ECHELON article From Eurobytes From London Daily Telegraph ONLINE SURVEILLANCE Rumors have abounded for several

years of a massive system designed to intercept virtually all email and fax traffic in the world and subject it to automated analysis, despite laws in many nations (including this one) barring such activity. The laws were circumvented by a mutual pact among five nations. It s illegal for the !nited "tates to spy on it s citi#ens. $i%ewise the same for &reat 'ritain. 'ut under the terms of the !(!") agreement, 'ritain spies on )mericans and )merica spies on 'ritish citi#ens and the two groups trade data. Technically, it may be legal, but the intent to evade the spirit of the laws protecting the citi#ens of those two nations is clear. The system is called *+,*$-., and had been rumored to be in development since /012, the result of the !(!") treaty signed by the governments of the !nited "tates, the !nited (ingdom, +anada, )ustralia and .ew 3ealand. The purpose of the !(!") agreement was to create a single vast global intelligence organi#ation sharing common goals and a common agenda, spying on the world and sharing the data. The uniformity of operation is such that .") operatives from 4ort 5eade could wor% from 5enwith ,ill to intercept local communications without either nation having to formally approve or disclose the interception. picture *+,*$-. intercept station at 5enwith ,ill, *ngland. 6hat is *+,*$-. used for7 In the days of the cold war, *+,*$-. s primary purpose was to %eep an eye on the !.".".R. In the wa%e of the fall of the !.".".R. *+,*$-. justifies it s continued multi8 billion dollar expense with the claim that it is being used to fight 9terrorism9, the catch8all phrase used to justify any and all abuses of civil rights. 6ith the exposure of the ):*+ scandal, however, *+,*$-. s capabilities have come under renewed scrutiny and criticism by many nations. )lthough not directly implicated in the bugging of the )sia :acific *conomic +onference in "eattle, the use of so many !.". Intelligence agencies to bug the conference for the purpose of providing commercial secrets to ;.+ donors raised the very real possibility that *+,*$-. s all8hearing ears were prying corporate secrets loose for the advantage of the favored few. &iven that real terrorists and drug runners would always use illegal cryptographic methods anyway, the !") led attempt to ban strong crypto to the general populace seemed geared towards %eeping corporate secrets readable to *+,*$-., rather than any real attempt at crime prevention.

The cover blows off! *ven close allies do not li%e it when they are being spied on. *specially if the objective is not law enforcement but corporate shenanigans to ma%e rich politicians just that much richer. "o, the +ivil $iberties +ommittee of the *uropean :arliament loo%ed into *+,*$-., and officially confirmed it s existence and purpose. Here is the arti le that ran in the London Telegraph! Tuesday 16 December 1 "ssue #6 $%ies li&e '$ !

) *uropean +ommission report warns that the !nited "tates has developed an extensive networ% spying on *uropean citi#ens and we should all be worried. "imon ;avies reports +oo%ing up a charter for snooping A "LO#AL electronic spy networ% that can eavesdrop on every telephone, email and telex communication around the world will be officially ac%nowledged for the first time in a *uropean +ommission report to be delivered this wee%. The report 8 )ssessing the Technologies of :olitical +ontrol 8 was commissioned last year by the +ivil $iberties +ommittee of the *uropean :arliament. It contains details of a networ% of )merican8controlled intelligence stations on 'ritish soil and around the world, that 9routinely and indiscriminately9 monitor countless phone, fax and email messages. It states< 96ithin *urope all email telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the !nited "tates .ational "ecurity )gency transferring all target information from the *uropean mainland via the strategic hub of $ondon then by satellite to 4ort 5eade in 5aryland via the crucial hub at 5enwith ,ill in the .orth =or% moors in the !(.9 The report confirms for the first time the existence of the secretive *+,*$-. system. !ntil now, evidence of such astounding technology has been patchy and anecdotal. 'ut the report 8 to be discussed on Thursday by the committee of the office of "cience and Technology )ssessment in $uxembourg 8 confirms that the citi#ens of 'ritain and other *uropean states are subject to an intensity of surveillance far in excess of that imagined by most parliaments. Its findings are certain to excite the concern of 5*:s. 9The *+,*$-. system forms part of the !(!") system (+oo%ing up a charter for snooping) but unli%e many of the electronic spy systems developed during the +old 6ar, *+,*$-. is designed primarily for non8military targets< governments, organi#ations and businesses in virtually every country.

