Uniqueness

Regional

General
Chinese investment in Latin America is strong and increasing. Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In
America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6, 2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-srising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, Accessed: 05/25/2013) Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American subforum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.

Latin America in transition to Chinas SOI- (domestic problems hamstring US action) Regenstreif 6-12-13, Gary: Editor at Large at Reuters, Special projects. Quoting Eric Farnsworth: vice
president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, an international forum on social development and open markets The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ The United States, Latin Americas largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemispheres nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America more than three times the regions commerce with China. In Obamas first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast . China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the regions powerhouse largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazils foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties.

Washingtons renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the Wests history of meddling in domestic affairs. Its about influence and leverage , said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than *in the+ patronizing way it happened in the past. The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washingtons domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there.

Chinese aggression
Transition now- Chinese involvement Valencia 6-24-13
New York-based foreign affairs analyst and is a contributing writer for the World Policy Institute and Global Voices Online World policy Institute: US and China: The Fight for Latin America June 24, 2013 - 6:46am By Robert Valencia http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation. Chinas active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, Chinas largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Perus largest trading partner. Chinas imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent. China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as El Vergatario (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chvez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the worlds cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

Chinese aggression now- incentives for involvement Mallen 6-28-13

Latin America reporter for the International Business Times quoting Michael Cerna of China Research Center, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State By Patricia Rey Malln on June 28 2013 9:53 PM Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US? http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-whatdoes-mean-us-1317981 China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. *The U.S.'+ attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said.

U.S. influence declining independence and backlash Martinez 3-23-13

Columnist for Sun Sentinel May 23, 2013|Guillermo I. Martinez America losing influence throughout Latin America http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latinamerica-pri Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America. It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is no more . The days when John F. Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez was elected. The rising price of oil gave Chvez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence . Many of the leftists' presidents in

the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.

Trade
China controls trade- growth rates prove Marketwatch 6-25-13
Quoting Tommy Wong, President of Global Sources Exhibitions June 25, 2013 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/global-sources-opens-third-annual-china-sourcingfairs-in-miami-amid-sino-latin-american-trade-growth-2013-06-25 "China's trade value with Latin America rose by 8 percent in 2012 to $255.5 billion -- a significant volume," said Tommy Wong, President of Global Sources Exhibitions. The growth in China's trade with the region has surpassed that of the Unite States, which was 6.2 percent last year. "Demand for Chinamade products is on the rise. The China Sourcing Fairs here in Miami act as a platform for buyers and manufacturers to meet and conduct business. In fact, pre-registrations from buyers in Latin America are up by 15 percent this year -- indicating strong interest in the Fairs," said Wong.

China winning trade war- flexibility Goodman 5-29-13

Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political coverage in Latin America quoting Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties By Joshua Goodman - May 29, 2013 12:52 PM ET http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latinamerica-influence.html Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American soy, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with, said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to.

China beating the US - Brazil Ellis 6-6-13

Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin America? BY R. EVAN ELLIS JUNE 6, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america

In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla PersadBissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make no mistake : China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders.

Agriculture
China increasing ag ties now MercoPress 6-12-13
News agency based in Montevideo, Uruguay. It provides information focused on Latin America and the South Atlantic Wednesday, June 12th 2013 - 07:20 UTC China set eyes on Latan agriculture to promote cooperation and food security http://en.mercopress.com/2013/06/12/china-set-eyes-on-latam-agriculture-topromote-cooperation-and-food-security China is determined to promote cooperation and food security, with an emphasis in technological development with Latinamerica said Minister Han Changfu at the conclusion of the forum which was organized by the Chinese government and the UN Economic Commission for Latinamerica and the Caribbean. To this effect China has already earmarked 50 million dollars to finance projects in Latinamerica, one of which is to increase and incorporate an additional half a million hectares of farming land in Argentina. Antonio Prado, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) said that there is a raft of complementation opportunities in the agricultural sectors of Latinamerica and China which can help build a strategic trade and technology relationship.

Political Relations
Latin America wants China now because theyre looking to counterbalance the U.S. Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao celebrate at closing of investment and trade seminar. Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and Western Institutions. Chinas historical status as a leader of the developing world positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a great admirer of Mao, while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simn Bolvar would have been great friends. While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position of the PRC as a geopolitical alternative to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the antiU.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.

Chinas expanding political relations Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 3-4, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, and are also perhaps more visibly characterised by the often successful attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina and Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodities exploration companies. On the political side, Beijings involvement in the Western hemisphere has materialised in the establishment of socalled strategic partnerships with several states in the region; Chinas training of increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and attempts to expand the ties of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political parties across the continent. These examples of the intensifying Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which Beijing uses trade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of the United States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that China is taking advantage of a power vacuum in the region that was created by the United States and Russias declining interest in Latin America.

Uniqueness China is increasing influence in Latin America recent trip proves Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America. China is increasing its funding to the region just as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin America, told Bloomberg. "The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. Xi's tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always making reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."

Economic Relations
China & Latin American economies are become dependent on one another Schmidt & Nicholson 10 (Susan & Tara, Susan Schmidt is a partner at the law firm Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips and Managing Director at ManattJones Global Strategies. Tara Nicholson is an intern with ManattJones Global Strategies and a candidate for a dual MA/MBA degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Chinas Relationship with Latin America in Perspective, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP April 18, 2010, www.manatt.com/Articles/China%E2%80%99s_Relationship_with_Latin_America_in_Perspective.aspx# sthash.uZO1xhJ1.dpuf) Chinas relations with Latin America are driven by the joint desire for mutually beneficial economic relations and a multi-polar world. The countrys increasing presence in Latin America is neither a panacea for the regions economic challenges nor a substitute for its historical economic relationships. Although China is laying the groundwork to expand its influence in Latin America, that influence will primarily serve Chinas own commercial interests. Chinas largely economic focus in Latin America is evident by contrasting the breath and depth of Chinas interests and relations in Southeast Asia. The opportunity for Latin America then lies in making Chinas interests a part of long-term economic strategy in the region. Long-term country attempts to turn Chinas primarily economic interests into political tools are likely to be unsuccessful. Regional growth and diversification will not be achieved misunderstanding Chinas primarily economic interests. The challenge is to transform the opportunity provided by a more diverse trade and economic relationship into domestic benefits and sustained growth and development. That will be accomplished only with perspective on an increasingly multilateral economic structure.

Chinas influence in Latin America is growing Sarmiento-Saher 13 (Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. China and Latin America: Big Business
and Big competition. The Diplomat 14 March 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-andbig-competition/ EW According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United

States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America. China is quickly catching up to many of LACs traditional trading partners, however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region
a trend that continues to grow.

Uniqueness More evidence multiple warrants Darlington, 12 (Shasta, international correspondent for CNN based in Brazil, China-Latam economic
ties tightening, Latam is not my typo, thats totes on CNN, November 19, 2012, Online, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/18/business/china-latam-ties, accessed 7/17/13) PE The rise of China in Latin America, long considered the United States' "backyard," took many by surprise. Now, its economic influence in the region is only expected to grow. For the past decade China has fueled high growth in major commodity producing countries like Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru

with its appetite for raw materials such as iron ore, soybeans and copper. In fact, China replaced the United States as the top trading partner in Brazil and Chile and is on the way to doing so in many others countries in Latin America. That relationship made China popular with many countries weary of trying to get their goods onto American and European shelves. But when global demand for Chinese goods dried up in 2008 and 2009, the relationship with Latin America evolved. "China figured out that Latin America could be a very good alternative market for its surplus," said Roberto Dumas Damas, a professor at Sao Paulo's INSPER business school. The flood of cheap exports from China sparked a backlash from many of the hardest-hit industries, but overall, the trade relationship still tips in Latin America's favor. Brazil's trade surplus with China, for example, was $11.5 billion in 2011. China followed up not only with cheap exports of its goods, but hefty investments in Latin America to make it easier to reach the region's growing middle class consumers. "There were two waves of foreign direct investment," Dumas said. "First to guarantee access to raw materials, like land for soybeans and iron ore plants." "In the second wave," he added. "Companies want to explore the region's consumer markets." He pointed to plans by Chinese carmakers Chery and JAC carmakers to build automobiles in South America. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, Chinese foreign investment in Latin America jumped to $10.5 billion in 2010 from $7.3 billion in 2009.

U.S. Inf Low

Link is unique- America backing out now Hilton 13
former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of China Dialogue, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for news. Isabel Hilton China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? from the Norwegian Peacebuilding Research Center http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for mutual transparency through the U.S. China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the regions energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the China threat. Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. Chinas presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administrations pivot to Asia,

U.S. influence low Snowden affair Riechmann, 13 (Deb, Associated Press, Edward Snowden Affair Dampens U.S.-Latin America Ties,
Huffington Post, Online, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowdenus_n_3591560.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry once referred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare already thorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua have already said they'd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States for revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador

has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the US and these countries were already testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improve ties with friendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback. Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil, which was privy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America. That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard. And all this comes right after President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in Latin America.

A2: Obama Tour

Obamas tour isnt a non-unique Obamas still perceived as abandoning Latin America to China Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 8, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE Obamas Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that the Chinese presence in Latin America is not a high priority for Washington; Chinas relations with the region have remained a minor issue because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance for the United States. Washingtons perception might change soon, though, as there are already a number of factors that it is starting to become concerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and economic orders and deepening economic integration between itself and Latin American countries. With regard to these core interests, the US is closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether China is disrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For the time being, however, China is not a firmly established power in Latin America, and Beijings rise on the continent is a relatively recent phenomenon.

A2: China Trade Low

It doesnt matter if Chinese trade with Latin America is low, influence is based on perception of the future Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/17/13) PE In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the worlds youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although Chinas current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism, while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as the wave of the future. In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

A2: Biden Visit

Bidens visit wasnt enough multiple warrants Ellis, 13 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Chinas New Backyard, Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013, Onlinehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america, accessed 7/19/13) PE In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla PersadBissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States.

Venezuela

General Influence
China will keep up relations with Maduro Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 4 -16 (Governmental
organization in charge of cataloguing foreign affairs, President Xi Jinping Congratulates Maduro on Presidential Election Win, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1032740.shtml)
On April 15, 2013, Chinese

President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Nicolas Maduro on his winning the Venezuelan presidency. In his message, Xi said with the joint efforts of the leaders of both sides, China-Venezuela relations have been developing remarkably since the two countries forged strategic partnership of common development in 2001. "China and Venezuela have become good friends of mutual trust and good partners of close cooperation," he said. Xi stressed the great importance he attached to developing ties with Venezuela, adding China is willing to join hands with Venezuela to carry forward bilateral ties into the future and open up new prospects for the relations.

Despite risks, China wont abandon ties Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, What Chavez Taught China, Inter-American Dialogue, 1-18, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/) Though more aware of country-specific risk, China is unlikely to abandon its deals and strategic agreements with Venezuela and other risky nations in the region. Chinas leaders instead are genuinely committed to expanding relations throughout Latin America in coming years, including investment and lending in a wider variety of sectors. Recent agreements with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) suggest as much. The region as a whole is looking east for economic opportunity. A new Venezuelan leadership-whether chavista or notwould be likely to do the same. Chinas strategic partnerships with Venezuela and other countries will remain intact. Its foreign policy apparatus is looking to forge stronger and longer-term friendships, and its firms will continue to engage the region based on a combination of Chinese domestic interests and profit-driven motives. But the trend is toward comprehensive risk assessment and a more cautious, research-based, and well-informed approach to the region. Latin America should expect ever more methodical engagement from China.

Without US aid, Maduro increases Chinese ties Negroponte, 4-16 (Diana Villiers, senior fellow with the Latin American Initiative under Foreign Policy
at Brookings, former trade lawyer and professor of history, Maduro As President of Venezuela: What to Expect, Brookings Institute, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/16venezuela-maduro-negroponte)
With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB),

Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. empire. Maduros

supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro

has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuelas debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is
critical. Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since

2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuelas national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Venezuela moving toward China- Maduro and Capriles prove Arsenault 3-12-13
Al Jazeera web producer, His work focuses on North and South America, geopolitics, and social movements. He holds a BA in history and economics from Dalhousie University and an MA in history from the University of British Columbia Venezuela looks to China for economic boost China may become the South American state's biggest trading partner, but some economists are sceptical of the benefits Chris Arsenault 12 Mar 2013 09:31http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away from its traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuelas largest trading partner. Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President Hugo Chavez on March 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend. "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China ," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuelas foreign minister. In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairman of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, said deepening relations between China and Venezuela are the only way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez. If elected president on April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be to China. Henrique Capriles, leader of Venezuelas opposition, criticises most government policies but generally supports expanding trade with China. The countries have launched two satellites together in recent years, and China is negotiating a free trade deal with Mercosur, a South American trading zone.

China working actively with Venezuela Correo Del Orinoco 5-17-13

Venezuela-China Relations Grow Following VPs Visit By CORREO DEL ORINOCO INTERNATIONAL May 17, 2013 http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9380 Venezuela and the Peoples Republic of China took a further step forward in strengthening their bilateral relations last Monday when Vice President Li Yuancho visited the Caribbean country as part of his recent tour of South America. We have come to amplify our political similarities as well as our

areas of cooperation, reciprocal benefit, and shared profits, said VP Li upon arriving at the Presidential Palace of Miraflores in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas. Li was met by President Nicolas Maduro and his executive cabinet in order to advance projects that will satisfy the essential needs of our people, wrote Venezuelas second-in-command, Vice President Jorge Arreaza via his Twitter account.

Economic Influence
China expanding influence in Venezuela now strong oil partnership Laguna and Cunningham 7-2-13 (Francisco and Jennie Linder. Francisco is the owner of Translegal LLC. Francisco assists clients
with every aspect of international commerce, including compliance with regulatory issues, obtaining required licenses and permits, establishing subsidiaries / representative offices. He has a JD from the University of Arizona and a BA in English from UC Berkeley. Jennie Linder Cunningham is a partner at Translegal LLC. Chinas Economic Influence in Latin America. Translegalllc.com. 2 July 2013. Web.) http://translegalllc.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/chinas-economic-influence-in-latin-america/

Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have invested heavily in Venezuela, often following a loans-foroil deal pattern. Reports indicate that the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has now become the countrys primary foreign source of financing. China currently reports 230,000 barrels imported per day, although official PDVSA (Venezuelas state oil company) reports ~ 319,000 exported barrels. This discrepancy indicates that China is not only importing oil from Latin America for domestic energy security, but that Chinese NOCs are simultaneously reselling their equity oil on the global market. With an almost 100,000 barrel-per-day disparity, it appears that Chinese NOCs (which are heavily state-supported) have entered the international oil trade, not just the import business.

Chinas influence on Venezuela is growing and sustainable The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3

The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary . The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.

China is expanding influence foreign investment and manufactured goods The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? The Economist 6 June 2013.
Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he

may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and

Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost
manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports

China has major influence opportunity Venezuelan debt Marquez 13 (Humberto Marquez, Journalist at IPS specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with Agence France-Presse
(AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas. China Maps out Venezuelas Valuable Mining Resources. Inter Press Service 28 February 2013. Web.) http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/china-maps-out-venezuelas-valuable-miningresources/

The prospecting agreement is part of a growing alliance between the two countries, which has turned Venezuela into a major source of petroleum for China, while the Asian giant is meeting the South American countrys growing need for credit to finance its constant outflow of public funds. Venezuela exports over 600,000 barrels of crude oil a day to China, according to Ramrez, although other sources put the figure at half that much. Beijing, in turn, has granted Caracas more than 38 billions dollars in credits, and at the same time it participates in energy and construction projects.

China is main source for Venezuelan oil funds, cheap interest rates make it attractive to Venezuela Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26, Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html) One vehicle for the lending is a joint fund to finance infrastructure projects set up in 2007 by CDB and Venezuelas Bank for Social & Economic Development. To date, China has contributed $16 billion, while Venezuela has committed half that amount, according to the Venezuelan government. Separately Chavez also secured a $20 billion loan from CDB in 2010, half of which is payable in U.S. dollars and half in renminbi. Chavez said this month that hes seeking a third credit line. Were thinking about 2013, he told reporters Sept. 11. I sent Hu Jintao a letter and the teams are already working on it, he said, referring to the Chinese president. Venezuela pays off the loans with oil, the amount of which fluctuates depending on the price of crude. Currently debt- servicing consumes about 200,000 barrels of the 640,000 a day that Venezuela sends China, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25, or about 9 percent of production. Venezuela relies on oil for 95 percent of its exports and half of public spending. The savings for Venezuela are significant. As a result of Chavezs nationalization drive and inflation that has remained above 18 percent since 2007, the countrys borrowing costs have soared to the highest among major emerging markets. The extra yield investors demand to own Venezuelan dollar debt rather than U.S. Treasuries
widened 5 basis points, or 0.05 percentage point, to 987 at 10 a.m. in Caracas, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.s EMBI Global index. Cheap Credit Venezuela

pays no more than 6 percent interest on its loans from China compared with 12 percent it pays for bonds issued in capital markets, Ramirez told El Nacional in an interview published Sept. 19. Ramirezs office didnt immediately respond to a request to confirm his comments as reported by El Nacional. The lower cost has allowed Chavez to avoid tapping global investors. While the government and state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA sold a record $17.5 billion of dollar- denominated debt in 2011, so far this year PDVSA has issued just $3 billion.

Oil
China taking over influence in LA- prefer predictive evidence Wallis 3-15-13
Reporter on political and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia Fri Mar 15, 2013 9:07am EDT By Daniel Wallis http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315 Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting President Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding. "We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station. "We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them."

China engaging Venezuela on oil Iwata 6-6-13

Reporter for the Wall Street Journal Venezuela Secures $4 Billion Funding From China By Mari Iwata June 6, 2013, 8:32 a.m. EThttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324798904578528922435217366.html Venezuela has secured $4 billion in funds from China to be used for oil field development, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Thursday. The minister didn't give details of the new funding from China, which will add to at least $35 billion of credit Beijing has provided to Venezuela, mostly in return for future oil deliveries. The South American country's state energy company Petroleos de Venezuela SA, or PDVSA, said Wednesday that Venezuela was negotiating a $4 billion credit line from Export-Import Bank of China.

spillover
Venezuela is key China needs energy, agriculture, and telecommunications engagement. Ellis 5 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Available Online: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf, Accessed: 07/15/2013) It can be argued that Venezuela is currently Chinas principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in Venezuelaprior to the recently announced $100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed during the state visit of Venezuelas populist president Hugo Chvez Frias to China during the 2004 Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with Venezuela reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Chvez. His interest in developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. influence in the region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his high- profile state visit to China, Chvez signed a number of accords in which he committed Venezuela to put its petroleum production at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.36 On the other hand, he is also a potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and anti- globalist causes could foment instability in Chinas trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region. Chinas principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific portseither across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Chvez to China in December 2004, and leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela will give China access to 15 mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in technical management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these fields, Venezuela will be able to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical capacity to do so, selling significant quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional markets. As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil,

China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third significant element of Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of Venezuelan ormulsi n, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of electricity. Ormulsi n is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric tons of ormulsi n per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsi n in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal finalized in 2004, Chinas commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsi n annually from Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsi n, which it is able to purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market. Moreover, Venezuela is Chinas natural partner for the ormulsi n deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the worlds largest proven ormulsi n reservesalmost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source. China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm, Corpozulia, are slated to sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48 Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the Chinese- Venezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords reached between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chvez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food production.49 In keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas 2004 visit of Hugo Chvez to China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, helping the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52

Venezuela key to Chinese natural resource access. Cerna 11 Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State
University, GA (Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 15, 2011, Available Online: http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-andchinese-presence-in-the-region/, Accessed: 05/21/2013)

Chinas thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. Its a win-win solution, said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National Peoples Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chiles total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazils largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazils then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazils state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. Just one of Chinas loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008, according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuelas Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuelas desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).

A2: Chavez Death Changed Everything

No change in relations post-Chavez Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Chinese Press on Chavezs Death, China-Latin America Blog, InterAmerican Dialogue, 3-14, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/) The following news stories, assembled by former Dialoguer Peng Ruijie, were published in the Chinese press following Hugo Chavez's death on March 5th. Although the reports offer a variety of perspectives on Chavez, most conclude that little will change with respect to the China-Venezuela relationship. According to most, the results of upcoming elections in Venezuela will have little effect on China's various agreements and lending arrangements in Venezuela. Xinhua News - Predicts stability in Venezuela because of Chavezs appointment of Maduro. States that Maduro has a 60 percent chance of winning in the upcoming elections. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher, Xu Shicheng, notes that even if Capriles wins the
election, there will be some continuity in terms of social policy and that Capriles might even try to lead other leftist countries in the region. Xu goes on to say that a

Maduro or Capriles government will still maintain good relations with China and will honor Chinese agreements in such areas as energy, infrastructure and finance. The report concludes that the political transition will have little effect on China-Venezuela relations. Maduro has furthered commitment to China DT 4/29, China in Venezuela: loans for oil, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragons Tail, blog about Chinese international affairs, Mollie Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavezs death. Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even said the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China. China seems evermore poised to secure new deals in Venezuelas oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragons strategy of tied loans and loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through its investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future and should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduros government. It is also establishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to be careful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its peaceful rise global strategy.

A2 LA trip ignored Venezuela

China still involved with Venezuela- their author concludes neg Economist 6-6-13
Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.

