ALFARO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No.140812; August 28, 2001; Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a helper/operator of private respondent since November 8, 1990. From November 23, 1993 until Decemb er 5, 1993, he took a sick leave. When he reported back to work on December 6, 1993, he was surprised to find out that another work er was recruited to take his place, and instead, he was transferred to [the] wrapping section where he was required to work with overtime up to 9:30 PM, f rom his regular working hours of from 7:00 a.m., to 4:00 p.m., despite the fact that he had just recovered from illness. On December 7, 1993, he was given a new assignment where the work was even more difficult[;] when he complained o[f] what he felt was rude treatment or sort of punishment since he was being exposed to hard labor notwithstanding his predicament of just coming from sickness, petitioner was told to look for another job because he was dismissed effective on said date, December 7, 1993, when petitioner was seeking his 13th month pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave pay [o]n the aft ernoon of the same day, he was ignored when he refused to sign documents which indicated that he was renouncing claims against private respondent. Befor e Christmas of 1993, petitioner sought private respondent to pay his 13th month pay and [his] 15 days sick leave pay, but he was told to come next year. On January 12, 1994, petitioner came to private respondent for his aforestated money claims. During that occasion, private respondent dangled to petitioner a check worth P3,000.00 which [would] be released to him, only if he [signed] the documents, being forced upon him to sign on December 7, 1993. Desperate for the money to support his subsistence, and against his will, petitioner was constrained to sign the said d ocuments which contained no amount of money released to him. The actual sum of money received by petitioner from private respondent amounted to P3,000.00 in the form of check, while his claims for 15 days sick leave pay was secured by him from the Social Security System. "The documents forced upon th e petitioner to sign were a 'resignation letter, and a Release and Quit Claim'. 'To the Personal Manager Mr. Michael Philip Elizalde Star Paper Corporation 46 Joy St., Grace Village, Q.C. Dear Sir, Ako po si Candido Alfaro ay nagbibigay ng aking resignation letter dahilan po sa aking sakit. Umaasa po ako na mabigyan ng tulong. Lubos na gumagalang (sgd) Candido Alfaro'

As submitted by private respondent in its pleadings on record, petitioner allegedly tendered said resignation letter on January 12, 1994, on the basis of which, the former maintains that the latter was not illegally dismissed, was paid [his] separation pay of P8,455.50, and t hat he voluntarily resigned from his job effective January 12, 1994. Labor Arbiter found for the private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court likewise ruled in favor of the private respondent, that petitioner was not illegally dismissed and that he voluntarily resigned. Hence, this recourse. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed. 2) Whether or not petitioner did not voluntarily resign from work. HELD: No to both. The factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, reveal that petitioner resigned fr om his work due to his illness, with the understanding that private respondent would give him separation pay. Unfortunately, it seems that private respondent did not keep its promise to grant the separation pay, prompting petitioner to institute the present action for illegal dismissal. It was only for this reason that the Court gave due course to this Petition. Generally, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay. In the present case, however, upon the request of petitioner, private respondent agreed to a scheme whereby the former would receive separation pay despite having resigned voluntarily. Thus, the terms and conditions they both agreed upon constituted a contract freely entered into, which should be performed in good faith, as it constituted the law between the parties. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned, simply because of a change of mind The position tak en by petitioner on the alleged illegal dismissal was vacillating and indecisive, as correctly found by the labor arbiter who provided a ratiocination on the matter as follows: "Thus, after a careful perusal of the evidence on hand, we are of the opinion that the position taken by the respondent corporation is more credible than that of complainant. This is evident from the fact that the complaint filed by complainant on June 14,1996, or more than two (2) years from his alleged dismissal on December 7, 1993, was only payment of separation pay. It was only on August 1, 1996 when complainant abandoned his claim for separation pay and instead filed an amended complaint claiming that he was, illegally dismissed. "To our mind, therefore, the foregoing coupled with the fact that there is practically no evidence on record which shows that complainant was pressured and made to sign a resignation letter and Release and Quitclaim against his will [and] better judgment only shows t hat his claim of illegal dismissal is unsubstantiated and is a mere afterthought. "Moreover, if indeed complainant was illegally dismissed, he should have pursued his claim against the respondent corporation by immediately filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. As it is, however, complainant filed a complaint for separation pay against the respondent corporation only after two (2) years from his alleged dismissal which complaint was amended for the purpose of claiming illegal dismissal almost two (2) months thereafter." Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. As discussed above, petitioner negotiated for a resignation with separation pay as the manner in which his employment relations with private respondent would end. He was already suffering from a lingering illness at the time he tendered his resignation. His continued employment would have been detrimental not only to his health, but also to his performance as an employee of private respondent. Hence, the termination of the employment relations of petitioner with private respondent was ultimately, if not outrightly inevitable. Resignation with separation pay was the best option for him under the circumstances. Rightly so, this was the mode adopted and agreed upon by the parties, as evidenced by the Release and Quitclai m petitioner executed in connection with his resignation. Clearly then, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed cannot be sustained, considering that his voluntary res ignation has been indubitably established as a fact by the three tribunals below. Indeed, illegal dismissal and voluntary resignation are adversely opposed modes of terminating employment relations, in that the presence of one precludes that of the other. Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the

