...... ...

r::_J'j ;,. ....

=--------
1 -1 3: 3\
REPUBLIC OF
SUPREME COURT
JVlANILA
EN D./-lNC
AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR.,
Petitioner
'
-versus-
FLORENCIO D. ABAD, et al.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
MANUELI'rO R. LUNA,
Petitioner
'
-versus-
SECRETARY J=<LORENCIO ABAD,
et a/.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
JOSE lVIAL VAR VILLEGAS, JR.,
Petitioner,
-versus-
TI-lE I-IONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUI'I'O N.
OCI-IOA, JR., eta/.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
G.H.. No. 209135
G.R. No. 209136
G.It. No. 209155
CONSOLlDi\TED COJ\1 t\IENT
.')_)juco
1
Jr. t'. b a t ~ et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 2 of 39
PI-IILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PI-IILCONSA), et
a!.,
Petitioners
'
-versus-
TI-lE DEPARTI\,IENT OF DUDGET
AND MANAGEIVIENT and/or
I-ION. FLORENCIO ll. ABAD,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------x
INTEGRATED DAR OF TI-IE
PI-IILIPPINES (IBP),
Petitioner
'
-t.Jersus-
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD
of the DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND 1\MNAGEMENT
(DBI\1),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------x
MAlliA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
et a/.,
Petitioners
'
-Vel"StiS-
BENIGNO SIIVIEON C. AQUINO
III, et a!.,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 2091G4
G.H.. No. 2092GO
G.R. No. 209237
CONSOLIDATED COJ\Il\IENT
Jjjuco, ]1: v. A bad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 3 of 39
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B.
llELGICA, et a!.,
Petitioners
'
-versus-
PllliSIDENT llENIGNO SIIVIEON
C. AQUINO III, eta!.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 20944t..
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CONSOLIDATED COM1VIEN1.-.
(W1ith Opposition to the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/ or \Vrit of Preliminary Injunction)
Respondents, by the Office of the Solicitor General, rcspcclfully
state:
lillLEV ANT FACTS
1. In the first three quarters of 2011, the Ac1uino administraliull
was faced with inefficiencies and other systemic issues that hampered the
capacity of some government institutions to spend their I.Judgcts aud
implement programs and projects. The national goven1mcnl's
disbursement level shrank, falling significant! y below target ~ y 1 G.l
percent.
1
'T'his problem was expressed at the 111acroccouomic level iu
terms of a reduction in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
2. Apart from the usual transition glitches brought auout Ly a
change in leadership, the Aquino administration's undcrspcnJing can alsu
Ge traced to the cancellation of some of the programs, activities aud
1
Dureau of the Treasury National Guveuuuent Fiscal Report as of the end of 2011.
CoNsouD1\TED Cotil\IENT
J)jm;o, jt: t'. A bad, eta!.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 4 of 39
projects initiated by the previous administration, which were found to Gc
anomalous or fraught with irregularities.
2
3. In order to accelerate public spending, the Ac1uino
administration evaluated and identified certain projects authorized under
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that fit any of the following
criteria:
a) Fast-moving or quick-disbursing;
b) Urgent or priority in terms of social and econonuc
development objectives; and
c) Programs or projects performing well and could deliver
rnore services to the public with additional funds.
4. The disbursements for these and other similar projects were
then prioritized. ,_fhese disbursements were collectively categorized intv
and named as the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
Introduced in October 2011, the DAP is a 111echanism of public
expenditure designed to fast-track public spcnJing for priority prograrw;,
activities and projects with d1e use of savings and the Unprogrammed
Fund.
5. The DAP has proven to be effective. Starting with the fourLI1
quarter of 2011, government spending improved and contributeJ to the
growth of the country's GDP. In a report released in J\1arch 2012, the
\Vorld Dank stated that "[t]he government's Disbursement Acceleration
Plan was partially successful and contributed 1.3 percentage points (11pt)
to GDP growth in Q4."
3
The acceleration of government spendjnt; alsv
contributed to the Philippines' ascent in the Global CompcLiLivcncss
Index ratings
4
and to the successive credit ratings upgrades, with tile top
sovereign credit raters
5
giving the Philippines investment grade raLiugs in
2013.
2
Frequently AskeJ Questions About the Djsbursement AccelcraLiou Program (DAP),
available at last accessed on 15 October 2013.
3
Philippjnes Quarterly Update: From Stability to Prosperity for i\ll, available at httl,!;l_L_y,rww-
wds.worldbank.org/ externalldefault/\VDSContentServer /WDSP liD /20 12/06/12/ OOOJJJ
037 20120612011744/RenJereJ/PDF
last accessed on 2 November 2013.
4
Supra note 2.
5
StandarJ anti Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch.
CONSOLIDATED (Or.lJ\lENT
.[JJUC0
1
jt: v. eta!.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 5 of 39
6. On October 2013, several petitions were filed befurc this
Honorable Court seeking to declare the DAP unconsLiLutional and
prohibit its implemental.ion.6
PRELIIVIINARY A VER1\1EN1;S
7. No!l-stiability of the President. Petitioners Araullo, et a!.
and Belgica, et a!. implead President Benigno Sin1eon C. Aquino lll as
respondent. Petitioners Belgica, eta!. clain1 that since "[t]he constitutional
authority [to augment] is specifically granted to the President who alunc
can act on the matter and may not delegate the same,"7 President Aquino
may be sued in his official capacity as an exception to the doctrine of
presidential immunity from suit.
8. 'This is a basic misunderstanding of constitutional law. lt is
settled that the President, while in office, and in the performance of !tis
official functions, is immune from suit. Tlus is necessary to free him from
any form of harassment or distraction in the performance of his
multifarious duties. Unlike the Congress and the Judiciary, only one
person constitutes the Executive Branch and anything that impairs the
President's usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs Lhc
operation of the govermnent.
8
9. IttsufficietJC)' of Facts. The present peuuons arc brought
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In a Rule 65 petition, the burden is
on the petitioners to establish their case and prove grave abuse uf
discretion on the part of the respondents. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it 1nust be sufficiently grave, resulting ln lack or excess uf
jutiscliction. There is grave abuse ofdiscretion where respondents acl in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner.
9
10. The petitions, mostly anchored on ne\vspaper clippings and
media reports, are 1niserably lacking on the allegations of facts that would
support a claim of grave abuse of discretion. For example, petitioner
6
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,209164,209260,209287, and 2094<14.
7
Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444), at 4.
8
See t'. Amryo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006.
9
Garcia t'. Comt of Ajpeals, G.R. No. 169005, 28 January 2013.
(ONSOLllJJ\TED COMMENT
J)y.flco, ]1: t' . .Abad, eta/.
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 6 of 39
Villegas admits that he "exhaustively tried to research on the DAP policy
or any guidelines on who may avail of the funJs under the program as
well as what types of projects may be funued but found nothing."IU
Petitioner IBP also admits that "[t]here is no detailed accounting from
where the savings supposedly originated from, or from what 'slow-
moving' projects these funds were taken, or how much GOCC dividends
were received as a windfall."
11
Petitioners Belgica, et aL even engage in
speculation, saying that "[fjrom the pronouncements of the
spokespersons of the President and by some portion of the DAP having
been coursed through many legislators, there is a reasonable probability
that these funJs were used for new projects and not merely to augment
actual deficiencies."1
2
11. It is incomprehensible, therefore, given the insufficiency allJ
uncertainty of facts, how petitioners can allege grave abuse of discretion.
'This is a violation of the Rule 65 requirement for petitioners to allege
facts with certainty. On this score alone, the various petitions may be
dismissed because they essentially state no cause of action suffi.cient Lo
allow this Honorable Court to craft an appropriate relief. The paucity of
the factual allegations in the various petitions is bound to transform this
litigation .into a trial before an .institution that is unsuited to perform
task. Such a proceeding also places respondents in the dif11cult position of
defending against vague, theoretical claims that stand on the wejght of
conjectures and insinuations.
12. The prudent, proper, and constitutional recourse would have
been for these various petitioners to have exercised their right lo
information and demanded the Department of Budget and IVIanagcment
(DIIM) lo furnish them with sufficient information to determine whether
their speculations are rationally and factually grounc.led. the
language of Rule 65, this would have been the "plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Instead, with hunches
and imperfect information, they have gone straight to this Honorable
Court alleging constitutional violations, making grand claims about the
need for widespread, "programmatic reviews" of abstract concepts of
governance. Thus, by the simple ruse of propagandizing theoretical
constitutonal violations, petitioners have simultaneously dispensed willt
10
Empbas.is .in the original. Villegas Petition (G.R. No. 209155) at 8.
11
lBP Pet.it.ion (G.R. No. 209260), par. 22.
