Journal of Human Values

http://jhv.sagepub.com Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible?

Dipasikha Chakraborty Journal of Human Values 2006; 12; 91 DOI: 10.1177/097168580501200108 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jhv.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/1/91

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Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible?

DIPASIKHA CHAKRABORTY

The recent revival of interest in the importance of virtues marks a shift of substance and method in thinking about it. The shift is away from discussion of rules and principles and focused on a discussion of traits, character and conditions of their excellence. This article attempts at unfolding the exact nature of an Indian ethics of virtue, which is yet to be explored in a systematic way. This enquiry into the exciting terrain of Indian philosophy inevitably leads to the interesting debate regarding the very possibility of an Indian ethics of virtue.

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic revival of philosophical interest in virtues. Ethics of virtue was initially introduced to distinguish an approach in normative ethics, which emphasizes the virtues or moral character, in contrast with an approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or one that emphasizes the consequences of actions (utilitarianism). The emphasis started shifting from norms to character traits of moral agents. Virtue ethicists started asking How should we be? rather than What should we do? Moralists supporting this contention looked to Aristotles Nicomachean ethics for a more promising ethical account of virtue. For Aristotle the fundamental question is not, as for Mill, Hobbes or Kant, What is the fundamental

principle of moral right or duty, and how might this be defended philosophically? Aristotle asks, What is the goal of life? What kind of life is the best for human beings? or What is good for man? (Irwin 1985: 2). In Indian philosophy it is very difficult to find out an exact counter-part of the word virtuegenerally it is identified with the word dharma, whereas in other cases it is described as sadgun a -ngun or kalya a. The word dharma is formed from the root dhr or to hold, meaning thereby that which holds a thing and maintains it. Every form of life, every group of being has its own dharma, which is the law of its being. Dharma or virtue is thus said to be conformity with the truth of things; adharma or vice is opposition to it.

Dipasikha Chakraborty is Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Ranchi University, Ranchi, Jharkhand. E-mail: rch_lci@sancharnet.in.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN VALUES 12:1 (2006) Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London Downloaded from http://jhv.sagepub.com at MADURAI KAMRAJ UNIV on June 18, 2009 DOI: 10.1177/097168580501200108

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Dharma is the basis of orderwhether social or -t dharmam itya -huh, dharmena moraldharma vidhr ta prajah (Radhakrishnan 1926: 78). Sometimes the Upanishads make a distinction between satya and dharma, the latter representing the practice of virtue, and the former, the principle underlying it. But the Upanishads also claim that both constitute dharma in the complete sense of the term. Similarly, virtue in Indian ethics is invariably related with some form of activity, and always refers to actions associated with it. For example, in the Taittiriya Upanishad we find, satyam bada (speak the truth), that is, the primary virtue in the life of a student is truth or satya. Truth helps the disciple develop his soul force by controlling his speech and mental state under the guidance of reason. The second instruction of a teacher to his disciple is dharmam cara (practice virtue). Dharma is related to truth as action is related to knowledge. In ancient times when the society had a simple structure, virtues were merely the characteristic features conducive to good human life. But soon a simple social structure came to be differentiated -hman into four classes or castesBra , Ks atriya, Vais ya and Sudra. Accordingly, virtues also became specificeach class became marked with specific virtues. This also stood for the fact that force is not the stronghold of the government, but that right alone is true might. The power of dharma was greater than that of the king of the state. It is universally binding (sarva-niyantr ) as Sankara says in his commentary, for it rules even the rulers. From this we can deduce that dharma is higher than the external authority of the king and is therefore internal. It should signify the sense of right and wrong, which is naturally the characteristic feature of humans as compared with the rest of sentient creation. Thus, dharma or virtue is presented as the ultimate guide to right living and the stability of society is traced to this moral idea of dharma as implanted in

