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<<<<Insert Link>>>> Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence Ellis 12
Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- The Inter-American Dialogue - The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf
At the political level, US

engagement with Latin American countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th
century Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to keep China out of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin

Americas own leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United States. Colombias close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC.28 The same logic has also applied to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with the United States. The degree to which a bad relationship with the United States has propelled a positive relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez to diversify away from Venezuelan
dependence on the United States as the nations primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to engage with China, and other countries, to procure military hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

Chinas influence in Latin America is key to their soft power Malik, 06 PhD in International Relations (Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," 6/12, http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org) China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to
subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States,

that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa, China

is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently
in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing

cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global influence . China's Grand
Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build

a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales.

Chinese international influence is an existential impact it controls every scenario for extinction Zhang 2012 (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. The Rise of Chinas
Political Softpower 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm) As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty , international conflict , the clash of civilizations and environmental protection . Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita
consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In

contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security . In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations
coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China

strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This

philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases . Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty,
prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the

rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

Uniqueness

Cuba

General Influence
China is working closely with Cuba now- just met with Cubas VP Xinhuanet 6/18/13 Sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet is an important central news
service-oriented website, an important information organ of the central government, and an important platform for building up China's online international communication capacity. Chinese President meets Cuban VP on stronger tieshttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htmSJH
BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) --

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first vicepresident of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro. Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship with Cuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own development and common prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community, Xi said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month. China would like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic cooperation and cultural mutual learning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American and Caribbean states. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America. Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.

China is beating out US for Cuban influence Boston Globe 13 (Cubas reforms pave way for new US policy, too. Bostonglobe.com 9 February 13. Web.)
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-intocentury/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html

Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills.

China maintains high influence in the squo MFA 6/18/13 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA or MFA) of the Government of the People's Republic of China is an executive agency responsible for foreign relations between the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world President

Xi Jinping Meets with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Stressing to Push China-Cuba, ChinaLatin America Relations for Greater Development http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml) SJH
On June 18, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping asked Diaz-Canel to convey his sincere greetings to President Raul Castro of Cuba and Fidel Castro. Xi Jinping said that China

and Cuba have always understood and supported each other since the establishment of diplomatic relationship. In the new century, the China-Cuba relationship has been increasingly mature with more content of cooperation and strong vitality. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish the traditional friendship with Cuba and is willing to work with the Cuban side to maintain high-level exchanges, to strengthen party-to-party exchanges and to share the experiences of state governance, to enhance political mutual trust, to build up consensus, to deepen mutual understanding, to expand practical cooperation and to boost development and common prosperity in the two countries. China is willing to
coordinate and cooperate closely with Cuba on international and regional affairs and to make positive contributions to enhancing the influence of developing countries and promoting fairness and justice of the international community. Xi Jinping said, I paid a visit recently to three Latin American and Caribbean countries. I was deeply impressed by the vigour and potential of development of the Latin American and Caribbean region. China

is ready to be a good partner of Latin American and Caribbean countries, with political mutual respect and trust, complementary and mutual benefit in economy and trade, and exchanges in culture. China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish an overall China-Latin America cooperation
mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum as the core to push forward mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. China appreciates the positive efforts of Cuba to promote the overall China-Latin America cooperation and is looking forward to greater development of China-Latin America relations while Cuba holding the rotating presidency of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro to Xi Jinping. Diaz-Canel said Cuba

places great importance on Cuba-China relations and is willing to work with China to strengthen high-level visits and communication, to expand friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation and to push for greater development of relationship between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America.

Trade Influence
Cuba and China deepening trade ties HavanaTimes 12 (Cuba and China strengthening trade relations. HavanaTimes.com. 27 September 2012. Web.)
The 25th Meeting of the Cuba-China Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Relations took place yesterday in Havana, where both countries expressed their willingness to deepen ties. According to the Prensa Latina news agency, talks gave priority to issues such as the provision of spare parts for automotive equipment on the island, as well as Chinas participation in the islands program for the development of renewable energy. On the Chinese side, Commerce Minister Chen Deming said that sugar, nickel and biotechnology are the main items exported to his country from Cuba. Cuban President Raul Castro visited the Asian giant this past July, at which time important agreements were signed in the areas of health, information technology, banking, agriculture and customs. At the end of the first half of this year, trade between the two countries exceeded $870 million, making China the second largest trading partner globally with the Island for the eighth consecutive year .

China building Cuban merchant fleet in the squo- boosts influence CAN 7/11/13 ( Cuban News Agency This page offers users news social, economic, political, sports and
cultural developments that take place in Cuba and in third world nations) Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm- SJH
Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier HAVANA, Cuba, July 11 (acn)

Cuba received in the Chinese city of Shanghai the ninth of 10 bulk carriers as part of a contract with the shipyards of that Asian port to develop the islands merchant fleet. Cuban News Agency Gertrudis is the name of the boat, which was received by Cuban authorities during a
ceremony at the shipyard located on Conngming Island, in Shanghai. Executives with Chinas National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and with the Trade Minister attended the ceremony. Cubas commercial attach in China, Tania Velazquez, was present at the shipyard along

Shanghai shipyard president Ma Shixiong described as fruitful the current collaboration between China and Cuba and he stressed his companys commitment to keep strengthening such links, which were established 50 years ago at the diplomatic level. Tania Velazquez recalled the historic friendly and cooperation relations between Beijing and Havana and she noted that the construction of these boats is the result of those bonds. Sources with the Cuban embassy in China stressed the strategic importance of these boats for Cuba, and the current bilateral economic and commercial relations.
representatives of the ACEMEX Company, engineers and technicians, who supervised the construction of boat.

China is boosting Cuban influence in the squo- just supplied them with tech. infrastructure Nelson 7-13 , Ana, who teaches New Media and Development Communication at Columbia's School of
International and Public Affairs China influence in Cuba http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/ SJH Jennifer Hernandez of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami has posted a note on her research on Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba. She notes that "through bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence," and looks at the activities of two large Chinese telecommunication equipment companies, Huawei and ZTE. Much of her emphasis is on surveillance and she concludes that "Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans."
Internet surveilance is pretty well taken for granted in Cuba and China, and it is deplorable, but I wonder about the up side.

Chinese control of telecommunications in Cuba grants regional influence and espionage opportunities Hernandez, 13 (Jennifer, research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami, Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba, Cuba Transition Project, Issue 186, March 13, 2013, online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm, accessed 7/16/13) PE Both Chinese companies have commercial presence in Cuba and actively participate in conferences organized by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Among these conferences are the XIV Edition of Converging Technologies: Integration and Independence held in Havana in 2011, where Huawei was one of the sponsors, and the V International Symposium of Telecommunications, where both Huawei and ZTE Corporation actively participated. (10) Ramiro Valdes, Cubas Vice-President, Communist party member and former Minister of Information and Communication, position he held until 2011, is an avid supporter of restriction and censorship of information technologies. It is not a coincidence that Ramiro Valdes promotes the commercialization and application of Chinese software and equipment that can be used to monitor and be remotely accessed. Cuba and China have been two amorous friends since the 1960s when Cuba became the first country in the Caribbean and Latin America to normalize relations with the Asian nation. Since that time, both countries have promoted communist ideology and have cooperated and coordinated with each other at multilateral organizations and on the issue of human rights. Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans. Perhaps, the Peoples Republic of China is also equipping an anti-American leadership with sophisticated communication and network technology capable of cyber espionage 90 miles from our shores.

US Losing Influence
US influence in Cuba is decreasing Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust Fidel Castro from the helm of Cuba in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was also concerned about Latin American countries emulating Cuba, particularly its geopolitical stance in the cold war, and thus undermining American leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same situation, just a more modern iteration. What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass, says Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis." We were concerned about our sphere of influence that we had taken for granted. *Today+ we cannot dominate this region anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within the region, and to some extent to Cuba still.

US is losing Cuban influence to China Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as it focused on terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the past decade Latin American democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, with Latin America no longer looking just north to the US for leadership and investment, but to India, China, and Russia. China surpassed the US as Brazils biggest trading partner in 2009.

Cuba/U.S. Relations Low

Cuba/U.S. Relations are low history of isolation, Alan Gross incident, and discontent with Obama Hanson and Lee, 13 (director of policy and outreach at One Acre Fund and Senior Production Editor
on the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Cuba Relations, January 31, 2013, Online, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, accessed 7/16/13) PE What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to nonfamily members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castroaccused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

A2: Cuba is Independent

Cuba can be controlled, but only by China multiple political weaknesses Werlau, 96 (New Jerseybased consultant and executive director of the nonprofit Cuba Archive,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT, page 493-194, ASCE Cuba, Online, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf, accessed 7/17/13) PE Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is very vertical, market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherently constrained. This negates the main theoretical argument for engagement and renders it essentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment
in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis on China concludes that economic engagement has also failed to bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism there because the three elements that would foster reform the rule of law, political accountability and a free presschallenge the security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: If

China is permitted to merely pick and choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable, and to resist those that push change in the direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch toward infinity.229 The same selective approach to capitalist mechanisms is the one applied by the Cuban leadership, and it has been effective. A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact on the feasibility
and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the means to exercise selfdetermination. When

the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regime legitimization is not the issue; the issue is capacity to exercise control. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism, while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The

core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.

Mexico

General Influence
Chinese Influence Spreads to Mexico Xinhua 13 ( The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a Strategic Partnership With
Mexico, People's Daily Online, http://www.trevorloudon.com/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pacechina-enters-into-a-strategic-partneship-with-mexico/). From the Communist Party of China website: MEXICO CITY Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the
development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has

entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each others concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each others core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each others development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries,
witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico

and China are each others important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said his visit to Mexico

aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico

relations

will enter a new stage, he said.

China and Mexico are upgrading relations now Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the
biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. China, Mexico upgrade bilateral relationship, June 5, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/201306/05/content_29033628.htm)
Chinese President Xi

Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for
a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the

two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to
constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the

two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues
concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies.

Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to
promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction, environmental protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China

and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote
tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly,

China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance,
energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the ChinaLatin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level.

Mexico wants closer trade ties to China Mallen 6-28 (Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the Internation Business Times, former employee
BBC America in New York, La Repblica in Lima, La2 TV in Madrid and the UN in Brussels, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For the U.S.?, 2013, International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981) Even more significant was Xis visit to Mexico. President Enrique Pea Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Bidens visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called brutal and tense by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrs Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America

Washingtons backyard in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogot, no
agreements were signed during his trip.

Economic Influence
China increased influence in Xis recent tour plus, economic relations are zero-sum Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.

China Is increasing influence in Mexico Now Economist 6/13(Economist, The Economist is an English-language weekly news and international
affairs publication owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd. and edited in offices in London, t targets highly educated readers and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policymakers. , Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3) SJH
Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China

is developing its own sphere of

influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The

visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.

China Values Sino Influence in Mexico-Trying to improve them Castillo 13 (E. Eduardo, Spanish News Editor, Leaders of Mexico, China promise broadened relations,
move toward more balanced trade, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, JUNE 4, 2013, http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promisebroadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/)

MEXICO CITY - The

presidents of China and Mexico agreed Tuesday to broaden relations between their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto said they are transforming the relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favour of China. The leaders signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and co-operation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure. "Today, we are giving way to a new relationship, a new phase of the relationship," Pena Nieto said in a joint statement. Xi said China wanted better relations with Mexico, which he called "a great friend and a great partner in the Latin American region."

Sino-Mexican Trade Increasing due to spread of Influence Fox News Latino 13 (China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico, FOX
News Network, LLC, June 02, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/chinapresident-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO)
Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China

needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national
and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State

oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of
crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In

April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs ."

Chinese-Mexican relations are increasing new deal with Pemex Globalpost 13 (Globalpost, an online US news company that focuses on international news. Pemex
and Sinopec agree to boost Mexican oil exports to China, April 6, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130406/pemex-and-sinopec-agree-boostmexican-oil-exports-china)
The Mexican oil company Pemex

signed Saturday on the southern Chinese island of Hainan an accord with the second largest oil company of China, Sinopec, to strengthen trade relations between the two firms and promote a larger volume of crude exports to the Asian giant, the second largest petroleum importer in the world. The accord was signed by the director general of Pemex, Emilio Lozoya, and the president of the XinXing Cathay International Group, a subsidiary of Sinopec, Sha Ming, in the presence of Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto. The pact marks the de facto opening of trade relations between the two giants, something of particular interest to the world's second economy because of its need for alternative sources of supply. The agreement was signed shortly after Pea Nieto met with the new president of China, Xi Jinping, during the Boao Forum on economic issues. The Mexican leader is one of the first Latin
American heads of state to meet with the new Chinese president, along with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The Boao Forum, an economic summit that has been called the "Asian Davos," began its 2013 meeting Saturday in China with a marked Latin American character, thanks to the presence as speakers of the presidents of Peru, Ollanta Humala, and of Mexico, Enrique Pea Nieto.

China is just beginning a strategic economic partner relationship with Mexico Associated Press 6/4/2013 (Associated Press is a multi-national non-profit news agency, Leaders of
Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade, Associated Press, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relationsmove-toward-more-balanced/) The presidents of China and Mexico have agreed to broaden relations between their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto say they are transforming their relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favor of China. The leaders on Tuesday signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and cooperation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure.

China expanding influence in Mexico - PEMEX Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW

China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Pea Nieto shared with Xi is that though
Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China.

China expanding influence in Mexico USA Today 13 (President Xi uses trip to strengthen Chinas influence. USA Today 6 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/ EW In Mexico, President

Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links . Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports 15% came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion 1.5% to China. "The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there."

China and Mexico forming stronger trade ties opens nation up to more influence from China NYT 13 (Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building trip to Mexico. New York Times 4 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0 EW

Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward changing their frosty relationship. Mexicos government would like to narrow its large trade gap with China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexicos Ministry of Economy. The two countries announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade and education. We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.

China and Mexico trading raw materials now builds influence Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Upon his arrival,

Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexicos huge trade deficit. This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China, said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil. China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete, said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs.

Chinas has influence in Mexico Pemex Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html Not coincidentally, Xis

visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Pea Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more. During Pea Nietos April visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.

China-Mexico Relations
Pena Nieto Resets China-Mexico Relations Zhang 13 (Tao, staffwriter Caoxin, 4-26-13, Caoxin Online, Building Bridges, http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-26/100521052.html)
Mexico's new president, Enrique

Pena Nieto, wants to redefine bilateral relations with China. In a trip to the southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old Pena Nieto met with the head of China's new leadership, Xi Jinping; announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with China; and repeatedly sent the message that the two economies can complement each other, rather than compete. "I've come to reaffirm, and to also confirm very clearly, the interest Mexico has to expand its relationship with China," Pena Nieto said in an exclusive interview with Caixin on April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both
are major suppliers of manufactured goods, especially to the United States. Mexico was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in 2001 to pave the latter's way into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico's trade deficit with China is the largest among its trade partners.

Past Issues Dont MatterNew Chapter in Mexico-China Relations GbTimes 13 (gb Times, 6-6-13, GbTimes, China, Mexico seek strategic partnership, end to trade issues
http://gbtimes.com/focus/politics/news/china-mexico-seek-strategic-partnership-end-trade-issues#sthash.tVMHq3TW.dpuf)

China and Mexico signed deals on Tuesday to step up Mexico's exports to China, as the two emerging economies seek to 'relaunch' ties that have been dogged by trade imbalances and rivalry in international markets. Following a meeting between visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pea Nieto in Mexico City, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a series of agreements. New contact
with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development - Xi Jinping The deals enable Mexico to export pork and tequila to the Chinese market after years of negotiation, and Mr Xi

announced that China also plans to sign contracts to purchase Mexican products worth an additional $1 billion. "New
contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development," the Chinese leader told Mexico's Senate on the second day of his visit. China's investment in and pursuit of raw materials and oil in Latin America is in contrast to its relationship with Mexico, which has competing with China in the US market in sectors such as manufactured goods. The

two countries also agreed to move to balance Mexico's trade deficit with China.

Mexico and China Deepening Relations Now Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News, 6-5-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm)
Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico

and China are each other's important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. Pena Nieto believed Xi's visit will advance bilateral cooperation into a new stage and promote bilateral ties to a higher level. Xi, for his part, said the Chinese and Mexican peoples feel close to each other, as the two countries
are both ancient civilizations and have a glorious history of fighting bravely for national independence and liberation. Since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972, China and Mexico have achieved rapid development of friendly cooperation in all fields, shown mutual understanding and support to each other, and maintained close cooperation in international affairs, Xi said, adding that they are good friends and good partners. The Chinese president noted that China and Mexico are faced with the common task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi

said his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. "I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage," he said. Xi, accompanied by Pena Nieto, then
inspected Mexico's guard of honor. Members of the Mexican cabinet and military leaders also attended the welcoming ceremony.

Economic Cooperation Means Closer Mexico-China Relations Now NewsAsia 13 (NewsAsia, 6-5-2013, Channel NewsAsia, China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexico-presidents/698924.html) MEXICO CITY: Chinese President Xi

Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly to access international markets, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership. Xi on Wednesday begins his
second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic powerhouse, which will include a speech before Mexico's congress. Xi arrived in Mexico after visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad and Tobago. On Friday Xi travels to the United States for a much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack Obama. China

has in recent years aggressively pushed trade and investment ties with the developing world, particularly Africa and Latin America, to secure raw materials to fuel its economic growth and wield greater geopolitical influence in relation to the United States. On Tuesday Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto pledged to enhance diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth over their long-standing rivalry on exporting products to the United States. "We expect to broaden investments of Chinese capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters late Tuesday, a move that will create
more jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we have free trade agreements." Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and Canada. Xi in turn praised

the "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. In a joint statement Mexico and China agreed to increase talks at various government levels "to deepen mutual trust and conduct bilateral dialogues on strategic issues," Chinese state news service Xinhua reported. Closer ties include more coordination in forums like the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, Xinhua said.

A2: China-Mexico Econ Comp

Perceived competition doesnt hamper soft power Xinhua 13 (Xinhua, 6-4-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico set to further promote trade ties,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/04/c_132428986.htm) Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to Mexico is a sign of deepening cooperation and indicates the two countries are eager to boost their economic and trade ties, officials and experts say. Xi's three-day stay in Mexico starting later Tuesday will include his second meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in less than two months. He will also meet parliament leaders, entrepreneurs and members of the Chinese community. The two sides are expected to sign a series of economic and trade agreements and issue a joint statement on further development of bilateral ties. China

is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while

the latter is China's second-largest in Latin America. Two-way trade jumped from about 5 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to
more than 36 billion dollars in 2012. In a written interview with Mexican media before his three-nation Latin American tour, Xi said China was ready to work with Mexico to expand and optimize bilateral trade, raising the possibility of starting negotiations on a bilateral free trade deal.

Officials and experts believe trade relations between China and Mexico are complementary rather than competitive, and the two countries should make more efforts to identify the complementarities in their economies. In a trip to China in early April, four months after he took office, Pena Nieto met Xi in China's southern city of Sanya and the two leaders agreed to work together to enhance trust and achieve win-win cooperation.

No Conflict from Trade ImbalanceTequila Pact Proves Prados 13, (Luis Prados, writer for El Pais, 6-5-2013, El Pais, China and Mexico sign tequila pact to boost bilateral trade,
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/06/05/inenglish/1370460721_956003.html) Chinese President Xi Jinping continued his first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean on Wednesday after signing a

far-reaching bilateral trade agreement with Mexican President Enrique Prez Nieto. Called the tequila pact because the distilled beverage is one of the major products Mexico will export to China as part of a $1-billion package the accord is geared toward offsetting the trade imbalance between Beijing and Mexico City. Xi and Pea Nieto agreed to put aside their countrys past differences over trade issues. According to Mexican statistics, Mexico exported about $5.7 billion in products to China last year while it imported $57 billion from the Asian giant. At a news conference, Pea Nieto said he immediately touched on the need to search for improved balance in trade. He also promised Xi to resolve in a friendly way Mexicos complaint lodged against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for unfair business practices in the textile sector. Mexico charges that China is selling its products under price while at the same time giving
government subsidies to the industry. Besides tequila, which is Mexicos national beverage, Xi said that China has committed itself to purchasing more Mexican pork products. The

two nations agreed to create a joint working group of businessmen and government officials to seek out investment opportunities in both countries. Pea Nieto said that Mexico
could also become a gateway for Chinese products to other Latin American nations, as well as the United States. Xi explained to reporters that Beijing was interested in investing in Mexicos energy and mining industries, as well as in infrastructure projects, and announced that in 2015 Mexico has agreed to host the first ever summit between Chinese and Latin American businessmen. The two leaders didnt give any precise figures on how much money they had pledged in investment or give a timetable as to when some of these accords will be put into place.

Pea Nieto and Xi, however, both stressed that they were willing to work to forge new relations and cooperate in international forums.

Venezuela

General Influence
China will keep up relations with Maduro Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 4 -16 (Governmental
organization in charge of cataloguing foreign affairs, President Xi Jinping Congratulates Maduro on Presidential Election Win, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1032740.shtml)
On April 15, 2013, Chinese

President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Nicolas Maduro on his winning the Venezuelan presidency. In his message, Xi said with the joint efforts of the leaders of both sides, China-Venezuela relations have been developing remarkably since the two countries forged strategic partnership of common development in 2001. "China and Venezuela have become good friends of mutual trust and good partners of close cooperation," he said. Xi stressed the great importance he attached to developing ties with Venezuela, adding China is willing to join hands with Venezuela to carry forward bilateral ties into the future and open up new prospects for the relations.

Despite risks, China wont abandon ties Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, What Chavez Taught China, Inter-American Dialogue, 1-18, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/) Though more aware of country-specific risk, China is unlikely to abandon its deals and strategic agreements with Venezuela and other risky nations in the region. Chinas leaders instead are genuinely committed to expanding relations throughout Latin America in coming years, including investment and lending in a wider variety of sectors. Recent agreements with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) suggest as much. The region as a whole is looking east for economic opportunity. A new Venezuelan leadership-whether chavista or notwould be likely to do the same. Chinas strategic partnerships with Venezuela and other countries will remain intact. Its foreign policy apparatus is looking to forge stronger and longer-term friendships, and its firms will continue to engage the region based on a combination of Chinese domestic interests and profit-driven motives. But the trend is toward comprehensive risk assessment and a more cautious, research-based, and well-informed approach to the region. Latin America should expect ever more methodical engagement from China.