9The *+,*$-. system wor%s by indiscriminately intercepting very large >uantities of communications and then siphoning out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids li%e 5*5*? to find %ey words9. )ccording to the report, *+,*$-. uses a number of national dictionaries containing %ey words of interest to each country. 4or more than a decade, former agents of !", 'ritish, +anadian and .ew 3ealand national security agencies have claimed that the monitoring of electronic communications has become endemic throughout the world. Rumors have circulated that new technologies have been developed which have the capability to search most of the world s telex, fax and email networ%s for 9%ey words9. :hone calls, they claim, can be automatically analy#ed for %ey words. 4ormer signals intelligence operatives have claimed that spy bases controlled by )merica have the ability to search nearly all data communications for %ey words. They claim that *+,*$-. automatically analyses most email messaging for 9precursor9 data which assists intelligence agencies to determine targets. )ccording to former +anadian "ecurity *stablishment agent 5i%e 4rost, a voice recognition system called -ratory has been used for some years to intercept diplomatic calls. The driving force behind the report is &lyn 4ord, $abour 5*: for &reater 5anchester *ast. ,e believes that the report is crucial to the future of civil liberties in *urope. 9In the civil liberties committee we spend a great deal of time debating issues such as free movement, immigration and drugs. Technology always sits at the centre of these discussions. There are times in history when technology helps democrati#e, and times when it helps centrali#e. This is a time of centrali#ation. The justice and home affairs pillar of *urope has become more powerful without a corresponding strengthening of civil liberties.9 The report recommends a variety of measures for dealing with the increasing power of the technologies of surveillance being used at 5enwith ,ill and other centres. It bluntly advises< 9The *uropean :arliament should reject proposals from the !nited "tates for ma%ing private messages via the global communications networ% (Internet) accessible to !" intelligence agencies.9 The report also urges a fundamental review of the involvement of the )merican .") (.ational "ecurity )gency) in *urope, suggesting that their activities be either scaled down, or become more open and accountable. "uch concerns have been privately expressed by governments and 5*:s since the +old 6ar, but surveillance has continued to expand. !" intelligence activity in 'ritain has enjoyed a steady growth throughout the past two decades. The principal motivation for this rush of development is the !" interest in commercial espionage. In the 4ifties, during

the development of the 9special relationship9 between )merica and 'ritain, one !" institution was singled out for special attention. The ."), the world s biggest and most powerful signals intelligence organi#ation, received approval to set up a networ% of spy stations throughout 'ritain. Their role was to provide military, diplomatic and economic intelligence by intercepting communications from throughout the .orthern ,emisphere. The .") is one of the shadowiest of the !" intelligence agencies. !ntil a few years ago, it existence was a secret and its charter and any mention of its duties are still classified. ,owever, it does have a 6eb site (www.nsa.gov<@A@A) in which it describes itself as being responsible for the signals intelligence and communications security activities of the !" government. -ne of its bases, 5enwith ,ill, was to become the biggest spy station in the world. Its ears 8 %nown as radomes 8 are capable of listening in to vast chun%s of the communications spectrum throughout *urope and the old "oviet !nion. In its first decade the base suc%ed data from cables and microwave lin%s running through a nearby :ost -ffice tower, but the communications revolutions of the "eventies and *ighties gave the base a capability that even its architects could scarcely have been able to imagine. 6ith the creation of Intelsat and digital telecommunications, 5enwith and other stations developed the capability to eavesdrop on an extensive scale on fax, telex and voice messages. Then, with the development of the Internet, electronic mail and electronic commerce, the listening posts were able to increase their monitoring capability to eavesdrop on an unprecedented spectrum of personal and business communications. This activity has been all but ignored by the !( :arliament. 6hen $abour 5:s raised >uestions about the activities of the ."), the &overnment invo%ed secrecy rules. It has been the same for 1A years. &lyn 4ord hopes that his report may be the first step in a long road to more openness. 9"ome democratically elected body should surely have a right to %now at some level. )t the moment that s nowhere9. Co%yri(ht Tele(ra%h )rou% Limited 1 !* Terms + Co,ditio,s of readi,(*

