Jean Nicod Prize

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search The Jean Nicod Prize is awarded annually in Paris to a leading philosopher of mind or philosophically oriented cognitive scientist. The lectures are organized y the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique !"#$%& as part of its effort to promote interdisciplinary research in cognitive science in France. The '(() lectures marked the centenary of the irth of the French philosopher and logician Jean #icod !'*()+'(,-&. .esides the "#$%, sponsors include the /cole #ormale %up0rieure !1#%& and the /cole des 2autes /tudes en %ciences %ociales !121%%&. The Jean Nicod lecturer is e3pected to deliver at least four lectures on a topic of his or her choice, and su se4uently to pu lish the set of lectures, or a monograph ased on them in the Jean Nicod Lectures series !56T Press7.radford .ooks8 F. $ecanati editor&. 9ist of Jean Nicod Prize laureates from '(() to the present day. Year Name University Lectures Title Publication

'(() Jerry Fodor $utgers :niversity

The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics

6%.# ;+,<,+ =<;()+)

'((- Fred >retske %tanford :niversity

Naturalizin the Mind

6%.# ;+,<,+ =-;*(+-

'((=

>onald >avidson

:" .erkeley

n7a

n7a

'((< 2ans ?amp :niversity of %tuttgart

Thin!in and Tal!in a"out Thin s

n7a

'((@ Jon 1lster

"olum ia :niversity

Stron #eelin s$ Emotion% 6%.# ;+,<,+ &ddiction% and 'uman (eha)ior ;=;=<+;

'((* %usan "arey #ew Aork :niversity

The *ri ins of Concepts: E)olution )s Culture

n7a

'((( John Perry

%tanford :niversity

+no,led e% -ossi"ilit.% and Consciousness

6%.# ;+,<,+ '<'((+;

,;;; John %earle :" .erkeley

Rationalit. in &ction

6%.# ;+,<,+ '(-<)+=

,;;'

>aniel >ennett

Tufts :niversity

S,eet /reams$ -hilosophical *"stacles to a Science of Consciousness

6%.# ;+,<,+ ;-,,=+*

,;;,

$uth 5illikan

:niversity of "onnecticut

0arieties of Meanin

6%.# ;+,<,+ ')---+<

,;;)

$ay Jackendoff

Tufts :niversity

Mental Structures$ Lan ua e% Societ.% Consciousness

n7a

,;;-

Benon Pylyshyn

$utgers :niversity

Thin s and -laces$ 'o, the mind connects ,ith the ,orld

n7a

,;;=

Cil ert 2arman

Princeton :niversity

The -ro"lem of Induction and Statistical Learnin Theor.

n7a

,;;<

5ichael Tomasello

5a3 Planck 6nstitute *ri ins of 'uman for 1volutionary Communication Dnthropology, 9eipzig

n7a

,;;@

%tephen %tich

$utgers :niversity

Moral Theor. Meets Co niti)e Science: 'o, the Co niti)e Science Can Transform Traditional /e"ates

n7a

Donald Davidson (philosopher)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Western Philosophy !th"century philosophy

Name# >onald 2er ert >avidson $irth# 5arch <, '('@ !%pringfield, 5assachusetts, :%D& Death# Dugust );, ,;;) !.erkeley, "alifornia, :%D& %chool&tradition# Dnalytic 'ain interests# 9anguage, Dction, 5ind, 1pistemology, 1vents $adical interpretation, Dnomalous 5onism, Notable ideas# triangulation, Truth+conditional semantics, $easons as causes, :nderstanding as translation Euine, Tarski, $amsey, Wittgenstein, >ummett, ?ant, (n)luences# %pinoza $ichard $orty, $o ert .random, John 5c>owell, Careth (n)luenced# 1vans, 1rnest 9epore, ?irk 9udwig

Donald *erbert Davidson !5arch <, '('@ F Dugust );, ,;;)& was an Dmerican philosopher, who served as %lusser Professor of Philosophy at the :niversity of "alifornia, .erkeley, from '(*' to ,;;), after having also held su stantive teaching appointments at %tanford :niversity, $ockefeller :niversity, Princeton :niversity and The :niversity of "hicago. 2is work has e3erted considera le influence in nearly all areas of philosophy from the '(<;s onward, ut particularly in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Dlthough pu lished mostly in the form of short essays which do not e3plicitly rely on any overriding theory, his work is nonetheless noted for a strongly unified character Gthe same methods and ideas are rought to ear on a host of apparently unrelated pro lemsGand for synthesizing the work of a great num er of other philosophers, including Dristotle, ?ant, Wittgenstein, Frank P. $amsey, W.H. Euine, and C. 1. 5. Dnscom e.

