual
rights
and
liberties;
and the
exposure
of both extreme
camps
to the liberal democratic values
dominating
American
political
culture,
which
unmistakably
colours their
political
rhetoric.
We have reason to think that a similar
study
conducted in some -
perhaps
many
-
European
countries would reveal even
greater
similarities between
the far left and far
right
than we have turned
up
in the United States. Unlike
the United
States,
which has
enjoyed
a
strong
liberal democratic tradition
that has served to weaken and soften the
intensity
of its radical
movements,
a
number of
European
countries,
less wedded to liberal democratic
principles,
have
developed
a more
vigorous,
less diluted tradition of radical
politics.
These nations have
long
had to contend with
powerful
extremist movements
actively
and
significantly engaged
in the
political struggles
of their
respective
nations. The radical movements of
Europe
have been more extreme and
zealous
- more
unequivocally revolutionary
and
reactionary
- than the radical
movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these
extremist
movements,
in our
view,
is
likely
to have intensified the authorita-
rian
propensities
of each.
In the
present
article,
through
a series of
surveys
in which we have tried to
identify,
as best we
can,
supporters
right,
we have
systematically compared
the two
camps
on a
variety
of
political
and
psycholo-
gical
characteristics. We
find,
in
keeping
with the conventional
view,
that the
far left and the far
right
stand at
opposite
ends of the familiar
left-right
continuum on
many
issues of
public policy, political philosophy
and
personal
belief.
They
hold
sharply contrasting
views on
questions
of law and
order,
foreign policy,
social
welfare,
economic
equality,
racial
equality,
women's
rights,
sexual
freedom, patriotism,
social conventions, religion, family
values
and orientations towards
business,
labour and
private enterprise.
Nevertheless,
while the two
camps
embrace different
programmatic
beliefs,
both are
deeply estranged
from certain features of American
society
and
highly
critical of what
they perceive
as the
spiritual
and moral
degeneration
of
American institutions. Both view American
society
as dominated
by conspir-
atorial forces that are
working
to defeat their
respective ideological
aims.
The
degree
of their alienation is intensified
by
the zealous and
unyielding
claim. Intuitive observation of
left-wing
and
right-wing regimes
as well as
radical
political
movements of the left and
right
reveals
striking parallels
in
their
styles
of
political engagement,
their reliance
upon
force,
their disdain
for democratic ideals and
practices
and their violations of civil liberties. In
addition,
systematic inquiry
into the similarities and differences between
far-left and
far-right
radicals in the United States has been
hampered by
various
methodological
difficulties. One
can. list,
among
these,
such
problems
as the obvious
inappropriateness
of the F scale
(owing
to its
strong right-wing
content)
as a measure for
identifying left-wing
authoritarians;
the
difficulty
of
obtaining adequate samples
of true believers of the extreme left and
right;
the
self-image
of the American left as a
persecuted minority
which,
for reasons of
self-interest,
spuriously
inflates the
degree
of
support expressed by
its
members for individual
rights
and
liberties;
and the
exposure
of both extreme
camps
to the liberal democratic values
dominating
American
political
culture,
which
unmistakably
colours their
political
rhetoric.
We have reason to think that a similar
study
conducted in some -
perhaps
many
-
European
countries would reveal even
greater
similarities between
the far left and far
right
than we have turned
up
in the United States. Unlike
the United
States,
which has
enjoyed
a
strong
liberal democratic tradition
that has served to weaken and soften the
intensity
of its radical
movements,
a
number of
European
countries,
less wedded to liberal democratic
principles,
have
developed
a more
vigorous,
less diluted tradition of radical
politics.
These nations have
long
had to contend with
powerful
extremist movements
actively
and
significantly engaged
in the
political struggles
of their
respective
nations. The radical movements of
Europe
have been more extreme and
zealous
- more
unequivocally revolutionary
and
reactionary
- than the radical
movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these
extremist
movements,
in our
view,
is
likely
to have intensified the authorita-
rian
propensities
of each.
In the
present
article,
through
a series of
surveys
in which we have tried to
identify,
as best we
can,
supporters
right,
we have
systematically compared
the two
camps
on a
variety
of
political
and
psycholo-
gical
characteristics. We
find,
in
keeping
with the conventional
view,
that the
far left and the far
right
stand at
opposite
ends of the familiar
left-right
continuum on
many
issues of
public policy, political philosophy
and
personal
belief.
