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Abstract: Several case studies show how to separate general corrosion from accelerated corrosion and how to predict end of useful life of products.
Paul Barringer, P.E. Barringer & Associates, Inc. P.O. Box 3985 Humble, TX 77347-3985 Phone: 281-852-6810 FAX: 281-852-3749 Email: hpaul@barringer1.com Web: http://www.barringer1.com
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
ln ln
1 ln( t) ln( ) 1 F( t)
CDF is:
CDF is:
F( t )
F( t )
( t ) ( t )
Observations: Same Y-axis Weibull has log X-axis Gumbel has uniform X-axis
F( t )
1
e
( t )
Or
1 F( t )
1 F( t )
1
e
t
Or
1 1 F( t )
e
( t )
e
t
ln ln
F( t)
1
( t )
ln ln
1 1 F( t)
Y = mX + b t
ln ln
1 F( t)
is a scale factor is a shape factor For Monte Carlo modeling: Small steep t + ln( ln( 1 a_random_n o) ) lines for G- & G+ Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007 distributions
Y = mX + b t
+ ln ln
1 1 F( t)
Time Issues
Another key issue is environmental impact along with the cost issues if failure occurs
Murphy says: Big Money Issues Will Prevail
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
l Fai
a ure
ges
Discovery Age/Thickness
Wall Thickness Discovered At Inspection We have stacks of data from the heat exchanger inspection because the IRIS data have been rounded to three significant digits.
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
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Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007 Small risk of wall thickness R= Coefficient of regression less than min allowed ccc= critical correlation coefficient
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Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007 R2= (Coefficient of regression)2 Higher risk of wall thickness less than 2= (critical correlation coefficient)2 (ccc) min allowed more conservative
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PDF Curves
~2*x x
Note the Gumbel- distribution says to expect more occurrences with thinner walls
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PDF Details
(0.050459, 3.933565)
4
( t )
1 e
100
1 e
t t0
t t 1 e 0
50
t t 1 e 0
0 0.04 t 0.06
0.04 t
0.05
Weibull PDF
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=0.06427
Xi Del r^2 n/s 0.06427 0.00316 0.989 46/0
.04
.05
.06
.07
.08
.09
.1
.11
Small Large
General Corrosion
This becomes a critical value!
t=? t=9
t=6
t=3yrs
Start = datum
Probability of Occurrence
63.2%
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Time
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
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Accelerated Corrosion
99.9% Probability of Occurrence t=9 t=6 t=3 General Deterioration
start
Dont exceed this probability of thin wall You must know when to accept the risk of failure and when to accept the risk of failure! $Risk = pof*$Consequence
min
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Minimum Wall Thickness At . Acceptable Risk Level End of life! Time Difficult decision.
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
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10
99 90 70 50 30
G-/rr/insp1
Assumes new tube with tmin = 0.083 and tmax = 0.101 for ~6* = 99.8%
Year 0
Note the flatter slope with larger means more wall thk. scatter!
= Xi = Del r^2 n/s 0.06427 0.0031573 0.989 46/0 0.09706 0.0020362
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Data needed for construction of trendlines on next page with as new slopes.
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5 2 1 .5 .2
Year 23
.1 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 Tube Wall Thickness (inches) 0.083 0.05237
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
.1
.11
0.03531 0.04246
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Year 20 Forecasted Line: = 0.05848, = 0.0033541 with 0.1228% occurrence at 0.036 wall.
0.05237 Y=0.083-0.0018017t
0.04246
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30
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51
33.09 32.3
Gen + Accel Cor. @ 99.9% Days Thickness 0 51 906 33.09 966 32.3 1105 27.56 1127 27.17
49
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End Of Life
949
1176
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Summary
ASME minimum wall was violated at 949 days API fitness for service will be violated at 1176 days and we are 1127 days into service Plan an immediate orderly shutdown for replacement Outage + planned replacement =$10,000,000 Emergency outage + emergency replacement = $20,000,000 because of safety hazards Risk is too high! 0.1%*$10,000,000 = $10,000 and climbing toward $20,000,000. Take action now!
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
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99.9
Peak Annual Stream Flows-Gage Height (feet) USGS 08074000 Buffalo Bayou at Houston, Texas
G+/rr
99
Occurrence CDF (%)
90 80 60 70 50 40 30 20 10 5 21 .2.5.1 0 10 20 30
95
June 9, 2001
Depth for 100 yr flood comes from the return period, RP = 1/(1-p). When RP = 100 years, then p = 99%
40
44.76 50
Peak Gage Height (feet) The flood was bad but not the worst recorded near downtown Houston!
Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007
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2
June 9, 2001
0 10 20 30 40 50
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Field Joint
Number of Incidents
2
41B
61C
41C
61A
Failures And Successes Data 53*3 57*1 58*1 63*1 -66*1 -67*3 -68*1 -69*1 70*2 -70*2 -72*1 -73*1 75*2 -76*2 -78*1 -79*1 -80*1 -81*1
41D STS-2
45o
50o
75o
80o
STS 51-C
Field Joint
Number of Incidents
2
41B Flights with no incidents 41D STS-2
41C
61A
61C
45o
50o
80 75 o o
Source: Engineering Ethics, Gail D. Baura, Barringer & Associates, Inc. 2007 Elsevier, ISBN 13:978-0-088531-2, 2006, Page 73. Data from the Rogers Commission 1986
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Which Plot?
Suspended data shown on plot as >
41
If you fail to turn on - is a suspension 42 you will conclude this is a good fit!!
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