+ontents

' 9ife , Work ,.' Dctions, reasons, and causes ,., 5ental events ,.) Truth and meaning ,.- ?nowledge and elief ,.= $adical interpretation ) $eferences ).' Work y >onald >avidson )., %econdary literature - %ee also = 13ternal links

Li)e
>avidson was orn in %pringfield, 5assachusetts on 5arch <, '('@ to "larence !I>avieI& 2er ert >avidson and Crace "ordelia Dnthony. The family lived in the Philippines from shortly after >avidsonJs irth until he was a out four. Then, having lived in Dmherst and Philadelphia, the family finally settled on %taten 6sland when >avidson was nine or ten. From this time he egan to attend pu lic school, having to egin in first grade with much younger children. 2e then attended the %taten 6sland Dcademy, starting in fourth grade. 6n high school, he tried to read PlatoJs -armenides, ?antJs Critique of -ure Reason and #ietzsche. Dt 2arvard :niversity he switched his maKor from 1nglish and comparative literature !Theodore %pencer on %hakespeare and the .i le, 2arry 9evin on Joyce& to classics and philosophy. >avidson was a fine pianist and always had a deep interest in music, later teaching philosophy of music at %tanford. Dt 2arvard, he was in the same class as the conductor and composer 9eonard .ernstein, with whom >avidson played four+hand piano. .ernstein wrote and conducted the musical score for the production which >avidson mounted of DristophanesJ play The (irds in the original Creek. %ome of this music was later to e reused in .ernsteinJs allet #anc. #ree. Dfter graduation he went to "alifornia, where he wrote radio scripts for the private+eye drama, I.ig Town,I starring 1dward C. $o inson. 2e returned to 2arvard on a scholarship in classical philosophy, teaching philosophy and concurrently undergoing the intensive training of 2arvard .usiness %chool. .efore having the opportunity to graduate from 2arvard .usiness %chool, >avidson was called up y the #avy, for which he had volunteered. 2e trained pilots to recognize enemy planes and participated in the invasions of %icily, %alerno, and 1nzio. Dfter three and a half years in the #avy, he tried

unsuccessfully to write a novel efore returning to his philosophy studies and earning his doctorate in philosophy in '(-(. >avidson wrote his dissertation, which he considered dull, on PlatoJs -hile"us. :nder the influence of W. H. L. Euine, whom he often credits as his mentor, he egan to gradually turn toward the more rigorous methods and precise pro lems characteristic of analytic philosophy. >uring the '(=;s >avidson worked with Patrick %uppes on developing an e3perimental approach to >ecision Theory. They concluded that it was not possi le to isolate a su KectJs eliefs and preferences independently of one another, meaning there would always e multiple ways to analyze a personJs actions in terms of what they wanted, or were trying to do, or valued. This result is compara le to EuineJs thesis on the indeterminacy of translation, and figures significantly in much of >avidsonJs later work on philosophy of mind. 2is most noted work !see elow& was pu lished in a series of essays from the '(<;s onward, moving successively through philosophy of action into philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and da ling occasionally in aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and the history of philosophy. >avidson was widely traveled, and had a great range of interests he pursued with enormous energy. Dpart from playing the piano, he had a pilotJs license, uilt radios, and was fond of mountain clim ing and surfing. 2e was married three times !the last time to the philosopher 5arcia "avell&. Thomas #agel elliptically eulogized him as Ideeply eroticI. 2e served terms as president of oth the 1astern and Western >ivisions of the Dmerican Philosophical Dssociation, and held various professional positions at Eueens "ollege !now part of ":#A&, %tanford, Princeton, $ockefeller :niversity, 2arvard, L3ford, and the :niversity of "hicago. From '(*' until his death he was at the :niversity of "alifornia, .erkeley, where he was Willis %. and 5arion %lusser Professor of Philosophy. 6n '((= he was awarded the Jean #icod Prize.

Wor,
-ctions. reasons. and causes
>avidsonJs most noted work egan in '(<) with an essay, IDctions, $easons, and "auses,I which attempted to refute the prevailing orthodo3 view, widely attri uted to Wittgenstein, that an agentJs reasons for acting cannot e the causes of his action !5alpas, ,;;=, M,&. 6nstead, >avidson argued that Irationalization Nthe providing of reasons to e3plain an agentJs actionsO is a species of ordinary causal e3planationI !'(<), p. <*=&. 6n particular, an action & is e3plained y what >avidson called a primar. reason, which involves a pro+ attitude !roughly, a desire& toward some goal 1 and an instrumental elief that performing action & is a means to attaining 1. For e3ample, someoneJs primary reason for taking an

um rella with her outside on a rainy day might e the she wants to stay dry and elieves that taking an um rella is a means to stay dry today. This view, which largely conforms to common+sense folk psychology, was held in part on the ground that while causal laws must e precise and mechanistic, e3planation in terms of reasons need not. >avidson argued that the fact that the e3pression of a reason was not so precise, did not mean that the having of a reason could not itself e a state capa le of causally influencing ehavior. %everal other essays pursue conse4uences of this view, and ela orate >avidsonJs theory of actions.