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E$%OSIN" THE "LO#AL SURVEILLANCE S&STE' by .ic%y ,ager I. T,* $)T* /0@A", I. ) ;*+I"I-. IT :R-')'$= R*&R*T", T,* !" :R-5:T*; .*6 3*)$).; T- B-I. ) .*6 ).; ,I&,$= "*+R*T &$-')$ I.T*$$I&*.+* "="T*5. ,)&*R " I.C*"TI&)TI-. I.T- IT ).; ,I" ;I"+-C*R= -4 T,* *+,*$-. ;I+TI-.)R= ,)" R*C*)$*; -.* -4 T,* 6-R$; " 'I&&*"T, 5-"T +$-"*$= ,*$; I.T*$$I&*.+* :R-B*+T". T,* "="T*5 )$$-6" ":= )&*.+I*" T- 5-.IT-R 5-"T -4 T,* 6-R$; " T*$*:,-.*, *85)I$, ).; T*$*? +-55!.I+)TI-.". 4or 1A years, .ew 3ealand s largest intelligence agency, the &overnment +ommunications "ecurity 'ureau (&+"') the nation s e>uivalent of the !" .ational "ecurity )gency (.")) had been helping its 6estern allies to spy on countries throughout the :acific region, without the %nowledge of the .ew 3ealand public or many of its highest elected officials. 6hat the .") did not %now is that by the late /0@As, various intelligence staff had decided these activities had been too secret for too long, and were providing me with interviews and documents exposing .ew 3ealand s intelligence activities. *ventually, more than DA people who wor% or have wor%ed in intelligence and related fields agreed to be interviewed. The activities they described made it possible to document, from the "outh :acific, some alliance8wide systems and projects which have been %ept secret elsewhere. -f these, by far the most important is *+,*$-.. ;esigned and coordinated by ."), the *+,*$-. system is used to intercept ordinary e8mail, fax, telex, and telephone communications carried over the world s telecommunications networ%s. !nli%e many of the electronic spy systems developed during the +old 6ar, *+,*$-. is designed primarily for non8military targets< governments, organi#ations, businesses, and individuals in virtually every country. It potentially affects every person communicating between (and sometimes within) countries anywhere in the world. It is, of course, not a new idea that intelligence organi#ations tap into e8mail and other public telecommunications networ%s. 6hat was new in the material lea%ed by the .ew 3ealand intelligence staff was precise information on where the spying is done, how the system wor%s, its capabilities and shortcomings, and many details such as the codenames. The *+,*$-. system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual s e8mail or fax lin%. Rather, the system wor%s by indiscriminately intercepting very large >uantities of communications and using computers to identify and extract messages of interest from the mass of unwanted ones. ) chain of secret interception facilities has been established around the world to tap into all the major components of the international telecommunications networ%s. "ome monitor communications satellites, others land8 based communications networ%s, and others radio communications. *+,*$-. lin%s together all these facilities, providing the !" and its allies with the ability to intercept a