12
Delgica Petition (G.R. No. 20944), at 10.
CoNSOLIDATED Cm.IMENT
J)juco, }1: v. Abml, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 7 of 39
the need to establish facts and effectively placed the burJcn on
respondents to prove the constitutionality of the n1inutest aspect of their
actions. \Ve submit that constitutional litigation and the attention of the
Honorable Court require higher thresholds than this.
13. Considering the foregoing, respondents thus reserve their
objections against the various suits on grounds of (1) non-justiciability,
and (2) the lack of a case or controversy. Given the innumerable
allounents and disbursements involving practically all types of
government-fundeJ activities in question, it is incumLent upon pelitioncrs
to establish with sufficient clarity what kinds of allotments and
disbursements they are complaining about as every relevant agency action
with respect to a particular allotment and disbursetnent potentially creates
separate and severable questions of fact that cannot be accommodated in
an omnibus decision.
14. Furthermore, respondents specifically object to the standing
of petitioners to raise the question of (1) presidential impoundment and
(2) equal protection with respect to the privilege of legislators to propose
DAP-idenlified projects. 'rhese shall be clarified below, in the
arguments germane to these topics,
ISSUE
\VI-IE'lTIER TI-IE DAP IS A VALID EXERCISE OF TI-lE
PRESIDENT'S PO\VERS UNDER ARTICLE VI, 25(5) Al'\ID
ARTICLE VII, 17 OF TI-lE CONSTITUTION.
CoNSI.JLlDi\TED COMMENT
]1: t'. A bad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 8 of 39
AH.GUMEN'fS
I
THE DAP IS A FUND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
15. N of a Fund. 'T'he collective fundmental flaw in petitioners'
argument is that the DAP is a "buJ.get within a budge{'13 or an
unappropriated funJ., that is, a fund without congressional authorization
and therefore an unconstitutional intrusion into the powers of Congress.
This is a false assertion. .
16. The DAP is neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a
program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending. As is
obvious from its name, it is a program for accelerating disbursements.
\Vhat is only unstated in the title of tl1e progratn-DAP-is that the
sources of funds are from, firH, the legiwnately-generated savings of the
government, and the Unprogrammed Fund authorizeJ. in any
relevant GAA.
17. No Law Required for the Creatio11 of D .. AP. The President
has the constitutional authority to create policies in the execution of laws.
Tllis is a necessaty implication of the President's authority as Chief
Executive pursuant to Art. VII, 17 of the Also, the DDI\1
is expressly empowered to issue rules and regulations "to carry into full
effect the laws relating to matters witllin Uts] jurisJ.iction,"
15
for the
"achievement of n1ore economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations .... "l6
18. The President, through the Dl3Ivf, implemented the DAP in
order to accelerate public spending, push economic growth, and promote
prudent fiscal management. 'This is plain executive policy-making, nothing
more. 'T'he government could have simply called it ".-fhe SpeuJing
Program" or "Efficient Fiscal 1\1anagement Program" or "Programa Ng
13
Syjuco Petition (G.R. No. 209135) at 12.
14
CONST., Art. Vll, 17. The President shall have control of all the executive Jeparunems,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executeJ.
15
J\DMINlSTRATlVE CODE, Book IV, Ch. 6, 36(1).
16
CODE, Book IV, Title XVII, Ch. 1, 3.
CONSOLIDATED COl\11\IENT
Jjjuw, J t ~ l'. b a ~ et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 9 of 39
Pag-gugol ng PonJo Tungo sa Daang lVIatuwid"-none of these
nomenclature would have had any constitutional i1nplications. In fact, the
government would have been within its authority if it had just spent all
available funds, including savings, for the appropriated items in tile
budget without any declared program of spending at all. It is in the nature
of bureaucracies to label and categorize the activities they perform to
comply with their conception of "the orJer of things," to borrow a
famous title. .
19. Considering that the DAP is but a label to categorize
administrative action and express exlsting powers of the President under
the Constitution, the Administrative Code, and the relevant GAAs,
petitioners' argument that it is a source of additional powers or that it is in
contravention of the powers of Congress is palpably ungrounded. J\s
respondents will show, all actions of the President under the DAP arc
standard, non-novel exercises of his constitutional powers.
II
THE DAP IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO AUGMENT.
20. Petitioners seek to Jeclare the DAP unconstitutional
primarily on the ground that it violates Art. VI, 25(5) of the
Constitution-
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropnauons;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heaJs of
Constitutional Cotntnissions tnay, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offi.ces from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
21. Respondents agree that Art. VI, 25(5) of the Constitution is
the relevant and controlling norm in tlus case. Given that petitioners also
do not Lluestion the constitutional and statutory authority of the President
to augment items in the GAA, we submit that petitioners' source of
confusion is notlung of the sort that cannot be clarified by facts.
22. The Power to Augme1tt. Art. VI, 29(1) of the Constitutiou
provides that "[n]o 111oney shall be paid out of the Treasury except lll
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Under Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(1)
(ONSOLID;\TED COI'df\IENT
J)jttco, ]1: f}. Abad, et a/.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 10 of 39
of the Administrative Code,17 an "appropriation" is defined as "an
authorization made by law or other legislative enactment, directing
payment out of government funds under specified conditions or for
specified purposes." In other words, an appropriat..ion is an authorizaLiun
by Congress to the President allowing funds to be paid out of the
,..freasury for a public purpose it has specified.
23. Art. VII, 17 of the Constitution reqUlres the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."IS T'hus, when Congress
appropriates an amount of money for a specified purpose in the GAJ\,
the President has a constitutional duty to achieve that purpose by allotLing
an amount to satisfy that specific appropriation. Under Uook VI, Ch. 1,
2(2) of the AdministraLive Code, "'[a]llotment' refers to an authorizaLion
issued by the Department of Budget to an agency, which allows .it to incur
obligation for specified amounts contained 1n a lcgislaLivc
appropriation. "
19
24. Consistent with the above-cited rules and the separation of
powers principle, the Constitution prohibits the Prcsiclent frorn issuing
allotments beyond what was appropriated by Congress. Simply put, if
Congress appropriates an atnount of Pl Billion to construct a Lridgc, the
President cannot just decide to countermand that appropriation Ly
spending Pl.S Billion. The exception to this rule is the President's power
to augment.
25. The Constitution provides that the "President ... _may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item .in the general appropriations law for
[his] officeO frorn savings in other items of [his] appropriatious."
2
U
Following this rule, a legal authorization can be issued to allow Lhc
President to go beyond the original appropriation by augmenting deficient
items
21
with savings from other items.
17
E.O. No. 292.
18
Supra note 14.
19
Allotments come in Lhe form of (1) an Agency Budget fviatrix (ABM) or what uscJ lo Lc
Lhe General Allounent Release Order (GARO), or (2) a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO).
2
CoNST., Art. VI, 25(5).
21
See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book VI, Ch. 5, 39; R.A No. 10352 (2013 GJ\A), 5J
(General Provisions).
CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT
j j y t ~ c o ]1: v. A bad, ef aL
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 11 of 39
26. The legislative authorization for the President's exercise of his
augmentation power is found in the GAA, the Administrative Codc,
22
and
in 44
23
of P.D. No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. The
2013 GAA provides in its General Provisions-
Sec. 52. UJe of SavingJ. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their
respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for tile
current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
27. The GAA further implements the requirements of Art. VI,
25(5) of the Constitution by defining "savings" and setting parameters as
to how they may be created-
Sec. 53. Meaning of Sat'tngJ and A11gmentation. Savings refer to portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in tllis Act free from any obligation
or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonp1ent of the work, activity or purpose for wllich the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from
unpaid compensation and related costs pertaitling to vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized
from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the rec1uired or
planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
Augmentation implies the existence in tllis Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a
non-e:lUstent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
22
Book V1, Ch. 5, 39. Autho1iry to UJe SavingJ in AppropliatiottJ to Cot'er DejicitJ. Except as
otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings .in the regular
appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and prujecls of
any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a
deficit in any other item .in the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new
positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary saviugs
except when specifically authorized by law: provided, further, that whenever authorized
positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same
department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services
are also deemed transferred, without, however, increasing the total outlay for personal
services of tl1e department, office or agency concerned.
23
Granting the President "the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of
another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to ... the
Constitution." Thus, the constitutional authority of the President to use savings of his
"respective office" to augment items in the GAA for such office extends to the enlire
ExecuLive Department.
Year
2UI3
2012
2011
ZUlU-
__cc __
'--
CoNsouoxmo
J)juco
1
jt: t'. Abatl, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 12 of 39
28. Thus, the President may exercise his authority to augment if
(a) there are savings as deilned in the General Provisions of the relevant
GAA, and (b) there is an "appropriation cover" or an item of
appropriation in the relevant GAA that may be augmented.Z4 These two
rel}uirements exhaust the conditions for the exercise of the President's
augmentation powers.