'ental events
6n I5ental 1ventsI !'(@;& >avidson advanced a form of token identity theory a out the mind: token mental events are identical to token physical events. Lne previous difficulty with such a view was that it did not seem feasi le to provide laws relating mental statesG for e3ample, elieving that the sky is lue, or wanting a ham urgerGto physical states, such as patterns of neural activity in the rain. >avidson argued that such a reduction would not e necessary to a token identity thesis: it is possi le that each individual mental event Kust is the corresponding physical event, without there eing laws relating t.pes !as opposed to tokens& of mental events to t.pes of physical events. .ut, >avidson argued, the fact that we could not have such a reduction does not entail that the mind is anything more than the rain. 2ence, >avidson called his position anomalous monism: monism, ecause it claims that only one thing is at issue in 4uestions mental and physical events8 anomalous !from a2, not, and nomos, law& ecause mental and physical event t.pes could not e connected y strict laws !laws without e3ceptions&. >avidson argued that anomalous monism follows from three plausi le theses. First, he assumes the denial of epiphenomenalism++that is, the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events. %econd, he assumes a nomolo ical )ie, of causation, according to which one event causes another if !and only if& there is a strict, e3ceptionless law governing the relation etween the events. Third, he assumes the principle of the anomalism of the mental, according to which there are no strict laws that govern mental and physical event types. .y these three theses, >avidson argued, it follows that the causal relations etween the mental and the physical hold only etween mental event tokens, ut that mental events as types are anomalous. This ultimately secures token physicalism and a supervenience relation etween the mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy of the mental !5alpas, ,;;=, M,&.

Truth and meanin/

6n '(<@ >avidson pu lished ITruth and 5eaning,I in which he argued that any learna"le language must e stata le in a finite form, even if it is capa le of a theoretically infinite num er of e3pressionsGas we may assume that natural human languages are, at least in principle. 6f it could not e stated in a finite way then it could not e learned through a finite, empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages. 6t follows that it

must e possi le to give a theoretical semantics for any natural language which could give the meanings of an infinite num er of sentences on the asis of a finite system of a3ioms. ICiving the meaning of a sentenceI, he further argued, was e4uivalent to stating its truth conditions, so originating the modern work on truth+conditional semantics. 6n sum, he proposed that it must e possi le to distinguish a finite num er of distinct grammatical features of a language, and for each of them e3plain its workings in such a way as to generate trivial !o viously correct& statements of the truth conditions of all the !infinitely many& sentences making use of that feature. That is, we can give a finite theory of meaning for a natural language8 the test of its correctness is that it would generate !if applied to the language in which it was formulated& all the sentences of the form IJpJ is true if and only if pI !IJ%now is whiteJ is true if and only if snow is white&. !These are called T+sentences: >avidson derives the idea from Dlfred Tarski.& This work was originally delivered in his John 9ocke 9ectures at L3ford, and launched a large endeavor y many philosophers to develop >avidsonian semantical theories for natural language. >avidson himself contri uted many details to such a theory, in essays on 4uotation, indirect discourse, and descriptions of action.

0no1led/e and belie)

Dfter the '(@;s >avidsonJs philosophy of mind picked up influences from the work of %aul ?ripke, 2ilary Putnam, and ?eith >onnellan, all of whom had proposed a num er of trou ling counter+e3amples to what can e generally descri ed as IdescriptivistI theories of content. These views, which roughly originate in .ertrand $ussellJs Theory of >escriptions !and perhaps in the younger WittgensteinJs Tractatus 9ogico+Philosophicus& held that the referent of a nameGwhich o Kect or person that name refers toGis determined y the eliefs a person holds a out that o Kect. %uppose 6 elieve IDristotle founded the 9yceumI and IDristotle taught Dle3ander the Creat.I Whom are my eliefs a"outP Dristotle, o viously. .ut whyP $ussell would say that my eliefs are a out whatever o Kect makes the greatest num er of them true. 6f two people taught Dle3ander, ut only one founded the 9yceum, then my eliefs are a out the one who did oth. ?ripke et al. argued that this was not a tena le theory, and that in fact whom or what a personJs eliefs were a out was in large part !or entirely& a matter of how they had ac4uired those eliefs, and those names, and how if at all the use of those names could e traced IcausallyI from their original referents to the current speaker. >avidson picked up this theory, and his work in the '(*;s dealt with the pro lems in relating first+person eliefs to second+ and third+person eliefs. 6t seems that first person eliefs !I6 am hungryI& are ac4uired in very different ways from third person eliefs !someone elseJs elief, of me, that I2e is hungryI& 2ow can it e that they have the same contentP >avidson approached this 4uestion y connecting it with another one: how can two people have eliefs a out the same e3ternal o KectP 2e offers, in answer, a picture of triangulation:

.eliefs a out oneself, eliefs a out other people, and eliefs a out the world come into e3istence Kointly. 5any philosophers throughout history had, argua ly, een tempted to reduce two of these kinds of elief and knowledge to the other one: >escartes and 2ume thought that the only knowledge we start with is self+knowledge. %ome of the logical positivists, !and some would say Wittgenstein, or Wilfrid %ellars&, held that we start with eliefs only a out the e3ternal world. !Dnd argua ly Friedrich %chelling and 1mmanuel 9evinas held that we start with eliefs only a out other people&. 6t is not possi le, on >avidsonJs view, for a person to have only one of these three kinds of mental content8 anyone who has eliefs of one of the kinds must have eliefs of the other two kinds.

2adical interpretation
>avidsonJs work is well noted for its unity, as he has rought a similar approach to a wide variety of philosophical pro lems. $adical interpretation is a hypothetical standpoint which >avidson regards as asic to the investigation of language, mind, action, and knowledge. $adical interpretation involves imagining that you are placed into a community which speaks a language you do not understand at all. 2ow could you come to understand the languageP Lne suggestion is that you know a theory that generates a theorem of the form Js means that pJ for every sentence of the o Kect language !i.e. the language of the community&, where s is the name of a sentence in the o Kect language, and p is that sentence, or a translation of it, in the metalanguage in which the theory is e3pressed. 2owever, >avidson reKects this suggestion on the grounds that the sentential operator Jmeans thatJ is sensitive not only to the e3tensions of the terms that follow it, ut also to their intensions. 2ence, >avidson replaces Jmeans thatJ with a connective that is only sensitive to the e3tensions of sentences8 since the e3tension of a sentence is its truth value, this is a truth functional connective. >avidson elects the iconditional + if and only if + as the connective needed in a theory of meaning. This is the o vious choice ecause we are aiming at e4uivalence of meaning etween s and p. .ut now we have a pro lem: Js if and only if pJ is an ungrammatical sentence ecause the connective must link two propositions, ut s is the name of a proposition, and not a proposition itself. 6n order to render s a proposition we need to supply it with a predicate. Which predicate is satisfied y s if and only if the sentence named y s, or a translation of it, is the caseP 6n other words, which predicate is satisfied I ananas are yellowI if and only if ananas are yellowP The answer is the predicate truth. Thus, >avidson is led to the conclusion that a theory of meaning must e such that for each sentence of the o Kect language it generates a theorem of the form Js is true if and only if pJ. D theory of truth for a language can serve as a theory of meaning. The significance of this conclusion is that it allows >avidson to draw on the work of Dlfred Tarski in giving the nature of a theory of meaning. Tarski showed how we can give a compositional theory of truth for artificial languages. Thus, >avidson takes three 4uestions to e central to radical interpretation. Firstly, can a theory of truth e given for a natural languageP %econdly, given the evidence plausi ly availa le for the radical interpreter, can they construct and verify a theory of truth for the language they wish to interpretP Thirdly,