Mexico

General Influence
Chinese Influence Spreads to Mexico Xinhua 13 ( The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a Strategic Partnership With
Mexico, People's Daily Online, http://www.trevorloudon.com/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pacechina-enters-into-a-strategic-partneship-with-mexico/). From the Communist Party of China website: MEXICO CITY Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the
development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has

entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each others concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each others core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each others development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries,
witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico

and China are each others important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said his visit to Mexico

aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico

relations

will enter a new stage, he said.

China and Mexico are upgrading relations now Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the
biggest center for collecting information and press conferences in China. China, Mexico upgrade bilateral relationship, June 5, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/201306/05/content_29033628.htm)
Chinese President Xi

Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for
a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the

two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to
constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the

two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues
concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies.

Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to
promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction, environmental protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China

and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote
tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly,

China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance,
energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the ChinaLatin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level.

Mexico wants closer trade ties to China Mallen 6-28 (Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the Internation Business Times, former employee
BBC America in New York, La Repblica in Lima, La2 TV in Madrid and the UN in Brussels, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For the U.S.?, 2013, International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981) Even more significant was Xis visit to Mexico. President Enrique Pea Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Bidens visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was called brutal and tense by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrs Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America

Washingtons backyard in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogot, no
agreements were signed during his trip.

China taking over in Mexico- Nieto causes transition Ellis 6-6-13

Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran China's New Backyard Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag in Latin America? BY R. EVAN ELLIS JUNE 6, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.

Nieto seeking Chinese ties Peoples Daily 6-9-13

Quoting Osvaldo Rosales, director of International Trade and Integration of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Xi's visit opens new chapter in China-Latin America ties, says UN official 6/9/13 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8279196.html As for Xi's visit to Mexico, during which the two countries elevated their ties to comprehensive strategic partnership, Rosales said "it is important to highlight that (Mexican) President Enrique Pena Nieto visited China in April during the Boao Forum... Barely two months later, President Xi Jinping has already returned the favor." The ECLAC official stressed that the first meeting between the two presidents was in China and it marked the first time that a Mexican president met with his Chinese counterpart before meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Barack Obama, who visited Mexico in May. "That points to a historical change that we should consider closely," said Rosales. Rosales hailed Xi's efforts to strengthen trade and investment with Mexico and to create Chinese-Mexican business alliances. He said that the Chinese president's tour of the region opened a new chapter in the relations between the two sides and their ties were experiencing fast growth.

Chinas sphere of influence in Mexico is increasing now. Perrault 6/6 (Mike, 6/6/13, President Xi uses trip to increase China's influence,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/)//DR. H

When Chinese President Xi Jinping's four-nation tour of the Americas comes here Friday for a two-day summit with President Barack Obama, area economists and economic development officials say China already will have taken fresh steps to bolster its economic influence in nations such as Costa Rica, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago. Xi took office in March and has used the trip to expand China's exports and relations:
Friday, the Chinese leader met with Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of the Caribbean Republic of Trinidad and Tobago a nation rich in liquefied natural gas where they announced they had discussed ways to cooperate in key areas of energy, minerals, infrastructure development, telecommunications and agriculture. Monday, Xi met Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla to discuss commercial and energy projects, in cluding upgrading the Central American country's oil refineries and developing a free-trade zone. Tuesday,

in Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports 15% came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion 1.5% to China.
"The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there." Last year, China eclipsed the United States to become the world's biggest trading nation, as measured by total exports and imports of goods (excluding services), according to figures both countries released earlier this year. Chinese exports and imports reached $3.87 trillion last year, the Chinese customs administration reported. The U.S. exports and imports combined for $3.82 trillion in 2012, the Commerce Department said.

China's latest efforts to boost export markets in places such as Latin America and Africa don't surprise Wes Ahlgren, chief operating officer for the Coachella Valley Economic Partnership in Palm Springs, Calif. Ahlgren has traveled to China and
Europe on trade missions to promote this area's renewable energy and clean technology opportunities.

During a recent conference call with U.S. state, trade and commerce officials who were in Africa at the time, Ahlgren said it was clear China has already made substantial investments in Latin America and Africa, and China continues to look for markets, resources and ways to expand its influence.
"Similarly, the U.S. foreign policy includes a large component of economic development, foreign military sales, direct investment, support for NGOs (non-government organizations), etc.," Ahlgren said. "Perhaps

they are taking a page from our playbook and

modeling it to their own vision." At a time when the USA is under financial pressure and has had to cut aid internationally, China is opening its wallet. "Because (China) is so rich with foreign currency and surplus, they are willing to make direct investments in these countries to improve their ties," Adibi said. "Whereas we have budgetary constraints."
Chinese officials announced last week they would loan Trinidad and Tobago $250 million to build a children's hospital, for instance. During his visit to Costa Rica, the Chinese president signed an agreement to grant Costa Rica a $400 million line of credit for energy and infrastructure projects, the countries announced. They also formalized a $900 million loan enabling Costa Rica to upgrade its main oil refinery to process 65,000 barrels a day.

Economists said China needs oil not only for the growing number of cars for its middle class but to fuel all facets of its expanding economy. Unlike the United States, where some 70% of the economy centers around consumer spending, countries such as China and Japan rely far more heavily on exports, Adibi said. As Latin American ministers and presidents, business executives and others increasingly recognize China's rapidly growing impact on the world economy, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have expanded bilateral ties, economists said. Mexico was among the last of the major Latin American countries to sign free-trade agreements with Beijing, which meant it lost out as China became the principal trade partner to regional competitors such as Brazil and Peru.

Mexico seeking China diversification Zhendong 6-4-13

Reporter of China Daily, quoting Rivera Banuet, Permanent Secretary of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, educated at Instituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mxico (ITAM), B.A. Degree in Economics Closer trade ties with China 2013-06-04 08:16 By Pu Zhendong ( China Daily) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/04/content_16562774.htm Jose Rivera Banuet, executive secretary-general of the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean, said that investments and joint ventures from China are most welcome in Latin America. "Mexico, for example, has around 85 percent of its trade volume with the United States," said Rivera, who is Mexican. "It is very important for Mexico to diversify its economy, and an ideal partner would be China since it is the most dynamic economy in the world," he added

China is only investing in Mexico for its natural resources-Nieto assumes your link uniqueness claims Yi 13 (Yang Yi, Reporter for Xinhuanet-a leading Chinese news source, 6/4/13, China, Mexico upgrade
relationship to comprehensive strategic parternship, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201306/05/c_132431199.htm) MEXICO CITY, June 4 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the MexicoChina ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other's development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction, environmental protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the

Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. Nieto is focusing only on Chinese investment-Economic framework for presidency Esenaro 13(Alberto Esenaro, Writer for JDSupra Law News, 6/20/13 President Xi Jinping sees Opportunities for Chinese Companies in Mexico, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-xijinping-sees-opportunities-35209/) Pea Nieto is focused on making economic prosperity the cornerstone of his presidency, and he believes improved ties with China are of upmost importance. During his trip to China, he made an agreement to send China 30,000 barrels of oil a day, an amount he hopes will increase. President Xi also mentioned the possibility of a free trade agreement between the two nations. It appears as though oil will present one of the largest opportunities for Chinese companies in Mexico: if legislation passes allowing foreign investment in the countrys oil sector, China could very well be the nation that could modernize the aging, outdated infrastructure and provide the know-how needed for deep water oil exploration. China would benefit greatly: China is an energy hungry nation and it needs to secure energy resources from as many sources as possible. However, oil is not the only sector where opportunities exist for Chinese companies. During his visit to China, the Mexican president spoke of the expertise the Chinese have in the field of national infrastructure and how Mexico could benefit greatly from Chinese companies investing in and building much needed public transportation infrastructure. The telecommunications industry is also opening up to foreign investment; Chinese investment could be crucial in the Mexican drive to provide affordable, high quality telecommunications to all of its citizens.

China is encroaching on the US because of US Asia pivot The Economist 13(The Economist-A leading news source, 6/20/13, Why has china snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains3) However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high

energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

China Latin America investment is challenging US pivoit Robledo 13(Carmen Robledo, Writer for Anclas.net, 6/11/13Relaunching China Mexico Relations:
President Xi Jingping Vistit to Mexico, http://anclas.net/2013/06/11/relaunching-china-mexicorelations-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico/) Some specialists point out that the Chinese visit to Latin America is a sign to the US. China is pointing out that it has interests in other parts of the world, and is not afraid to contest US hegemony, even in the its back yard. Similarly, the US could interpret the visit as a payback for the recent increase in US engagement in Asia, Chinas back yard. In any case, this is a perfect environment for Mexicos diversification, since it could help to break the Mexican trade dependency on the US and to reaffirm itself as a key global player.

Economic Influence
China increased influence in Xis recent tour plus, economic relations are zero-sum Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence
in Latin America, Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-chinabattles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.

China Is increasing influence in Mexico Now Economist 6/13(Economist, The Economist is an English-language weekly news and international
affairs publication owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd. and edited in offices in London, t targets highly educated readers and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policymakers. , Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3) SJH
Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China

is developing its own sphere of

influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The

visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.

China Values Sino Influence in Mexico-Trying to improve them Castillo 13 (E. Eduardo, Spanish News Editor, Leaders of Mexico, China promise broadened relations,
move toward more balanced trade, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, JUNE 4, 2013, http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promisebroadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/)

MEXICO CITY - The

presidents of China and Mexico agreed Tuesday to broaden relations between their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto said they are transforming the relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favour of China. The leaders signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and co-operation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure. "Today, we are giving way to a new relationship, a new phase of the relationship," Pena Nieto said in a joint statement. Xi said China wanted better relations with Mexico, which he called "a great friend and a great partner in the Latin American region."

Sino-Mexican Trade Increasing due to spread of Influence Fox News Latino 13 (China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico, FOX
News Network, LLC, June 02, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/chinapresident-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO)
Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China

needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national
and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State

oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of
crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In

April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs."

Chinese-Mexican relations are increasing new deal with Pemex Globalpost 13 (Globalpost, an online US news company that focuses on international news. Pemex
and Sinopec agree to boost Mexican oil exports to China, April 6, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130406/pemex-and-sinopec-agree-boostmexican-oil-exports-china)
The Mexican oil company Pemex

signed Saturday on the southern Chinese island of Hainan an accord with the second largest oil company of China, Sinopec, to strengthen trade relations between the two firms and promote a larger volume of crude exports to the Asian giant, the second largest petroleum importer in the world. The accord was signed by the director general of Pemex, Emilio Lozoya, and the president of the XinXing Cathay International Group, a subsidiary of Sinopec, Sha Ming, in the presence of Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto. The pact marks the de facto opening of trade relations between the two giants, something of particular interest to the world's second economy because of its need for alternative sources of supply. The agreement was signed shortly after Pea Nieto met with the new president of China, Xi Jinping, during the Boao Forum on economic issues. The Mexican leader is one of the first Latin
American heads of state to meet with the new Chinese president, along with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The Boao Forum, an economic summit that has been called the "Asian Davos," began its 2013 meeting Saturday in China with a marked Latin American character, thanks to the presence as speakers of the presidents of Peru, Ollanta Humala, and of Mexico, Enrique Pea Nieto.

China is just beginning a strategic economic partner relationship with Mexico Associated Press 6/4/2013 (Associated Press is a multi-national non-profit news agency, Leaders of
Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade, Associated Press, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relationsmove-toward-more-balanced/) The presidents of China and Mexico have agreed to broaden relations between their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto say they are transforming their relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favor of China. The leaders on Tuesday signed a dozen memorandums of understanding and cooperation agreements in areas including energy, mining, education and infrastructure.

China expanding influence in Mexico - PEMEX Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW

China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Pea Nieto shared with Xi is that though
Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China.

China expanding influence in Mexico USA Today 13 (President Xi uses trip to strengthen Chinas influence. USA Today 6 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/ EW In Mexico, President

Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports 15% came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion 1.5% to China. "The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there."

China and Mexico forming stronger trade ties opens nation up to more influence from China NYT 13 (Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building trip to Mexico. New York Times 4 June 2013. Web.)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0 EW

Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward changing their frosty relationship. Mexicos government would like to narrow its large trade gap with China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexicos Ministry of Economy. The two countries announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade and education. We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.

China and Mexico trading raw materials now builds influence Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html
Upon his arrival,

Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexicos huge trade deficit. This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China, said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil. China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete, said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs.

Chinas has influence in Mexico Pemex Knowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. Chinas President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking Economic Ties. World
Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html Not coincidentally, Xis

visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Pea Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more. During Pea Nietos April visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.

China-Mexico Relations
Pena Nieto Resets China-Mexico Relations Zhang 13 (Tao, staffwriter Caoxin, 4-26-13, Caoxin Online, Building Bridges, http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-26/100521052.html)
Mexico's new president, Enrique

Pena Nieto, wants to redefine bilateral relations with China. In a trip to the southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old Pena Nieto met with the head of China's new leadership, Xi Jinping; announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with China; and repeatedly sent the message that the two economies can complement each other, rather than compete. "I've come to reaffirm, and to also confirm very clearly, the interest Mexico has to expand its relationship with China," Pena Nieto said in an exclusive interview with Caixin on April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both
are major suppliers of manufactured goods, especially to the United States. Mexico was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in 2001 to pave the latter's way into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico's trade deficit with China is the largest among its trade partners.

Past Issues Dont MatterNew Chapter in Mexico-China Relations GbTimes 13 (gb Times, 6-6-13, GbTimes, China, Mexico seek strategic partnership, end to trade issues
http://gbtimes.com/focus/politics/news/china-mexico-seek-strategic-partnership-end-trade-issues#sthash.tVMHq3TW.dpuf)

China and Mexico signed deals on Tuesday to step up Mexico's exports to China, as the two emerging economies seek to 'relaunch' ties that have been dogged by trade imbalances and rivalry in international markets. Following a meeting between visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pea Nieto in Mexico City, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a series of agreements. New contact
with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development - Xi Jinping The deals enable Mexico to export pork and tequila to the Chinese market after years of negotiation, and Mr Xi

announced that China also plans to sign contracts to purchase Mexican products worth an additional $1 billion. "New
contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development," the Chinese leader told Mexico's Senate on the second day of his visit. China's investment in and pursuit of raw materials and oil in Latin America is in contrast to its relationship with Mexico, which has competing with China in the US market in sectors such as manufactured goods. The

two countries also agreed to move to balance Mexico's trade deficit with China.

Mexico and China Deepening Relations Now Xinhua 13 (Xinhua News, 6-5-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm)
Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations. As two emerging powers, Mexico

and China are each other's important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said. Pena Nieto believed Xi's visit will advance bilateral cooperation into a new stage and promote bilateral ties to a higher level. Xi, for his part, said the Chinese and Mexican peoples feel close to each other, as the two countries
are both ancient civilizations and have a glorious history of fighting bravely for national independence and liberation. Since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972, China and Mexico have achieved rapid development of friendly cooperation in all fields, shown mutual understanding and support to each other, and maintained close cooperation in international affairs, Xi said, adding that they are good friends and good partners. The Chinese president noted that China and Mexico are faced with the common task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi

said his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. "I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage," he said. Xi, accompanied by Pena Nieto, then
inspected Mexico's guard of honor. Members of the Mexican cabinet and military leaders also attended the welcoming ceremony.

Economic Cooperation Means Closer Mexico-China Relations Now NewsAsia 13 (NewsAsia, 6-5-2013, Channel NewsAsia, China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexico-presidents/698924.html) MEXICO CITY: Chinese President Xi

Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly to access international markets, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership. Xi on Wednesday begins his
second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic powerhouse, which will include a speech before Mexico's congress. Xi arrived in Mexico after visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad and Tobago. On Friday Xi travels to the United States for a much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack Obama. China

has in recent years aggressively pushed trade and investment ties with the developing world, particularly Africa and Latin America, to secure raw materials to fuel its economic growth and wield greater geopolitical influence in relation to the United States. On Tuesday Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto pledged to enhance diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth over their long-standing rivalry on exporting products to the United States. "We expect to broaden investments of Chinese capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters late Tuesday, a move that will create
more jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we have free trade agreements." Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and Canada. Xi in turn praised

the "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries. In a joint statement Mexico and China agreed to increase talks at various government levels "to deepen mutual trust and conduct bilateral dialogues on strategic issues," Chinese state news service Xinhua reported. Closer ties include more coordination in forums like the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, Xinhua said.

Spillover
Mexico is key to China most important market. Dominguez 6 Jorge Dominguez, Professor at Harvards Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs (China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, June 2006, Available Online: www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Mexico is one of Chinas strategic partners in Latin America. Its overall trade importance for China is second only to Brazils in this region. It is Chinas principal export market in Latin America. Compared to the four South American countries under discussion, China runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 to 2004, Chinas exports to Mexico nearly quadrupled while its imports from Mexico quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of Sino-Brazilian trade, except that Chinas bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years. China is also a significant foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing manufacturing accounting for a third and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the most important Latin American economy for Chinese investment, much of which is geared for sales throughout the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to call Mexico a strategic partner.

Mexico is economically key to China consumer products. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products , a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and

opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

A2: China-Mexico Econ Comp

Perceived competition doesnt hamper soft power Xinhua 13 (Xinhua, 6-4-2013, Xinhuanet, China, Mexico set to further promote trade ties,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/04/c_132428986.htm) Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to Mexico is a sign of deepening cooperation and indicates the two countries are eager to boost their economic and trade ties, officials and experts say. Xi's three-day stay in Mexico starting later Tuesday will include his second meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in less than two months. He will also meet parliament leaders, entrepreneurs and members of the Chinese community. The two sides are expected to sign a series of economic and trade agreements and issue a joint statement on further development of bilateral ties. China

is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while

the latter is China's second-largest in Latin America. Two-way trade jumped from about 5 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to
more than 36 billion dollars in 2012. In a written interview with Mexican media before his three-nation Latin American tour, Xi said China was ready to work with Mexico to expand and optimize bilateral trade, raising the possibility of starting negotiations on a bilateral free trade deal.

Officials and experts believe trade relations between China and Mexico are complementary rather than competitive, and the two countries should make more efforts to identify the complementarities in their economies. In a trip to China in early April, four months after he took office, Pena Nieto met Xi in China's southern city of Sanya and the two leaders agreed to work together to enhance trust and achieve win-win cooperation.

No Conflict from Trade ImbalanceTequila Pact Proves Prados 13, (Luis Prados, writer for El Pais, 6-5-2013, El Pais, China and Mexico sign tequila pact to boost bilateral trade,
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/06/05/inenglish/1370460721_956003.html) Chinese President Xi Jinping continued his first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean on Wednesday after signing a

far-reaching bilateral trade agreement with Mexican President Enrique Prez Nieto. Called the tequila pact because the distilled beverage is one of the major products Mexico will export to China as part of a $1-billion package the accord is geared toward offsetting the trade imbalance between Beijing and Mexico City. Xi and Pea Nieto agreed to put aside their countrys past differences over trade issues. According to Mexican statistics, Mexico exported about $5.7 billion in products to China last year while it imported $57 billion from the Asian giant. At a news conference, Pea Nieto said he immediately touched on the need to search for improved balance in trade. He also promised Xi to resolve in a friendly way Mexicos complaint lodged against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for unfair business practices in the textile sector. Mexico charges that China is selling its products under price while at the same time giving
government subsidies to the industry. Besides tequila, which is Mexicos national beverage, Xi said that China has committed itself to purchasing more Mexican pork products. The

two nations agreed to create a joint working group of businessmen and government officials to seek out investment opportunities in both countries. Pea Nieto said that Mexico
could also become a gateway for Chinese products to other Latin American nations, as well as the United States. Xi explained to reporters that Beijing was interested in investing in Mexicos energy and mining industries, as well as in infrastructure projects, and announced that in 2015 Mexico has agreed to host the first ever summit between Chinese and Latin American businessmen. The two leaders didnt give any precise figures on how much money they had pledged in investment or give a timetable as to when some of these accords will be put into place.

Pea Nieto and Xi, however, both stressed that they were willing to work to forge new relations and cooperate in international forums.

Cuba

General Influence
China is working closely with Cuba now- just met with Cubas VP Xinhuanet 6/18/13 Sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet is an important central news
service-oriented website, an important information organ of the central government, and an important platform for building up China's online international communication capacity. Chinese President meets Cuban VP on stronger tieshttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htmSJH
BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) --

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first vicepresident of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro. Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the two countries forged diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly mature relations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship with Cuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust, deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own development and common prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of the international community, Xi said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region during his visit earlier this month. China would like a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic cooperation and cultural mutual learning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America through a comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China appreciates Cuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth of relations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American and Caribbean states. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging to enhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America. Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.

China is beating out US for Cuban influence Boston Globe 13 (Cubas reforms pave way for new US policy, too. Bostonglobe.com 9 February 13. Web.)
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-intocentury/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html

Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills.