large proportion of the communications on the planet. The computers at each station in the *+,*$-. networ% automatically search through the millions of messages intercepted for ones containing pre8programmed %eywords. (eywords include all the names, localities, subjects, and so on that might be mentioned. *very word of every message intercepted at each station gets automatically searched whether or not a specific telephone number or e8mail address is on the list. The thousands of simultaneous messages are read in 9real time9 as they pour into the station, hour after hour, day after day, as the computer finds intelligence needles in telecommunications haystac%s. SO'EONE IS LISTENIN" The computers in stations around the globe are %nown, within the networ%, as the *+,*$-. ;ictionaries. +omputers that can automatically search through traffic for %eywords have existed since at least the /02As, but the *+,*$-. system was designed by .") to interconnect all these computers and allow the stations to function as components of an integrated whole. The .") and &+"' are bound together under the five8nation !(!") signals intelligence agreement. The other three partners all with e>ually obscure names are the &overnment +ommunications ,ead>uarters (&+,E) in 'ritain, the +ommunications "ecurity *stablishment (+"*) in +anada, and the ;efense "ignals ;irectorate (;";) in )ustralia. The alliance, which grew from cooperative efforts during 6orld 6ar II to intercept radio transmissions, was formali#ed into the !(!") agreement in /01@ and aimed primarily against the !""R. The five !(!") agencies are today the largest intelligence organi#ations in their respective countries. 6ith much of the world s business occurring by fax, e8mail, and phone, spying on these communications receives the bul% of intelligence resources. 4or decades before the introduction of the *+,*$-. system, the !(!") allies did intelligence collection operations for each other, but each agency usually processed and analy#ed the intercept from its own stations. !nder *+,*$-., a particular station s ;ictionary computer contains not only its parent agency s chosen %eywords, but also has lists entered in for other agencies. In .ew 3ealand s satellite interception station at 6aihopai (in the "outh Island), for example, the computer has separate search lists for the ."), &+,E, ;";, and +"* in addition to its own. 6henever the ;ictionary encounters a message containing one of the agencies %eywords, it automatically pic%s it and sends it directly to the head>uarters of the agency concerned. .o one in .ew 3ealand screens, or even sees, the intelligence collected by the .ew 3ealand station for the foreign agencies. Thus, the stations of the junior !(!") allies function for the .") no differently than if they were overtly .")8run bases located on their soil. The first component of the *+,*$-. networ% are stations specifically targeted on the international telecommunications satellites (Intelsats) used by the telephone companies of most countries. ) ring of Intelsats is positioned around the world, stationary above the

e>uator, each serving as a relay station for tens of thousands of simultaneous phone calls, fax, and e8mail. 4ive !(!") stations have been established to intercept the communications carried by the Intelsats. The 'ritish &+,E station is located at the top of high cliffs above the sea at 5orwenstow in +ornwall. "atellite dishes beside sprawling operations buildings point toward Intelsats above the )tlantic, *urope, and, inclined almost to the hori#on, the Indian -cean. )n .") station at "ugar &rove, located FDA %ilometers southwest of 6ashington, ;+, in the mountains of 6est Cirginia, covers )tlantic Intelsats transmitting down toward .orth and "outh )merica. )nother .") station is in 6ashington "tate, FAA %ilometers southwest of "eattle, inside the )rmy s =a%ima 4iring +enter. Its satellite dishes point out toward the :acific Intelsats and to the east. G/ The job of intercepting :acific Intelsat communications that cannot be intercepted at =a%ima went to .ew 3ealand and )ustralia. Their "outh :acific location helps to ensure global interception. .ew 3ealand provides the station at 6aihopai and )ustralia supplies the &eraldton station in 6est )ustralia (which targets both :acific and Indian -cean Intelsats). GF *ach of the five stations ;ictionary computers has a codename to distinguish it from others in the networ%. The =a%ima station, for instance, located in desert country between the "addle 5ountains and Rattlesna%e ,ills, has the +-6'-= ;ictionary, while the 6aihopai station has the 4$I.T$-+( ;ictionary. These codenames are recorded at the beginning of every intercepted message, before it is transmitted around the *+,*$-. networ%, allowing analysts to recogni#e at which station the interception occurred. .ew 3ealand intelligence staff has been closely involved with the .") s =a%ima station since /0@/, when .") pushed the &+"' to contribute to a project targeting Bapanese embassy communications. "ince then, all five !(!") agencies have been responsible for monitoring diplomatic cables from all Bapanese posts within the same segments of the globe they are assigned for general !(!") monitoring.H !ntil .ew 3ealand s integration into *+,*$-. with the opening of the 6aihopai station in /0@0, its share of the Bapanese communications was intercepted at =a%ima and sent unprocessed to the &+"' head>uarters in 6ellington for decryption, translation, and writing into !(!")8 format intelligence reports (the .") provides the codebrea%ing programs). CO''UNICATION( THROU"H SATELLITES The next component of the *+,*$-. system intercepts a range of satellite communications not carried by Intelsat.In addition to the !(!") stations targeting Intelsat satellites, there are another five or more stations homing in on Russian and other regional communications satellites. These stations are 5enwith ,ill in northern *nglandI "hoal 'ay, outside ;arwin in northern )ustralia (which targets Indonesian satellites)I $eitrim, just south of -ttawa in +anada (which appears to intercept $atin )merican satellites)I 'ad )ibling in &ermanyI and 5isawa in northern Bapan. ) group of facilities that tap directly into land8based telecommunications systems is the