29. DAP a1zd Table 1 below shows the annual
level of savings of the Aquino administration since it assumed power in
2010 to the present and the amounts of charges to the overall savings Gy
way of augmentation. What this shows is that, at an aggregate level, the
total augmentations have been matched by a sufflcient amount of savings.
In other words, all augmentations have been properly accounted for
because they were covered by a corresponding amount of savings.
Table 1. (Figures in Thousand Pesos)
OVERALL SAYINGS CHARGES
Current
Continuing Approriation
GAA
TOTAL DAP Others
Appro. Appropriation Current
Continuing Sub-'fotal
Cuuent
Contil1uing Sub-Total
Balances Balances GAA GAA
Withdtawn
Appro. Unobligated
Allotnumts
32,877,175 - 32,877,175 4,658,215 - 4,658,215 48,933 48,933

Cluuge!' to
Overall
Sadngs
---=-=-
4,701' 148
56,466,715 3,634,500 6,315,862 66,417,077 38,656,700 7,046,840 45,703,540 7,321,231


-59.882;977
50,476,7.33
-46,6J1,805
1---c_l ,8 72,966 7,281,893 59,631,592 40,497,512 10,551,125 51,048,637 3,877,170 4,705,785 8,582,955
16,995,381 63,627,186 21,711,779 21,711,779 19,873,665 5,421,242 25,294,907
30. All 1111der the DAP have AjJprojJriatiou
Cover. A big part of petitioners' presentation hinges on the claim that Lhe
President practically invented non-existent appropriations. T'his is at once
untrue and indicative of petitioners' lack of knowledge of how public
funds are actually allotted and released.
31. To be sure, the standard practice at the DBI\1 is to specifically
itemize the details of a particular allot111ent such that for every
augmentation exercise the following facts can be shown-
24
J'ancbez !l. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, 23 April 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Na?jm;tb u.
Villm; G.R. No. 188635, 29 January 2013, 689 SCRA 385.
.
4/,006,686
CONSOLIDATED COl\li\IENT
SJJIICO, Jr. v. A bat{, et al
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 13 of39
a) The particular office of the government concerned;
b) T'he PAP code or the "programs, activities or projects"
code under the relevant GAA;
c) The SARO number of the document;
d) 'The date of issuance of the SARO;
e) The original amount of the appropriation under the
relevant GAA;
f) The amount of augmentation involved; and
g) The specific page of the GAA where the item may be
found.
32. Furthermore, the SARO indicates a PAP code wbicil
corresponds to an item of appropriation in the GAA. All SAROs created
Gy the software or cornputer application used by the DB1vl have a PAP
code. This is a built-in safeguard which cannot be altered unless the
SARO itself is fake. 'I'he built-in PAP code ensures that all disbursements
have appropriation covers.
33. This can be illustrated with the use of exemplars or samples
of ten augmentation exercises _under the DAP that indicate the specific
details enumerated above. One readily sees that this unfailing adhcreucc
to particularity lias a two-fold function: (1) to ensure proper record-
keeping and easy access to the history of evety specific allocation and
release of funds; and (2) to provide detailed compliance with tbc
constitutional requirements with respect to augmentations. The LCJl
exemplars are shown in Table 2 below-
Table 2. (Figures in Thousand Pesos)
--
AGENCY PAP
SARO DATE
AUGMENTATION
APPH.OPlUATION
NO. ISSUED COVEH/PAP CUDE
DOST l. lmplementMion of E-11- 22-Dec-12 1,600,000 R.A. No. 10147, p. 748
the Nationwide 02253
Disaster Risk, A.lll.a.lll.a- Generatiun
Exposure, Assessment, of new knowleJge &
and Migration technologies & tesearch
(DREAM)
25
capability building in
priorit)' areas identified
as strategic to Natioual
Development
2. Establishment of E-1 1- 22-Dec-12 300,000 R.A. No. 10147, p. 771
the Advanced Failure ll2254
Analysis Laboratory A.ll.a -Development,
25
DREAM is a major component of DOST's Project NOAH (NationwiJe Operational
Assessment of Hazards).
CoNSOLIDATED Coivll\IENT
J)j11co, }1: v. Abml, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 14 of 39
DILG 3. Repair/
D-11-
Rehabilitation of the 01929
PNP Crime
Laboratory
4. (PN P) Mission D-13-
Essential Equipment 01182
Capability
Enhancement Program
DND 5. (PAF) On-Base D-11-
Housing Facilities and 01459
Communication
Equipment
6. (PAF) Rehabilitation D-12-
of the Air Educatiorl 01421
and Training
Command
7. Additional Funds to
Support Unfunded
Requirements to
address its current
capability gap
DOTC 8. Capability
A-13-
Requirements for. the 00584
Operations of PCG in
the West Philippine
Sea
07-Dec-1 1
29-Jul-13
14-0ct-11
28-Dec-12
04-Mar-13
Integration &
Coordination of the
National Research for
Industry, Energy &
Emerging Technology
and Related Fields
3,255,837
R.i\. No. 10147, p. 502
A.lll.a.l.a- Conduct of
operation and other
related confidential
activities against
dissidents, subversives,
lawless elements and
organized crime
syndicate and campaign
against kidnapping,
uafficking of women
and minors, smuggling,
carnapping, gunrunning,
illegal fishing and
trafficking of illegal
drugs
2,516,167
R.A. No. 10352, p. Ml
B.l.b- Capability
Enhancement Program
29,800
R.A. No. 10147, p. 570
A.II.a.2- Service
Support Acti\ities
Alll.a.1 -Air and
Ground Combat
Services
A.lll.a.3- Combat
Support Services
A.lll.b.l- Territorial
Defense Activities
367,500
R.A. No. lUI 55, p. 702
A.ll.a.l -Twining
Services
A.lll.a.l - Jur &
Ground Combat
Services
A.lll.b.l -Territorial
Defense Activities
A.Ill.c.l -Disaster
Response and Relief
Services
104,673
R.A. No. 10 I 55, p. 1069
A.Ill.c- Protection of
Philippine Coast
CONSOLlDi\TED Cor.Il\IENT
S_)!_jflco, jt: v. Abatl, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 15 of 39
9. (PCG) Addjtional A-12-
MOOE for Patrol 00743
Operations at Bajo de
Masinloc
DBM I 0. GSIS Premium B-12-
Parments for DepEd 00799
personnel
10-Sep-12
28-Sep-12
44,171 R.A. No. 10155, p. IU6Y
A.lll.c.l -Promotion of
safety of life and
property at sea, incluJing
safeguarding the matine
environment &
resources & enforcement
of all applicable maritime
laws
3,461,685 R.A. No. 10155, p. 97
A.l.a.l.a- General
Management anJ
Supervjsion
34. If petitioners are interested .in learning the specific details of
any government program for which funding was provided, whether or not
under the DAP, we .invite them to exercise their constitutional rights by
asking the DD.LV1 to provide the specific details of how the government
funded any such project, activity, or program.
35. Sources of S avi11gs Determi11ed by Congre.rs, Not the
President. There is an .insinuation in the various petitions that U1e
President, in order to exercise his augmentation po-wers, has been
colluding with the DBl\1 to artificially generate savings. This cannot be
farther from the truth because, while the President can augment .items in
the GAA w.ith savings, .it .is the legislature that defines what can LJc
considered "savings" for purposes of augmentation. The current GAA
identifies three sources of savings as "portions or balances of a11y
programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encwnbrance which are"-
(i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation .is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances ansmg from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions
and leaves of absence without pay; and
(iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the
CONSOLIDATED (Ol\II\lENT
.S)juco, Jr. t'. A bat/, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 16 of 39
required or planned targets, programs and services approved in
this Act at a lesser cost.ZG
36. In essence, savmgs are "appropriations balances" or the
difference between the approriation authorized by Congress and the
actual amount allotted for such an appropriation. T'he appropriations
balances must fall under these three categories. 'I'he Execulive
Department and all other institutions that enjoy fiscal autonomy or whose
heads of agency are given the constitutional and statut01y license to
augment must comply with these standards.
37. 'J'hus, following 'fable 1 above, the total appropnauons
balance in 2012 for the Executive Department was P66,417,077,000 of
which P59,882,977,000 was used for augmentation purposes. 'I'his means
that about P66.4 Billion was the cumulative amount of appropriations
balances or "savings" incurred pursuant to the standards set by Congress.
Presumably, this is also the same set of standards used by other fiscally
autonomous departtnents of government in determining savings that may
be used for augmentation purposes.