China maintains high influence in the squo MFA 6/18/13 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA or MFA) of the Government of the People's Republic of China is an executive agency responsible for foreign relations between the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world President

Xi Jinping Meets with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Stressing to Push China-Cuba, ChinaLatin America Relations for Greater Development http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml) SJH
On June 18, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping asked Diaz-Canel to convey his sincere greetings to President Raul Castro of Cuba and Fidel Castro. Xi Jinping said that China

and Cuba have always understood and supported each other since the establishment of diplomatic relationship. In the new century, the China-Cuba relationship has been increasingly mature with more content of cooperation and strong vitality. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish the traditional friendship with Cuba and is willing to work with the Cuban side to maintain high-level exchanges, to strengthen party-to-party exchanges and to share the experiences of state governance, to enhance political mutual trust, to build up consensus, to deepen mutual understanding, to expand practical cooperation and to boost development and common prosperity in the two countries. China is willing to
coordinate and cooperate closely with Cuba on international and regional affairs and to make positive contributions to enhancing the influence of developing countries and promoting fairness and justice of the international community. Xi Jinping said, I paid a visit recently to three Latin American and Caribbean countries. I was deeply impressed by the vigour and potential of development of the Latin American and Caribbean region. China

is ready to be a good partner of Latin American and Caribbean countries, with political mutual respect and trust, complementary and mutual benefit in economy and trade, and exchanges in culture. China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish an overall China-Latin America cooperation
mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum as the core to push forward mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. China appreciates the positive efforts of Cuba to promote the overall China-Latin America cooperation and is looking forward to greater development of China-Latin America relations while Cuba holding the rotating presidency of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro to Xi Jinping. Diaz-Canel said Cuba

places great importance on Cuba-China relations and is willing to work with China to strengthen high-level visits and communication, to expand friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation and to push for greater development of relationship between the two countries and relations between China and Latin America.

Trade Influence
Cuba and China deepening trade ties HavanaTimes 12 (Cuba and China strengthening trade relations. HavanaTimes.com. 27 September 2012. Web.)
The 25th Meeting of the Cuba-China Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Relations took place yesterday in Havana, where both countries expressed their willingness to deepen ties. According to the Prensa Latina news agency, talks gave priority to issues such as the provision of spare parts for automotive equipment on the island, as well as Chinas participation in the islands program for the development of renewable energy. On the Chinese side, Commerce Minister Chen Deming said that sugar, nickel and biotechnology are the main items exported to his country from Cuba. Cuban President Raul Castro visited the Asian giant this past July, at which time important agreements were signed in the areas of health, information technology, banking, agriculture and customs. At the end of the first half of this year, trade between the two countries exceeded $870 million, making China the second largest trading partner globally with the Island for the eighth consecutive year.

China building Cuban merchant fleet in the squo- boosts influence CAN 7/11/13 ( Cuban News Agency This page offers users news social, economic, political, sports and
cultural developments that take place in Cuba and in third world nations) Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm- SJH
Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier HAVANA, Cuba, July 11 (acn)

Cuba received in the Chinese city of Shanghai the ninth of 10 bulk carriers as part of a contract with the shipyards of that Asian port to develop the islands merchant fleet. Cuban News Agency Gertrudis is the name of the boat, which was received by Cuban authorities during a
ceremony at the shipyard located on Conngming Island, in Shanghai. Executives with Chinas National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and with the Trade Minister attended the ceremony. Cubas commercial attach in China, Tania Velazquez, was present at the shipyard along

Shanghai shipyard president Ma Shixiong described as fruitful the current collaboration between China and Cuba and he stressed his companys commitment to keep strengthening such links, which were established 50 years ago at the diplomatic level. Tania Velazquez recalled the historic friendly and cooperation relations between Beijing and Havana and she noted that the construction of these boats is the result of those bonds. Sources with the Cuban embassy in China stressed the strategic importance of these boats for Cuba, and the current bilateral economic and commercial relations.
representatives of the ACEMEX Company, engineers and technicians, who supervised the construction of boat.

China is boosting Cuban influence in the squo- just supplied them with tech. infrastructure Nelson 7-13 , Ana, who teaches New Media and Development Communication at Columbia's School of
International and Public Affairs China influence in Cuba http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/ SJH Jennifer Hernandez of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami has posted a note on her research on Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba. She notes that "through bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence," and looks at the activities of two large Chinese telecommunication equipment companies, Huawei and ZTE. Much of her emphasis is on surveillance and she concludes that "Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans."
Internet surveilance is pretty well taken for granted in Cuba and China, and it is deplorable, but I wonder about the up side.

Chinese control of telecommunications in Cuba grants regional influence and espionage opportunities Hernandez, 13 (Jennifer, research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami, Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba, Cuba Transition Project, Issue 186, March 13, 2013, online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm, accessed 7/16/13) PE Both Chinese companies have commercial presence in Cuba and actively participate in conferences organized by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Among these conferences are the XIV Edition of Converging Technologies: Integration and Independence held in Havana in 2011, where Huawei was one of the sponsors, and the V International Symposium of Telecommunications, where both Huawei and ZTE Corporation actively participated. (10) Ramiro Valdes, Cubas Vice-President, Communist party member and former Minister of Information and Communication, position he held until 2011, is an avid supporter of restriction and censorship of information technologies. It is not a coincidence that Ramiro Valdes promotes the commercialization and application of Chinese software and equipment that can be used to monitor and be remotely accessed. Cuba and China have been two amorous friends since the 1960s when Cuba became the first country in the Caribbean and Latin America to normalize relations with the Asian nation. Since that time, both countries have promoted communist ideology and have cooperated and coordinated with each other at multilateral organizations and on the issue of human rights. Chinas transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the islands information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy on Cubans. Perhaps, the Peoples Republic of China is also equipping an anti-American leadership with sophisticated communication and network technology capable of cyber espionage 90 miles from our shores.

US Losing Influence
US influence in Cuba is decreasing Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust Fidel Castro from the helm of Cuba in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was also concerned about Latin American countries emulating Cuba, particularly its geopolitical stance in the cold war, and thus undermining American leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same situation, just a more modern iteration. What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass, says Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis." We were concerned about our sphere of influence that we had taken for granted. *Today+ we cannot dominate this region anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within the region, and to some extent to Cuba still.

US is losing Cuban influence to China Llana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City for seven years.
Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan50 Years after Cuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning. Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as it focused on terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the past decade Latin American democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, with Latin America no longer looking just north to the US for leadership and investment, but to India, China, and Russia. China surpassed the US as Brazils biggest trading partner in 2009.

Cuba/U.S. Relations Low

Cuba/U.S. Relations are low history of isolation, Alan Gross incident, and discontent with Obama Hanson and Lee, 13 (director of policy and outreach at One Acre Fund and Senior Production Editor
on the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Cuba Relations, January 31, 2013, Online, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, accessed 7/16/13) PE What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to nonfamily members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castroaccused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

Tech

China taking over in LA- tech expansion Hernandez 3-13-13

Research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami Issue 186 March 13, 2013 Jennifer Hernandez http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm The Peoples Republic of China has a strong commercial presence in Latin America. The Asian giant is providing professional expertise and technology transfer while Latin American countries guarantee access to their natural resources. China has been particularly successful in securing oil from Venezuela by providing the Bolivarian country with components for its information technology infrastructure. In recent years, Chinese technology enterprises have had a more open presence in Cuba- its largest trade partner in the Caribbean (1). Several Trade Fairs have been held in Havana with the participation of numerous Chinese companies offering products from kitchen appliances to sophisticated information technology equipment, which have substantial demand in Cuba. China, in turn, has benefited from heavy investments in the islands nickel industry, agricultural products such as rice and sugar, and oil exploration. Through bilateral trade agreements, China has been expanding its sphere of influence.

spillover
Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external potentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.

Chinese investment in Cuba key to persuade other Latin American countries. Hearn 9 Adrian Hearn, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and Kiriyama
Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim ("China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts," Pacific Rim Report, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, No. 52, January 2009, Available Online: usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of SouthSouth cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

A2: Cuba is Independent

Cuba can be controlled, but only by China multiple political weaknesses Werlau, 96 (New Jerseybased consultant and executive director of the nonprofit Cuba Archive,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT, page 493-194, ASCE Cuba, Online, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf, accessed 7/17/13) PE Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is very vertical, market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherently constrained. This negates the main theoretical argument for engagement and renders it essentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment
in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis on China concludes that economic engagement has also failed to bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism there because the three elements that would foster reform the rule of law, political accountability and a free presschallenge the security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: If

China is permitted to merely pick and choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable, and to resist those that push change in the direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch toward infinity.229 The same selective approach to capitalist mechanisms is the one applied by the Cuban leadership, and it has been effective. A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact on the feasibility
and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the means to exercise selfdetermination. When

the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regime legitimization is not the issue; the issue is capacity to exercise control. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin
America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The Bolivarian socialist regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western imperialism, while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The

core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.

A2 LA trip ignored Cuba

China still involved with Cuba - their author concludes neg Economist 6-6-13
Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad.

Links

General

Generic
Influence is zero sum Latin America allows Chinese investment because of lack of US economic engagement. Erikson and Chen 7 Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. policy at the Inter-American
Dialogue and coeditor of Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond, and Janice Chen, joint-degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Georgetown University Law Center, former intern at Inter-American Dialogue (China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal, Tufts University, Summer, 2007, 31 Fletcher F. World Aff. 69, Available Online from Lexis Nexis Law Journals) Meanwhile, China's galloping entrance into the Latin American market for energy resources and other commodities has been accompanied by an accelerating pace of high-level visits by Chinese officials to the region over the past few years. Though China's foreign policy strategy toward the developing world prioritizes South Asia and Africa over Latin America, this last relationship has experienced explosive growth . In 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to the region sparked a wave of visits by senior officials and business leaders to discuss political, economic, and military concerns. Since then, the volume of trade between China and the region has skyrocketed. President Hu Jintao traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba in 2004 and visited Mexico in 2005. The presidents of all those and other countries have paid reciprocal visits to China. China's economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $ 60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America--particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $ 6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas. n9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean exceeded $ 2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year. n10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $ 100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. FIGURE 2. CHINA V. TAIWAN: TRADING WITH LATIN AMERICA n11 [*75] For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower without a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituencies that are increasingly antiAmerican and skeptical of Western intentions. n12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China--to the extent that this has actually occurred--is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about China's rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competition posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors.

Economic engagement trades off with Chinese influence Dowd 12

Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation Countering China's Reach in Latin America By Alan W. Dowd, Julys 23, 2012 http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the regiona challenge that must be answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas valuesand needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade, according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without respect for human rights. Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily. That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short,

what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. intervention tanks U.S.-China relations Carpenter 10

Vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs By Ted Galen Carpenter This article appeared on The National Interest (Online) on October 19, 2010.Resets and Spheres of Influence http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/resets-spheresinfluence The Obama administration has explicitly sought to reset the relationship with Russia, which had become quite dysfunctional during the final years of the Bush administration. Although Washington has not used the reset terminology with respect to the troubled U.S. relationship with China, the substantive goal appears to be similar. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates effort to restore the dialogue between the militaries of the two countries is one indication of that intent. Both goals, however, are encountering headwinds for a key reason. Policy makers seem unwilling to accept the reality that any great power in the international system expects, and will seek to enforce, a sphere of influence in its immediate region. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously (or infamously) insisted that the concept of a sphere of influence was both obsolete and pernicious. But that viewpoint is dangerously erroneous. The tensions between the United States and Russia and those between the United States and China confirm that point. The latest, clumsy provocation is Moscows agreement to help Venezuela build a nuclear-power plant. Predictably, that move has caused hawks in the United States to thunder about perfidious Russian contempt for the Monroe Doctrine. There is more than a little hypocrisy in that outrage, since many of those same hawks successfully lobbied for adding the Baltic republics to NATO and now advocate deploying ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe and offering NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia as though Russia has no justifiable reason to object to such moves in its geopolitical back yard. Like the proverbial broken clock that is right twice a day, however, the hawks are correct with respect to the Russian-Venezuelan nuclear deal. The United States has an important interest at stake in making sure that Latin America, currently a nuclear-weapons-free zone, stays free of nuclear weapons. Moscows willingness to help Hugo Chavez, the Crazy Eddie of the Western Hemisphere, acquire nuclear capabilities even if they are ostensibly for peaceful power-generation purposes is an unfriendly act in our geopolitical back yard. Both sides need to back off. Russia needs to find a graceful way out of its increasingly cozy relationship with Chavez, and the United States needs to stop talking about deploying missile defenses or expanding NATO eastward. Washington and Moscow must acknowledge that the concept of spheres of influence is alive and well, and that gratuitous violations of that concept will negate any prospect for a reset in relations. U.S. leaders must also comprehend that cordial relations with China require a willingness to accept that East Asias rapidly rising great power will seek to establish a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. Beijings expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea and the recent spat with Japan over disputed islets in another body of water are signs of that process. Chinas growing power and assertiveness means that the United States will need to tread softly regarding such territorial disputes, as well as the even more sensitive Taiwan issue, if Washington wants to avoid nasty confrontations with Beijing.

American action in LA trades off with Chinese influence Johnson 05

senior associate of the CSIS Americas Program, senior foreign policy analyst at the Washington-based Heritage Foundation,holds a B.A. from the University of Wyoming and an M.A.L.S. from Georgetown University. Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America By Stephen Johnson October 24, 2005 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latinamerica Today, another communist state-the People's Republic of China (PRC)-is seeking trade, diplo-matic, and military ties in Latin America and the Car-ibbean. The region is rich in natural resources and developing markets for manufactured goods and even arms. China does not currently pose a direct military threat in Latin America and has steadily embraced market concepts, but it represents serious competi-tion that could dilute U.S. influence. Washington could ignore this intrusion or attempt to contain it. Ignoring it leaves a vacuum for China to fill, while trying to contain it runs against America's own free market ideals. Instead, the United States can best look after its hemispheric interests and moderate China's presence by: Consolidating trade relations with Latin America and removing protectionist U.S. trade barriers, Emphasizing comprehensive relationships as opposed to narrow-interest diplomacy such as counternarcotics, Minimizing unproductive restrictions on assis-tance to U.S. neighbors, and Pressing harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur-poses, and reenergizing public diplomacy.

US still has dog in fight over Latin America, increased imports, economic dependency Sol M. Linowitz Forum 12 (Bi-annual forum to discuss western hemispheric political conditions,
hosted by Inter-American Dialogue and affiliates Genaro Arriagada, former minister of the presidency of Chile and ambassador of Chile to the United States, chairman of the Board of Radio Cooperativa and national director of the NO Campaign; Sergio Bitar, former Chilean minister of public works under President Michelle Bachelet from 2008 to 2010, minister of education, minister of mining, a senator, president of the Party for Democracy (PPD) on two occasions, and author of numerous books about Chilean politics and international relations; Nora Lustig, former visiting Shapiro professor of international affairs at George Washington University, president and professor of the Department of Economics of the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico, and professor at the Center of Economic Studies at the Colegio de Mexico; Margaret Myers, Director, China and Latin America Program, InterAmerican Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government; Manuel Orozco, chair of US Foreign Service Institutes division on Central America and the Caribbean, senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, adjunct professor at the School for International Service at American University; Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue, April, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55
percent of the regions imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin Americas imports . China and Europe have made

huge inroads . Chinas share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia . Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves . Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazils second largest trading partner, just behind China . Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace .

They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin Americas growth continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the regions markets and resources . While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the regions expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability . Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia. Chinese view Latin American investment as key to their global standing Trinh et al, 06 Senior Economist (Tamara, Silja Voss, Researcher, Steffen Dyck, "China's commodity hunger: Implications for
Africa and Latin America" Deutsche Bank Research)

Latin America have become destinations for Chinese investment Even if the spotlight has been on the massive inflows of foreign investment money into China in recent years, China is increasingly investing abroad as well. We
B. Africa and estimate the stock of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) to have totalled USD 44-50 bn at the end of 2005. While the largest part of these flows remains within Asia (60% of flows in 2005, 73% of the stock as of end-2005, see chart 23), China has been increasingly investing in other regions as well, including Latin America and more recently also Africa. However, the high share of Asia is likely biased by the phenomenon of round-tripping through Hong Kong9which would explain its dominant position in the ODI statistics (see table 24)10.Chinese ODI to Latin America and Africa only makes up 2% and 1% (the latter excluding round-tripping11), respectively, of the total, but China

has stepped up its investment in the two regions recently (see boxes). In the last few years Chinese government officials have made high profile trips to both Latin America and Africa, announcing extensive investment plans. During his trip to Latin America in late 2004, Hu Jintao announced that China would invest up to USD 100 bn in Latin America over the next ten years. We therefore think that ODI flows could increase substantially over the next few years, as China tries to secure more and more resources in an environment of rising commodity prices. In fact, in a survey about their
ODI intentions in the next 2-5 years, Chinese firms indicated that the share of ODI flowing into Africa and Latin America could increase to about 15% and 11%, respectively, of the total (see chart 25).12While many of the investment projects in both Africa and Latin America are carried out by Chinese state-owned enterprises, private companies also increasingly invest abroad.13 The Chinese government has created a framework in the form of its Go-out or Going Global strategy, which centres on active government support and encouragement for domestic firms to pursue investments abroad. Chinese firms have taken up the call: AnUNCTAD report lists five Chinese (state-owned) transnational corporations (TNC) among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing economies14(see table 26). Some 700 Chinese companies are active in Africa alone.15Three

main goals have been mentioned as driving Chinese outward direct investment: 1. Economic

rationale : Improving energy security and securing access to resources, markets, and strategic assets.16
Strategic assets in this context refer to management skills, brands or distribution networks. Access to markets includes setting up production sites in countries with favoured access to major markets (e.g. access to the US market from Mexico via NAFTA, or from African countries via the African Growth and Opportunity Act). 2.

Political intentions : Official recognition as a market economy from its

trading partners and adherence to the One-China principle.173. Strategic goals : Supporting Chinas emergence as a major global power. Concomitant with its economic success China wants to be accepted as an important international player. Closer external trade ties can be leveraged towards reaching this goal. Moreover, China supports the idea of a multi-polar world to counter American hegemony.

Econ
We have a link to their econ advantage maintaining financial weakness in America gives China the edge in control of Latin America Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department
of Sociology and Social Policy, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate Chinas deepening ties with Latin America. The specialist asked whether China is willing to come to the table with the United States to promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese officials reply was revealing: We are interested in trade, and not in politics. Talking past rather than with each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in the United States and Europe has intensified Chinas engagement with developing countries. SinoLatin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and Chinas priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of their countrys demand for the regions primary products, evinced by Latin Americas impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011). Latin American publications reflect the regions historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

Econ Engagement
Economic engagement pushes out China Dowd 2012 (Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. Countering China's Reach in Latin
America 2012. http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Second, the U.S.

must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy . The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in
Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.

Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.

Inaction Link
Chinese Influence Based on US Inaction plan is an attempt to push china out. Cerna 11 (Michael, writer China Research Center, 4-15-2011, Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America, web)
In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama met with leaders and officials in Brazil, Chile and El Salvador. Mr. Obama made this visit amid growing Chinese power in the region. The trip marked the first time President Obama had visited Latin America since becoming President. By comparison, at this point in Hu Jintaos presidency, the Chinese president already had visited four countries, including Brazil, where he signed 39 bilateral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments. While Mr. Obama was well-received during his trip, the most common response in those countries was that the trip was symbolic but not very substantive. Obamas visit did not reflect any shift in policy. Many of the major statements these countries hoped for (such as a call for Brazils permanent place on the U.N. Security Council), in fact, were not made. Mr. Obama

admitted on his trip: There have been times when the United States took this region for granted, according to the Latin American Herald Tribune. Those times are not yet in the distant past and there are fears
this administration is making mistakes similar to ones in the past. After promising during his 2000 election campaign to correct Washingtons indifference to Latin America, George

W. Bush was accused of turning his back on the region in favor of more pressing issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The President showed no concern for a growing Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and China put both feet inside before anyone in Washington seemed to realize the door was open. This was a move China had planned during the administration of George H.W. Bush.

Indirect Issues
China views even indirect issues as zero-sum with the U.S Perlez 12
Jane, Lieberthal, Kenneth, Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the Beijing bureau of the New York Timse, Kenneth Lieberthal is the director of the John L. Thorton Center for China Studies at Brookings, Chinese Influence Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S-China Frictions, The New York Times, April 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-uschina-frictions.html In the face of Chinas strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from its premier position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying by American planes and ships along Chinas borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang writes. Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed as an effort to Westernize the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand for, he says. That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthals appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr. Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial Chinese officials that these officials assume very much a zero-sum approach when discussing issues directly and indirectly related to United States-China relations. Because these are privileged communications not intended for public consumption, American officials interpret them to be particularly revealing of Chinas real objectives, he writes. In turn, American law enforcement officials see an alarming increase in Chinese counterespionage and cyberattacks against the U nited States that they have concluded are directed by the Chinese authorities to gather information of national interest.

Oil Link
China needs Latin America to maintain oil demands Xiaoxia, 13 (Wang, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Translated by Laura Lin, In
Americas Backyard: China in Latin America, Economic Observer Online, April 27, 2013, Online, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml, accessed 7/17/13) PE Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. Oil is a zero-sum game- uniquely true in the context of China and Latin America Luft, 2006 (Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Challenge or Opportunity? Chinas Role in Latin America, United States Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm) China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. With half of its oil imports coming from the Western Hemisphere and with oil imports in the United States projected to surge 60 percent during the next two decades, the United States cannot afford to lose chunks of Western hemispheric crude. Every barrel of oil China buys in the Americas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil available to the United States market. This means that China will have to--the United States will have to look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the Middle East, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the United States less dependent on, ``places that don't particularly like us.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman, this is a zero-sum game.