Without US aid, Maduro increases Chinese ties Negroponte, 4-16 (Diana Villiers, senior fellow with the Latin American Initiative under Foreign Policy
at Brookings, former trade lawyer and professor of history, Maduro As President of Venezuela: What to Expect, Brookings Institute, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/16venezuela-maduro-negroponte)
With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB),

Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. empire. Maduros

supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro

has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuelas debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is
critical. Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since

2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuelas national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Economic Influence
China expanding influence in Venezuela now strong oil partnership Laguna and Cunningham 7-2-13 (Francisco and Jennie Linder. Francisco is the owner of Translegal LLC. Francisco assists clients
with every aspect of international commerce, including compliance with regulatory issues, obtaining required licenses and permits, establishing subsidiaries / representative offices. He has a JD from the University of Arizona and a BA in English from UC Berkeley. Jennie Linder Cunningham is a partner at Translegal LLC. Chinas Economic Influence in Latin America. Translegalllc.com. 2 July 2013. Web.) http://translegalllc.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/chinas-economic-influence-in-latin-america/

Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have invested heavily in Venezuela, often following a loans-foroil deal pattern. Reports indicate that the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has now become the countrys primary foreign source of financing. China currently reports 230,000 barrels imported per day, although official PDVSA (Venezuelas state oil company) reports ~ 319,000 exported barrels. This discrepancy indicates that China is not only importing oil from Latin America for domestic energy security, but that Chinese NOCs are simultaneously reselling their equity oil on the global market. With an almost 100,000 barrel-per-day disparity, it appears that Chinese NOCs (which are heavily state-supported) have entered the international oil trade, not just the import business.

Chinas influence on Venezuela is growing and sustainable The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3

The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary . The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.

China is expanding influence foreign investment and manufactured goods The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he

may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and

Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost
manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports

China has major influence opportunity Venezuelan debt Marquez 13 (Humberto Marquez, Journalist at IPS specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with Agence France-Presse
(AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas. China Maps out Venezuelas Valuable Mining Resources. Inter Press Service 28 February 2013. Web.) http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/china-maps-out-venezuelas-valuable-miningresources/

The prospecting agreement is part of a growing alliance between the two countries, which has turned Venezuela into a major source of petroleum for China, while the Asian giant is meeting the South American countrys growing need for credit to finance its constant outflow of public funds. Venezuela exports over 600,000 barrels of crude oil a day to China, according to Ramrez, although other sources put the figure at half that much. Beijing, in turn, has granted Caracas more than 38 billions dollars in credits, and at the same time it participates in energy and construction projects.

China is main source for Venezuelan oil funds, cheap interest rates make it attractive to Venezuela Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26, Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html) One vehicle for the lending is a joint fund to finance infrastructure projects set up in 2007 by CDB and Venezuelas Bank for Social & Economic Development. To date, China has contributed $16 billion, while Venezuela has committed half that amount, according to the Venezuelan government. Separately Chavez also secured a $20 billion loan from CDB in 2010, half of which is payable in U.S. dollars and half in renminbi. Chavez said this month that hes seeking a third credit line. Were thinking about 2013, he told reporters Sept. 11. I sent Hu Jintao a letter and the teams are already working on it, he said, referring to the Chinese president. Venezuela pays off the loans with oil, the amount of which fluctuates depending on the price of crude. Currently debt- servicing consumes about 200,000 barrels of the 640,000 a day that Venezuela sends China, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25, or about 9 percent of production. Venezuela relies on oil for 95 percent of its exports and half of public spending. The savings for Venezuela are significant. As a result of Chavezs nationalization drive and inflation that has remained above 18 percent since 2007, the countrys borrowing costs have soared to the highest among major emerging markets. The extra yield investors demand to own Venezuelan dollar debt rather than U.S. Treasuries
widened 5 basis points, or 0.05 percentage point, to 987 at 10 a.m. in Caracas, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.s EMBI Global index. Cheap Credit Venezuela

pays no more than 6 percent interest on its loans from China compared with 12 percent it pays for bonds issued in capital markets, Ramirez told El Nacional in an interview published Sept. 19. Ramirezs office didnt immediately respond to a request to confirm his comments as reported by El Nacional. The lower cost has allowed Chavez to avoid tapping global investors. While the government and state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA sold a record $17.5 billion of dollar- denominated debt in 2011, so far this year PDVSA has issued just $3 billion.

A2: Chavez Death Changed Everything

No change in relations post-Chavez Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Chinese Press on Chavezs Death, China-Latin America Blog, InterAmerican Dialogue, 3-14, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/) The following news stories, assembled by former Dialoguer Peng Ruijie, were published in the Chinese press following Hugo Chavez's death on March 5th. Although the reports offer a variety of perspectives on Chavez, most conclude that little will change with respect to the China-Venezuela relationship. According to most, the results of upcoming elections in Venezuela will have little effect on China's various agreements and lending arrangements in Venezuela. Xinhua News - Predicts stability in Venezuela because of Chavezs appointment of Maduro. States that Maduro has a 60 percent chance of winning in the upcoming elections. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Xu Shicheng, notes that even if Capriles wins the
election, there will be some continuity in terms of social policy and that Capriles might even try to lead other leftist countries in the region. Xu goes on to say that a

Maduro or Capriles government will still maintain good relations with China and will honor Chinese agreements in such areas as energy, infrastructure and finance. The report concludes that the political transition will have little effect on China-Venezuela relations.

General

Political Relations
Latin America wants China now because theyre looking to counterbalance the U.S. Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao celebrate at closing of investment and trade seminar. Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and Western Institutions. Chinas historical status as a leader of the developing world positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a great admirer of Mao, while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simn Bolvar would have been great friends. While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position of the PRC as a geopolitical alternative to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the antiU.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.

Chinas expanding political relations Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 3-4, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, and are also perhaps more visibly characterised by the often successful attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina and Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodities exploration companies. On the political side, Beijings involvement in the Western hemisphere has materialised in the establishment of socalled strategic partnerships with several states in the region; Chinas training of increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and attempts to expand the ties of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political parties across the continent. These examples of the intensifying Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of the United States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that China is taking advantage of a power vacuum in the region that was created by the United States and Russias declining interest in Latin America.

Uniqueness China is increasing influence in Latin America recent trip proves Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America. China is increasing its funding to the region just as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin America, told Bloomberg. "The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. Xi's tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always making reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."

Economic Relations
China & Latin American economies are become dependent on one another Schmidt & Nicholson 10 (Susan & Tara, Susan Schmidt is a partner at the law firm Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips and Managing Director at ManattJones Global Strategies. Tara Nicholson is an intern with ManattJones Global Strategies and a candidate for a dual MA/MBA degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Chinas Relationship with Latin America in Perspective, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP April 18, 2010, www.manatt.com/Articles/China%E2%80%99s_Relationship_with_Latin_America_in_Perspective.aspx# sthash.uZO1xhJ1.dpuf) Chinas relations with Latin America are driven by the joint desire for mutually beneficial economic relations and a multi-polar world. The countrys increasing presence in Latin America is neither a panacea for the regions economic challenges nor a substitute for its historical economic relationships. Although China is laying the groundwork to expand its influence in Latin America, that influence will primarily serve Chinas own commercial interests. Chinas largely economic focus in Latin America is evident by contrasting the breath and depth of Chinas interests and relations in Southeast Asia. The opportunity for Latin America then lies in making Chinas interests a part of long -term economic strategy in the region. Long-term country attempts to turn Chinas primarily economic interests into political tools are likely to be unsuccessful. Regional growth and diversification will not be achieved misunderstanding Chinas primarily economic interests. The challenge is to transform the opportunity provided by a more diverse trade and economic relationship into domestic benefits and sustained growth and development. That will be accomplished only with perspective on an increasingly multilateral economic structure.

Chinas influence in Latin America is growing Sarmiento-Saher 13 (Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. China and Latin America: Big Business
and Big competition. The Diplomat 14 March 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-andbig-competition/ EW According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United

States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America. China is quickly catching up to many of LACs traditional trading partners, however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region
a trend that continues to grow.

Uniqueness More evidence multiple warrants Darlington, 12 (Shasta, international correspondent for CNN based in Brazil, China-Latam economic
ties tightening, Latam is not my typo, thats totes on CNN, November 19, 2012, Online, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/18/business/china-latam-ties, accessed 7/17/13) PE The rise of China in Latin America, long considered the United States' "backyard," took many by surprise. Now, its economic influence in the region is only expected to grow. For the past decade China has fueled high growth in major commodity producing countries like Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru

with its appetite for raw materials such as iron ore, soybeans and copper. In fact, China replaced the United States as the top trading partner in Brazil and Chile and is on the way to doing so in many others countries in Latin America. That relationship made China popular with many countries weary of trying to get their goods onto American and European shelves. But when global demand for Chinese goods dried up in 2008 and 2009, the relationship with Latin America evolved. "China figured out that Latin America could be a very good alternative market for its surplus," said Roberto Dumas Damas, a professor at Sao Paulo's INSPER business school. The flood of cheap exports from China sparked a backlash from many of the hardest-hit industries, but overall, the trade relationship still tips in Latin America's favor. Brazil's trade surplus with China, for example, was $11.5 billion in 2011. China followed up not only with cheap exports of its goods, but hefty investments in Latin America to make it easier to reach the region's growing middle class consumers. "There were two waves of foreign direct investment," Dumas said. "First to guarantee access to raw materials, like land for soybeans and iron ore plants." "In the second wave," he added. "Companies want to explore the region's consumer markets." He pointed to plans by Chinese carmakers Chery and JAC carmakers to build automobiles in South America. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, Chinese foreign investment in Latin America jumped to $10.5 billion in 2010 from $7.3 billion in 2009.

U.S. Inf Low

U.S. influence low Snowden affair Riechmann, 13 (Deb, Associated Press, Edward Snowden Affair Dampens U.S.-Latin America Ties,
Huffington Post, Online, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowdenus_n_3591560.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry once referred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare already thorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua have already said they'd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States for revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the US and these countries were already testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improve ties with friendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback. Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil, which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America. That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard. And all this comes right after President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in Latin America.

A2: Obama Tour

Obamas tour isnt a non-unique Obamas still perceived as abandoning Latin America to China Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 8, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE Obamas Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that the Chinese presence in Latin America is not a high priority for Washington; Chinas relations with the region have remained a minor issue because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance for the United States. Washingtons perception might change soon, though, as there are already a number of factors that it is starting to become concerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and economic orders and deepening economic integration between itself and Latin American countries. With regard to these core interests, the US is closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether China is disrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For the time being, however, China is not a firmly established power in Latin America, and Beijings rise on the continent is a relatively recent phenomenon.

A2: China Trade Low

It doesnt matter if Chinese trade with Latin America is low, influence is based on perception of the future Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/17/13) PE In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the worlds youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although Chinas current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism, while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as the wave of the future. In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

A2: Biden Visit

Bidens visit wasnt enough multiple warrants Ellis, 13 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Chinas New Backyard, Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013, Onlinehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america, accessed 7/19/13) PE In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla PersadBissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States.

Links

General

Generic
US still has dog in fight over Latin America, increased imports, economic dependency Sol M. Linowitz Forum 12 (Bi-annual forum to discuss western hemispheric political conditions,
hosted by Inter-American Dialogue and affiliates Genaro Arriagada, former minister of the presidency of Chile and ambassador of Chile to the United States, chairman of the Board of Radio Cooperativa and national director of the NO Campaign; Sergio Bitar, former Chilean minister of public works under President Michelle Bachelet from 2008 to 2010, minister of education, minister of mining, a senator, president of the Party for Democracy (PPD) on two occasions, and author of numerous books about Chilean politics and international relations; Nora Lustig, former visiting Shapiro professor of international affairs at George Washington University, president and professor of the Department of Economics of the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico, and professor at the Center of Economic Studies at the Colegio de Mexico; Margaret Myers, Director, China and Latin America Program, InterAmerican Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government; Manuel Orozco, chair of US Foreign Service Institutes division on Central America and the Caribbean, senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, adjunct professor at the School for International Service at American University; Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue, April, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55
percent of the regions imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin Americas imports . China and Europe have made

huge inroads . Chinas share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia . Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves . Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazils second largest trading partner, just behind China . Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace . They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin Americas growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the regions markets and resources . While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the regions expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability . Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia. Chinese view Latin American investment as key to their global standing Trinh et al, 06 Senior Economist (Tamara, Silja Voss, Researcher, Steffen Dyck, "China's commodity hunger: Implications for
Africa and Latin America" Deutsche Bank Research)

Latin America have become destinations for Chinese investment Even if the spotlight has been on the massive inflows of foreign investment money into China in recent years, China is increasingly investing abroad as well. We
B. Africa and estimate the stock of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) to have totalled USD 44-50 bn at the end of 2005. While the largest part of these flows remains within Asia (60% of flows in 2005, 73% of the stock as of end-2005, see chart 23), China has been increasingly investing in other regions as well, including Latin America and more recently also Africa. However, the high share of Asia is likely biased by the phenomenon of round-tripping through Hong Kong9which would explain its dominant position in the ODI statistics (see table 24)10.Chinese ODI to Latin America and Africa only makes up 2% and 1% (the latter excluding round-tripping11), respectively, of the total, but China

has stepped up its investment in the two regions recently (see boxes). In the last few years Chinese government officials have

made high profile trips to both Latin America and Africa, announcing extensive investment plans. During his trip to Latin America in late 2004, Hu Jintao announced that China would invest up to USD 100 bn in Latin America over the next ten years. We therefore think that ODI flows could increase substantially over the next few years, as China tries to secure more and more resources in an environment of rising commodity prices. In fact, in a survey about their
ODI intentions in the next 2-5 years, Chinese firms indicated that the share of ODI flowing into Africa and Latin America could increase to about 15% and 11%, respectively, of the total (see chart 25).12While many of the investment projects in both Africa and Latin America are carried out by Chinese state-owned enterprises, private companies also increasingly invest abroad.13 The Chinese government has created a framework in the form of its Go-out or Going Global strategy, which centres on active government support and encouragement for domestic firms to pursue investments abroad. Chinese firms have taken up the call: AnUNCTAD report lists five Chinese (state-owned) transnational corporations (TNC) among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing economies14(see table 26). Some 700 Chinese companies are active in Africa alone.15Three

main goals have been mentioned as driving Chinese outward direct investment: 1. Economic

rationale : Improving energy security and securing access to resources, markets, and strategic assets.16
Strategic assets in this context refer to management skills, brands or distribution networks. Access to markets includes setting up production sites in countries with favoured access to major markets (e.g. access to the US market from Mexico via NAFTA, or from African countries via the African Growth and Opportunity Act). 2.

Political intentions : Official recognition as a market economy from its

trading partners and adherence to the One-China principle.173. Strategic goals : Supporting Chinas emergence as a major global power. Concomitant with its economic success China wants to be accepted as an important international player. Closer external trade ties can be leveraged towards reaching this goal. Moreover, China supports the idea of a multi-polar world to counter American hegemony.

Econ
We have a link to their econ advantage maintaining financial weakness in America gives China the edge in control of Latin America Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department
of Sociology and Social Policy, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate Chinas deepening ties with Latin America. The specialist asked whether China is willing to come to the table with the United States to promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese officials reply was revealing: We are interested in trade, and not in politics. Talking past rather than with each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in the United States and Europe has intensified Chinas engagement with developing countries. SinoLatin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and Chinas priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of their countrys demand for the regions primary products, evinced by Latin Americas impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011). Latin American publications reflect the regions historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

Econ Engagement
Economic engagement pushes out China Dowd 2012 (Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering China's Reach in Latin
America 2012. http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Second, the U.S.

must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy . The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in
Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.

Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.

Inaction Link
Chinese Influence Based on US Inaction plan is an attempt to push china out. Cerna 11 (Michael, writer China Research Center, 4-15-2011, Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America, web)
In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama met with leaders and officials in Brazil, Chile and El Salvador. Mr. Obama made this visit amid growing Chinese power in the region. The trip marked the first time President Obama had visited Latin America since becoming President. By comparison, at this point in Hu Jintaos presidency, the Chinese president already had visited four countries, including Brazil, where he signed 39 bilateral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments. While Mr. Obama was well-received during his trip, the most common response in those countries was that the trip was symbolic but not very substantive. Obamas visit did not reflect any shift in policy. Many of the major statements these countries hoped for (such as a call for Brazils permanent place on the U.N. Security Council), in fact, were not made. Mr. Obama

admitted on his trip: There have been times when the United States took this region for granted, according to the Latin American Herald Tribune. Those times are not yet in the distant past and there are fears
this administration is making mistakes similar to ones in the past. After promising during his 2000 election campaign to correct Washingtons indifference to Latin America, George

W. Bush was accused of turning his back on the region in favor of more pressing issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The President showed no concern for a growing Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and China put both feet inside before anyone in Washington seemed to realize the door was open. This was a move China had planned during the administration of George H.W. Bush.

Indirect Issues
China views even indirect issues as zero-sum with the U.S Perlez 12
Jane, Lieberthal, Kenneth, Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the Beijing bureau of the New York Timse, Kenneth Lieberthal is the director of the John L. Thorton Center for China Studies at Brookings, Chinese Influence Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S-China Frictions, The New York Times, April 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-uschina-frictions.html In the face of Chinas strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from its premier position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying by American planes and ships along Chinas borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang writes. Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed as an effort to Westernize the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand for, he says. That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthals appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr. Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial Chinese officials that these officials assume very much a zero-sum approach when discussing issues directly and indirectly related to United States-China relations. Because these are privileged communications not intended for public consumption, American officials interpret them to be particularly revealing of Chinas real objectives, he writes. In turn, American law enforcement officials see an alarming increase in Chinese counterespionage and cyberattacks against the U nited States that they have concluded are directed by the Chinese authorities to gather information of national interest.

Oil Link
China needs Latin America to maintain oil demands Xiaoxia, 13 (Wang, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Translated by Laura Lin, In
Americas Backyard: China in Latin America, Economic Observer Online, April 27, 2013, Online, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml, accessed 7/17/13) PE Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. Oil is a zero-sum game- uniquely true in the context of China and Latin America Luft, 2006 (Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Challenge or Opportunity? Chinas Role in Latin America, United States Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm) China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. With half of its oil imports coming from the Western Hemisphere and with oil imports in the United States projected to surge 60 percent during the next two decades, the United States cannot afford to lose chunks of Western hemispheric crude. Every barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil available to the United States market. This means that China will have to--the United States will have to look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the Middle East, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the United States less dependent on, ``places that don't particularly like us.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman, this is a zero-sum game.

Perception
Perception key- China will base its action towards Latin America based off of its ability to maintain access Ellis, 2011 (R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP
It is also important to clarify that soft necessarily on

power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist"
regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The

core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture
and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

Perception is key

Ferchen, 2013 (Matt, Specializes Chinas Political-Economic Relations with Emerging Economies
Chinas Latin American Interests, 4/6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latinamerican-interests/a7av)
While overall the United States remains the regions main trade and investment partner, the

perception that Chinas star is rising and Americas is falling means the United States must reengage the region both economically and politically in a way that is seen as contributing to rather than inhibiting Latin American economic and political development. And even if the idea of a China Model or Beijing Consensus remains vague and open to various interpretations, the idea that China itself presents a successful model of development, and is a major new trade and investment partner for the region, exposes the need for the United States to rethink its own approach toward both economic and
political development issues in Latin America and elsewhere.

Cuba

Embargo
We have a specific link eliminating or lessening the Embargo brings Latin America back to the U.S.s court Goodman, 9 (Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard, Latin America to Push Obama
on Cuba Embargo at Summit, April 13, 2009 15:07, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk, accessed 7/17/13) PE Then Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century. While Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexicos pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. Obama, born six months before President John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isnt prepared to support ending it. Instead, hell seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush. That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of U.S. arrogance that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last May. All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba, Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. They value what Obama has promised, but they want more. The policy changes unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba. Symbolically Important Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the regions leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island. Cuba represents a 50-year policy failure in Latin America and thats why its so important for Obama to address it now, says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State Departments Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. Unless Obama wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas. The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be unfortunate if Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy, poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White Houses top adviser for the meeting. Obama also understands that he cant control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April

U.S. is losing influence to China because of the Cuban embargo 2012 summit proves Cawthorne and Ellsworth, 12 (Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 on
various assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property lawyer at Alston and Bird LLP, Latin America rebels against Obama over Cuba, Reuters, Sun Apr 15, 2012 10:13pm, Online, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summitidUSBRE83D0E220120416, accessed 7/18/13) PE

Unprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack Obama isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a region being aggressively courted by China. Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the Americas after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads of state. Brazil and others have bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has been on the defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs. Due to the hostile US and Canadian line on communist-run Cuba, the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out on Sunday afternoon. There was no declaration because there was no consensus, said Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. He bristled at suggestions the summit had been a failure, however, saying the exchange of different views was a sign of democratic health. For the first time, conservativeled US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind the traditional demand of leftist governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas. Cuba was kicked out of the Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been kept out of its summits due mainly to US opposition. But Latin American leaders are increasingly militant in opposing both Cuba's exclusion and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean island. The isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking the other way, have been ineffective, Santos said. I hope Cuba is at the next summit in three years. Santos, a major US ally in the region who has relied on Washington for financial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has become vocal about Cuba's inclusion even though he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana. In an ironic twist to the debate, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cuban music is played. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington recognize its claim to the Falkland Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summit well before its official closure. She missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the Maldives instead of the Malvinas when using the name Latin Americans give to the disputed islands. The leftist ALBA bloc of nations -including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean nations - said they will not attend future summits without Cuba's presence. It's not a favor anyone would be doing to Cuba. It's a right they've had taken away from them, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.

Lifting the embargo puts the U.S. back in the lead Goodman, 13 (Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say, Bloomberg Business News, Feb 20, 2013 6:21, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cubaembargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE Now, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do more, said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-state enterprises in Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on the island, he said. Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the biggest economic overhaul since the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government began allowing the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses. The latest sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the island. Castro in December said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent. Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012. The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges Obama to gain even more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of 1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change. Any move to ease the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the

biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A bill introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle the web of legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no cosponsors.

Ending the Embargo lets the U.S. compete with China lowering restrictions isnt enough Goodes, 9 (Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba
embargo, Friday, October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo, accessed 7/18/13) PE The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our economic, military, and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama administration decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel and personal money transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and state-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough. While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic, information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer competitors with the United States.

General
Cuba is strategically important for China political symbol of influence. Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for

China both hold high strategic value. Examining Chinas relations with Mexico and Cuba opens an analytic window into the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted to
distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives.Chinas economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang 2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of Jos Luis Len Manrquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de Amrica Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacfico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although Chinas emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a raw materials corner. Similarly, a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas

multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chi nas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast,
offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda. Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html) China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if

Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an externalpotentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.

Medical Tech
Cuba and Chinas medical tech partnership is a part of a larger bi -national agreement Whitney, 2012 (W.T, Writer for the Peoples World magazine on Latin American Issues, Peoples
World March 5th, 2012, web) The present era of cooperation began in Nov. 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao brought 200 businesspersons and investors to Cuba. He ended up signing a 16-point bi-national agreement covering bio-technical, higher education, telecommunications, nickel extraction initiatives, and more, with China providing favorable credit terms. Follow-up took place in Havana in 2009, as national assembly presidents of the two nations agreed on new financial and commercial arrangements, and prepared for Cuban port, radio and television, and bulk transport modernization. In Dec. 2011, Cuban Council of State Vice-Minister Ricardo Cabrisas, meeting in China with the inter-governmental Cuba-China Commission, signed updates and reported on the 6th Cuban Communist Party Congress of that year. Bilateral trade rose from $590 million in 2004 to $1.8 billion in 2010. China became Cuba's second largest trading partner, exceeded only by Venezuela. Chinese trade with Latin America overall has increased 42 percent over five years. China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China. Cuba's Molecular Immunology Center (MIC) recently announced that the anti-lung cancer vaccine CimaVax-EGF, made by the Cuban-Chinese Biotech Pharmaceutical Ltd (BPL) Company, would undergo trials in China. MIC head Augustin Lage visited China in February to assess use of Nimotuzumab monoclonal antibody, a BPL product directed at several human several cancers.