final element of the *+,*$-. system. 'esides satellite and radio, the other main method of transmitting large >uantities of public, business, and government communications is a combination of water cables under the oceans and microwave networ%s over land. ,eavy cables, laid across seabeds between countries, account for much of the world s international communications. )fter they come out of the water and join land8based microwave networ%s they are very vulnerable to interception. The microwave networ%s are made up of chains of microwave towers relaying messages from hilltop to hilltop (always in line of sight) across the countryside. These networ%s shunt large >uantities of communications across a country. Interception of them gives access to international undersea communications (once they surface) and to international communication trun% lines across continents. They are also an obvious target for large8 scale interception of domestic communications. 'ecause the facilities re>uired to intercept radio and satellite communications use large aerials and dishes that are difficult to hide for too long, that networ% is reasonably well documented. 'ut all that is re>uired to intercept land8based communication networ%s is a building situated along the microwave route or a hidden cable running underground from the legitimate networ% into some anonymous building, possibly far removed. )lthough it sounds technically very difficult, microwave interception from space by !nited "tates spy satellites also occurs.1 The worldwide networ% of facilities to intercept these communications is largely undocumented, and because .ew 3ealand s &+"' does not participate in this type of interception, my inside sources could not help either. NO ONE IS SAFE FRO' A 'ICRO)AVE ) /001 exposJ of the +anadian !(!") agency, "pyworld, co8authored by one of its former staff, 5i%e 4rost, gave the first insights into how a lot of foreign microwave interception is done (see p. /@). It described !(!") 9embassy collection9 operations, where sophisticated receivers and processors are secretly transported to their countries overseas embassies in diplomatic bags and used to monitor various communications in foreign capitals. GD "ince most countries microwave networ%s converge on the capital city, embassy buildings can be an ideal site. :rotected by diplomatic privilege, they allow interception in the heart of the target country. GK The +anadian embassy collection was re>uested by the .") to fill gaps in the )merican and 'ritish embassy collection operations, which were still occurring in many capitals around the world when 4rost left the +"* in /00A. "eparate sources in )ustralia have revealed that the ;"; also engages in embassy collection. G2 -n the territory of !(!") nations, the interception of land8based telecommunications appears to be done at special secret intelligence facilities. The !", !(, and +anada are geographically well placed to intercept the large amounts of the world s communications that cross their territories. The only public reference to the ;ictionary system anywhere in the world was in relation to one of these facilities, run by the &+,E in central $ondon. In /00/, a former 'ritish &+,E official spo%e anonymously to &ranada Television s 6orld in )ction about the agency s abuses of power. ,e told the program about an anonymous red bric% building at

