SARITA, KIRSTY E. PALACIOS VS.

PALACIOS FACTS: Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios. On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitime. After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs againstpetitioner. From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, and accordingly, the record was elevated to this Court. It should be noted that petitioner instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will availing himself of the provisions of Article 838, para graph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such petition one Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her legitime. In other words, Maria Catimbang does not object to the probate of the will insofar as its due execution is concerned or on the ground that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will. We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death. ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid. RULING: This is in line with our ruling in Montaanovs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein we said: "The authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated." On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator it does, not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.

Should he, make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance, to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in order" (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code). It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an acknowledged natural daughter of the testator. This is an extraneous matter which should be threshed out in a separate action. Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. NUGUID VS NUGUID FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity. ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited, thereby rendering the holographic will void whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will. RULING: The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states: The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. DELA CRUZ VS FABIE FACTS: The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. Six children were born to them during their overture they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre. All these parcels are registered in their names. They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets. The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the Silay Hacienda, their conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in Bacolod City. The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant started living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at2nd Street, Bacolod City. After 1955 up to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode, and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. He has abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with his concubine, NenitaHernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect the existence of illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. C, also written by Nenita.Immediately after her husband departed for Manila the following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for Baguio, where she learned thatNenita had actually stayed at the Patria Inn, but had already left for Manila before her arrival. The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the action, he started to live separately from his wife. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the children. ISSUES: (1) Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties? (2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets? RULING: We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. We believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was only P500monthly. There is good reason to believe, however, that she and the children received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children continued to draw from his office more than P500monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently played Mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to spare. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulatedin marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code,

Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it mayonly be ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared that the defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their various business concerns. Although she did not allege, much less prove, that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties; she averred nevertheless that her husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine, hence, the urgency of separation of property. The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that the has applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his time, to the management, maintenance and expansion of their business concerns, even as his wife threw money away at the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which he himself drove at the time of their marriage, he had built upon business after another, the Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press, the Philippine TexboardFactory, and miscellaneous other business enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the spouses now own have been acquired through his diligence, intelligence and industry; that he has steadily expanded the income and assets of said business enterprises from year to year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as proved by his balance sheet and profit and loss statements for the year 1958and 1959 (exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he had purchased additional equipment and machineries and has partially paid their indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines. The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of administration.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. OGAWA VS MENIGISHI FACTS: Petitioner Rosea Fontelar Ogawa and respondent Elizabeth Gache Menigishi were childhood friends and former residents of Sorsogon City. Respondent married a Japanese national, Tomohito Menigishi (Tomohito), and lived in Japan. Sometime in June 1992, the Menigishis visited the Philippines and introduced Yashoyuki Ogawa (Yashoyuki), Tomohitos friend, to petitioner. Yashoyuki and petitioner eventually got married in the Philippines and thereafter, also lived in Japan. On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, breach of good human relation and unjust enrichment before the RTC against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-7299, alleging that the latter borrowed from her the amounts of P15,000.00, P100,000.00 and P8,000.00, in September 2000, August 2001, and March 2003, respectively. Unable to pay, respondent offered to sell her building and its improvements in Sorsogon City to petitioner for a consideration of P1, 500,000.00 with the agreement that her outstanding loans with petitioner be deducted from the purchase price and the balance payable in installments. As partial payment for the properties, petitioner remitted the following amounts to respondent: (a) P150,000.00 through the account of her friend Emma Fulleros on October 23, 2003; and (b) P250,772.90 by way of bank remittance to respondent's Equitable-PCI Bank Account on December 8, 2003. Having paid huge amounts and in order to protect her proprietary rights, petitioner then demanded for the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, but respondent backed out from the deal and reneged on her obligations. In her Answer with Counterclaim, respondent specifically denied her indebtedness to petitioner and claimed that it was the latter who owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen, equivalent to about P500, 000.00, as evidenced by a receipt. In partial payment of her indebtedness, petitioner, thus, remitted the amounts of P150, 000.00 and P250,000.00 to respondent, leaving a balance of P100,000.00. Respondent also sought reimbursement of the advances she allegedly made for the wedding expenses of petitioner and Yashoyuki in the amount of 4,000,000.00 Yen. While she admitted offering her property for sale to petitioner, respondent explained that the sale did not materialize as petitioner failed to produce the stipulated down payment. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of 4,000,000.00 Yen, the balance of petitioner's purported loan in the amount of P100, 000.00; moral and exemplary damages; and attorneys fees. ISSUE: whether the disputed receipt sufficiently established respondent's counterclaim that petitioner owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen. RULING: Finding that respondent was indeed indebted to petitioner in the amounts of P150, 000.00 and P250, 772.90 or the total amount of P400, 772.90, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 1, 2005, thus: 1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P400, 772.90 plus interest of 12% from the date of filing of this case until the same shall have been paid in full. 2. Ordering the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the actual expenses she incurred in filing the instant case, to wit: a. P54, 000.00 for her fare of plane tickets b. P7, 355.00 for docket fees 3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the following amounts: a. P25, 000.00 moral damages b. P25, 000.00 exemplary damages c. P50, 000.00 attorneys fees d. P1, 000.00 per appearance of her lawyer SO ORDERED.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. REYES VS MOSQUEDA FACTS: The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18, 1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes - Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes - Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Marina Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes - Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half-blood) - Pedro Dalusong. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San Juan. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula, to wit: "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the motion of February 12, 1976 filed by Ursula D. Pascual thru counsel be, as it is hereby ordered, excluded from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to return to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these properties, until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate action." (G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24) The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394. On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1, 1976 Order. Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15 of the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the above-mentioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M. In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164.

