You are on page 1of 34

***NEG***

UQ China Involved Now


China is coming!!!!!!!!! (but will be peaceful and avoid conflict with the US) Hilton 13 (Feb. 2012, Isabel, Norweigian Peacebuilding Resource Center, London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf) The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in the region is large and growing. How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from
cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite

its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have
repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Chinas taking advantage of weak US relations to encroach on the region. Munene 6/17 (2012, Macharia, professor of history and international relations, USIU, Superpowers redefine their policies, Business Daily Africa, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/America-and-China-redefinetheir-policies--/-/539548/1885816/-/qf5u13z/-/index.html)
For a long time, Latin

America was considered a preserve of the United States but China is making successful inroads. It is seemingly repaying the United States with its own coin since Americans frequently encroach on what China would thinks is Beijings backyard in Asia. It has developed good ties with Brazil which leads in Latin America in self assertiveness. Mexico would like to appear to be independent of the United States in terms of making decisions on who to relate to and thus received Xi very well before the Chinese president went to meet Obama in California. Besides Mexico, Xi was a guest in Costa Rica as well as Trinidad and Tobago. In itself, this development might be a tacit understanding between the two leading powers that they will infiltrate each others sphere of influence even as they try to forge what Xi would like to think of as a new relationship of trust between the two countries. Xis global onslaught worries some countries which are forced to come out of geopolitical hibernation and essentially respond to the agenda set by China.

I/L US Involvement
Watson 04 (2004, Cynthia, Professor of Strategy at National War College, U.S. Responses to Chinas Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States
and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net bene t for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China,

Latin America, and the United States benet from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade con icts, protectionism,
and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signicant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It

appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders
of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors. Washington

should not blame Beijing for moving into an area made attractive because of historic and current absence of consistent U.S. policies.

Link Cuba Aff


China is key to economic growth and modernization in Cuba demand for investment and embargo with the US means China is the most attractive option. Hearn 12 (Jan. 2012, Adrian, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, google scholar)
Since the early 1990s, state-to-state

cooperation has enabled Cuba to leverage Chinese support for the development and coordination of basic industrial infrastructure. The bilateral relationship has now moved into a new phase marked by strategic planning of economic opening and controlled privatisation. Tensions and disagreements are to be expected, but since Ral Castro assumed power in 2008, Cuban authorities have shown sincere interest in learning from Chinas experiences with liberalisation. The Chinese government has a vested interest in the success of Cubas reforms, reflected in the negotiation of the first Five-Year Plan for SinoCuban cooperation in June 2011. As a long-time financier of Cubas development, many are looking to Beijing to underwrite the credits and loans aspiring entrepreneurs need to grow small businesses. As Cubas need for capital deepens, its leaders have expressed no principled position against relations with the IMF or World Bank (quoted in Feinberg 2011: 67).
Having defaulted on IMF loans and reporting requirements in the early years of the revolution, Cuba preempted expulsion by voluntarily withdrawing from the institution in 1964 (and subsequently repaying its debt). The United States remains firmly opposed to Cubas reentry, but as Feinberg has argued, CubaIMF dialogue could prove beneficial across a range of topics, from developing micro-enterprise to sharing insights from previous Eastern European and Asian transitions (Feinberg 2011: 74, 78-83). The internal evolution of the IMF to accommodate changing global conditions, including Chinas deepening influence, makes engagement with Cuba more likely. Growing international reliance on the renminbi and greater provisions for public spending are important in this regard, but equally important are Cubas domestic reforms, which are bringing the island into closer alignment with conventions of economic governance. China

sits at the crossroads of these local and global developments, encouraging Cuba toward rapprochement with international norms even as it works to reform them. Conclusion The Latin American operations of Chinese state enterprises, undertaken through state-to-state channels with no strings attached, challenge orthodox conventions of international cooperation. Alarmist reports of worst-case scenarios and potential threats, from disregard for human rights to telecommunications espionage, obscure the more encompassing and genuine challenge of building dialogue with China on Western hemisphere affairs. As Daniel Erikson has written, the energy of policymakers and
publics would be better directed at leveraging Chinas intensifying engagement with multilateral institutions as a basis for discussing regional codes of governance and approaches to state intervention (Erikson 2011: 132). The changing internal dynamics of the IMF, including the increase of Chinas voting rights, suggest that this process is now underway. Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States, Chinese

initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Long-term market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC. The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for Cubas liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward alignment with international norms. Cuba is the linchpin for the region whoever controls it controls the whole sphere of influences Llana 12 (10/14, citing Riordan Roett, PhD, Johns Hopkins University, American political scientist specializing in Latin America, Sara Miller, Christian Science Monitor, 50 years after Cuba missile crisis, US influence in hemisphere waning, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemispherewaning)
Indeed, the

anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis will likely provide an opportunity for the extreme left in Latin America to express support for Cuba, says Johns Hopkins Latin American expert Riordan Roett. They will be in solidarity about the survival of the Castro brothers, Mr. Roett says. 'A linchpin' in the region That kind of defiance showing respect for a nation that for so long the US has considered a thorn in its side would have been unthinkable 50 years ago. Before the Cuban missile crisis, after the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the US pressured Latin American countries to suspend Cubas membership from the Organization of American States (OAS). At the same time, Cuba

signed onto the nonaligned movement, and Brenner says it was that move that the US feared other countries in Latin America might follow. At the time, US thinking on the movement was, you are with us or you are against us. The politics surrounding Cuba at the OAS highlights the declining influence of the US in the region. Fifty years ago, the US advocated
Cubas suspension and was successful; but during the groups summit in April, leaders across political spectrums said they would question attending another summit

without Cuba at the table. This Brenner.

comes from [Colombian President Juan Manuel] Santos, our most loyal ally in the region," says

"Cuba was once the pariah state; it is now a linchpin for all the other countries.

Thats why Chinas interested influence in Cuba is key to unseating the US throughout the region. Latin Business Chronicle 07 (6/4, Chronicle Special, Center for Hemispheric Policy, based on an excerpt from the final report of the China-Latin America Task Force of the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami, China Undermines U.S. in Latin America, http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1297)
Cuba. The

nations proximity to the United States gives it particular strategic value to China. This value includes a Chinese presence at Cuban facilities at Bejucal and Santiago, potentially used to collect intelligence data on the United States. China played a key role in upgrading the Cuban Air Defense System, and has frequently exchanged high-ranking Chinese military delegations. Continuing Chinese sponsorship of the Cuban regime also helps the PRC to maintain its branding as a champion of third-world causes an image with real commercial and strategic value when the PRC positions itself to do business with new leftist regimes in the hemisphere . Cuba also has secondary value to the PRC as a supplier of strategic materials and agricultural products. In addition to making sugar one of Latin Americas major exports to China, Cuba also has both offshore petroleum and the worlds largest proven nickel reserves. In February 2007, however, a $500 million arrangement between
Cubaniquel and the Chinese firm MinMetals to develop Cuban nickel capacity was abruptly canceled, and the concession was given, instead, to Venezuela.

---Ext. I/L Influence


Cuba is key strong regional influence, ties with Venezuela, and model for Chinese style development policies. Amuchastegu 06 (9/1, Domingo, CubaNews, Cuba and China: similarities and differences, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cuba+and+China%3A+similarities+and+differences.-a0151844511) What can China find in the island of Cuba that makes it so interesting for members of China's Military Commission and Politburo to visit the Caribbean nation and to persuade President Hu to declare China's support of Cuba's stand in unusually strong terms? First, there is what can be described as the "mirror effect." In the eyes of Chinese foreign policymakers, Cuba is to the United States what Taiwan is to China.
THE TAIWAN FACTOR As the issue of Taiwan has become more tense and aggravating for Chinese policies, Beijing has increased its relations with Cuba. This has been a dominant trend since the early 1990s, but especially in recent years following Taiwan's increased hostility toward China backed by the Bush administration.

A second important dimension in Beijing's current alliance with Cuba is that Cuba is located in the heart of the Caribbean
where Taiwan has been able to retain diplomatic recognition from a considerable number of the region's states.

Cuba's political influence throughout the region is extremely valuable to China's long-term policy of eroding Taiwan's standing. First, Cuba is an important political actor with strong ties to influential political forces and governments from which China benefits; second, Cuba has throughout the region a positive and constructive image derived from its alliance with China, an image aimed at undermining Taiwan's fading regional leverage. These two factors today are increasingly reinforced by the alliance between Venezuela and Cuba, which is a third factor that has
augmented China's interest in Cuba.