38. It may also be relevant to point out that a significant amount
of savings incurred by most government agencies with capacity Lo
augment is from Personnel Services, of which the J'viiscellancous
Personnel Benefits Fund (J'YIPBF) is a major component. For example, in
2012, of the total P59,882,977,000 in augmentations, P42,426,3G2,000
came from appropriations balances from Personnel Services. 'This fact is
important because inS ancbez v. Commission on Audit}
27
the Honorable Court
expressly recognized the use of the MPBF for incurring savings when it
declared that "the Chief Justice hitnself transfers funds only when
there are actual savings, e.g.) from unfilled positions in the J uJiclary."
28
(Emphasis in the original)
39. F lexibifity i11 the DetertJJittatioJJ of /-lctual Savings. For
purposes of augmentation, Congress defines "savings" when it enacts Lhe
GAA. In doing so, Congress only sets the parameters of when savings
actually occur, because a broad, a priori definition of savings in Lhc GAA
26
R.A. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), 53 (General Provisions).
27
Supra note 24.
28
Id. at 497.
CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT
J)j11m, }1: t'. A bad, eta/.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 17 of 39
cannot possibly fix the actual occurrence of savings for the different
operations of each implementing agency. Thus, operationally, it is the
Executive (or any other constitutional officer with authority to augment)
which determines when savings actually occur, because it is only during
the implementation of the GAA when it can be determined that there arc
savmgs 111 an agency.
40. A good example pertains to the use of the lVIPDF as savings
for purposes of augmentation. As stated by this Honorable Court in
Sanchez;, salaries for "unfilled positions in the Judiciary" arc savings that
can be used for augmentation. In such a case, it is possible to have savings
every payday (whether daily, weekly, bi-monthly, or monthly) so long as
such unfilled positions remain vacant. Thus, a vacant position in tl1c
judiciary with a salary of PSO,OOO a n1onth translates to a monthly savings
for the judiciary in the same amount, from January until such vacancy is
filled up. T'his illustrates how savings may be incurred early on given the
nature of Lhe item involved.
41. It would be impractical for Congress to fix specific and
absolute standards to determine when actual savings occur in all agencies.
For example, when the Executive uses savings from a bridge construclion
project which is "finally abandoned" due to geological conditions, the usc
of funds for such project as savings to augment other items in the GAA is
not made suspect by the eventual clearing of the geological conclitions,
which makes the construction of the bridge feasible again. 'The necessity
lo use these funds assumes even greater exigency when we consider the
reality that a significant amount of public funds used to operate the
government is borrowed money for which interest accrues, whether or
not such funds are used.
42. Thus, for both practical and theoretical purposes, the
President or the Chief Justice or any other constitutional officer with
authority to augment has to have wide cliscretion in the determination of
actual savings within the definition provided by Congress in the GJ\A.
\Vhen Congress defines "savings" in the GAA, it is not so much intended
to constrain the constitutional offlcer, as to provide reasonable standards
for the considerable leeway in managing funds for the operation of Lhc
government. This much the Court stated in Demetria v. A/ba
29
and Gonzales
29
No. L-71977, 27 february 1987, 148 SCRA 208,214.
CONSOLlDi\TED Coivll\IENT
J)juco, ]1: v. Abati, el aL
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 18 of 39
v. Aiacaraig,
30
when it said that the power of augmentation is intended to
afford a head of a branch of government "considerable flexibility" in the
use of public funds and resources.
43. Given this "considerable flexibility" enjoyed by the Executive
to determine actual savings, the midyear review under National Budget
Circular (NDC) No. 541 is reasonable because it is a good faith
determination of "final discontinuance or abandonment" of a project for
the fiscal year, based on the actual performance of the agency. The
Honorable Court has no judicially manageable standards Lo determine
when actual savings accrue because such determination requires intimate
knowledge of the implementation conditions of the GAA, facts that arc
solely accessible to the Executive. To be sure, this "considerable
flexibility" is also enjoyed by other constitutional officers with authority to
augment.
44. Natio11al Budget Circular 541 is Not The Face of D_AP.
As a preliminaty 1natter, we note some petitioners' exaggeration of the
importance of NDC 541 (Re: Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Ivieasure-\Vithdrawal of Agencies' Unobligated Allotments as of June
30, 2012) in their attack against the DAP. Again, this is downright false, if
we are to ground our conclusion on facts. Following Table 1, we can sec
that in the years 2011 and 2012, the total amount of withdraw11
unobligated allotments totalled F7,281,893,000 and 6,315,862,000,
respectively. Given that the augmentations through DAP-idcntificd
projects, programs and activities accounted for P51,048,637,000 auJ
45,703,540,000 in 2011.and 2012, respectively, tllis 111eans that N13C 541
accounted for only 14.26/o and 13.82/o of the DAP Juring those years.
By these standards, NBC 541 cannot possibly be "the face of DAP."
45. lf7ithdraw!1 U11obligated Allotme11fs are Savi11gs. Even as
NBC 541 covers only a small percentage of the DAP, the allolmcuts
which are withdrawn pursuant to NBC 541 constitute savings pursuant Lo
53 of the General Provisions of the 2013 GA.i\.. They are clearly
"portions or balances of any programmed appropriation ... free from any
obligation or encumbrances which are: 0 still available after the
completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the "\Vork, activity
or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized .... "
31
' G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452,472.
CoNSOLIDATED COl\Jl\lENT
Jjjum, ]1: t'. A bad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 19 of 39
46. NBC 541 Authorizes the WithdraJPal of Allot!IJenls
Pursuant to Book VI, Ch. 5, 38 of the Ad111i11istrative Code. 'The
authority of the President under NBC 541 to withdraw allotments has
firm statutory grounding-
Sec. 38. Suspension of ExjJenditure of Aj;prvpnations. Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the
public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office
concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations useJ
fur permanent officials aud employees.
47. The "public interest" standard for the President's exercise of
the authority to "suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds"
is but a recognition of the need to give to the President, as the national
economic manager and Chief Executive of the Republic, the widest
possible discretion in the determination of the need to continue or
discontinue or even abandon the implementation of a program, project or
activity mandated by Congress. The Executive Department's institutional
capacity-its access to the facts on the ground-uniquely situates his
office to exercise such discretion. His decision to withdraw allotments is
coextensive with his discretion to discontinue or abandon a "work,
activity or purpose" mandated by Congress.
48. NBC 541 is a Spe11di11g, NOT S aviug, PoliCJ' Petitioners
should disaLuse themselves of the notion that NBC 541 is a scheme Lo
generate savings-the text of NBC 541 belies this claim. A casual reading
of NBC 541 shows that it is, in fact, a last-ditch effort of the President to
push agencies into actually spending the approrialions authorlzeJ by
Congress by using the allounents issued then1. NBC 541 slates-
For the first five months of 2012, the national government has not met its
spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal targets
during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the
utilization of available resources.
Departments/ agencies have registered low spendipg levels in terms uf
obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012 performance. To
enhance agencies' performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation
meetings and/ or send call-up letters, requesting them to iJentify slow-moving
programs/projects anJ the factors/issues affecting their performance (Loth
pertaining to internal systems and those which are outside the agencies'
CONSOLIDATED (Oi\11\IENT
Jjj11co, ]1: v. Abad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 20 of 39
spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and
improvement plans for the rest of 2012.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/ agencies have continued
lo post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus resulting to
substantial unobligated allotments.
31
49. Considering that the actual goal of NBC 541 is to push
agencies to ensure that they obligate their allotments as soon as possible,
it is downright unfair to characterize NBC 541 as a presidential policy
meant to take away funds from the various agencies of government so his
office can use them as savings.
50. 'fable 3 below shows that all disbursements under the DJ\P
were maJe on the second semester of the fiscal year. This belies the claim
that the DAP is an arbitrary mechanism for creating savings at the
beginning of the year.
Table 3. (Figures in Thousand Pesos)
D A I ~ AMOUNT
DISBURSEMENTS
12-0ct-11 67,722,280
21-Dec-11 11,004,157
27 -Jun-12 21,564,587
05-Sep-12 2,731,080
21-Dec-12 33,082,603
17-Jun-13 4,658,215
26-Sep-13 8,489,600
TOTAL 149,252,523
51. It is important to note that, unlike a household budget, the
national budget follows a Keynesian model, z:e., it is a spending program
whose underlying theory is the belief in the multiplier effects of
government participation .in economic activities. This is the reason why
the President's proposed budget is called the "National Expenditure
Program." Thus, government agencies at the beginning of the fiscal year
are issued general authorizations or the Agency Budget JV[atrix (J-\.131\t) Lo
obligate allotn1ents issued pursuant to their respective appropriations. Put
otherwise, they are designed to spend their budgets. Tlus also means that
the DBJ'vi, consistent with this spending policy, has to monitor the levels
of spending by tracking the levels of obligated alloU11cnLs. These
31
NI3C 541, Item l.O, pars. 3-5.
