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Management Education in Emerging Economies: The Impossible Dream?

N.K. Napier, Michael Harvey and Kengo Usui Journal of Management Education 2008 32: 792 originally published online 5 June 2008 DOI: 10.1177/1052562908319994 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jme.sagepub.com/content/32/6/792
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Management Education in Emerging Economies

The Impossible Dream?
N. K. Napier
Boise State University
Journal of Management Education Volume 32 Number 6 December 2008 792-819 2008 Organizational Behavior Teaching Society 10.1177/1052562908319994 http://jme.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com
Michael Harvey
University of Mississippi
Kengo Usui
DIC Imaging Products USA, LLC
Providing management education in countries where poverty is rampant seems a contradiction in terms. Yet it may help the country to develop stronger competitiveness and economic development. The article proposes a tentative framework to show how management education might be implemented in the worlds poorest countries. The proposed framework integrates conditions and influences relating to management education, including country environment, with particular emphasis on stage and nature of poverty and openness of educational practices to ideas from outside the country. Finally, the model suggests that outcomes are hard to assess and face many obstacles. The article primarily draws on a decade-long case study within one country in Southeast Asia but also provides observations from other emerging countries in Asia and Africa. The article discusses the challenges of the dream of providing management educationincluding the length of time and difficulties of infusing concepts and behaviors into developing countries management education institutions. Keywords: management education; emerging economy; poverty
Catch a man a fish, and you can sell it to him. Teach a man to fish, and you ruin a wonderful business opportunity. Karl Marx
Marxs prophetic statement points to the growing conflict between developed and developing nations: What role should developed economies play relative to economic development of emerging economies? Many journalists, scholars, and educators recognize the unprecedented changes since the
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Berlin Walls fall in 1989 (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Kornai, 1992; Peng, 2000), which symbolizes the unique opportunity for change in the global economy, especially within emerging economies. Since 2000, such interest has only grown, most recently with a focus on the worlds poorest countries. Economic development is increasingly viewed as a way to eliminate (or decrease) poverty in developing and emerging economy countries, where seven eighths of the worlds population lives and the average daily income is $2 or less (Hart, 2005; Prahalad, 2005). Although the average may be less than $2 per day, wide income disparities exist even within countriesfrom rural to urban and within urban settings. Nevertheless, even within the poorer sections of such countries, multinational and local firms are tapping those markets (Prahalad, 2005). Developing economies have several characteristics differentiating them from developed economies: (a) nearly twice the economic growth or development rates, (b) higher rates of foreign direct investment, (c) rapid shifts from agrarian to industrial segments, (d) higher proportions (30% to 40%) of people younger than 20, (e) increased rates of urbanization, and (f) significant increases in total global demand. As emerging economies gravitate to market-based economies, their governments and Western experts have recognized a needand opportunity for management training (Clark, Lang, & Balaton, 2001; Pearce & Branyiczki, 1993; Puffer, 1996). Many Western professors and experts have been drafted to train professors within those countries as well as managers. The motivation for Western governments and universities to provide such training varies but typically includes anticipation of economic gains (e.g., building a future trading partner, access to markets in the region, source for resources), political benefits (e.g., access to military bases, building partnerships in a volatile region, helping to stabilize a country), or humanitarian advances (e.g., seeking to improve health). Finally, some external partners support development without major quid pro quo economic, political, or strategic expectations. The Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), for instance, are among the highest per capita donors of aid money in the world, supporting recipient countries where they can make a differencesuch as in Southeast Asia or East Africarather than going to countries where their aid money would be insignificant, such as China. Despite widespread activity in management education in many emerging economies, little documentation exists about those efforts, how they were conducted, or the impact of such knowledge transfer in these countries. What little that does exist is primarily based on short-term visits by
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Journal of Management Education
Western professors, not on long-term observation or on work by indigenous researchers (Tsui, 2004). This lack of documentation is regrettable because foreigners from industrialized countries could use lessons from them to inform future experiencesboth within emerging countries and in their home settings. To address that gap in documentation and knowledge, we draw on experience from a decade-long management education capacity-building project to propose a tentative framework to understand how management education and support might be implemented in poor countries. The context of emerging economies makes the challenges of implementation of programs much different than in the developed world; the framework seeks to take that into account. The article has three parts. First, we briefly review literature on emerging economies generally and on management education in particular. Then, we suggest a tentative framework for management education capacity building in emerging economies. We close the article with conclusions about the challenges for such ventures.
Review of Literature on Emerging Economies and Management Education