Economic considerations are no less important. Nickel, cobalt and oil are vital to China's economy. Because Cuba is a source for all three commodities, China is willing to grant Cuba exceptional privileges in terms of financial arrangements, insurance
backing, rescheduling of debt and long-term investments in mining, oil, biotechnology, and tourism.

China is also prepared to engage in an undisclosed range of military cooperation that has included scores of high-level military
delegations visiting their respective nations. There is also another special advantage to China: to prove how great their experience is in saving a collapsing socialist economy as was the case with Cuba in the early '90s. This

is not only relevant to the past, present, and future of socialist economies but also in sending a clear message to Third World economies, where Beijing exerts considerable influence. If China's "recipe" works in the Cuban case, then its relevance will be even greater. Sieff 08 (11/17, Martin, Hu's Cuba visit highlights China's growing LatAm clout, UPI, http://www.upi.com/news/issueoftheday/2008/11/17/Hus-Cuba-visit-highlights-Chinas-growing-LatAm-clout/UPI32141226935486/) China is now far more important economically to Cuba than its historic ally and protector Russia. Beijing has become the communist-led Caribbean island's second-largest trading partner after Venezuela. Zhao said their total volume of trade in 2007 was worth $2.3 billion. The ambassador also said bilateral cooperation was also rapidly expanding in transportation, communication, agriculture and education. China does not have the strategic military power that Russia can bring to Latin America. The Kremlin sent two Tupolev Tu-160
Blackjack supersonic nuclear bombers to Venezuela for a week in September, and they practiced long-range patrol patterns in the Caribbean Sea. The two aircraft together had the capability to fire 24 nuclear-capable, 2,000-mile-range KH-55 air-launched cruise missiles into the heart of the United States. China cannot provide any comparable military or strategic muscle to Cuba, Venezuela or their neighbors. However, economically,

China is pumping far more investment and economic clout into Latin America. Beijing's economic and political ties with Brazil are extremely close, and the two nations cooperate especially closely as BRIC -- Brazil-Russia-India-China major emerging economies -- partners. So far in Cuba the growing Chinese presence has not been expressed in much direct investment. However, Beijing has provided plenty of credit to buy Chinese exports. Hu also squeezed in his visit 10 days before Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was due to visit the island on a Caribbean swing that will focus
on Venezuela. Medvedev's trip to Caracas, where he will be warmly welcomed by fiercely anti-American Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, has been scheduled to coincide with a Nov. 24-30 visit to Venezuela by a powerful Russian naval squadron consisting of the missile battle cruiser Pyotr Veliky ("Peter the Great") and the anti-submarine war combat vessel Admiral Chabanenko. Hu and Medvedev's eagerness to risk Washington's wrath by honoring the most anti-U.S. leaders in the Western Hemisphere may be in part a calculated insult to Bush during his lame-duck incumbency for the next two months until he is replaced by President-elect Barack Obama. They may also, however, signal a much more calculated defiance of Washington by Russia and China in the Western Hemisphere once Obama takes office. For Russia

and China are both working energetically to take advantage of the United States' faltering influence in the Latin American region -- America's own "near abroad." Russia and China have been expanding their influence in Latin America at U.S. expense, and they have been using Cuba and especially Venezuela as close partners in the process. It has been a process pursued with both an economic and security dimension. As UPI's John Sweeney reported Oct. 31, the Chavez government also is
expanding defense and security ties with China. During his visit to Beijing on Sept. 24, Chavez signed an agreement to purchase 24 Chinese-made K-8 light attack

aircraft, which Venezuelan air force officials say will be used for training purposes. The K-8s, which are scheduled to arrive in Venezuela during 2009, will operate from the Teniente Vicente Landaeta Gil Air Base near the city of Barquisimeto in Lara state, Sweeney reported.

---AT: China Bad for Cuba


China key to economic liberalisation and growth in Cuba Hearn 12 (Jan. 2012, Adrian, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, google scholar) Chinas incremental approach to market expansion in Cuba is one component of a broader strategy of state-guided development that has proven successful across East Asia (Hira 2007: 87-96). A related component is the linkage of distinct industrial sectors into an integrated system, a process that analysts argue has given the Chinese government an unusual degree of control over international production chains (Ellis 2005). As Joshua Kurlantzick writes: The Chinese government wants to control the entire process, from taking commodities out of the ground to shipping them back to China, because it does not trust world markets to ensure continuous supplies of key resources. It is purchasing stakes in important oil and gas firms abroad, constructing the infrastructure necessary to get those industries resources to port, and building close relations with refiners and shippers (Kurlantzick 2008: 200). Chinas pursuit of industrial integration is evident in the Cuban transport sector, which in 2006 received a 1.8 billion USD revolving credit line backed by the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), whose
repayment was renegotiated in 2010 (ICCAS 2009: 47; EFE 2010). The Cuban government also announced in 2006 that contracts totalling more than 2 billion USD had been signed, primarily with Chinese counterparts, to improve Cuban road and rail transport (Nuevo Herald 2009). Five hundred Chinese freight an d passenger train carriages were ordered for Cubas rail fleet, with 21 complete locomotives entering service in 2009. In 2008 the Chinese firm Yutong sold 1,000 energyefficient buses to the island, 200 of which were in circulation by midyear. According to Rosa Oliveras of the Grupo para el Desarrollo de la Capital (GDIC): When the Special Period hit us the vehicles and spare parts we had imported from the Soviet Bloc fell out of production, and our transport system was so damaged that the mobility of Havanas citizens was reduced by between 70 and 80 per cent. Until recently, people had to wait at bus stops for two or three hours and were forced to work half days, and sometimes not at all. We couldnt have carried on like this. The Chinese buses s aved our city, and actually the whole country, from a very grave situation (Oliveras 2008). Rather than deliver complete buses to Cuba, Yutong shipped components from its factory in Zhengzhou for assembly in Havana, saving 12 to 15 per cent in transportation costs (Pizarro 2009). The scheme facilitated skills transfer through the training of Cuban automobile assembly technicians by a team of 30 Chinese counterparts. As

with training in Cuban electrodomestic factories, a marsh gas extraction, a sheep-rearing farm, a reservoir fishery, and three pesticide production plants, this approach is building a valuable source of specialised talent that may facilitate Cubas entry into global production chains. The projects integration into a broader, coordinated programme of de velopment and skills training distinguishes it from private sector investments from Europe (particularly Spain), which have focused on enclave sectors like hotel construction and tourism services. President Hus two main speeches in Cuba during his 2004 and 2008 visits focused on human capital development. In his former speech, delivered at Cubas leading IT training facility, the University of Information Science (UCI), Hu noted that thousands of the computers on campus came at subsidised prices from China, with the express purpose of advancing Cubas IT capacities. His latter speech, delivered at the Tarar Student City, confirmed Chinas intention to send 5,000 students to Cuba to study medicine, tourism and Spanish. The recruitment of Chinese technicians to live in Cuba to supervise and train the local workforce in 37 Chinese investment projects, proposed during the 2008 visit, will advance this goal if the projects are implemented. The integration of infrastructure upgrading with IT and electronics training has laid the foundation for a coordinated industrial chain that supports domestic manufacturing along with the shipment of goods to markets around Cuba and potentially to neighbouring Latin American and Caribbean countries. Facilitated by the refurbishment of Cubas ports with Chinese equipment, this strategy could significantly advance both countries regional influence (Frank 2006). State-to-state cooperation with China has helped Cuba to establish the basic infrastructure it needs for economic growth . The challenge now facing the island is to employ this platform to support private initiative and harness the productive potentials of the market. As Robert B. Reich famously wrote three decades ago, Economies are like bicycles. The faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided (Reich 1982). The Chinese government adopted this strategy of gradual liberalisation at home in the early 1980s, and has repeatedly advocated it to Cuban officials ever since Fidel Castros 1995 meeting with Premier Li Peng in Beijing (Cheng 2007; Jiang 2009). After 15 years of hearing their advice, Cubas reformers led by Ral Castro are now listening. Hearn 12 (Jan. 2012, Adrian, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, google scholar)
At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage w ith a Chinese official to debate Chinas deepening ties with Latin America. The

specialist asked whether China is willing to come to the table with the United States to promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese officials reply was revealing: We are interested in trade, and not in politics. Talking past rather than with each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific as
China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in the United States and Europe has intensified Chinas engagement with developing countries. Sino-Latin