(
\ .. ,.
CONSOLIDATED (Oi\II\IENT
J)juco, ]r: 1'. A bat{, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 21 of 39
"obligation levels" are important because only those allotments which arc
obligated will most likely be spent.
52. l::.'ollowing the spending policy of the government, expressed
through the slogan "use it or lose it," NBC 541 simply states that
"agencies with low levels of obligations" as of the middle of the year may
be subjected to the 38 powers of the President. In fact, it is the
concerned agencies that inform the President, through the DB.l'vi, that
because of certain contingencies (failure of bidding, inability tu
expropriate, failure to contract, etc.) they can no longer obligate the
existing allotments for a particular project, which is why they are the ones
that recommend the withdrawal of the unobligated allotment.
53. The available funds derived fron1 these withdrawn
unobligated allotments are textbook appropriations balances in the same
way that unused allotments for unfllled positions in the judiciary or any
other department or agency of government, by way of lYIPBF, are
considered savings. One cannot reasonably insinuate that the President is
inventing savings because of the failure of some agencies to conduct
successful bids and enter into contracts that result in obligated allotments,
in much the same way that no one can charge the Chief Justice with
artificially creating savings when some judicial positions arc not filled up
because of lack of qualified applicants to judicial posts.
54. NBC 541 is Not atl ItnjJoutzdtneflt Scheme. Given the
thtust of the government to spend, not save, as expressed in NBC 541,
the notion that NBC 541 is an impoundment measure is self-
contradicting. In the United States, the terrn impoundment refers to the
decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or
ideological justifications.
32
For example, Richard Nixon refused to spend
$14.7 Billion Congress made available for various federal programs on the
ground that "excessive" spending would cause inflation or require a tax
increase.33 Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy impounded
federal funds because they did not want to build new \Veapons syslems.3
4
32
See Note, Presidential Impoundment: Comtitutional Theoties and Politicalllealities, Cil GEO. L. J.
1295 (1973); RI-1. Clark, Presidential Impoundmmt of Approptiated Funds: The Strpreme Court's Fi!Jt
Pronouncement, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 81 (1976).
33
Note, Impoundmellf oJFunds, 86"!-lARV. L. REV. 1505 (1973).
34
ld. at 1509.
CONSOLIDATED COl\Il\IENT
J)juco, jt: v. Abad, et al.
G.R.. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 22 of 39
55. NBC 541 is not an impoundment schen1e precisely because
the real objective is to put agencies on notice that their unobligated
allotments might be withdrawn if thry failed to obligate, and tberefoi-e their
allotments. NBC 541 is calculated to trigger spending pursuant to the
original allotments issued to the various agencies of government. It is only
when the agencies themselves Jeclare to the DBIYI that they cannot
obligate these allotments that they are finally withdrawn by the President.
Thus, to equate with the American concept of impoundment the decision
of the President to "discontinue or abandon" a project mandated by
Congress by withdrawing the allotment therefor is not only to compare
apples and oranges but also to misunJerstand the stark disparity in
context between impoundment and NBC 541.
56. J urisdictio11al Problems ff7ith Respect to I111jJOtl!tdtJteJJt:
Sta11di11g, Case or Co11troversy, a11d N o11-Ripe11ess. \Vhile NBC 5
1
11 or
the DAP involves no impoundment at all, any possible quesLion of
impoundment in this case poses simultaneous problems of "case or
controversy," "prematurity," and "standing" because the petitions clo not
identify any injury arising from a particular appropriation that the
President refuses to spend.
57. Petitioners suecl as taxpayers based on their interest in
jJrez;enting an illegal disbursement of funds. However, a challenge involving
impoundment seeks an entirely different form of relief-the release of the
impounded funds. An impoundment suit is . meant to . compel the
to disburse funds based on a claim that one is actually and
directly injureJ by the refusal of the President to spend a particular
appropriation. An example is the case of a contractor who cannot proceed
with a project because the President has impounded the funds for that
activity. Not only is there no such claim here, but also, and in fact, the
goal is the opposite-to stop the President from using, disbursing, or
releasing funds.
58. Given this procedural posture, petitioners who complain of
presidential impoundment have placed themselves in a logical conundrum
that affects this Honorable Court's jurisdiction to decide this parLicular
issue. If their complaint is about impoundment, then they clearly are not
the proper parties because they have not shown any entitlement lo the
funds; but if their complaint is about prohibiting the release of public
(UNSOLIDJ\TED COMMENT
jjj11co, Jr. v. Abatl, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 23 of 39
funds, then they themselves-not the President-are peuuoning for
impoundment. Either way, petitioners are not entitled to relief.
59. There is also a substantive concern about the role of the
Honorable Court in the question of impoundment. At least in tl1e United
States, problems of impoundment raise separation of powers concerns
because the televant institutions that deal with such issue arc the
Executive Department and tl1e Legislature.JS Defining the contours of
savings, characterizing impoundment, and crafting various solutions to
the occasional tug-of-war between these two branches of government fall
largely witlun tl1e realrn of politics and lawn1aking, not constitutional
interpretation. \"V./e ask the Honorable Court to take note of the fact that
various bills involving the litigated issues in this case have been D.lcJ Gy
different legislators of diverse political backgrounds and inclination.
36
It
may very well be that the solutions to tl1e perceived problems of
petitioners about good governance are to be found in the clemocraLic
arena, not in the session hall of the Supreme Court.
60. The Jf7itbdrawal of Allottneuts 1111der NBC 541 DoeJ
Not Involve a Trattsjer of Ftt11ds. Petitioners insist that NBC 541 goes
against the decision in Demet1ia because it sanctions the transfer of funds.
This is again a basic misconception. The withdrawal of allotment does not
involve a transfer of fund because such action does not involve a.changc
in the corpus of funds in tl1e National Treasury. There is no mmremcnl of
funds because no money is released from the National Treasury through
the mere reduction or increase in allotments.
61. To illustrate, we can classify allotrnenls into four categories:
a) Allotments that are unobligated;
G) Allotments that have been obligated;
c) Allounents that have been obligated, the funds fur
which have likewise been released; and
35
U. at 1529-1535.
36
Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 404 filed by Sen. Ivliriarn Defensor-Santiago; S.l3. No. 661 filet! by
Sen. JV Ejercito; S.B. No. 779 filed by Sen. Jinggoy Estrada; House Bill (I-LB.) No. 1819 filed
by Rep. Ben Evardone; H.B. No. 2904 ftled by Rep. Martin Romualdez; H.D. No. 2256 filed
by AKDAYAN Reps. Barry Gutierrez and Walden Bello; I-LB. No. 2257 filed Gy
AK13AYAN Reps. Barry Gutierrez and Walden Bello.
CONSOLIDATED (Ol\ll\IENT
J)juco, jt: t'. Aba0 el aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 24 of 39
d) Allotments that have been obligated, the funds for
which have been released and paid to the obligee.
62. ,_fhe issuance of a SARO, for instance, is a declaration Lhat
funds have been allotted-not actually released-and allows the recipient
agency to obligate such funds by entering into binding contracts. Thus,
even if the allollnent has already been obligated, it does not ncccssaril y
follow that funds have been released to the agency because the Dl3IYI
must first issue a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) informing the agency
that funds may now be withdrawn from a government depositoq. NDC
541 covers a situation that falls only under the first categoq: unobligaLcd
allotments. Therefore, the withdrawal of unobligated allotments docs not
involve any transfer of funds because no moneys have yet been released
from the National Treasury. Simply put, one cannot transfer funds that, in
the first place, have not yet been released.
63. The text of NBC 541 confirms this, as it only limiLs itself Lo
unobligated. allotments or those amounts allotted which are not yet
"committed to be paid by the Government for any lawful act made by an
authorized officer for and in behalf of the Government."
37
Under llcm
5.5 of NBC 541, the withdrawal of allotments is done through the
issuance of negative SAROs, which means that the withdrawal is nothing
but a modification of the allotment through a reduction of a
corresponding amount.
64. The DAP Did Not Fu11d Progra!lls a11d Projects Not in
the GAA. Petitioners Araullo, et al. and Belgica, et al. insist that the DJ\P
is used to fund new programs and projects with no appropriation in Ll1c
GAA. They cite Item 5.7.3 of NDC 541 which provides that a wiLhJra\vn
allotment may be-
5.7.3. Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to
fund priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget but
expected to be started or implemented during the current year.
Again, Lhis claim can be clarified by both facts and context.
37
ADJ\HNISTRA TIVE CODE, Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(11) on the definition of "Obligat.ion."