established facts and applicable law and doctrine. An employee who resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally estopped from filing any further

INTERTROD MARITIME INC. and TROODOS SHIPPING CO. Vs. NLRC G. R. No. 81097 June 19, 1991 Padilla J. FACTS: On 10 May 1982, private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with petitioner Troodos Shipping Company as principal and petitioner Intertrod Maritime, Inc., as agent to serve as Third Engineer on board the M/T "BREEDEN" for a period of twelve (12) month. He eventually boarded a sister vessel, M/T "AFAMIS" and proceeded to work as the vessel's Third Engineer under the same terms and conditions of his employment contract previously referred to. On 26 August 1982, while the ship (M/T "Afamis") was at Port Pylos, Greece, private respondent requested for relief, due to "personal reason." The Master of the ship approved his request but informed private respondent that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty (30) days notice in view of the Clause 5 of the employment contract so that a replacement for him could be arranged. Only four days after the request for relief, while the vessel was at Port Said in Egypt, the Master signed off the private respondent. The Master paid him in cash all amounts due him less the amount of US$780.00 for his repatriation expenses, as evidenced by the wages account signed by the private respondent. On his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board (NSB)(now POEA) charging petitioners for breach of employment contract and violation of NSB rules and regulations. He alleged that his request for relief was made in order to take care of a Filipino member of the crew of M/T "AFAMIS" who was hospitalized on 25 August 1982 in Athens, Greece. However, the Master of the ship refused to let him immediately disembark in Greece so that the reason for his request for relief ceased to exist. Hence, when the Master of the ship forced him to step out in Egypt despite his protestations to the contrary, there being no more reason to request for relief, an illegal dismissal occurred and he had no other recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense. POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. However, on appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and ruled against the employer. The NLRC held that the immediate approval of private respondent's request for relief should have resulted in his disembarkati on in Port Pylos, Greece; that failure of the Master to allow disembarkation in Greece nullified the request for relief and its approval, such that private respondent's subsequent disembarkation in Egypt is no longer his doing but rather an illegal dismissal on the part of the Master.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employee Ernesto dela Cruz was illegally terminated. HELD: NO. The resolution of the NLRC fails to consider the clear import of the provisions of the employment contract between the employ er and employee. Under the provisions of the employment contract, private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz was required by the employment contract not only to pay his own repatriation expenses but also to give thirty (30) days notice should he decide to terminate his employment prior to the expiration of the period provided in the contract. When the Master approved his request for relief, the Master emphasized that private respondent was required to give thirty (30) days notice and to shoulder his own repatriation expenses. Approval of his request for relief, therefore, did not constitute a waiver by petitioners of the provisions of the contract. The Court also did not sustain the claim of Dela Cruz that his request for relief was only for the reason of taking care of a fellow member of the crew so much so that when he was not allowed to disembark in Port Pylos, Greece, the reason no longer existed and, therefore, when he was forced to "sign off" at Port Said, Egypt even when he signified intentions of continuing his work, he was illegally dismissed. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment." The employer has no control over resignations and so, the notification requirement was devised in order to ensure that no disruption of work would be involved by reason of the resignation. This practice has been recognized because "every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits by adopting a device or means designed towards that goal." Once a voluntary resignation has been accepted, it may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. In the instant c ase, the Master had already accepted the resignation and, although the private respondent was being required to serve the thirty (30) days notice provided in the contract, his resignation was already approved. Private respondent cannot claim that his resignation ceased to be effective because he was not immediately discharged in Port Pylos, Greece, for he could no longer unilaterally withdraw such resignation. When he later signified his intention of continuing his work, it was already up to the petitioners to accept his withdrawal of his resignation. The mere fact that they did not accept such withdrawal did not constitute illegal dismissal for acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation was their (petitioners') sole prerogative. Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, as in this case, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. Under the terms of the employment contract, it is the ship's Master who determines where a seaman requesting relief may be "signed off." It is, therefore, erroneous for private respondent to claim that his resignation was effective only in Greece and that because he was not immediately allowed to disembark. LABOR STANDARDS Termination of Employment in Greece (as the employer wanted compliance with the contractual conditions for termination on the part of the employee), th e resignation was to be deemed automatically withdrawn. The decision of the NLRC is therefore set aside. To sustain it would be to authorize undue oppression of the employer. After all, "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer."