American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and Chinas priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new

markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic
implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of their countrys demand for the regions primary products, evinced by Latin Americas impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011). Latin American publications reflect the regions historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010). With Kotschwar, Moran, and Muir 2011), little

few exceptions (e.g. Gonzalez-Vicente 2011; Hearn and LenManrquez 2011; attention has been paid to the influence of Chinas rise on the coordination and development of Latin American industrial sectors, and how this influence resonates or not with international conventions of governance. The case of Cuba is instructive, as no other country is so openly condemned by Washington and so publicly praised by Beijing. With bilateral trade exceeding 1.8 billion USD in 2010 (down from a pre-GFC high of 2.3 billion USD in 2008), China is Cubas second-largest trading partner, and the two countries have pursued state-led cooperation in sectors as diverse as biomedicine, tourism, industrial manufacturing, nickel and oil mining, and oil refining (UN-COMTRADE 2011). The workings of Sino-Cuban initiatives are guarded as state secrets, provoking concerns from external observers about their intentions, capacities, and potential threats to the United States. These apprehensions dovetail with a broader discourse on the negative influence that China may bear on development and democracy in Latin America. This article argues that in spite of continuing differences between international conventions of governance and Chinas
approach to foreign engagement, the line between the two is narrowing. The first half of the article traces the key points of contention to diverging evaluations of state intervention but finds that these tensions are diminishing as multilateral institutions evolve to accommodate Chinas influence. For instance, adjustments to fiscal reserve policies within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the gradual relaxation of the IMFs benchmark guidelines on public sector expenditure, resonate with Chinas vision of publicprivate integration as a basis for economic development. As

China becomes more integrated into the existing geopolitical architecture, its government has encouraged political outliers, most notably Cuba, to follow its example. The second half of the article finds that the trajectory of Chinese cooperation with Cuba has evolved from statecentric bilateral accords to an increasing emphasis on economic liberalisation. Consequently, even some of Cubas staunchest critics have recognised that, with Chinas assistance, the island is headed toward rapprochement with the international economic system. Set against the backdrop of evolving multilateral institutions, Chinas impact in Cuba constitutes a convincing response to former US Secretary of State Robert Zoellicks invitation for China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system that has enabled its success (Zoellick 2005). Hearn 12 (Jan. 2012, Adrian, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, google scholar) Like their Chinese counterparts, Cuban officials are often accused of excessive intervention in the economic and social lives of their citizens. Moreover, Cubas cooperation with China, managed exclusively through state channels, has drawn criticism for its undisclosed (hence suspicious) nature. From secret arms transfers and development of biological weapons to anti-US intelligence gathering, commentators perceive a sinister intergovernmental strategy underlying the bilateral relationship (Cereijo 2001, 2010; ICCAS 2004). Sino-Cuban cooperation is indeed driven by a political strategy, but it is focused less on undermining the United States than on the longterm (and less newsworthy) goal of upgrading and coordinating Cubas industrial capacities. Although Chinese assistance to Cuba is managed through governmental channels, it has been accompanied by advice from Beijing about the benefits of incorporating a greater degree of private initiative into the existing state-led system. Under the leadership of Ral Castro since 2008, the Cuban government has begun to heed this advice as it seeks to open the islands economy in a controlled manner. The next section examines recent advances in Sino-Cuban cooperation, including bilateral efforts to plan the latters industrial evolution and implement market reforms. These developments suggest that the Cuban government is distancing itself from Fidel Castros 50-year-long rejection of capitalism, and moreover, that China is committed to guiding the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward reconciliation with international conventions.

Link Mexico Aff


Mexico key to expanding Chinese regional influence Ellis 13 (6/6, R. Evan, , PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, China's New Backyard, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,0)
Ironically, it's

the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.

Link Venezuela Aff


Venezuela is key biggest oil producer. Lafargue 06 (2006, Francois, Chinas Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits, China Perspectives, 68, p. 2-11, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053)
By 2002, China

had become the words second biggest consumer of oil, after the United States but ahead of Japan. And between 2000 and 2005, Beijing moved up from ninth to third place among the worlds oil importers. These foreign purchases, representing nearly one-third of Chinas oil consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is likely to reach 60% between now and 2010. So China has committed itself to a policy of diversifying its supplies of hydrocarbons by investing in Africa, (Sudan and Angola in particular), Central Asia and Latin America. 6 Latin America, with 9.7% of the worlds oil reserves, was producing by 2005 8.8% of world output11. For the time being, Chinas presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil, but
lags far behind the United States in terms of volume12. By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of Chinas oil supplies, 107,000 barrels per day (bpd). This may seem a small amount, but these exports were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty times more than in 2001. An

undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin Americas contribution to Chinas oil imports estimated to have doubled last year. 7China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the worlds oil reserves (putting it in sixth place) and 68% of Latin Americas reserves (as against Mexicos 11.3%). As a producer it ranks in seventh place, with 4% of world production. 8In December 2004 and again more recently in August last year, President Hugo Chvez paid an official visit to Beijing, where he and President Hu signed several agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 billion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in 2005 . Chinas Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting Beijings interest in Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts were signed. China plans investments worth US$350 million in the development of 15 oilfields (which might contain up to one billion barrels of oil) and US$60
million towards infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have also signed agreements on offshore gas exploration. Then, at the end of August 2005, the two countries formed a joint company to develop the Zumano oilfield in Anzotegui State, which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China

has also created a US$40 million credit line for Venezuelas purchase of agricultural equipment from China. 9 The volume of Venezuelas oil exports to China rose between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300 bpd to 70,000 bpd. Last year it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the year ahead, on course to reach 500,000 bpd by 2010. By the second half of 2006, Venezuela was supplying about 5% of Chinas oil imports. China is its second biggest customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.

Impact Energy Prices


Chinese investment and security assistance in Latin America is key to a stable oil supply chain trades off with US influence and no-strings nature makes it uniquely valuable Xiaoxia 5/6 (2013, Wen, Economic Observer, Worldcrunch, IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-inlatin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
Initially, Chinas

activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum
constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energ y sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All

China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in
entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round?

Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States , as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin
American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United S tates has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

Oil shocks cause extinction Roberts 04 (Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World, p. 93-94)
The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil

is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and
prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in

the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

---Ext. War
High oil prices trigger great power wars Nader Elhefnawy, April-May 2008, Survival, pp. 27-66 (currently teaches at the University of Miami. He has previously published on international and security
issues in journals including Astropolitics, International Security and Parameters

Some states, particularly in the underdeveloped world, may not even be able to obtain sufficient energy resources to keep their economies functioning. Less-developed nations differ widely in the energy-intensiveness of their economies as well, but given the relatively low
resource productivity of many; their obsolete, poorly maintained or otherwise inadequate infrastructure; and their obligation to pay for high-priced oil in hard currency; low-income oil importers will be in an especially poor position. In contrast to developed states enjoying more developed institutions and better access to capital and technology, less-developed nations have fewer of the resources needed to adapt to new circumstances, and any price shock would weaken such resources as they do have. Indeed, with adequate supplies of energy priced out of the reach of consumers, businesses and government, basic services might fail and states cease to be viable, even as developed nations continue to get by. Any price shock would come in an environment already favouring state failure: recent years have seen stagnating growth in Latin America Africa; the removal of a great deal of foreign support for weak governments (a process that started with the Cold Wars end); and continued population growth in the poorest regions, putting pressure on infrastructure and resource bases. Many of these problems will get worse rather than better, particularly the relationship between population size and natural resources such as water and arable land. The salinated and damaged farmland on which a third of the worlds crops are presently grown is a case in point. Aside from the expensive repairs such lands require, drip-irrigation and other methods needed to keep them productive are much more energy intensive than current practices. Not

having access to the required energy may mean disaster. Moreover, there will be spillover effects, such as refugee flows and the emergence of havens for terrorism and organised crime, as in Afghanistan and Somalia. There is also the danger that where one state fails, another may move in, either formally or informally. These interventions may be motivated by a sense of threat (guerrillas using the territory of failed states as a base of refuge), or the
sighting of an opportunity to grab territory and resources both of which were factors in the numerous invasions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by its neighbours since the mid 1990s. The heightened risk of state failure will drive inreasingly desperate efforts to avoid it, especially given the lower efficacy of marketdriven solutions in impoverished countries. Weak states may make neo-feudal arrangements with sub-state actors like warlords, private militias and private corporations to shore up their positions. Alternatively, they may become more centralized and controlling, even totalitarian, and other, stronger nations may feel compelled to prop them up, despite the unsavoury character of their regimes. There may also be an increased demand for peacekeeping missions, demand that will likely overwhelm the ability of the major military powers to deliver; indeed, they have already been overwhelmed.76 The problem could become still more severe, not only because of more numerous crises, but because the lopsided conventional wars the major powers are most likely to fight require relatively few boots on the ground, while nation-building in the ever more populous and urbanised developing world requires larger numbers. Smaller countries are not the only ones at risk. The failure of large but economically fragile states on the model of the Soviet collapse is conceivable, and even more problematic at the global level, given that their size compounds their problems, making them more difficult to bail out or prop up, and introducing problems that are not a consideration with smaller states, such as the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry. The moment before a large nation collapses is especially fraught with peril. The Soviet Union made surprisingly little effort to resist dissolution in 1991, but there is