CONSOLIDATED (OI\!Iv!ENT
j)jur:o, Jr. l'. A bat" et al
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 25 of 39
65. NBC 541 was never meant to be a budget circular
empowering the President to spend for projects without legislative
authorization. lten1 5.7.3 of NBC 541 only n1eans that withdrawn
allotments may be used to (1) augment existing programs and projects;
and (2) fund appropriated programs and projects that were previously not
considered "priority" in the 2012 budget, but ended up being prioritizeJ
in 2012 and therefore "to be started or implemented during the current
year." In other words, for the second part of Ite1n 5.7.3, it is the prioli(Jt
status of the program or project, not its existence, that was not previously
co-msidered in the 2012 budget.
66. This intention is consistent with the policy of NBC 541 Lo
prioritize programs or projects that are "fast-1noving" or "quick-
disbursing." For instance; some aspects of existing programs with
multiple projects that require continuous funding beyond a fiscal year may
not have been considered "priority." However, when the project within
that progran1 becomes important and is considered "fast-moving/' it may
be prioritized and its funding augmented through the DAP. Tllis does not
mean that such project did not have an appropriation cover in any
relevant GAA. The exemplar for tlus case is that of Project NOAH which
was an existing project that became a priority only after a series of
calamities brought about by typhoons.
67. Consistent with our sub1i1ission, we challenge petitioners to
go beyond speculations and insinuations and bring tl1e debate to the level
of facts by pointing out specific disbursen1ents under NDC 5,.,11 for
projects they claim have no approprlatioi1 cover. Respondents arc more
than willing to oblige them by providing them and this Honorable Court
the specific details of any disbursement under any program or project
under the Aquino ad1ninis tration.
68. Lump-Sum Discretionary Fu11ds are Expressly
Authorized by the Coustitutio11 attd the Admi11istrative Code.
Petitioners Belgica, eta!. question the use of the DAP to augment lump-
sum discretionary appropriations in the 2013 GAA based on their
preliminary claim that these types of appropriations violate Article Vl,
CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT
J)juco, ]1: v. A bad, et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 26 of 39
25(1)
38
of the Constitution and the Administrative They cite l3ook
VI, Ch. 4, 23 of the Administrative Code as authority-
Sec. 23. Content if the General ApprojJtiatio11s Act. The General Appropriations
Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each
agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations each
program and project, including statutoty provisions of specific agency or
general applicability.
69. According to them, since 23 of the Administrative Code
speaks only of "programs" or "projects," they conclude that lump-sum
discretiona1y funds are unconstitutional because they fail to follow the
"form, manner, and preparation of the budget" as prescribed by the
Administrative Code. This is belied by express provisions of the
Constitution and the same statute petitioners cite-it can only be correct
if we declared as unconstitutional some provisions of the Constitution
and of the Administrative Code.
70. Article VI, 25(6) of the Constitution expressly allows the
creation of "discretiona1y funds" whose purpose may be as broad as any
"public purposeD to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law." 'The constitutional authority
to create discretionary funds necessarily carries the authority to create
lump-sum appropriations.
71. Under Article VI, 29(3), Congress can create a special fund
through a tax levied for a special purpose and paid out for such purpose
only. This provision, in effect, is constitutional authority for Congress Lo
create lump-sum, even automatic, appropriations that go directly to the
Executive Department or some other office by way of special levy. To
declare that h1n1p-sum discretionary funds are unconstitutional is tu
nullify these provisions in the Constitution.
72. The way the Administrative Code defines "programs" or
"projects" 1s textually broad to cover lump-sum discretionary
appropriations. Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(12) of the Administrative Code defines
"program" as "functions and activities for the performance of a major
38
CONST., Art. VI, 25(1). The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended
by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the buJget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
CONSOLlDi\ TED COM!VIENT
Sjjuco, ]t: v. A bad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 27 of 39
purpose for which a government agency is established." A lump-sum
discretiona1y appropriation such as the Contingent Fund is intended to
perform the "rnajor purpose" of financing "functions and activities"
which were not foreseen when the GAA was enacted. On the other hand,
Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(13) defines "project" only as a "component of a
program covering a homogeneous group of activities that results in the
accomplishment of an identifiable output."
73. The Administrative Code expressly authorizes lump-sun1
appropriations. Book VI, Ch. 5, 47 gives to "[t]he Department
of Budget [to] administer the Lump-Sum Funds appropriated in the
General Appropriations Act. .. " In other words, Congress can give the
Executive the power to administer and implement lump-sum funds unJer
the GAA. Furthermore, Book VI, Ch. 5, 35 of the Administrative Code
states that lun1p-sun1 appropriations "shall be made in accordance with a
special budget to be approved by the President. .. " This provision
recognizes that the President can propose a lump-sun1 approprialion in
the budget and Congress can include it in the GAA.
74. This Honorable Court stated in Philcowa v.

that
"[t]he power of appropriation [of Congress] carries with it the power Lo
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It
can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be."
40
--rhe purpose
of the appropriation 1nay be as broad as a discretionary fund or it may Ge
as detailed as a special appropriations law. The Constitution and the
Administrative Code envision a budget that covers both the stalic and
dynamic needs of a nation over the course of a year, not one that ties the
hands of the Executive, creates an auton1aton out of him, and leaves hilll
incapacitated to respond to national concerns.
75. Petitioners Belgica, et al.'s conceptual dogmatism is betrayed
by their opposition to the augmentation of even the Contingent and
Calamity Funds. \Ve restate their submission-
Petitioners respectufully submit that insofar as the DAP funJs were
used to "augment" provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 2013 that
are in the nature of lump sum discretionary appropriations--such as under Title
on the Contigency [sic] Fund, under Title on the Calamity
39
G.R. No. 113105, 19 August 1994,235 SCRA 506.
40
Id. 522.
CONSOLIDATED (OI\Uv!ENT
Sjjflco, }1: v. A bad, et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 28 of 39
Fund, under Title XLV on the Unprogrammed Fund, under Title Xt'C..t'CV on
Budgetary Support for GOCCs, under Title XLV [sic] on the Priority
Development Assistance Fund and such other special purpose funds - it is
illegal and unconstitutional considering tl1at tl1e lump sum discret.iunaty
appropriations are contraty to Section 25 (1) Article VI of the Constitution in
relation to the Administrative Code of 1987.
41
7 6. By these clai1ns, pet1t1oners effectively argue that the
President can do nothing (except, perhaps, beg for private funds or ask
for a supple1nental budget) to respond to a present, devastating calamity
or emergency once the Calamity and Contingent Funds arc depleted. \'Ve
only need to temper our deeply-held interpretive con1mitmcnts with a
sense of humanity to recognize the dangers posed by tlus argument.
77. To be sure, petitioners Belgica, et al.'s argument on this point
is but a species of an atgument raised during the PDAF oral arguments.
\Y/e therefore re-cite our averments in the Me1norandum for Respondents
in Be(gica} et aL t). fiott Executive Secretary} et aL4
2
for the benefit of the
petitioners and tlus Honorable Court-
70. Averments with respect to the level of specificity of
appropriations. It was pointed out during oral arguments that there is an
obligation on the part of the Legislature to propose O!t!J line-iterns in the
budget, to correspond with tl1e line-item veto of the President. However, there
is notlung in the Constitution tl1at mandates Congress to pass only line-item
appropriations. The standard, simple solution to a lump-sum appropriation tl1e
President does not approve of is an ordinaty veto, nothing more. The
presidency is not dinunished by a proposal for a lump-sum appropriation by
his counterparts in Congress. Tlus Honorable Court should not create
constitutional principles out of thin air.
71. Any notion of a "line-item-only obligation" is in fact textually
belied by Article VI, Section 25(6), of tl1e Constitution which allows the
creation of "discretionaty furids" whose purpose may be as broad as any
"public purposeD to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law." The textually-grounded constitutional
authority to create discretionary funds necessarily carries the authority to create
lump-sum appropriations.
72. Similarly, under Article VI, Section 29(3), Congress can create a
special fund through a tax levied for a special purpose and paid out for such
purpose only. This provision, in effect, is constitutional autl1ority for Congress
to create lump-sum, even automatic, appropriations that go directly to the
Executive Department or some other office by way of special levy. This should
41
Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444) at 28.
42
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493; UDK 14951.
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Jjjuco, ]1: t. A bad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 29 of 39
eliminate any doubt about the possible existence of an obligation to pass line-
item-only appropriations.
73. These constitutional provlslons clearly contemplate different
levels of specificity for different kinds of appropriations. The Honorable Court
in Philconsa declared that "[t]he power of appropriation [of Congress] carries
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the
appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it
to be." The purpose of the appropriation may be as broad as a discretionary
fund or.it may be as detailed as a special appropriations law. To say that only
line-item appropriations are permitted is to nullify these provisions in the
Constitution.