Perception
Perception key- China will base its action towards Latin America based off of its ability to maintain access Ellis, 2011 (R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP
It is also important to clarify that soft necessarily on

power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist"
regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The

core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture
and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

Perception is key

Ferchen, 2013 (Matt, Specializes Chinas Political-Economic Relations with Emerging Economies
Chinas Latin American Interests, 4/6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latinamerican-interests/a7av)
While overall the United States remains the regions main trade and investment partner, the

perception that Chinas star is rising and Americas is falling means the United States must reengage the region both economically and politically in a way that is seen as contributing to rather than inhibiting Latin American economic and political development. And even if the idea of a China Model or Beijing Consensus remains vague and open to various interpretations, the idea that China itself presents a successful model of development, and is a major new trade and investment partner for the region, exposes the need for the United States to rethink its own approach toward both economic and
political development issues in Latin America and elsewhere.

Cuba

Embargo
We have a specific link eliminating or lessening the Embargo brings Latin America back to the U.S.s court Goodman, 9 (Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard, Latin America to Push Obama
on Cuba Embargo at Summit, April 13, 2009 15:07, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk, accessed 7/17/13) PE Then Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century. While Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexicos pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades. Obama, born six months before President John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isnt prepared to support ending it. Instead, hell seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush. That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of U.S. arrogance that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last May. All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba, Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. They value what Obama has promised, but they want more. The policy changes unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba. Symbolically Important Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the regions leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island. Cuba represents a 50-year policy failure in Latin America and thats why its so important for Obama to address it now, says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State Departments Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. Unless Obama wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas. The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be unfortunate if Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy, poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White Houses top adviser for the meeting. Obama also understands that he cant control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April

U.S. is losing influence to China because of the Cuban embargo 2012 summit proves Cawthorne and Ellsworth, 12 (Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 on
various assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property lawyer at Alston and Bird LLP, Latin America rebels against Obama over Cuba, Reuters, Sun Apr 15, 2012 10:13pm, Online, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summitidUSBRE83D0E220120416, accessed 7/18/13) PE

Unprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack Obama isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a region being aggressively courted by China. Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the Americas after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads of state. Brazil and others have bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has been on the defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs. Due to the hostile US and Canadian line on communist-run Cuba, the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out on Sunday afternoon. There was no declaration because there was no consensus, said Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. He bristled at suggestions the summit had been a failure, however, saying the exchange of different views was a sign of democratic health. For the first time, conservativeled US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind the traditional demand of leftist governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas. Cuba was kicked out of the Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been kept out of its summits due mainly to US opposition. But Latin American leaders are increasingly militant in opposing both Cuba's exclusion and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean island. The isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking the other way, have been ineffective, Santos said. I hope Cuba is at the next summit in three years. Santos, a major US ally in the region who has relied on Washington for financial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has become vocal about Cuba's inclusion even though he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana. In an ironic twist to the debate, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cuban music is played. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington recognize its claim to the Falkland Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summit well before its official closure. She missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the Maldives instead of the Malvinas when using the name Latin Americans give to the disputed islands. The leftist ALBA bloc of nations -including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean nations - said they will not attend future summits without Cuba's presence. It's not a favor anyone would be doing to Cuba. It's a right they've had taken away from them, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.

Lifting the embargo puts the U.S. back in the lead Goodman, 13 (Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say, Bloomberg Business News, Feb 20, 2013 6:21, Online, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cubaembargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html, accessed 7/18/13) PE Now, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do more, said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-state enterprises in Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on the island, he said. Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the biggest economic overhaul since the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government began allowing the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses. The latest sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the island. Castro in December said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent. Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012. The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges Obama to gain even more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of 1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change. Any move to ease the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the

biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A bill introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle the web of legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no cosponsors.

Ending the Embargo lets the U.S. compete with China lowering restrictions isnt enough Goodes, 9 (Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba
embargo, Friday, October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo, accessed 7/18/13) PE The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our economic, military, and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama administration decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel and personal money transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and state-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough. While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic, information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer competitors with the United States.

Lifting the embargo reasserts U.S. influence RT 10

Russia Today quoting Daniel Griswold, associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies , earned a Bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Wisconsin at Madison and a Diploma in Economics and a Masters degree in Politics of the World Economy from the London School of Economics. Stumbling blockade: Opposition grows in US over Cuban embargo October 19, 2010 http://rt.com/usa/american-embargo-cuba-rethink/ The embargo has largely been seen as ineffective. It has given the Castro regime a handy excuse for the failures of its socialist experiment. It is hurting the very Cuban people that we claim to be helping, says Daniel Griswold from the CATO Institute based in Washington DC. Lets lift the embargo, move more products there, more Americans will be able to spread their influence there. I think it is our best hope for having influence in Cuba when that wonderful day comes when the Castro regime falls, he advocates.

General
Cuba is strategically important for China political symbol of influence. Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, for

China both hold high strategic value. Examining Chinas relations with Mexico and Cuba opens an analytic window into the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomatic cooperation programs have adapted to
distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gathered during three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positive and negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectively tailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives.Chinas economic impact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up commodity prices, benefiting exporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang 2005, Zweig and Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of Jos Luis Len Manrquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and the countries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountable competition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperation with China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de Amrica Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacfico (Latin American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments in order to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief (REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although Chinas emergence represents a valuable opportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States and Europe, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a raw materials corner. Similarly, a book from the Inter-American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean, argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-term strategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism and education sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greater coordinating role for Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as a backlash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas

multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast,
offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

Engagement with Cuba blocks out China Benjamin-Alvarado 06

PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, University of Nebraska Omaha1 November 2006

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy 2 security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs.
Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cubas oil industry. To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy c onsiderations applying strategic thought to what I will term Post -Oil Cuba a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3 The primary consideration is to determine the pres ent state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cubas favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cubas energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havanas energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on Americas refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil indus try analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a staging area for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes mo re attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos 3 refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American co mpanies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cubas vaunted pu blic education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that bei ng the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has

. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.
cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like

Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda. Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January, usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html) China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an externalpotentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.

Medical Tech
Cuba and Chinas medical tech partnership is a part of a larger bi -national agreement Whitney, 2012 (W.T, Writer for the Peoples World magazine on Latin American Issues, Peoples
World March 5th, 2012, web) The present era of cooperation began in Nov. 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao brought 200 businesspersons and investors to Cuba. He ended up signing a 16-point bi-national agreement covering bio-technical, higher education, telecommunications, nickel extraction initiatives, and more, with China providing favorable credit terms. Follow-up took place in Havana in 2009, as national assembly presidents of the two nations agreed on new financial and commercial arrangements, and prepared for Cuban port, radio and television, and bulk transport modernization. In Dec. 2011, Cuban Council of State Vice-Minister Ricardo Cabrisas, meeting in China with the inter-governmental Cuba-China Commission, signed updates and reported on the 6th Cuban Communist Party Congress of that year. Bilateral trade rose from $590 million in 2004 to $1.8 billion in 2010. China became Cuba's second largest trading partner, exceeded only by Venezuela. Chinese trade with Latin America overall has increased 42 percent over five years. China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China. Cuba's Molecular Immunology Center (MIC) recently announced that the anti-lung cancer vaccine CimaVax-EGF, made by the Cuban-Chinese Biotech Pharmaceutical Ltd (BPL) Company, would undergo trials in China. MIC head Augustin Lage visited China in February to assess use of Nimotuzumab monoclonal antibody, a BPL product directed at several human several cancers.

Cuban Biotechnology is a key growing interest for China Meacham 2012 (Karen, director of educational outreach and dean of the Abshire-Inamori
Leadership Academy at CSIS, where she designs and implements the Centers executive education, leadership, and training activities. She also directs the CSIS Seven Revolutions Project, an ongoing research effort to identify and analyze global strategic trends looking out to 2030. Chinese

Investments in the Cuban Biotech Industry, CSIS, Print)

Although Chinas investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as catalysts for a stronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has opened significant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology expertise and a presence in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States Cubas strength in biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nations health, scientific, and medical research and delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators of any country in the developing world. Its infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States and several other large industrialized nations, Cuba has made considerable advances in biotechnology, including the development of the worlds first vaccine for meningitis 13 has developed a pesticide for dengue carrying mosquitoes and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis 13 vaccines in the region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and as an example, is

advancing its TheraClM hR3 anticancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany. During the past two decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According to Cubas National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2007 was roughly $2.7 billion. Though hard to measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cuban biotechnology industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech pharmaceutical companies have emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in earnest in 2004 when Chinese and Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnological cooperation during Chinese president Hu Jintaos visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was to amplify cooperation and deepen the economic and commercial ties between the two countries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity, Biotech Pharmaceutical, set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research and pharmaceuticals to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since 2006, China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber Pharmaceuticals, which produces interferon and other compounds; and, most recently. Beijing Neurotechnology Limited,which will develop, produce, and commercialize neurotechnological products. Chinas recent economic growth and increasing global power have cast a new light on this relationship, Beijings interest in Cuba has produced more frequent highIevel meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and numerous exchanges in the areas of science, technology, and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban biotechnology industry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is expected to continue to grow.

Oil
China assisting Cuba in supplying key rig components, indicates interest in oil Jeff Franks (Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-12, Reuters, Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration
work, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119 The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in the capital, but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the platform will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from the Florida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using the Scarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All the wells will be in water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions of gallons of oil in the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It has been trying for several years to bring another rig for more drilling, a task that was complicated by the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places on the amount of U.S. technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant pontoon legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent to Singapore in late 2010 for completion.

Chinas intent to drill confirmed by exploratory drilling

Investors.com (Business magazine and advisory), 4-11-12, Investors Business Daily, While We Dither On Oil, It's Drill, Beijing, Drill, http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/041112-607461-china-seekscanadian-cuban-oil.htm?p=full Energy Policy: A Chinese oil company is now the world's top producer. While we sleep and watch pump prices rise, China, India and even Cuba seek supplies the world over, including drilling off the Florida coast. Global demand for oil is rising, as is its global price, as energy-hungry economies such as China, India and Brazil scour the earth for oil they know will be the energy of the present for some time to come. Even those lacking their own technology are asking others to help them get more. For them, there is no such thing as "peak oil." The U.S., however, stands alone as the only major country not actively seeking new supplies. Less than two years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion of a single rig virtually shut down our efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, a Chinese rig built for a Spanish company, Repsol, has begun exploratory drilling for oil off Cuba as close as 50 miles to Key West, Fla. The Scarabeo 9 rig will drill at a depth of 6,000 feet underwater. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill happened at a shallower depth of 5,500 feet. The U.S. Geological Survey recently estimated the North Cuban Basin contains as much as 9 billion barrels of oil and 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Other estimates range from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels. Pools of oil and natural gas tend not to obey lines drawn on a map. It is certain that at least some of Cuba's wells will be tapping oil pools that straddle the boundary separating our zone from theirs, meaning Havana will be getting oil that should be ours. Countries like China clearly don't see oil as an energy source of the past. China and India provided a combined $24 billion in oil industry subsidies in 2010, according to the International Energy Agency. The figure dwarfs the $4 billion in industry incentives that President Obama is seeking to end.

China enabled by Cuba to drill in restricted areas, indicates intent to compete Aaron Sharockman (Deputy government and politics editor, writer/editor for PolitiFact.com, Times staff writer), 4-4-10, Tampa Bay Times, PolitiFact: Stearns' claim about Chinese oil drilling in Gulf of
Mexico is half true, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/politifact-stearns-claimabout-chinese-oil-drilling-in-gulf-of-mexico-is/1085129 "Cuba wants to let the Chinese drill in some of the very parts of the gulf that American producers are currently forbidden to touch, as close as 45 miles off the Florida coast," Stearns, R-Ocala, says on his campaign Web site. Stearns' point that if Cuba is going to drill anyway, why shouldn't we? is obvious. But are his facts right? First, some background. In 1977, Cuba and the United States negotiated maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the waters south of the Florida Keys, called the Florida Straits, according to the U.S. Department of State. The boundaries, called Exclusive Economic Zones, give countries special rights of exploration and marine usage. Mexico, Cuba and the United States have EEZs in the gulf, and Cuba and the United States control the Florida Straits. When it comes to oil, Cuba decides who drills in its EEZ and oil that may come from it and the United States controls who can drill in its territory. The United States currently bans drilling in much of the eastern Gulf of Mexico (including waters within 234 miles of Tampa Bay), and all of its portion of the Florida Straits. But last week, President Barack Obama proposed to open new areas to oil and gas exploration along the eastern seaboard south of New Jersey and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida's coast. U.S. drilling would still be banned in the Florida Straits. . Now onto Cuba, the heart of Stearns' claim. Cuba's maritime boundary in the Florida Straits extends to within 45 miles of the Keys, as Stearns suggests. Cuba has no drilling moratorium. Its EEZ is broken down into 59 areas. In 2002, Cuba's state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, started leasing individual areas to foreign oil companies in both the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico for exploration. So far, Cuba has leased 15 of the 59 areas, said Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive with Shell and Amoco who is an expert on Cuba's energy sector and a former energy fellow with the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy. The waters closest to the United States have not yet been leased. Who holds the rights to the areas? Oil and gas companies based in Spain, Norway, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Brazil. But not China. China has an onshore, land-based lease in Cuba but not an offshore lease, Pinon said.

Chinese industrial oil initiatives key in Cuba Cuban Research Institute, 05-26-09, Commissioned report for the CubaInfo Series, Cuba and
China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissionedreports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf Chinese enterprises have developed a broad range of industrial initiatives in Cuba. Agricultural cooperation has focused on the production of rice, soy, sorghum, and maize, and Cuba exports 400,000 tonnes of raw sugar annually to China. Scientific exchange has developed in earthquake detection, solar energy research, cancer treatment, and vaccine production. In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged to invest $500 million in Cubas nickel sector, and although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las Camariocas ferro-nickel plant, China has since consumed 20,000 tons of the resource (Cheng 2009:1). The Chinese oil company Sinopec has teamed up with Cubas CUPET to develop onshore operations in Pinar del Rio (CRS 2008:24), while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is negotiating exploration of Cuban deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2007, 10,000 Chinese tourists visited Cuba, and as discussed below, electronics manufacturing and transport infrastructure have emerged as key areas of expansion. China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005).

Chinese oil refurbishments of Cuban refineries trade off Reuters, 06-05-11, NewsMax.com, China to Refurbish Cuban Oil Refinery,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/cubanrefinery-china-partnership/2011/06/05/id/398888 China signed a letter of intent to refurbish a Cuban oil refinery and agreed to give new credit and start drawing up a five-year cooperation plan between the two communist-run countries in accords signed Sunday during a visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The agreement on the refinery was the first official word on a project first reported by Reuters in November that is expected to cost $6 billion and would be a significant step forward in budding Cuba-Chinese economic relations. The signing of the accords followed talks between Xi and Cuban President Raul Castro on Xi's second day in Cuba after arriving Saturday from Italy. XI is widely expected to succeed Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2013. Few details about the credit and other agreements were available. China is Cuba's second largest trading partner, behind Venezuela, with trade last year totaling $1.83 billion, according to official Chinese news agency Xinhua. The refinery letter of intent is an agreement among Cuvenpetrol, which is a joint venture between Cuba and Venezuela, China National Petroleum Corp's Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering unit and the Italian unit of French oilfield service company Technip to finalize a contract to expand and improve a Soviet era refinery in Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The plan would expand the refinery's capacity to 150,000 barrels per day, from 65,000, and is a key part of Cuba's plans to develop its still untapped oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico.

Scarabeo 9 indicates dependent partnership between China and Cuba W.T. Whitney Jr (Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace), 03-05-12, Peoples
World, Cuba reaffirms ties with China, http://www.peoplesworld.org/cuba-reaffirms-ties-with-china/ China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China.

Sinopec and Cupet are mutually dependent, key operation to mining Cuban resources Alexander Wstmann (Author, GasAndOil.com writer, founder, CEO), 3-16-04, GasAndOil.com,
Sinopec and Cupet to explore oil blocks in Cuba, http://www.gasandoil.com/news/ms_america/d7c92d068a2d16b0faaa819123514b2d China Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, has signed a memorandum of understanding with Cuba's national oil company, Cuba Petroleo, or Cupet, to explore four oil blocks in Cuba, a Sinopec official said. The MoU will allow Sinopec to conduct geological studies of the four Cuban blocks over six months beginning mid-March, which could lead to the signing of a production sharing contract between the two companies, he said. "We will do a survey on these blocks first and then decide if we will enter into a PSC," he said, adding the blocks are likely to contain mostly crude oil, as opposed to natural gas. The MoU marks the first attempt by Sinopec, China's second largest oil and gas company, to enter oil and gas exploration and production in Cuba.

Now Key
We have a now is key booster Chinese influence is solidifying itself in Cuba through long-term policy planning Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 171, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States, Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Longterm market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC. The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for Cubas liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward alignment with international norms.

Mexico

Agriculture
China investing in Mexican agriculture now Sun, 2013 (Hongbo, A New Stage of Interaction MERL Research / Technical Staff
Senior Principal Member Research Staff Ph.D., Chongqing University China Daily, 6/6/2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/201306/06/content_16573253.htm)
China and Mexico will work together to safeguard each other's national interests and the interests of developing countries. President Xi Jinping's visit to Mexico shows the new Chinese leadership's support for Mexico's development and their will to expand and deepen cooperation. On

Tuesday, Xi and his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Pena Nieto, pledged they will enhance political dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues so as to consolidate the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership. Since diplomatic ties were established 40 years ago, bilateral relations have developed rapidly. Confucius said, at 40 one should be free of doubts, and China-Mexico ties have matured and are
now robust, featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit. And with Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party returning to power, ChinaMexico relations can open a new chapter in their longstanding friendship. Mexico established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. At the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba voted that the government of the People's Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In the 1970s and 1980s, China and Mexico cooperated in the international community supporting South-South cooperation in a bid to promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order. In

2003, the two countries forged a strategic partnership, expanding their friendly exchanges and cooperation in various fields. Both China and Mexico are
emerging economies with increasingly close bilateral economic and trade relations and the two countries' influence on the global governance reform is irreplaceable. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while Mexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin America. The two countries should take more political initiative and make pragmatic policy efforts to push relations to a new level. On issues concerning each other's core national interests, the two countries should enhance mutual understanding and properly handle their differences. And partisan politics in Mexico should not be allowed to have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship. What concerns Mexico most is how to narrow the huge trade deficit with China. The trade imbalance is an indisputable fact mainly due to the differences in the two countries' economic structures. To solve the problem, the two sides should adopt a constructive attitude, put more political resources into their economic cooperation mechanism and improve the quality, level and sustainability of their economic and trade cooperation. Economic and trade cooperation is high on Mexico's agenda and the Mexican business community is eager to gain more market access to China, which is considering expanding imports of Mexico's competitive products, such as agricultural, livestock and fishery products. The two countries can also expand mutual investment. According to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2011, China's investment in Mexico was only $264 million, which is less than its investment in some other Latin American countries. With

regard to their economic and trade cooperation mechanism, the two countries can try to set up a China-Mexico cooperation fund to facilitate financing for mutual investment and trade. Mexico has great demand for investment in transportation, agriculture, communication networks and other areas, and China hopes to expand direct investment in Mexico, which will create employment opportunities for local people. The two sides can also consider starting a feasibility study on building
a free trade area. Meanwhile, the Mexican government is actively promoting energy reform and the prospects for energy cooperation are bright. The two countries should also strengthen consultation and safeguard each other's national interests and the common interests of developing countries in the fields of finance, trade and climate change under the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, the G20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. They should also expand people-to-people exchanges and strengthen cultural and educational exchanges and contacts. Mexico has the most Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the National Autonomous University of Mexico has set up the Mexican Center in China. Cultural and academic exchanges between China and Mexico are frequent and the two sides may consider expanding the number of exchange students. In addition, the two countries should also strengthen public diplomacy to deliver a real and vivid national image to each other's people. Finally, relations between the two countries must take into account the United States. Because of the complex and asymmetrical interdependence between Mexico and the US, developing relations with the US is the top priority in Mexico's diplomacy. However, it is definitely not a zero-sum game, and the three countries can explore potential areas for future cooperation.