no certainty that the next great power to go this way will not flail about dangerously prior to collapse. Great-power conflict is not out of the question; it may even be the most likely cause of conflict in the future, particularly if crises bring radical ideologies to the fore. Resources have historically been a factor motivating and fueling armed conflicts. According to a
study by Paul Collier, a country that is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income coming from them, has a risk of conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports.79 This connection may be clearest in the case of oil, which is not just another natural resource, particularly where the onset of civil wars is concerned.80 More than other resources, the presence of oil seems to increase the danger of harsh preemptive repression against insurgencies by central governments, as in Darfur; of other states interceding in internal conflicts, such as providing support for a separatist movement in an oil-rich state; and of secessionists prolonging conflicts by selling off future exploitation rights. Explanations include the developmental problems common to resource dependent countries such as poor government, corruption, poverty and high levels of inequality. High

oil prices can exacerbate these problems by enabling failing states to stave off needed reforms, and increasing the attractiveness border disputes and secessionist movements could be reactivated as oil revenue becomes more attractive in places outside the Middle East, such as
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Where states have been thoroughly privatised, as by warlords, criminal syndicates or state leaders with links to multinational corporations, this risk is especially high. A

global economic crisis of the kind made likely by pinched oil supplies (particularly in lessdeveloped regions) may also create openings for radical groups. Such problems affect not just oil-producing nations, but key states in the staggeringly complex worldwide energy distribution system. Besides the risk to overland pipelines, especially problematic in Central Asia, state collapse tends to translate into maritime insecurity as well, as with the intensified (although so far comparatively minor) pirate activity off the coast of Somalia in recent years.83 External powers routinely embroil themselves in the domestic affairs of states key to the production and transport of oil, exposing themselves to all the hazards such intervention can entail. For example, supporting repressive governments
can provoke resentment among the local population, which may manifest itself in terrorist acts (as in Saudi Arabia). Overthrow of a client government can mean inter-state conflict, as with the US and Iran since the 1979 revolution. Another risk

is that major powers might find themselves on opposite sides of an internal conflict, as in Georgia, the territory of which is crossed by a key pipeline for oil from the Caspian Sea basin. There, a US-backed government battles Russian-backed separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia a conflict some experts have identified as resembling a Cold War proxy war Even private companies, as they seek to develop resources in ever more unstable areas, may be implicated in local conflicts. Oil companies have run up large private-security bills in recent years, and oil corporations were among the earliest clients of private military corporations, as in Angola. The formation of new international alliances can also be a driver of conflict as large states pursue energy security. In Central Asia,
Russia and China actively seek to counter US influence through bilateral military agreements and with the formation of regional blocs such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.85 Outside the Caspian Sea basin China is actively securing access to oil through relationships with Iran and Sudan, and through the ongoing build-up of its naval capabilities. The problem of interstate conflict over oil may be exacerbated as an unintended consequence of some solutions to the worlds energy problems. For example, new technologies that permit cost-effective drilling for oil in deeper waters could create new flashpoints. Cheaper deep-water drilling, for instance, would make the oil under the contested South China Sea a more valuable prize.86 It might be

hoped that deep-water oil will be less likely to cause conflicts because the facilities and workers are relatively difficult for disgruntled local populations to reach. While this may make the facilities less accessible, however, offshore oil still figures into international conflicts because of territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone claims.

Impact Stability/Crime
Chinese security and military assistance key to solve transnational crime and the drug trade key to solve regional stability and prevent terrorism Ellis 11 (Aug. 2011, R. Evan, PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, CHINA-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: GOOD WILt, GOOD BUSINESS., AND STRATEGIC POSITION, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685) Because of the importance of the United States for the PRC as a source of technology and as a market and because of the damage that animosity with the United States could do to the economic and technological development of the PRC, Chinese leaders have traditionally been very sensitive to possible adverse U.S. responses to their initiatives. The PRC is unlikely to bow before U.S. demands, yet the character of the U.S. response, among other factors, will shape how the PRC and its companies behave in Latin America and the pace at which they proceed. Such analysis is not intended to imply that the United States should initiate a new Monroe Doctrine, telling the PRC to stay out of the region. Although such rhetoric might play well politically, and although it might induce China to proceed more cautiously in the short term, it would also work against U.S. strategic interests in the long term by strengthening the hand of more conservative forces in the PRC, and by fueling accusations in Latin America that its powerful neighbor to the north is once again trying to interfere with the sovereign right of countries in the region to maintain relations with whom they choose. Beyond such a likely negative reaction from the region, trying to prevent the PRC from establishing military ties with Latin America would also deny the United States some of the real benefits that may be realized from Chinese military engagement with the region. To the extent that it proves reliable, for example, Chinese military hardware and supplies, in addition to training programs, may provide the region with cost-effective ways to meet security needs in the face of serious threats, such as those posed by transnational criminal organizations .142 Cooperation between the PRC and Latin American police forces with data, personnel exchanges, and translation support, could be of great benefit in combating the activities of mafias operating in Latin America with ties to PRC criminal enterprises such as the Red Dragon, with its involvement in human trafficking networks in the region 143 or in stemming the flow of precursor chemicals from China to cocaine laboratories in the Andes and Amazon jungle.144 Revenue from export sales to China, if carefully managed, may also help Latin American states meet their security needs, as seen in the case of Chile, where by law, 10 percent of copper export revenues are channeled
to fund defense modernization.145

Organized crime makes nuclear and CBW warfare inevitable outweighs the risk of state-state warfare CSIS 9 (CEnter for Strategic and International Studies, "Revolution 6 - Conflict," Global Strategy Institute," gsi.csis.org/index.php?Itemid=59&id=30&option=com_content&task=view)
The shift from interstate to intrastate war and the increasing capacity of non-state actors to commit acts of megaviolence reflect

how patterns of conflict have changed since the end of the Cold War. Today warfare is increasingly described as asymmetric. Traditional military powers, like the United States, are confronted by increasingly atypical adversaries non-state ideologues, transnational criminal syndicates, and rogue states that employ unconventional tactics in wars ambiguous in both place and time. Today, conflict is more likely to occur between warring factions on residential streets than between armies on battlefields. As before, many belligerents still fight for power and/or wealth, but an increasing number are fighting purely for ideology. Acts of terrorism have become the major vehicle for their malcontent, especially for well-organized and well-funded Islamic groups like al-Qaeda. The attacks of
September 11, 2001 and similar incidences in recent decades have shown that even small groups of terrorists can carry out sophisticated attacks that result in an incredible loss of life. The

proliferation of nuclear and biological technologies only ups the ante for future incidences. [19] Terrorist organizations have evolved from scrappy bands of dissidents into well-organized groups with vast human and capital resources. This
Terrorism and Transnational Crime Over the past few decades the size and scope of terrorists abilities have become truly alarming. situation is forcing governments around the world to develop strategies to both neutralize these groups where they operate and maintain security at home. The United States has met some success in combating terrorist organizations, killing high-level officials and isolating certain sub-groups, but the War on Terror has had the unintended consequence of forming micro-actors, individuals driven by foreign military operations to militant extremism. These individuals, or groups of individuals, operate in poorly organized cells and as such use internet technologies to spread their message and share plans of attack. Perhaps paradoxically, this disorganization and decentralization makes these groups a greater threat to the military as it is harder to detect and track them. [1] Terrorism

has also had the effect of heightening tensions between sovereign nations. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, India and Pakistan neared war after India accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and Pakistan refused to turn over individuals for prosecution. To finance their illegal activity, terrorist organizations are becoming involved in transnational crime, especially drug trafficking . Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Director of the American Center for Democracy, has stated, The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill the coffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region. [2] Over the last two decades, we have witnessed a

surge in transnational crime, in large part because of the dissolution of Cold War alliances that helped keep criminal syndicates in check. Organized crime activity is not limited to the smuggling of illicit drugs, but includes the trafficking of arms, drugs, and human beings. Weapons of Mass Destruction According to President Obama, In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. *3+ International mechanisms established in recent decades have by and large kept the nuclear ambitions of superpowers at bay. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the increasing prevalence and power of criminal networks have made it more likely that a single actor could get his or her hands on a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). The term WMD is used to describe any weapons technology (radiological, chemical, biological, or nuclear) that is capable of killing a large number of people. [4] By and large it is believed that WMD pose the greatest threat in the possession of belligerent states like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. However, experts are warning that a more urgent threat would come from WMD in the hands of non-state actors. Nuclear material and technical knowledge are frequently exchanged on the black market, especially in postSoviet countries, where security personnel charged with guarding nuclear facilities are easily bribed into selling nuclear plans and materials. [5] With the help of the United States, Russia and its neighbors have made strides in securing these sites and improving oversight of the nuclear industry, but there is no telling how much material has been traded over the years. [6] The WMD threat does not only come from groups operating in the developing world, however, as recent biochemical attacks attest. The prime suspect in the anthrax attacks of 2001 was a government scientist, and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway was committed by a religious organization that enjoyed official government recognition. The ease with which these materials have become available, especially through online resources, is forcing governments to restrict their use. International governing bodies will need to find an
acceptable paradigm that allows for the benign applications of these technologies, as in power generation, while deterring the nefarious ones.

---Ext. Terrorism
Drug trade -> terrorism Sullivan 11 (2/23/11, Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf)
As in other parts of the world, the

United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations over the years in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported the government of El Salvador with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla insurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America and
Caribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS. Moreover,

given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the Andean region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. Will involve nuclear weapons Ferkaluk 10 (2010, Brian, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base Wing, Logistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, article written while a MA candidate in Diplomacy at Norwich University, completed in 2011, Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Ferkaluk%20Latin%20America.pdf) These factors fall in line with the current administrations policy of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It has stated that although the threat of a nuclear attack by sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up. Latin America has not only a history of terrorist activity and stratocracy, but nuclear activity as well. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone, recent developments have demonstrated that a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development may be on the rise. This will mean a risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of domestic or international terrorists is now a real concern for the US in the region itself. Terrorism in Latin America is almost completely characterized by domestic, guerrilla insurgents. These insurgents channel their terrorist activity against the authoritarian
democracies they live under. Groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) implement similar tactics to those of international terrorist groups. These Research Service, murders

tactics include car bombings, kidnappings and, according to the Congressional of elected officials and attacks against military and civilian targets in urban and rural areas. 1 However, although it has tactical similarities to international terrorist groups, they differ quite profusely in their purpose. Whereas other groups maintain religious differences as the premise for their activity, domestic Latin American groups have Marxist political and economic ideologies underlying their activity. Their livelihood comes from the most profitable market they are capable of exploiting, drug trafficking. This poses a significant and immediate threat to the United States. The initial threat is the fact that many of these drugs find their way to the US border. The greater danger lies in what this market is being used to fund, domestic attacks on key leaders of Latin American states who are key allies of the US and supporters of the GWOT. In many cases, these groups are further supported by neighboring states who seek to undermine US interests as well as US allies in the region. These neighboring states have supported terrorist groups more and more in recent years as a result of a leftward political trend across the region. That escalates to global nuclear war and extinction Spiece 2006 (Patrick F., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427)
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very

little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place

are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A

terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Turn Economy
Exploiting comparative advantage is uniquely likely to be successful in Latin America consensus of most recent and specific research. Ellis 09 (2009, R. Evan, PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, p. 5-6) The new commercial relationship emerging between the PRC and the countries of Latin America calls attention to the traditional question of comparative advantage in the modern global economy, including whether and under what conditions an economic approach based on comparative advantage in the production of primary products can serve the long-term development goals of the country. On one side of the question, Raul Prebisch,21 Andre Gunder Frank,22 and others have argued that Latin Americas participation in the system of global economic relations is actually prejudicial to its development. Urging a different view, some contemporary literature represented by authors (e.g., Franko)23 and studies by such institutions as the World Bank24 and the International Monetary Fundemphasizes that pursuing economic activity in areas in which a country has a comparative advantage, under the right conditions and with effective management by the state, can contribute to development of the country. In the economic interactions between China and Latin America examined by this book, evidence suggests that patterns of trade specialization are indeed emerging, with each partner tending to export those goods in which it has comparative advantage. In general, as Robert Devlin and others have noted, the PRC leverages its advantages in manufacturing, including inexpensive labor, to sell products to Latin America and other global markets.25 Reciprocally, as noted by Francisco Gonzlez, Latin American countries have capitalized on abundant natural resources, including petroleum, iron, and copper, as well as available land for export-oriented agricultural crops such as soy.26

AT: Dependence
Chinas manufactured goods advantage is eroding anyway and consumption is rising dependence will only be temporary and the long-term benefits outweigh the costs Saher 13 (3/14/13, Sebastian-Sarmiento, The Diplomat, China and Latin America: Big Business and Big Competition, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-big-competition/)
Despite these issues, recent

external and internal developments may be creating an opportunity for the region to balance its growing economic relations with China. Notably, Chinas comparative advantage may be eroding due to increased production costs and Beijings desire to lead its economy toward higher-end manufacturing and domestic consumption. If this trend continues, it would help beleaguered Mexico, whose security and political problems may finally start to improve and give Mexican industries a chance to compete on the global stage. Using targeted policies, other countries with manufacturing sectors may benefit from Chinas economic restructuring. In terms of development overall, alarmism about China keeping LAC economies dependent on natural resources is overblown. As Latin America continues to grapple with deficits in infrastructure, education, and social mobility, the question about whether growing economic ties with the PRC will be a burden or a key opportunity lies in the actions of Latin America, not China. The central issue is about governance: those countries that benefit over the long term from the current commodity boom will be the ones most judicious when it comes to future investments and industrial policy. Fighting corruption is difficult anywhere, and Latin America is no exception. As democracy deepens and middle classes emerge in the region, new stakeholders will hold governments accountable. As Latin America continues to develop, China will undoubtedly play a significant role in its progress and advancement . There will continue to be cases of cooperation and competition between LAC countries and the PRC as their relations mature but as long each side has much to offer the other, the people of both Latin America and China have a lot to look forward to in the evolution of their South-South relations. Chinese investment and trade will be net positive for the region economic consensus Blzquez-Lidoy et al. 06 (June 2006, Jorge Blzquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodrguez and Javier Santiso Research programme on: Asian Drivers and their Impact on Development, OECD, ANGEL OR DEVIL? CHINAS TRADE IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICAN EMERGING MARKETS, OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, Working Paper No. 252, https://www1.oecd.org/china/37054336.pdf) Chinese trade impact on Latin America is, in the short and medium run and in general terms, positive. The results of our study are consistent with others such as the one produced by IMF economists and other economists (Lall and Weiss, 2004). On average, and from the point of view of trade impact, Latin America will benefit from increased Chinese demand and growth. In comparative terms, as stressed by the IMF, the only net looser will be South Asia, while for Latin America the welfare effect will be positive . For sectors such as agriculture in Latin America, the estimated impact of faster Chinese integration around 2020 is clearly positive (with output up by 4 per cent). The clear losers will be, however, sectors such as textiles and from the point of view of
countries, the ones specialising in labour-intensive manufactures exports. More detailed analysis would be however needed in particular referring to the trade impact of China in the home markets of Latin American countries such as, for example, Mexico. In terms of trade relations, China

and Latin America have been intensively developing their relations over the past decade37. The trade volume between China and Latin America rose from $2 billion in the early 1990s to $15 billion in 2001, according to Chinese statistics. Since 2000, Brazilian and Chinese trade has leapt nearly threefold, a blessing for the Brazilian indebted economy and especially for the exporters of soybeans, steel and iron ore, which accounted for two-thirds of the goods exported. In general, Latin America, has a surplus commodity endowment that boosts synergies with China needs and strategy to secure food and energy imports in order to avoid shortages. No resource curse size is a prerequisite to diversification AND Latin America can enter higher value-added markets like beef and wine. Devlin 07 (2007, Robert, Regional Advisor for the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, What Does China Mean for Latin America? in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)
What does this situation mean for Latin America? Quite

a few studies address this very question. The major study was undertaken by the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); it concludes that China is a competitor in some respects, yet it is complementary to Latin Americas role in other ways. Thus, China represents both a challenge and an opportunity. Trade is

relatively small, between four and seven percent of exports. But trade countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Latin

is growing quickly, and in some sectors it is quite signicant, particularly in American exports to China tend to be concentrated in a few commodities; whereas Chinas exports to Latin America are rather diversied and mostly concentrated in manufactured goods. The Chinese demand for commodities has strongly affected Latin American terms of trade, relative to the situation that existed in the 1990s. Regarding direct competition, the export similarity index suggests that the country most vulnerable to the global effects of trade is Mexico.
Brazil is also affected, albeit to a lesser extent. In terms of Latin American domestic markets, there are several sectors particularly sensitive to Chinese imports, as the many complaints by shoe, textile, apparel, and toy producers indicate. Also important to consider is that as