@ :almer "treet where &+,E secretly intercepts every telex which passes into, out of, or through $ondon, feeding them into powerful computers with a program %nown as 9;ictionary.9 The operation, he explained, is staffed by carefully vetted 'ritish Telecom people< 9It s nothing to do with national security. It s because it s not legal to ta%e every single telex. )nd they ta%e everything< the embassies, all the business deals, even the birthday greetings, they ta%e everything. They feed it into the ;ictionary.9 G@ 6hat the documentary did not reveal is that ;ictionary is not just a 'ritish systemI it is !(!")8 wide. "imilarly, 'ritish researcher ;uncan +ampbell has described how the !" 5enwith ,ill station in 'ritain taps directly into the 'ritish Telecom microwave networ%, which has actually been designed with several major microwave lin%s converging on an isolated tower connected underground into the station.0 The .") 5enwith ,ill station, with FF satellite terminals and more than 1.0 acres of buildings, is undoubtedly the largest and most powerful in the !(!") networ%. $ocated in northern *ngland, several thousand %ilometers from the :ersian &ulf, it was awarded the .") s 9"tation of the =ear9 pri#e for /00/ after its role in the &ulf 6ar. 5enwith ,ill assists in the interception of microwave communications in another way as well, by serving as a ground station for !" electronic spy satellites. These intercept microwave trun% lines and short range communications such as military radios and wal%ie tal%ies. -ther ground stations where the satellites information is fed into the global networ% are :ine &ap, run by the +I) near )lice "prings in central )ustralia and the 'ad )ibling station in &ermany. G/A )mong them, the various stations and operations ma%ing up the *+,*$-. networ% tap into all the main components of the world s telecommunications networ%s. )ll of them, including a separate networ% of stations that intercepts long distance radio communications, have their own ;ictionary computers connected into *+,*$-.. In the early /00As, opponents of the 5enwith ,ill station obtained large >uantities of internal documents from the facility. )mong the papers was a reference to an .") computer system called :latform. The integration of all the !(!") station computers into *+,*$-. probably occurred with the introduction of this system in the early /0@As. Bames 'amford wrote at that time about a new worldwide .") computer networ% codenamed :latform 9which will tie together DF separate computer systems used throughout the world. 4ocal point, or Lhost environment, for the massive networ% will be the .") head>uarters at 4ort 5eade. )mong those included in :latform will be the 'ritish "I&I.T organi#ation, &+,E.9 G// LOO*IN" IN THE DICTIONAR& The ;ictionary computers are connected via highly encrypted !(!") communications that lin% bac% to computer data bases in the five agency head>uarters. This is where all the intercepted messages selected by the ;ictionaries end up. *ach morning the specially 9indoctrinated9 signals intelligence analysts in 6ashington, -ttawa,+heltenham, +anberra, and 6ellington log on at their computer terminals and enter the ;ictionary system. )fter %eying in their security passwords, they reach a directory that lists the

different categories of intercept available in the data bases, each with a four8digit code. 4or instance, /0// might be Bapanese diplomatic cables from $atin )merica (handled by the +anadian +"*), H@1@ might be political communications from and about .igeria, and @/@F might be any messages about distribution of encryption technology. They select their subject category, get a 9search result9 showing how many messages have been caught in the *+,*$-. net on that subject, and then the day s wor% begins. )nalysts scroll through screen after screen of intercepted faxes, e8mail messages, etc. and, whenever a message appears worth reporting on, they select it from the rest to wor% on. If it is not in *nglish, it is translated and then written into the standard format of intelligence reports produced anywhere within the !(!") networ% either in entirety as a 9report,9 or as a summary or 9gist.9 INFOR'ATION CONTROL ) highly organi#ed system has been developed to control what is being searched for by each station and who can have access to it. This is at the heart of *+,*$-. operations and wor%s as follows. The individual station s ;ictionary computers do not simply have a long list of %eywords to search for. )nd they do not send all the information into some huge database that participating agencies can dip into as they wish. It is much more controlled. The search lists are organi#ed into the same categories, referred to by the four digit numbers. *ach agency decides its own categories according to its responsibilities for producing intelligence for the networ%. 4or &+"', this means "outh :acific governments, Bapanese diplomatic, Russian )ntarctic activities, and so on. The agency then wor%s out about /A to DA %eywords for selection in each category. The %eywords include such things as names of people, ships, organi#ations, country names, and subject names. They also include the %nown telex and fax numbers and Internet addresses of any individuals, businesses, organi#ations, and government offices that are targets. These are generally written as part of the message text and so are easily recogni#ed by the ;ictionary computers. The agencies also specify combinations of %eywords to help sift out communications of interest. 4or example, they might search for diplomatic cables containing both the words 9"antiago9 and 9aid,9 or cables containing the word 9"antiago9 but not 9consul9 (to avoid the masses of routine consular communications). It is these sets of words and numbers (and combinations), under a particular category, that get placed in the ;ictionary computers. ("taff in the five agencies called ;ictionary 5anagers enter and update the %eyword search lists for each agency.) The whole system, devised by the ."), has been adopted completely by the other agencies. The ;ictionary computers search through all the incoming messages and, whenever they encounter one with any of the agencies %eywords, they select it. )t the same time, the computer automatically notes technical details such as the time and place