This section briefly reviews the literature on emerging economies and management education.
Emerging Economies
The emerging economy literature offers several consistent findings. First, countries that change political and economic systems simultaneously face greater challenges than those, such as Vietnam and China, that change only economic approaches (Boisot & Child, 1996; Han & Baumgarte, 2000; Newman, 2000). Also, visible prosperity (e.g., cell phones, motorbikes) has been relatively fast in many urban areas (Napier & Thomas, 2004). This economic improvement accentuates the differences between urban or educated and rural or uneducated portions of the populations. Therefore, progress comes at a cost in the unevenness of growth and prosperity to its total population that, if not addressed by the government, could create more problems. One finding should have surprised few but shocked many: Economic changes take longer than expected. In discussing collective culture shock, Fink and Feichtinger (1998) argued that, just as individuals experience culture shock, so does a society when shifting from a mind-set and behavior of
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planned economics to market economics. Rather than months, collective cultural shock could take a generation or longer (20 to 30 or more years). Although little research exists on long-term impacts of transitions to confirm the idea of collective cultural shock, general observations support it. In Vietnam, for instance, official economic renovation began in 1986, but consistent economic progress has emerged only in the past 4 years (almost 20 years later).
Management Education
During the 1990s, rapid economic development and business opportunities in emerging economies revealed the dearth of management education materials and knowledge for managers and employees to take advantage of the shifts toward market economies, increasing prosperity and economic development. Many Western universities offered educational products and services to hungry emerging economies undergoing rapid change (Gobeli, Przybylowski, & Rudelius, 1998). Chinese and Vietnamese universities, for instance, took advantage of opportunities offered by generous donors, such as the European Community and the Scandinavian countries. Many Western scholars trained both local professors and managers in the intricacies of market economics; they usually taught over short periods (weeks or months) and only in their expertise areas (vs. building capacity within the institutions). Several findings have emerged on challenges when Western-style management education enters in developing countries: (a) the difficulty for local managers to change mind-sets as the economy shifts (Soulsby, 2001); (b) how infrastructure challenges, such as lack of power, water, or classroom equipment, can affect education (Napier, Vu, Ngo, Nguyen, & Vu, 1997); (c) how hard it is for foreigners and locals to connect when they lack shared language or conceptual models (Michailova & Husted, 2003; Napier, 2006; Puffer, 1996; Von Kopp, 1992; Vu & Napier, 2000); (d) difficulty in building equal relationships between local and foreign partners (Napier, Ngo, Nguyen, Nguyen, & Vu, 2002); and (e) the impact of culture and technology on communication and the communication infrastructure (Barrett, 2002). The capacity to diffuse knowledge to emerging economies also depends on differing cultures and political risk (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Effective knowledge diffusion is bidirectional (Buckley & Carter, 2002), not just a one-way transfer. Instead, foreigners need to absorb local knowledge formal and informal business practices, market and competitive conditions, and relations with government, suppliers, customers, local universities, and other stakeholders (Buckley & Carter, 2002).
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Significant knowledge transfer also needs to occur as emerging economy business organizations learn to deal with regional and global business environments and trade. African businesss heterogeneous environments, for example, impose time pressure on the process of developing appropriately adapted competitive strategies for African countries (Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999). African organizations focus heavily on the external competitive environment in strategy formulation at the expense of heterogeneous internal contexts (Kamoche, 1993) because of a lack of codification of local knowledge about the volatile and inherently hostile external environment (Kamoche, 1993; Munene, 1991). This confuses both Western and African players because a firms specific strategic choices require unique, rare, and inimitable bundles of knowledge assets, significantly different from those in the West, to effectively compete in African countries (Barney, 1991). Foss and Pedersen (2002) found that such cluster-based knowledge is more difficult to transfer than network and internally-generated knowledge. But to help developing countries, knowledge must be transferred. So how is it done? As suggested, little research exists about long-term projects; most observations of cases are 1 to 3 years. Yet a short time horizon may limit understanding stages of change (Fink & Feichtinger, 1998).
Tentative Framework for Encouraging Management Education

This section offers a tentative framework of management education in emerging economies. It is shaped by existing literature and our experiences, ranging from Africa to Asia, largely drawing from a near decade-long capacitybuilding project for management education in Vietnam. The longitudinal ethnographic case examines the development of Vietnams first international standard business school, housed within one of the countrys preeminent universities, the National Economics University (NEU) in Hanoi. In the early 1990s, both the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) recognized Vietnams need for trained managers to operate in a global economy. Ultimately, a decade-long project, supported by Sweden, the United States, and Vietnam, allowed NEU to develop more than 80 managers and faculty members, curriculum, facilities, and processes for academic and research programs that would provide Vietnamese managers with the knowledge and skills they needed to conduct business in and beyond Vietnam. The train-thetrainer program to develop faculty members assumed that they would (and
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they did) develop MBA programs for Vietnamese managers who worked in domestic firms, worked in state-owned enterprises, or started their own companies. MBA programs now exist in both Vietnamese and in English, with both now running several cohorts per year. Participants in the train-the-trainer program were highly educated in that they all had bachelor degrees but were not among the elite of the country; they were mostly faculty members at the university who made about $30 to $40 per month at the time, and thus their tuition and fees for the MBA program were fully funded by the project. A few managers were supported by their companies (e.g., Vietnam Airlines, the government news agency). The case study involved participant observation by the foreign managers running the project, semistructured and informal interviews with more than 60 Vietnamese faculty members, managers, university administrators, and more than 30 foreign visiting professors and administrators, and field notes, documentation, and archival records. The frameworks components comprise, first, the environmental context, which may in turn affect educational practices, such as openness to ideas from outside the country. These factors influence decisions of whether to go it alone or join with external partners to develop and deliver management education and training. If country can secure external supporters, two other issues come into playthe nature of the partnerships and the type of knowledge flow within the partnership. These factors may or may not all work together to lead to successful outcomes. (see Figure 1).
Environmental Context
Emerging economies have environmental contexts that influence poverty and practices of management education. Context includes factors, such as politics, geography, and infrastructure, that may affect technology development and, significantly, the stage and nature of poverty.
Politics
A governments politics may support economic development, external involvement, and long-term growth, even when the politics are quite different from those of the potential partners. For example, China and Vietnam have strong communist political contexts, with a single-party system and controlled media, yet the governments do allow changes in nonpolitical realmsfrom education to economics. Other countries with similar restrictions, however,
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Figure 1 Tentative Framework: Management Education in Emerging Economies

Go Goititalone alone
Environment Politics Geog/infrastructure Technology Stage and nature of Poverty
Openness of Educational Institutions
Developing Developing Mgt Education Mgt-Desire Education