Cuban Biotechnology is a key growing interest for China Meacham 2012 (Karen, director of educational outreach and dean of the Abshire-Inamori
Leadership Academy at CSIS, where she designs and implements the Centers executive education, leadership, and training activities. She also directs the CSIS Seven Revolutions Project, an ongoing research effort to identify and analyze global strategic trends looking out to 2030. Chinese

Investments in the Cuban Biotech Industry, CSIS, Print)

Although Chinas investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as catalysts for a stronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has opened significant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology expertise and a presence in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States Cubas strength in biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nations health, scientific, and medical research and delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators of any country in the developing world. Its infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States and several other large industrialized nations, Cuba has made considerable advances in biotechnology, including the development of the worlds first vaccine for meningitis 13 has developed a pesticide for dengue carrying mosquitoes and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis 13 vaccines in the region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and as an example, is

advancing its TheraClM hR3 anticancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany. During the past two decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According to Cubas National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2007 was roughly $2.7 billion. Though hard to measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cuban biotechnology industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech pharmaceutical companies have emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in earnest in 2004 when Chinese and Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnological cooperation during Chinese president Hu Jintaos visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was to amplify cooperation and deepen the economic and commercial ties between the two countries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity, Biotech Pharmaceutical, set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research and pharmaceuticals to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since 2006, China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber Pharmaceuticals, which produces interferon and other compounds; and, most recently. Beijing Neurotechnology Limited,which will develop, produce, and commercialize neurotechnological products. Chinas recent economic growth and increasing global power have cast a new light on this relationship, Beijings interest in Cuba has produced more frequent highIevel meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and numerous exchanges in the areas of science, technology, and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban biotechnology industry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is expected to continue to grow.

Oil
China assisting Cuba in supplying key rig components, indicates interest in oil Jeff Franks (Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-12, Reuters, Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration
work, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119 The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in the capital, but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the platform will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from the Florida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using the Scarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All the wells will be in water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions of gallons of oil in the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It has been trying for several years to bring another rig for more drilling, a task that was complicated by the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places on the amount of U.S. technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant pontoon legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent to Singapore in late 2010 for completion.

Chinas intent to drill confirmed by exploratory drilling

Investors.com (Business magazine and advisory), 4-11-12, Investors Business Daily, While We Dither On Oil, It's Drill, Beijing, Drill, http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/041112-607461-china-seekscanadian-cuban-oil.htm?p=full Energy Policy: A Chinese oil company is now the world's top producer. While we sleep and watch pump prices rise, China, India and even Cuba seek supplies the world over, including drilling off the Florida coast. Global demand for oil is rising, as is its global price, as energy-hungry economies such as China, India and Brazil scour the earth for oil they know will be the energy of the present for some time to come. Even those lacking their own technology are asking others to help them get more. For them, there is no such thing as "peak oil." The U.S., however, stands alone as the only major country not actively seeking new supplies. Less than two years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion of a single rig virtually shut down our efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, a Chinese rig built for a Spanish company, Repsol, has begun exploratory drilling for oil off Cuba as close as 50 miles to Key West, Fla. The Scarabeo 9 rig will drill at a depth of 6,000 feet underwater. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill happened at a shallower depth of 5,500 feet. The U.S. Geological Survey recently estimated the North Cuban Basin contains as much as 9 billion barrels of oil and 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Other estimates range from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels. Pools of oil and natural gas tend not to obey lines drawn on a map. It is certain that at least some of Cuba's wells will be tapping oil pools that straddle the boundary separating our zone from theirs, meaning Havana will be getting oil that should be ours. Countries like China clearly don't see oil as an energy source of the past. China and India provided a combined $24 billion in oil industry subsidies in 2010, according to the International Energy Agency. The figure dwarfs the $4 billion in industry incentives that President Obama is seeking to end.

China enabled by Cuba to drill in restricted areas, indicates intent to compete Aaron Sharockman (Deputy government and politics editor, writer/editor for PolitiFact.com, Times staff writer), 4-4-10, Tampa Bay Times, PolitiFact: Stearns' claim about Chinese oil drilling in Gulf of
Mexico is half true, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/politifact-stearns-claimabout-chinese-oil-drilling-in-gulf-of-mexico-is/1085129 "Cuba wants to let the Chinese drill in some of the very parts of the gulf that American producers are currently forbidden to touch, as close as 45 miles off the Florida coast," Stearns, R-Ocala, says on his campaign Web site. Stearns' point that if Cuba is going to drill anyway, why shouldn't we? is obvious. But are his facts right? First, some background. In 1977, Cuba and the United States negotiated maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the waters south of the Florida Keys, called the Florida Straits, according to the U.S. Department of State. The boundaries, called Exclusive Economic Zones, give countries special rights of exploration and marine usage. Mexico, Cuba and the United States have EEZs in the gulf, and Cuba and the United States control the Florida Straits. When it comes to oil, Cuba decides who drills in its EEZ and oil that may come from it and the United States controls who can drill in its territory. The United States currently bans drilling in much of the eastern Gulf of Mexico (including waters within 234 miles of Tampa Bay), and all of its portion of the Florida Straits. But last week, President Barack Obama proposed to open new areas to oil and gas exploration along the eastern seaboard south of New Jersey and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida's coast. U.S. drilling would still be banned in the Florida Straits. . Now onto Cuba, the heart of Stearns' claim. Cuba's maritime boundary in the Florida Straits extends to within 45 miles of the Keys, as Stearns suggests. Cuba has no drilling moratorium. Its EEZ is broken down into 59 areas. In 2002, Cuba's state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, started leasing individual areas to foreign oil companies in both the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico for exploration. So far, Cuba has leased 15 of the 59 areas, said Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive with Shell and Amoco who is an expert on Cuba's energy sector and a former energy fellow with the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy. The waters closest to the United States have not yet been leased. Who holds the rights to the areas? Oil and gas companies based in Spain, Norway, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Brazil. But not China. China has an onshore, land-based lease in Cuba but not an offshore lease, Pinon said.

Chinese industrial oil initiatives key in Cuba Cuban Research Institute, 05-26-09, Commissioned report for the CubaInfo Series, Cuba and
China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf Chinese enterprises have developed a broad range of industrial initiatives in Cuba. Agricultural cooperation has focused on the production of rice, soy, sorghum, and maize, and Cuba exports 400,000 tonnes of raw sugar annually to China. Scientific exchange has developed in earthquake detection, solar energy research, cancer treatment, and vaccine production. In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged to invest $500 million in Cubas nickel sector, and although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las Camariocas ferro-nickel plant, China has since consumed 20,000 tons of the resource (Cheng 2009:1). The Chinese oil company Sinopec has teamed up with Cubas CUPET to develop onshore operations in Pinar del Rio (CRS 2008:24), while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is negotiating exploration of Cuban deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2007, 10,000 Chinese tourists visited Cuba, and as discussed below, electronics manufacturing and transport infrastructure have emerged as key areas of expansion. China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005).

Chinese oil refurbishments of Cuban refineries trade off Reuters, 06-05-11, NewsMax.com, China to Refurbish Cuban Oil Refinery,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/cubanrefinery-china-partnership/2011/06/05/id/398888 China signed a letter of intent to refurbish a Cuban oil refinery and agreed to give new credit and start drawing up a five-year cooperation plan between the two communist-run countries in accords signed Sunday during a visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The agreement on the refinery was the first official word on a project first reported by Reuters in November that is expected to cost $6 billion and would be a significant step forward in budding Cuba-Chinese economic relations. The signing of the accords followed talks between Xi and Cuban President Raul Castro on Xi's second day in Cuba after arriving Saturday from Italy. XI is widely expected to succeed Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2013. Few details about the credit and other agreements were available. China is Cuba's second largest trading partner, behind Venezuela, with trade last year totaling $1.83 billion, according to official Chinese news agency Xinhua. The refinery letter of intent is an agreement among Cuvenpetrol, which is a joint venture between Cuba and Venezuela, China National Petroleum Corp's Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering unit and the Italian unit of French oilfield service company Technip to finalize a contract to expand and improve a Soviet era refinery in Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The plan would expand the refinery's capacity to 150,000 barrels per day, from 65,000, and is a key part of Cuba's plans to develop its still untapped oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico.

Scarabeo 9 indicates dependent partnership between China and Cuba W.T. Whitney Jr (Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace), 03-05-12, Peoples
World, Cuba reaffirms ties with China, http://www.peoplesworld.org/cuba-reaffirms-ties-with-china/ China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China.

Sinopec and Cupet are mutually dependent, key operation to mining Cuban resources Alexander Wstmann (Author, GasAndOil.com writer, founder, CEO), 3-16-04, GasAndOil.com,
Sinopec and Cupet to explore oil blocks in Cuba, http://www.gasandoil.com/news/ms_america/d7c92d068a2d16b0faaa819123514b2d China Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Cuba's national oil company, Cuba Petroleo, or Cupet, to explore four oil blocks in Cuba, a Sinopec official said. The MoU will allow Sinopec to conduct geological studies of the four Cuban blocks over six months beginning mid-March, which could lead to the signing of a production sharing contract between the two companies, he said. "We will do a survey on these blocks first and then decide if we will enter into a PSC," he said, adding the blocks are likely to contain mostly crude oil, as opposed to natural gas. The MoU marks the first attempt by Sinopec, China's second largest oil and gas company, to enter oil and gas exploration and production in Cuba.

Now Key
We have a now is key booster Chinese influence is solidifying itself in Cuba through long-term policy planning Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 171, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States, Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Longterm market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC. The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for Cubas liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward alignment with international norms.

Mexico

Agriculture
China investing in Mexican agriculture now Sun, 2013 (Hongbo, A New Stage of Interaction MERL Research / Technical Staff
Senior Principal Member Research Staff Ph.D., Chongqing University China Daily, 6/6/2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/201306/06/content_16573253.htm)
China and Mexico will work together to safeguard each other's national interests and the interests of developing countries. President Xi Jinping's visit to Mexico shows the new Chinese leadership's support for Mexico's development and their will to expand and deepen cooperation. On

Tuesday, Xi and his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Pena Nieto, pledged they will enhance political dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues so as to consolidate the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership. Since diplomatic ties were established 40 years ago, bilateral relations have developed rapidly. Confucius said, at 40 one should be free of doubts, and China-Mexico ties have matured and are
now robust, featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit. And with Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party returning to power, ChinaMexico relations can open a new chapter in their longstanding friendship. Mexico established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. At the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba voted that the government of the People's Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In the 1970s and 1980s, China and Mexico cooperated in the international community supporting South-South cooperation in a bid to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order. In

2003, the two countries forged a strategic partnership, expanding their friendly exchanges and cooperation in various fields. Both China and Mexico are
emerging economies with increasingly close bilateral economic and trade relations and the two countries' influence on the global governance reform is irreplaceable. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while Mexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin America. The two countries should take more political initiative and make pragmatic policy efforts to push relations to a new level. On issues concerning each other's core national interests, the two countries should enhance mutual understanding and properly handle their differences. And partisan politics in Mexico should not be allowed to have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship. What concerns Mexico most is how to narrow the huge trade deficit with China. The trade imbalance is an indisputable fact mainly due to the differences in the two countries' economic structures. To solve the problem, the two sides should adopt a constructive attitude, put more political resources into their economic cooperation mechanism and improve the quality, level and sustainability of their economic and trade cooperation. Economic and trade cooperation is high on Mexico's agenda and the Mexican business community is eager to gain more market access to China, which is considering expanding imports of Mexico's competitive products, such as agricultural, livestock and fishery products. The two countries can also expand mutual investment. According to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2011, China's investment in Mexico was only $264 million, which is less than its investment in some other Latin American countries. With

regard to their economic and trade cooperation mechanism, the two countries can try to set up a China-Mexico cooperation fund to facilitate financing for mutual investment and trade. Mexico has great demand for investment in transportation, agriculture, communication networks and other areas, and China hopes to expand direct investment in Mexico, which will create employment opportunities for local people. The two sides can also consider starting a feasibility study on building
a free trade area. Meanwhile, the Mexican government is actively promoting energy reform and the prospects for energy cooperation are bright. The two countries should also strengthen consultation and safeguard each other's national interests and the common interests of developing countries in the fields of finance, trade and climate change under the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, the G20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. They should also expand people-to-people exchanges and strengthen cultural and educational exchanges and contacts. Mexico has the most Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the National Autonomous University of Mexico has set up the Mexican Center in China. Cultural and academic exchanges between China and Mexico are frequent and the two sides may consider expanding the number of exchange students. In addition, the two countries should also strengthen public diplomacy to deliver a real and vivid national image to each other's people. Finally, relations between the two countries must take into account the United States. Because of the complex and asymmetrical interdependence between Mexico and the US, developing relations with the US is the top priority in Mexico's diplomacy. However, it is definitely not a zero-sum game, and the three countries can explore potential areas for future cooperation.

China already invested in Mexico Agriculture Watts, 2013 (Elleka, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat Chinese Firms Go Global
The Diplomat, May 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinese-farms-go-global/)

Already, as China has developed more of its land, concerns have developed over whether enough arable land will be available to produce enough food to feed its massive population. This problem has serious implications. As Katherine Morton, a specialist on Chinese environmental governance, notes: Ten percent of the Chinese population is estimated to be undernourished, the rural labor force is declining, and agricultural productivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters and water shortages. She goes on to explain, For planning purposes, China must have at least 120 million hectares of arable land to produce enoug h food to meet future demands. But around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified as either barren or low in agricultural potential Despite its long-standing policy of being agriculturally self-sufficient, the Chinese government has tried to cope with rising food insecurity by encouraging overseas investment in agricultural farms around the world, including in Mexico, Cuba, Russia, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania, Laos, the Philippines, and Australia. A 2012 report from the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) examined Chinas domestic and global agricultural investment strat egies, and found that China is becoming increasingly dependent on agricultural imports. Indeed, the IISD report notes that soybeans have become Chinas main imports, accounting for 38 percent of total agricultural imports, while other major agricultural imports include cotton (9 percent), and palm oil (8 percent). The majority of these imports come from Asia, North and South America, and Africa. Some Chinese farmers, like Zhu Zhangjin, believe this new trend of outsourcing will help strengthen food safety standards and improve quality, while lowering production costs and increasing profit margins. Zhu has followed other individual farmers, agribusiness corporations, and governments by buying huge tracts of land in countries like Brazil and Australia. While outsourcing agriculture has its benefits, as evident from the sheer number of countries pursuing this avenue, there are also many potential problems with transnational land investments. For the investor, these challenges include having to secure large plots of land in order to achieve economies of scales, high transportation costs, political unrest in recipient states, and hostility and resentment from local populations. Chinese investors have been no exception as they have encountered increasing hostility from local populations in purchasing land in areas like South America and Africa, including the charge that this new wave of outsourcing is the equivalent of neocolonialism. These allegations are inaccurate though, since neocolonialism involves a relationship whereby a states policy is influenced by the political, military, or economic leverage it exercises over an external actor. In the case of agricultural outsourcing, there is no loss of sovereignty in recipient countries even if trade patterns resemble those in colonial times. As Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-African relations and Director of the International Development Program at John Hopkins SAIS, explained in a recent interview with The Diplomat, observers accusing China of neocolonialism are using an oversimplified idea of neocolonialism i.e. that China exports manufactured goods and imports raw materials. This structure of trade is accurate but its a very narrow definition. Colonialism is about domination and political control, occupation and military force. This is hardly true of China in Africa. Furthermore, charging China with neocolonialism absolves the governm ents in recipient countries of all blame. As Brautigam adds, I think those who use this term fail to appreciate that African econ omies are already structured as raw material exporters. It is up to Africans themselves to develop other kinds of attractive export products. Indeed, countries like Braz il have found ways to resist eager Chinese investment in its arable land by strengthening regulations on foreigners purchasing land. If other countries are opposed to the increasing attention they are receiving from international land investors, they too can pass laws to keep investors in check and focus on developing other export industries. Nonetheless, China has been proactive in devising ways to ensure that local populations benefit from its investment policies. As the IISD report cited above notes, Acquiring farmland is one of the investment strategies that China is pursuing. But it is part of a much broader strategy that includes joint ventures with local governments or local companies and contracts with local farmers. Locals are often able to benefit from the investment by continuing to work on th e farms rather than being replaced by Chinese labor that is imported for specific projects. Furthermore, in many countries Chinese investment in land leads to sharp rises in its productivity due to the importation of modern technology and additional investments in key irrigation infrastructure. In some cases, Chinese investment in other types of infrastructure like roads and ports can expand these benefits to other local industries. Nevertheless, local grievances need to be considered and addressed when companies, states, and individuals invest in countries with rich, arable land. For instance, local farmers need to be fairly compensated if they are asked to move off land that is being used for transnational land investments. As mentioned above, local farmers should be given the option of continuing to work the land, and local food security should be guaranteed before any of the harvest is exported to other countries. In adopting these methods, investors can avoid charges of neocolonialism and the accompanying local hostility that puts investments at risk.

China greatly values investment in Mexican Agriculture Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2012 (Niu Dun Co-chairs 5th China-Mexico Agricultural Working
Group meeting April 5, 2012 http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm) China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Intergovernmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012. Vice Minister Niu Dun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos,
Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and Livestock Research (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led their respective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004, the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and investment. Both

sides reviewed and evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China and Mexico. Both agreed that, with joint efforts, China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed increasing number of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth. Both sides recognized that
in terms of future agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sides expressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes. Both

sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the years ahead and related agricultural policies. Both were of the view that the exchange of agricultural development and related policies is beneficial to drawing on advantages from each other and boosting agricultural development. Both agreed to facilitate the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural

Science and Technology Cooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS). The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and
plant diseases and plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology. The

Meeting also reached

consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation, inter alia to intensify cooperation in marine fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. Other issues discussed at the Meeting included creating favorable conditions for investment, granting appropriate preferential policies, and providing necessary service and facilitation measures so as to encourage and support eligible enterprises from both sides into agricultural trade and investment.

Drugs
China supports Mexican trade, empirically proven David Gibson (Former legislative aide to a state senator, staff writer for Examiner), 9-2-11,
Examiner.com, Chinese companies supporting Mexican drug cartels, http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese-companies-supporting-mexican-drug-cartels On Thursday, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency announced the seizure of 520 pounds of methylamine hydrochloride, the chief chemical component used in producing methamphetamine. The shipment which was found at an air cargo facility at Los Angeles International Airport originated in China and was headed to Mexico. A Drug Enforcement Agency official told Fox News that the amount of chemicals seized could have produced 330 pounds of methamphetamine, with a street value worth as much as $16 million. This shipment was only the latest of its kind to have been sent from China in support of Mexicos drug trade. -In August 2011, a shipment of gamma-Butyrolactone, the chief component used in manufacturing gamma-Hydroxybutrate, or the date-rape drug. -In February 2011, Mexican authorities seized over 23 tons of ethyl phenylacetate, which is also used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The drug component was discovered at the Pacific port of Manzanillo. -In April 2010, Mexican officials seized 80 tons of phenylacetic acid and its derivatives shipped from Shanghai, China. Imports of ethyl phenylacetate require authorization from the countrys health ministry, so the shipments are intentionally mislabeled before leaving China. Last year, an anonymous U.S. official told Reuters that between October and November 2010, Mexican authorities seized 818 tons of chemicals used in making crystal meth. Due to rampant corruption among port officials, the cartels are allowed to receive large shipments of the chemicals from China which are transported to meth labs throughout Mexico. The chemicals are used in a production process known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P method), and cost much less than pseudoephedrine, thus increasing the cartels profits. In 2009 alone, the Mexican police and military found 215 meth labs, a 400 percent increase of the labs discovered in 2008. 90 percent of the methamphetamine sold in the U.S. is brought into this country from Mexico and distributed by several street gangs such as the notoriously violent MS-13.

Experts support theory of Chinese involvement in Mexican meth trade Kari Huus (Reporter, staff writer for MSNBC, Newsweek writer, foreign/domestic policy journalist), 918-06, NBC News, Crystal cartels alter face of U.S. meth epidemic,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14817871/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/crystal-cartels-alter-face-usmeth-epidemic/#.Ueh3Go2yCn9 Recognizing the new international threat, Washington is taking legislative and diplomatic initiatives to ensure cooperation from the global players in the meth trade manufacturing centers like Mexico and the world's biggest producers of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, China, India and Germany. At the United Nations, the U.S. pushed through a resolution that calls on countries to submit a yearly estimate of their legitimate need for the chemicals and to provide information on all exports -- both bulk shipments and those of pharmaceutical preparations. Previously those ingredients were uncontrolled, a gaping loophole in regulations that allowed millions of tablets containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine to be sold on the black market. Under the Combat Methamphetamine act, the State Department also is required to certify that the biggest exporters and importers of the chemicals cooperate with the United States, with the threat of withdrawal of foreign aid hanging over those that do not. The U.S. initiative is working to a degree. The DEA says the U.S. has seen increasing cooperation from Mexico, China, India and Germany in sharing intelligence and conducting joint enforcement operations. The urgency of the mission is clear because they too are witnessing a rising tide of meth

abuse, the DEA says. But political will doesn't always translate into control over agile drug trafficking organizations. We're seeing ephedrine shipped from India and China to South Africa and then from there to South and Central America, DEA administrator Karen Tandy said in a recent speech in Canada. Chinese ephedrine is being diverted through Cairo on its way to Mexico. And ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are being diverted in other African countries including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Mozambique.

DEA findings indicate China is providing drug precursors to Mexico David W. Koop (Huffington Post staff writer), 12-14-09, Huffington Post World, Pseudoephedrine
Crackdown Forces Mexican Meth Cartels To Go Back To Basics, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/pseudoephedrine-crackdown_n_390894.html# "We are starting to see a rise in chemicals that are easier to get," said U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration spokeswoman Dawn Dearden. Preisler, who works at an electroplating factory and has been arrested twice in the U.S. for his work with methamphetamine, says he isn't surprised traffickers have turned to P2P. "P2P is old school," he said. "Hell, I used to cook by that route circa 1980." The fight has come full circle. In the 1980s, the U.S. government severely restricted access to P2P seeking to curtail methamphetamine production. Meth makers shifted to ephedrine, which could be found in common cold remedies. When authorities cracked down on ephedrine, they switched to pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Sudafed and other decongestants. When U.S. authorities regulated bulk sales of the ephedrines ,meth production shifted to Mexico, where, at the time, gangs could get their hands on mammoth quantities of pseudoephedrine imported from China and India. Mexico was soon supplying up to 80 percent of the drug sold in the U.S ., and American authorities were calling meth the No. 2 drug threat to society after cocaine. Once Mexico restricted imports and sales of pseudoephedrine, the cartels took a hit. The volume of methamphetamine seized in the United States fell 34 percent, from 7.1 tons in 2006 to 4.7 tons in 2007, according to the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center. It also said it observed decreased drug purity. Dearden says DEA agents found the price of meth increased. Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals. "People forget that these are synthetically made drugs, and we haven't even seen the end of all the possible recipes," said Ralph A. Weisheit, an Illinois State University professor who wrote "Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment."