LABOR STANDARDS Termination of Employment money claims against the employer arising from the employment. However, private respondent has not complied with its obligation to give petitioner's separation pay in the amount of P8,542.50. It was this deliberate withholding of monetary benefits that necessitated the long, litigious and lethar gic proceedings in this case. Had private respondent simply paid the measly amount of P8,452.50 as separation pay to petitioner, this legal controversy could have been avoided and the court dockets unclogged.

BLUE ANGEL MANPOWER AND SECURITY SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMEL CASTILLO, WILSON CIRIACO, GARY GARCES, AND CHESTERFIELD MERCADER, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Blue Angel, a messengerial and security agency, hired private respondents Romel Castillo, Wilson Ciriaco, Gary Garces, and Chesterfield Mercader as security guards and detailed them at the National College of Business and Arts (NCBA) in Cubao, Quezon City. On April 20, 1999, Castillo and Mercader, later joined by Ciriaco and Garces, filed a complaint for illegal deductions and other money claims against Blue Angel. Eventually, they amended their complaint to include illegal dismissal. According to the four guards, they were required, while still with Blue Angel, to work from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. without overtime and premium holiday pay, among other benefits. They also alleged receiving only PhP 5,000 a month or PhP 166 per day and, from this amount, Blue Angel deducted PhP 100 as cash bond. They further averred that Blue Angel, when apprised of their original complaint, illegally terminated Garces and Ciriaco on April 11 and 12, 1999, respectively, and Castillo and Mercader on April 28, 1999. The four guards prayed for (1) payment of backwages, wage differentials, premium and overtime pay for holidays, and 13th month pay; (2) reimbursement of their cash bond; (3) reinstatement or separation pay; and (4) damages. Blue Angel, for its part, denied the charges of illegal dismissal. It alleged that, on two occasions, the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Security Force of NCBA, Reynaldo Dayag, reported that the four complaining guards had, while on guard duty detail with the school, committed several infractions, among them: insubordination, sleeping while on duty, and absence without leave (AWOL). When summoned to explain their side on the derogatory report, only Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces, according to Blue Angel, showed up, but not Mercader who had since stopped reporting for work and thus considered on AWOL. Continuing, Blue Angel alleged that when told that they would be subjected to an investigation, Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces pleaded that they be allowed to resign instead. The three, so Blue Angel claimed, then tendered theirproforma letters of resignation followed by handwritten resignation letters in the nature of quitclaims. To refute the guards' claims of non-payment of what was due them, Blue Angel presented the payrolls and vouchers from July 1997 to April 1999 that showed the four guards' respective gross salaries and deductions. In a Decision[2] dated May 31, 2000, the labor arbiter, in part, found for the guards, Blue Angel being ordered to immediately reinstate them with backwages. The dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Blue Angel Security and Manpower Services, Inc. to immediately reinstate the complainants to their former positions pursuant to the ruling in the Pioneer Texturing case that an order of reinstatement is selfexecutory even pending appeal. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay the backwages of the complainants tentatively computed as follows: Rommel Castillo Wilson Ciriaco Gary Garces Chesterfield Mercader Php 82,971.00 Php 86,139.00 Php 86,337.00 Php 82,971.00

SO ORDERED. Dissatisfied, Blue Angel, on one hand, and Castillo, et al., on the other, interposed separate appeals to the NLRC, the former faulting the labor arbiter mainly for his finding that the four guards in question were illegally dismissed. The guards, for their part, took exception to the arbiter's holding that some items of their money claim had already been paid. By the Decision dated May 9, 2001, the NLRC affirmed with modification that of the labor arbiter. The NLRC predicated its modificatory action on the finding that Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces were not terminated from the service as they had indeed voluntarily resigned, and that only Mercader was illegally dismissed. In net effect, the NLRC ruled that, of the four complaining guards, only Mercader deserved to be reinstated with backwages as he was the only one dismissed illegally. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification only in so far as the dismissal of the complaints filed by Romel Castillo, [Wilson] Ciriaco and Gary Garces; the judgment arrived at in the case of complainant Chesterfield Mercader is hereby Affirmed. All other reliefs herein sought and prayed for are DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[3] According to the NLRC, the two sets of letters of resignation, the pro-formaresignations and the handwritten resignations, were never disputed. Besides, the NLRC reasoned, the fact that the later resignation letters were handwritten in Pilipino, a dialect known to them, militated against the claims of Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces that they were coerced and pressured to writing the letters. On certiorari before the CA, the CA first noted that Blue Angel did not appeal the portion of the NLRC Decision affirming the labor arbiter's ruling that Mercader was illegally dismissed; hence, said portion of the decision of the labor arbiter became final and binding on Blue Angel.