-Desire -Funding -Funding -Partners -Partners
Outcomes Outcomes
-Relationship stage -Relationship stage -Receptiveness -Receptiveness -Competence -Competence
Partnerships Partnerships
-Passive/active -Passive/active -Infusion of concepts -Infusion of concepts
Knowledge Knowledgeflow flow
such as Myanmar (Burma), may be less open to educational change (or less attractive to donors). Although Myanmar has opened more schools and universities since the late 1980s, quality and consistency have been unstable (Thien & Nyo, 1999), and the government has repeatedly closed and opened universities during that time. Recently, it built new facilitiesdorms, classrooms, officesfar from urban areas, which some speculate was to reduce possible protests by dispersing faculty members and students. Perhaps also for political expediency, the University of Distance Education is a major delivery mechanism, serving nearly 200,000 students, compared to the traditional institutes, which may each have only 5,000 to 10,000 students (Thien & Nyo, 1999).
Geography and Infrastructure

Geographical size, lack of infrastructure, and population may influence policies relating to rural education. Some Southeast Asian and African countries have developed distance education or clustered centers in rural areas. Cambodia and Myanmar, for instance, have learning centers and e-learning institutions reaching more rural areas (Middleborg & Duvieusart, 2002).
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Some countries use a staged or phased approach to regional education focus. Vietnam, for instance, spent 20 years building the quality of its urban university education, particularly at the nations top universities. In the past 5 years, emphasis, in funding and supporting external visitors (e.g., Fulbright scholars), has shifted to regions outside the major cities of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.
Stage and Nature of Poverty

For many emerging economies, poverty remains an overwhelming characteristic. Elimination will come partly from economic development by indigenous firms and external support, which will help create jobs. But to qualify for new job opportunities, inhabitants need skills and knowledge to gain meaningful employment. Therefore, education plus jobs should help reduce poverty levels in emerging economies. The concept of poverty is not confined to emerging economies but is ubiquitous and also relative. Those living in Beverly Hills feel that South-Central Los Angles represents high-level poverty, whereas the poor of Bangladesh or Somalia represent a standard of deprivation that makes South-Central Los Angeles mimic Beverly Hillswith electricity, running water, and educational institutions. Although scholars have debated how to measure poverty (e.g., Bourguignon & Chakravarty, 2003; Chakravarty, 2001; Chakravarty & Mukherjee, 1999; Shaohua, Gaurav, & Ravallion, 1994; Thon, 1979), few disagree that it exists in all societies. The type and level of poverty need to be explored to forecast how to appropriately address environmental context of countries providing management education. The nature of poverty in emerging economies comprises at least 10 indicators, used by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund: (a) per capita income, (b) inhabitants per household, (c) work-related expenses (i.e., house expenditures or costs related to allowing individuals to work, such as child care), (d) level of compulsory education, (e) average level of education (i.e., the percentage of the population with education beyond government-mandated compulsory levels, (f) life expectancy, (g) medical infrastructure (i.e., the number of hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants, as a quasi indicator of societys supporting medical infrastructure, (h) social or cultural institutions as constraints (i.e., the level of influence of religious and educational institutions), (i) government policies and/or programs that address poverty, and (j) NGOs and their impact on poverty in the country (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2 Classification of the Level or Degree of Poverty

Poverty Indicatiors Per Capita Income Inhabitants per Household Work Related Expenses Compulsory Education Average Level of Education Life Expectancy Medical Infrastructure Social/Cultural Institutions as Constraints Govt Policies Programs Relative to Addressing Poverty NGOs & Their Impact on Poverty in the Country Stage 1 Level of Poverty
Less Than $600 per Annum Greater than 12 Inhabitants Less than 5% of Annual Household Income
Stage 2 Level of Poverty

$600-1000 per Annum 12-9 Inhabitants 5-10% of Annual Household Income

$1,000-2000 per Annum 8-6 Inhabitants 11-15% of Annual Household Income

$2,000-6,000 per Annum 5-4 Inhabitants 15-20% of Annual Household Income

Greater than $6,000 per Annum Less than 4 Inhabitants Greater than 20% of Household Income
None
3-5 Years
5-7 Years
8-9 Years
Greater than 9 Years
Less than 3 years
4-5 Years
5-6 Years
7-8 Years
Greater than 8 Years
Less than 45 Years
45-50 Years
51-55 Years
56-60 Years 7-8 Years
Grater than 60 Years
Less than 100 Beds per 100,000
100-250 Beds per 100,000
250-500 Beds per 100,000
500-1,000 Beds per 100,000
Greater than 1000 Beds per 100,000
Extremely High Level of Interference
High Level of Interference
Medium Level of Interference
Low Level of Interference
Extremely Low Level of Interference
Limited Govt Policies Directed at Poverty
Low Level of Govt Policies Directed at Poverty
Medium Level of Govt Policies Directed at Poverty
High Level of Govt Policies Directed at Poverty
Extremely High Level of Govt Policies Directed Towards Poverty
No NGO Impact
Limited Level of NGO Impact
Moderate Level of NGO Impact
High Level of NGO Impact
Extremely High Level of NGO Impact
An understanding of relative poverty indicators (Figure 2) helps policy makers, educators, and partners frame the type or nature of poverty in a country to devise strategies for management education and needed organizational changes. Second, poverty indicators, when ranked, show the likely importance or impact on organizations and managers and on strategies they use. Third, countries and organizations need a plan with timelines to determine if poverty is decreasing and at what rate. Fourth, review and modification of the importance of poverty indicators need to be undertaken, given changes in other environmental conditions. Such concerns may also contribute to a countrys willingness and ability to be open to new ideas about education.
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Openness of Educational Practices