China grows, its income is also going to grow. The Chinese pattern of demand may prove interesting for Latin America, as Chinese consumption of beef, more sophisticated processed foods, and perhaps Argentine wine will increase. The Chinese will also seek services such as tourism, an area in which Latin America has a real advantage. The region may attract Chinese tourists if Latin America can address such issues as security and language. Chile has been leading the way in the region by signing a free trade agreement with China. The agreement represents two major advantages for Chile: the facility to enter the Chinese market, and the potential to enter into Asian production chains, where Latin America is not currently present. In addition to trade is the issue of investment. Today, China is a minor overseas investor. If one does not include nancial investment, the amount of Chinese investment channeled to Latin America in 2005 was roughly $77 80 million. Yet the president of China has stated that over the next ten years there will be $100 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America. This announcement has had many Latin Americans waiting with baited breath. Financial investment aside, Latin America was likely the least important region of the world in terms of Chinese overseas investment in 2005. In terms of cooperation, however, the relationship between China and Latin America has dramatically intensied since 1990. The number of reciprocal visits has increased, and there are a number of bilateral agreements in several areas. There is a bigger story behind Chinas involvement in Latin America, however, and it should serve as a wake-up call for the region. Since 1950, East Asian economies have been moving steadily in the direction of convergence with the U.S. economy. Yet Latin America has been moving in the opposite direction as its participation in world trade has generally declined. Although Latin America has recovered a bit of trade in recent years, East Asia and China have clearly taken off with respect to trade. The growth of East Asian trade represents a reversal of fortune for Latin America . Beginning with Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and followed by Malaysia and now China, Asian countries have overtaken Latin American trade. India and Vietnam are also now overtaking Latin America in growth and exports. If these changes merely represented the growth of rankings, Latin America would not be as negatively impacted by East Asias recent growth. Yet East Asian countries have been able to dramatically reduce poverty while Latin America continues to confront difculties in combating poverty. Strong growth rates thus very much matter to Latin American countries. China thus serves as a wake-up call to Latin America to better organize itself in order to compete
globally, and to better diversify and upgrade exports to encourage growth. Studies increasingly indicate that exports are an important stimulus for growth. Beyond the traditional effects of exports as part of GDP, there is also a portfolio ef fect related to diversi cation. There are dynamic effects resulting from entering into new activities. Additionally, countries that aspire to be rst-class global exporters must undergo structural reforms that create constituencies within the economy in favor of exports. Three elements are crucial to future Latin American success. First, it is critical to re ect on the strategic forces behind East Asian successe s. Second, it is important that Latin America better exploit its advantages. Third, countries of the region must pursue more strategic public/private alliances. All three of these actions are necessary in order for Latin America to better innovate and to upgrade and diversify its export base in pursuit of economic growth. Several factors have contributed to the success of East Asian countries. First, they tend to value long-term strategies and goal setting. They are also generally pragmatic and gradualist in their approach. Additionally, East Asian countries prioritize the development of local capacities independent of foreign direct investment. Financing is also generally available, in contrast to the way nances constitute a major constraint in many Lati n American countries. In East Asia, the state is proactive in support of export development, innovation, and upgrading. East Asian countries also tend to have competent technical bureaucracies, which are guarantors for basic macroeconomic stability. Latin America has been doing quite well lately in this latter regard. Furthermore, East Asian countri es concern with government failures has led them to support the development of long -term strategies. These countries have also introduced both horizontal and vertical incentive systems in order to encourage private sector exporters to undertake new activities. It also would appear that East Asian countries treat business as business and ideology remains separate. In Latin America, however, it seems that ideology is too often mixed with business, something less prevalent within East Asian countries. Latin A merica has a number of advantages that represent great promise. Although it remains dif cult for Latin America to compete di rectly based on cost, the region is competitive in terms of the speed with which it is able to access markets in North America, Europe, and other countries within the region.

Natural resources are not a curse in Latin America; rather they may be a signi cant asset if countries of the region use revenues to develop their economies and to add value to their national resources.

AT: China Dangerous


No US hype means there wont be direct conflict its a peaceful rise. Hilton 13 (Feb. 2012, Isabel, Norweigian Peacebuilding Resource Center, London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf) The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S. China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the regions energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community
about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has

been little response in senior policy circles to the China threat. Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. China will avoid pissing us off. Hilton 13 (Feb. 2012, Isabel, Norweigian Peacebuilding Resource Center, London-based writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf) China has tried to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to great power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interests and the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States. China sees Asia as its own sphere of influence, and the Obama administrations pivot a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy towards Asia has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread carefully in the U.S. backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges to the U.S., including from its Latin American partners.

AT: Same Visit


Just a coincidence neither side wants to antagonize the other. GTA 5/31 (2013, Global Times Agencies, China, US not competing over Latin America: expert, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml) While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao

Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game ," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate
with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

AT: Military Bad


Military aid will be secondary and peaceful dont want to provoke the US. Ellis 11 (Aug. 2011, R. Evan, PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, CHINA-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: GOOD WILt, GOOD BUSINESS., AND STRATEGIC POSITION, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685)
As noted previously, the

PRCs pursuit of military objectives in the region is subordinate to its broader national objectives. exact balance will reflect the perceptions and self-confidence of the Chinese leadership and its propensity for risk-taking, factors which continue to evolve with each successive generation of Chinese leadership. Direct forms of security assistance, for example, may support the objective of protecting Chinese companies and resource flows, yet undermine the more important strategic objective of preserving access by the PRC to Western technology and markets. At the very least, China has strong incentives to portray all military interactions with Latin American states in a way that avoids an appearance of threatening the United States , so as to minimize the risk of damage to its broader objectives. In many cases, this goal not only will impact how China represents its activities, but how it structures them. Gifts of military medical capabilities or logistics gear, for example, may be preferable to selling or donating more lethal end items because the former generates similar institutional good will and contacts, while appearing less threatening. In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with
Where the two conflict, the Latin America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC

is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establishment of bases with a assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.
significant Chinese presence, overt military

***AFF***
Obviously not very complete, just some stuff I found.

L/T US Trade Good


China would be MORE willing to engage if the US did NAFTA and Mexico prove. The Economist 6/6 (2012, Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3)
But as

wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States . This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

L/T Terrorism
Drug cartels are key to avoid terrorism. Weitz 11 (11/9, Richard, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Where are Latin Americas Terrorists? http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-)
Ironically, the

strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin Americas powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention
on their criminal operations.

AT: Oil Shocks


Shocks have zero effect on the economy. Taylor and Van Doren 07 (October 17 2007, Jerry and Peter, senior fellows at the Cato Institute, No need to fear oil shocks, National Post, lexis)
The lesson to be derived from this is pretty clear: While oil-price spirals are certainly nothing for consumers to celebrate, the

health of the economy is not

held hostage to oil markets. The orthodox view that governed our understanding of oil-price shocks until recently was that the economic damage
associated with those shocks was not the result of oil-price increases per se. Higher oil prices, after all, simply make oil producers richer, and everyone else poorer. Over the long run, more money spent on oil equals less money spent on everything else. This reduces the demand for, and thus the price of, everything (including labour!) save for oil. As long as oil producers are spending and/or investing their increased profits, the net effect of all this -- from a macroeconomic perspective--is zero. All of this will eventually happen, but the

length of time required to get oil consumers to adjust their behaviour in response to a price shock is what was thought to trigger the economic downside associated with an oil crisis. If wages and consumption rates
outside the oil sector fail to go down, either unemployment will follow or inflation will result, because there's only so much money to go around, unless the Federal Reserve accommodates everyone's demand for money. The main

dissenting view was most strongly forwarded by then Princeton University economist and now Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues. They argued that different ("better") monetary policy - more specifically, one that maintains the federal funds rate at a constant level, rather than raising it in the face of an oil shock -- could reduce or even eliminate the recessionary effect of oil shocks. Economists James Hamilton and Anna Herrera, however, were skeptical of that proposition. They
argued that the "better" monetary policy advocated by Bernanke et al. effectively calls for massive declines in the federal funds rate over the entire course of an oil shock, something that is probably not possible in the real world. Moreover, the Federal Reserve would have to keep the funds rate below levels anticipated by market actors for 36 months in a row, which is, of course, an unlikely proposition. Interestingly enough, the Federal Reserve, now chaired by Ben Bernanke, is not pursuing the policies advocated by its chairman when the chairman was in the academy. That was

the state of the debate until the most recent price shock. The economy's failure to respond to one of the steepest oil-price increases in history with a recession, however, sent economists back to the theoretical drawing board. All the new analyses agree that the more flexible economy that we have now allows us to cope more easily with oil price shocks. It underscores the danger of the price-control regimes of the 1970s, something
that politicians are increasingly flirting with as energy prices continue to climb and put into question a panoply of government programs.

Empirically disproven. Nordhaus 07 [William, professor of economics at Yale, Whos afraid of a big bad oil shock september 2007 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/Big_Bad_Oil_Shock_Meeting.pdf\] In the end, this suggests that much of what we should fear from oil-price shocks is the fearful overreactions of the monetary authority, consumers, businesses, and workers. A cautious reading today suggests that policymakers should not be afraid of a Big Bad Oil Shock. The most recent evidence suggests that the economy is robust in the face of major energy shocks. The economy weathered an increase in real oil prices of 125 percent from 2002 to 2006 without any major strain. This suggests that policymakers should focus on fundamentals such as employment, real output, and containment of inflation as well as the instabilities caused by financial innovations and risk-taking. Oil-price shocks are neither so big nor as bad as in the 1970s. The economy had adapted since the 70soil shocks no longer have a substantial impact. Oliver Blanchard and Jordi Gali, 11/8/2007. The Class of 1941 Professor of Economics, is a former MIT economics department head and Research Associate in
the NBER's Program on Economic Fluctuations and Growth and the Program on Monetary Economics. The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s So Different from the 1970s? National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13368. Since the 1970s, and at least until

recently, macroeconomists have viewed changes in the price of oil as as an important source of economic uc- tuations, as well as a paradigm of a global shock, likely to aect many economies simultaneously. Such a perception is largely due to the two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, and high ination that char- acterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s. Con- ventional accounts of those episodes of stagation blame them on the large increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and the Iranian revolution of 1979, respectively.1 The events of the past decade, however, seem to call into question the rel- evance of oil price changes as a signicant source of economic uctuations. The reason: Since the late 1990s, the global economy has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s but, in contrast with the latter episodes, GDP growth and ination have remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world. Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the nature of the apparent changes in the macroeconomic eects of oil shocks, as well as on
some of its possible causes. Disentangling the factors behind those changes is obviously key to assessing the extent to which the episodes of stagation of the 1970s can reoccur in response to future oils shocks and, if so, to understanding the role that monetary policy can play in order to mitigate their adverse eects. One plausible hypothesis is that the eects of the increase in the price of oil proper have been similar across episodes, but have coincided in time with large shocks of a very dierent nature (e.g. large rises in other commodity prices in the 1970s, high productivity growth and world demand in the 2000s). That coincidence could signicantly distort any assessment of the impact of oil shocks based on a simple observation of the movements in aggregate variables around each episode. In order

to evaluate this hypothesis one must isolate the component of macroeconomic uctuations associated with exogenous changes in the price of oil. To do so, we identify and estimate the eects of an oil price shock using structural VAR techniques. We report and compare estimates for dierent sample periods and discuss how they have changed over time. We follow two alternative approaches. The rst one is based on a large VAR, and allows for a break in the sample in the mid 1980s. The second approach is based on rolling bivariate VARs, including the price of oil and one other variable at a time. The latter approach allows for a gradual change in the estimated eects of oil price shocks, without imposing a discrete break in a single period. Two conclusions clearly emerge from this analysis: First, there indeed other

were adverse shocks at work in the 1970s; the price of oil explains only part of the stagation episodes of the 1970s. Second, and importantly, the effects of a given change in the price of oil have changed substantially over time. Our estimates
point to much larger eects of oil price shocks on ination and activity in the early part of the sample, i.e. the one that includes the two oil shock episodes of the 1970s. Our basic empirical ndings are summarized graphically in Figure 1 (we postpone a description of the underlying assumptions to Section 3). The left-hand graph shows the responses of U.S. (log) GDP and the (log) CPI to a 10 percent increase in the price of oil, estimated using pre-1984 data. The right-hand graph displays the corresponding responses, based on post-1984 data. As the Figure makes clear, the response of both variables has become more muted in the more recent period. As we show below, that pattern can also be observed for other variables (prices and quantities) and many (though not all) other countries considered. In sum, the

evidence suggests that economies face an improved trade-off in the more recent period, in the face of oil price shocks of a similar magnitude.

AT: Terrorism/Crime
*Note cant read this and the link turn Too many barrier and threats are exaggerated to secure foreign support. Weitz 11 (11/9, Richard, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Where are Latin Americas Terrorists? http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-) Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal
operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence.

Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials
may tolerate some foreign terrorists activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their nonviolent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin

American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting
communist subversion, governments seek to fight terrorist threats at Americas expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal

organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional

terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not
difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants.

But Latin Americas powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert
time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

No terrorist sneak intheir evidence is racist LoMonaco 06 (Claudine, 9/11, "border security: line blurs on terrorism" Tucson Citizen, http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/local/25753.php)
While no evidence exists that terrorists have entered the United States through Mexico, the concern, fueled largely by anti-immigration forces, has brought more money and manpower to the border. Some security experts say the

threat is overblown. It has diverted limited resources, they say, and left the United States vulnerable to more realistic and dangerous has been no evidence of any serious attempt of terrorists to come into the United States through the southern border," said U.S. Rep. Jim Kolbe of Arizona. "We should be much more worried about the northern border, where there's 4,000 miles of completely unprotected and basically unmanned crossing points." A study by the conservative Nixon Center, a Washington, D.C.-based foreign policy think tank, found that of 373 suspected or convicted terrorists with links to al-Qaida who resided or crossed borders in Western Europe or North America since 1993, none had entered North America from Mexico. In contrast, the center found that 26 had used Canada as
threats while doing little to curb illegal immigration. "Our intelligence agents will tell you that there a host country. "The nightmare of Department of Homeland Security officials with whom I speak," wrote Robert S. Leiken, who wrote the study, "Europe's Mujahideen," "is not the Mexican border or the Middle East. They lose sleep over Muslim immigrants from enlightened Western Europe." The terrorist threat along the southern border has largely been stoked by illegal immigration opponents, such as Colorado Republican Tom Tancredo, who has spearheaded the "enforcement-only" approach to the border and opposes any guest worker or legalization program. Tancredo can often be heard on TV, speaking of prayer rugs and Qurans found in the desert. "It's not just people from Mexico coming across the Mexican border," he said on "The CBS Morning News" on Oct. 27, 2005. Tancredo and others point to the large number of "OTMs," or illegal immigrants from countries other than Mexico, caught along the southern border as cause for concern. In fiscal 2005, OTMs accounted for around 11 percent, or around 48,000, of the 438,932 apprehensions made in the U.S. Border Patrol's Tucson sector, according to Border Patrol public information officer Sean King. But only

a minuscule number of those OTMs - 21 in all of 2005, according to King - involved so-called "special interest aliens," or illegal immigrants from one of 35 countries with links to terrorism such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. None of the 21 was found to have links to terrorism, King said. Since the start of fiscal 2006 in October 2005, the Border Patrol in the Tucson sector has
caught 15 special-interest aliens. The vast majority - 99.5 percent - of people crossing the southern border illegally come from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Lt. Col. Margaret Stock, a professor of national security and immigration law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, said anti-immigration

forces emphasize the threat of terrorists entering from Mexico because it bolsters their cause to build up the border to keep out illegal immigrants. "Post-9/11, everybody is saying everything has to do with national security because those are the magical words that get you the resources," Stock said. "If you say, hey, my primary mission is to kick out the guys washing floors at Wal-Mart, it's not going to get you a lot of federal funding, and it doesn't create the fear necessary to generate the resources." Crossing the southern border doesn't fit al-Qaida's history, she said. "Read al-Qaida's training

manual," she said. "Their modus operandi has been to use the existing systems, to come in legally so people won't notice you." Stock argues that the problem of illegal immigration from Mexico and Latin America must be resolved on its own terms, and not on the back of a pumped-up terrorist threat. "I see all these resources that could be used on true security threats being wasted on people that are not security threats," Stock said, "and that means we're more likely to miss the bad guys."