- t param na - sti the human being dharma (Mukhopadhyay 1960: 157). It is not wise to look for a distinct wellformulated ethics of virtue in Indian philosophy that can be said to directly correspond to the ethics of virtue in the West. This does not imply that Indian philosophy does not have any ethical framework or moral grounding. On the contary, we can legitimately claim that Indian ethics of virtue is intimately connected with its metaphysics. Indian sages turned on the one hand to -stra, and on the other hand to the metaDharmas a physical approaches to ultimate problems, without giving much importance to a philosophical treatment of ethical norms. Accordingly, Indian ethics of virtue is very much related with Indian metaphysical concepts and has a strong metaphysical foundation. Since ancient times Indian seers were involved in the search of truththey were attracted by the questions of inner spirit or being or atman. Spiritual reflection and medi-tman tation led them to the conclusion that this a or self is Absolute or Brahman, which is pure consciousness, pure knowledge and pure bliss -nanda). From it all things flow: by it (Sacchida all things are sustained; and into it all things are dissolved. All parts in the universe share in the life of this universal spirit and possess specific features on account of the special functions, which they have to perform (Buhler 1964: 25). As all spokes are contained in the axle, and in the felly of the wheel, thus also all beings and all gods, all worlds and all organs also are contained in the Self (Madhavananda 1983: 63). This metaphysical background makes Indian ethics of virtue ethico-metaphysical in naturea synthesis of intellectual understanding and self-realization. The highest good is the achievement of moksa or liberation, which means perfection, not in the theoretical sense of intellectual achievement, but in the practical sense of rising above all contradictions and uniting with the Absolute or

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Brahman. This realization of the oneness with Brahman is the ideal of man. Taittiriya Upanishad -na -ra -mam mana-a -nandam, describes it as, pra s anti samr ddham amr tamThe delight of life and mind, the fullness of peace and eternity (Gambhirananda 1966: 270). Critics, however, raise the questionif all is One, how can we have moral relations? If the Absolute is perfection, what is the need for any effort to realize what is already accomplished? In answer we can say that if humans were really external to each other, then it is impossible to achieve the ethical ideal. If we are called upon to love our neighbour, it is because all are one in reality. Moks a literally means liberationliberation from bondage of our individual finite self to the identification with the infinite, eternal Self. To live in perfect goodness is to realize ones life in all (Jolly 1880: 20). The Absolute is present in a person only as a potentiality or a possibility; and it is ones primary duty to achieve this potentiality. It is the task of moral life, under the guidance of virtues, to eliminate the non-divine element, not by destroying it but by suffusing it with the divine spirit. Different systems of Indian philosophy stress the importance of ethics of virtue as the stepping stone to moks a. For example, the Upanishads stress the importance of knowledge as the means of salvation, but they do not advocate knowledge in the narrow sense of the term. The pursuit of knowledge has been advocated along with upholding of virtues. It has been urged that the Self cannot be gained by the knowledge of the Vedas, or by understanding or by learning, but by adherence to the eternal virtue. Dharma is also considered to be a part of structure of values or what W. Norman Brown calls the four motivations of human activity (the -rthas): dharma, artha, ka -ma and moks purus a a. -rtha The four-fold classification of the purus a must not be allowed to obscure the fact that there are in fact two dimensions of virtues that are quite

distinctthe temporal and the eternal, centring round dharma and moks a. Thus, dharma seems to imply temporal virtues or socially prescribed roles, along with two other dimensions of virtue aesthetic and sensual satisfactions, and economic pursuits. In principle, all three are dharma or ordinary norms or motivations, in contrast to the transcendent norm, moks a . Abundant metaphysical reference in this context encouraged some thinkers to hold that Indian ethics of virtue is merely transcendental in this widely vague sense. But a proper study of Indian ethics of virtue will reveal that it is not so. The virtues are primarily instrumental and indispensable for the well-being of man. Since ancient times Indian thinkers have been attracted by the quest of the inner self or atman, and spiritually advanced sages realized after deep meditation that this self or atman is Brahman or the Absolute. This fact enhances the dignity of human beings and so Indian ethics of virtue can rightly be said to be monistic and agent-centred since its primary concern is good qualities and moral character of the moral agent. Although agent-focused ethics of virtue emphasizes the character at the core of morality, it nonetheless is often charged with uncodifiability. It is often argued that agent-focused virtue ethics does not seem to provide us with exact and detailed guidance for action. But this charge is not applicable to an Indian ethics of virtue. We should accept that codifiability is always a matter of degree. On the one hand there are true moral generalizations in the Indian ethics of virtue; on the other hand it is very clearly seen in the Vedic prescriptions that Indian ethics of virtue pays equal importance to the aspect of practical guidance in daily life. So Indian ethics of virtue can be said to be agent-centred and agentbased simultaneously. In fact, the dynamic aspect of the ethics of virtue, which reflects an agent-based stance, is

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-s represented in the system of the varna ramadharmas, that is, virtues related to the varn a or -s class, and a rama or virtues related to a particular -s stage of life. The virtues of varn a and a rama together constitute the code of relative virtues, -s being related to the varn a and a rama respectively. They are to be distinguished from the common -dha -ran virtues of humans, called sa a-dharmas; these are the virtues that are obligatory to all equally, irrespective of class or station in life. The purpose of this classification of virtues is that two kinds of service are obligatory for each individual. First of all, one should pay off ones debt to the particular community in a specific way, according to ones own capabilities (social virtues). Besides community, one is also indebted to humankind in general for overall well-being and the oppor-dha -ran tunities of life. The sa a-dharmas and varna s ramadharma s together constitute the objective morality of the Indian ethics of virtue, that is, morality as represented in a code of external acts, which demand external confirmation. But objective morality is not enoughthe ethics of virtue demands that the individual look inwards into oneself and pays attention to inner purity and an inner ability to excel. Indian ethics of virtue professes an elaborate system of virtue along with practical schemes through the performance of which an individual can subordinate lower impulses to higher and spiritual ones and attain inner purification or cittas uddhi. But even this subjective purity is also not enough; it is only a means to moks a or Absolute Reality. In a sense, it is a supra-moral plane of being in which the individual becomes one with the Absolute and thus attains freedom from mere duty and obligation. The realization of the social self or [man qua social being] and, through it, the realization of the Supreme Self or [man qua Ideal Being] together makes a unique agent-based ethics of virtue.

Further, analysts have often argued that an Indian ethics of virtue encourages an anti-theory stance. It is noteworthy that, as seen earlier, Indian ethics is intimately connected with metaphysical systems and, accordingly, Indian ethics always tried to lay down codes and patterns of behaviour in accordance with their inherent metaphysical theories. But the hindrance to developing a moral theory of virtue in Indian ethics is due to the fact that the highest ideals of human life as well as the social ideals have been expressed in various ways by different systems. The situation seems to be more confusing when they seem to overlap and create vagueness. But the difficulties in forming an ethical theory should not be taken as a hindrance to form an ethics of virtue of Indian philosophical systems. This is an anthropocentric world where humans construct their own world, and establish their own relations with things and with others. In a sense all philosophical systems accept this position. In such a world we think of what is and what ought to be, what we must do and how we should behave. So it is obvious that we should believe in the concepts of general virtues and obligation to survive, interact and pass on to eternity. Critics often argue that an Indian ethics of virtue paves the path to fatalism because most classical Indian philosophers resolve the problem of human suffering and evil by taking recourse to the law of karma, which states that nothing can happen without a sufficient cause in the moral as well as in the physical world. Each life with all its pleasures and pains is the necessary result of the action of past lives and becomes in its turn the cause of future births. The fruits of action carry -ran over from one life to the next. The Br hada yaka Upanishad says: The soul passes at death to another body whose character is determined by its former deeds and thoughts and there is no interval between the end of one life and the beginning of next (Maitra 1963: 103).

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Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible? 95

But then, is an Indian ethics of virtue fatalistic? To answer this question we should try to understand what is meant by freedom. Freedom does not mean total absence of determination. To act with ever-changing motives would mean acting from impulse and such freedom will completely disrupt social life as it would imply that anyone can do anything at any time. So freedom should not be used as unrestricted licence, but as determined by oneself, that is, self-determination is determination by ones will or moral character, and not self-determination in general. So when we ask whether the law of karma results in fatalism, all we mean is whether it implies selfdetermination. If we confine our attention to a single life then it will omit self-determination, for it is evident that all good and evil that may befall a person cannot be explained by his or her present actions. But that is not the only option for explaining the discrepancy between virtue and success in life. We can very well conceive of ones continued existence in a series of lives, and this belief easily wards off the difficulty of fatalism. The law of karma not only demands that the events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes, but that there is perfect justice in the rewards and punishments that happen to us. The implication of this idea of reward and punishment is grounded in the moral view of the universe. When we consider the fact that virtue is not always rewarded in this life nor vice always punished, the belief in the continued existence of the self is forced upon us and we can rightly justify the Indian belief in transmigration of the soul. Thus, the law of karma and the belief in transmigration are the necessary postulates of the ethics of virtue of classical Indian philosophical systems. The Indian ethics of virtue should be given credit for laying the foundation of a universal ethics of virtue by trying to synthesize the ethics of communal good and the ethics of self-culture. The individual becomes a useful member of society