In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil denied Reyes assertion of ownership over the Tondo property. On November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 119359. In her complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2) doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises. The two cases were consolidated. On June 3, 1982, the then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. 115164 1) Declaring TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void; and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17854 in the name of Emilio D. Pascual; 2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit including all fees which the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full implementation of this decision. For lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed. In Civil Case No. 119359 1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit; and 2) On the counterclaim, ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendants the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees." Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42. On January 29, 1986, we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was affected. The entry of judgment was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on the ground that the January 29, 1986 resolution was not received by the petitioners' counsel of record. The petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1986 resolution. The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution. ISSUE: Petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1, 1976. RULING: We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga in S. P. Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action." The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete. (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the case of Morales v. Court First Instance of Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373 [1986]): "It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part

of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266)."

SARITA, KIRSTY E. IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF CABIGTING FACTS: Vicente d. Ching, a legitimate son of the spouses tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Priscila Dulay, a Filipina, was born in Tubao, la union on April 11, 1964.since birth, Chinghas resided in the Philippines on July 17, 1998, Ching , after graduated of bachelor of laws course at st. Louis university in Baguio city ,filed an application to take the 1998 bar exam. The Supreme Court allowed him to take provided that he can produce proof of his Philippine citizenship. Incompliance with said requirements, Ching submitted the following documents: A.) Certification from board of accountancy of the PRC showing that he is a certified public accountant.B.) Voter certification from Comelec Tubao La Union.C.) Certification that he served as Sangguniang Panlungsod member. On April 5, 1999 Ching was included as one of the lucky passers of the bar exam and the schedule of their oath taking was on may 5, 1999 but he was not allowed to take his oath due the questionable citizenship issue. ISSUE: Is Ching a Filipino citizen? Is his election to Philippine citizenship within the reasonable time prescribed by the law? RULING: No. Since the applicant was born on 1964, the governing charter with regards to citizenship issue is the 1935 constitution. Therefore as what is provided by the said constitution, which said that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother with an alien father followed the citizenship of the father unless upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years of age elected Philippine citizenship. In the case at bar, Ching did not elect his citizenship when he reach 21 years old but instead in 1999 which is 14years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered as not within the reasonable period of time considering the length of 14 years after he reaches 21 years old. In addition to that, the court said that Philippine citizenship can never be treated like commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. In view of the foregoing, the court denies Vicente d. Chings application for admission to the Philippine bar.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. CUIZON VS REMOLETE FACTS: Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent. On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased. On March 23, 1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. ISSUE: Of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix. RULING: WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. MORALES VS CFI FACTS: In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended. ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail. HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the States very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. SUROZA VS HONRADO FACTS: Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the US Army (Philippine Scouts) married Marcelina Salvador but they were childless. However, they reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. When Mauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier. However, he was disabled and his wife was appointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent. In connection to this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be his guardian however the court confirmed Nenitas appointment as guardian of Agapito. The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks. She executed a notarial will which is in English and was thumb marked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will) filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. As there was n o opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratix and subsequently, issued two orders directing the two banks to allow Marina to withdraw from the savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring the custodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix house among who was Nenita and to place Marina in possession thereof. Nenita was then alerted to the existence of the testamentary proceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that the decedents son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased; that he has a daughter named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapitos guardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedents granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate courts jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order. In spite of such fact, Judge Honrado issued on order probating Marcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress. Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter petition for administration and preliminary injunction reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not duly executed and attested; and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick. Further, that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix. Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was also dismissed. hence, this complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for having admitted a will, which on its face is void. RULING: Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency implies negligence, incompete nce, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF ANTERO MERCADO FACTS: A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. Florentino Javiwe who wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of First Instance found that the will was valid but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision holding that the attestation clause failed: 1) To certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; 2) To certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the formers request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof. 3) To certify that the witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is valid. RULING: The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumb mark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark.

SARITA, KIRSTY E. 1.) 2.) 2.) 3.) 5.) 4.) 7.) 5.) 9.) 10.) Palacios vs. Palacios Nuguid vs. Nuguid Dela Cruz vs. Fabie Ogawa vs. Menigishi Reyes vs. Mosqueda In The Matter Of the Will of Cabigting Cuizon vs. Remolete Morales vs. CFI Suroza vs. Honrado In The Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado