Dixon V Pinal County 10-0325PHXDKD Partial Documents of Lawsuit With Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Case 2:10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11 .
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Office of the Pinal County Attorney Joe A. Albo, Sate Bar No. 004810 P.O. Box 887 Florence, Arizona 85132 520-866-6242 520-866-6521 - Fax Attorney for the Pinal County Defendants
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARK E. DIXON, Plaintiff,
v.
NO. CIV 100325 PHX DKD
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PINAL COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, et. al Defendants.
ANSWER OF THE PINAL COUNTY DEFENDANTS
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For their answer to Mark E. Dixon's complaint against them, the Pinal County Defendants, state as follows: Jurisdiction, standing and venue
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These defendants deny that this Court has subject matter to hear and decide the matters
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alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff and all named defendants reside in Pinal County, Arizona, and within the District of Arizona. The acts or omissions of all of the parties alleged in the complaint occurred in Pinal County, Arizona, and within the District of Arizona. 2. Although plaintiff attempts to allege a cause of action under the United States Constitution
and laws, the factual allegations in the numbered paragraphs of the complaint fail to state a cause
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of action against these defendants upon which relief can be granted. The complaint's factual
Dixon v. Pinal County, et al
Case 2: 10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11
allegations allege neither a specific constitutional violation nor a violation of any clearly established right caused by these defendants required to invoke this Court's jurisdiction. 3. Plaintiff has filed a similar lawsuit in this Court against several Pinal County Sheriffs
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deputies in their individual capacities arising out of the same issue of the ownership and right to
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possession of a dog. That matter isDixon v. Clark, et. ai, Case Number CIV 092650 PHX SRB. 4. Defendants deny the allegations in numbered paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 based on a lack of
knowledge or information upon which to form an opinion as to their veracity. 5. Defendants admit that Pinal County is a political subdivision of the State of Arizona that
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has legal authority to sue and be sued. Defendants deny the rest of the allegations in numbered paragraph 6. 6. Defendants admit the parts of the allegations in numbered paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and II
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that allege that each named defendant is the current elected official serving in that capacity. Defendants deny the rest of the allegations in those numbered paragraphs. 7. These defendants lack sufficient, specific knowledge or information upon which to form
an opinion as to the veracity of the allegations contained in numbered paragraphs 12 through 22 and therefore deny them. specifically admitted herein. Defendants deny every other allegation in the complaint not
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8. In this matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction to "sentence" defendants under 42. U.S.C. 1988, as requested in the prayer for relief and that part of the prayer should be stricken. 9. The entire complaint, if true, fails to state a claim against these defendants upon which
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relief can be granted. Having answered each numbered paragraphs of the complaint, Defendants pray for relief as follows: That Plaintiff take nothing from Defendants.
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That the complaint against Defendants be dismissed for Plaintiffs failure to state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted. For Defendants' costs incurred. For such as other relief as is just as to Defendants Goode and LeBlanc. Dated this 8th day of March, 20 I O.
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lsi Joe A. Albo- - - - - - - Joe A. Albo Deputy County Attorney, Civil Division Attorney for the County Defendant
ORIGINAL filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court of the District of Arizona this 8th day of March,2010.
COPY of the foregoing mailed this 8th day of March, 2010, to: Mark E. Dixon P.O. Box 12695 Casa Grande, Arizona 85130 Plaintiff
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Case 2:10-cv-00325-DGC Document 33
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William J. Pearlman SBN # 003990 Law Offices of William J. Pearlman 1237 South Val Vista Drive, Suite 218 Mesa, Arizona 85204 Phone: 480-396-0681 Fax: 480-396-0532 Email: pearllaw@hotmail.com UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA MARK E. DIXON, Plaintiff, vs. 1. PINAL COUNTY, a Political Subdivision ; 2. JAMES WALSH, Pinal County Attorney, In his Official Capacity; 3. PAUL BABEU, Pinal County Sheriff, In his Official Capacity; 4. PETE RIOS, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 5. BRYAN MARTYN, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 6. DAVID SNIDER, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; et. al. DEFENDANTS, ) Case No.: CIV 2010-0325 PHX DGC ) ) ) ) ) ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS ) TO LIABILITY PER RULE 56, ) FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL ) PROCEDURE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
MOTION - 1
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Pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel, hereby moves for judgment as to the issue of liability. This motion is based upon the attached Investigation of the Professional Standards Unit, Pinal County Sheriffs Office by Sergeant Wayne Cashman, PCSO dated February 18, 2010, and just disclosed to Plaintiff July 9, 2010. Exhibit 1 FACTS The salient facts as found by the PCSO investigation are as follows: 1. Plaintiff had possession of his dog, Shiloh, on December 2, 2010. 2. Officers of the PCSO: Sgt. LeBlanc, Detectives Goode and Pile, employees of Defendants, stopped Plaintiff in his vehicle, under color of law, surrounded him, and demanded possession of the dog from Plaintiff. 3. That Plaintiff, surrounded by the 3 armed officers, surrendered his dog. 4. That the officers did not have in their possession, had not obtained and did not produce any order of Court, either an order of the Pinal County Superior Court or a search or arrest warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate authorizing the seizure of this property from Plaintiff. 5. That the Pinal County Sheriff, through his above mentioned deputies, did then turn over the dog to a third party, to wit: Carol Dixon, ex-wife of Plaintiff, again without further order of court.
MOTION - 2