General
Mexico is key to Chinas sphere of influence Brandt et al, 2012 (Jon Brandt American University School of International Science Derek Hottle Nicole Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew, Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy, December http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-CongressFINAL.pdf) The PRCs military interests in LAC are closely aligned with its commercial objectives. Bilateral security ties build political goodwill with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57 Chinas economic priorities are seen in its official system of cataloguing states as cooperative,
implication that this has for the allocation of economic resources.58 Chinas four strategic Brazil and Venezuela serve friendlycooperative or strategic partnerswith the

partners in Latin America - Argentina, Mexico ,

as important trading partners and commodity suppliers. Chinas strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere is consistent with its publically stated national security priorities. The PRCs 2010 national
defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreign interference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. While Chinas

ties with LAC reflect a growing desire to protect economic and security interests, the PRC is promoting cooperation which reflects mutual trust and benefit, not offensive measures that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level defense visits have occurred between China and Latin American nations.59 While these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures and provide openings for arms transactions.606

US-Mexico Relations Check Chinese Influence Arizona Daily Star 12, (Arizona Daily Star, 9/14/2012, Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence, web)
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday
at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His

point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the
United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances.

Plan reduces the attention deficit pushes out China Martinez 13 (Guillermo I, writer South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 5-23-13, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, America losing influence throughout
Latin America, web)

Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new

economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not

highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country
and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China

has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that
Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home.

Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.

Oil
China is investing in PEMEX now plan pushes them out. Yang 13 (Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing on
international issues. Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties, Global Times, April 9, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)
Observers say Mexican state oil company Pemex's

decision to significantly boost oil exports to China will help optimize

the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following their leadership transitions. On the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoya said the company would begin increasing exports to China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-year agreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported. The level of exports to China could increase over time as part of the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US and only some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International. Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the

increase stemmed from China's potential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports as a result of its shale boom. A report released by OPEC last week expected China to overtake the US as the world's largest oil importer by 2014. This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only about 9 percent of the
imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation showed last year nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East. Yang

Zhimin, a researcher with the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the supply of oil is not solely decided by market demands, given its strategic nature. "We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in Mexico's decision, but the current president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his predecessor did." Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon as
president. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed at mending bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yang said the new oil deal would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2 billion in 2012.

Chinese pursuit for oil takes from US production denying China risks anti-US cooperation Pierson 9 (David Pierson is a reporter for the LATimes. He is based in Beijing and covers the Chinese
economy. China's push for oil in Gulf of Mexico puts U.S. in awkward spot, LATimes, October 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/22/business/fi-china-oil22
A Chinese company's gambit

to drill for oil in U.S. territory demonstrates China's determination to lock up the raw materials it needs to sustain its rapid growth, wherever those resources lie. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp., or CNOOC, reportedly is negotiating the purchase of leases owned by the Norwegian StatoilHydro in U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the source of about a quarter of U.S. crude oil production. China's push to
enter U.S. turf comes four years after CNOOC's $18.5-billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. was scuttled by Congress on national security grounds. The El Segundo oil firm eventually merged with Chevron Corp. of San Ramon. Whether CNOOC's second attempt to lock up U.S. petroleum assets will trigger a similar political backlash remains to be seen. The sour U.S. economy and the need for Washington

and Beijing to cooperate on potentially larger issues could mute any outcry. The U.S. could also find it difficult to rebuff China when it has long welcomed other foreign investment in the gulf. In addition to StatoilHydro, foreign oil companies with
stakes in deep-water projects there include Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Brazil's Petrobras, British oil giant BP and the Dutch-British multinational Shell. The U.S. risks undercutting its foreign policy goals as well. Concern

is growing over China's aggressive investment in oil-rich nations with anti-U.S. regimes, including Iran and Sudan. Denying China a shot at drilling in U.S. waters would only encourage Beijing to make deals in volatile regions given that new oil reserves in stable, democratic nations are getting harder to find. "China doesn't have a lot of alternatives," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief China economist for Royal Bank of Scotland. "They're very late to the game."

China views Pemex as way to increase relations lowers trade gap Johnson 13 (Tim Johnson, the Mexico bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. Chinas Xi splashes
cash, deals on leisurely trip to woo Mexico, McClatchy News Service, June 5, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/05/193101/chinas-xi-splashes-cash-deals.html#.Uehqko1OSSo)
Chinas leader is a guest who brings lots of gifts and lingers. President Xi Jinping, on the second day of an unhurried three-day visit to Mexico, spoke to the nations Senate Wednesday afternoon, then left for City Hall and prepared to visit the nations most renowned Mayan pyramid before heading on to California later in the week. Throughout his activities, Xi emphasized

that China is upgrading its relations with Latin America, and Mexico in particular. Xi opened his nations wallet to prove it, splashing out $1 billion in credit to Petroleos Mexicanos, the state oil giant, and pledging $1 billion in trade deals. He also vowed
to strengthen cultural and educational ties, offering 300 scholarships for Mexican students to study in China and announcing the opening of Chinas first cultural center in Latin America. Other accords promised cooperation in renewable energy, disease control and promotion of tourism. Xis presence marked the first official state visit of President Enrique Pena Nietos

six-month-old government, which hailed it as giving new impetus to ties between the two nations after passing through a cool phase. Appearing before lawmakers, the 59-year-old Xi highlighted that he and Pena Nieto had upgraded ties to what he called a comprehensive strategic partnership. By doing this, we send a strong message to the international community that China
and Mexico will form a common front to face various challenges in the future, Xi said. The relationship between China and the region is now at an important stage of accelerated development, Xi said. Xi did not spell out what commercial deals were in the offing, but the announcement appeared intended to lessen frictions over a wide trade deficit. Local news accounts said Chinese firms are interested in building ports, highways and pipelines. Mexico is Chinas second-largest trade partner in Latin America. But even as total trade has risen sixfold, to more than $36 billion in 2012, a trade gap is yawning. For every $9 in goods that China sells to Mexico, Mexico only sells $1 in goods back. China said it had agreed to permit imports of Mexican pork and tequila, and to a bigger presence of Mexican products in China. China is not looking for a trade surplus, Xi told lawmakers. On the contraryit is ready to actively increase the import of Mexican products. China

also sees

crude oil purchases from Mexico as a way to ameliorate the trade gap. Mexico agreed in April to provide China
with 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Both Xi and Pena Nieto offered effusive words at a joint appearance, followed by a banquet Tuesday evening. The Mexican leader described Mexico and China as two countries on the rise that are strategic allies, while Xi noted that both are descended from millenary civilizations. Banners of Chinas red flag with five gold stars festooned poles along the capitals main boulevard, Paseo de la Reforma. The visit marked a warming of relations that were chilled under two previous Mexican presidents, both of whom met with the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan minority in China, who Beijing brands as an incorrigible separatist. In a 33-point joint statement released Tuesday night, Mexico pledged not to interfere in Chinas affairs regarding its inalienable region of Tibet and its claims on Taiwan, the independently governed island off its shores. On the sprawling Tibetan Plateau, 118 ethnic Tibetans, many of them monks or nuns, have set themselves on fire since 2009 to protest Chinese rule. Xis visit to Mexico drew wide coverage in media on the Chinese mainland, and is likely to boost tourism interest in Mexico, especially after Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, a renowned singer, tour the Mayan pyramids at Chichen Itza on the Yucatan Peninsula on Thursday. Growing numbers of Chinese are traveling outside the mainland, but of the 93 million who did so last year, only 47,810 came to Mexico. The joint statement said the two countries would work to promote reciprocal tourism and develop direct airline connections, both for passengers and freight, by a Chinese airline. Xi pledged to lawmakers that there will be more Chinese tourists at the temples of the moon and sun at the pre-Aztec Teotihuacan ruins near the capital, and more at Chichen Itza and on the beaches of Acapulco.

Xis visit came amid a growing courtship of Latin America by the United States and China, the worlds No. 1 and 2 economies, respectively, as both nations seek to boost trade with a region that the United Nations says has lifted 58
million people from poverty in the past decade. President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month, and Vice President Joe Biden just returned from Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil. In a column printed in the Wall Street Journal Wednesday, Biden wrote the Obama administration has launched the most sustained period of U.S. engagement with the Americas in a long, long time.

Transport Infrastructure
China likely to invest in Mexican Infrastructure Universia 2013 (Knowledge @ Wharton; online resource publication that offers the latest business
insights, and information and interviews with business leaders, members of Gumtree, and presidents of various universities; NAFTAs Uninvited Guest: Why Chinas Path to U.S. manufacturing Runs Through Mexico; Article contains interview from Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of International relations at Boston University, 3-20-2013, http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english) Gallagher predicts that the next wave of Chinese exports to Mexico may well include finished vehicles , but he argues that those Chinese-built cars are more likely to be assembled in Mexico than in the U.S. There will be
Chinese automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico before there are any such plants in the U.S. because the costs are lower [in Mexico], and it is harder to operate a plant in the U.S., where there are so many regulations. Nevertheless, Gallagher

worries about whether Mexicos transportation infrastructure is up to the task of handling huge, additional volumes of goods made within the countrys own borders. To overcome the significant gaps in Mexicos industrial and transportation infrastructure, Gallagher suggests that Mexico approach the China Development Bank for loans that would be used to construct and expand Mexican seaports and high-speed highways. That way, Mexico could smoothly accommodate additional volumes of imported Chinese raw materials and components that
would flow from the decision by Chinese firms to build automotive plants inside Mexico.

China looking to invest in Mexican infrastructure Regenstreif 2013 (Gary Regenstreif; news editor for Thomson Reuters; The looming U.S.-China
rivalry over Latin America; Reuters; 6-12-13; http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/) China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment.

Venezuela

Drugs
Anti-Drug Cooperation Seen as First Step to Mend Relations Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS DE CRDOBA and SARA MUOZ, Latin America news reporters for Wall Street Journal,
Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html) But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chvez. For

its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step. "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.

US Sees Drug Cooperation as First step in Relations Kappa 13 (Bradley, 1/9/2013, writer, Associated Press, US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez, web)
Washingtons goal is a pragmatic relationship with Chavezs successors, even as the two countries will likely have much to continue disagreeing over. The approach is somewhat akin to the one President Barack Obama adopted with Russia after taking office four years ago, hoping to eliminate the distrust that built up during George W. Bushs presidency by re-establishing cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, while
acknowledging that Moscow and Washington wont necessarily agree on democracy and the rule of law. The reset in ties with the Kremlin has stalled amid sharp U.S.-Russian disputes over missile defense plans and Syrias civil war, but the administration still fiercely defends its merits. With Venezuela, the U.S. is hoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination, a challenge given that the Venezuelan government includes officials subject to U.S. drug kingpin sanctions. Other American priorities include energy cooperation and stronger enforcement of sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for terrorist or other activity in the Western Hemisphere against American interests.

Counternarcotics Represent Key Area of China-Venezuela Cooperation Daniel 10, (Frank, staff writer Reuters, 3-13-2010, Reuters, China delivers Venezuela jets for anti-drugs fight, web)
Venezuela on Saturday tested six training and light attack jets bought from China for defense and anti-drugs flights in a deal that dodges an embargo banning sales of U.S. weapons parts to oil exporter Venezuela. President Hugo Chavez ordered a total of 18 K-8 jets built by China after a plan to buy similar jets from Brazil's Embraer fell through, apparently because they include U.S. electrical systems. "Thank you, China. The empire wanted to leave us unarmed. Socialist China, revolutionary China appeared and here are our K-8 planes," he said during a televised display of the jets' capabilities. Officials at the ceremony said the versatile jets will be used to train pilots and intercept drug
traffickers who use Venezuela as a stop off point to take Colombian cocaine to the United States, Europe and Africa.

New Regime Makes Cooperation Likely Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS and SARA, Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, Latin America news reporters for Wall
Street Journal, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with
the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chvez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism

and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the
subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With

Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving

the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chvez, who expanded state control over
parts of the oil sector.

General
Venezuela is under Chinas Sphere of influence now plan impedes that. Noriega 2010 (Roger, Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and a
former U.S ambassador to the Organization of the United States, Chvez and China: Challenging U.S. Interests America Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defensepolicy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/) Under the cloak of Washington's indifference, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chvez is making steady progress in cementing strategic relations with China, which is eager to eclipse U.S. presence in a key, mineral-rich South American economy. Russia is a source of weapons and foreign policy clout, Iran is abetting Chvez's shadowy nuclear program, and Cuba is managing a system of internal control and repression in Venezuela. Together with China's capital, in the form of loans and investments, this cadre of hostile powers has selfish motives and ruthless methods for keeping Chvez in power. China has funneled money and expertise into Venezuela's oil industry and taken an authoritative role in improving the country's manufacturing sector and finances. With so much to gain in trade and oil, China will strive to keep Chvez in power. The United States can no longer afford to practice wishful thinking but must recognize the threat growing in Venezuela. Key points in this Outlook: China's growing economic role in Venezuela is a direct result of Hugo Chvez's systematic drive to supplant U.S. influence and impose a socialist system on his country. U.S. oil producers and manufacturers stand to lose their market share in Venezuela and may soon see new competitors with Chinese backing emerge there. The United States must abandon its policy of inaction and recognize the foreign-backed threat growing under Chvez in Venezuela. In the last six years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increased its presence in Venezuela's oil industry dramatically, filling a void as Chvez muscles out U.S. and even local expertise. More recently, China has also been providing financial support as Chvez grapples with fiscal chaos of his own making and looks to ramp up domestic spending on the eve of September's National Assembly elections. U.S. diplomats are loath to speak out against Chvez's antidemocratic, anti-U.S. agenda; however, in July a State Department spokesperson broke this eerie silence to say that "we want to continue our mutually beneficial energy relationship" with Venezuela.[1] Washington's wishful thinking and passive policy are no match for Chvez's tireless campaign to convert Venezuela into a bulwark for U.S. enemies.

Lack of US demand drives Venezuela to China Agence France-Presse 13 (Largest French newspaper, publishes in English, Venezuela Looks
Beyond US to China As a Customer, Rappler Beta, 3-15, http://www.rappler.com/world/23924venezuela-united-states-china-oil)
CARACAS, Venezuela - Woe

is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves. Production is down and its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So here comes China to the rescue, among others, as Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Under the late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a difficult diplomatic relationship, and they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010. But oil makes the world go round and a buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the main destination for Venezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million barrels in 2007 to 906,000 in 2012, according to figures from the US Energy Department. That poses a problem for Venezuela. The United States pays cash, unlike countries of the Caribbean and South America which import Venezuelan crude under

preferential terms or even trade oil for services like doctors and teachers, said analyst Diego Gonzalez. The US is importing
less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendor portfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In 2012, Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11% to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to Venamcham, the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and has promoted investment and technology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the world's top oil producer, says the International Energy Agency (IEA). "It is not

easy to substitute a client like the United

States for any old client," said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy Orientation. What is harder is to have Venezuelan crude keep going to Venezuelan Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to transfer," said Gonzalez. Then there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela has developed serious economic and political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008 exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000 barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay off loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in recent years.

Loans
Loans are a tool the Chinese use to gain influence in Venezuela plan trades off Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26, Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html)
Winning Twice The loans

give the Chinese influence over Chavez, who regularly speaks of recovering Venezuelas sovereignty after decades of subjugation to the U.S. empire. In addition to securing large deliveries of oil, much of the money lent to Venezuela returns in the form of contracts to Chinese state-run companies whose global expansion is also being financed by the Beijing-based CDB, the worlds biggest policy lender. Among the beneficiaries are China Petrochemical Corp and the countrys biggest oil and gas producer, China National Petroleum Corp. Both gained stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM) and ConocoPhillips (COP) abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. Venezuelas oil is at the service of China, Chavez, 58, said in February 2009 at a meeting in Caracas with a delegation of
Chinese businessmen led by Vice President Xi Jinping.

Oil
Chavezs oil policies are continuing, shying away from the US in favor of China Wallis 13 (Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times
newspaper and PA News agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported on political, general and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia Reuters, Mar 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315) Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting President
Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding. "We

are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station. "We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them." Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces
Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a twoyear battle with cancer. If Maduro wins, he can

be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense of the United States, while taking on more debt from those partners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese energy company,

China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largest hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in the Orinoco called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium, Petromiranda,
began pumping there last year.

China benefits from Latin American regimes opposed to the US such as Venezuela Ellis 10 (R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, August 9, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html) The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa
Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the

PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and
its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

China is increasing competition against the US in Latin American specifically in Venezuelan oil Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq) Latin America is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The region, which has traditionally come under the U.S. sphere of influence, caught the attention of China following the significant growth potential of its energy resources. Latin America is estimated to hold 13.5 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves but accounts for only 6 percent of total output. Although China has tapped energy resources in Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and Bolivia, there still exists significant room for expansion, especially given that China still depends on the Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes to further diversify. Chinas domestic energy needs and regional developments in the Asia Pacific region are likely to fuel Beijings desire to access Latin American energy resources. China, which has been a net oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer
after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the presence of sporadic power shortages, growing car ownership, crosscountry air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain Chinas burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mounting on C hina to access energy resources on the world stage. Furthermore, Chinas limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring states (witness the Sino-Japanese dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputed status of the Spratly and Paracel islands and growing political instabilities in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy further afield. However, China's

growing presence on the international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's largest energy consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is the Sino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the United States backyard. The competition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as
seen by developments in other regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, Chinas military cooperation with Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources in these states. While not a zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between China

and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States relations with its neighbors, which will only undermine U.S. ability to access the regions energy resources. This will force the U.S. to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as
West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. Entering the U.S. Sphere of Influence As the worlds number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere, Venezuela

is emerging as

a major prize in the competition for energy resources in Latin America. While Venezuela sells 60 percent of its crude oil exports to the U.S. and is the United States fourth largest oil supplier, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is attempting to reduce his countrys dependence on the U.S. market. President Chavez has stated that "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years but they have been years of dependence on the United States. Now we are free and we make our resources available to the great country of China." [1]
Easier said than done, as Chinas refineries will have to be refitted to process Venezuelas heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy resources from Venezuela and Argentina is particularly difficult given that both states are on South Americas Atlantic coast although there have been discussions to overcome this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless, China

has made significant inroads in accessing Venezuelas energy resources. During Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China committed to develop Venezuelas energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 million in a gas project as well as upgrading the countrys railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a year and 1.8 million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has also been given significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuela including the fields at Zumano in eastern Venezuela, which has an estimated 400 million barrels of oil.

LA countries exporting oil to China over US gain leverage Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq) China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing involvement in the region's security. In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti
comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically, Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions. While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim government of Haiti have asked that the mandate be extended by one year in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential elections to be held later this year, China is pushing for only a six month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July. While having to accept the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwans secessionist forces, China

has garnered the goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy when negotiating energy and other deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights abuses in Venezuela.

Venezuela hopes to increase oil exports to China, tradeoffs with US imports Ratliff 6 (William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy. Pragmatism Over Ideology: Chinas Relations with Venezuela, The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&tx_ttnews %5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo Chavez seeks a special relationship so that China can replace the United States as Venezuelas chief foreign client, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuela in the context of his continentwide Bolivarian revolution. At present, the United States imports about 15% of its foreign oil from Venezuela. Late in 2005,
Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invade Venezuela and overthrow him, oil will continue to flow north (ABC Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styled successor to Fidel Castro seems to think Venezuela must break all economic dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan (Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez using oil as a diplomatic weapon (China Daily, November 22). In early February 2006 Rafael

Ramirez, the president of Venezuelas state-run oil company Petroleos de relations with China in a Caracas interview, saying we are hoping to send 300,000 bpd to *China+ very soon (Xinhua, February 9). This would be double the current amount, most of which goes into
Venezuela (PDVSA), reviewed Venezuelas oil-related asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a low-grade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the Orinoco Tarbelt.)

Venezuelas ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of Chinas oil import needs. Much of that might have to come from what the United States now receives, for Chinese and foreign sources fear that production is falling, not
rising, in Venezuela.

China lacks oil security US dominance gets in the way

Peterson 7 (Keith Alan, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINAS GROWING DEMAND FOR OIL: A CASE STUDY IN VENEZUELA, December 2007, 07Dec_Peterson.pdf) As one energy expert states, petroleum has proven to be the most versatile fuel source ever discovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial economy.66 Beijing certainly understands this and is striving to secure enough of this precious resource to meet current and future needs. China is now the second largest energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67 China became a net petroleum importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68 Unlike the United States and other developed nations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters to guarantee an uninterrupted supply. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of securing new international oil sources to meet future demands in a market that is dominated by the United States.

Relations Link
US-Venezuela rift allows China to step in Luft 05 (Dr. Gal, Executive Director at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Challenge or
Opportunity: Chinas Role in Latin America, Speech before senate foreign relations committee, 9-20, http://www.setamericafree.org/SenateForeignRelationsSept202005.pdf)
Last but not least is Venezuela, U.S.'fourth largest oil supplier. Since

April 2002, U.S. relations with Venezuela have become increasingly acrimonious. Venezuelas President Hugo Chavez warned the U.S. against any interference with Venezuelas
internal affairs threatening that Venezuela has enough allies on this continent to start3 a 100-year war," and that "U.S. citizens could forget about ever getting Venezuelan oil." This threat is not being ignored. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in her confirmation hearing that two of her chief worries with regards to Venezuela are U.S. dependence on Venezuelan oil and whether Chavez will continue to supply it.

The fissure in the relations enables China to step in and reduce Venezuelas dependence on selling oil to the U.S., which currently buys 60% of Venezuelas crude. A series of oil agreements signed in early 2005 allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela. Venezuelas state run oil company PDVSA opened a marketing office in Beijing and has a target of selling to China 300,000 barrels per day by 2012. But for now Venezuelas oil exports to China are much more limited. The
majority of Venezuela's exports to China as of now consist of Orimulsion, a boiler fuel alternative which is burned by power plants to generate electricity. Chinas refineries are not equipped to refine Venezuelas crude. Geography is also a constraint. Venezuela has no access to the Pacific shore and the Panama Canal cannot accommodate the biggest tankers. A tanker trip from Venezuela to China takes 45 days. But China and Venezuela are trying to resolve these problems. In July 2004 Venezuela signed a contract with Colombia to build a crude oil pipeline connecting its oil fields with a port on Colombia's Pacific coast sparing Chinese tankers the need to traverse the Panama Canal. This could reduce the travel time by half.