China already invested in Mexico Agriculture Watts, 2013 (Elleka, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat Chinese Firms Go Global
The Diplomat, May 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinese-farms-go-global/)

Already, as China has developed more of its land, concerns have developed over whether enough arable land will be available to produce enough food to feed its massive population. This problem has serious implications. As Katherine Morton, a specialist on Chinese environmental governance, notes: Ten percent of the Chinese population is estimated to be undernourished, the rural labor force is declining, and agricultural productivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters and water shortages. She goes on to explain, For planning purposes, China must have at least 120 million hectares of arable land t o produce enough food to meet future demands. But around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified as either barren or low in agricultural potential Despite its long-standing policy of being agriculturally self-sufficient, the Chinese government has tried to cope with rising food insecurity by encouraging overseas investment in agricultural farms around the world, including in Mexico, Cuba, Russia, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania, Laos, the Philippines, and Australia. A 2012 report from the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) examined Chinas domestic and global agricultural investment strat egies, and found that China is becoming increasingly dependent on agricultural imports. Indeed, the IISD report notes that s oybeans have become Chinas main imports, accounting for 38 percent of total agricultural imports, while other major agricultural imports include cotton (9 percent), and palm oil (8 percent). The majority of these imports come from Asia, North and South America, and Africa. Some Chinese farmers, like Zhu Zhangjin, believe this new trend of outsourcing will help strengthen food safety standards and improve quality, while lowering production costs and increasing profit margins. Zhu has followed other individual farmers, agribusiness corporations, and governments by buying huge tracts of land in countries like Brazil and Australia. While outsourcing agriculture has its benefits, as evident from the sheer number of countries pursuing this avenue, there are also many potential problems with transnational land investments. For the investor, these challenges include having to secure large plots of land in order to achieve economies of scales, high transportation costs, political unrest in recipient states, and hostility and resentment from local populations. Chinese investors have been no exception as they have encountered increasing hostility from local populations in purchasing land in areas like South America and Africa, including the charge that this new wave of outsourcing is the equivalent of neocolonialism. These allegations are inaccurate though, since neocolonialism involves a relationship whereby a states policy is influenced by the political, mili tary, or economic leverage it exercises over an external actor. In the case of agricultural outsourcing, there is no loss of sovereignty in recipient countries even if trade patterns resemble those in colonial times. As Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-African relations and Director of the International Development Program at John Hopkins SAIS, explained in a recent interview with The Diplomat, observers accusing China of neocolonialism are using an oversimplified idea of neocolonialism i.e. that China exports manufactured goods and imports raw materials. This structure of trade is accurate but its a very narrow definition. Colonialism is about domination and political control, occupation and military force. This is hardly true of China in Africa. Furthermore, charging China with neocolonial ism absolves the governments in recipient countries of all blame. As Brautigam adds, I think those who use this term fail to appreciate that African economies are alr eady structured as raw material exporters. It is up to Africans themselves to develop other kinds of attractive export products. Indeed, countries like Brazil have found ways to resist eager Chinese investment in its arable land by strengthening regulations on foreigners purchasing land. If other countries are opposed to the increasing attention they are receiving from international land investors, they too can pass laws to keep investors in check and focus on developing other export industries. Nonetheless, China has been proactive in devising ways to ensure that local populations benefit from its i nvestment policies. As the IISD report cited above notes, Acquiring farmland is one of the investment strategies that China is pursuing. But it is part of a much broader strategy that includes joint ventures with local governments or local companies and contracts with local farmers. Locals are often able to benefit from the investment by continuing to work on the farms rather than being replaced by Chinese labor that is imported for specific projects. Furthermore, in many countries Chinese investment in land leads to sharp rises in its productivity due to the importation of modern technology and additional investments in key irrigation infrastructure. In some cases, Chinese investment in other types of infrastructure like roads and ports can expand these benefits to other local industries. Nevertheless, local grievances need to be considered and addressed when companies, states, and individuals invest in countries with rich, arable land. For instance, local farmers need to be fairly compensated if they are asked to move off land that is being used for transnational land investments. As mentioned above, local farmers should be given the option of continuing to work the land, and local food security should be guaranteed before any of the harvest is exported to other countries. In adopting these methods, investors can avoid charges of neocolonialism and the accompanying local hostility that puts investments at risk.

China greatly values investment in Mexican Agriculture Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2012 (Niu Dun Co-chairs 5th China-Mexico Agricultural Working
Group meeting April 5, 2012 http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm) China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Intergovernmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012. Vice Minister Niu Dun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos,
Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and Livestock Research (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led their respective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004, the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and investment. Both

sides reviewed and evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China and Mexico. Both agreed that, with joint efforts, China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed increasing number of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth. Both sides recognized that
in terms of future agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sides expressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes. Both

sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the years ahead and related agricultural policies. Both were of the view that the exchange of agricultural development and related policies is beneficial to drawing on advantages from each other and boosting agricultural development. Both agreed to facilitate the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural

Science and Technology Cooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS). The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and
plant diseases and plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology. The

Meeting also reached

consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation, inter alia to intensify cooperation in marine fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. Other issues discussed at the Meeting included creating favorable conditions for investment, granting appropriate preferential policies, and providing necessary service and facilitation measures so as to encourage and support eligible enterprises from both sides into agricultural trade and investment.

Drugs
China supports Mexican trade, empirically proven David Gibson (Former legislative aide to a state senator, staff writer for Examiner), 9-2-11,
Examiner.com, Chinese companies supporting Mexican drug cartels, http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese-companies-supporting-mexican-drug-cartels On Thursday, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency announced the seizure of 520 pounds of methylamine hydrochloride, the chief chemical component used in producing methamphetamine. The shipment which was found at an air cargo facility at Los Angeles International Airport originated in China and was headed to Mexico. A Drug Enforcement Agency official told Fox News that the amount of chemicals seized could have produced 330 pounds of methamphetamine, with a street value worth as much as $16 million. This shipment was only the latest of its kind to have been sent from China in support of Mexicos drug trade. -In August 2011, a shipment of gamma-Butyrolactone, the chief component used in manufacturing gamma-Hydroxybutrate, or the date-rape drug. -In February 2011, Mexican authorities seized over 23 tons of ethyl phenylacetate, which is also used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The drug component was discovered at the Pacific port of Manzanillo. -In April 2010, Mexican officials seized 80 tons of phenylacetic acid and its derivatives shipped from Shanghai, China. Imports of ethyl phenylacetate require authorization from the countrys health ministry, so the shipments are intentionally mislabeled before leaving China. Last year, an anonymous U.S. official told Reuters that between October and November 2010, Mexican authorities seized 818 tons of chemicals used in making crystal meth. Due to rampant corruption among port officials, the cartels are allowed to receive large shipments of the chemicals from China which are transported to meth labs throughout Mexico. The chemicals are used in a production process known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P method), and cost much less than pseudoephedrine, thus increasing the cartels profits. In 2009 alone, the Mexican police and military found 215 meth labs, a 400 percent increase of the labs discovered in 2008. 90 percent of the methamphetamine sold in the U.S. is brought into this country from Mexico and distributed by several street gangs such as the notoriously violent MS-13.

Experts support theory of Chinese involvement in Mexican meth trade Kari Huus (Reporter, staff writer for MSNBC, Newsweek writer, foreign/domestic policy journalist), 918-06, NBC News, Crystal cartels alter face of U.S. meth epidemic,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14817871/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/crystal-cartels-alter-face-usmeth-epidemic/#.Ueh3Go2yCn9 Recognizing the new international threat, Washington is taking legislative and diplomatic initiatives to ensure cooperation from the global players in the meth trade manufacturing centers like Mexico and the world's biggest producers of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, China, India and Germany. At the United Nations, the U.S. pushed through a resolution that calls on countries to submit a yearly estimate of their legitimate need for the chemicals and to provide information on all exports -- both bulk shipments and those of pharmaceutical preparations. Previously those ingredients were uncontrolled, a gaping loophole in regulations that allowed millions of tablets containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine to be sold on the black market. Under the Combat Methamphetamine act, the State Department also is required to certify that the biggest exporters and importers of the chemicals cooperate with the United States, with the threat of withdrawal of foreign aid hanging over those that do not. The U.S. initiative is working to a degree. The DEA says the U.S. has seen increasing cooperation from Mexico, China, India and Germany in sharing intelligence and conducting joint enforcement operations. The urgency of the mission is clear because they too are witnessing a rising tide of meth

abuse, the DEA says. But political will doesn't always translate into control over agile drug trafficking organizations. We're seeing ephedrine shipped from India and China to South Africa and then from there to South and Central America, DEA administrator Karen Tandy said in a recent speech in Canada. Chinese ephedrine is being diverted through Cairo on its way to Mexico. And ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are being diverted in other African countries including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Mozambique.

DEA findings indicate China is providing drug precursors to Mexico David W. Koop (Huffington Post staff writer), 12-14-09, Huffington Post World, Pseudoephedrine
Crackdown Forces Mexican Meth Cartels To Go Back To Basics, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/pseudoephedrine-crackdown_n_390894.html# "We are starting to see a rise in chemicals that are easier to get," said U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration spokeswoman Dawn Dearden. Preisler, who works at an electroplating factory and has been arrested twice in the U.S. for his work with methamphetamine, says he isn't surprised traffickers have turned to P2P. "P2P is old school," he said. "Hell, I used to cook by that route circa 1980." The fight has come full circle. In the 1980s, the U.S. government severely restricted access to P2P seeking to curtail methamphetamine production. Meth makers shifted to ephedrine, which could be found in common cold remedies. When authorities cracked down on ephedrine, they switched to pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Sudafed and other decongestants. When U.S. authorities regulated bulk sales of the ephedrines ,meth production shifted to Mexico, where, at the time, gangs could get their hands on mammoth quantities of pseudoephedrine imported from China and India. Mexico was soon supplying up to 80 percent of the drug sold in the U.S ., and American authorities were calling meth the No. 2 drug threat to society after cocaine. Once Mexico restricted imports and sales of pseudoephedrine, the cartels took a hit. The volume of methamphetamine seized in the United States fell 34 percent, from 7.1 tons in 2006 to 4.7 tons in 2007, according to the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center. It also said it observed decreased drug purity. Dearden says DEA agents found the price of meth increased. Experts say a crackdown on phenylacetic acid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals. "People forget that these are synthetically made drugs, and we haven't even seen the end of all the possible recipes," said Ralph A. Weisheit, an Illinois State University professor who wrote "Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment."

General
Mexico is key to Chinas sphere of influence Brandt et al, 2012 (Jon Brandt American University School of International Science Derek Hottle Nicole Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew, Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy, December http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-CongressFINAL.pdf) The PRCs military interests in LAC are closely aligned with its commercial objectives. Bilateral security ties build political goodwill with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57 Chinas economic priorities are seen in its official system of cataloguing states as cooperative,
implication that this has for the allocation of economic resources.58 Chinas four strategic Brazil and Venezuela serve friendlycooperative or strategic partnerswith the

partners in Latin America - Argentina, Mexico ,

as important trading partners and commodity suppliers. Chinas strategic posture in the Western Hemisphere is consistent with its publically stated national security priorities. The PRCs 2010 national
defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreign interference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. While Chinas

ties with LAC reflect a growing desire to protect economic and security interests, the PRC is promoting cooperation which reflects mutual trust and benefit, not offensive measures that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level defense visits have occurred between China and Latin American nations.59 While these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence building measures and provide openings for arms transactions.606

US-Mexico Relations Check Chinese Influence Arizona Daily Star 12, (Arizona Daily Star, 9/14/2012, Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence, web)
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday
at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His

point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the
United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances.

Plan reduces the attention deficit pushes out China Martinez 13 (Guillermo I, writer South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 5-23-13, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, America losing influence throughout
Latin America, web)

Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Pea Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new

economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not

highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country
and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Pea Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China

has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that
Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicols Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela the alliance between Cuba's Ral Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home.

Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.

Oil
China is investing in PEMEX now plan pushes them out. Yang 13 (Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing on
international issues. Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties, Global Times, April 9, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)
Observers say Mexican state oil company Pemex's

decision to significantly boost oil exports to China will help optimize

the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following their leadership transitions. On the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoya said the company would begin increasing exports to China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-year agreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported. The level of exports to China could increase over time as part of the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US and only some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International. Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the

increase stemmed from China's potential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports as a result of its shale boom. A report released by OPEC last week expected China to overtake the US as the world's largest oil importer by 2014. This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only about 9 percent of the
imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation showed last year nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East. Yang

Zhimin, a researcher with the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the supply of oil is not solely decided by market demands, given its strategic nature. "We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in Mexico's decision, but the current president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his predecessor did." Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon as
president. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed at mending bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yang said the new oil deal would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2 billion in 2012.

Chinese pursuit for oil takes from US production denying China risks anti-US cooperation Pierson 9 (David Pierson is a reporter for the LATimes. He is based in Beijing and covers the Chinese
economy. China's push for oil in Gulf of Mexico puts U.S. in awkward spot, LATimes, October 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/22/business/fi-china-oil22
A Chinese company's gambit

to drill for oil in U.S. territory demonstrates China's determination to lock up the raw materials it needs to sustain its rapid growth, wherever those resources lie. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp., or CNOOC, reportedly is negotiating the purchase of leases owned by the Norwegian StatoilHydro in U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the source of about a quarter of U.S. crude oil production. China's push to
enter U.S. turf comes four years after CNOOC's $18.5-billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. was scuttled by Congress on national security grounds. The El Segundo oil firm eventually merged with Chevron Corp. of San Ramon. Whether CNOOC's second attempt to lock up U.S. petroleum assets will trigger a similar political backlash remains to be seen. The sour U.S. economy and the need for Washington

and Beijing to cooperate on potentially larger issues could mute any outcry. The U.S. could also find it difficult to rebuff China when it has long welcomed other foreign investment in the gulf. In addition to StatoilHydro, foreign oil companies with
stakes in deep-water projects there include Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Brazil's Petrobras, British oil giant BP and the Dutch-British multinational Shell. The U.S. risks undercutting its foreign policy goals as well. Concern

is growing over China's aggressive investment in oil-rich nations with anti-U.S. regimes, including Iran and Sudan. Denying China a shot at drilling in U.S. waters would only encourage Beijing to make deals in volatile regions given that new oil reserves in stable, democratic nations are getting harder to find. "China doesn't have a lot of alternatives," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief China economist for Royal Bank of Scotland. "They're very late to the game."

China views Pemex as way to increase relations lowers trade gap Johnson 13 (Tim Johnson, the Mexico bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. Chinas Xi splashes
cash, deals on leisurely trip to woo Mexico, McClatchy News Service, June 5, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/05/193101/chinas-xi-splashes-cash-deals.html#.Uehqko1OSSo)
Chinas leader is a guest who brings lots of gifts and lingers. President Xi Jinping, on the second day of an unhurried three-day visit to Mexico, spoke to the nations Senate Wednesday afternoon, then left for City Hall and prepared to visit the nations most renowned Mayan pyramid before heading on to California later in the week. Throughout his activities, Xi emphasized

that China is upgrading its relations with Latin America, and Mexico in particular. Xi opened his nations wallet to prove it, splashing out $1 billion in credit to Petroleos Mexicanos, the state oil giant, and pledging $1 billion in trade deals. He also vowed
to strengthen cultural and educational ties, offering 300 scholarships for Mexican students to study in China and announcing the opening of Chinas first cultural center in Latin America. Other accords promised cooperation in renewable energy, disease control and promotion of tourism. Xis presence marked the first official state visit of President Enrique Pena Nietos

six-month-old government, which hailed it as giving new impetus to ties between the two nations after passing through a cool phase. Appearing before lawmakers, the 59-year-old Xi highlighted that he and Pena Nieto had upgraded ties to what he called a comprehensive strategic partnership. By doing this, we send a strong message to the international community that China
and Mexico will form a common front to face various challenges in the future, Xi said. The relationship between China and the region is now at an important stage of accelerated development, Xi said. Xi did not spell out what commercial deals were in the offing, but the announcement appeared intended to lessen frictions over a wide trade deficit. Local news accounts said Chinese firms are interested in building ports, highways and pipelines. Mexico is Chinas second-largest trade partner in Latin America. But even as total trade has risen sixfold, to more than $36 billion in 2012, a trade gap is yawning. For every $9 in goods that China sells to Mexico, Mexico only sells $1 in goods back. China said it had agreed to permit imports of Mexican pork and tequila, and to a bigger presence of Mexican products in China. China is not looking for a trade surplus, Xi told lawmakers. On the contraryit is ready to actively increase the import of Mexican products. China

also sees

crude oil purchases from Mexico as a way to ameliorate the trade gap. Mexico agreed in April to provide China
with 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Both Xi and Pena Nieto offered effusive words at a joint appearance, followed by a banquet Tuesday evening. The Mexican leader described Mexico and China as two countries on the rise that are strategic allies, while Xi noted that both are descended from millenary civilizations. Banners of Chinas red flag with five gold stars festooned poles along the capital s main boulevard, Paseo de la Reforma. The visit marked a warming of relations that were chilled under two previous Mexican presidents, both of whom met with the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan minority in China, who Beijing brands as an incorrigible separatist. In a 33-point joint statement released Tuesday night, Mexico pledged not to interfere in Chinas affairs regarding its inalienable region of Tibet and its claims on Taiwan, the independently governed island off its shores. On the sprawling Tibetan Plateau, 118 ethnic Tibetans, many of them monks or nuns, have set themselves on fire since 2009 to protest Chinese rule. Xis visit to Mexico drew wide coverage in media on the Chinese mainland, and is likely to boost tourism interest in Mexico, especially after Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, a renowned singer, tour the Mayan pyramids at Chichen Itza on the Yucatan Peninsula on Thursday. Growing numbers of Chinese are traveling outside the mainland, but of the 93 million who did so last year, only 47,810 came to Mexico. The joint statement said the two countries would work to promote reciprocal tourism and develop direct airline connections, both for passengers and freight, by a Chinese airline. Xi pledged to lawmakers that there will be more Chinese tourists at the temples of the moon and sun at the pre-Aztec Teotihuacan ruins near the capital, and more at Chichen Itza and on the beaches of Acapulco.

Xis visit came amid a growing courtship of Latin America by the United States and China, the worlds No. 1 and 2 economies, respectively, as both nations seek to boost trade with a region that the United Nations says has lifted 58
million people from poverty in the past decade. President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month, and Vice President Joe Biden just returned from Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil. In a column printed in the Wall Street Journal Wednesday, Biden wrote the Obama administration has launched the most sustained period of U.S. engagement with the Americas in a long, long time.

Transport Infrastructure
China likely to invest in Mexican Infrastructure Universia 2013 (Knowledge @ Wharton; online resource publication that offers the latest business
insights, and information and interviews with business leaders, members of Gumtree, and presidents of various universities; NAFTAs Uninvited Guest: Why Chinas Path to U.S. manufacturing Runs Through Mexico; Article contains interview from Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of International relations at Boston University, 3-20-2013, http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english) Gallagher predicts that the next wave of Chinese exports to Mexico may well include finished vehicles , but he argues that those Chinese-built cars are more likely to be assembled in Mexico than in the U.S. There will be
Chinese automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico before there are any such plants in the U.S. because the costs are lower [in Mexico], and it is harder to operate a plant in the U.S., where there are so many regulations. Nevertheless, Gallagher

worries about whether Mexicos transportation infrastructure is up to the task of handling huge, additional volumes of goods made within the countrys own borders. To overcome the significant gaps in Mexicos industrial and transportation infrastructure, Gallagher suggests that Mexico approach the China Development Bank for loans that would be used to construct and expand Mexican seaports and high-speed highways. That way, Mexico could smoothly accommodate additional volumes of imported Chinese raw materials and components that
would flow from the decision by Chinese firms to build automotive plants inside Mexico.

China looking to invest in Mexican infrastructure Regenstreif 2013 (Gary Regenstreif; news editor for Thomson Reuters; The looming U.S.-China
rivalry over Latin America; Reuters; 6-12-13; http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/) China has particular interest in Mexico, the regions second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment.

Venezuela

Drugs
Anti-Drug Cooperation Seen as First Step to Mend Relations Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS DE CRDOBA and SARA MUOZ, Latin America news reporters for Wall Street Journal,
Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html) But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chvez. For

its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step. "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.

US Sees Drug Cooperation as First step in Relations Kappa 13 (Bradley, 1/9/2013, writer, Associated Press, US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez, web)
Washingtons goal is a pragmatic relationship with Chavezs successors, even as the two countries will likely have much to continue disagreeing over. The approach is somewhat akin to the one President Barack Obama adopted with Russia after taking office four years ago, hoping to eliminate the distrust that built up during George W. Bushs presidency by re-establishing cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, while
acknowledging that Moscow and Washington wont necessarily agree on democracy and the rule of law. The reset in ties with the Kremlin has stalled amid sharp U.S.-Russian disputes over missile defense plans and Syrias civil war, but the administration still fiercely defends its merits. With Venezuela, the U.S. is hoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination, a challenge given that the Venezuelan government includes officials subject to U.S. drug kingpin sanctions. Other American priorities include energy cooperation and stronger enforcement of sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for terrorist or other activity in the Western Hemisphere against American interests.

Counternarcotics Represent Key Area of China-Venezuela Cooperation Daniel 10, (Frank, staff writer Reuters, 3-13-2010, Reuters, China delivers Venezuela jets for anti-drugs fight, web)
Venezuela on Saturday tested six training and light attack jets bought from China for defense and anti-drugs flights in a deal that dodges an embargo banning sales of U.S. weapons parts to oil exporter Venezuela. President Hugo Chavez ordered a total of 18 K-8 jets built by China after a plan to buy similar jets from Brazil's Embraer fell through, apparently because they include U.S. electrical systems. "Thank you, China. The empire wanted to leave us unarmed. Socialist China, revolutionary China appeared and here are our K-8 planes," he said during a televised display of the jets' capabilities. Officials at the ceremony said the versatile jets will be used to train pilots and intercept drug
traffickers who use Venezuela as a stop off point to take Colombian cocaine to the United States, Europe and Africa.

New Regime Makes Cooperation Likely Cordoba and Munoz 13 (JOS and SARA, Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties, Latin America news reporters for Wall
Street Journal, 1/9/13, web, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with
the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chvez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism

and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the
subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With

Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving

the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chvez, who expanded state control over
parts of the oil sector.