74. The text of the Constitution env1s10ns a flexible Ludgetary
process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy.
This Court said in Phi/coma that "[t)he Constitution is a framework of a
workable government and its interpretation must take into account the
complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political
branches of government." Lump-sum appropriations are essential to
financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is
enacted. The purposes of a contingency fund, for example, cannot be itemized.
If, as conceded by petitioners themselves, lump-sum funds such as the
contingency and calamity funds are allowed by the Constitution, then there is
no principled way of picking and choosing which other funds are
constitutionally invalid.
75. Finally, the idea that the Congress is somehow constitutionally
compelled to propose a lump-sum-free budget to allow the President lo use his
line-item veto is belied by: first, the fact that the President can exercise his veto
power regardless of the level of specificity of the item; and s e c n t ~ it is the
Congress which in fact has the greater interest in submitting a more specific
budget, not the President, for the simple reason that a more specific
appropriation means greater constraint on presidential discretion. This
happens all the time because the budget is predominantly a line-item budget.
The decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is
constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. Such decision is for Congress,
not tlus Honorable Court, to make. It is purely a political matter for Congress
to propose such types of funds, on one hand, and for tl1e President to approve
them, on the other.
43
43
At 29-30. Citations omitted.
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Jjjf.fco
1
Jr. v. A bad, et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 30 of 39
III
THE DAP IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF
THE PRESIDENT'S PO\VER TO SPEND.
78. The PresideJJt's Po1ver to Speud the U11progra1JI!JJed Fund.
Aside from savings, the other component of the DAP is the use of the
Unprogrammed Fund. The Unprogrammed Fund is an appropriation that
authorizes expenditures for stated purposes only if there are, additional
revenues received by the government which were not covered by the
budget proposal submitted by the President to Congress. These funds arc
considered "unprogrammed" because the timing of their existence anJ
actual amounts are unpredictable. The 2011 to 2013 GAAs carry
substailtially the following Spe.cial Provision with regard to the release of
the Unprogrammed Fund:
1. Release of t!Je Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by
the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not
considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets, as certified by the BTr:
PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted
projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be
sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
79. Thus, expenditures under the Unprogrammed Fund are
authorized if there are:
a) Revenue collections in excess of the original revenue
targets in the budget proposal submitted by the President
to Congress;
b) New revenues which are collected from sources not
originally considered in the budget proposal; and
c) Newly-approved loans for foreign-assisted projects that
were obtained.
80. Table 4 below shows the amount of disbursements under the
DAP charged to the Unprogrammed Fund.
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Sjjtuo, Jt: v. _A_bat" et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,
209164,209260,209287,2091tl4
Page 31 of39
Table 4. (Figures in Thousand Pesos)
AMOUNT
DAP CHARGED TO
DISBURSEMENTS UNPROGRAMMED
FUND
1 13,242,030
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 4,398,722
6
7 8,489,600
TOTAL 26,130,352
81. Moneys that flow through the Unprogrammed Fund arc not
savings as defined in the GAA. They are either revenues or loan proceeds.
Therefore, expenditures under the Unprogramn1ed Fund are merely "usc
of funds" that are not subject to any of the restrictions of Art. VI, 25(5)
of the Constitution.
82. The Unprogrammed Fund provides flexibility to the
Executive to use additional funds brought about by good fiscal
management or some contingent event, without need of rcturulng to
Congress to obtain authorization to spend such funds. In other words,
Congress authorized in advance, through the GAA, the expenditure of
these additional funds which were not contemplated when the GAA was
enacted. As in Phi/coma, this is part of "a fran1ework of a workable
government [which] take[s] into account the complexities, realities and
politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
governn1en t. "44
83. Nonetheless, expenditures under the Unprogrammed Fund
are limited to the purposes stated therein. The common purposes of the
Unprogrammed Fund from the 2011 to 2013 GAAs are "Budgetary
Support to Government-Owned and/ or Controlled Corporations,"
"Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects," "General Fund Adjustments,"
and "Support for Infrastructure Projects and Social Programs."
4
5 ,..fhesc
44
Supra note 37, 523.
45
Adclitional purposes under the 2011 GAA include 0) Strategic Government Reforms; (ii)
Support for Pre-School Education; (iii) Collective Negotiation Agreement; and (iv) Payment
of Total Administrative Disability Pension. Additional purposes under the 2012 GAA
include (i) Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; and (ii) Debt Management Program.
CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
Jjjuco, ]1: v. Abad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 32 of 39
purposes provide reasonable limits to the President's power to spend the
Unprogrammed Fund.
84. As a funding source for the DAP, the Unprogrammed Fund
is used to finance DAP-identified programs, activities and projects. 'There
is nothing unconstitutional here so long as the expenditures fall within the
statutorily-defined purposes of the Unprogrammed Fund under any of the
relevant GAAs.
SPECIAL A VE.RJ.VIENTS WITI-1 RESPECT TO TI-lE
LEGISLATORS' lillCOMMENDATIONS OF
PROJECTS TO THE PRESIDENT
85. Lack of Sta11di11g to Raise Violatiou of Equal ProtectioJJ.
Petitioner Luna claims that releases under the DAP were made only to
select lawmakers in violation of the equal protection clause.
46
He cites
Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Joker Arroyo as among the
lawrnakers who did not propose projects to be funded as DAP-identificd
projects. This claim is irrelevant.
First. T'he argument cannot be taken to 1nean that all the
Senators should have been entitled to propose DAP-idenlified
projects. If the claim is that the DAP is per se unconstitutional, then
no legislator should have been entitled to propose any DAP-
identified projects, not that all of tl1em should have been given such
entitlement.
Second. 'I'hose who have the right to complain about the
alleged "uneven and discriminatory implementation of [the] DAP"
47
are the 111embers of Congress tl1emselves. Petitioner Luna is not
suing in representation of any such mernber and he himself is not
an injured party to tl1e extent that he has not shown any entitlement
to propose DAP-identified projects.
Additional purposes under the 2013 GAA include (i) AFP Modernization Program; (ii) Debt
Management Program; (ill) Payment of Total Administrative Disability Pension; and (iv)
People's Survival Fund.
46
Luna Petition (G.R. No. 209136), par. 7.33.
47
ld., par. 7.29.
CONSOUD;\TED COJ\HviENT
J)Jttco, ]!: v. b a c ~ et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 33 of 39
Tbird. The Equal Protection Clause .is not some doctrine that
can be called to function for any perceived .inequality. The doctrine
is meant to prevent invidious discrimination or those types of
discrimination such as race-, gender-, poverty-, or some other
status-based distinctions that are simultaneously unjust and
revolting. Obviously, disparities in the President's political
treatlnent of his colleagues .in the legislature do not rise to the level
of a concern that should be remedied under the Equal Protection
Clause.
86. Preside11t Not Constitutio11al[y Barred jro111 Rcceivi11g
Proposals 011 Use of S avittgs. Petitioners IBP, Araullo, et a!., Villegas,
and BeJgica, eta/. restate. the objections against the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) by saying that the DAP is unconstitutional
because some of .its disbursements were made pursuant to "funding
requests"
48
by legislators. It .is argued that the DAP is "ec1ually, .if not
more so, unconstitutional"
49
because, unlike the PDAF, the ability of
legislators to propose and identify projects under the DAP .is not
authorized by the GAA.
87. On the contrary, what petitioners consider as Lhe
uGjectionable feature of the questioned recommendations-the absence
of such a mechanism in the GAA-is what respondents consider their
strongest constitutional characteristic. It is precisely the absence of any
law which provides for participation by legislators that makes the DAP
legitimate. This is because there .is nothing in the Constitution or any law
which prohibits legislators from recommending to the President how he
may use his department's savings. A Cabinet ]\{ember, a friend of the
PresiJ.ent, a civic organization, or any other citizen for that matter can
recommend to the President any project, progran1, or activity. That
legislators were the ones who made the recommendations to the President
does not have any constitutional impact on the President's use of savings
any more than the recommendation of any other citizen would. 'The fact
that there is no law which recognizes any authority of members of
Congress means that whatever request they make to the President .is, at
best, recommendatory and, at worst, an unsolicited advice.
48
Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444) at 13.
49 Id.
..
CONSOLID1\TED COMMENT
J)juco, Jr. tJ. A bad, et al.
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 34 of39
88. In Pbilconsa, tlus Honorable Court validated the authority of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects to be implemented
by the Executive because it is merely recommendatory. Such authority
does not legally grant any role to members of Congress in the
implementation of the GAA because the President has the ultimate power
to accept or reject their recommendations.