Now to the case of Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces. In its February 26, 2003 Decision, the CA found incredulous the claim of Blue Angel that the guards pleaded that they be allowed to resign and had voluntarily resigned after they were told that an investigation would ensue. The CA concluded that Blue Angel had illegally terminated Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces. The fallo of its Decision reads: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May 9, 2001 is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE except insofar as it sustained the labor arbiter's ruling that petitioner Chesterfield Mercader was illegally dismissed, with the result that the decision of the labor arbiter dated May 31, 2000 is reinstated. SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: WON private respondents were illegally dismissed. HELD: We rule that the resignations were involuntary and the termination of private respondents was illegal. Blue Angel insists that the guards had pleaded to be allowed to resign when they were told of the pending investigation, and that they eventually tendered their pro-formaresignation letters followed by their own handwritten resignation letters. Our review of the circumstances surrounding these resignation letters does not support Blue Angel's contentions that these letters are indications that private respondents had voluntarily resigned. We agree with the labor arbiter when he pointed out that the undated, similarly worded resignation letters tended to show that the guards were made to copy the pro-forma letters, in their own hand, to make them appear more convincing that the guards had voluntarily resigned. As the labor arbiter noted, the element of voluntariness of the resignations is even more suspect considering that the second set of resignation letters were pre-drafted, similarly worded, and with blank spaces filled in with the effectivity dates of the resignations. [5] In their Comment, private respondents claimed being forced to sign and copy the pro-forma resignation letters and quitclaims on pain that they would not get their remaining compensations.[6] We are more inclined to believe the dismissed guards. Other circumstances have been aptly pointed out by respondents-guards in their Comment that we are wont to agree that they were forced into a situation where to refuse to sign the resignation letters and quitclaims meant loss of money for the immediate and urgent basic needs of their family. To buttress the conclusion that the resignation letters were involuntary on the part of the guards, we find convincing the circumstances mentioned in the Comment of respondents-guards. For one, it seemed unlikely and improbable that Garces and Ciriaco would voluntarily resign on April 26, 1999 when they had 15 and 12 days earlier, or on April 11 and 12, 1999, already been terminated. Then again, it was likewise inconsistent and implausible that Castillo would voluntarily tender his resignation and sign a quitclaim on April 28, 1999, when Mercader and he had in fact already filed a complaint against Blue Angel with the NLRC regarding illegal deductions of their salary eight days earlier, or on April 20, 1999.[7] Lastly, there is nothing on record showing that Blue Angel provided any proof that Castillo, Ciriaco, and Garces had indeed committed the infractions attributed to them. Blue Angel merely enumerated the offenses without providing particulars as to the date and place these infractions were committed. Neither did Blue Angel present written notices, warnings, and affidavits of the OIC to support its allegations against the guards. We are not unaware that the execution of the resignation letters was undisputed, but the aforementioned circumstances of this case and the fact that private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal from employment against Blue Angel completely negate the claim that private respondents voluntarily resigned.[8] Well-entrenched is the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.[9] To constitute resignation, the resignation must be unconditional with the intent to operate as such. There must be clear intention to relinquish the position. In this case, private respondents actively pursued their illegal dismissal case against Blue Angel such that they cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned from their jobs. With the finding that private respondents were illegally dismissed, they are entitled to reinstatement to their positions without loss of their seniority rights and with full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time private respondents' compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement as provided for in Article 279 of the Labor Code. As the law now stands, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and reinstatement. They are entitled to reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, and backwages. [10] The award of one does not preclude the other as the Court had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.[11] Where an employee would have been entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, but circumstances, i.e., strained relationships, make reinstatement impossible, the more equitable disposition would be to award separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, in addition to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time the employee's compensation was withheld up to the time of the employee's actual reinstatement.[12] As to the other money claims of private respondents, the vouchers,[13] payrolls,[14]and other documentary evidence[15] show that the other monetary benefits being claimed by private respondents have already been duly paid. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67478 reinstating the Decision dated May 31, 2000 of the labor arbiter is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Blue Angel Security and Manpower Services, Inc. is ordered to reinstate complainants Romel Castillo, Wilson Ciriaco, and Gary Garces to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their compensations were withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatements. In the event reinstatement is not feasible, they shall be paid separation pay in the amount equivalent to at least one month pay or one month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. With respect to Chesterfield Mercader, the NLRC Decision dated May 9, 2001, affirming the labor arbiter's Decision dated May 31, 2000 which ordered petitioner to reinstate him to his former position and pay him backwages of PhP 82,971, had become final on November 2, 2001, in the

absence of an appeal thereon to the CA. SO ORDERED.