General
Venezuela is under Chinas Sphere of influence now plan impedes that. Noriega 2010 (Roger, Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and a
former U.S ambassador to the Organization of the United States, Chvez and China: Challenging U.S. Interests America Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defensepolicy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/) Under the cloak of Washington's indifference, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chvez is making steady progress in cementing strategic relations with China, which is eager to eclipse U.S. presence in a key, mineral-rich South American economy. Russia is a source of weapons and foreign policy clout, Iran is abetting Chvez's shadowy nuclear program, and Cuba is managing a system of internal control and repression in Venezuela. Together with China's capital, in the form of loans and investments, this cadre of hostile powers has selfish motives and ruthless methods for keeping Chvez in power. China has funneled money and expertise into Venezuela's oil industry and taken an authoritative role in improving the country's manufacturing sector and finances. With so much to gain in trade and oil, China will strive to keep Chvez in power. The United States can no longer afford to practice wishful thinking but must recognize the threat growing in Venezuela. Key points in this Outlook: China's growing economic role in Venezuela is a direct result of Hugo Chvez's systematic drive to supplant U.S. influence and impose a socialist system on his country. U.S. oil producers and manufacturers stand to lose their market share in Venezuela and may soon see new competitors with Chinese backing emerge there. The United States must abandon its policy of inaction and recognize the foreign-backed threat growing under Chvez in Venezuela. In the last six years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increased its presence in Venezuela's oil industry dramatically, filling a void as Chvez muscles out U.S. and even local expertise. More recently, China has also been providing financial support as Chvez grapples with fiscal chaos of his own making and looks to ramp up domestic spending on the eve of September's National Assembly elections. U.S. diplomats are loath to speak out against Chvez's antidemocratic, anti-U.S. agenda; however, in July a State Department spokesperson broke this eerie silence to say that "we want to continue our mutually beneficial energy relationship" with Venezuela.[1] Washington's wishful thinking and passive policy are no match for Chvez's tireless campaign to convert Venezuela into a bulwark for U.S. enemies.

Lack of US demand drives Venezuela to China Agence France-Presse 13 (Largest French newspaper, publishes in English, Venezuela Looks
Beyond US to China As a Customer, Rappler Beta, 3-15, http://www.rappler.com/world/23924venezuela-united-states-china-oil)
CARACAS, Venezuela - Woe

is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves. Production is down and its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So here comes China to the rescue, among others, as Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Under the late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a difficult diplomatic relationship, and they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010. But oil makes the world go round and a buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the main destination for Venezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million barrels in 2007 to 906,000 in 2012, according to figures from the US Energy Department. That poses a problem for Venezuela. The United States pays cash, unlike countries of the Caribbean and South America which import Venezuelan crude under

preferential terms or even trade oil for services like doctors and teachers, said analyst Diego Gonzalez. The US is importing
less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendor portfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In 2012, Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11% to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to Venamcham, the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and has promoted investment and technology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the world's top oil producer, says the International Energy Agency (IEA). "It is not

easy to substitute a client like the United

States for any old client," said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy Orientation. What is harder is to have Venezuelan crude keep going to Venezuelan Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to transfer," said Gonzalez. Then there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela has developed serious economic and political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008 exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000 barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay off loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in recent years.

Loans
Loans are a tool the Chinese use to gain influence in Venezuela plan trades off Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine,
former CNN International Reporter, China Bankrolling Chavezs Re-election Bid With Loans, 9-26, Bloomberg magazine, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-reelection-bid-with-oil-loans.html)
Winning Twice The loans

give the Chinese influence over Chavez, who regularly speaks of recovering Venezuelas sovereignty after decades of subjugation to the U.S. empire. In addition to securing large deliveries of oil, much of the money lent to Venezuela returns in the form of contracts to Chinese state-run companies whose global expansion is also being financed by the Beijing-based CDB, the worlds biggest policy lender. Among the beneficiaries are China Petrochemical Corp and the countrys biggest oil and gas producer, China National Petroleum Corp. Both gained stakes in Venezuelas oil industry after Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM) and ConocoPhillips (COP) abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. Venezuelas oil is at the service of China, Chavez, 58, said in February 2009 at a meeting in Caracas with a delegation of
Chinese businessmen led by Vice President Xi Jinping.

Oil
Now is the tipping point peaceful rise is only possible if status quo investments are not increased DT 4/29, China in Venezuela: loans for oil, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragons Tail, blog about Chinese international affairs, Mollie Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavezs death. Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even said the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China. China seems evermore poised to secure new deals in Venezuelas oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragons strategy of tied loans and loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through its investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future and should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduros government. It is also establishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to be careful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its peaceful rise global strategy.

Chavezs oil policies are continuing, shying away from the US in favor of China Wallis 13 (Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times
newspaper and PA News agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported on political, general and economic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia Reuters, Mar 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315) Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting President
Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign funding. "We

are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station. "We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them." Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces
Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a twoyear battle with cancer. If Maduro wins, he can

be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense

of the United States, while taking on more debt from those partners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese energy company,

China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largest hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in the Orinoco called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium, Petromiranda,
began pumping there last year.

China benefits from Latin American regimes opposed to the US such as Venezuela Ellis 10 (R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, August 9, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html) The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa
Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the

PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and
its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

China is increasing competition against the US in Latin American specifically in Venezuelan oil Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq) Latin America is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The region, which has traditionally come under the U.S. sphere of influence, caught the attention of China following the significant growth potential of its energy resources. Latin America is estimated to hold 13.5 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves but accounts for only 6 percent of total output. Although China has tapped energy resources in Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and Bolivia, there still exists significant room for expansion, especially given that China still depends on the Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes to further diversify. Chinas domestic energy needs and regional developments in the Asia Pacific region are likely to fuel Beijings desire to access Latin American energy resources. China, which has been a net oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer
after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the presence of sporadic power shortages, growing car ownership, crosscountry air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain Chinas burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mounting on China to access energy resources on the world stage. Furthermore, Chinas limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring states (witness the Sino-Japanese dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputed status of the Spratly and Paracel islands and growing political instabilities in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy further afield. However, China's

growing presence on the international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's largest energy consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is the Sino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the United States backyard. The competition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as
seen by developments in other regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, Chinas military cooperation with Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources in these states. While not a zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between China

and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States relations with its neighbors, which will only undermine U.S. ability to access the

regions energy resources. This will force the U.S. to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as
West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. Entering the U.S. Sphere of Influence As the worlds number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere, Venezuela

is emerging as

a major prize in the competition for energy resources in Latin America. While Venezuela sells 60 percent of its crude oil exports to the U.S. and is the United States fourth largest oil supplier, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is attempting to reduce his countrys dependence on the U.S. market. President Chavez has stated that "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years but they have been years of dependence on the United States. Now we are free and we make our resources available to the great country of China." [1]
Easier said than done, as Chinas refineries will have to be refitted to process Venezuelas heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy resources from Venezuela and Argentina is particularly difficult given that both states are on South Americas Atlantic coast although there have been discussions to overcome this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless, China

has made significant inroads in accessing Venezuelas energy resources. During Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China committed to develop Venezuelas energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 million in a gas project as well as upgrading the countrys railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a year and 1.8 million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has also been given significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuela including the fields at Zumano in eastern Venezuela, which has an estimated 400 million barrels of oil.

LA countries exporting oil to China over US gain leverage Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Masters degree in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint Kings-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq) China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing involvement in the region's security. In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti
comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically, Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions. While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim government of Haiti have asked that the mandate be extended by one year in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential elections to be held later this year, China is pushing for only a six month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July. While having to accept the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwans secessionist forces, China

has garnered the goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy when negotiating energy and other deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights abuses in Venezuela.

Venezuela hopes to increase oil exports to China, tradeoffs with US imports Ratliff 6 (William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy. Pragmatism Over Ideology: Chinas Relations with Venezuela, The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2006,

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&tx_ttnews %5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo Chavez seeks a special relationship so that China can replace the United States as Venezuelas chief foreign client, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuela in the context of his continentwide Bolivarian revolution. At present, the United States imports about 15% of its foreign oil from Venezuela. Late in 2005,
Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invade Venezuela and overthrow him, oil will continue to flow north (ABC Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styled successor to Fidel Castro seems to think Venezuela must break all economic dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan (Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez using oil as a diplomatic weapon (China Daily, November 22). In early February 2006 Rafael

Ramirez, the president of Venezuelas state-run oil company Petroleos de relations with China in a Caracas interview, saying we are hoping to send 300,000 bpd to *China+ very soon (Xinhua, February 9). This would be double the current amount, most of which goes into
Venezuela (PDVSA), reviewed Venezuelas oil-related asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a low-grade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the Orinoco Tarbelt.)

Venezuelas ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of Chinas oil import needs. Much of that might have to come from what the United States now receives, for Chinese and foreign sources fear that production is falling, not
rising, in Venezuela.

China lacks oil security US dominance gets in the way

Peterson 7 (Keith Alan, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINAS GROWING DEMAND FOR OIL: A CASE STUDY IN VENEZUELA, December 2007, 07Dec_Peterson.pdf) As one energy expert states, petroleum has proven to be the most versatile fuel source ever discovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial economy.66 Beijing certainly understands this and is striving to secure enough of this precious resource to meet current and future needs. China is now the second largest energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67 China became a net petroleum importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68 Unlike the United States and other developed nations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters to guarantee an uninterrupted supply. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of securing new international oil sources to meet future demands in a market that is dominated by the United States.

Relations Link
US-Venezuela rift allows China to step in Luft 05 (Dr. Gal, Executive Director at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Challenge or
Opportunity: Chinas Role in Latin America, Speech before senate foreign relations committee, 9-20, http://www.setamericafree.org/SenateForeignRelationsSept202005.pdf)
Last but not least is Venezuela, U.S.'fourth largest oil supplier. Since

April 2002, U.S. relations with Venezuela have become increasingly acrimonious. Venezuelas President Hugo Chavez warned the U.S. against any interference with Venezuelas
internal affairs threatening that Venezuela has enough allies on this continent to start3 a 100-year war," and that "U.S. citizens could forget about ever getting Venezuelan oil." This threat is not being ignored. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in her confirmation hearing that two of her chief worries with regards to Venezuela are U.S. dependence on Venezuelan oil and whether Chavez will continue to supply it.

The fissure in the relations enables China to step in and reduce Venezuelas dependence on selling oil to the U.S., which currently buys 60% of Venezuelas crude. A series of oil agreements signed in early 2005 allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela. Venezuelas state run oil company PDVSA opened a marketing office in Beijing and has a target of selling to China 300,000 barrels per day by 2012. But for now Venezuelas oil exports to China are much more limited. The
majority of Venezuela's exports to China as of now consist of Orimulsion, a boiler fuel alternative which is burned by power plants to generate electricity. Chinas refineries are not equipped to refine Venezuelas crude. Geography is also a constraint. Venezuela has no access to the Pacific shore and the Panama Canal cannot accommodate the biggest tankers. A tanker trip from Venezuela to China takes 45 days. But China and Venezuela are trying to resolve these problems. In July 2004 Venezuela signed a contract with Colombia to build a crude oil pipeline connecting its oil fields with a port on Colombia's Pacific coast sparing Chinese tankers the need to traverse the Panama Canal. This could reduce the travel time by half.

Internal Links

Influence Tradeoff I/Ls

Plan eliminates motive US engagement prevents Latin American interest in China. Economic Observer 13 Byline Wang Xiaoxia, Economic Observer, Translated by Worldcrunch (In
America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America, Worldcrunch/Economic Observer, May 6, 2013, Available Online: http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-srising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, Accessed: 05/25/2013) In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development -- while China rises on the back of globalization. Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military means largely without restraint. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin Americas strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling.

Option Tradeoff Latin America chooses China due to lack of US economic engagement. Ellis 12 R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Ph.D. in Political Science (The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Working Paper: Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Available Online: http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424en.pdf, Accessed: 05/21/2013) The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources. 25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

Engagement is zero-sum Chinas power depends on Americas neglect. Kreps and Flores-Macas 13 Sarah E. Kreps & Gustavo A. Flores-Macas, Assistant Professors of
Government at Cornell (No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad, The Diplomat, 5/17/2013, Available Online: http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attachedevaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/, Accessed: 07/15/2013) To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely. A second set of implications deals with the United States. During the same period in which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior. This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

Chinas investment depends on US negligence US economic engagement pushes them out. Romero & Barrionuevo 9 Simon Romero & Alexei Barrionuevo, NYT Bureau Chiefs in Brazil
(Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America, New York Times, 4/16/2009, Available Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/world/16chinaloan.html, Accessed: 07/15/2013) CARACAS, Venezuela As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to credit. In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazils national oil company $10 billion. The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come. Chinas trade with Latin

America has grown quickly this decade, making it the regions second largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washingtons influence in the hemisphere. This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis, said David Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active. Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the economic crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. Leaders at the summit meeting are also expected to push Mr. Obama to further loosen the United States policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes. One of Chinas new deals in Latin America, the $10 billion arrangement with Argentina, would allow Argentina reliable access to Chinese currency to help pay for imports from China. It may also help lead the way to Chinas currency to eventually be used as an alternate reserve currency. The deal follows similar ones China has struck with countries like South Korea, Indonesia and Belarus. As the financial crisis began to whipsaw international markets last year, the Federal Reserve made its own currency arrangements with central banks around the world, allocating $30 billion each to Brazil and Mexico. (Brazil has opted not to tap it for now.) But smaller economies in the region, including Argentina, which has been trying to dispel doubts about its ability to meet its international debt payments, were left out of those agreements. Details of the Chinese deal with Argentina are still being ironed out, but an official at Argentinas central bank said it would allow Argentina to avoid using scarce dollars for all its international transactions. The takeover of billions of dollars in private pension funds, among other moves, led Argentines to pull the equivalent of nearly $23 billion, much of it in dollars, out of the country last year. Dante Sica, the lead economist at Abeceb, a consulting firm in Buenos Aires, said the Chinese overtures in the region were made possible by the lack of attention that the United States showed to Latin America during the entire Bush administration. China is also seizing opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders over which the United States holds some sway, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are pushing up against their limits. Just one of Chinas planned loans, the $10 billion for Brazils national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008. Brazil is expected to use the loan for offshore exploration, while agreeing to export as much as 100,000 barrels of oil a day to China, according to the oil company. The Inter-American bank, in which the United States has de facto veto power in some matters, is trying to triple its capital and increase lending to $18 billion this year. But the replenishment involves delicate negotiations among member nations, made all the more difficult after the bank lost almost $1 billion last year. China will also have a role in these talks, having become a member of the bank this year. China has also pushed into Latin American countries where the United States has negligible influence, like Venezuela. In February, Chinas vice president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo Chvez. The two men announced that a Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to one million barrels a day from a level of about 380,000 barrels. US-Latin American ties trade-off with Chinese influence in Latin America Dowd 12
Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, Crisis in the America's, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war , the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America . We should remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine 2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere. The PRC benefits from faltering United States presence in Latin America Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU Press, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The

rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests.
In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the

PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the antiU.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

China soft power directly trades off with Western soft-power Follath 10 (Erich, Der Spiegel writer, Chinas Soft Power is a Threat to the West July 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-unitedstates/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM

China may have no intentions of using its growing military might, but that is of little comfort for Western countries. From the World Trade Organization to the United Nations, Beijing is happy to use its soft power to get what it wants -- and it is wrong-footing the West at every turn. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen once told me, half with amusement and half with resignation, that military people around the world are all more or less the same. "They can only be happy when they have the most up-to-date toys," he said.
If this is true, Beijing's generals must be very happy at the moment. China has increased its military budget by 7.5 percent in 2010, making funds available for new fighter jets and more cruise missiles. Beijing's military buildup is a source of concern for Western experts, even though the US's military budget is about eight times larger. Some feel that China poses a threat to East Asia, while others are even convinced that Beijing is preparing to conquer the world militarily.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike, say, the United States, the People's Republic has not attacked any other country in more than three decades, not since it launched an offensive against Vietnam in 1979. And even though Beijing's leaders periodically rattle their sabers against Taiwan, which they refer to as a "renegade province," they have no intention of entering into any armed conflicts. Unlike many in the West, they have long since recognized that bombs are little more than deterrents these days. In today's asymmetric conflicts, it is difficult to hold on to territory captured in bloody battles. War is an instrument of the past, and Mao's argument that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" no longer holds true today.

Soft Is the New Hard It is, however, true that the Chinese are in the process of conquering the world. They are doing this very successfully by pursuing an aggressive trade policy toward the West, granting low-interest loans to African and Latin American countries, applying diplomatic pressure to their partners, pursuing a campaign bordering on cultural imperialism to oppose the human rights we perceive to be universal, and providing the largest contingent of soldiers for United Nations peacekeeping missions of all Security Council members. In other words, they are doing it with soft power instead of hard power. Beijing is indeed waging a war on all continents, but not in the classical sense. Whether the methods it uses consistently qualify as "peaceful" is another matter. For example, the Chinese apply international agreements as they see fit, and when the rules get in their way, they "creatively" circumvent them or rewrite them with the help of compliant allies. But why are politicians in Washington, Paris and London taking all of this lying down, kowtowing to the Chinese
instead of criticizing them? Does capturing -- admittedly lucrative -- markets in East Asia and trying to impress the Chinese really help their cause? The Communist Party leaders manipulate their currency to keep the prices of their exports artificially low. The fact that they recently allowed their currency, the renminbi, to appreciate slightly is evidence more of their knack for public relations than of a real change of heart. They are known for using every trick in the book when buying commodities or signing pipeline deals, with participants talking of aggressive and pushy tactics. Meanwhile, these free-market privateers unscrupulously restrict access to their own natural resources. They

denounce protectionism, and yet they are more protectionist than most fellow players in the great game of globalization.

Its a zero-sum between the U.S. and China resources, purchasing power and geographic proximity. Valencia 6/24 (Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, US and China: The Fight for
Latin America, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more importantLatin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its backyard. The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the U nited States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player. As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation. Chinas active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, Chinas largest
mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Perus largest trading partner. Chinas imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela

known as El Vergatario (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chvez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the worlds cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

U.S. neglect and Chinas low cost-less politicized appeal creates a zero sum relationship. Fergusson 12 (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H The Chinese economic threat to the U.S in the region

The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons. Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003. *71+ This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez, but the more moderate social
democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade Organization rules. Given

the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.s economy there can be little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of China s growing political and economic influence. [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence of the U.S that Latin America is exerting. This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On
one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political change, but on the other, China

is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views the U.S as *using+ its economic leverage to exert political pressure on China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships. [73] In this respect, the U.S has what it wants China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.

Chinese and Western Engagement Mutually Trade off Ellis 13 (Evan, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an
analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors, including India, Russia and Iran, 6-713, Manzella Report, U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America, web)
In Latin America, while many

governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRCs entry into the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy objectives there,
including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law. Although the PRC has been careful not to associate itself with the anti-imperialistic rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), efforts

by China Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China to expand lending has been complimented by the interest within ALBA nations to free themselves from the constraints of borrowing from Western financial institutions. The resulting $50 billion loaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007 has proved an important source of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain antiWestern policies and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region. Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so
long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

China gaining soft power from Latin America now, specifically Cuba and Venezuela Castillo 9 (Antonio Castillo is a Senior Lecturer & Program Director At RMIT China in Latin America
http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/) SJH China's growing influence on international affairs is nowhere more evident than in Latin America, a region pejoratively regarded as the 'backyard' of the United States. Latin America and the Caribbean are the next stop in Chinas global expansion, and the first-ever Chinese white paper for this region, released on 4 November, 2008, doesnt leave any doubt about Chinas intentions. Latin America has abundant natural resources, a good base for economic and social growth and tremendous development potential, the document says. In the November-December 2008 issue of The Diplomat, Peter Hartcher wrote of China emerging from the
current financial crisis as a more credible and respected international leader. This is precisely Chinas image in Latin America. China is not only regarded as an alternative to the US hegemony in the region, but it is also seen as a good and credible partner. According to the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project, China

enjoys a positive image among Latin American countries. Chinas aim in Latin America

these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America. Chinese

policy towards Latin America today is highly pragmatic rather than ideologically driven, Professor Gonzalo
Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries. A sign of this new paradigm is the growing and wider range of bilateral agreements China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation. The trade between China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a

The Chinese diplomatic model soft power, multipolar and non-interference is considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region. South-south
healthy surplus. cooperation, strategic partnership of common development or common understanding is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of high-ranking Chinese officials who have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says a lot. Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said Chinas soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Hearn said. The

first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn suggests, Chinatowns are key to the soft power exercised by China in the region. This is especially the case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese immigrants. Chinatowns leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.
China leverages ethnic locals, technology transfer, development Hearn highlights the northern Mexican city of Mexicali, the heart of the Mexican Chinese community. Here Chinatown leaders have been luring Chinese investors to get involved in the development of the frontera del silicio [silicon border] a high-tech park for the production of semiconductors and other electrical products. This is very much part of the Chinese growth model of building a series of industrial hubs. Technology transfer is the second way the Sino-Latin American relationship is developing and, according to Dr Hearn, this is. different to the United States and Europe. Venezuela is one of the largest producers of oil in the world and had previously been reliant on technicians from the US company Chevron for drilling. China, however, is happily teaching Venezuelans how to do it themselves. China has implemented a lengthy training programme that has allowed Venezuelans to learn how to make drills something that they have been doing since 2008, says Hearn. And technology transfer is exactly what Latin American countries need desperately to improve their economies. Integrated development is the third way China has been able to forge relationships with Latin American countries. For example, Cuban workers trained by Chinese technicians are manufacturing a wide range of electrical goods, from televisions to electrical fans. These are moved to the ports by a transport system designed and developed by Chinese experts. The Cuban docks from where the goods will be shipped to China are no longer inefficient facilities. Chinese investors have transformed them into world-class ports. Dr Hearn argues that soft

power, integrated development and technology transfer have a political edge: is what China is doing in the case of Cuba and Venezuela.
It is a way not to upset the US. You can build cooperation with a country and never express a political ideology or affinity and this

China Influence Displaces US political leverage Hilton 13 (Isabel, former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and editor of
www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, 2-2013, The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?, web) The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a number of
ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In

other cases, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance that wish to pursue more radical political and
social models.

China threatened by US stealing cooperation opportunities Ellis 2011(R. Evan Ellis; Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University; Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study; Joint Force Quarterly; January 2011; http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latinamerica.html)
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The

rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the
PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Chinese Influence is a Direct Result of US Diplomatic Absence Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey, writer Bloomberg, 6-28-13, Bloomberg, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean
For The US?, web)

China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. *The U.S.'+ attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century
to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.

LA Key to China Soft Power

Chinese influence in Latin America is key to Chinese soft power- It provides a basis of understanding between countries. Ellis 2008 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html- SJH
This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's

economic footprint in Latin America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft
power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Cuban President Raul Castro watch signing of treaties in Havana after Hu signed dozens of trade and investment deals with Cuba It is also important to clarify that

soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally
in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an

The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this
important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. perception can be divided into seven areas: Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods. Estimates of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used, although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and government officials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as well. In the commodities sector, Latin American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as Jos Cuervo, Caf Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to "sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundacin Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place

products in those countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds.

thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion
Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today, commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Au, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities in ways that

Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America. Although the presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison to that of the United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries.
U.S. investors cannot.6

Chinese soft power is contingent on having influence in Latin America Wiest 11 (Nailene Chou teaches financial journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication,
Tsinghua University Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America Caixin Online 11.09.2011 http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-09/100324170.html)
The Spanish expression "cuento chino," or "Chinese story" is a synonym for "tall tale." It's a fitting expression for our times, since China's size, population and spectacular economic achievements of late have inspired

grand fantasies across Latin America. Barely a decade ago, China was the will overtake the United States and become the world's largest economy in 2016. No wonder the developing world is held in thrall. There's likewise a prevailing readiness to accept and emulate China, which in turn has given China a golden opportunity to extend its cultural soft power abroad. Indeed, promoting soft power overseas was a policy goal recently declared by the Chinese government. The initiative recognizes that a nation's success on the world stage, as Harvard University's Joseph Nye once said, "depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins." Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative. The China-Latin America attraction is easy to understand. China provides a growth model as a counterweight to the United States. Latin American countries have tried one failed development model after another only to find themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of
world's seventh-largest economy. Now, by the reckoning of the International Monetary Fund, China East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut. State-led import substitution policies mired these countries in self-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in line with the Washington Consensus led to dependency on fickle capital inflow. China's economic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by expanding technical capacities in order to attract foreign investment, offers a viable alternative. In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of guerrilla warfare which once shone like a beacon guiding fervent revolutionaries in South America faded into the Andean jungles. But since launching its capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideological exports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to mercantilist policies: Doing business for business' sake. Latin American countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, have benefited enormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, countries overly dependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession, cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects. "Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over an US$ 8 billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the Pacific Ocean. This would be an engineering feat that arguably only the Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and three mountain ranges, and through a region marred by drug-trafficking violence. The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent and what some said was an unabashed incursion into America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canal seco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed ships would be ferried on railroad cars from sea to sea. Infatuation with China, however, can quickly turn to antipathy. An economic powerhouse China may be, but it can hardly be called a gentle giant. It's actually a voracious monster, gobbling crude oil, minerals and natural resources, wreaking havoc on the environment, blithely emitting unacceptable amounts of the carbon dioxide that causes global warming. China as "la fabrica del mundo" the factory of the world arouses fear and resentment, as more than 90 percent of Latin American manufacturing exports are threatened by Chinese competition. No wonder some 60 percent of all anti-dumping cases launched against China at the World Trade Organization were filed by Latin American countries. Latin

America's perceptions of China are

still largely shaped by international media. The Chinese government's soft-power Confucius Institutes, if managed well, could bring greater
understanding of China. A Colombian woman I recently met said she is keen to learn the Chinese language but confesses she's more drawn to Tibetan Buddhism than the moral teachings of that ancient sage, Confucius. In predominantly Catholic countries, China as an atheist country does not go down very well.

Bonding China and Latin America calls for a narrative that resonates. For a country of 1.3 billion people with a per capita GDP no higher than Colombia or Peru's, China has shared experiences and future hopes to tell to other emerging economies. Finding the right story will be crucial for soft power policy to succeed. Otherwise, the game will be lost even before it begins.

LA trade key to Chinese soft power RFERL 7-18-13

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty internally quoting Bruce Stokes the director of the global economic program at the Pew Research Center Tuesday, July 23, 2013 Study Shows Many See China Becoming World's Leading Power http://www.rferl.org/content/china-us-pew-study/25050541.html In Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, favorable opinions of China are on the rise, but lower than those of the United States. Stokes says this is likely linked to China's sizable investments in both regions. "Chinese influence [and] the appreciation of China is fairly strong in Latin America and Africa. Actually, one might expect it to be not quite this strong. There is a fair appreciation for Chinese soft power in both of these regions. In part that may be due to growing Chinese trade relations with many of these countries and growing Chinese foreign investment in these countries."

LA is key to soft power Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Farther abroad, Beijing's soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. The BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South Africa, Chile and Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It is particularly interesting that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whose manufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about China's economic influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. The existence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of China's development model have facilitated Beijing's quest for market, natural resources and political influence . Under President Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a 'market economy', which would make it harder to impose penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to play an important role in forging Brazil's policy toward China.35 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's foreign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model - former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and his former deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its linkages with countries to its east, such as China and India.57

Zero Sum
Latin American countries treat U.S./China influence as zero-sum Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jrn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School
(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE Overall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While Latin American governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention on the part of the United States and the latters rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations with its hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the United States by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to play the China card in an attempt to balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy. Multidirectional is the key word here. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 200809, every trade and investment opportunity is welcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The result of opportunity-maximising in AsiaLatin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeply institutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateral and (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the Forum for East AsiaLatin America Cooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American States (OAS) and has expanded its diplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

China US Relations are Zero Sum Menendez 13 (Fernando Menndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, The
Counterbalance in Americas Backyard, web)

From the perspective of Latin Americas foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. Chinas foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to
ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as

China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional

tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise Chinas cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from Americas national security apparatus.

Latin American influence is a zero sum game Kreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University and Gustavo A. FloresMacas, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. No Strings Attached? Evaluating Chinas Trade Relations Abroad. The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/ EW To be sure, China

may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this gravitational effect has a sound economic basis.
Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent on China than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudans trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its Gross Domestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in 2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual

countries are far less important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicit design. Whether by design or not, the convergence with Chinas foreign policy goals is important on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulled by the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicit political agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be an illusion. Whether this reaches the level of new
colonialism as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to be seen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications deals with the United States. During

the same period in which Chinas trade with Africa and Latin America and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and China have actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior . This suggests something of a zero sum dynamic in which Chinas growing trade relations make it easier to attract allies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trends call for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Since the September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America through benign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tighter commercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade
and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influence abroad.

A2: Africa Resources Sufficient

China needs Latin American resources Caspary 8 (Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and
Bolivia, China Eyes Latin American Commodities, Yale Global Online, Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities, accessed 7/16/13) PE Latin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies with rising commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to that attraction. Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high demand from the global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbirds seat, calling shots and setting prices. Yet, despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like China, the cards are not necessarily stacked in Latin Americas favor. Unless the region develops policies of sustainable development and transparent transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could prove to be limited. Latin America produces 47 percent of the worlds soybean crop, 40 percent of copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an increasing amount of such commodities both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for private consumption, given the nations rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to rise at lower double-digit rates until at least 2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates have recently been 10 times higher than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

African resources arent enough China needs raw materials and export markets in Latin America Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more importantLatin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its backyard.

A2: U.S./China Dont Compete

The U.S. and China inevitably compete theyve got eyes on the same prize Regenstreif, 13 (Gary, Editor of special projects at Reuters, The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin
America, Reuters, JUNE 12, 2013, Online, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/thelooming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, accessed 7/18-13) PE Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a new model of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washingtons sights are set on a similar prize and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chiles president paid Obama a visit last week, Perus leader arrived Tuesday and Brazils is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position against China which has money to burn in the region. There is a more energetic *U.S.+ tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than *the+ first time, Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. Theres something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether theres a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.

A2: China Hurts LA Econ

China doesnt hurt Latin America because they want to import different things, instead it provides them with new markets Chen and Chen, 13 (Kayla, intern at VOX Global, Xiangming, founding Dean and Director of the
Center for Urban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at Trinity College in Hartford, China And Latin America: Connected And Competing Analysis, Eurasia Review, June 17, 2013, Online, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-andlatin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinas stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some Latin American countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term though, Chinas demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America. Since Latin American countries and China have different export structures, the former is not as threatened by Chinas rapid market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, Mexico is the only country in Latin America whose comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantage of [India and China+, and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head-to-head economic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to eithers favor in turns.

Impact

Soft Power

China Soft Power Up

Chinese soft power increasing now Jaime A. Florcruz (Beijing Bureau Chief and correspondent at CNN, Newsweek reporter, TIME magazine writer), 3- 30-12, CNN, China works hard to project soft power,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power) After investing tens of billions of dollars in Southeast Asia, China has now decided that its vaunted economic power, which has bought it significant influence with regional governments, is not enough. Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinese diplomacy, language and culture - and, yes, pop songs -- are playing a major role in Beijings quest to be understood and, if all go well, win the affection of Southeast Asia's 600 million people. Its uncharted territory for a government that until recently appeared to care very little about how it was perceived outside of China. "The Chinese government is paying much more attention to public diplomacy than before," said Yang Baoyun, a Southeast Asia expert at Peking University in Beijing. "The government has realized that people are important, and that cultural exchange can supplement traditional diplomacy." On Nov. 18-20, Cambodia will host Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and other world leaders at the ASEAN Summit. As the United States pivots from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and re-engages with the 10 countries of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, much of the focus at the summit will be on Washington's ability to revive its flagging diplomatic influence. But in the contest for public opinion, which the United States is accustomed to leading without challenge, the landscape is shifting. The Chinese government, with the help of large companies and thousands of young language teachers willing to relocate overseas, has launched an ambitious cultural diplomacy effort designed to clean up its image, which has been soiled by a number of high-profile scandals in the region, including investment projects that have resulted in land grabbing and environmental damage. To counter these negative perceptions, Beijing has overseen an explosion of language schools, exchange programs, bookstores, and cultural corners. The effort began in earnest in 2004 when Hanban, an organization that falls under the Ministry of Education, began establishing Confucius Institutes at universities around the world.

Chinese soft power increasing in Latin America cultural exchanges Farnsworth, 12 (Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, Memo to
Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, Online, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, accessed 7/19/13) PE This will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-term relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes student exchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004. There is nothing inappropriate or frightening about student exchanges or language study. Indeed, U.S. and European officials understand that these initiatives are unrivaled instruments of soft power. They introduce students to another culture and, presumably, provide them at an early age with positive impressions of the host nation. As well, mastery of another language can lock in future patterns of trade and investment, travel and tourism, research and scientific exchanges, and eventually, government-togovernment relationships.

A2: Culture blocks Soft Power

Nye is wrong chinas economic soft power is working in the nations it needs to work in Dynon 13
Nicholas a Macquarie University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), International Communication and is coordinator of the Line 21 project Academic and former diplomat with a research focus on country and regime branding and contemporary propaganda media. Success of China's soft power campaign can't be gauged by rich countries Global Times 7-7-2013 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo SCTM US political scientist Joseph Nye claims that the leaders of China and Russia just don't get his concept of "soft power." In an article published in Foreign Policy in April, he reminds us that soft power springs from individuals, the private sector and civil society. China and Russia, Professor Nye points out, "make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power." Clearly there is dissonance between Nye's soft power and the strategies followed by Beijing and Moscow in their respective pursuits of it. But are they all talking about the same "soft power?" Hong Kong University's David Bandurski, charting the appearance of the term "soft power" in Chinese print publications from 1998 to 2008, has identified massive growth in the importance of the concept. Usage of "soft power" in Chinese newspapers grew from a negligible number of appearances in 2003 to around 7,500 in 2008. A closer look suggests that China's increasing interest in soft power has less to do with Nye than it does with an ongoing focus on the unprecedented growth of its own national power and the need to measure it, assess it and control its implications. Usage of the term "comprehensive national power" (CNP) first appeared in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested by some Chinese scholars considering various national power equations as methods for analyzing the international balance of power. Huang Shuofeng of China's Academy of Military Science, a founder of the CNP concept, writes that the CNP "refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well." As Deng Xiaoping once stated, "in measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides." As part of the CNP equation, the soft power concept, rendered in Chinese as ruanshili, has evolved in Chinese discourse into a range of concepts quite distinct from that envisaged by Joseph Nye. As Nye has pointed out, polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in Africa and Latin America, but not so much in the developed world. China's approach to soft power doesn't resonate as much with the rich nations of the world as it does with much of the developing world where Beijing's traditional non-alignment and aid work has had positive reputational results. Similarly, as the same international polls indicate, China's reputation at home far exceeds its reputation within the developed world. An emergent China is unsurprisingly perceived far more positively by its own population relative to how it is perceived by publics in Europe, North America and developed East Asia. Beijing's idea of soft power appears to be working relatively well across large tracts of the developing world for whom its emerging success shines as a relevant alternative to Western models. Beijing's "internal" soft power also appears to be doing nicely in articulating China's national power ascendancy to its own increasingly globalized population. And while many Western policymakers and media commentators pen a pervasive narrative of concern in relation to China's rise, how much of the rest of the world is actually listening? Does Nye's comment that China doesn't quite get his version of soft power really matter? Probably not. They have their own.

Asia Stability Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to Asian trade and interdependence thats key to regional stability Garrison 5 (Jean, Director of Global & Area Studies Program at the University of Wyoming, Spring 05,
China's prudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 32.1, Academic OneFile) China's patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of "soft" power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system. (1) China's policy approach represents the sophisticated neomercantilist view that globalization has altered the way nations compete for power. China acknowledges that acceding to international and regional rules-based organizations and agreements has become a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism rather than a limit to its autonomy. In the near future China will primarily follow agreed-upon international practices, although it is increasingly moving in position to directly shape the system itself. China's growing soft power is not inherently a threat to U.S. interests, but how the United States responds to this change in the coming years will shape prospects for future stability in East Asia and the global economic system. China's "Good Neighbor" Diplomacy A few years ago China's dominance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the East Asian region, speedy regional economic growth, and military spending increases were cast in zerosum terms in East Asia, emphasizing the dangers associated with China's growing shadow. (2) Cognizant of this apprehension, China launched an aggressive campaign to alleviate those fears by establishing closer political, economical, and cultural ties with its neighbors. Tangible examples of China's new diplomacy include bilateral efforts along various fronts in the 1990s when it settled long-term border conflicts with Russia and Vietnam, adopted a pragmatic approach to settle disputes over the Paracel, Spratly, and Senkaku Islands, and aided its neighbors during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Seeking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a cornerstone of China's most recent efforts to promote the benign view of its rise. At the October 2003 ASEAN Summit, China continued FTA negotiations and broadened the dialogue to promote peace and security through China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)--the first of its kind that China has signed with a regional grouping. China also proposed using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to form a conference to increase communication among Asian militaries. Although the ARF largely remains a confidence-building mechanism rather than a means of preventive diplomacy, it serves China's goal to reassure other countries in the region as to its peaceful intentions. China has seized the political initiative from the Japanese who, in response, launched bilateral free-trade talks of its own and acceded to the TAC (Korea has made similar moves for FTAs with Singapore and Japan). China has broadened its efforts by seeking FTAs, outside the ASEAN structure, with Australia and New Zealand. A possible FTA with India has been discussed as well. The prominent exception to China's savvy diplomatic initiatives is its relationship with Taiwan. The dangerous zero-sum nature of China's rhetoric surrounding Taiwan's recent election demonstrates the continuing sensitivity of the issue in Chinese politics. However, because maintaining the cross-strait status quo is necessary for continued stability and economic growth, China has reason to opt for patience. Beijing's logical policy will be to maintain the status quo. China's Lure and Growing East Asian Economic Interdependence East Asian states and Taiwan recognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade is flourishing due to China's huge market for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China's import growth and increasing exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is now recovering from a decade-long decline and

its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of total exports of China's trading partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S. government reports. A large percentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States. States in the East Asian region recognize the need to take advantage of their closeness to China to become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. This trend is reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China since 1990--which ASEAN reports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on the decline. In addition, China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $14.8-billion trade deficit with Japan, $23 billion deficit with Korea, $16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $40 billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003 according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds to the interdependence, with China at the center. East Asian investment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence. First, East Asian states invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that 61 percent of China's FDI inflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with the remainder of the figure attributed to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China has also begun to encourage outward FDI into East Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from $400 million in the 1980s to $2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For example, Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese companies may aim to escape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home, and even higher land and labor costs in China by relocating to Thailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has emerged. Growing economic interdependence with China provides new incentives for states in the East Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations to maintain prosperity. Japan focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern of power projection in the region. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's future development, such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, gives them leverage in negotiations with both countries and "power of say" in the region's development. Even the Taiwan issue potentially reinforces the status quo. East Asian countries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's independence and register little enthusiasm over Taiwan's quest for freedom.

Nuclear war Dibb, 01 emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University
(Paul, Winter. Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads. Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1. Ebsco.) The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and
these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future

The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive
that could lead to its breakup.

But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted
tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. with major crises.

China Rise Mpx

China soft power is key to their overall power Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Analysis and debate concerning China's rise is focused almost entirely on the economic and military aspects of its growing power.1 Yet 'soft' sources of power - including culture, political ideology and diplomacy - are increasingly recognised as essential components of Great Power status. It seems odd that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China, or misapplied. While China is constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its soft-power resources are considerable and demand scrutiny.

Thats key to the global economy and stability the impact is nuclear war Buzan 4 (Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, 2004, Does China Matter? A Reassessment, New York, Questia, p. 145-147)
The underlying argument in this section is that there

is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western
hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China

does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it
now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American States. If

the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds

in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces
in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it

If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question
become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

Immigration Mpx
China soft power is key to attract foreign students Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth. Within a decade, total enrolment of international students in China (excluding those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) increased threefold to no,844.6 Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea and Japan consistently sending the most.7 A growing number of students, though, are from Southeast Asia, a region that accommodates the majority of overseas Chinese and has a centuries-old history of Chinese-language education. Students from Vietnam, for example, have increased more than sixfold over the past six years.8 While a major influx of international students in China is driven by the country's booming economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also reflects China's role as the cultural magnet of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, over three-quarters of foreign students went to China to study academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine).9

Thats key to China-EU relations Xinhua 13 (China.org, 5/1/13, Chinese gov't to support international students,
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/01/content_28704250.htm, acc. 7/19/13) The Chinese government will support about 50,000 international students in China in 2015, and the country will become the largest Asian destination for such students in 2020, high-level Chinese officials said on April 25. About 320,000
overseas students came to China in 2012, the majority from South Korea and the United States, said Liu Jinghui, secretary-general of the China Scholarship Council. Last year, the ministry implemented the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the education sector, she said. According to the plan, in 2015, the number of international students in China supported by the government's scholarship program will reach 50,000. While Europe has become the second-largest destination for Chinese students abroad, "only about 35,000 students came from EU member states to study in China last year, so we will promote China's education system in Europe now," Liu said. Du Yubo, vice-minister of education, said that by 2020, about 500,000 international students will be in China, enabling the country to become the largest Asian destination for international students. China and the European Union will deepen education and exchange cooperation this year, said European commission and Chinese government officials at the first meeting of the EU-China Higher Education Platform for Cooperation and Exchanges, which was held on Thursday in Brussels. "We

should learn from each other's strong points, and boost cooperation in various areas," Du said. In 2013, the Chinese government will provide 1,087 scholarships to 27 EU countries, the ministry said. "The Chinese government has been paying close attention to cooperation projects between China and Europe. Our cooperation has a long history, a lot of achievements and potential," said Jan Truszczynski, director general for Education, Training, Culture and Youth of the European Commission. China has
established 105 Confucius Institutes in about 20 EU member states, and joined hands with the European Commission to set up three programs in three Chinese universities. For instance, the

EU has injected 17 million euros ($22.16 million) to establish the ChinaEU School of Law with the China University of Political Science and Law, one of the top law schools in the country.

China-EU relations are key to solve climate change Balme 9 (Richard, Centre for European Studies and Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and
Management, June 2009, Global Warming Politics: the EU, China and Climate Change, http://sciencespo-globalgovernance.net/node/23, acc. 7/18/13) The European Union (EU) and China were to a large extent at the core of the process whereby climate change became a prominent issue in international relations. Supported by the sensitivity of European public opinion on environmental issue, its preference for multilateralism, and by its own policy expertise, the EU was from the onset very active in promoting international agreements on climate. As the United States eventually failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol signed by the Clinton Administration, and remained reluctant to negotiations on climate under Georges Bush presidencies, the EU was able to assume leadership among developed countries on the issue. As evidence about human influence on climate change accumulated, the tension between energy-intensive modes of development and the capacity to mitigate climate change also became more apparent. As the most populated and fastest growing economy of developing countries, Chinas environmental policy and attitude with regard to climate change regime became increasingly scrutinized. Its record of first CO2 emitter surpassing the USA for the first time in 2008 was widely noticed, and China is frequently vilainized for its dirty growth model and its global consequences. China nevertheless developed a significant policy to address climate and energy issues over the recent years. To a large extent, the limited steps accomplished so far at the global level in climate change policy largely relied on the convergence of policies and cooperation programs between the EU and China.