of interception on the piece of intercept so that analysts reading it, in whichever agency it is going to, %now where it came from, and what it is. 4inally, the computer writes the four8digit code (for the category with the %eywords in that message) at the bottom of the message s text. This is important. It means that when all the intercepted messages end up together in the database at one of the agency head>uarters, the messages on a particular subject can be located again. $ater, when the analyst using the ;ictionary system selects the four8 digit code for the category he or she wants, the computer simply searches through all the messages in the database for the ones which have been tagged with that number. This system is very effective for controlling which agencies can get what from the global networ% because each agency only gets the intelligence out of the *+,*$-. system from its own numbers. It does not have any access to the raw intelligence coming out of the system to the other agencies. 4or example, although most of the &+"' s intelligence production is primarily to serve the !(!") alliance, .ew 3ealand does not have access to the whole *+,*$-. networ%. The access it does have is strictly controlled. ) .ew 3ealand intelligence officer explained< 9The agencies can all apply for numbers on each other s ;ictionaries. The hardest to deal with are the )mericans. ... MThere areN more hoops to jump through, unless it is in their interest, in which case they ll do it for you.9 There is only one agency which, by virtue of its si#e and role within the alliance, will have access to the full potential of the *+,*$-. system the agency that set it up. 6hat is the system used for7 )nyone listening to official 9discussion9 of intelligence could be forgiven for thin%ing that, since the end of the +old 6ar, the %ey targets of the massive !(!") intelligence machine are terrorism, weapons proliferation, and economic intelligence. The idea that economic intelligence has become very important, in particular, has been carefully cultivated by intelligence agencies intent on preserving their post8+old 6ar budgets. It has become an article of faith in much discussion of intelligence. ,owever, I have found no evidence that these are now the primary concerns of organi#ations such as ."). +UIC*ER INTELLI"ENCE,SA'E 'ISSION ) different story emerges after examining very detailed information I have been given about the intelligence .ew 3ealand collects for the !(!") allies and detailed descriptions of what is in the yards8deep intelligence reports .ew 3ealand receives from its four allies each wee%. There is >uite a lot of intelligence collected about potential terrorists, and there is >uite a lot of economic intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating in &)TT negotiations. 'ut by far, the main priorities of the intelligence alliance continue to be political and military intelligence to assist the larger allies to pursue their interests around the world. )nyone and anything the particular governments are concerned about can become a target. 6ith capabilities so secret and so powerful, almost anything goes. 4or example, in Bune /00F, a group of current 9highly placed intelligence operatives9 from the 'ritish &+,E spo%e to the $ondon -bserver< 96e feel we can no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice and negligence within the establishment in