A critical decision is the extent to which a country seeks external support and partnerships in developing management educational institutions, practices, and content. Because some Western ideas may clash with internal policies and philosophies, this decision is major. For instance, given Karl Marxs description of Kapitalismus as a (quite evil) political system, not just an economic system, the Vietnamese opposed accepting more than just the economic aspects. Thus, doi moi, or economic renovation, was officially called moving toward a market-oriented economy under socialist guidance, allowing Vietnam to allow market economics concepts to be taught while adjusting them to fit local conditions. Conversely, some countries may seek to become part of the regional and global marketplace, but they may not be welcomed into the international business community, sometimes for reasons they may not be able to control. Ghana, for example, a relatively stable West African country in political and economic terms, has sought foreign investment and support for years (Brown & Masten, 1998). But Africa has an image problem. In the past, many investors and donors painted much of Africa, including Ghana, with a similar brush, assuming it to be too risky for various business ventures. But recently, with UN and World Bank support and more insight into differences across the continent, countries such as Ghana are receiving more positive attention and educational support. In contrast, however, Myanmar continues to face isolation. The government seeks investment and business from outside the country, but its negative image has led to sanctions and anti-investment feelings, which eliminate it from most investor and donor consideration. Both countries desperately need management education, but their chances of receiving it vary dramatically.
Developing Management Education

Three factors affect an emerging economys decision to seek external support in developing management education: (a) country desire and ability to seek help, (b) availability of sufficient funding from private or public or governmental sources, and (c) availability of appropriate partners. As suggested, even if a country wishes to work with outside partners, funding and partnerships may be limited. Myanmar, facing sanctions from much of the developed world, receives limited support from a few countries, including Japan and the United Kingdom. Its political isolation makes the
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educational process more tenuous. Elsewhere (e.g., North Korea), the leaderships willingness to allow outsiders in to assist is limited, precluding efforts to educate future managers. For countries considered strategically, politically, or commercially important, funding is frequently available. Sometimes funding may exist, but the recipient country may resist taking it, which happened in Vietnam. The NEU projects first 7 years were funded by the Swedish government. For the final 2 years, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offered funding, and the Vietnamese delayed 9 months before accepting it. Although U.S. senators and congressmen were baffled at the delay, its sensitivity stemmed from concerns about whether the funding had political requirements attached to it. Finally, a country seeking management education needs partners that are appropriate (have the ability and commitment) to work with it. Again, at one point the NEU business school approached five U.S., three Australian, and two British universities to be possible partners. For various reasons, none of the universities were acceptable as partners. The reasons ranged from concern about bureaucracy, to commitments to other projects, to financial requirements that were above what an aid development project could sustain.
Partnerships
If a country is able to garner outside assistance, then two factors become important in helping the management education development succeed: the nature of the partnerships with external supporters and knowledge flow and arrangement between the partners. Partnerships between an educational institution and its supporter or supporters encompass three key factors: (a) nature of relationship (Napier & Thomas, 2004), (b) receptiveness of both partners to offer and receive information, knowledge, and skills (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Michailova & Husted, 2003), and (c) competence of each partner to know how to use the information to reach the desired outcomes for their partnership (Napier, 2005). Development stages of relationship between partners. The nature of a relationship appears to go through four stages: establishing contact, encountering critique, finding convergence, and determining how to continue the relationship. Key characteristics of the stages follow (adapted from Napier & Thomas, 2004, pp. 83-84). As the description and graphic suggest, the acceptance of foreigner influence is not always consistent but rather starts
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high, dips severely, and then works back up, visible over longitudinal observation (Figure 3):
Contact (Years 1 to 3): At first, when we foreigners showed up, the Vietnamese treated us like gods. People wanted to hear what we had to say, to learn and to work with us, even though they were really wary. Theyd grown up hearing government people talk about the evil foreigners so a number of people didnt want to spend much time with usespecially away from workbut they wanted to learn. They thought that since we came from the outside world we knew it all. Then they moved to a point where they became less cautious, wanted more from us, but they wanted to know why and how we did things. They still accepted what we said, but just wanted to understand our reasoning. Critique (Years 3 to 5): Later, things shifted. . . . Much of it was subtle people didnt respond as enthusiastically as before or they said something wouldnt work because of the special conditions in Vietnambut other times it was more blatant. The local managers became more confident, believed they had learned what they needed from the foreigners, and just wanted us to give them money and leave. The attitude was weve gotten from you what we want, you can just leave now. Its our country and our organization, we dont want outsiders telling us what to do. This shift in behavior and how they interacted was tough to get used tosome of the foreigners couldnt adjust to being questioned and challenged. Convergence (Years 6 to 9): But those of us who stuck with it (or had to since our projects werent finished) tried to adjust. And slowly, the attitude changed once more. Our Vietnamese colleagues seemed to realize that there was a lot they could learn, and perhaps just as important, we started to realize that we could learn from them. It was sort of a stage of becoming colleagues more than mentors or feeling like we werent needed. We all recognized that we had to work together, had to complete the job and wanted to do it well. So we found ways to work togethereach of us adjusting. Continue (Years 9+): Were now at a point where our work is coming to a closeat least on this projectand we have to decide and find a new future path as partners. We might just stay in touch, or we might find some way to collaborate that is quite new and unusual. But we made it through the rough spots and know that if we want to continue, we can.
Receptiveness of partners to information and competence to use or apply it. As the relationship changes over time, so does willingness to receive information and the ability or competence to use it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Napier, 2005). During the contact stage, knowledge flow is mainly one way: from foreigners to locals. Although the Vietnamese accepted information,
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Figure 3 Acceptance of Foreigner Influence by Vietnamese During Relationship Stages