They
hold
sharply contrasting
views on
questions
of law and
order,
foreign policy,
social
welfare,
economic
equality,
racial
equality,
women's
rights,
sexual
freedom, patriotism,
social conventions, religion, family
values
and orientations towards
business,
labour and
private enterprise.
Nevertheless,
while the two
camps
embrace different
programmatic
beliefs,
both are
deeply estranged
from certain features of American
society
and
highly
critical of what
they perceive
as the
spiritual
and moral
degeneration
of
American institutions. Both view American
society
as dominated
by conspir-
atorial forces that are
working
to defeat their
respective ideological
aims.
The
degree
of their alienation is intensified
by
the zealous and
unyielding
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
Left- Wing
and
Right- Wing
Radicals
manner in which
they
hold their beliefs. Both
camps possess
an inflexible
psychological
and
political style
characterized
by
the
tendency
to view social
and
political
affairs in
crude,
unambiguous
and
stereotypical
terms.
They
see
political
life as a conflict between 'us' and
'them',
a
struggle
between
good
and evil
played
out on a
battleground
where
compromise
amounts to
capitulation
and the
goal
is total
victory.
The far left and the far
right
also resemble each other in the
way they
pursue
their
political goals.
Both are
disposed
to censor their
opponents,
to
deal
harshly
with
enemies,
to sacrifice the
well-being
even of the innocent in
order to serve a
'higher purpose',
and to use cruel tactics if
necessary
to
'persuade' society
of the wisdom of their
objectives.
Both tend to
support (or
oppose)
civil liberties in a
highly partisan
and
self-serving
fashion,
supporting
freedom for themselves and for the
groups
and causes
they
favour while
seeking
to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes
they
dislike.
In
sum,
when the views of the far left and far
right
are evaluated
against
the
standard
left-right ideological
dimension,
they
can
appropriately
be classified
at
opposite
ends of the
political spectrum.
But when the two
camps
are
evaluated on
questions
of
political
and
psychological style,
the treatment
of
and the tactics that
they
are
willing
to
employ
to achieve
their
ends,
they display many parallels
that can
rightly
be labelled authori-
tarian.
APPENDIX I25
Far-Left
Scale
The communist countries will
go
down in
history
as:
(A)
countries that reached a new and
higher stage
of
progress;
(B) dictatorships
that crushed human freedom.
When black militant
groups
use violence to achieve their
goals:
(A) they
deserve our
support considering
the
way
blacks have been
treated;
(B) they
should be arrested.
Education in America
mainly
aims:
(A)
to
help keep
the mass of
people
under
control;
(B)
to teach
people
of all
groups
to
read, write,
and
get
ahead.
The sacrifices made
by
the
people
in the communist countries:
(A)
are
necessary
and will benefit the
people
in the
long run;
(B)
are not
really
in the
people's
interests.
If the
police
are harder on radicals than on other
groups:
(A)
the radicals are entitled to use violence to strike
back;
(B)
their actions should be
brought
to the attention of the courts.
Individual terrorist or
guerrilla
acts:
(A)
are often the
only way
an
oppressed group
can win its
rights;
(B)
are
morally wrong
and never do much
good anyway.
25
Each of the items on the Far-Left and
Far-Right
scales also contains the
response
alternatives
'Neither' and 'Undecided'. To conserve
space
in the tables
presented
in this
article,
we have
combined these
responses
into a
single
'Decline to choose'
category.
manner in which
they
hold their beliefs. Both
camps possess
an inflexible
psychological
and
political style
characterized
by
the
tendency
to view social
and
political
affairs in
crude,
unambiguous
and
stereotypical
terms.
They
see
political
life as a conflict between 'us' and
'them',
a
struggle
between
good
and evil
played
out on a
battleground
where
compromise
amounts to
capitulation
and the
goal
is total
victory.
The far left and the far
right
also resemble each other in the
way they
pursue
their
political goals.
Both are
disposed
to censor their
opponents,
to
deal
harshly
with
enemies,
to sacrifice the
well-being
even of the innocent in
order to serve a
'higher purpose',
and to use cruel tactics if
necessary
to
'persuade' society
of the wisdom of their
objectives.
