CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II case # 6 set- A Bautista vs.

Juinio GR L-50908, 31 January 1984 En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on weekends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power." ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' " In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' " Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta). Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II case # 6 set- B G.R. No. 177807 & G.R. No. 177933 October 11, 2011 Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City G.R. No. 177807 Petitioners: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired) Respondents: City Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority G.R. No. 177933 Petitioners: Metro Manila Development Authority Respondents: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired)
Facts: Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located EDSA, Quezon City. A few years later, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. It required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request" subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands."The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power. Ruling: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution inthe legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow

to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.