which we operate.9 They gave as examples &+,E interception of three charitable organi#ations, including )mnesty International and +hristian )id. )s the -bserver reported< 9)t any time &+,E is able to home in on their communications for a routine target re>uest,9 the &+,E source said. In the case of phone taps the procedure is %nown as 5antis. 6ith telexes it is called 5ayfly. 'y %eying in a code relating to Third 6orld aid, the source was able to demonstrate telex 9fixes9 on the three organi#ations. 9It is then possible to %ey in a trigger word which enables us to home in on the telex communications whenever that word appears,9 he said. 9)nd we can read a pre8 determined number of characters either side of the %eyword.9/F 6ithout actually naming it, this was a fairly precise description of how the *+,*$-. ;ictionary system wor%s. )gain, what was not revealed in the publicity was that this is a !(!")8wide system. The design of *+,*$-. means that the interception of these organi#ations could have occurred anywhere in the networ%, at any station where the &+,E had re>uested that the four8digit code covering Third 6orld aid be placed. .ote that these &+,E officers mentioned that the system was being used for telephone calls. In .ew 3ealand, *+,*$-. is used only to intercept written communications< fax, e8mail, and telex. The reason, according to intelligence staff, is that the agency does not have the staff to analy#e large >uantities of telephone conversations. 5i%e 4rost s exposJ of +anadian 9embassy collection9 operations described the .") computers they used, called -ratory, that can 9listen9 to telephone calls and recogni#e when %eywords are spo%en. Bust as we can recogni#e words spo%en in all the different tones and accents we encounter, so too, according to 4rost, can these computers. Telephone calls containing %eywords are automatically extracted from the masses of other calls and recorded digitally on magnetic tapes for analysts bac% at agency head>uarters. ,owever, high volume voice recognition computers will be technically difficult to perfect, and my .ew 3ealand8based sources could not confirm that this capability exists. 'ut, if or when it is perfected, the implications would be immense. It would mean that the !(!") agencies could use machines to search through all the international telephone calls in the world, in the same way that they do written messages. If this e>uipment exists for use in embassy collection, it will presumably be used in all the stations throughout the *+,*$-. networ%. It is yet to be confirmed how extensively telephone communications are being targeted by the *+,*$-. stations for the other agencies. The easiest pic%ings for the *+,*$-. system are the individuals, organi#ations,and governments that do not use encryption. In .ew 3ealand s area, for example, it has proved especially useful against already vulnerable "outh :acific nations which do not use any coding, even for government communications (all these communications of .ew 3ealand s neighbors are supplied, unscreened, to its !(!") allies). )s a result of the revelations in my boo%, there is currently a project under way in the :acific to promote and supply publicly available encryption software to vulnerable organi#ations such as democracy movements in countries with repressive governments. This is one practical way of curbing illegitimate uses of the *+,*$-. capabilities.

-ne final comment. )ll the newspapers, commentators, and 9well placed sources9 told the public that .ew 3ealand was cut off from !" intelligence in the mid8/0@As. That was entirely untrue. The intelligence supply to .ew 3ealand did not stop, and instead, the decade since has been a period of increased integration of .ew 3ealand into the !" system. Cirtually everything the e>uipment, manuals, ways of operating, jargon, codes, and so on, used in the &+"' continues to be imported entirely from the larger allies (in practice, usually the .")). )s with the )ustralian and +anadian agencies, most of the priorities continue to come from the !", too. The main thing that protects these agencies from change is their secrecy. -n the day my boo% arrived in the boo% shops, without prior publicity, there was an all8day meeting of the intelligence bureaucrats in the prime minister s department trying to decide if they could prevent it from being distributed. They eventually concluded, sensibly, that the political costs were too high. It is understandable that they were so agitated. Throughout my research, I have faced official denials or governments refusing to comment on publicity about intelligence activities. &iven the pervasive atmosphere of secrecy and stonewalling, it is always hard for the public to judge what is fact, what is speculation, and what is paranoia. Thus, in uncovering .ew 3ealand s role in the .")8 led alliance, my aim was to provide so much detail about the operations the technical systems, the daily wor% of individual staff members, and even the rooms in which they wor% inside intelligence facilities that readers could feel confident that they were getting close to the truth. I hope the information lea%ed by intelligence staff in .ew 3ealand about !(!") and its systems such as *+,*$-. will help lead to change. CA+ SU#SCRI%TION INFOR'ATION CA+ (+overt)ction Euarterly) has won numerous awards for investigative journalism. In /00K, it won 1 of 9:roject +ensored9 top FD awards for investigative reporting. +)E is read around the world by investigative reporters, activists, scholars, intelligence buffs, news jun%ies, and anyone who wants to %now the news and analysis behind the soundbites and headlines. Recommended by .oam +homs%yI targeted by the +I). *ach article in the K18page maga#ine, which is in its /0th year of publication, is extensively footnoted and accompanied by photographs and graphics. 4or a single issue, send OK. ) one year subscription< !" OFFI +anadaP5exico OF2I $atin )mericaP*urope OHHI -ther areas OHD. ) two year !" subscription is OH@ :lease send chec% or money order in O!" to< +)E /DAA 5assachusetts )ve. Q2HF

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