VICENTE VS. CA This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 2006 [1] and December 13, 2006,[2] respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88140 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated June 21, 2004[3] and its Resolution dated October 14, 2004,[4] and declared that petitioner was not constructively dismissed but voluntarily resigned from her employment. The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner Finina E. Vicente was employed by respondent Cinderella Marketing Corporation (Cinderella) as Management Coordinator in January 1990. Prior to her resignation in February 2000, she held the position of Consignment Operations Manager with a salary of P27,000.00 a month.[5] She was tasked with the oversight, supervision and management of the Consignment Department dealing directly with Cinderellas consignors.[6] Petitioner alleged that it has been a practice among the employees of Cinderella to obtain cash advances by charging the amount from the net sales of Cinderellas suppliers/consignors. Mr. Miguel Tecson (AVP-Finance) approves the requests for cash advances, Mr. Arthur Coronel (AVP-Merchandising) issues the memos instructing the accounting department to issue the corporate checks and finally, Ms. Theresa Santos (General Manager) rediscounts them by issuing her personal checks. [7] After some time, one of Cinderellas suppliers complained about the unauthorized deductions from the net sales due them. Accordingly, an investigation was conducted and upon initial review of respondents business records, it appears that petitio ner was among those involved in the irregular and fraudulent preparation and encashment of respondents corporate checks amounting to at least P500,000.00.[8] Petitioner alleged that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation on several occasions. On February 15, 2000, Mr. Tecson allegedly told her MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI, in the presence of Lizz Villafuerte, the Accounting Manager. [9] As a result of this alleged force and intimidation, petitioner tendered her resignation letter. On January 13, 2003, or three years after her resignation, petitioner filed a complaint against Cinderella alleging that her severance from employment was involuntary amounting to constructive dismissal.[10] Cinderella denied the charge of constructive dismissal. It claimed that petitioner voluntarily resigned from office before the internal audit was completed and before any formal investigation was initiated. She tendered her resignation on February 7, 2000, then submitted another resignation letter on February 15, 2000 where she confirmed the first resignation letter. Respondent alleged that the complaint for constructive dismissal was a mere afterthought demonstrated by the long delay of filing the same. [11] On October 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[12] finding that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Cinderella was not able to controvert petitioners assertion that she was forced to resign; that the resignation letter relied upon by respondent to show the voluntariness of the resign ation was fabricated and without evidentiary weight since it does not bear petitioners signature; that there was no basis to terminate petitioner on the ground of loss of confidence since her involvement in the fraudulent transactions was doubtful as shown by the Confidential Memo clearing her of any liability. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Cinderella Marketing Corporation to: 1. pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement computed at one (1) month for every year of service in the amount of P270,000.00; and 2. pay complainant full backwages from the time she filed this complaint in the amount of P270,000.00. SO ORDERED.[13] On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that the statement of Mr. Tecson informing petitioner, to wit: MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI, was the proximate cause for petitioners decision to resign. Thus, the resignation cannot be deemed voluntary notwithstanding the execution of the two resignation letters. Respondent companys motion for reconsideration was denied hence, it filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the C ourt of Appeals. On August 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision finding that the totality of evidence on record showed that petitioner voluntarily resigned from her employment; that the subsequent acts of petitioner belie the claim of constructive dismissal; that after the alleged forced resignation, petitioner attended the meetings concerning her involvement in the anomalous transactions and even arranged for the settlement of her consequent liabilities as may be determined during the investigation; that the belated filing of the complaint militates against petitioner because it is hardly expected from an aggrieved employee to wait three years before instituting the case.

The dispositive portion of the Decision provides: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents complaint a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.[14] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[15] Petitioner asserts the following: (1) The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not correctible by certiorari and are binding on the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that they are completely without any support in the evidence on record. (2) In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion, intimidation or other factors that vitiate the free will. (3) The NLRC correctly gave credence to petitioners allegation that Mr. Tecson demanded her resi gnation. (4) The delay in filing the complaint for illegal dismissal cannot be taken against her as the same was filed within the prescriptive period allowed by law to file such actions. The petition lacks merit. The primary issue in the case at bar is factual: whether petitioner was constructively dismissed. Petitioner claims that her separation from employment was a case of constructive dismissal. On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner voluntarily resigned. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for reversing the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC that she was constructively dismissed relying on the principle of finality and conclusiveness of the decisions of the labor tribunals. However, it is well-settled that for want of substantial basis, in fact or in law, factual findings of an administrative agency, such as the NLRC, cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to it, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not exempt from the judicial review when so warranted.[16] In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [17] The Court of Appeals may review the factual findings of the NLRC and reverse its ruling if it finds that the decision of the NLRC lacks substantial basis. In the same vein, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally not subject to this Courts review under Rule 45. However, the general rule on the conclusiveness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is also subject to well-recognized exceptions such as where the Court of Appeals findings of facts contradict those of the lower court, or the administrative bodies, as in this case. [18] All these considered, we are compelled to make a further calibration of the evidence at hand. Petitioner argues that the employer bears the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. We agree that in termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.[19] In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad,[20] the Court ruled that should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as in the present case, it is still incumbent upon respondent company to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. From the totality of evidence on record, it was clearly demonstrated that respondent Cinderella has sufficiently discharged its burden to prove that petitioners resignation was voluntary. In voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. [21] To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.[22] Petitioner relinquished her position when she submitted the letters of resignation. The resignation letter submitted on February 15, 2000 confirmed the earlier resignation letter she submitted on February 7, 2000. The resignation letter contained words of gratitude which can hardly come from an employee forced to resign.[23] The NLRC cannot disregard the resignation letter dated February 15, 2000 on the allegation that its submission was a product of an unintelligent and confused decision due to the disdain shown by Mr. Tecson absent any sufficient proof of force or intimidation. Likewise, it was erroneous for the Labor Arbiter not to give evidentiary weight on the resignation letter on the ground that it was fabricated as it was not signed by petitioner. A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows that it bears the signature of petitioner. More importantly, petitioner admitted having submitted the said letter, albeit, due to an alleged intimidation. Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also, though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period, its belated

filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a mere afterthought. [24] Taken together, these circumstances are substantial proof that petitioners resignation was voluntary. Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the argument that it is the employer who bears the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal[25] with clear, positive, and convincing evidence.[26] Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive dismissal. Petitioner contends there was an orchestrated plan to intimidate her into resigning to exculpate other officers of the company from the anomaly; and that in the course of the internal investigation, Mr. Tecson forced her to resign by saying, Mag-resign ka na. Maiipit kami. Allegedly, this caused confusion and fear which led to her uninformed decision of tendering the resignation letter on February 15, 2000. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was grave error on the part of the NLRC to rely on the allegation that Mr. Tecson threatened and forced petitioner to resign. Other than being unsubstantiated and self-serving, the allegation does not suffice to support the finding of force, intimidation, and ultimately constructive dismissal. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. [27] In St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] we ruled that mere allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. We enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as follows: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. x x x[29] None of the above requisites was established by petitioner. Other than the allegation that Mr. Tecson intimidated petitioner into resigning, there were no other proofs presented to support a finding of forced resignation to stand against respondents denial and proof against dismissal. Neither can we consider the conduct of audits and other internal investigations as a form of harassment against petitioner. Said investigation was legitimate and justified, conducted in view of the discovery of the anomalous transaction involving the employees of the respondent including petitioner. Moreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position with a salary of P27,000.00 a month. Hence, she is not an ordinary employee with limited understanding such that she would be easily maneuvered or coerced to resign against her will. [30] Thus, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not constructively dismissed by respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88140 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the NLRC and declared that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not constructively dismissed from her employment, and consequently ordered the dismissal of the complaint for constructive dismissal, as well as the Resolution dated December 13, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, petitioner, vs. BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent. FACTS: Respondent Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner School as high school teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a study leave for six months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter dated June 2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon, principal of the high school department, told Villas that her request for study leave was granted for one school year subject to the following conditions: 1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends on March 31, 1996; 2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the School; 3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be submitted upon return on April 1, 1996; 4. Faculty Manual Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of Leave of Absence should be observed: a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in employment outside the institution, the administration shall regard the faculty member on leave as resigned; b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for by the faculty member and granted by administration is twelve (12) months. If, at the lapse of the period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the administration shall regard the faculty member as resigned.4

Respondent alleged that she intended to utilize the first semester of her study leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philippine Women s University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push through so she took up an Old Testament course in a school of religion and at the same time utilized her free hours selling insurance and cookware to augment her familys income. However, during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to justify her study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden Gate Colleges and a letter explaining why she took up an Old Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral class during the first semester. On June 3, 1996, the President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote her, stating that her failure to enroll during the first semester was a violation of the conditions of the study leave and that the reasons she advanced for failure to enroll during the first semester were not acceptable, thus: In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first that you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree before applying and securing the approval of your leave by the School. In the second place, you should have informed the School at once that you could not enroll in the first semester so that your leave could have been adjusted for only one-half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-time business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is sufficient justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the Faculty Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester of your study leave without informing the School beforehand constitutes deception, to say the least, which is not a good example to the other teachers.5 Her case was subsequently referred to the grievance committee, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, and the report was submitted on July 12, 1996, both to the union and the School. However, since the grievance committee could not reach a decision, the case was referred for voluntary arbitration. Respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal and the case was assigned to VA Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally dismissed, thus: WHEREFORE premises considered, we rule that complainant Mrs. BELEN P. VILLAS was illegally dismissed from her employment by respondent, and as prayed for, respondent COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA is hereby ordered to reinstate Mrs. Belen P. Villas to her former position or job in said school without loss of seniority and with full backwages and other monetary benefits effective the start of school year 1996-1997 up to the time she is reinstated.6 Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. This was denied. Thus, this petition for review. The sole issue is whether or not respondents alleged violation of the conditions of the study grant constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination from petitioner School. Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of respondent was lawful inasmuch as (a) the requirements of due process were followed and (b) she not only violated several lawful regulations but also breached her contractual obligations to the School. All this constituted a valid ground for her dismissal. In assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner School basically questions the court a quos findings of fact on respondents alleged violation of petitioner Schools policy on study leave grants. The petition has no merit. Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect).7 The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.8 In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and procedural aspects were not satisfied. According to petitioner, respondent violated the following conditions of her study leave: (a) she failed to report for work on April 1, 1996, the day after the lapse of her leave period, which was violative of Section 40 of the Faculty Manual; (b) she failed to submit proof of her studies during the first semester of her leave period, suggesting that she was not enrolled during this period; and (c) she engaged in employment outside the School. In sum, petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not only the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual obligation) but also the Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty of serious misconduct which was a ground for termination. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that there was no violation of the conditions of the study leave grant. Thus, respondent could not be charged with serious misconduct warranting her dismissal as a teacher in petitioner School. Petitioner has failed to convince us that the three alleged violations of the study leave grant constituted serious misconduct which justified the termination of respondents em ployment. Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. 9 Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or

unimportant.10 Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination, as held in some of our decisions, include: sexual harassment (the managers act of fondling the hands, massaging the shoulder and caressing the nape of a secretary); 11 fighting within company premises;12 uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior;13 misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and intimidating a co-teacher to change that students failing grade to passing.14 In this light, the alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered serious misconduct. With regard to respondents alleged failure to report for work on April 1, 1996 and failure to enroll during the first semester, the Court o f Appeals and the Voluntary Arbitrator found that she did in fact report for work on April 1, 1996 and that she was in fact enrolled during the first semester. Wellsettled is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. And they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-finding body, in this case the Voluntary Arbitrator.15 Likewise, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.16 Assuming arguendo that she did fail to report for work on April 1, 1996 and enroll during the first semester, the most respondent could be charged with was simple misconduct. In both instances, there was evidence of substantial compliance by respondent. Her alleged failure to report for work exactly on April 1, 1996 is not equivalent to "failure to return for work," a sanctionable offense under the Faculty Manual. As correctly pointed out by the VA, petitioner failed to establish that there was a distinct and definite assignment that needed to be done personally by respondent, and specifically on April 1, 1996, which she failed to do on said date. Although we give credence to petitioners argument that a private high school teacher still has work at the end of the schoolyear to assist in the graduation preparations and in the beginning of the school year to assist in the enrollment such tasks cannot be considered a teachers main duties, the failure to perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment. Besides, there is no disagreement that respondent reported for work on May 15, 1996 at which time petitioner School could have asked her to assist in the enrollment period. At most, respondent failed to help out during the preparations for graduation and this, to us, was not a significant reason for terminating or dismissing her from her job. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first semester, although we agree with the President and Rector, Fr. Mendez, that respondent should have first ascertained whether she was still eligible to study at the PWU before applying for a study leave,17 such lapse was more of an error in judgment rather than an act of serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her study leave for other unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to believe, she would not have enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges during the second semester. Yet she did, as borne out by the certification18 prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges. Furthermore, we find that respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in employment outside the school as specified in her study leave grant and as provided in the Faculty Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual19 states: a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in employment outside the institution, the administration shall regard the faculty member on leave resigned. (Emphasis supplied) We find the provision of the Faculty Manual ambiguous as the term "employment" connotes a number of meanings. Employment in its general sense connotes any work or service rendered in exchange for money. The loose connotation of employment may therefore cover jobs without an employer-employee relationship. However, inasmuch as in this case, petitioner School drafted the said policy, the term "employment" should be strictly construed against it.20 Moreover, it is a settled rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the formers favor .21 The act of respondent in selling insurance and cookware was not the "employment" prohibited by the Faculty Manual. The prohibition against outside employment was enacted to prevent the teacher from using the study leave period for unsanctioned purposes since the School pays the teacher while pursuing further studies. That rationale was not violated by respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and cookware could not have prevented her in any way from studying and, more importantly, she was not being paid by the School while on leave. How did the school expect her and her family to survive without any income for one whole year? Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid dismissal. As earlier noted, the law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed two written notices before terminating his employment. Considering that these notices are mandatory, the absence of one renders any management decision to terminate null and void. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice which should have informed the latter of the formers intention to dismiss her. Petitioner argues that it complied with this requirement as there were several exchanges of communication between the School and respondent regarding the cause of her termination. However, we find that these letters did not apprise respondent that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School as said letters only required respondent to submit proof of enrollment. The letter of Principal Angelina Q. Quiatchon dated April 17, 1996 22 was worded as follows: In accordance with the terms of your study leave from June 5, 1995 to March 31, 1996, you must submit credentials/proofs of your study to justify the approved leave.

To this date, April 17, this office has not received your credentials. Please do so within the next three days from receipt hereof so that this office can act accordingly. Similarly, the May 10, 1996 letter23 of the Academic Affairs Director, Dr. Rhodora G. Odejar, was worded thus: The Academic Affairs Office has received your certification of graduate studies completed in the second semester of Schoolyear 1995-1996. However, there is no report as to how you utilized your leave in the first semester. You are therefore instructed to submit your report on the matter within three days from receipt hereof. The next letter from the petitioner, dated June 3, 1996, already informed respondent that she was considered resigned effective schoolyear 19961997. These letters did not comply with the requirements of the law that the first written notice must apprise the employee that his termination is being considered due to a certain act or omission. These letters merely required petitioner to submit proof of her studies and respondent could not have reasonably inferred from them that her dismissal was being considered by the petitioner. The fact that there was a hearing conducted by the grievance committee pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement did not work in petitioners favor because this was done after petitioner had informed respondent that she was already considered resigned from her teaching job. Besides, the rights of an employee to be informed of his proposed dismissal are personal to him24 and, therefore, the notice to the union was not notice to the employee. With regard to the respondents claim for the six-month study leave and vacation pay, we affirm the decision25 of the Voluntary Arbitrator that respondent is not entitled to such benefits: While it is true that the collective bargaining agreement between respondent and complainants union provides for six months pay for qualified teachers who will go on sabbatical or study leave, the same was expressly waived by complainant when she signed conforme to the letter dated June 2, 1995 approving her study leave which states among others, to wit: 2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the school. And considering that her leave of absence for the whole school year 1995 1996 was presumed to be a leave of absence without pay, then she did not earn her vacation leave incentive for the next coming summer. We find it just, fair and reasonable to grant vacation pay on April and May of every calendar as additional incentive only to those teachers who rendered continuous service to the Collegio the preceding school year. We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrators decision that respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees because there is no evidence showing that bad faith or malice attended the dismissal of respondent. Moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud, or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. A dismissal may be contrary to law but, by itself alone, it does not necessarily establish bad faith.26 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.