89. In fact, .it has been argued tl1at the PDAF ceaseJ to be
recommendato1y because there are "Special Provisions" in tl1c recent
GAAs which supposedly require the "concurrence" of legislators or
"favorable endorse1nent" of the House Committee on Appropriation or
the Senate Committee on Finance in the release of funds or realirwment
0
of projects. Wlule we continue to maintain that these special provisions
do not destroy the rec01nmendatory nature of legislator identificaLion
under the PDAF, these special provisions are not found in the DAP.
Thus, "fund requests" by legislators to the President under the DJ\P can
only be recommendatory because there is nothing which binds the
President to follow or even accept these requests. In fact, what the
legislators did in this particular instance is exactly what will be the
nonn in a regirne where the PDAF 1nechanisn1. in the bullge t is
declared unconstitutional.
SPECIAL AVERMENTS \VITI-I RESPECT TO TI-lE
SPECIFIC DISBURSEMENTS CITED BY PETI'I'IONERS
90. Petitioners Syjuco and Luna cite the following disbursements
as "items" allegetlly not found in the GAA:
a) P1.5 Billion to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
(CPLA);
b) P1.8 Billion to the Ivioro National Liberation Front
(MNLF); and
c) P700 Million as assistance to the Province of Quezon.
91. 'The disburse1nents for the CPLA and the MNLF were made
in line with the P AJYIANA (Payapa at JYiasaganang Pamayanan or Peaceful
and Resilient Communities), a program under the Office of tbc
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). PAI'vLANA is an
..
.
... . ....,..-.. .,.. . ..,.,c ......
. CONSOLID1\TED COMMENT
Syjuco, }t: t' . .-4batl, et aL
G.R. Nos. 20Yl35, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 35 of 39
economic development and aid package launched in conjunction with the
government peace process. Projects implemented under the P AiviANA
include shelter for internally-displaced persons,. support for agriculture
and eco-touris1n, and infrastructure in conflict-affected areas.
92. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the P AiviANA program is
supported by the necessary "appropriations cover" in the GAAs. For the
2011. GAA, P235,880,000 was appropriated to support the activities of the
OPAPP.
50
Similar appropriations are present in the 201251 and 20135
2
GAAs.
93. On the other hand, the assistance to the Province of Quezon
finds its berth .in the appropriation for Financial Subsidy to Local
Government Units,
53
later called the Local Government Support Fund.
54
The amount allocated was augmented to offset outstanding obligations of
the national government to the province.
94. The Belgica and former Budget Secretary Benjamin
Diokno also complain about a Pl 0 Billion capital infusion into the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. --rhis infusion, as cited by petitioners Belgica,
el a/. is for "Budgetary Support to Government Corporations," an iLem of
expenditure under the Unprogrammed Fund. T'he release of money from
the Unprogrammed Fund, whether under the DAP or any other program,
should be uncontroversial as it has an appropriation cover.
95. The above disbursements, like any other disbursement under
the DAP, relate to specific appropriations in the budget. There is no
genuine question of law, only error in petitioners' appreciation of the
facts-a state otherwise avoidable through reasonable inquiry and the
reading of publicly available information.
50
ItA. No. 10147 (2011 GAA), II(A)(B)(I)(b).
51
R.A. No. 10155 (2012 GAA), L'CVJ(V).
52
R.A. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), L'XVI(V). .
53
R.A. No. 10147 (2011 GAA), L'CXVI(B); R.A. No. 10155 (2012 GAA),
54
ItA. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), L'C.X.Vl(C).
CONSOLIDATED COl\lliiENT
Jyjuco, Jr. v. Abad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 36 of39
PRAYER
\VHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1) The application for a 'femporary Restraining Order ancl/ or \X!riL
of Prelimlninaty Injuction be DENIED; and
2) The petitions be DISMISSED for LACK OF IVIERIT.
Respondents pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable.
Manila, 7 November 2013.
OFFICE OF TI-lE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village
1229 Makati City
Tel. No.: 8186301 to 09 (Trunkline)
Fax No.: 8176037
Website: "\Vww.osg.gov.ph
Email: docket@osg.gov.ph

FRANCIS II. JARDELEZA
Solicitor General
Roll No. 25719
IBP Lifetime No. 00037
IVICLE Exemption No. III-008523
J enior J tate J olicitm
(OJ]icer-m-Charge, Lorenzo 'Tat ada Division)
Roll No. 44957
IBP Lifetime No. 08505
IYICLE Exemption No. IV-001068, 5-14-13
CONSOLIDATED COJ\IMENT
Sjjuco, ]1: v. Abad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 37 of 39
.
EMERSON S. BANEZ
Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 56723
IBP No. 914231, 1-3-13
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0010542, 12-20-12

Solicitor .
'Roll No. 61899
IBP No. 935430, 4-11-13
IviCLE Compliance No. N/ A
Assotiate Solicitor
Roll No. 59301
IBP No. 932006, 2-26-13
IvlCLE Compliance No. N/ A
M
IBP No. 935418, 4-11-13
MCLE Compliance No. N/ A
CONSOLIDATED COMI\IENT
J)juco, jt: v. Abad, et aL
G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 38 of 39
Copy Furnished:
AUGUSTO L. S1JUCO, R ~
Petitioner in G.R. No. 209135
No.4 Rodriguez St., Sta. Barbara
Iloilo City
ATTYS. DANTE N. GARCIA and
ROMEO C. LAGUARDIA
For Petitio11er itt G.R. No. 209135
3 Flame Tree Road, Forbes Park
Makati City
ATTY. \VANDAM. TALOSIG
Talosig Saquing and Associates
Counselfor Petitioner itt G.R. No. 209136
No. 321 FEMII Bldg., (Annex A)
A. Soriano, Jr., Ave., Intramuros
Manila
ATTY. l\1ANUELITO R. LUNA
Luna and Associates
Petitioner in G.R. No. 209136
No. 4 ~ FEMII Bldg., (Annex A)
A. Soriano, Jr., Ave., Intramuros
Ivlanila
ATTYS. RAYMOND PARSIFAL A.
FORTUN and MARIA ROMINA M.
DALAGAN
Cormsel for Petitiomr in G.R No 209155
137 CRJ\:1 Avenue cor. CRJ\:1 Marina
BF Homes Almanza, Las,Pifias City
ATTY. MANUEL l\1. LAZARO
Cormsel for Petitioners i11 G.R No. 209164
Chatham House l3ldg.
Valero cor. Rufino Streets
Salcedo Village, Makati City
DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN,
AT1'YS. RITA LINDA V. JIMENO,
REYNALDO Y. MAULIT, and
ROMULO B. LUMAUIG
ComrselforPetitionersin G.R. No. 209164
. 2"d Floor, Phil trust Building
Remedios cor. M.H. Del Pilar Sts.
Malate, Manila
DEAN PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Cormsel for Petitioner in G.R No. 209260
26th Floor, Pacific Star Building
Gil Puyat Avenue cor. Makati Avenue
Ivlakati City
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO Ill
New Executive Building, Malacaiiang
Marilla
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I'AQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR.
Office of the President, Malacafiang
Manila
SECRETARY FLORENCIO D. AllAD
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
General Solano St., San J'viiguel
Manila
SENATE PRESIDENT FHANIU.IN lVI.
DRILON
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
4th Floor, Senate Building, Roxas Boulevard
Pasig City
SPEAKER FELICIANO H..
BELMONTE, JR.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
House of Representatives Complex
Constitution Hills, Quezon City
SECRETARY CESAR V. PUIUSIJ\tli\
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
DOF Building, BSP Complex
Roxas Boulevard, Manila
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA
V.DELEON
DUREAU OF TREASURY
Palacio Del Gobernador Duilding
Intramuros, Marilla
CONSOLIDATED CorviMENT
Jjjuco
1
]1: v. A bat{, eta!.
G.R. Nus. 209135, 209136, 209155,
209164,209260,209287,209444
Page 39 of 3.9
ATTYS.JOVENCIO H.
EVANGELISTA, VANESSA
QUIAl'viBAO MAGUIGAD, and .MARIA
CRISTINA P. YAMBOT
Commljor Petitioners in G.R No. 209287
No. 45 K-7'h St., Drgy. West Kamias
Quezon City
PROF. !-lARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,
ATTYS. JOEL RUIZ B UTUYAN and
ROGER R. RAYEL
Roque and Butuyan Law Offices
Counsel for Petitioners in G.R No. 209442
Antel Corporate Center, Unit 1904, 19th Flr.
121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City
EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Except for Dean Pacifico A. Agabin and Prof. Harry L. Roc1ue (Roque and Dutuyan
Law Offices) who were personally served, the foregoing Consolidated Comment is being served
by registered mail due to lack of sufficient personnel in the Office of the Solicitor General to
effect personal service. Advance copies will be personally served to all others within Metru
11anila to ensure timely receipt thereof.
Attomry II