Both tend to
support (or
oppose)
civil liberties in a
highly partisan
and
self-serving
fashion,
supporting
freedom for themselves and for the
groups
and causes
they
favour while
seeking
to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes
they
dislike.
In
sum,
when the views of the far left and far
right
are evaluated
against
the
standard
left-right ideological
dimension,
they
can
appropriately
be classified
at
opposite
ends of the
political spectrum.
But when the two
camps
are
evaluated on
questions
of
political
and
psychological style,
the treatment
of
and the tactics that
they
are
willing
to
employ
to achieve
their
ends,
they display many parallels
that can
rightly
be labelled authori-
tarian.
APPENDIX I25
Far-Left
Scale
The communist countries will
go
down in
history
as:
(A)
countries that reached a new and
higher stage
of
progress;
(B) dictatorships
that crushed human freedom.
When black militant
groups
use violence to achieve their
goals:
(A) they
deserve our
support considering
the
way
blacks have been
treated;
(B) they
should be arrested.
Education in America
mainly
aims:
(A)
to
help keep
the mass of
people
under
control;
(B)
to teach
people
of all
groups
to
read, write,
and
get
ahead.
The sacrifices made
by
the
people
in the communist countries:
(A)
are
necessary
and will benefit the
people
in the
long run;
(B)
are not
really
in the
people's
interests.
If the
police
are harder on radicals than on other
groups:
(A)
the radicals are entitled to use violence to strike
back;
(B)
their actions should be
brought
to the attention of the courts.
Individual terrorist or
guerrilla
acts:
(A)
are often the
only way
an
oppressed group
can win its
rights;
(B)
are
morally wrong
and never do much
good anyway.
25
Each of the items on the Far-Left and
Far-Right
scales also contains the
response
alternatives
'Neither' and 'Undecided'. To conserve
space
in the tables
presented
in this
article,
we have
combined these
responses
into a
single
'Decline to choose'
category.
36I 36I
362
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
362
MCCLOSKY AND CHONG
The best
way
to solve this
country's problems
and make life better for the American
people
is to:
(A)
overturn the whole
society
from
top
to
bottom;
(B)
work within the
system
and
try
to reform it.
The welfare of mankind can best be served:
(A) by establishing
a
government
controlled
by
the
working
class;
(B) by improving
our
present government.
Which is the better
way
to
bring
about
necessary changes
in
society?
(A) by demonstrating
in the streets and
disrupting
the
system;
(B) through
the election
process.
The American form of
government
is:
(A)
one of the worst;
(B)
one of the best.
The use of violence to
try
to
change
the
system:
(A)
is often the
only way
to
get
results;
(B) usually
hurts the cause more than it
helps.
American
foreign policy
for the
past twenty-five years
has shown that we are:
(A)
an
imperialist
and warlike
country trying
to dominate the
world;
(B)
a
country sincerely trying
to defend the free world
against aggression.
The Americans who
put
this
country
down:
(A)
have seen
through
the fine words to the rotten
core;
(B) forget
how well it
compares
to other countries.
APPENDIX II26
Far-Right
Scale
Most
campus protests
and antiwar demonstrations:
(A)
are started
by
Americans who want to
express
their
feelings
and frustrations;
(B)
are
secretly organized by foreign agents.
country
in the world:
(A)
has a
right
to his
opinion;
(B)
doesn't deserve to live here.
Books that
preach
the overthrow of the
government
should be:
(A)
made available
by
the
library, just
like
any
other
book;
(B)
banned from the
library.
Any
American who shows
disrespect
for the
flag:
(A)
has the
right
to think what he
pleases;
(B)
patriots
to be
taught
a lesson.
The most
important
values children should learn are:
(A) independence
and self-reliance;
(B)
love and
respect
for their
parents.
The
employment
of radicals
by newspapers
and TV:
(A)
is their
right
as Americans;
(B)
should be forbidden.
If a
foreign country
is
strongly opposed
to our
way
of life:
(A)
we should still trade and
try
to
get along
with
them;
(B)
we should refuse to trade with them.
The best
way
to solve this
country's problems
and make life better for the American
people
is to:
(A)
overturn the whole
society
from
top
to
bottom;
(B)
work within the
system
and
try
to reform it.