Internal Links

Influence Tradeoff I/Ls

Chinese and Western Engagement Mutually Trade off Ellis 13 (Evan, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an
analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors, including India, Russia and Iran, 6-713, Manzella Report, U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America, web)
In Latin America, while many

governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRCs entry into the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy objectives there,
including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law. Although the PRC has been careful not to associate itself with the anti-imperialistic rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), efforts

by China Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China to expand lending has been complimented by the interest within ALBA nations to free themselves from the constraints of borrowing from Western financial institutions. The resulting $50 billion loaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007 has proved an important source of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain antiWestern policies and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region. Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so
long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

China gaining soft power from Latin America now, specifically Cuba and Venezuela Castillo 9 (Antonio Castillo is a Senior Lecturer & Program Director At RMIT China in Latin America
http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/) SJH China's growing influence on international affairs is nowhere more evident than in Latin America, a region pejoratively regarded as the 'backyard' of the United States. Latin America and the Caribbean are the next stop in Chinas global expansion, and the first-ever Chinese white paper for this region, released on 4 November, 2008, doesnt leave any doubt about Chinas intentions. Latin America has abundant natural resources, a good base for economic and social growth and tremendous development potential, the document says. In the November-December 2008 issue of The Diplomat, Peter Hartcher wrote of China emerging from the
current financial crisis as a more credible and respected international leader. This is precisely Chinas image in Latin America. China is not only regarded as an alternative to the US hegemony in the region, but it is also seen as a good and credible partner. According to the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project, China

enjoys a positive image among Latin American countries. Chinas aim in Latin America

these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America. Chinese

policy towards Latin America today is highly pragmatic rather than ideologically driven, Professor Gonzalo
Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries. A sign of this new paradigm is the growing and wider range of bilateral agreements China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation. The trade between China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a

The Chinese diplomatic model soft power, multipolar and non-interference is considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region. South-south
healthy surplus. cooperation, strategic partnership of common development or common understanding is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the

Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of high-ranking Chinese officials who have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says a lot. Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said Chinas soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Hearn said. The

first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn suggests, Chinatowns are key to the soft power exercised by China in the region. This is especially the case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese immigrants. Chinatowns leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.
China leverages ethnic locals, technology transfer, development Hearn highlights the northern Mexican city of Mexicali, the heart of the Mexican Chinese community. Here Chinatown leaders have been luring Chinese investors to get involved in the development of the frontera del silicio [silicon border] a high-tech park for the production of semiconductors and other electrical products. This is very much part of the Chinese growth model of building a series of industrial hubs. Technology transfer is the second way the Sino-Latin American relationship is developing and, according to Dr Hearn, this is. different to the United States and Europe. Venezuela is one of the largest producers of oil in the world and had previously been reliant on technicians from the US company Chevron for drilling. China, however, is happily teaching Venezuelans how to do it themselves. China has implemented a lengthy training programme that has allowed Venezuelans to learn how to make drills something that they have been doing since 2008, says Hearn. And technology transfer is exactly what Latin American countries need desperately to improve their economies. Integrated development is the third way China has been able to forge relationships with Latin American countries. For example, Cuban workers trained by Chinese technicians are manufacturing a wide range of electrical goods, from televisions to electrical fans. These are moved to the ports by a transport system designed and developed by Chinese experts. The Cuban docks from where the goods will be shipped to China are no longer inefficient facilities. Chinese investors have transformed them into world-class ports. Dr Hearn argues that soft

power, integrated development and technology transfer have a political edge: It is a way not to upset the US. You can build cooperation with a country and never express a political ideology or affinity and this is what China is doing in the case of Cuba and Venezuela.

China Influence Displaces US political leverage Hilton 13 (Isabel, former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and editor of
www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, 2-2013, The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?, web) The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a number of
ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In

other cases, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance that wish to pursue more radical political and
social models.

China threatened by US stealing cooperation opportunities Ellis 2011(R. Evan Ellis; Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University; Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study; Joint Force Quarterly; January 2011; http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latinamerica.html)
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The

rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its

acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the
PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Chinese Influence is a Direct Result of US Diplomatic Absence Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey, writer Bloomberg, 6-28-13, Bloomberg, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean
For The US?, web)

China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. *The U.S.'+ attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century
to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.

LA Key to China Soft Power

Chinese influence in Latin America is key to Chinese soft power- It provides a basis of understanding between countries. Ellis 2008 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html- SJH
This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's

economic footprint in Latin America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft
power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Cuban President Raul Castro watch signing of treaties in Havana after Hu signed dozens of trade and investment deals with Cuba It is also important to clarify that

soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally
in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an

The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this
important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. perception can be divided into seven areas: Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods. Estimates of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used, although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and government officials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as well. In the commodities sector, Latin American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as Jos Cuervo, Caf Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to "sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundacin Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place

products in those countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds.

thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion
Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today, commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Au, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities in ways that

Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America. Although the presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison to that of the United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries.
U.S. investors cannot.6

Chinese soft power is contingent on having influence in Latin America Wiest 11 (Nailene Chou teaches financial journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication,
Tsinghua University Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America Caixin Online 11.09.2011 http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-09/100324170.html) China's size, population and grand fantasies across Latin America. Barely a decade ago, China was the world's seventh-largest economy. Now, by the reckoning of the International Monetary Fund, China will overtake the United States and become the world's largest economy in 2016. No wonder the developing world is held in thrall. There's likewise a prevailing readiness to accept and emulate China, which in turn has given China a golden opportunity to extend its cultural soft power abroad. Indeed, promoting soft power overseas was a policy goal recently declared by the Chinese government. The initiative recognizes that a nation's success on the world stage, as Harvard University's Joseph Nye once said, "depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins." Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative. The China-Latin America attraction is easy to understand. China provides a growth model as a counterweight to the United States. Latin American countries have tried one failed development model after another only to find themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of
The Spanish expression "cuento chino," or "Chinese story" is a synonym for "tall tale." It's a fitting expression for our times, since spectacular economic achievements of late have inspired East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut. State-led import substitution policies mired these countries in self-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in line with the Washington Consensus led to dependency on fickle capital inflow. China's economic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by expanding technical capacities in order to attract foreign investment, offers a viable alternative. In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of guerrilla warfare which once shone like a beacon guiding fervent revolutionaries in South America faded into the Andean jungles. But since launching its capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideological exports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to mercantilist policies: Doing business for business' sake. Latin American countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, have benefited enormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, countries overly dependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession, cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects. "Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over an US$ 8 billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the Pacific Ocean. This would be an engineering feat that arguably only the Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and three mountain ranges, and through a region marred by drug-trafficking violence. The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent and what some said was an unabashed incursion into America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canal seco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed ships would be ferried on railroad cars from sea to sea. Infatuation with China, however, can quickly turn to antipathy. An economic powerhouse China may be, but it can hardly be called a gentle giant. It's actually a voracious monster, gobbling crude oil, minerals and natural resources, wreaking havoc on the environment, blithely emitting unacceptable amounts of the carbon dioxide that causes global warming. China as "la fabrica del mundo" the factory of the world arouses fear and resentment, as more than 90 percent of Latin American manufacturing exports are threatened by Chinese competition. No wonder some 60 percent of all anti-dumping cases launched against China at the World Trade Organization were filed by Latin American countries. Latin

America's perceptions of China are

still largely shaped by international media. The Chinese government's soft-power Confucius Institutes, if managed well, could bring greater
understanding of China. A Colombian woman I recently met said she is keen to learn the Chinese language but confesses she's more drawn to Tibetan Buddhism than the moral teachings of that ancient sage, Confucius. In predominantly Catholic countries, China as an atheist country does not go down very well.

Bonding China and Latin America calls for a narrative that resonates. For a country of 1.3 billion people with a per capita GDP no higher than Colombia or Peru's, China has shared experiences and future hopes to tell to other emerging economies. Finding the right story will be crucial for soft power policy to succeed. Otherwise, the game will be lost even before it begins.

LA is key to soft power Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Farther abroad, Beijing's soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South Africa, Chile and Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It is particularly interesting that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whose manufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about China's economic influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. The existence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of China's development model have facilitated Beijing's quest for market, natural resources and political influence . Under President Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a 'market economy', which would make it harder to impose penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to play an important role in forging Brazil's policy toward China.35 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's foreign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model - former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and his former deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its linkages with countries to its east, such as China and India.57

Zero Sum
Latin American countries treat U.S./China influence as zero-sum Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on the part of the United States and the latters rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 200809, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The result of opportunity-maximising in AsiaLatin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the Forum for East AsiaLatin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

China US Relations are Zero Sum Menendez 13 (Fernando Menndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, The
Counterbalance in Americas Backyard, web)

From the perspective of Latin Americas foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. Chinas foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to
ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as

China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional

tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise Chinas cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from Americas national security apparatus.

Latin American influence is a zero sum game Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. FloresMacas, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad. The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/ EW To be sure, China

may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis.
Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual

countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new
colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States. During

the same period in which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior . This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade
and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

A2: Africa Resources Sufficient

China needs Latin American resources Caspary 8 (Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and
Bolivia, China Eyes Latin American Commodities, Yale Global Online, Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities, accessed 7/16/13) PE Latin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies with rising commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to that attraction. Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high demand from the global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbirds seat, calling shots and setting prices. Yet, despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like China, the cards are not necessarily stacked in Latin Americas favor. Unless the region develops policies of sustainable development and transparent transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could prove to be limited. Latin America produces 47 percent of the worlds soybean crop, 40 percent of copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an increasing amount of such commodities both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for private consumption, given the nations rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to rise at lower double-digit rates until at least 2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

African resources arent enough China needs raw materials and export markets in Latin America Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more importantLatin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its backyard.

A2: U.S./China Dont Compete

The U.S. and China inevitably compete theyve got eyes on the same prize Regenstreif, 13 (Gary, Editor of special projects at Reuters, The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin
America, Reuters, JUNE 12, 2013, Online, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, accessed 7/18-13) PE Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a new model of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washingtons sights are set on a similar prize and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chiles president paid Obama a visit last week, Perus leader arrived Tuesday and Brazils is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China which has money to burn in the region. There is a more energetic *U.S.+ tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than *the+ first time, Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. Theres something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether theres a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.

A2: China Hurts LA Econ

China doesnt hurt Latin America because they want to import different things, instead it provides them with new markets Chen and Chen, 13 (Kayla, intern at VOX Global, Xiangming, founding Dean and Director of the
Center for Urban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at Trinity College in Hartford, China And Latin America: Connected And Competing Analysis, Eurasia Review, June 17, 2013, Online, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-andlatin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinas stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some Latin American countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term though, Chinas demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America. Since Latin American countries and China have different export structures, the former is not as threatened by Chinas rapid market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, Mexico is the only country in Latin America whose comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantage of [India and China+, and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head-to-head economic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to eithers favor in turns.

Impact

Soft Power

China Soft Power Up

Chinese soft power increasing now Jaime A. Florcruz (Beijing Bureau Chief and correspondent at CNN, Newsweek reporter, TIME magazine writer), 3- 30-12, CNN, China works hard to project soft power,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power) After investing tens of billions of dollars in Southeast Asia, China has now decided that its vaunted economic power, which has bought it significant influence with regional governments, is not enough. Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinese diplomacy, language and culture - and, yes, pop songs -- are playing a major role in Beijings quest to be understood and, if all go well, win the affection of Southeast Asia's 600 million people. Its uncharted territory for a government that until recently appeared to care very little about how it was perceived outside of China. "The Chinese government is paying much more attention to public diplomacy than before," said Yang Baoyun, a Southeast Asia expert at Peking University in Beijing. "The government has realized that people are important, and that cultural exchange can supplement traditional diplomacy." On Nov. 18-20, Cambodia will host Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and other world leaders at the ASEAN Summit. As the United States pivots from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and re-engages with the 10 countries of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, much of the focus at the summit will be on Washington's ability to revive its flagging diplomatic influence. But in the contest for public opinion, which the United States is accustomed to leading without challenge, the landscape is shifting. The Chinese government, with the help of large companies and thousands of young language teachers willing to relocate overseas, has launched an ambitious cultural diplomacy effort designed to clean up its image, which has been soiled by a number of high-profile scandals in the region, including investment projects that have resulted in land grabbing and environmental damage. To counter these negative perceptions, Beijing has overseen an explosion of language schools, exchange programs, bookstores, and cultural corners. The effort began in earnest in 2004 when Hanban, an organization that falls under the Ministry of Education, began establishing Confucius Institutes at universities around the world.

Chinese soft power increasing in Latin America cultural exchanges Farnsworth, 12 (Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, Memo to
Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, Online, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, accessed 7/19/13) PE This will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-term relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes student exchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004. There is nothing inappropriate or frightening about student exchanges or language study. Indeed, U.S. and European officials understand that these initiatives are unrivaled instruments of soft power. They introduce students to another culture and, presumably, provide them at an early age with positive impressions of the host nation. As well, mastery of another language can lock in future patterns of trade and investment, travel and tourism, research and scientific exchanges, and eventually, government-togovernment relationships.

A2: Culture blocks Soft Power

Nye is wrong chinas economic soft power is working in the nations it needs to work in Dynon 13
Nicholas a Macquarie University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), International Communication and is coordinator of the Line 21 project Academic and former diplomat with a research focus on country and regime branding and contemporary propaganda media. Success of China's soft power campaign can't be gauged by rich countries Global Times 7-7-2013 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo SCTM US political scientist Joseph Nye claims that the leaders of China and Russia just don't get his concept of "soft power." In an article published in Foreign Policy in April, he reminds us that soft power springs from individuals, the private sector and civil society. China and Russia, Professor Nye points out, "make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power." Clearly there is dissonance between Nye's soft power and the strategies followed by Beijing and Moscow in their respective pursuits of it. But are they all talking about the same "soft power?" Hong Kong University's David Bandurski, charting the appearance of the term "soft power" in Chinese print publications from 1998 to 2008, has identified massive growth in the importance of the concept. Usage of "soft power" in Chinese newspapers grew from a negligible number of appearances in 2003 to around 7,500 in 2008. A closer look suggests that China's increasing interest in soft power has less to do with Nye than it does with an ongoing focus on the unprecedented growth of its own national power and the need to measure it, assess it and control its implications. Usage of the term "comprehensive national power" (CNP) first appeared in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested by some Chinese scholars considering various national power equations as methods for analyzing the international balance of power. Huang Shuofeng of China's Academy of Military Science, a founder of the CNP concept, writes that the CNP "refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well." As Deng Xiaoping once stated, "in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides." As part of the CNP equation, the soft power concept, rendered in Chinese as ruanshili, has evolved in Chinese discourse into a range of concepts quite distinct from that envisaged by Joseph Nye. As Nye has pointed out, polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in Africa and Latin America, but not so much in the developed world. China's approach to soft power doesn't resonate as much with the rich nations of the world as it does with much of the developing world where Beijing's traditional non-alignment and aid work has had positive reputational results. Similarly, as the same international polls indicate, China's reputation at home far exceeds its reputation within the developed world. An emergent China is unsurprisingly perceived far more positively by its own population relative to how it is perceived by publics in Europe, North America and developed East Asia. Beijing's idea of soft power appears to be working relatively well across large tracts of the developing world for whom its emerging success shines as a relevant alternative to Western models. Beijing's "internal" soft power also appears to be doing nicely in articulating China's national power ascendancy to its own increasingly globalized population. And while many Western policymakers and media commentators pen a pervasive narrative of concern in relation to China's rise, how much of the rest of the world is actually listening? Does Nye's comment that China doesn't quite get his version of soft power really matter? Probably not. They have their own.

Asia Stability Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to Asian trade and interdependence thats key to regional stability Garrison 5 (Jean, Director of Global & Area Studies Program at the University of Wyoming, Spring 05,
China's prudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 32.1, Academic OneFile) China's patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of "soft" power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system. (1) China's policy approach represents the sophisticated neomercantilist view that globalization has altered the way nations compete for power. China acknowledges that acceding to international and regional rules-based organizations and agreements has become a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism rather than a limit to its autonomy. In the near future China will primarily follow agreed-upon international practices, although it is increasingly moving in position to directly shape the system itself. China's growing soft power is not inherently a threat to U.S. interests, but how the United States responds to this change in the coming years will shape prospects for future stability in East Asia and the global economic system. China's "Good Neighbor" Diplomacy A few years ago China's dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the East Asian region, speedy regional economic growth, and military spending increases were cast in zerosum terms in East Asia, emphasizing the dangers associated with China's growing shadow. (2) Cognizant of this apprehension, China launched an aggressive campaign to alleviate those fears by establishing closer political, economical, and cultural ties with its neighbors. Tangible examples of China's new diplomacy include bilateral efforts along various fronts in the 1990s when it settled long-term border conflicts with Russia and Vietnam, adopted a pragmatic approach to settle disputes over the Paracel, Spratly, and Senkaku Islands, and aided its neighbors during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Seeking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a cornerstone of China's most recent efforts to promote the benign view of its rise. At the October 2003 ASEAN Summit, China continued FTA negotiations and broadened the dialogue to promote peace and security through China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)--the first of its kind that China has signed with a regional grouping. China also proposed using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to form a conference to increase communication among Asian militaries. Although the ARF largely remains a confidence-building mechanism rather than a means of preventive diplomacy, it serves China's goal to reassure other countries in the region as to its peaceful intentions. China has seized the political initiative from the Japanese who, in response, launched bilateral free-trade talks of its own and acceded to the TAC (Korea has made similar moves for FTAs with Singapore and Japan). China has broadened its efforts by seeking FTAs, outside the ASEAN structure, with Australia and New Zealand. A possible FTA with India has been discussed as well. The prominent exception to China's savvy diplomatic initiatives is its relationship with Taiwan. The dangerous zero-sum nature of China's rhetoric surrounding Taiwan's recent election demonstrates the continuing sensitivity of the issue in Chinese politics. However, because maintaining the cross-strait status quo is necessary for continued stability and economic growth, China has reason to opt for patience. Beijing's logical policy will be to maintain the status quo. China's Lure and Growing East Asian Economic Interdependence East Asian states and Taiwan recognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade is flourishing due to China's huge market for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China's import growth and increasing exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is now recovering from a decade-long decline and

its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of total exports of China's trading partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S. government reports. A large percentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States. States in the East Asian region recognize the need to take advantage of their closeness to China to become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. This trend is reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China since 1990--which ASEAN reports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on the decline. In addition, China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $14.8-billion trade deficit with Japan, $23 billion deficit with Korea, $16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $40 billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003 according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds to the interdependence, with China at the center. East Asian investment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence. First, East Asian states invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that 61 percent of China's FDI inflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with the remainder of the figure attributed to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China has also begun to encourage outward FDI into East Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from $400 million in the 1980s to $2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For example, Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese companies may aim to escape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home, and even higher land and labor costs in China by relocating to Thailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has emerged. Growing economic interdependence with China provides new incentives for states in the East Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations to maintain prosperity. Japan focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern of power projection in the region. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's future development, such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, gives them leverage in negotiations with both countries and "power of say" in the region's development. Even the Taiwan issue potentially reinforces the status quo. East Asian countries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's independence and register little enthusiasm over Taiwan's quest for freedom.

Nuclear war Dibb, 01 emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University
(Paul, Winter. Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads. Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1. Ebsco.) The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and
these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future

The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive
that could lead to its breakup.

But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted
tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. with major crises.

China Rise Mpx

China soft power is key to their overall power Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Analysis and debate concerning China's rise is focused almost entirely on the economic and military aspects of its growing power.1 Yet 'soft' sources of power - including culture, political ideology and diplomacy - are increasingly recognised as essential components of Great Power status. It seems odd that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China, or misapplied. While China is constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its soft-power resources are considerable and demand scrutiny.

Thats key to the global economy and stability the impact is nuclear war Buzan 4 (Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 2004, Does China Matter? A Reassessment, New York, Questia, p. 145-147)
The underlying argument in this section is that there

is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western
hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China

does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it
now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American States. If

the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds

in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces
in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it

If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question
become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

Immigration Mpx
China soft power is key to attract foreign students Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth. Within a decade, total enrolment of international students in China (excluding those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) increased threefold to no,844.6 Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea and Japan consistently sending the most.7 A growing number of students, though, are from Southeast Asia, a region that accommodates the majority of overseas Chinese and has a centuries-old history of Chinese-language education. Students from Vietnam, for example, have increased more than sixfold over the past six years.8 While a major influx of international students in China is driven by the country's booming economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also reflects China's role as the cultural magnet of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, over three-quarters of foreign students went to China to study academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine).9

Thats key to China-EU relations Xinhua 13 (China.org, 5/1/13, Chinese gov't to support international students,
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/01/content_28704250.htm, acc. 7/19/13) The Chinese government will support about 50,000 international students in China in 2015, and the country will become the largest Asian destination for such students in 2020, high-level Chinese officials said on April 25. About 320,000
overseas students came to China in 2012, the majority from South Korea and the United States, said Liu Jinghui, secretary-general of the China Scholarship Council. Last year, the ministry implemented the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the education sector, she said. According to the plan, in 2015, the number of international students in China supported by the government's scholarship program will reach 50,000. While Europe has become the second-largest destination for Chinese students abroad, "only about 35,000 students came from EU member states to study in China last year, so we will promote China's education system in Europe now," Liu said. Du Yubo, vice-minister of education, said that by 2020, about 500,000 international students will be in China, enabling the country to become the largest Asian destination for international students. China and the European Union will deepen education and exchange cooperation this year, said European commission and Chinese government officials at the first meeting of the EU-China Higher Education Platform for Cooperation and Exchanges, which was held on Thursday in Brussels. "We

should learn from each other's strong points, and boost cooperation in various areas," Du said. In 2013, the Chinese government will provide 1,087 scholarships to 27 EU countries, the ministry said. "The Chinese government has been paying close attention to cooperation projects between China and Europe. Our cooperation has a long history, a lot of achievements and potential," said Jan Truszczynski, director general for Education, Training, Culture and Youth of the European Commission. China has
established 105 Confucius Institutes in about 20 EU member states, and joined hands with the European Commission to set up three programs in three Chinese universities. For instance, the

EU has injected 17 million euros ($22.16 million) to establish the ChinaEU School of Law with the China University of Political Science and Law, one of the top law schools in the country.

China-EU relations are key to solve climate change Balme 9 (Richard, Centre for European Studies and Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and
Management, June 2009, Global Warming Politics: the EU, China and Climate Change, http://sciencespo-globalgovernance.net/node/23, acc. 7/18/13) The European Union (EU) and China were to a large extent at the core of the process whereby climate change became a prominent issue in international relations. Supported by the sensitivity of European public opinion on environmental issue, its preference for multilateralism, and by its own policy expertise, the EU was from the onset very active in promoting international agreements on climate. As the United States eventually failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol signed by the Clinton Administration, and remained reluctant to negotiations on climate under Georges Bush presidencies, the EU was able to assume leadership among developed countries on the issue. As evidence about human influence on climate change accumulated, the tension between energy-intensive modes of development and the capacity to mitigate climate change also became more apparent. As the most populated and fastest growing economy of developing countries, Chinas environmental policy and attitude with regard to climate change regime became increasingly scrutinized. Its record of first CO2 emitter surpassing the USA for the first time in 2008 was widely noticed, and China is frequently vilainized for its dirty growth model and its global consequences. China nevertheless developed a significant policy to address climate and energy issues over the recent years. To a large extent, the limited steps accomplished so far at the global level in climate change policy largely relied on the convergence of policies and cooperation programs between the EU and China.