High
Low Contact Critique Converge Continue?
they did not always understand it and hence were sometimes unable to apply it. They heard about concepts such as supply and demand, working capital, and human resource management, but they lacked a context for the concepts, and thus they were simply pieces of data to memorize. For instance, because Vietnam has been a cash-based society, no one used (or trusted) banks; hence, there was no concept of credit. To facilitate understanding of a concept such as credit, a finance instructor had to be receptive to the Vietnamese context. As locals moved from complete acceptance to greater understanding, their ability to use information increased. During the critique stage, the receptiveness and competence of individuals varied significantly. In general, the Vietnamese receptiveness and competence began to outstrip that of many foreigners, who could not, or did not, realize the need to move from the role of expert to that of colleague with local partners. Thus, although the Vietnamese absorbed and used knowledge, some foreigners were stuck in an outdated view of the relationship. Locals criticized foreigners and said they had learned all they needed to, and thus their receptiveness to new information suffered as well. Funding for most capacity-building projects ends after 2 to 4 years. Had this happened at the NEU, the relationship would have ended with the critique stage. Yet the project lasted a decade, allowing the partnership to mature. Each side realized the other had knowledge and value to contribute and thus settled into a more collegial relationship. Thus, receptiveness and competence
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increased; knowledge flow was bidirectional (Napier, 2006) because each side had the willingness and ability to learn from the other (Jovanovic & Rob, 1989). The final stage, whether and how to continue, is still in progress. Although there is no formal relationship with the primary partners, the Vietnamese institution has developed and maintained business partnerships with some universities to deliver very specific programs.
Knowledge Flow
The nature of the relationship among partners, as suggested, may influence receptiveness of and ability to use knowledge that comes from each partner. Those in turn relate to the ways and speed that knowledge flows: (a) passive versus active and (b) infusion of the innovations. Passive and Active Flow Passive flow refers to each side absorbing knowledge in ways that happen with little explicit action (Napier, 2006). Participating in meetings, social occasions, or informal discussions where tacit information and knowledge emerge forms the basis of passive knowledge flow. Cultural understanding can increase during such encounters. For example, several Vietnamese faculty and staff members lived in houses that flooded during the yearly monsoon season, and yet they accepted the inconvenience and damage as an inevitable part of the cycle of life. Such acceptance of the uncontrollable helped explain some reactions to institutional situations, such as rules about pay, travel, or job expectations. Foreigners who learned from such events gained insights about thinking and norms and how to better interact with their counterparts. Active knowledge flow happens when each side explicitly offers (or receives) information and may apply it. For instance, one evening after work early in the project, a senior Vietnamese university administrator confidentially told the two foreign project managers that the university sought approval from the Ministry of Education and Training to establish Vietnams first international standard business school, a highly sensitive and potentially contentious move. The foreigners recognized the sensitivity because of their long association with and knowledge of the institution and the country. Thus, active knowledge transfer in a meaningful way (after hours) revealed much about governmental bureaucracy, concern about the impact of the news, and the growing level of trust between the partners. It was another 4 years before the school was allowed to open.
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Infusion of Management Education Concepts Emerging economies may have unique needs and approaches to management education innovations and knowledge. Although Western managers and educators may assume that organizations adopting innovations follow common patterns of diffusion (Majahan, Muller, & Bass, 1990), such assumptions may not hold in emerging economies and thus should be examined (Brown & Hagel, 2005; Lieberthal & Prahalad, 2003; Postrel, 2002; Tsui, 2004). The longitudinal capacity-building project in Vietnam provides some insight into whether and which management education concepts and innovations could be adopted by emerging country institutions. In this section of the article, we examine adoption (or lack thereof) of three management education concepts and practices: (a) infrastructure-related components, (b) student-centered teaching techniques, and (c) creating a research culture. The figures suggest that the adoption (or adaptation) of international standard practices ranged from high (widely used and adopted) to low (very little used). Typically a low ranking means that the existing (or former) Vietnamese practice continued. Infrastructure-related components. Infrastructure-related components comprise four aspectstechnology, updated classrooms, updated library, and policies relating to administration of the institution (e.g., finance, accounting, human resources). Figure 4 illustrates the adoption of various infrastructure components over time. Of these components, threetechnology, classrooms, and financial or accounting policieswere adopted; library and human resource practices were not. The information technology components (e.g., computers in a lab, computers for professors, access to the Internet) began slowly but grew quite rapidly for at least three reasons. First, donor funding for computer technology was available at various points during the project. Second, over the projects lifetime, two staff people taught themselves about technology and (pirated) software and, in turn, became the support staff for the business school. Finally, faculty members became increasingly aware of what was available beyond their institution as they traveled abroad (Figure 4). Financial and accounting practices were also adopted and improved on over time, although not extensively until two capable (and willing to learn) staff persons joined the project in 1999. One of them, in particular, has continued to improve the routines and process. In 1993, the designated project classroom was updated to include a wall-mounted air conditioner, an overhead projector, 16 two-person desks, chairs, and a flip-chart easel. Flip-chart paper was brought from Hong Kong or custom made in Hanoi. In 1999, two
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Figure 4 Adoption of Infrastructure-Related Components: Technology, Updated Classrooms, Policies for Finance, Accounting, and HR, and Updated Library
Hi
Technology
Level of Adoption
Updated Classrooms
Fin &acctg policies Updated Library

Lo
HR practices 1995 1997 1999 2000 2003 2006
1993
additional rooms were updated, and the school purchased a computer projector. Since 2003, another three rooms have been updated, and each has an in-room computer in a locked cabinet for PowerPoint presentations. Two infrastructure-related areas where Western concepts were not adopted were the library and human resource practices. The library was mostly built by donations from visiting professors of texts and used books they brought into Vietnam. In 1997, the project purchased an annual subscription to a business periodicals index, but the university did not renew it. Part of the difficultly with library infrastructure adoption was the resistance to the fundamental idea of a librarywhere materials can be borrowed and then are returned for others to use. Rather than returning materials, faculty members kept them in their bookshelves so they could be sure they (alone) would have access. Thus, the library became a musty storage room for old newspapers. Human resource practices common in the developed world, such as recruitment, selection, performance appraisal, and compensation systems, were unacceptable in Vietnam, partly because of political sensitivities. In a communist country such as Vietnam, individuals must apply for permission to move to a new city, travel or study abroad, or publish articles in international journals. Selection and promotion link closely with seniority and political factors, and compensation is typically based on seniority rather
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Figure 5 Adoption of Student-Centered Teaching Techniques (e.g., cases, projects, discussion)

Level of Adoption
High
Using Student centered Teaching Techniques
Med
Experiencing And learning About new methods

Low
Bi-cultural team teaching
Independent teaching
1993
1995
1997
1999
2000
2003
2006
than performance. The project administrators tried twice (1998, 2001) to help the Vietnamese implement some aspects they requested (performance appraisal), but the effort was halfhearted and abandoned. Student-centered teaching techniques. A second management education innovation introduced in the Vietnamese university was the notion of alternatives to lecture-based teaching. The capacity-building project encouraged professors to learn about and use cases, small-group discussions, roleplays, team projects, simulations, student presentations, and the like. By the projects end, the adoption of techniques was fair but had fallen, as several of the stronger users left the business school for other jobs in the university or outside. Because the project involved three cohorts of faculty members going through an MBA program, the first group experienced (1993 to 1995) and then applied the methods, first through bicultural team teaching (1995 to 1999) and then on their own in Vietnamese- and English-language graduate programs (Figure 5). Many faculty members continue to use student-centered techniques, but few have learned or created their own new techniques. For example, several remaining instructors use more in-class discussion, cases, and short incidents than they did prior to the projects start. One strategy professor, for instance, has begun using in-class games and puzzles where
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Figure 6 Adoption of Research Culture (e.g., learning how, conducting research for international publications)
Level of Adoption
High
Group B. 1 int l PhD completed; 14 Masters of Research completed Group A. 4 int l PhDs
Group C. 10 -12 Local PhDs (from own university)
Med
Getting MBA Degrees: I, II, III

Low
1993
1995
1997
1999
2000
2003
2006
they help illustrate some concepts. Such practices would have been unheard of before the project. Developing a research culture. A key goal of the capacity-building project was to instill a research culture among Vietnamese faculty members (Figure 6) using several approaches: funding doctoral studies for faculty members, including Vietnamese faculty members in research projects conducted by foreigners, and educating Vietnamese administrators in the value of faculty-driven, analytical, peer-reviewed research. The long-term impact was negligible. Over 6 years, the project funded 27 faculty members pursuing advanced PhD or masters degrees from universities in the United States, Australia, England, and Singapore. Of those, 19 completed their degrees. In addition, the NEU supported 10 to 12 faculty members in its doctoral program, and 4 others pursued international programs in Thailand, Denmark, and Japan. In addition, throughout the project, visiting foreign professors invited local professors to join them in research projects. By the end of the project, all Vietnamese business school faculty members had participated with foreigners on at least one project; several had been involved in more than one and had attended conferences, presented papers, or published in international peerreviewed journals. Some have continued to do research for international conferences and (a few) journals with foreign colleagues, but rarely on their own. Several publish in the universitys journal.
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A final way of building a research culture was to help Vietnamese university administrators understand how international standard research works, in contrast to the Vietnamese way. In general, research in Vietnam follows a prescribed pattern. Some ministry provides a research topic and question (e.g., How many and what kind of farmers work in the Red River Valley?). The ministry provides funding to a university to conduct the study and often has a say in who will lead the research. The senior researcheror the university administratorsdesignates instructors or students to carry out the research. The lead researchers name appears first in a publication, and (sometimes) the others are listed afterward. The report appears in a Vietnamese-language journal, typically published by the university that conducted the research. Thus, many ideas accepted in international research institutions were new and controversial for Vietnamese administrators and faculty members. Such ideas included (a) faculty members choosing research topics rather than being assigned them from government ministries, (b) faculty members choosing their research partners rather than being assigned to a project, (c) faculty members conducting analytical, rather than descriptive, research, and (d) faculty members jointly contributing to research rather than a few doing the work with no (or little) acknowledgement. When he first heard about the notion of blind reviews and competitive research proposals, a senior administrator summarily dismissed it. Hence, to introduce and explain the ideas, two groups of Vietnamese senior administrators visited the U.S. partners university campus and met counterpart administrators. They spent 2 hours with the director of the Office of Research Administration, who explained the international standard review process, the value of blind-reviewed proposals and manuscripts, and the importance of faculty members choosing and pursuing their own research interests. Foreigners talk about an informal 18-month rule in Vietnam: the length of time it takes for an idea to gain credibility. Indeed, after about 18 months of continuing discussion, one Vietnamese administrator came up with an innovative idea: Faculty members should pick research topics they wanted to pursue, write proposals, and submit them for competitive review. Of all the management education concepts that foreigners tried to convey, the research culture was the most disappointing failure. Ultimately, Vietnamese administrators and many faculty members were unable or unwilling to recognize the value of research to an institution. Some Vietnamese administrators saw publishing in international journals as boosting only the researchers reputation, not that of the institution. In a communist and Confucian society, where people are discouraged from standing out, those who published were not celebrated. With no funding or incentive, and sometimes active discouragement, the embryonic research culture fizzled.
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In sum, even a decade-long capacity-building project encompassing more than 100 Vietnamese, more than 80 foreigners, and more than $8 million in financial support was marginally successful at fully implementing a management education program. We discuss some of the challenges more generally in the next section.
Is There Hope for Management Education in Emerging Economies?

Scholars, journalists, donors, and investors alike are acknowledging the potential importance of emerging economies. The sample case study suggests that it is possiblealbeit frustratingto implement at least some management education concepts in a developing country. If we accept that progress is a basic tenet of free trade and economic development, we must understand the challenges of effectively engaging the emerging economies, especially relating to education, and potential negative outcomes of awakening them. In the next section, we review issues facing management education groupsboth within the emerging economies and those seeking to support them.
Aid Policies: Boon or Boondoggle?