The welfare of mankind can best be served:
(A) by establishing
a
government
controlled
by
the
working
class;
(B) by improving
our
present government.
Which is the better
way
to
bring
about
necessary changes
in
society?
(A) by demonstrating
in the streets and
disrupting
the
system;
(B) through
the election
process.
The American form of
government
is:
(A)
one of the worst;
(B)
one of the best.
The use of violence to
try
to
change
the
system:
(A)
is often the
only way
to
get
results;
(B) usually
hurts the cause more than it
helps.
American
foreign policy
for the
past twenty-five years
has shown that we are:
(A)
an
imperialist
and warlike
country trying
to dominate the
world;
(B)
a
country sincerely trying
to defend the free world
against aggression.
The Americans who
put
this
country
down:
(A)
have seen
through
the fine words to the rotten
core;
(B) forget
how well it
compares
to other countries.
APPENDIX II26
Far-Right
Scale
Most
campus protests
and antiwar demonstrations:
(A)
are started
by
Americans who want to
express
their
feelings
and frustrations;
(B)
are
secretly organized by foreign agents.
country
in the world:
(A)
has a
right
to his
opinion;
(B)
doesn't deserve to live here.
Books that
preach
the overthrow of the
government
should be:
(A)
made available
by
the
library, just
like
any
other
book;
(B)
banned from the
library.
Any
American who shows
disrespect
for the
flag:
(A)
has the
right
to think what he
pleases;
(B)
patriots
to be
taught
a lesson.
The most
important
values children should learn are:
(A) independence
and self-reliance;
(B)
love and
respect
for their
parents.
The
employment
of radicals
by newspapers
and TV:
(A)
is their
right
as Americans;
(B)
should be forbidden.
If a
foreign country
is
strongly opposed
to our
way
of life:
(A)
we should still trade and
try
to
get along
with
them;
(B)
we should refuse to trade with them.
26
See fn.
25.
26
See fn.
25.
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
Left-Wing
and
Right-Wing
Radicals
As a
political system,
communism:
(A)
has become so well established that we must learn to
get along
with
it;
(B)
is so evil we should
go
to
any lengths
to
destroy
it.
These
days:
(A) people
have healthier and more relaxed ideas about
sex;
(B)
there is too much sexual freedom and loose
living.
How would
you
feel if the United States were to lose its role as a leader
among
nations?
(A)
I doubt it would bother me
much;
(B)
I would consider it
tragic
and
humiliating.
Which of these comes closer to what
you
believe?
(A)
There is little or
nothing
to be said in favor of war;
(B)
War is cruel but it does teach
people something
about honor,
loyalty,
and
courage.
Liberalism differs from communism:
(A)
in
many ways,
but
especially
in liberalism's concern for
freedom;
(B) hardly
at all.
Censoring
obscene books:
(A)
is an old-fashioned idea that no
longer
makes
sense;
(B)
is
necessary
to
protect community
standards.
The United States was meant to be:
(A)
a
country
made
up
of
many
races,
religions,
and
nationalities;
(B)
a Christian nation.
As a
political system,
communism:
(A)
has become so well established that we must learn to
get along
with
it;
(B)
is so evil we should
go
to
any lengths
to
destroy
it.
These
days:
(A) people
have healthier and more relaxed ideas about
sex;
(B)
there is too much sexual freedom and loose
living.
How would
you
feel if the United States were to lose its role as a leader
among
nations?
(A)
I doubt it would bother me
much;
(B)
I would consider it
tragic
and
humiliating.
Which of these comes closer to what
you
believe?
(A)
There is little or
nothing
to be said in favor of war;
(B)
War is cruel but it does teach
people something
about honor,
loyalty,
and
courage.
Liberalism differs from communism:
(A)
in
many ways,
but
especially
in liberalism's concern for
freedom;
(B) hardly
at all.
Censoring
obscene books:
(A)
is an old-fashioned idea that no
longer
makes
sense;
(B)
is
necessary
to
protect community
standards.
The United States was meant to be:
(A)
a
country
made
up
of
many
races,
religions,
and
nationalities;
(B)
a Christian nation.
363 363

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SiniIavilies and BiJJevences Ielveen LeJl-Wing and BigIl-Wing BadicaIs

AulIov|s) HevIevl McCIosI and Bennis CIong

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