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MEMORANDUM 1 Even accepting the purported justifications in the Professional Standards Unit report, it is clear that the officers of the Pinal County Sheriffs Office (hereinafter referred to as PCSO) seized private property in possession of a citizen without order of court or due process of law. While Defendants have argued as to the ownership of the dog, Plaintiff suggests that is a red herring and that Federal Court is not the proper place for a trial on that issue. The Constitution of the State of Arizona Art. 2, 4 states: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Article 2, 8 provides: No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. The PCSO report shows that these officers did not have authority of law, what they had was the color of authority of law and semi-automatic weapons issued by Pinal County and assigned to them by Defendant Babeu. 2 It is suggested that the law is settled that law enforcement officers do not have unbridled discretion to seize property from persons under the jurisdiction of the Constitution. This was apparently settled in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) where in a criminal matter the warrant issued under the authority of state law by the State
MOTION - 3
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Attorney General was held to be insufficient since it was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The good faith of the officers is irrelevant. The officers determination of probable cause is similarly irrelevant. The ownership of a dog even if it is at issue in a post decree divorce case is a question for the Pinal County Domestic Relations Court. If the Officers of the Defendant Babeu thought they had sufficient evidence of probable cause in a criminal matter, that question was to be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate. 3 The Defendants failed to properly train or supervise these officers from engaging in conduct that violated Plaintiffs rights even by their own investigation. The Defendants failed to respond reasonably when informed by their own investigation and continued the violation of Plaintiffs rights under color of state law. Plaintiff suggests that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability as a matter of law and that trial should proceed solely on the issue of damages. Respectfully submitted this 16th of JULY, 2010
20 21 22 23 24 25 __________________________ WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN Attorney at Law
MOTION - 4
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Copy of the foregoing Mailed/faxed/delivered/eMailed this 16th of JULY, 2010 to: Marc A. Appel, Esq. #010759 APPEL LAW OFFICE, P.L.L.C 10601 N. Hayden Rd, Suite I-103 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 Attorney for Defendants Pinal County, James Walsh, Paul Babeu, Pete Rios, Bryan Martyn and David Snider
MOTION - 5
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William J. Pearlman SBN # 003990 Law Offices of William J. Pearlman 1237 South Val Vista Drive, Suite 218 Mesa, Arizona 85204 Phone: 480-396-0681 Fax: 480-396-0532 Email: pearllaw@hotmail.com UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA MARK E. DIXON, Plaintiff, vs. 1. PINAL COUNTY, a Political Subdivision ; 2. JAMES WALSH, Pinal County Attorney, In his Official Capacity; 3. PAUL BABEU, Pinal County Sheriff, In his Official Capacity; 4. PETE RIOS, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 5. BRYAN MARTYN, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 6. DAVID SNIDER, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; et. al. DEFENDANTS, ) Case No.: CIV 2010-0325 PHX DGC ) ) ) ) ) ) MOTION IN LIMINE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
MOTION - 1
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Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel, hereby requests the court in Limine to not allow the Defendants to present evidence regarding certain matters listed below as such are not relevant to the cause of action, not material to the issues of law, and in the interests of due process and judicial economy. FACTS The police reports and Professional Standards unit investigation makes it clear that the dog was in Plaintiffs possession when he was stopped by the deputies of Defendant Sheriff under color of state law allegedly investigating an improper turn signal: a Lieutenant, two detectives and a patrol officer for one turn signal. The police reports and Professional Standards unit investigation makes it clear that the dog was taken into possession by the deputies without a warrant or other indicia of a court order. The police reports and Professional Standards unit investigation makes it clear that the dog was not taken as evidence but was turned over to the ex-wife Carol Dixon, who was their complainant. The police reports and Professional Standards unit investigation admit that no criminal complaint was ever issued nor was a request for a complaint even made to the office of Defendant County Attorney, James Walsh. The investigation of the Sheriffs Officer Professional Standards Unit was conducted by Sergeant Cashman. That investigation was completed February 18, 2010. It was never provided to Defendants counsel but was discovered by the Plaintiff after a second Freedom of Information Act request on July 9, 2010. The report was then forwarded by Counsel for the Plaintiff to Counsel for the Defendants.
MOTION - 2
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1 OWNERSHIP OF THE DOG The Defendants have given notice that they intend to litigate the ownership of the dog, Shiloh. In absence of a search warrant, arrest warrant or a judicial determination of ownership, the seizure of this personal property is the issue, and the ownership of the dog is irrelevant. It was in Plaintiffs possession. While he can prove ownership, where is the actual relevance? The dog is not contraband, it is personal property. The law of the State of Arizona is clear: No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law. Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 4 Due process of law is not the opinion of the employees of the Defendant Sheriff. It is the responsibility of the employees of the Defendant Sheriff to follow the law of the State of Arizona. It is their sworn duty. The ownership of the dog was then an issue for the Courts, not the deputies of the Defendant, Sheriff. The Sheriff is not constitutionally allowed to redistribute property within the State of Arizona without due process of law. The Sheriffs own investigation disclosed this. The Sheriff by not acting after his own investigation, and not following the law and the Arizona Constitution committed an act in furtherance of this violation of Plaintiffs rights. The report of the Professional Standards Unit is merely laughable and an indication of how much callous indifference to the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff permeates the Office of the Sheriff of Pinal County. As the Court said in Comfort v.
MOTION - 3