Warming is an existential risk

Mazo 10 PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, pg. 122 The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above preindustrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2C (O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

North Korea Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to prevent North Korean proliferation and conflict Pei 3 (Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace, Carnegie
Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo, acc. 7/19/13) This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining a stable relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economic growth have served the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, on balance, Beijing's foreign policy has demonstrated increasing maturity and sophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in Iraq and North Korea also shows the risks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership re-evaluated the geopolitical assumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq and North Korea, the desire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous stance and lose whatever influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which has taken a more proactive approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force against Iraq is unclear. Its declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula has not been accompanied by visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomes harder to defend when one considers what is at stake for China. Its immediate economic interests in Iraq are modest. But because of its growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of imports, it may better serve its interests by getting more actively involved and taking a clear stand. Quiescence risks marginalisation. In dealing with an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North Korea, Beijing's inaction has disappointed its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have to toe the US line toward Pyongyang, China needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of no negotiation. If it allows the crisis to spiral out of control, it could be dragged into a nuclear maelstrom with devastating consequences for peace and prosperity in the region. In a world where the threats from rogue states and international terrorism are at least as dangerous as rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its interests by modifying its diplomatic strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operation with the US, it must use its growing influence to assume a more active role in the international community . This may require Beijing to break some old habits, such as its aversion to substantial participation in peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial contributions to the United Nations, and abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership will be necessary above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can do much more to allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This may require it to adopt a new twopronged regional strategy. First, China should use its clout to push for regional integration and cooperation. On the top of this agenda should be expanded regional free trade. Despite Tokyo's lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-Asean free trade agreement, China should continue to push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayed ties with Tokyo, where sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure Japan, China must be more transparent about its military modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start treating it as a full co-equal partner in maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the requisite for regional collective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new foreign policy team. It also goes against ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese leaders do not seize the current opportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it for them - and not necessarily to their liking.

North Korean conflict escalates and goes nuclear Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of

Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product
which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Koreas nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over Chinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention,
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security trea ties can be relied upon for protection.

miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula
itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2

Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited
million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is,

The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the
individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the

There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat
global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

Resources Mpx
China soft power is key to their resource access thats key to economic growth Hunter 9 (Alan, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry
University, Soft Power: China on the Global Stage, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf, acc. 7/19/13) Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among all developing countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, Chinas need for natural resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries with populations of over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan is worse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective political handling of resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten the future of the country . Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucial to determining whether or not China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st century.23 The West now fears competition from China for access to global resources, particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted competition over hydrocarbon resources in coming years as the most likely cause of international conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijing leaders are also well aware of the issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through proper handling of the energy issue is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use of resources, as well as fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources China must explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policy encouraging its three major national oil corporations to go out (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas energy supplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries, and building pipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and now stands at around 6 million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about 40% of oildemand growth worldwide from 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004, Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercial agreements with Latin American countries; investments in Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a later visit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gas explorations; China also announced it would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offered more than US $ 50 billion of investment to countries within the US backyard, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructure development; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.29 An online newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between China and the USA for African black gold.30 Chinas potential competition with the USA in West Asia and North Africa could be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept US leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.31 Frequent high-level exchange visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economic ties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders new transnational dynamics. We have therefore explored Chinas need to avoid military conflict, its massive economic development, and its need to secure resources as important contexts for Chinese soft power in the

21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is another factor which will become even more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.

Resources and growth are key to CCP stability Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong
Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy, September/October, proquest) An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid
urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's

access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven
economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.

Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper)
August 3, 2005, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-83/30931.html)
Since the

Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil
filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the killed 80 million Chinese people, now

CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

Taiwan Independence Mpx

China soft power key to prevent Taiwanese independence Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005, China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition party leaders to visit the main-land, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and, through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'heartsand-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society , and politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than sioobn on the mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some $18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington - a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - is another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on Taiwan in its favour. Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the proindependence movement in Taiwan for the time being.

The impact is China/Taiwan war which goes nuclear

OHanlon adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, 07 *Michael, A war like no other: the truth about
China's challenge to America, p. google books+

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states . It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv China and the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water. But the Taiwan problem is

different . Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control. Not only does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the United States sees as a long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, the way that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherent potential for escalation to direct superpower war . This chapter explains whv. Thenext chapters get into the dynamics of what could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely seriousbut also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is sobering.

Even if the chances of war

between the United States and China

are less than 25 percent indeed, even

if they are less than 10 percentthey are far from zero. And given the enormous consequences of any every effort must be made to prevent it . World War I did not seem very likely to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even worse world war, was not predicted. We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second, Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunityif it can keep the United States out of the light Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions
such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system,

could matter more than reality in such a situation . Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat
ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.

Economy Mpx

1nc
China Sphere of Influence in Latin America critical to Chinese growth Ellis 11(Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU press. 1st quarter 2011 http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf SCTM)
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin

American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country
who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China

has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and
Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

Now Key For China Econ

China is at a crtical transition point, they need long-term sustained growth to keep up the world economy Xinhua July 15,2013
Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition Xinhua http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-hasreached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM
Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts. Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means? 'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that

China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy. 'The economic
growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the year in the second quarter, China's

economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth, and presented 'three-speed' growth pattern: China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times. At the same time, China, Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years of rapid growth, the emerging economies are gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.' Blanchard also noted that China's economic growth slowdown. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that
China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said. On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%. Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of

Chinese macro-control policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth. 'China should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth superficial.' Zhuang Jian said. Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current
investment from the shadow banking, which makes the development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important. 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said. In this regard, Blanchard believes that although China's

economy is still at risk, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth. Seeking good way: China's economy has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global economy is essential. Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. ' 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing, China urgently looking for a new economic growth point, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the
economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.

Chinese Economic collapse causes war Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would

economic crisis in China. have serious global

repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

China Key to Global Econ

Chinese slowdown is bringing down economies all over the world AFP 13 (Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy Jul 17, 2013
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html SCTM)
LONDON: China's

slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia on Tuesday, sparking questions over Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on the world economy, analysts said. The
nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter, down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months, official data showed Monday. "China

is a key downside risk to the global economy. Recent data does suggest that the are concerned about the rapid rate of credit expansion and the impact it might have on inflation. This rules out any near-term monetary or fiscal stimulus." New evidence emerged Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is still struggling to recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis. Investors in Germany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over falling exports to China,
economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told AFP. "In addition, the authorities in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers. Germany's investor confidence index, calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. That disappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40 points. "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of the German economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski. "These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East. The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern (and) could become a new risk factor for the German economic outlook." China is now the fifth most important single export market for German companies and accounts for some six per cent of total exports. The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's slowing growth was weakening momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent. The

sluggishness comes as "China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards a more consumer-driven economy," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton. But this rebalancing would present growth
opportunities for the West, he noted. "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies with strong brand identity," he said. "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment, conversely the ones that were doing so well in the last decade." Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added that markets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy. "China's support for global demand has been welcome over the past couple of years as the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era," Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse in 2008 triggered a global slump. "A slowing of China's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the economy matured. "The main concern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth plummet sub-5.0 per cent and lead to financial and social crisis." Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on booming China to help overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis. "Slower growth will have impact on those countries who have strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.

China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies because the Asian powerhouse nation is a major
consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes. At the same time, China is also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and high volume production. But the International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased "possibility of a longer growth slowdown" in emerging market economies like China. Scicluna added Tuesday that all nations around the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels of growth to create a balanced global economy. "Over the long run we would hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told AFP. "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese slowdown with disorderly consequences." But due

to the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of information about risks in the Chinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the probability of that happening," he said.

Banking crisis in China creates collapse if growth isnt sustained Fisher June 20 2013
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com. Chinas economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?

The Washington Post June 20 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-uphow-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM

Thursday was a very bad day for Chinas economy, the worlds second-largest and a

crucial pillar of the global economy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.
The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a

Chinas economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us. Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been
much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. Theres no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on Chinas banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be. Heres what has happened: Chinas

credit market has been in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis. All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down, as happened the United States. Chinas economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse
meant to avoid The Big One. In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it

suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else companies that want to build new factories, families that went to buy a home to borrow money. Thats an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of
China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one. Chinas central bank, which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the Peoples Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates liquidity or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago. This pair of charts, from the economics site Zero Hedge, shows the eerie parallels between todays freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending market and what happened in the United States when Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that were still recovering from: That second chart shows something called the TED spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend to one another. Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to what the Financial Times David Keohane called silly levels. This chart, via Keohane and Reuters Jamie McGeever, shows the money market rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last five years: Heres where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday evening Beijing time that, as panic moved through the Chinese financial system, the countrys central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in relief to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What does this mean? Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that Chinas largest bank managed to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be less healthy than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets. But then the Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding some unnecessary confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation. So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case theyll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth. Chinawatchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the countrys economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: This is a tricky issue, as the definition of financial crisis can differ among investors. The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijings control over the financial system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: Nonetheless, we

expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions. If that happens, Chinas growth would slow even more. HSBC just cut their prediction for
Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy and political stability on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was disastrous for Americas already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also facing a massive property bubble. All

of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is heavily linked to Chinas economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises

China Econ Turns LA Econ

Chinese investment and involvement stabilize Latin American economies most recent economic downturn proves Arnson and Davidow, 11 (Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of Virginia. Davidow has served as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela, and Mexico, China, Latin America, and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online, http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PE In a keynote address, Enrique Garca, president and CEO of the Corporacin Andina de Fomento (CAF), a Latin American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has not obstructed Latin Americas path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to]8 percent. This success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin Americas resource rich countries and China.

Chinese trade with Latin America is a positive force creates sustainable growth in Latin America Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it diversifies the sources of finance finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.

China Relations

Relations Internal
Regional competition in Latin America kills US-China Relations
Zweig, 10 Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational Relations and a Chair Professor in the Division of Social Science (David, Chinas Energy Rise, The U.S., And The New Geopolitics Of Energy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, April) Americas bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearer voice when it
speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S. interests, but to find ways to help China adapt to the world and help Chinas energy and environmental sector. But there

are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate

the China threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting Chinas rise and challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thrive on expressions of American concerns about Chinas rise. Mistrust of America runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most Chinese are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try to stop their rise and see it doing so, even when it is not. And while American concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they
must not drive Americas China policy. The message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral, triangular and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible player triangularizing Chinas bilateral ties, then many

issues could be best discussed within a triangular format, such as a Sino-AmericanAfrican dialogue or a Sino-American-Latin America one. While the U.S. may hesitate to join such discussions, as they give credence and legitimacy to Chinas engagement in regions from which the U.S. would have preferred to exclude them, such dialogue with a rising China is necessary. Many of the meetings could be track-two, bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers together to discuss how Chinas rise in a particular region can be best managed to insure a win-win scenario. Conferences in the West on these issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that regional competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral relationship. Only then can the potentially negative implications of
Sino-American triangularization be better managed.

US presence in Latin America kills US-China relations Hilton, 13 (Isabel, Latin America correspondent China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?, 2/20, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf) The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in the region is large and growing. How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter
of manufactured goods. The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China

has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Infringements on Chinese sphere of influence spillover to prevent cooperation kills relations Hills & Blair 7 (Carla A. & Dennis c., Carla A. Hills is chairman and chief executive officer of Hills &
Company, International Consultants, which advises companies on global trade and investment issues. Ambassador Hills served as U.S. trade representative (1989-93) in the first Bush administration and as secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Ford administration. Prior, she was assistant attorney general, heading the civil division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She currently serves on the board of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and on the international boards of J.P. Morgan Chase, Rolls Royce, and the Coca-Cola Company. She also serves as co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue and the Advisory Board of Center for Strategic & International Studies, chair of the National Committee on US-China Relations, and member of the executive committee of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and of the Trilateral Commission. Ambassador Hills is a member of the President's Council on International Activities at Yale University and of the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group., and Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, April 2007, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985) No relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as the one between the United States, the worlds great power, and China, the worlds rising power. Chinas development is directly transforming the lives of one-fifth of the worlds population, and is otherwise influencing billions more. Chinas rapid economic growth, expanding regional and global influence, continued military modernization, and uneven human rights record are also shifting the geopolitical terrain and contributing to uncertainty about Chinas future course. After thirty-five years of engagement, the United States and China have a relationship that was truly unimaginable two generations ago. At the same time, there are some Americans who believe that Chinas strategic interests are incompatible with those of the United States. The Council on Foreign Relations established an Independent Task Force to take stock of the changes under way in China today and to evaluate what these changes mean for China and for the U.S.-China relationship. Based on its careful assessment of the developments in the country and Chinas likely future trajectory, the Task Force recommends that the United States pursue a strategy focused on the integration of China into the global community and finds that such an approach will best encourage China to act in a way consistent with U.S. interests and international norms. The Task Force concludes with a series of recommendations aimed to reinforce recent efforts to deepen U.S.-China cooperation . The overall message is that while the United States should not turn a blind eye to the economic, political, and security challenges posed by Chinas rise and should be clear that any aggressive behavior on Chinas part would be met with strong opposition, U.S. strategy toward China must focus on creating and taking advantage of opportunities to build on common interests in the region and as regards a number of global concerns.

War Mpx Boosters

US-Chinese political tensions already high-Cool War to come Feldman 13 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard and the author of five
books. bachelor's degree from Harvard, a law degree from Yale and a doctorate in Islamic thought from Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar. He clerked for Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court. As an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, he contributed to the creation of the country's new constitution. He lives in Cambridge, Mass., and is a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows at Harvard., The Coming Cool War With China, BLOOMBERG L.P, June 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html)
Ahead of the first summit meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of

China on June 7, the two nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight.
Chinas peaceful rise was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for Chinas leaders. Americas peaceful decline will get no one elected, whether Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China

can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets and drones, the U.S.s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China.

US already anticipated, but not inevitable-War preparations being made now Peck 12 (Michael, is Games Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine and a writer for Training & Simulation
Journal at Defense News, Wargaming A U.S.-China War, Gawker Media 2013, 9/3/12, http://kotaku.com/5939729/wargaming-a-us+china-war)
As if the U.S.

and China don't have enough problems, now they're eyeing each other like two high school jocks competing to be Big Alpha Male on Campus. Oh, they're not exactly enemies. Actually, they're kind of friendly with each other. One loans the other money, and the other uses that money to buy cigarettes from the first guy. But beneath the bromance, both are steeling themselves for a rumble to decide who's the biggest, baddest dude at Pacific Ocean High. This has prompted the U.S. to change its strategic focus. Post-1945, America's main concern was stopping a Soviet
tank blitz of Western Europe. Then for the last decade, we have been obsessed with the Global War on Terror (though Terror has yet to surrender). Now the Pentagon is preparing for a confrontation in the Pacific. The question boils down to who is allowed to play in China's backyard. A quick glance at a map shows that the Western Pacific is a lot closer to Bejiing than Los Angeles. But the U.S. has allies over there: Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam (who'd have believed it?), and the biggest flashpoint of all, Taiwan. China

regards Taiwan as a renegade republic that must be reclaimed for the Fatherland, while the other nations claim resource-rich waters and islands that resource-hungry China also calls its own. Considering that China versus its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan, is like Mike Tyson versus Tiny Tim, America is the only power that can stand up to the biggest kid in the neighborhood. It's not a question of altruism. The U.S. has its interests. So does China. Much mayhem may ensue. The new U.S. doctrinethe guiding principles of how the U.S. would fightare embodied in a new concept called Air-Sea Battle. As the name suggests, Air-Sea Battle envisions a Pacific war as a contest of ships and aircraft, which is logical: until they
build a Star Trek transporter or a 6,000-mile San Francisco-Shanghai bridge, tank divisions and infantry battalions are useless in a trans-oceanic war without sea and air transportation to move them to where they're going. This is good news for swabbies and zoomies: the War on Terror has mostly been an Army/Marine/Special Forces war, with the Air Force and Navy as supporting players (Air-Sea Battle also happens to be great timing as the services compete for shares of a shrinking defense budget). For its part, China has vastly increased its defense spending, including advanced jets, missiles, subs, and even a pathetic ex-Soviet carrier. Air-Sea

Battleand a U.S.-China Warwould be primarily a missile war. China would use its vast arsenal, including carrier-killing ballistic missiles originally designed to carry nukes, to target the platforms that project U.S. power: airbases in Taiwan, Japan, and islands such as Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the mobile airbases that are the U.S.

Navy's aircraft carriers. If China can neutralize American airpower, it will render American ground and sea forces (except for subs)
impotent, and then Beijing can go about its business as it invades Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. Under Air-Sea Battle, America would use its own missiles to destroy China's sensor network; if China can't detect the carriers in the wide-open ocean, it can't shoot at them. Then American forces would destroy own China's missile forces, and then... who knows how this war would end.

The US & China already have a potential war scenario Saunders 13 (Doug, well -known British-Canadian journalist and author, and columnist for the Globe
and Mail, a Canadian national newspaper based in Toronto, Canada, international-affairs columnist, and a long-serving foreign correspondent formerly based in London and Los Angeles. His journalism has won the National Newspaper Award, Canada's counterpart to the U.S. Pulitzer Prize, on five occasions. In 2006 and in 2013, he was honored as the best columnist in Canada. One of the five finalists for the 2011 Lionel Gelber Prize honouring the world's best book on international affairs, and for the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing., Why are the U.S. and China preparing for war with one another? The Globe and Mail Inc., July 12, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smilefor-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/)
Both the Pentagon

and the Peoples Liberation Army are arming for an all-out war and pursuing enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war will occur. In the case of the United States, this appears to be taking place without any authorization or approval from the White House or Congress. The Pentagon is now basing its global strategy on a detailed plan known as the AirSea Battle concept, in which the U.S. Army and Air Force defend the presence of 320,000 U.S. troops in the area by readying themselves for a full-scale land and air assault on China in the event of a threat in the South China Sea or its surroundings. In a detailed analysis paper in this summers issue of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, the famed sociologist and
military-policy expert Amitai Etzioni asks, Who authorized preparations for war with China? His answer is stark: Mr. Obama has spoken of a pivot to Asia, but there has been no political intent or desire to have such an active military confrontation with China in fact, the politics and diplomacy have been moving in the opposite direction. The United States is preparing for a war with China, a momentous decision that so far has failed to receive a thorough review from elected officials, namely the White House and Congress, Prof. Etzioni writes. In the public sphere there was no debate led by either think tanks or public intellectuals like that which is ongoing over whether or not to use the military option against Irans nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the 2009 surge of troops in Afghanistan. But the AirSea Battle plan has far more expensive and dangerous implications. The imagined result of ASB is the ability to end a conflict with China in much the same way the United States ended WWII: The U.S. military defeats China and dictates the surrender terms. This is a drastic change from Cold War approaches, where nuclear-scale conflict was carefully avoided. The plan scares the heck out of many military figures. AirSea

Battle is demonizing China, James Cartwright, the former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last year. Thats not in anybodys interest. A Marine Corps assessment warned that the concept is preposterously expensive to build in peace time and, if used as intended, would cause incalculable human and economic destruction, in good part because it makes escalation to nuclear war far more likely. And the Chinese have responded in kind: If the U.S.
military develops AirSea Battle to deal with the *Peoples Liberation Army+, Col. Gauyue Fan warned, the PLA will be forced to develop antiAirSea Battle. And that is now taking place. Soon after assuming power last year, Mr. Xi

abandoned his predecessors commitment to peaceful rise, took direct command of the Central Military Commission and commanded the military to focus on real combat and fighting and winning wars. As Jeremy Page of The Wall Street Journal noted recently, Mr. Xi has rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military advisers who have advocated a military strategy based on preparing for direct confrontation with the United States. He has particularly embraced Col. Liu Mingfu, whose calls for direct China-U.S. military competition had led his books to be
banned, but are now back on the bookstore shelves in droves. Also widely published now is air force Col. Dai Xu, who wrote last year, according to Reuters, that Chinas neighbours are running dogs of the United States in Asia and we only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to heel.

Brink
Sino-American Relations are on the brink, infringements on SOI push it over. Rudd 13 (Kevin, Australian politician who has been the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of
the Labor Party since 27 June 2013. He was previously Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, and Labor Leader from 2006 to 2010. He is the first former Prime Minister to return to the office since Robert Menzies in 1949, and only the second Labor Prime Minister to do so, A subtle defrosting in Chinas chilly war with America, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2013, June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ZJU1aaCD)
In Beijing

analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the China-US relationship. As one said to me not a hot war, its not a cold war; its more like a chilly war. The problem for leaders, diplomats and analysts is that the relationship defies simple definition. Variants range from strategic engagement, strategic co-operation and strategic competition to China as a responsible global stakeholder. The problem with these ideas is that they mean very little to the Chinese. The phrase that hits home in both capitals these days is strategic trust deficit a gap between China and the US which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such a deficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionage and cyber warfare; in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, where hundreds of naval and air assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula; and in the UN Security Council stalemate over Syria. That is why the working summit between presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the weekend was so important. There had been no high-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage these and other apparently intractable challenges facing the regional and global order. With this summit, with more to follow, we at last have the capacity to build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself (simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary of the Communist party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart, Chinas political system is geared to the defence of the status quo. In the US, the secretaries both of state and defence are able to make some strategic calls in negotiations. But their Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most senior officials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls. Despite opposition in both capitals, both
recently: Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan. Or, in the Queens English: Its presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for the past 40 years and convened a working summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits. This is a success in its own right. More importantly, both camps are privately delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement, with neither expecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this as the cyber summit described in the US media. So, what are the outcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military dialogue is critical. It could contribute to rules of the road on cyber security; crisis management for the Korean peninsula; the management of incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating a mechanism to develop basic confidence and security-building measures for the region. Second, the summit represented the first systematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea, including their reported public commitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, there was agreement on climate change, perhaps reflecting the start of a commitment to make the global rules-based order more effective. No one should expect Chinese policy to change quickly. Much could go wrong. But, without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much of strategic importance right. After 20 years of drift in the relationship following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for the previous 20 years provided the underlying rationale for co-operation this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente. We were headed towards strategic competition or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship, creating a framework to manage the growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face. It could even lead to what Mr Xi himself described as a new model of great power relations for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicate the bloody history of the rise and fall of great powers in centuries past.