will having a theory of truth suffice for allowing the radical interpreter to understand the languageP >avidson has shown, using the work of Tarski, that the first 4uestion can e answered affirmatively. What evidence is plausi ly availa le to the radical interpreterP >avidson points out that eliefs and meanings are insepara le. D person holds a sentence true ased on what he elieves and what he takes the sentence to mean. 6f the interpreter knew what a person elieved when that person held a sentence to e true, the meaning of the sentence could then e inferred. Hice versa, if the interpreter knew what a person took a sentence to mean when that person held it to e true, the elief of the speaker could e inferred. %o >avidson doesnJt allow the interpreter to have access to eliefs as evidence, since the interpreter would then e egging the 4uestion. 6nstead, >avidson allows that the interpreter can reasona ly ascertain when a speaker holds a sentence true, without knowing anything a out a particular elief or meaning. This will then allow the interpreter to construct hypotheses relating a speaker and an utterance to a particular state of affairs at a particular time. The e3ample >avidson gives is of a Cerman speaker who utters Q1s regnetR when it is raining. >avidson claims that even though in isolated cases a speaker might e mistaken a out the state of o Kective reality !for e3ample, the Cerman speaker might utter Q1s regnetR even though it is not raining&, this doesnSt undermine the entire proKect. This is ecause a speakerSs eliefs must e mostly correct and coherent. 6f they werenSt, we wouldnSt even identify the speaker as a speaker. This is >avidsonSs famous principle of charit. and it is what ena les an interpreter to e confident that the evidence he gathers will allow him to verify a theory of truth for the language. Ln first glance, it might seem that a theory of truth is not enough to interpret a language. Dfter all, if truth+conditions are all that matters, then how can anomalous sentences such as TQ%chnee ist weissR is true if and only if snow is white and grass is greenS e verified as falseP >avidson argues that ecause the language is compositional, it is also holistic: sentences are ased on the meanings of words, ut the meaning of a word depends on the totality of sentences in which it appears. This holistic constraint, along with the re4uirement that the theory of truth is law+like, suffices to minimize indeterminacy Kust enough for successful communication to occur. 6n summary, then, what radical interpretation highlights is what is necessary and sufficient for communication to occur. These conditions are: that in order to recognize a speaker as a speaker, their eliefs must e mostly coherent and correct8 indeterminacy of meaning doesnSt undermine communication, ut it must e constrained Kust enough.
6 conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to e learned, mastered, or orn with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language+users ac4uire and then apply to cases. Dnd we should try again to say how convention in any important sense is involved in language8 or, as 6 think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate y appeal to conventions.

F ID #ice >erangement of 1pitaphs,I Truth and 6nterpretation, 334

-cademic 3enealo/y

Notable teachers

Notable students

Dlfred #orth Whitehead W. H. L. Euine

Dkeel .ilgrami .ruce Hermazen

2e)erences
Wor, by Donald Davidson

IDctions, $easons, and "auses,I Journal of -hilosoph., <;, '(<) !reprinted in >avidson, ,;;'a&. ITruth and 5eaning,I S.nthese, '@, '(<@ !reprinted in >avidson, ,;;' &. I5ental 1vents,I in Experience and Theor., Foster and %wanson !eds.&, 9ondon: >uckworth, '(@; !reprinted in >avidson, ,;;'a&. IDgency,I in & ent% &ction% and Reason, .inkley, .ronaugh, and 5arras !eds.&, Toronto: :niversity of Toronto Press, '(@' !reprinted in >avidson, ,;;'a&. I$adical 6nterpretation,I /ialectica, ,@, '(@) !reprinted in >avidson, ,;;' &. Semantics of Natural Lan ua es, >avidson, >onald and 2arman, Cil ert !ed.&, ,nd ed. %pringer, '(@). /ecision2Ma!in : &n Experimental &pproach, co+authored with %uppes, Patrick, "hicago, '(@@. -lato5s 6-hile"us7, #ew Aork, '((;. Essa.s on &ctions and E)ents, ,nd ed. L3ford, ,;;'a. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, ,nd ed. L3ford, ,;;' . Su"8ecti)e% Intersu"8ecti)e% *"8ecti)e, L3ford, ,;;'c. -ro"lems of Rationalit., L3ford. ,;;-. Truth% Lan ua e% and 'istor.: -hilosophical Essa.s, L3ford. ,;;=. Truth and -redication, 2arvard, ,;;=.

%econdary literature

?alugin, Hladimir. I>onald >avidson !'('@+,;;)&I Internet Enc.clopedia of -hilosoph., ,;;<. !link& 9ePore, 1rnest !ed.&. Truth and Interpretation: -erspecti)es on the -hilosoph. of /onald /a)idson. L3ford. '(*<. 9ePore, 1rnest and ?irk 9udwig. /onald /a)idson: Meanin % Truth% Lan ua e and Realit.. L3ford. ,;;=.

9udwig, ?irk !ed.&. /onald /a)idson. "am ridge. ,;;). 5alpas, Jeff 1. /onald /a)idson and the Mirror of Meanin 2 'olism% Truth% Interpretation. "am ridge. '((,. 5alpas, Jeff. I>onald >avidsonI Stanford Enc.clopedia of -hilosoph., ,;;=. !link& Preyer, Cerhard7%ie elt, Frank7:lfig, Dle3ander !ed.&. Lan ua e% Mind and Epistemolo .$ *n /onald /a)idson9s philosoph.. >ordrecht. '((-. $am erg, .Korn. /onald /a)idson5s -hilosoph. of Lan ua e: &n Introduction. L3ford. '(*(.