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Town of Pittsfield, 924 F. Supp 1219, 1231 (U.S.D.C. Maine, 1996): Supervisory personnel are liable under 1983, upon a showing of a constitutional violation, when: (1) the supervisor's conduct or inaction amounts to either deliberate, reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others, and (2) an affirmative link exists between the street-level constitutional violation and the acts or omissions of the supervisory officials. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988) Whereby, since the facts are clear that the property, the dog, was in Plaintiffs possession, that there was no court order determining ownership in any other person, then it should not be relevant or material here to take valuable court time to prove ownership of the dog under these circumstances. 2 Probable Cause The Defendants have given notice that they will present evidence regarding their belief in the existence of probable cause to believe that the dog was stolen by Plaintiff from his ex-wife. In doing so they ignore the applicable statute, ARS 111010, which provides that the owner of a dog is determined by the anti-rabies vaccination certificate which clearly stated Plaintiffs ownership. However, the existence of probable cause in the mind of the deputies of Defendant Sheriff is similarly irrelevant and immaterial to this trial. The probable cause for the seizure of evidence in a criminal matter when it is not ipso facto contraband, is a matter to be determined, not by the officers of the investigating agency, but by the Courts. Officers cannot take personal property which is not contraband without a search
MOTION - 4
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warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) The existence of probable cause in the mind of the deputies of the Defendant is irrelevant to this cause of action. Probable cause is an issue for the Courts. It is one of our most cherished liberties. The Defendant Sheriff, a sworn law enforcement agent, violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff when he was advised of the facts through his own investigation, and then either promoted the cover-up or was so callously indifferent that he failed to act 3 Good Faith The Defendants have given notice that they will present evidence regarding their good faith belief in the claim of ownership of the dog by the ex-wife, Carol Dixon. The good faith of the deputies of Defendant Sheriff is only relevant if they had relied upon a search warrant or other indicia of authority which was later overturned or proven to lack probable cause. The Defendant Sheriffs deputies admit that they lacked a warrant but want to claim they acted in good faith. Good Faith is irrelevant to seizures without a warrant. United States v. Winsor, 846 F. 2d 1569, 9th Cir. 1987 The state of mind of the acting officers is irrelevant. The Defendant Sheriff knew or should have known after his own investigation in February, 2010 that this taking of property and re-distribution of wealth by his deputies was without legal authority. Sheriff Babeu then failed to act, or exhibited calloused indifference to Plaintiffs rights when so advised, and in so doing furthered the violation of Plaintiffs rights.
MOTION - 5
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Even the Defendant Sheriffs alleged good faith is no defense. He has an obligation, a sworn duty to uphold the law, and he failed to act and apparently attempted to cover-up the facts of this matter. CONCLUSION Plaintiff requests that the Court rule in Limine that the Defendants may not present evidence as to the following: 1. 2. 3. Ownership of the dog, Probable cause of the deputy sheriffs to believe the Dog was stolen, and Good Faith of the deputy sheriffs, in the absence of a proper judicial warrant. Respectfully submitted this 29th of JULY, 2010 / s / __________________________ WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN Attorney at Law Original of the foregoing electronically filed This 29th day of July, 2010 to: United States District Court District of Arizona Clerk of Court 401 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Copy of the foregoing Mailed/faxed/delivered/eMailed this 29th of JULY, 2010 to: Marc A. Appel, Esq. #010759 APPEL LAW OFFICE, P.L.L.C 10601 N. Hayden Rd, Suite I-103 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 Attorney for Defendants Pinal County, James Walsh, Paul Babeu, Pete Rios, Bryan Martyn and David Snider
MOTION - 6
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William J. Pearlman SBN # 003990 Law Offices of William J. Pearlman 1237 South Val Vista Drive, Suite 218 Mesa, Arizona 85204 Phone: 480-396-0681 Fax: 480-396-0532 Email: pearllaw@hotmail.com UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA MARK E. DIXON, Plaintiff, vs. 1. PINAL COUNTY, a Political Subdivision ; 2. JAMES WALSH, Pinal County Attorney, In his Official Capacity; 3. PAUL BABEU, Pinal County Sheriff, In his Official Capacity; 4. PETE RIOS, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 5. BRYAN MARTYN, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; 6. DAVID SNIDER, Pinal County Supervisor, In his Official Capacity; et. al. DEFENDANTS, ) Case No.: CIV 2010-0325 PHX DGC ) ) ) ) ) ) ACCEPTANCE OF ) OFFER OF JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
MOTION - 1
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Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel, to the extent it is legally possible, accepts the Offer of Judgment offered by Defendant Pinal County, pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure. Respectfully submitted this 26th of August, 2010 / s / __________________________ WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN Attorney at Law Attorney for Plaintiff Mark Dixon Original of the foregoing electronically filed This 26th day of August, 2010 to: United States District Court District of Arizona Clerk of Court 401 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Copy of the foregoing Mailed/faxed/delivered/eMailed this 26th of August, 2010 to: Marc A. Appel, Esq. #010759 APPEL LAW OFFICE, P.L.L.C 10601 N. Hayden Rd, Suite I-103 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 Attorney for Defendants Pinal County, James Walsh, Paul Babeu, Rule 68, Federal
MOTION - 2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Mark E. Dixon, Plaintiff, vs. Pinal County, a political subdivision; James Walsh, Pinal County Attorney, in his official capacity; and Paul Babeu, Pinal County Sheriff, in his official capacity, Defendants. Plaintiff Mark Dixon claims to be the sole and lawful owner of an Australian shepherd named Shiloh. He alleges that Pinal County sheriff deputies wrongfully seized Shiloh and turned the dog over to his ex-wife. He has brought suit against the County itself, County Attorney James Walsh, and Sheriff Paul Babeu for allegedly having failed to investigate, prosecute, and make arrests in the matter. Doc. 1. The amended No. CV-10-325-PHX-DGC ORDER
complaint purports to assert eight separate counts (Doc. 60 11-18), but those counts consist of the statement of facts (id. at 3 & 19) supporting unspecified civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (id. 5). Liberally construed, the complaint asserts
constitutional violations of due process and equal protection of the law. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1, 6-8. The parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Docs. 98, 107. The motions are fully briefed. Docs. 103, 106, 112. Oral argument has not been requested. For reasons stated below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants.

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I.
Summary Judgment Standard. A principal purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of factually or legally
unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). II. Discussion. Plaintiff contends that the following undisputed facts entitle him to summary judgment: that deputies seized Shiloh and gave the dog to a third-party without lawful authority and while acting under color of state law, that the County received a notice of claim detailing the facts alleged by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has the constitutional right to not be deprived of property without due process and to not be denied equal protection under the law, and that the County Attorney and Sheriff have a sworn duty to protect constitutional rights. Docs. 98 at 2, 106 1-6, 108 at 2. Defendants argue, correctly, that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to require the County Attorney or the Sheriff to investigate a particular matter, to prosecute or arrest any individual, or to even discipline subordinates for alleged misconduct. Doc. 103 at 4. Because Defendants have been sued in their official capacities (Doc. 60 at 1), liability will lie under 1983 only if Plaintiff shows that his alleged constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to an official policy or longstanding practice or custom, or that the injury was caused or

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ratified by an individual with final policy-making authority. Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2276774, at *6 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011) (quoting Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Assn, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008)); see Monell v. Dept of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Plaintiff can show neither. He has identified no policy or custom of Defendants as the moving force behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see Bd. of Cnty. Commrs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). Nor has he presented evidence showing that Defendants ratified the alleged misconduct on the part of the deputies. Defendants inaction, standing alone, is not enough to create a triable issue. Ratification is used as a theory of 1983 liability where an unconstitutional policy is established by the post hoc ratification of prior actions. Lancaster v. Carey, No. CIV S08-0051 LKK GGH P, 2011 WL 2198313, at *14 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2011) (emphasis in original). Stated differently, ratification simply makes clear that the policy was in effect at the time of the incident and was the moving force for the unconstitutional act. Id. The ratification theory cannot be so stretched to a situation where, as in this case, no policy is at issue, but simply a one-time event that had been completed at the time the complaint was made. Id.; see Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (making clear that to hold municipalities liable under 1983 for failing to overrule the unconstitutional acts of subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat superior liability into [] 1983 law resulting in an impermissible end run around Monell); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that a single act or isolated incidents are normally insufficient to establish supervisory inaction upon which to predicate 1983 liability); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 848

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(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the theory of ratification is limited in 1983 cases to extreme factual circumstances). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have provided him no post deprivation relief as required by their respective oaths of office and statutory duties, thereby denying [him] his Constitutional right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the law. Doc. 60 13. Defendants argue, correctly, that because Arizona law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies (including tort actions for replevin and trespass to chattels), no 1983 claim will lie. Docs. 103 at 6, 112 at 1-2; see Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available); Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (When state remedies are adequate to protect an individuals procedural due process rights, a section 1983 action alleging a violation of those rights will not stand.). III. Conclusion. In summary, Plaintiff has identified no specific policy or custom that arguably violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 326. Nor has he produced evidence of affirmative or deliberate conduct by [Defendants] that may be said to have ratified the actions taken by the deputies. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants purported failure to support and defend the Constitution and otherwise uphold his civil rights constitutes [an] unconstitutional custom or policy by the County (Doc. 110 at 9), but the mere failure to protect an individuals constitutional rights is not sufficient to establish municipal liability under 1983. See Myers v. City of Madera, No. 1:10-CV-01398 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 2361628, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2011) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Jackim v. City of Brooklyn, No. 1:05 cv 1678, 2007 WL 893868, at *20 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)

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(granting summary judgment on 1983 claims where a police officer engaged in a single incident of wrongdoing and mere inaction on the part of the city was not enough to establish municipal liability); Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting summary judgment on municipal liability claim where the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that the alleged unconstitutional acts committed by the police officers were connected to any policy, custom or practice beyond mere speculation and conjecture). IT IS ORDERED: 1. 2. 3. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98) is denied. Defendants cross-motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 7th day of July, 2011.

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Case 2:10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11 .

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NO. CIV 100325 PHX DKD

PINAL COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, et. al Defendants.

ANSWER OF THE PINAL COUNTY DEFENDANTS

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20 21 22 23 24 25 __________________________ WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN Attorney at Law

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