No impact terrorism is over-hyped and wont actually cause that much harm. Shane 10 (Scott, International Herald Tribune, U.S. clamor over Qaeda may overstate its capability; Exaggerated coverage aids jihadists by creating an atmosphere of fear January, 14th 2010, lexis) As terrorist plots against the United States have piled up in recent months, politicians and the news media have sounded the alarm with a riveting message for Americans: Be afraid. Al Qaeda is on the march again, targeting the country from within and without, and your hapless government cannot protect you. But the politically charged clamor has lumped together disparate cases and obscured the fact that the jihadist enemies on American soil in 2009, rather than a single powerful and sophisticated juggernaut, were a scattered, uncoordinated group of amateurs who displayed more fervor than skill. Their weapons were old-fashioned guns and explosives - in several cases, duds supplied by FBI informants - with no trace of the biological or radiological poisons, let alone the nuclear bombs, that have long been the ultimate fear. And though 2009 brought more domestic plots, and more serious plots, than any recent year, their lethality was relatively modest. Exactly 14 of the about 14,000 murders in the
United States last year resulted from allegedly jihadist attacks: 13 people shot at Fort Hood in Texas in November and one at a military recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, in June. Such statistics would be no comfort, of course, if an attack with mass casualties were to succeed some day. Nor do they excuse the acknowledged missteps at the bulked-up American security agencies that permitted a Nigerian student to carry a makeshift bomb onto a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day the attempted attack that set off the flood of news coverage. But even that near miss, said Mark M. Lowenthal,

assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency for analysis from 2002 to 2005, may offer indirect evidence of the enemy's diminished strength, compared with the coordinated attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. ''Sending one guy on one plane is a huge step down,'' Mr. Lowenthal said. ''They're less capable, even if they're still lethal. They're not able to carry out the intense planning they once did.'' Too many unresolved capabilities for nuke terror to occur Mueller 10 (John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and author of Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda(Oxford University Press, 2009). Winter 2010 (Calming our Nuclear Jitters ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)) 1 An inadequately secured source of adequate quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) must be found. 2 The area must be entered while avoiding detection by local police and locals wary of strangers. 3 Several insiders who seem to know what they are doing must be corrupted. 4 All the insiders must remain loyal throughout the long process of planning and executing the heist, and there must be no consequential leaks. 5 The insiders must successfully seize and transfer the HEU, the transferred HEU must not be a scam or part of a sting, and it must not be of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence. 6 The HEU must be transported across the country across unfamiliar turf while its possessors are being pursued. 7 To get the HEU across one or more international borders, smugglers must be employed and must remain loyal despite, potentially,
The atomic terrorists to-do list the temptation of massive reward money, even as no consequential suspicion is generated in other smugglers using the same routes who may be interested in the

8 A machine shop must be set up in an obscure area with imported, sophisticated equipment without anyone becoming suspicious. 9 A team of highly skilled scientists and technicians must be assembled, and during production all members of the team must remain absolutely loyal to the cause and develop no misgivings or severe interpersonal or financial conflicts. 10 The complete team must be transported to the machine shop, probably from several countries, without suspicion and without consequential leaks from relatives, friends, and colleagues about the missing. 11 The team must have precise technical blueprints to work from (not general sketches) and must be able to modify these appropriately for the precise purpose at hand over months or even years of labor and without being able to test. 12 Nothing significant must go wrong during the long process of manufacture and assembly of the improvised nuclear device. 13 There must be no inadvertent leaks from the team. 14 Local and international police, on high (even desperate) alert, must not be able to detect the project using traditional policing methods as well as the most advanced technical detection equipment. 15 No locals must sense that something out of the ordinary is going on in the machine shop with the constant coming and going of nonlocal people. 16 The nuclear device, weighing a ton or more, must be smuggled without detection out of the machine shop to an international border. 17 The device must be transported to the target country either by trusting the commercial process filled with people on the alert for cargo of this sort or by clandestine means, which requires trusting corrupt co-conspirators who may also know about any reward money. 18 A team of completely loyal and technically accomplished co-conspirators must be assembled within or infiltrated into the target country. 19 The nuclear device must successfully enter the target country and be received by the in-country
same money.

co-conspirators. 20 A detonation team must transport the device to the target place and set it off without anybody noticing and interfering, and the untested and much-traveled device must not prove to be a dud. The probability of a terrorist attack is so low that the risk becomes acceptable around 1 in a million chance of success IF THEY EVEN GET A WEAPON. Mueller 10 (John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and author of Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda(Oxford University Press, 2009). Winter 2010 (Calming our Nuclear Jitters ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY))
The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely indeed, exceedingly likelyto come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be

At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls a case for fear, Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that
justified. if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are not the most comforting. Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he

there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But

AT: Econ/Stability I/L


Mexican economy is stable. Nevaer, 09 [LousNew America Media, News Report, In Global Economic Crisis, Mexico Is Resilient+ http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=b8dc03d6f2792eba9e84392106c2c6f4>
MERIDA, Mexico The economic crisis sweeping the globe has spared no nation, but some are showing remarkable resilience. Mexico's example, has

economic performance, for

shown tremendous strength. When the U.S. Federal Reserve extended a loan of $30 billion each to the central banks of Brazil, South Korea, Singapore and It stems from prudent economic policies implemented after the December 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso that sent the economy into a tailspin. At that time, President Ernesto Zedillo had been in office a few days, and his entire agenda was thrown into disarray by the crisis. The Clinton administration had to issue an
Mexico, Mexico did not touch those funds. It simply reinvested them in Treasury bonds, leaving them in accounts in New York. This is no accident. emergency $50 billion loan - which Mexico paid back ahead of schedule and with interest - and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, helped craft a recovery program. It was a painful adjustment as budgets were slashed, fiscal restraint was implemented across the board, and the Mexican people saw their investments and savings diminish. That was 15 years ago, and the

lessons learned the hard way are now paying off: Mexico's stock market fell 23 percent in 2008, the "best" performing major index at a time when the U.S. markets
fell 38 percent and Russian markets collapsed by an astounding 70 percent. Last fall, some feared that the Mexican economy would not be able to escape the turmoil engulfing the United States, and the Mexican peso fell almost 30 percent vis--vis the American dollar. It has since recovered, although

it has suffered a 20 percent devaluation since the economic crisis began last summer. These currency fluctuations reflect the fact that, because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, neither Mexico nor Canada have "decoupled" from the U.S. economy. There are several reasons for Mexico's economic resilience. One is the fiscal restraint that Zedillo initiated and that his successor, Vicente Fox, continued. Fox, a former corporate executive, made significant strides in eliminating Mexico's foreign debt. Mexico's current president, Felipe Calderon, has kept spending in line, even as revenues have increased. When disaster struck, Mexico had a balanced budget, almost no foreign debt and rising federal revenues, allowing it to intervene to stabilize prices. Mexico also dodged the housing speculation that brought its neighbor to its knees. Mexico's financial system has always been stringent in extending credit. Americans roll their eyes at the bureaucracy this entailed - two forms of ID are required to open a bank
account in Mexico; when customers request checks, they have to pick them up at the bank, where their signature and ID are verified; credit card applications must be made in person at the financial institution, and not over the phone or through unsolicited mail-in applications. As a result, "identity

theft" is almost non-existent in Mexico, and it was nearly impossible for a housing bubble to emerge there. Another factor is the windfall oil profits despite the sudden drop in oil prices. When oil
peaked at $147 a barrel last summer, there was disbelief around the world: Would it shoot up to $200 or fall back? The conventional wisdom was that $100 a barrel for oil was the new reality going forward, and there was a frenzy to lock in prices through futures contracts. Mexican officials at Pemex, the state-owned oil monopoly, didn't believe that price was sustainable; their economic models indicated that, with slacking demand due to the recession, a price range between $60 and $80 was "sustainable." Other countries - most notably Venezuela and Russia - were more ambitious, and reckless. Both countries let spending explode, believing that they could finance anything they wanted. The economies in both countries today are in freefall. Mexico, by comparison, was

prudent, saving the oil windfall, and Mexican traders implemented a strategy that hinged on the price of oil falling below the $60 to $80 range. "They're great traders," Phil Flynn, an analyst at Alaron Trading Corp., said of Pemex futures traders. "If the economy continues to slow, they're looking like geniuses." The world economy has more than slowed: It has hit a wall. And Mexico is collecting $90 to $110 per barrel today, for oil that is trading in the $38 to $45 range at the beginning of 2009. Having hedged its exports, Mexico is getting a premium, and a significant windfall that will total several billion dollars this year, enough to sustain social spending without massive federal deficits