Africa Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Saving the African Economy, Infrastructure, Society and Politics He 13 (Wenping, a senior fellow with the Chahar Institute and a professor and director of the African
Studies Section of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)., An Important Step Forward: China-US Cooperation in Africa, China-United States Exchange Foundation, July 17, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forwardchina-us-cooperation-in-africa/)
In the past

few months, Africa has welcomed two leaders from the first and the second biggest economies in the world. After Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Africa, Tanzania and the Republic of Congo in late March, US President Barack Obama also visited Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania in late June. And, whether by coincidence or by careful arrangement, the two leaders visited exactly the same
number of African countries with exactly the same combination of English-speaking and French-speaking citizenry. This all reflects a high degree of consistency. People are wondering whether it is because great

minds thin alike, or whether Obama's goal in Africa is to counter China. As a matter of fact, the common feature of the two leaders visits is that both China and the US have realized the great development potential of the African continent. However the difference is that China realized this potential and the historic chance for strengthening China-Africa ties much earlier than that of the US. Actually, Africa has been high on Chinas diplomatic agenda in the most recent decade. As earlier as 2000, China established the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Along with the release of the first White
Paper on Chinas Africa Policy in January 2006 and the first China-Africa Summit in early November 2006, which brought more than 40 African heads of state to Beijing, Chinese high-level officials including President Xi Jinping, his predecessor Hu Jintao, former Premier Wen Jiabao, other cabinet members and members of the Political Bureau have all been frequent visitors to Africa. As a result, trade

between China and Africa has soared in the last decade, reaching a record high of over $200 billion in 2011 from a mere $ 10.5 billion in 2000, leading China to surpass the United States and to become Africas biggest trading partner since 2009. On the contrary, the US has long regarded Africa as a hopeless continent full of problems such as conflict, disease and famine,. Being the very first African-American President in the US and having Kenyan family roots,
President Obama seems to have had no time for Africa during his first term in office, and spent only 20 hours in Ghana in 2009, which resulted in deep disappointment and dissatisfaction throughout Africa. Partly due to his election campaigns need for wooing African-American voters for his second term, and the intention to pacify the increasing criticism of losing Africa, and perhaps also due to avoid being labeled as an African-American President who unfortunately has had "the least interest in Africa", President Obama unveiled a new strategy towards subSaharan Africa in June 2012. The new strategy sets forth four strategic objectives in Africa, namely: strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth and strengthening trade and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. The U.S. now believes that Africas economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with technological change sweeping across the continent and offering tremendous opportunities in banking, medicine, politics, and business. With the change in mindset about Africas rise and the motivation of catching up with Chinas pace in Africa, President Obama recently announced a $7 billion power initiative over five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa, and also pledged to host a US-Africa Summit next year in the United States. To a large extent, the US new focus on Africas infrastructure and establishment of a US-Africa Summit have been inspired by the FOCAC and

the US and Chinas approach of engaging with Africa is indeed quite different, but Obamas characterization of US interactions with Africa including goals of social and political development, whereas China more narrowly focuses on commercial benefits is false. Actually, it is no need to mention that one of the focus of Obamas trip in Africa was to appeal and push American enterprises to do business in Africa and to firmly grasp the potential of Africas rising. As for Chinas engagement in Africa, it is certainly too simple and too one-sided to say that China-Africa relations is mainly for commercial benefits. Apart from building many infrastructure projects such as dams, ports, railways and stadiums, China has also engaged in education and health areas, such as providing scholarships, technical training and malaria treatment. And even the economic interaction has also laid a solid foundation for social and political development. However, it should be pointed out that the US and China do have a big difference in military engagement and security interactions, . To uphold and abide by
Chinas extensive engagement in Africas infrastructure industry. Clearly,

its non-interference policy, Chinas involvement in Africas security issues has long been limited to taking part in the UN multi-national peacekeeping forces for missions in Africa, rather than setting up military bases and taking military actions like the US has been doing on the Continent. Since the US established the US Africa Command in 2007, it has accelerated its pace of gathering information, setting up military and drone bases and directly participating in attacking extremist forces and terrorism in Africa. This

has generated unease and worries from African countries and African people. It is also worthwhile to point out that Obamas speech about China and other emerging countries entry into Africa is quite encouraging and can be seen as an important step forward for future US-China cooperation in Africa. This is quite unlike his former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who made accusations against China's so-called "new colonialism" during her visit to Zambia in June 2011, and then criticized Chinas development and investment model in Africa as extracting value rather than adding value. President Obama made clear during his Africa trip that he sees no threat by the growing trade and investment in Africa by emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, etc. In

Obamas words, I dont feel threatened by it (Chinas entry in Africa). I feel its a good thing. The more investment in Africa, the more the worlds least-developed continent can be integrated into the global economy.

Laundry List Mpx

US China relations are key to solve extinction conflict, economic collapse, and multiple trans-national threats become inevitable without cooperation Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting
firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf) The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitordeliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognizeand acceptthat the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is

not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement ofand cooperation betweenthe United States and China. The United States and Chinathe worlds first- and third-largest economies are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holderby farof U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interestand central rolethat both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-

to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATOChina cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gainedand much to be lost in terms of trust and respect by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposaldiplomatic, economic, military, political and culturalpicking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor softit is the skillful combination of bothIt is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

War Mpx
China war escalates draws in other countries
Hunkovic, American Military University, 09 *Lee J, 2009, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible
Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf] war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose
A actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Warming Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Environment Cohen 9 (William S., The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.,
U.S. defense secretary from 1997-2001, is chairman of The Cohen Group, a global business consulting firm., April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html)
Recent events confirm that we're living in a new world of disorder. North Korea tested a missile that could reach the U.S., and is threatening to resume its nuclear-weapons program; the Taliban is using drug money to destabilize Afghanistan and turn that country back into a terrorist safe haven; the financial crisis has sparked a global recession; and unchecked

greenhouse gas emissions are transforming the global climate. These disparate challenges share one thing in common: They cannot be addressed successfully without cooperation between the U.S. and China. The most immediate opportunity for cooperation is in confronting the international financial crisis. China currently holds $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, and it is by far the world's largest holder of U.S. government debt. As the Obama administration increases that debt to finance its economic stimulus plan, China will almost certainly be
called upon to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments. China also has an interest in working with the U.S. to ensure those efforts succeed, because it depends on economic growth in the U.S. (still its largest single trading partner) to ensure stability at home. There is a compelling need to create a new dialogue on finance and economics. This conversation began with President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao's discussions at the G-20 summit this month in London. Meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders have been dubbed the "G-2" by some to reflect the crucial role of economic negotiations between our two countries. This first meeting between the two men, and the agreement reached by world leaders at the close of the summit, mark a positive beginning to the effort to harmonize our financial management and banking regulatory practices, and explore ways to expand bilateral trade opportunities in areas such as energy and environmental technologies. The

U.S. and China are the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. This means that our nations have the opportunity, and the primary responsibility, for shaping the global response to climate change. To date, both sides have used each other as an excuse for inaction. This must end. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will work hard on energy and environmental issues within our bilateral relations. China and the U.S. together have the power to set the de facto global standard for energy efficiency and emissions control. To do so, we should jointly promote the development and transfer of clean energy technology between our countries, initiate bilateral projects on energy and climate issues, and develop common principles to drive the multilateral negotiations on a new international climate-change agreement.

Impact Turn Shield

No SOI Good Turn

No negative impact to China influence Xiaoxia 13 (Wang, staff writer and economic observer at Worldcrunch. In Americas Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America. Worldcrunch. 6 May 2013 http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region. China doesnt pose a threat Hanna, 2012 (Don, Managing director of Global Liquid Markets Research at Fortress Investment Group Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere? January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) Chinas emergence as a global economic force, surpassing in many ways the political influence the country wielded in the 1950s and 1960s, is a development with profound and multifaceted implications for the Western Hemisphereimplications that arent sensibly encapsulated in terms like threat or opportunity. The
important issue for the people of the Western Hemisphere is to understand the nature of those implications and to respond in a fashion that

Demonizing (or sanctifying) China is not a sensible response. One crucial aspect to understand about Chinas emergence is that it is not an emergence, but a reemergence. Prior to Europes industrial revolution, global income was distributed largely on the basis of population because technologyand hence labor productivitydidnt differ much. Chinas reemergence, then, owes much to its ability to put in place policies that have allowed it to catch up with frontiers of technology and improved productivity. Learning which elements of Chinas success can be replicated should be a welcome spur to development in
magnifies the gains for the region from Chinas astonishing emergence.

the Western Hemisphere . Another crucial aspect of China is its sheer sizewith all the demands that creates on resources and the
environment. Higher terms of trade for commoditiesa boon to the regions commodity producersowe much to the surge in Chinas economy. At the same time, Chinas surging greenhouse gas emissions, among the highest in the world, highlight the urgency of a coherent, global program to control such emissions. Chinas sheer size, though, makes it more likely that the country will realize that its own actions will matter in solving this global problem. The

Western Hemisphere needs to contribute to the fashioning of global institutions that can accommodate Chinas reemergence, providing an opportunity for China to share in the burdens of global macroeconomic, political and environmental stability that come with its resurgence.

A2: Heg Turn

Chinese regional presence doesn't challenge US regional security or hegemony Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077) Chinese military engagement with Latin America has been one of the most broadly discussed, but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in the region.2 The PRCs military initiatives in Latin America are arguably not the largest or most strategi- cally significant part of its rapidly expanding interac- tions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in the same fashion as Soviet military engagement with Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives, however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the evaluation by
Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999, U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

China will not harm regional US interests Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)
In general, as this section has suggested, the medium or long term is

course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in the likely to dif- fer significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

A2: LA SOI Causes War

China wont go to war with the US rise is peaceful Jenkins, 10 - Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, Chinas Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge Journals, 2010, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KG Chinas main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials and market access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic and political stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States, could also adversely aect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example, expressed concerns over the implications for his countrys oil interests of institutional uncertainties created by the revision of the countrys constitution and bilateral investment agreements.66 Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, Chinas policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological . Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of dierent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.

Affirmative

General

Uniqueness
Non-unique: China not projected to gain influence in Latin America Azpuru and Zechmeister 13 (Dinorah, associate professor of political science at Wichita State University and a member of the
Scientific Support Group of the AmericasBarometer. Elizabeth, associate professor of political science and Associate Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. Latin Americans Perception of the United States and China. 24 June 2013. Web.) http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china The U.S. profile in the region remains comparatively strong in general, particularly among countries geographically close to the United States. But what responses to a question asking which country currently has the most influence in the region.

is the Latin American publics expectation of future U.S. influence? Figure 3 presents, on the left, Forty percent selected the United

States. But the right of the figure shows that only 30 percent of respondents believe the U.S. will be the dominant power in the future. Interestingly, the difference in response rates in regard to Chinas current and future influence is only marginal (3.5 percentage points), which indicates that important segments of the public perceive other Latin American countries (e.g., Brazil) and non-Latin American countries (e.g., Japan) as likely contenders for key influence in the future.

Non-unique Chinas trade with Latin America is a quarter of the U.S.s and not with topic countries O'Neil, 12 (Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a
nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, Chinas Economic Role in Latin America, Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/, accessed 7/17/13) PE There is much talk of Chinas escalating economic influence in Latin America. But its worth looking at what has (and hasnt) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the regions economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state-owned banks). Trade is the most visible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have increased some 30 percent per year, bringing todays total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in Chinas favor, with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion [dollars]. While sizable numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin Americas trade with the United States. And it appears to be leveling off, suggesting that China wont overtake the United States as the regions primary trading partner anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to Mexicoa mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment for production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade. But it is worth remembering that it both started from a low base and is unevenly distributedaffecting a few countries significantly and others very little.

Non-unique Despite gains in China/Latin America trade, the U.S. is still far more involved in regional trade Malln, 13 (two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern
Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US?, International Business Times, June 28 2013 9:53 PM, Online, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981, accessed 7/17/13) PE Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin

American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, Americas trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.

Obamas recent tour proves non-unique the U.S. isnt done yet American University, 13 (Jun 10, 2013, U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and the
Caribbean?, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online, http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/, accessed 7/18/13) PE The recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff from Washington to Beijing of the role as the regions sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift in influence. The presidents visits were similar in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met with real citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee farmer); and praised the bilateral relationships. Both held sub-regional summits Obama in San Jos and Xi in Port of Spain. Both repackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new accords. Obama pledged another $150 million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), part of the strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in Costa Rica for providing more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase replacement taxis and buses from Chinese manufacturers. Significantly, China is also building Costa Ricas new National Police Academy the sort of project Washington used to thrive on.

US perception in LA higher than China now perceived as better for engagement Dyer July 18, 2013
Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy Policy Activities and Societies: Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association, President (2011) U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America Tico Times Thursday, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/NewsBriefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 SCTM The United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year , and many surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China. US-Chinese influence Latin American
respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese but viewed Chinese acts more positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center Recent

allegations that the United States National Security Agency may have been spying on several Latin American countries has done little to improve the U.S.s image abroad, but a new report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has retained a favorable public image across the region. U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and
Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States. Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report. Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for people older than 50. Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S.

remains more influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a great

deal or fair amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China. While the
U.S. may have more impact, respondents said that Chinas influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia were among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light. During Chinese President Xi Jingpings visit to Costa Rica in June, both countries leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Mon refinery expansion project. Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the worlds second-largest economy has gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National Police academy. Popularity contests aside, most

Latin Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the more important country to have strong ties with .
Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

Balance Thumper
Non-unique Chinese engagement isnt perceived as balanced doesnt increase relations Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE I would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between China and Latin America is not indicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal engagement. In many cases, the cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to new technologies or scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of the playing field, but as an element of Chinas ever-evolving economic statecraft. Chinas cooperative endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are often seen as intervention in the affairs of Chinas commercial actors to ensure a degree of mutual benefit in overseas dealings. Mutual benefit, a guiding principle of Chinas external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure access to and postive relationships with countries and markets in the region.

Plus, Chinese academic literature proves Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE Chinas academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward Latin America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vast majority seeks to derive jiaoxun or lessons from Latin Americas failed experiments in economic and social development. These lessons frequently are taught in Chinas top universities, where students encounter numerous charts documenting Chinas and Latin Americas divergent paths toward economic development. The economic demise of Latin America often linked to import substitution and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside Chinas post-1979 growth miracle. Only one widely-published Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or Another kind of rise, considers Brazils approaches to dealing with rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades, suggesting that China might benefit from similar reforms.

Thumper
Sino-Latin American relations face challenges in future Dominguez 06 (Jorge I., Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico, vice provost of
international affairs, special advisor for international studies to the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue, June, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf) Chinese academics also call attention to four problems in Sino-Latin American relations, though they stress that the reasons for convergence outweigh those for divergence. First, there is increased industrial competition, especially in textiles, where China has been hit by large anti-dumping duties. One reason for its insistence in being recognized as a market economy is to limit the imposition of such penalties. Second, China supports regional integration in Latin America and with the United States but worries about the use of trade barriers against outside countries such as China. Third, there are few cultural contacts between China and Latin America and few of each others peoples speak the others language; both sides suffer from information
deficits regarding the other. Finally, Chinese academics fear that Taiwan may make diplomatic gains.

Link Answers
No link Latin America will be controlled by neither the U.S. or China Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE Both the United States and China use infrastructure investment, diplomacy, and trade as leverage, but Latin America wants to be seen as a socioeconomic partner, not a subordinate. The Pacific Alliance, for example, hopes to become a powerful bloc that can stand up to the worlds two super powers. Comprised of Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and possibly soon Panama, the Pacific Alliance is a new economic bloc that seeks economic integration oriented toward Asia-Pacific markets. Additionally, the Pacific Alliance can become a springboard for other Latin American nations with a Pacific shore to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement among AsiaPacific, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, and the United States. Being part of the Pacific Alliance is significant, because for countries like Costa Rica, it would otherwise be an unlikely candidate for the TPP. Taken together, the Pacific Alliances GDP totals $3 trillion, making it easier to integrate itself to the TPP and for it to fight for better terms. The United States will still hold the lions share of the TPP with an economy that hovers around $13 trillionbut an alliance worth $3 trillion will give it more leverage than it would otherwise have. The battle for influence in Latin America may have the effect of pushing the countries closer together, allowing them to stand up to both the United States and China.

No link Brazil is key Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.

No competition for Latin America, China wont challenge US Global Times 2013 (Global Times-Agencies; daily Chinese newspaper focusing on global issues;
China, US not competing over Latin America: expert; The Global Times; 5-31-2013; http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Ueh3dNKyDMU) Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders

chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.

US faces more challenges in obtaining influence Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW The challenges

facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washingtons domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost
exclusively on commercial terms there.

US will struggle to keep up with China financial struggles Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, Patricia holds two BAs from Universidad
Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean. International Business Times 30 May 2013. Web.) http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean1284839 EW

China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging from $3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now, China seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations, reports the South China Morning Post. The U.S., on the other hand, which has had deep involvement in many Latin American nations for the past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent trade policies, said Boston University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer, but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to, he told Bloomberg.

Chinese industries beating out the US Ellis 13 (Evan Ellis, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic,
political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors. U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America. The Manzella Report 7 June 2013. Web.) http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america EW Similarly, the willingness

of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to
remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

Chinese relations with Latin American are neither a threat nor zero-sum multiple warrants Jiang 11 (Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of
Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations, China & US Focus, November 3, 2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-insino-latin-american-relations/)
The U.S.

concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in
November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out milita ry exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China

does not wish to be used as a card against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance,
Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster *economic+ performance. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western H emisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that while Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it

is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and wellbeing in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Erikson added, Chinas engagement in Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score. So, President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave.

No trade-off; China treading carefully, values US too much Jenkins 10 (Rhys, Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, research focus on
development in Latin America, MA from University of Cambridge, Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Sussex, Chinas Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf) Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically. 67 As a result, Chinas policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of dierent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with

which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of
developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.

Uniqueness overwhelms the link Chinese military engagement guarantees strong ties this is their author Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International, February 2012, page 2, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/20122/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE For the PRC, military engagement is one tool, among many, for building political good-will and leverage in a country, in order to make it more likely that the regime will not oppose the entry of Chinese products or act against its investments. Military activities are useful in this context because the armed forces remain an important political actor in most Latin American countries, although thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist and pre-communist philosophy. Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin American country helps the Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken against PRC commercial interests, influence the political leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be taken by the armed forces in the political arena that could impact Chinese interests.

Link Turn
Chinese soft-power benefits from US economic engagement multiple warrants Ellis 12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics
and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? Inter-American Dialogue, May 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)
In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade

agreements between the United States and Latin American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable to go. Chinese
auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22 The

possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned in the
context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin America, US

consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include
goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United States to serve as

a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and
investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention

also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

A2: Zero Sum

U.S. and Chinese influence arent zero sum recent visits prove GT, 13 (Global Times-Agencies, China, US not competing over Latin America: expert, 2013-5-31
1:13:01 , Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UebisNJtN2w, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

Influence not zero-sum, competition for influence normal Zhou 11

(Jianghou Zhou, Associate Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, PhD, Baylor University US-China Rivalry Still a mismatch April 14, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html)

China's soft power does not hurt global interests . There is a view that soft power is becoming more important to a country's comprehensive power in international society, while hard power is becoming somewhat less important. [13] Since the 1990s, China has
achieved impressive gains in using soft power through implementing its "smiling" foreign policy, providing scholarships for foreign students in Chinese studies, financially aiding many countries, playing critical roles in many international organizations and meetings, and hosting the Summer Olympic Games in 2008. Joshua Kurlantzick believes one of reasons for China's success is that China is using soft power to appeal to other countries and position itself as a model of social and economic success. As a result, China is winning friends and influencing people around the world almost as fast as the United States is doing the opposite. Chinese government spending on education is still low. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggests that Chinese traditional culture is waning on the mainland. The

CCP has recently attempted to revive Confucianism to help in developing harmonious society, but the result of this effort is uncertain. It will take a long time for the West to accept Chinese culture. While China's trade surplus exceeded $21 billion in 2010, its cultural trade deficit is growing. According to a China Daily report in 2006, the ratio of China's imports of cultural products to its exports was 10:1, and is believed to be much higher today. This reflects that the influence of Chinese culture in the West is very limited. More importantly, the CCP has not solved the puzzle of how to integrate its political system, one of the most important aspects of soft power, into the current mainstream of the global order . The US is worried about

China's expansion in Africa and Latin America. In fact, China's policies toward Africa and Latin America obviously are more economically driven than cultural or political. The relationship between the two countries in Latin America and Africa in particular is not zero-sum. China is acting similarly in Europe, the Chinese
government has promised to help helping Spain and other European Union countries deal with their financial crisis and to regain market confidence. Ideologically and politically, the world today is still pretty much dominated by Western ideas and values. Most of the accepted "cosmopolitan values" originated in the West, such as human rights and democracy. According to Joseph Nye, despite China's efforts to enhance its soft power, the US remains dominant in all soft power categories. In terms of soft power influence, China is still no match for the US. And there is no telling how and when China will catch up with, let alone surpass, the US in this regard. Non-democratic China can peacefully co-exist with US. Generally, Western societies view the political system in China as directly contradicting the core values of the West and see no fundamental way for the two sides to co-exist, because they assume that a democratic government would inevitably runs in conflict with a non-democratic one. However, this is a misconception. A democratic government does not necessarily make peace with another democratic one. For example, there are many conflicts between the US and other democracies. On the other hand, a democracy could make friends with a non-democracy, such as the US and Saudi Arabia. So there is no reason why US could not co-exist with China, non-democratic as it may be for the time being. To be sure, different nations have different national interests; and every nation puts its national interests as top priority. Conflicts

of interest between

different nations are very normal.

The U.S. doesnt crowd out China countries became dependent on China without having to push the U.S. out Castaneda, 11 (Sebastian, graduate student at the University of Hong Kong and a contributor to
Foreign Policy in Focus, South America awake to risks of China ties, Asia Times, Apr 21, 2011, Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD21Ad01.html, accessed 7/19/13) PE In the wake of US President Barack Obama's recent tour of Latin America, media reports and commentators claimed that China has been economically outmuscling the United States in the region. The reality, however, is that Beijing's economic presence has not come at the expense of the United States. Although Washington still maintains an overwhelming edge, its influence is decreasing. This decline will be exacerbated by Obama's focus on boosting US exports to the region rather than importing more of Latin America's manufactured goods. True, China has become a key trading partner in Latin America during the last decade. Sino-Latin American trade has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to more than $140 billion today (though the region's trade deficit also rose from $950 million to $32 billion in 2009). Nevertheless, China's relations with Latin America need qualifying. In 2008, 90% of the region's exports to China originated in four South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru). The disparity of trade with China explains to some extent the different growth patterns within subregions in Latin America. In 2010, Central America's economy grew by 4.9% while South America's expanded by 6.6%. The current trade dynamic between China and South America is becoming a relationship of economic dependence that benefits Beijing. China is the largest export market for Brazil and Chile, and comes in second with Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Most exports consist of commodities such as iron ore, copper, copper ores and concentrates, and soya derivatives. In turn, up to 92% of Latin America's manufactured exports compete directly or indirectly with China's products, which ultimately results in deindustrialization for Latin America. In 2010, Brazil lost approximately 70,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector and $10 billion in income.

Economics is not zero-sum Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

In Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributorsWorld

Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international tradecome down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin
America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolster s the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). Some of the empirical methods used in Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin America are nevertheless imperfect: trade data are somewhat outdated and insufficiently disaggregated to drill down to the level of particular products; there are possibly problems of endogeneity bias and reverse causality (as noted in the footnotes to page 32); and some trade models employ dangerously simplifying assumptions. However, the

evidence is overwhelming that a burgeoning Chinese economy has given Latin America a measurable boost.