Aid programs in developing and emerging economies are often the pariah of scholars and politicians (Sachs, 2005) anxious to find ways to solve poverty and bypass the dangers of mismanaged, misguided development programs. Others have argued that too often aid programs are designed without the recipient fully participating in decisions regarding needs and implementation (Chambers, 1997; Rist, 1999). At base, questions arise as to whether aid programs, such as the capacity-building project in Vietnam, are a boon or a boondoggle for participants (from both sides). We argue that there may be a bit of both in aid projects. The boondoggle aspect certainly included some travel that may not have been critical for daily operations, such as trips for senior administrators (on both sides) to visit their counterparts in partner universities, but which ultimately did help understanding and relationships that allowed those in the trenches to accomplish project goals. One potential boondoggle candidate, involving a senior administrator from the U.S. university partner, turned into a major unexpected boon, which later paid off in a large way in project management. Because the
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fourth phase of the project was funded by USAID, U.S. university administrators wanted to use an American bank (rather than the ANZ Bank, which had been the project bank for the first 7 years). So the project manager opened an account with one of the two U.S. banks in Vietnam. When the U.S. universitys top financial officer visited Hanoi to get an overview of the project, she stepped into a quagmire, unusual for her, not unusual for Vietnam. She learned on Day 1 of her visit that the projects U.S. bank had left Hanoi and thus the project would need to open an account with the other U.S. bank. Opening a bank accountsimple in the United States, not so simple in Vietnam. She spent 3 hours every afternoon during her 5 days in Hanoi trying to open that elusive bank account because the bank required different and new information each day. The U.S. bank was used to corporate accounts, not aid projects, and its requirements for funds in the account, use of the account, and related activities became too cumbersome for the relatively small aid project. Eventually, the project returned its accounts to ANZ Bank. The serendipity of having a senior U.S. administrator go through the frustration of the simple process of opening a bank account was more than worth the cost of her trip. The project managers had no difficulties with that administrator on financial issues during the project because she understood the challenges faced in the country. The bigger question, though, is whether an aid project is a boon to the participants, the institutions, and the country as a whole. Despite its many frailties and rockiness, the capacity-building project on the whole has benefitted all three groups. The NEU business school has sustainable graduate programs in business administration (in Vietnamese and English), accountancy, and finance. It has begun initiating undergraduate business programs as well. By 2007, more than half of the faculty MBA participants had attained PhDs and were teaching in the NEU or other Vietnamese institutions; three hold academic positions outside of Vietnam (in the United States, Australia, and Macau). Some left the university to join international development programs (e.g., United Nations Development Programme, World Bank) or to start their own consulting firms. Slightly fewer than half of those who started the business school remain there; others have moved to different areas of the university, so the NEU has gained additional expertise throughout its other divisions and units. Thus, the NEU has built its human capital, has improved and strengthened its curriculum and teaching approaches, and has (a few) faculty members who continue to conduct international standard research with foreign colleagues. Furthermore, the NEU has dramatically expanded its worldwide network of partner universities and the networks that individual faculty
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members have developed through their studies abroad and research. This only complements its already strong connections within the countrys governmental and party components: Several previous rectors have been National Assembly members or have served on high-ranking committees. In some ways, the NEU has become a model for other universities within Vietnam seeking to build capacity. Finally, in unexpected ways, the project was a boon for Vietnams visibility as it was beginning to enter the world economic stage. In the early 1990s, the Asian Wall Street Journal had a front page article about the program, and the program received national U.S. media attention in 1995 when President Clinton established diplomatic relationson National Public Radio, on CNN radio, and in the New York Times. The NEU received visits from top universities worldwide, many seeking partnerships, generating more connections for the NEU with the broader academic community.
Adoption, Adaptation, or Rejection of International Standard Practices: Bending Bamboo

One of the basic questions of our article is, Why were some practices accepted and others were not? In the Vietnam case, as our discussion and the figures suggest, some practices were rejected outright, some were adapted to fit the local conditions, and some were adopted in a form comparable to what one would find anywhere. The form and level of acceptance seemed to vary in part because of whether the new ideas clashed with existing modes of practice or models of thinking. A key difference, then, is the extent to which the new knowledge or model of thinking or behavior challenged core belief systems of the Vietnamese recipients (Leonard & Swap, 2005). In some cases, there was a type of vacuum in which no existing model for behavior or practice existed. For example, before the capacity-building project, the university and business school had few computers; yet once faculty members had access to the technology and understood what they could do with it, the technology was easy to accept and adopt. With regard to research culture, though, an existing heavyweight model remained as an undercurrent, even while the international standard model was imported. So when the foreigners left, the traditional model reemerged throughout most of the university. In that case, the heavyweight was ultimately incompatible with the international standard approach. Adaptationrather than outright adoption or rejectionhappened when the Vietnamese saw value in parts of an innovation or idea, even when local and international standard ideas clashed somewhat. For example, the
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Vietnamese faculty members liked the idea of group projects yet could not accept peer evaluation of group members as part of the process. Several foreigners saw peer evaluation as a way to control for the slacker problem (i.e., when one person or people do not carry a fair share of the work). In Vietnam, however, such peer evaluation is uncomfortable and thus was not accepted, although the idea of group projects in general was. Throughout the project, this willingness to adopt, adapt, and reject fit the way the Vietnamese describe themselves. We are like bending bamboo, they say. Very strong and tough, but when bamboo is wet, it can bend into many different shapes. Their reshaping and changing, then, raise the next question, whether and what standard makes sense to use in such a developing country?
Why and what International Standard?

Most aid projects in developing economies assume that knowledge flow moves from the developed to the developing country participants. They further assume, especially in an area such as management education, that an international standard exists and is appropriate. But perhaps a more fundamental question is whether the notion of an international standard makes sense in an emerging economy, and, if so, which international standard? It is interesting that in the Vietnamese university case we examined, the university administrators picked the standard. When the project began, they requested that a North American university accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) oversee the delivery of the MBA program. At the time (early 1990s), only four in North America met that criterionall were in Canada, because the United States had an embargo against Vietnam and thus could do no official business or trade. According to the initial contractors, the Vietnamese administrators had no idea what AACSB was or what accreditation meant other than reputation. Later, when the program shifted to an American partner, accreditation was still important to the Vietnamese, and thus the new partner was acceptable. Thus, the initial questions of whether to follow a standard and which standard came from the recipients rather than the deliverers. Later, as challenges throughout the program delivery emerged (e.g., plagiarism, academic standards of performance), the foreign university could rely on the accreditation requirements, which made some decisions more straightforward. Even though the delivering school had (highly American-driven) AACSB accreditation, the project managers, university administrators, and Swedish
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funders used the phrase international standard throughout the project. Not North American, not British, not Japanese standard. International standard. That was important for two reasons. First, it gave a clear signal that the NEU was open to and welcomed more than a single standard approach to teaching, administrative practices, study-abroad programs, doctoral research approaches. In fact, it was not until the latter phases of the project that a majority of foreign faculty members involved came from the United States. To that point, the range of regions and countries represented was wide, including, for example, Europe (e.g., Scotland, Denmark, and England), North America (e.g., Canada and the United States), and Asia (e.g., Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines). Even though the research culture was generally common across professors from developed countries, differences still existed in areas such as what constituted valuable topics, what methods should be used, how to adapt to Vietnam, and the like. Of course, into this mix entered the Vietnamese way. Often, as we suggested, the Vietnamese would adapt, rather than adopt, some approach to fit their conditions, whether that be ways to lead a discussion in a class, deal with management issues within the university, or carry out a research survey (hand delivered and collected rather than phoned or mailed). Thus, the questions of which standards and how to apply them are still somewhat unsettled. As developing countries become more adept at learning what the rest of the world has to offer, they will inevitably find their own paths. The Vietnamese university certainly has taken from its foreign visitors what works and what it wanted to use but has adjusted and tossed those innovations that do not fit or make sense. The programs, the business school, and their operations belong to them and thus must be made for and by them.
Management Education and Economic Development: Is It a Dream?

The Nordic country aid agencies are known in Southeast Asia for their willingness to collaborate, for working in catalyst countries where they can make a difference rather than being a small drop in a large bucket, as they would be in China, and for their patience. When the Vietnam project began, Sweden made a 2-year commitment to provide the MBA degree to a set of 30 faculty members. At the end of the first phase, both the Swedes and the Vietnamese governments recognized that 2 years was not long enough. Thus, Swedens involvement continued for 7 more years. The
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USAID funded portion lasted 2, extremely short, years. Even an evaluator of the final phase of the project commented that 2 years was too short to see any direct impact of the U.S. aid involvement. So how long does it take to see if such a project matters for economic development of a country? Representatives of Sida, which funded the Vietnam capacity-building project, often told a story about a Sida-funded forestry project some 25 years earlier. The logging mill, in the mountains of Vietnam, was a model aid project in its first several years. Workers and managers on both sides touted the productivity, efficiency, and success of the plant. But when the Swedes moved onto another project, the forestry project became an embarrassing failure: Productivity fell, safety records plummeted, and the Swedes reluctantly admitted that, 10 years on, the project was an unfortunate venture. Twenty-five years after the project began, a Swedish representative visited the site. His surprising story became an urban (or perhaps in this case countryside) legend within Sida. The factory had survived and in fact turned around completely. It was highly productive, employed several Vietnamese from the area, and was more successful than anyone had hoped for, even during its early good years. The moral was that the time frame for aid projects is longer than even the patient Swedes had expected. Thus, an evaluation of the management education and its link to economic development in Vietnam is ongoing, informally if not formally, even 14 years after it began. Some tangible results achieved are highly encouraging, if anecdotal. Several manager MBA graduates have started their own companies; one of those firms employs more than 100 people and exports products regionally and does business for customers in North America. Others work for foreign companies, for state-owned enterprises, or abroad. One has become the director of a competing business school, which has a strong U.S. partner and English-language and executive MBA programs. About one third have sent their children abroad to study; half travel abroad themselves for business and academic purposes. Several within the university have moved to higher-level administrative positionshead of the business school, head of a small business development center, head of the graduate school. Finally, the NEU Business School has completed at least six 45-person cohorts in its English-language MBA program, more than 20 of its Vietnamese-language program. Training and consulting for such firms as IBM, KMPG, and British Petroleum have been ongoing for more than a decade. Even so, as we suggested earlier, some of the academic innovations and practices followed a somewhat jerky, Sisyphian process in terms of acceptance: a few steps forward, several back. Perhaps part of the jerkiness
817
stemmed from too much, too fast. Certainly, Vietnam has wrestled with the too much, too fast challenges. At varying times, the government puts brakes on the development, and at other times it encourages it. Finding the balance and having the patience to see what transpires are critical. The Vietnam case certainly suggests that even a decade spent creating a business school and its culture is just a scratch on the surface. Thus, engaging emerging economies in economic-development activities, such as management education, is a multigenerational, multidecade process. So, Is Management education and economic development in emerging countries a dream? Yes, of a sort. But one with promise. We see it as a long running dream, with active and deep sleep phases, that is neither a fantasy nor a nightmare but something still emerging.
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