-s by performing a rama duties as well as common duties. Therefore, the Indian ethics of virtue is not an abstract scheme of ethical duties that apply nowhere; on the contrary, they seem to apply to each and every human being. It also seeks to combine ethical consequentialism with ethical disinterestedness, that is, it recognizes the purity of unconditional duties and at the same time provides moral significance to conditional duties. The utility of the varna system lies in the development of a certain sense of vocation, in whatever sphere the individual has found oneself. This sense of vocation is very important in inculcating stability and usefulness of any society, and for the dignity of the individual life. We can also hope that the -s varn a rama-dharmas will still be able to control the tendency of too much liberty, which is often resorted to in the guise of human rights. However, it may be pointed out here that it is very difficult to set rules in the domain of a personal ethics of virtue. No two beings are alike; their degrees of inner development are different from each other. We are all on different rungs on the ladder of lifeascending from the unconscious matter to absolute consciousness and spiritual progress has little to do with varna or -s a rama duties. A shoemaker may well be closer -hman. The Padma to sainthood than a proud Bra Puran a explains that during the present kali yuga -dras have the greater advantage u women and S because their duties are easily fulfilled, while it is almost impossible for princes and priests not to fail in their external obligations and in their dedication to inner advancement (Barlingay 1966: 98). The law of karma is often criticized as the weakest point in the Indian ethics of virtue. In its widely accepted form it is found to be false and misleading because it has been associated with enormous eschatological conceptions. Moreover, it has been applied unethically because it is conceived as operating in a rigid and mechanical way.

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It is not very clear why the universe is constituted on moral lines. It is noteworthy that it is in the works that manifest the spirit of earnestness that the tendency has been most marked to depart from the rigidity of the doctrine of karma and to grant a place to the grace of god, which is given freelynot according to merit. A verse in the - says: -ta Gi -si yaj juhosi dada -si yat Yad karos i yad as na Yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kurus ava madarpan am (Chinmayananda 1992: 585) (Whatever be thy work, thine eating, thy gift, thy mortification, make thou of it an offering to me, O son of Kunti. Thus, shalt thou be released from the bonds of works, fair or foul of fruit, thou shalt be delivered and come to me.) This quote does refer to gracea conception that transcends the domain of the law of karma. The dichotomy of temporal and eternal virtues often creates a problem in the Indian ethics of virtue. How can moks a be trans-moral and yet the experience of moks a regulative for morality? If the seers experience of the Supreme Reality transcends ordinary life, it is difficult to see the relevance of his experience for the realm of dharma or virtue. If the saints experience is in a transmoral realm, its only relevance to those still under the sway of morality would seem to be as a mentor -ra (the in the process of moving beyond samsa cycle of birth and death). If the achievement of moks a gives the seer credit both for the process -ra and also regulating life of transcending samsa in samsara, we have a departure of no small magnitude from a classical ethics of virtue. Thus, a great deal of controversy has centred round the question whether the virtues of the Indian ethics of virtue have intrinsic value, and whether an Indian ethics of virtue is at all possible. The Indian philosophical systems are quite

explicit in pointing out that virtues are only a prerequisite for philosophical enquiry and spiritual realization, while moks a is the highest good and the only intrinsic value. The meaning -ma karma in the of disinterested action or niska Bhagavad Gi ta is that, instead of actions having specified material goals, all actions have one and the same end, that is, perfection. In that case, we are bound to reach a point beyond ethics because from this point of view, all virtues are finite goalsto be eclipsed by the supreme ideal. Thus, if we strictly adhere to the Indian ethics of virtue, we are automatically led to the region beyond ethics. So morality becomes a footstool and virtues are converted to the gateway to moks a. Thus, the Indian ethics of virtue ultimately seems to aim at a goal that lies beyond the norms of ethics because ethics of virtue belongs to a world of relativitya world of claims and counterclaims, with its imperfections and contradictions. So long as one is content to belong here, one cannot attain perfection. Hence, there seems to be wide gulf between the complete realization of moks a and the life governed by virtues. So the question is often raised, is an Indian ethics of virtue possible? Moreover, it is often argued that we fail to draw a line between the various ascetic disciplines of the ethics of virtue and the philosophical notions that had grown simultaneously. The disciplines that later came to have a more strictly moral appearance were in some cases practised originally with the belief that they had magical efficacy. So the ethics of virtue had to deal with the lower sphere of experience. It serves as a platform over which one may climb to a position from which it becomes easier to reach the higher zone. When this position is reached, it is no longer needed. We can try to solve this problem in a positive manner. The Indian ethics of virtue can be treated as a practical pursuit whose object is to overcome the radical unrest of life The ultimate good of

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moks a helps one to see the importance of subordinating virtues to it. We should view virtues as intrinsically valuable. Duty for dutys sake or -ma karma alone is a psychological imposnis ka sibility. Virtues must always be instrumental the means to an endand the highest concept of virtue is that it is instrumental to moks a, to the supreme spiritual ideal rather than to any secular end. Moks a is related to the eternal virtues, the beautiful, the true and the good. These virtues may be realized and yet one may remain in ignorance. The highest service they can render is as handmaids to moks a. Moks a is seen to consist of these eternal, though not ultimate, virtues; but the ideal of moks a is not just a mere combination, but a creative synthesis, a new unity that includes yet transcends them. A jivanmukta person transcends all personal or subjective valuation. The seer engages in spontaneous and selfless service and works in a spirit of disinterestedness, which is rooted in all-encompassing love, resulting from complete enlightenment. We can conclude this discussion by saying that it is a unique feature of the Indian ethics of virtue that almost all virtues are conducive to spiritual development. They are necessary but insufficient conditions for spiritual life in India. Ethical activity and spiritual activity overlap as they are difficult to be delineated. Ethical activity is spiritual only when performed with the realization of its

relation to the inner spirit; or when directed to the realization of God or atman, inasmuch as spirit-tmanual activity is defined as the activity of a realization. If we take the Indian ethics of virtue as a new face in the milieu of contemporary ethical discourse in the way it has been depicted here as an anti-theory stanceits complex dynamics and transcendentalism all giving a new dimension then it is indeed the latest possibility. Thus, an Indian ethics of virtue transcends virtues at the corporeal level, but finds consummation in the transcendental realm where it is hardly differentiated from the metaphysical. Herein lies its uniqueness as different from the Aristotelian virtue ethics. In fact, there has been no ethics of virtue in the East as well as in the West until it was given the much-needed thrust by Elizabeth Anscombe, Foot, McIntyre and other virtue ethicists. It has been a matter of interpretation, whether or not Aristotle had an ethics of virtue, and we have taken a positive position. Similar is the case with the Indian ethics of virtue. It is really a matter of finding out whether Indian ethics fits in the jigsaw puzzle set by us in the name of a defined ethics of virtue. But certainly it is not a hazy or a nebulous situation. On the contrary, it is a very significant and critical issue, and deserves further investigation, interpretation and promotion.

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Irwin, Terence (trans.) (1985), Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a 13 (Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing Company). Jolly, Julius (1880), The Institute of Vis n u, in F.M. Muller, ed., The Sacred Books of the East (London: Oxford Clarendon Press). - ran Madhavananda, Swami (trans.) (1983), Br hada yaka Upanis ad II, 515, (Kolkata: Advaita As rama). Maitra, S.K. (1963), The Ethics of the Hindus (Kolkata: Calcutta University Press). Mukhopadhyay, G. (1960), Studies in the Upanis ads (Kolkata: Calcutta Oriental Press). Radhakrishnan, S. (1926), Hindu View of Life (London: Allen and Unwin).

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