Lack of cultural influence causes decrease of soft power and not zero sum Nye 2012 (Joseph S. Nye Jr; University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and
author of The Future of Power; Why China Is Weak on Soft Power; New York Times; 1-17-12; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=0) As Han Han, a novelist and popular blogger, argued in December, the restriction on cultural activities makes it impossible for China to influence literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to raise our heads up proud. The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries can gain from finding attraction in one anothers cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon.

China and US not competing for Latin America China Media 13 (China, US not competing over Latin America: expert. China Media 31 May 2013. Web.)
http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/ EW While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some

media reports described dueling visits by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the competition between the worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display. Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages . Tao Wenzhao, a
fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China

has no intention to challenge US influence in the

area.

China doesnt want to compete with the United States Carlson 13 (Benjamin Carlson, GlobalPosts senior correspondent covering China. Chinese insider: Chinas rise is not Americas
demise. Global Post 25 January 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130124/china-japantensions-Senkaku-Islands-conflict-zone-ruan-zongze EW

Online, nationalism is even more strident. One Chinese web user mocked the Japanese dogs *who+ once again go to their
daddy for support. In Japan, commenters joked Now that the US is really involved, China is scared out of its mind, according to a translation by Tea Leaf Nation, an online magazine about China. Remarking

on the United States, Ruan said Beijing has no reason or desire for conflict with America. "We do not want a zero-sum game," he said. "We dont want to say that Chinas rise is the demise of the United States.

Soft Power Low

No Chinese Soft Power- Only an illusion quickly shattered by repression Minas 2010 (Stephen, Master of International Relations from the London School of Economics, research associate with the Foreign
Policy Centre, London, The Hard Truth About Chinas Soft Power November 24, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/41252.html) The recently finished Shanghai World Expo was Chinas second coming out party, so-called, in three years. Like the Beijing Olympics before it, it went off without a hitch. Like the Olympics, it was widely declared a success. And it was. As an expo a big, public event. But some

had grander hopes for the Expo namely, that it would showcase Chinas soft power. Prior to the Expo opening,
Jin Canrong of Renmin Universitys School of International Studies predicted: The message will remain one of how China's rise is characterised by soft power. The Expo is a very safe way for *the government+ to show China's soft power, concurred Ding Xueling of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. As it happened, the

events that swirled around the Expos closing weeks showcased something quite else: Why China doesnt have much soft power and why the West, broadly defined, still has it in spades. Harvard Universitys Joseph Nye coined the term soft power. He defines it as the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. For nations, according to Nye, soft power rests on culture, values and policies. It is therefore difficult to manufacture. Which brings us to Chinas problem. Take Shanghai itself the city not the Expo site. It is a tableau of Western soft power. Young men while away evenings in Western bars, playing not majiang but pool.
Young women self-consciously answer Hello when their phone rings, before launching into Chinese. Expensively dressed Chinese drink at the French-themed Bar Rouge, perched high above the grand, colonial-era Bund. During Halloween, skeletons, vampires and witches lurch merrily out of the darkness. The release of the iPad prompted scenes of public jubilation. And those people wearing Manchester United and Liverpool football shirts are not expats but locals. Its to the great credit of Shanghais government and people that the citys Western heritage has been preserved and enhanced. It gives Shanghai much of its character and marks it out from the megacities rising up around it. But Western

soft power undoubtedly remains on show in mainland Chinas greatest city. East of the Huangpu River, at the main Expo site, the limits of Chinas commitment to even pursue a soft power strategy eventually became clear. In September the Japanese government detained a Chinese fishing captain and a heated row over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands flared up. Among its various responses, China revoked an invitation to 1,000 Japanese youths issued by Premier Wen Jiabao to visit the Expo. If the Expo was meant to showcase Chinas soft power, the cancelled invitation did the exact opposite. The young Japanese were finally re-invited after Japan released the Chinese fisherman. Even more telling is that, as the Expo came to an end, the standout soft power play came not from China but from the Nobel Committee. It awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed critic of Chinas government. President Barack Obama reacted by urging China to release his fellow Nobel Laureate as soon as possible.
Political reform *in China+ has not kept pace, the president said. The basic human rights of every man, woman and child must be respected.

This was a pure exercise in soft power. The Nobel Committee cannot coerce. It can only attract. It does so through its prestige and through the common recognition that it stands for certain principles. What happened next? A media blackout punctuated by official criticism of Liu and the Nobel Committee. A celebratory dinner abruptly broken up, with Lius friends and comrades
hauled off to the slammer. The newly minted Nobel Laureates wife put under house arrest, her phone line cut. And now, reports of Lius supporters prevented from leaving the country. Behaviour

like this throttles the development of Chinese soft power values, culture and policies that can attract. And the Nobel reaction is hardly an isolated event. China is still a nation where typing any of the forbidden words into a search engine causes the internet to reset (The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy, Firefox artlessly suggests). And yet China has a lively Twitter conversation
evidence for the truism that bad laws tend to be flouted and invite derision and contempt. Chinas leadership did not want the Nobel Committees criticism. In 2008, it did not want Kevin Rudds. Australias then prime minister addressed students at Chinas top university, Peking. Speaking in excellent Chinese, Rudd presented himself as a zhengyou, which Rudd defined as a friend who offers unflinching advice. Rudd raised the significant human rights problem in Tibet and urged China to do more on climate change. Of course, no nation wants foreign criticism. But ignoring it is not always the best course. Jerome Cohen, another zhengyou and the doyen of Chinese law studies at New York University, puts it bluntly: Until the party leaders are persuaded to *embrace+ the rule of law, China will not have soft power. Some will disagree that China lacks soft power. They might point to Chinas increasing influence in emerging economies. And its true, governments and businesses in Africa, South America and all parts of Asia are trading with China in increasing volumes. But how

many of their elites would consider sending their kids to university in China ahead of the US or Europe? How many of their workers dream of migrating to China to start a new life? How many of their consumers watch Chinese

TV shows and use iconic Chinese brands every day? How many nations are influenced by China through attraction not payment or coercion? China has a long way to go before it develops soft power assets that can significantly augment
its foreign policy. But the good news for China is that the biggest obstacles are not inherent but a matter of choice.

China soft power in rapid decline now all around the world Shambaugh 13
David, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of ''China Goes Global: The Partial Power.''Falling Out of Love With China The New York Times March 19, 2013 Lexis SCTM
Washington NOW image and the

that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the importance of its global need to enhance its ''soft power.'' It is tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, ''external propaganda work'' and public diplomacy. Unfortunately for China, that's not enough. While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia. There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's military sales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. China's reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the country's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia. Even in Africa -- where relations remain positive on the whole -- China's image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same reasons. Finally, China's most important relationship -- with the United States -- is
also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.

Alt cause to soft power Chinese support for dictators Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in the developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy.76 Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban eviction programme.77 Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its Darfur region.78 China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In justifying its

activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.79 Yet coddling dictators can antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.80 To the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally the only three countries with a plurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies. Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine China's claim to moral high ground even at a time of overall decline in US soft power.81 In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% of the people queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to the aid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China.82

Internet Censorship blocks Chinas Soft Power Keck 2013 (Zachary Keck; assistant director of The Diplomat, international current affairs for AsiaPacific region; Destined to Fail: Chinas Soft Power Push; The Diplomat; 1-7-13; http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/) Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijings soft power, a number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCPs charm offensive is doomed to fail. For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet. After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials, the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete illegal posts and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China, authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned.

Soft Power Fails

China doesnt understand soft power well enough to use it effectively its social not governmental Nye 13
JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_po wer?page=0,1 SCTM
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China

has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's
influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea. Even

China's soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu
after the last international athletes had departed, China's Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia

make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda
is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for

China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.

Too many cultural and economic differences this is their author Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE The growth and exercise of soft power by the Peoples Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each others culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even

fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chineselanguage programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social Sciences, which currently has the worlds largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as not one of usa reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.

Economic leverage doesnt translate into soft power Pew, 13 (Pew Research Center, Americas Global Image Remains More Positive than Chinas, Global
Attitudes Project, Online, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remainsmore-positive-than-chinas/, accessed 7/18/13) PE Publics around the world believe the global balance of power is shifting. Chinas economic power is on the rise, and many think it will eventually supplant the United States as the worlds dominant superpower. However, Chinas increasing power has not led to more positive ratings for the Peoples Republic. Overall, the U.S. enjoys a stronger global image than China. Across the nations surveyed, a median of 63% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., compared with 50% for China. Globally, people are more likely to consider the U.S. a partner to their country than to see China in this way, although relatively few think of either nation as an enemy. America is also seen as somewhat more willing than China to consider other countries interests. Still, both of these world powers are widely viewed as acting unilaterally in international affairs.

Chinese culture projection doesnt help their position in Latin America Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE Despite PRC marketing efforts, by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRCs weakest levers of soft power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, Chinas influence in the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in

those countries. Such perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived differentness of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products.

Sino-Latin America relations fail; Cultural and language barriers, poor corporate citizenship by Chinese Ellis 2011 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and an author and researcher on topic of Latin Americas relations with external actors, Ph.D in Political Science, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University Press, January, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-powerlatin-america.html) The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting

the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us"a reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.

China Soft power is infective and fails DeLisle 2010 (Jacques deLisle is the director of the Asia Program at FPRI, the Stephen A. Cozen
Professor of Law and professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania. Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf) SJH
In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and fragile . The ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Beijing Consensus is only supercially understood and disappointments that would accompany attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China may prove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. These are not the most pure or robust forms of softpower. In some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power. With Chinas growing economic presenceconcentrated in extractive industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured exportscome looming and already-materializing risks to Chinas image in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. Complaints

of labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface. Nearer Chinas periphery, economic integrationdriven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated. As more careful analyses have pointed out, East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. values than PRC ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States through strategies that can be
variouslyif not wholly satisfactorilycharacterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.64 Throughout much of the non-Western world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent super-cial and self-indulgent tweaking of a sole superpower that is seen as havingbeen on a binge of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys and inuential Chinese scholars own estimates, China has scored only limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft power.65 Second, as we have seen,

Chinas soft power resources are plagued by internal contradictions. To build and emphasize some dimensions is to undermine others. Playing up residual
communism can narrow the relevance and appeal of the China Model. Trumpeting strong commitments to sovereignty can raise doubts especially when Taiwan is the issue or when Beijing backs pariah regimesabout Beijings claims to be a benevolent, peace-seeking and responsible power. And so on. Third, key

types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. As many analysts at home and abroad have noted, Chinas political institutions and ofcial values do not enjoy broad appeal, nor does Chinas record on socialequity, the environment, international human rights and other matters.66 The international relevance, content and even existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter foreigners attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests. Chinas soft power remains heavily statist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions that provide much of the might of American soft power.67A slowing of Chinas growth rate or rise in its perceived collateral costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model. Even continued success could sap soft power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less relevant to the developing world. Fourth, China may suffer from a particularly pronounced case of the general problem that soft power resources can be difcult to deploy, especially to achieve afrmative (as opposed to defensive) policy aims. The attractive force of a China Model of development or vigorous defenses of sovereignty or traditional Chinese culture do not translate neatly or more than very indirectly into support in the international system for likely PRC policy agendas that go beyond defusing fears of a rising China.68 Many of Chinas high-prole soft power-building international activities have been pro-status quo (for example, supporting a state-centric international system and a relatively liberal international economic order and largely accepting thenDeputy Secretary of State Zoellicks call on China to be a responsible stakeholder) or have served values that are more like the United States than the PRCs (in the case of humanitarian and democracy-promotion agendas associated with UN peacekeeping operations and other PRC moves to engage with the international human rights regime).69 Seemingly more revisionist efforts (mostly on economic issues and especially with the advent of the 2008 global nancial crisis) so far have been, variously, rhetorical, vague, tentative and not very inuential. Especially in the closing years of the twenty-rst centurys rst decade, China has given reason to doubt its will or ability to stick to a line that will maximize its soft power. Some of what Beijing says and does is bad for Chinas soft-power inuence with key international constituencies. Examples include: newly haughty (if, on the merits, plausible) lectures about the shortcomings of

American-style capitalism and Washingtons regulatory regime; proud and sometimes strident nationalism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in response to perceived provocations from alleged foreign-backed separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang; high-prole actions against pro-democracy, prohuman rights and pro-civil liberties elements; declarations that Western-style democracy is not appropriate for China; and prominent statements implying or asserting that theworld needs to learn to deal with China on Chinese terms.

Entanglement Mpx Turn

Turn Chinese involvement in Latin America means they get drawn in to Latin America conflicts means Sino/U.S. war Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International, February 2012, page 4, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/20122/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE Chinese decision-makers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence of the PRC as a principal global actor, including the possibility that it may have to one day fight a major war involving not only Asia, but other theaters of operations in which it has interests, or where it might wish to hold its would-be adversary at risk. While there is nothing to suggest that the PRC desires or anticipates such a struggle in the short term, it is reasonable to anticipate that its military strategic thinkers are preparing for the possibility. To this end, Chinas military ties in Latin America afford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of US forces, creating diversionary crises or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United States.

A2: China modeled Mpxs

China is only a trading partner, not a model nations dont follow its policies Ford 11
Peter is The Christian Science Monitors Beijing Bureau Chief and was educated in England and graduated from Durham University with an honors degree in Politics and Sociology The rise of an economic superpower: What does China want? The Christian Science Monitor November 5, 2011 Lexis SCTM
With the United States it's cultural and political - the two countries share many interests that China doesn't," such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, and transparent governance, he adds. Indeed, for a government that says it is generally content with the current world order, Beijing is on unusually good terms with regimes cast out by that order, such as those ruling Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar),

China challenges the [global] democratic system and works at cross purposes to the international mainstream," complains Mao Yushi, a well-known reformer who has mentored many of
and Zimbabwe. "By making friends with dictators, China's leading economists. This does not inspire confidence in Western capitals but is less of an issue in developing countries, whose own experience with Western governments - under their rule or trading with them - has often left them feeling seriously hard done by. China

has fewer opportunities to exert international political influence commensurate with its economic clout. That's partly because few governments around the world, and even fewer electorates, regard China's repressive, authoritarian one-party system as a model to be admired or imitated, regardless of its economic achievements. Though China's readiness "to voice different opinions from the only country in the world that has had a say up until now
... is attractive to other nations," says Gong Wenxiang, a professor at Peking University's Journalism School. "I can't see people being happy with

supporting dictators. That is not a positive image." "China is a power in terms of its resources, but it's not a power in terms of its appeal," adds David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at George Washington University. Deficient in soft power, "it's not a model, not a magnet others want to follow." Nor does Beijing show much sign at the moment of seeking to push any particular model of governance or political mind-set, which is music to the ears of men like Mr. Mende, the Congolese communications minister. "We don't believe in that
a very strong power often trend of Western powers mixing with internal affairs of countries," he says. "We don't like people giving us orders. China is more about respecting the self-determination of their partner." That hands-off approach also steers the country clear of alliances that might enmesh Beijing in the costly defense of other people's interests. Even those Pakistani officials who would like to play Beijing off against Washington recall that not once has Beijing stepped in to help Pakistan in any of its wars with India, all of which Pakistan lost. "China

wants to make the deals but not to shoulder responsibilities," says Zhu, the Peking University international relations scholar. "We
are far from ready, psychologically, to make ourselves a dependable power." The government's recent white paper acknowledged as much: "For China, the most populous developing country, to run itself well is the most important fulfillment of its international responsibility." Recent events in Libya illustrate how far China is from playing a creative international diplomatic role. Throughout the crisis, Beijing was a passive, reactive bystander, going along with Western intervention. But, focused on protecting its oil interests above all else, it was the last major power to recognize the new Libyan government. That cautious attitude was on display again last week in China's reluctance to contribute as heavily to the eurozone's bailout fund as European leaders had hoped it would. China was not, after all, going to save the world. "China's

diplomacy is cost-benefit-oriented, not dealing in terms of global public goods," argues Professor Shambaugh. "It's a very self-interested country, looking after themselves." One result of that attitude? "China is rising, but we are a lonely rising power," says Zhu. "The US has alliances; no one is an ally of China's."

A2: US China Relations Mpx

Other Asian player put pressure on US, China to maintain relations for sake of their own dependencies Fingar 11 (Thomas, inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies at Stanford University, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, former Research director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub_pdfs/One%20Step%20Fingar.pdf) The United States and China have an additional incentive to cooperate and avoid antagonistic behavior in Northeast Asia, namely, the strong desire of others in the region to escape having to make either/or choices about alignment. Other states want to maintain good relations with both and to avoid jeopardizing the dependent dimensions of their relationships with both China and the U.S. Thus, for example, Japan and the ROK do not want to put their economic dependence on China at risk by having to side with the U.S. against China. They also want to avoid jeopardizing the security benefits they derive from U.S. extended deterrence by having to tilt toward China in order to protect their economic stakes. Moreover, in a region where balance of power thinking is endemic, all prefer the benefits they think they derive from their relationships with both of the major players. This is strikingly different than the situation during the Cold War when all willingly practiced what Mao described as leaning to one side. No one wants to draw a line through the region with adversaries grouped on either side. Preferences of and pressure from others in the region will reinforce already strong desires in Washington and Beijing to avoid confrontation.

A2: Heg Mpx

Theres no internal link to heg their argument relies on outdated views of international relations Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.

A2: US-Sino War Mpx

No US-Sino war Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

Some realists posit that conflict, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising and declining powers,
citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and between China and Japan. The transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by common political institutions and similar visions of the desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from U.S.-China relations. Jack S. Levy

argues that traditional power-transition theorists speak of a single, hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in global regional interactions. Specifically, he asks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional level, including in the Western Hemisphere? The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China might pose to the interests of the United States or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberal institutionalist G. John Ikenberry suggests: The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. It is a wider and deeper political order than the
orders of the past. In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice in global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so

long as the reigning powers are flexible and accommodate legitimate Chinese interests, tensions stemming from Chinas rise can be managed, and China can be integrated into the existing world system as a responsible stakeholder, in the words of former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Braslia, and other Latin American and world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will they imagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will they seek to avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual international norms?

China SOI Bad

Chinese engagement threatens environmentally sensitive areas Plus, Chinese standards arent adequate Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental concerns are at an all-time high.

Cuba

Non-Unique
Non-unique The U.S. increased agricultural and medical exports to Cuba should have triggered the link Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. , author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, The Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, June 2009, online, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf, accessed 7/16/13) PE As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term investments, partnerships with Cuba could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009 the Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for future industrial engagement. Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment, medical apparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that have already benefited from Chinese trade credits. Such steps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese counterparts in Cuba, and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would advance U.S. strategic interests if extended to the oil sector.

Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient

of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

A2: Cuba Models China

Cuba wont use the Chinese model its too wary of foreign control Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 168-168, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that they intend to follow a China model of development. A historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has long coloured the character of the islands international engagement, and relations with China appear to be no exception. Spanish colonialism in the nineteenth century, along with US domination in the first half of the twentieth century and Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses. Cuba learned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic structures, an admission made by Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Cuban government began to experiment with decentralisation, manifested in the constitutional reforms of 1992, which facilitated the division of Havana into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, and the passage of Decree Law 143, which allowed local management of Havanas historic centre, the countrys most dynamic economic zone. While the revitalisation of Old Havana under the Office of the Historian of the City was a considerable success, the broader push for decentralisation exhibited more ambivalent results. The liberalisation of resources and the devolution of executive capacities did not keep pace with local plans, and overly China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba 169 rigid structures of monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity (Fernndez Soriano 1999).

A2: Oil Link

Chinese drilling co-op with Cuba is a myth Politico, 06-12-08, Politico Live, Report: No Chinese offshore drilling near Cuba,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0608/Report_Chinese_arent_drilling_near_Cuba.html The GOP is in the midst of a coordinated effort to slam Democrats for a seemingly outrageous contradiction: While Democratswith the help of Florida Republicansblock oil drilling off the Florida shore, China is doing just that a mere 60 miles off the coast of Cuba. Vice President Dick Cheney, House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) have all raised the specter of Chinese drilling off Cubas coast. In a recent speech, Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that "drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." The truth of that claim, however, is seriously in doubt. Democrats today pointed to a February 29, 2008 Congressional Research Service that found *w+hile there has been some concern about Chinas potential involvement in offshore deepwater oil projects, to date its involvement in Cubas oil sector has been focused on onshore oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). Sen. Mel Martinez, a Florida Republican, took to the Senate floor Wednesday and called the alleged Cuba drilling akin to urban legend.

A2: Embargo Link

Theres no link ending the embargo doesnt mean increased trade with the U.S. Suchlicki, 13 (Jaime, Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies, University of Miami, author of multiple books on Cuba and Mexico, What If...the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?, An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Issue 185, February 26, 2013, Online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications. Trade - All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. - Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba's major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums.

Mexico

Non-Unique
China will have less influence in Mexico unhealthy trade partnership Funaro 13 (Kaitlin Funaro is a GlobalPost breaking news writer. Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America.
Global Post 3 June 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-usinfluence-latin-ame EW Chinese President Xi

Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a threeday visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal."

Venezuela

Uniqueness
Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil has been modest at best Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) China also has an obvious interest in Venezuelan oil, and Chvez has visited China six times in his drive to win Chinese investment and energy purchases, and thereby create a soft balance to U.S. power. Yet by all accounts (i.e., Ellis and Halper), Beijing has been cautious in building relations with the volatile Venezuelan caudillo. Chinese investment in Venezuelas energy sector remains modest, and its purchases of Venezuelan crude continue to fall well below the ambitious goals set by Chvez. As Luisa Palacios points out in her essay in Chinas Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, there are technical obstacles: Venezuelan heavy crude is incompatible with existing Chinese refineries, whereas geographic proximity to the United States makes it the more natural market for Venezuelan oil: travel time by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast is only five days, compared to forty days to reach China. Moreover, there is some evidence that China wants to avoid becoming embroiled in Venezuela-U.S. tensions and considers the confrontational Chvez something of a risky bet. Overall, Palacios concludes that, although Chinese natural resource companies are slowly gaining a foothold in Latin America as part of their global drive to diversify their energy portfolios, the region is not poised to become a significant supplier of oil to China.

Relations Unsustainable
China-Venezuelan relations failure inevitable without Chavez. Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Perspective on the Future of China-Venezuela Relations, InterAmerican Dialogue, March 22, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3266)
According to Matt Ferchen, however, the

strength of the China-Venezuela strategic partnership will likely be tested in the coming years. China is unprepared for the possibility of significant political and economic instability in Venezuela, he added, and is fearful of losing its preferred status in a post-Chvez government. Ferchen agreed that economic complementarity exists between China and Venezuela, and will play a role in future engagement, but suggested that the extent of future cooperation between China and Venezuela will depend upon economic and political developments in the South American nation. Andrs Rojas Jimnez explained that Chinas loans have done little to strengthen Venezuelas economy. Following the creation of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000 bpd in 2012. But Venezuelas external debt also increased considerably. In 2012, Chinese loans accounted for 25 percent of Venezuelas total external debt. Venezuela is also increasingly dependent upon oil exports for economic growth; exports of non-traditional goods are at the same levels as a decade ago. PdVSA, furthermore, has consistently fallen short of the eventual 800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently criticized Venezuela for delays on certain projects, including some in the Orinoco.