Warming is an existential risk

Mazo 10 PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, pg. 122 The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above preindustrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2C (O'9""1.5C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

North Korea Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to prevent North Korean proliferation and conflict Pei 3 (Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace, Carnegie
Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo, acc. 7/19/13) This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining a stable relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economic growth have served the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, on balance, Beijing's foreign policy has demonstrated increasing maturity and sophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in Iraq and North Korea also shows the risks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership re-evaluated the geopolitical assumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq and North Korea, the desire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous stance and lose whatever influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which has taken a more proactive approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force against Iraq is unclear. Its declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula has not been accompanied by visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomes harder to defend when one considers what is at stake for China. Its immediate economic interests in Iraq are modest. But because of its growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of imports, it may better serve its interests by getting more actively involved and taking a clear stand. Quiescence risks marginalisation. In dealing with an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North Korea, Beijing's inaction has disappointed its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have to toe the US line toward Pyongyang, China needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of no negotiation. If it allows the crisis to spiral out of control, it could be dragged into a nuclear maelstrom with devastating consequences for peace and prosperity in the region. In a world where the threats from rogue states and international terrorism are at least as dangerous as rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its interests by modifying its diplomatic strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operation with the US, it must use its growing influence to assume a more active role in the international community . This may require Beijing to break some old habits, such as its aversion to substantial participation in peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial contributions to the United Nations, and abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership will be necessary above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can do much more to allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This may require it to adopt a new twopronged regional strategy. First, China should use its clout to push for regional integration and cooperation. On the top of this agenda should be expanded regional free trade. Despite Tokyo's lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-Asean free trade agreement, China should continue to push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayed ties with Tokyo, where sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure Japan, China must be more transparent about its military modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start treating it as a full co-equal partner in maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the requisite for regional collective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new foreign policy team. It also goes against ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese leaders do not seize the current opportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it for them - and not necessarily to their liking.

North Korean conflict escalates and goes nuclear Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of

Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product
which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, Nor th Koreas nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over Chinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention,
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security trea ties can be relied upon for protection.

miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula
itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2

Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited
million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is,

The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the
individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the

There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat
global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

Resources Mpx
China soft power is key to their resource access thats key to economic growth Hunter 9 (Alan, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry
University, Soft Power: China on the Global Stage, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf, acc. 7/19/13) Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among all developing countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, Chinas need for natural resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries with populations of over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan is worse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective political handling of resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten the future of the country . Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucial to determining whether or not China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st century.23 The West now fears competition from China for access to global resources, particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted competition over hydrocarbon resources in coming years as the most likely cause of international conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijing leaders are also well aware of the issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through proper handling of the energy issue is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use of resources, as well as fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources China must explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policy encouraging its three major national oil corporations to go out (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas energy supplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries, and building pipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and now stands at around 6 million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about 40% of oildemand growth worldwide from 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004, Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercial agreements with Latin American countries; investments in Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a later visit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gas explorations; China also announced it would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offered more than US $ 50 billion of investment to countries within the US backyard, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructure development; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.29 An online newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between China and the USA for African black gold.30 Chinas potential competition with the USA in West Asia and North Africa could be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept US leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East.31 Frequent high-level exchange visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economic ties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders new transnational dynamics. We have therefore explored Chinas need to avoid military conflict, its massive economic development, and its need to secure resources as important contexts for Chinese soft power in the

21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is another factor which will become even more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.

Resources and growth are key to CCP stability Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong
Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy, September/October, proquest) An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid
urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's

access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven
economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.

Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper)
August 3, 2005, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-83/30931.html)
Since the

Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil
filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the killed 80 million Chinese people, now

CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

Taiwan Independence Mpx

China soft power key to prevent Taiwanese independence Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In 2005, China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition party leaders to visit the main-land, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and, through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'heartsand-minds' policy not only aims to reduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives the Chinese government leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society , and politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a result of Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - the possibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian has increasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population lives and works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than sioobn on the mainland. To be sure, some of China's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including the deployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwarting independence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some $18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington - a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - is another indication of the mainland's ability to shape policy decisions on Taiwan in its favour. Beijing's influence still falls far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But a combination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to have stemmed the political fortunes of the proindependence movement in Taiwan for the time being.

The impact is China/Taiwan war which goes nuclear

OHanlon adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, 07 *Michael, A war like no other: the truth about
China's challenge to America, p. google books+

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states . It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv China and the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water. But the Taiwan problem is

different . Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control. Not only does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the United States sees as a long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, the way that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherent potential for escalation to direct superpower war . This chapter explains whv. Thenext chapters get into the dynamics of what could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely seriousbut also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is sobering.

Even if the chances of war

between the United States and China

are less than 25 percent indeed, even

if they are less than 10 percentthey are far from zero. And given the enormous consequences of any every effort must be made to prevent it . World War I did not seem very likely to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even worse world war, was not predicted. We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second, Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunityif it can keep the United States out of the light Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions
such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system,

could matter more than reality in such a situation . Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat
ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.

Economy Mpx

1nc
China Sphere of Influence in Latin America critical to Chinese growth Ellis 11(Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU press. 1st quarter 2011 http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf SCTM)
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin

American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country
who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China

has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and
Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

Now Key For China Econ

China is at a crtical transition point, they need long-term sustained growth to keep up the world economy Xinhua July 15,2013
Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition Xinhua http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-hasreached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM
Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economy grew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the Asian Development Bank, World Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts. Look growth: Economic growth of 7.6% in the world what it means? 'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negative growth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that

China's current economic growth is undoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy. 'The economic
growth of 7.6% in line with expectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the year in the second quarter, China's

economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth, and presented 'three-speed' growth pattern: China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, the U.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times. At the same time, China, Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirms an important signal: After years of rapid growth, the emerging economies are gradually entering the 'deceleration zone.' Blanchard also noted that China's economic growth slowdown. Few days ago, IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that
China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, compared with April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy is one of the three new risks.' Blanchard said. On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial National Bureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contribution to GDP ratio reached 53.9%. Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of

Chinese macro-control policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continue to maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if the tightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth. 'China should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-term economic growth superficial.' Zhuang Jian said. Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important role in developing countries, China's current
investment from the shadow banking, which makes the development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structure and quality is very important. 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue to increase investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He said. In this regard, Blanchard believes that although China's

economy is still at risk, but the macro-control policy makers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth. Seeking good way: China's economy has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment In a globalized world, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the global economy is essential. Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improving growth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when the opportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. ' 'China's economy continues to years of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing, China urgently looking for a new economic growth point, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the
economic growth, more emphasis on improving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.

Chinese Economic collapse causes war Kaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of
Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would

economic crisis in China. have serious global

repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

China Key to Global Econ

Chinese slowdown is bringing down economies all over the world AFP 13 (Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy Jul 17, 2013
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html SCTM)
LONDON: China's

slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia on Tuesday, sparking questions over Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on the world economy, analysts said. The
nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter, down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months, official data showed Monday. "China

is a key downside risk to the global economy. Recent data does suggest that the are concerned about the rapid rate of credit expansion and the impact it might have on inflation. This rules out any near-term monetary or fiscal stimulus." New evidence emerged Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is still struggling to recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis. Investors in Germany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over falling exports to China,
economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told AFP. "In addition, the authorities in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers. Germany's investor confidence index, calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. That disappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40 points. "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of the German economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski. "These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East. The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern (and) could become a new risk factor for the German economic outlook." China is now the fifth most important single export market for German companies and accounts for some six per cent of total exports. The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's slowing growth was weakening momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent. The

sluggishness comes as "China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards a more consumer-driven economy," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton. But this rebalancing would present growth
opportunities for the West, he noted. "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies with strong brand identity," he said. "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment, conversely the ones that were doing so well in the last decade." Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added that markets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy. "China's support for global demand has been welcome over the past couple of years as the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era," Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse in 2008 triggered a global slump. "A slowing of China's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the economy matured. "The main concern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth plummet sub-5.0 per cent and lead to financial and social crisis." Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on booming China to help overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis. "Slower growth will have impact on those countries who have strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.

China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies because the Asian powerhouse nation is a major
consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes. At the same time, China is also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and high volume production. But the International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased "possibility of a longer growth slowdown" in emerging market economies like China. Scicluna added Tuesday that all nations around the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels of growth to create a balanced global economy. "Over the long run we would hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told AFP. "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese slowdown with disorderly consequences." But due

to the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of information about risks in the Chinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the probability of that happening," he said.

Banking crisis in China creates collapse if growth isnt sustained Fisher June 20 2013
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com. Chinas economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?

The Washington Post June 20 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-uphow-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM

Thursday was a very bad day for Chinas economy, the worlds second-largest and a

crucial pillar of the global economy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.
The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a

Chinas economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us. Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been
much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. Theres no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on Chinas banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be. Heres what has happened: Chinas

credit market has been in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis. All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down, as happened the United States. Chinas economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse
meant to avoid The Big One. In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it

suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else companies that want to build new factories, families that went to buy a home to borrow money. Thats an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of
China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one. Chinas central bank, which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the Peoples Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates liquidity or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago. This pair of charts, from the economics site Zero Hedge, shows the eerie parallels between todays freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending market and what happened in the United States when Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that were still recovering from: That second chart shows something called the TED spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend to one another. Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to what the Financial Times David Keohane called silly levels. This chart, via Keohane and Reuters Jamie McGeever, shows the money market rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last five years: Heres where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday evening Beijing time that, as panic moved through the Chinese financial system, the countrys central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in relief to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What does this mean? Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that Chinas largest bank managed to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be less healthy than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets. But then the Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding some unnecessary confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation. So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case theyll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth. Chinawatchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the countrys economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: This is a tricky issue, as the definition of financial crisis can differ among investors. The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijings control over the financial system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: Nonetheless, we

expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions. If that happens, Chinas growth would slow even more. HSBC just cut their prediction for
Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy and political stability on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was disastrous for Americas already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also facing a massive property bubble. All

of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is heavily linked to Chinas economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises

China Econ Turns LA Econ

Chinese investment and involvement stabilize Latin American economies most recent economic downturn proves Arnson and Davidow, 11 (Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of Virginia. Davidow has served as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela, and Mexico, China, Latin America, and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online, http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PE In a keynote address, Enrique Garca, president and CEO of the Corporacin Andina de Fomento (CAF), a Latin American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has not obstructed Latin Americas path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to]8 percent. This success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin Americas resource rich countries and China.

Chinese trade with Latin America is a positive force creates sustainable growth in Latin America Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it diversifies the sources of finance finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.

China Relations

Relations Internal
Regional competition in Latin America kills US-China Relations
Zweig, 10 Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational Relations and a Chair Professor in the Division of Social Science (David, Chinas Energy Rise, The U.S., And The New Geopolitics Of Energy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, April) Americas bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearer voice when it
speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S. interests, but to find ways to help China adapt to the world and help Chinas energy and environmental sector. But there

are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate

the China threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting Chinas rise and challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thrive on expressions of American concerns about Chinas rise. Mistrust of America runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; si nce most Chinese are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try to stop their rise and see it doing so, even when it is not. And while American concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they
must not drive Americas China policy. The message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral, triangular and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible player triangularizing Chinas bilateral ties, then many

issues could be best discussed within a triangular format, such as a Sino-AmericanAfrican dialogue or a Sino-American-Latin America one. While the U.S. may hesitate to join such discussions, as they give credence and legitimacy to Chinas engagement in regions from which the U.S. would have preferred to exclude them, such dialogue with a rising China is necessary. Many of the meetings could be track-two, bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers together to discuss how Chinas rise in a particular region can be best managed to insure a win-win scenario. Conferences in the West on these issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that regional competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral relationship. Only then can the potentially negative implications of
Sino-American triangularization be better managed.

US presence in Latin America kills US-China relations Hilton, 13 (Isabel, Latin America correspondent China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?, 2/20, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf) The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in the region is large and growing. How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter
of manufactured goods. The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China

has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Infringements on Chinese sphere of influence spillover to prevent cooperation kills relations Hills & Blair 7 (Carla A. & Dennis c., Carla A. Hills is chairman and chief executive officer of Hills &
Company, International Consultants, which advises companies on global trade and investment issues. Ambassador Hills served as U.S. trade representative (1989-93) in the first Bush administration and as secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Ford administration. Prior, she was assistant attorney general, heading the civil division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She currently serves on the board of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and on the international boards of J.P. Morgan Chase, Rolls Royce, and the Coca-Cola Company. She also serves as co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue and the Advisory Board of Center for Strategic & International Studies, chair of the National Committee on US-China Relations, and member of the executive committee of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and of the Trilateral Commission. Ambassador Hills is a member of the President's Council on International Activities at Yale University and of the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group., and Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, April 2007, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985) No relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as the one between the United States, the worlds great power, and China, the worlds rising power. Chinas development is directly transforming the lives of one-fifth of the worlds population, and is otherwise influencing billions more. Chinas rapid economic growth, expanding regional and global influence, continued military modernization, and uneven human rights record are also shifting the geopolitical terrain and contributing to uncertainty about Chinas future course. After thirty-five years of engagement, the United States and China have a relationship that was truly unimaginable two generations ago. At the same time, there are some Americans who believe that Chinas strategic interests are incompatible with those of the United States. The Council on Foreign Relations established an Independent Task Force to take stock of the changes under way in China today and to evaluate what these changes mean for China and for the U.S.-China relationship. Based on its careful assessment of the developments in the country and Chinas likely future trajectory, the Task Force recommends that the United States pursue a strategy focused on the integration of China into the global community and finds that such an approach will best encourage China to act in a way consistent with U.S. interests and international norms. The Task Force concludes with a series of recommendations aimed to reinforce recent efforts to deepen U.S.-China cooperation . The overall message is that while the United States should not turn a blind eye to the economic, political, and security challenges posed by Chinas rise and should be clear that any aggressive behavior on Chinas part would be met with strong opposition, U.S. strategy toward China must focus on creating and taking advantage of opportunities to build on common interests in the region and as regards a number of global concerns.

War Mpx Boosters

US-Chinese political tensions already high-Cool War to come Feldman 13 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard and the author of five
books. bachelor's degree from Harvard, a law degree from Yale and a doctorate in Islamic thought from Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar. He clerked for Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court. As an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, he contributed to the creation of the country's new constitution. He lives in Cambridge, Mass., and is a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows at Harvard., The Coming Cool War With China, BLOOMBERG L.P, June 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html)
Ahead of the first summit meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of

China on June 7, the two nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight.
Chinas peaceful rise was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for Chinas leaders. Americas peaceful decline will get no one elected, whether Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China

can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets and drones, the U.S.s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China.

US already anticipated, but not inevitable-War preparations being made now Peck 12 (Michael, is Games Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine and a writer for Training & Simulation
Journal at Defense News, Wargaming A U.S.-China War, Gawker Media 2013, 9/3/12, http://kotaku.com/5939729/wargaming-a-us+china-war)
As if the U.S.

and China don't have enough problems, now they're eyeing each other like two high school jocks competing to be Big Alpha Male on Campus. Oh, they're not exactly enemies. Actually, they're kind of friendly with each other. One loans the other money, and the other uses that money to buy cigarettes from the first guy. But beneath the bromance, both are steeling themselves for a rumble to decide who's the biggest, baddest dude at Pacific Ocean High. This has prompted the U.S. to change its strategic focus. Post-1945, America's main concern was stopping a Soviet
tank blitz of Western Europe. Then for the last decade, we have been obsessed with the Global War on Terror (though Terror has yet to surrender). Now the Pentagon is preparing for a confrontation in the Pacific. The question boils down to who is allowed to play in China's backyard. A quick glance at a map shows that the Western Pacific is a lot closer to Bejiing than Los Angeles. But the U.S. has allies over there: Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam (who'd have believed it?), and the biggest flashpoint of all, Taiwan. China

regards Taiwan as a renegade republic that must be reclaimed for the Fatherland, while the other nations claim resource-rich waters and islands that resource-hungry China also calls its own. Considering that China versus its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan, is like Mike Tyson versus Tiny Tim, America is the only power that can stand up to the biggest kid in the neighborhood. It's not a question of altruism. The U.S. has its interests. So does China. Much mayhem may ensue. The new U.S. doctrinethe guiding principles of how the U.S. would fightare embodied in a new concept called Air-Sea Battle. As the name suggests, Air-Sea Battle envisions a Pacific war as a contest of ships and aircraft, which is logical: until they
build a Star Trek transporter or a 6,000-mile San Francisco-Shanghai bridge, tank divisions and infantry battalions are useless in a trans-oceanic war without sea and air transportation to move them to where they're going. This is good news for swabbies and zoomies: the War on Terror has mostly been an Army/Marine/Special Forces war, with the Air Force and Navy as supporting players (Air-Sea Battle also happens to be great timing as the services compete for shares of a shrinking defense budget). For its part, China has vastly increased its defense spending, including advanced jets, missiles, subs, and even a pathetic ex-Soviet carrier. Air-Sea

Battleand a U.S.-China Warwould be primarily a missile war. China would use its vast arsenal, including carrier-killing ballistic missiles originally designed to carry nukes, to target the platforms that project U.S. power: airbases in Taiwan, Japan, and islands such as Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the mobile airbases that are the U.S.

Navy's aircraft carriers. If China can neutralize American airpower, it will render American ground and sea forces (except for subs)
impotent, and then Beijing can go about its business as it invades Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. Under Air-Sea Battle, America would use its own missiles to destroy China's sensor network; if China can't detect the carriers in the wide-open ocean, it can't shoot at them. Then American forces would destroy own China's missile forces, and then... who knows how this war would end.

The US & China already have a potential war scenario Saunders 13 (Doug, well -known British-Canadian journalist and author, and columnist for the Globe
and Mail, a Canadian national newspaper based in Toronto, Canada, international-affairs columnist, and a long-serving foreign correspondent formerly based in London and Los Angeles. His journalism has won the National Newspaper Award, Canada's counterpart to the U.S. Pulitzer Prize, on five occasions. In 2006 and in 2013, he was honored as the best columnist in Canada. One of the five finalists for the 2011 Lionel Gelber Prize honouring the world's best book on international affairs, and for the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing., Why are the U.S. and China preparing for war with one another? The Globe and Mail Inc., July 12, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smilefor-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/)
Both the Pentagon

and the Peoples Liberation Army are arming for an all-out war and pursuing enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war will occur. In the case of the United States, this appears to be taking place without any authorization or approval from the White House or Congress. The Pentagon is now basing its global strategy on a detailed plan known as the AirSea Battle concept, in which the U.S. Army and Air Force defend the presence of 320,000 U.S. troops in the area by readying themselves for a full-scale land and air assault on China in the event of a threat in the South China Sea or its surroundings. In a detailed analysis paper in this summers issue of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, the famed sociologist and
military-policy expert Amitai Etzioni asks, Who authorized preparations for war with China? His answer is stark: Mr. Obama has spoken of a pivot to Asia, but there has been no political intent or desire to have such an active military confrontation with China in fact, the politics and diplomacy have been moving in the opposite direction. The United States is preparing for a war with China, a momentous decision that so far has failed to receive a thorough review from elected officials, namely the White House and Congress, Prof. Etzioni writes. In the public sphere there was no debate led by either think tanks or public intellectuals like that which is ongoing over whether or not to use the military option against Irans nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the 2009 surge of troops in Afghanistan. But the AirSea Battle plan has far more expensive and dangerous implications. The imagined result of ASB is the ability to end a conflict with China in much the same way the United States ended WWII: The U.S. military defeats China and dictates the surrender terms. This is a drastic change from Cold War approaches, where nuclear-scale conflict was carefully avoided. The plan scares the heck out of many military figures. AirSea

Battle is demonizing China, James Cartwright, the former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last year. Thats not in anybodys interest. A Marine Corps assessment warned that the concept is preposterously expensive to build in peace time and, if used as intended, would cause incalculable human and economic destruction, in good part because it makes escalation to nuclear war far more likely. And the Chinese have responded in kind: If the U.S.
military develops AirSea Battle to deal with the *Peoples Liberation Army+, Col. Gauyue Fan warned, the PLA will be forced to develop antiAirSea Battle. And that is now taking place. Soon after assuming power last year, Mr. Xi

abandoned his predecessors commitment to peaceful rise, took direct command of the Central Military Commission and commanded the military to focus on real combat and fighting and winning wars. As Jeremy Page of The Wall Street Journal noted recently, Mr. Xi has rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military advisers who have advocated a military strategy based on preparing for direct confrontation with the United States. He has particularly embraced Col. Liu Mingfu, whose calls for direct China-U.S. military competition had led his books to be
banned, but are now back on the bookstore shelves in droves. Also widely published now is air force Col. Dai Xu, who wrote last year, according to Reuters, that Chinas neighbours are running dogs of the United States in Asia and we only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to heel.

Brink
Sino-American Relations are on the brink, infringements on SOI push it over. Rudd 13 (Kevin, Australian politician who has been the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of
the Labor Party since 27 June 2013. He was previously Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, and Labor Leader from 2006 to 2010. He is the first former Prime Minister to return to the office since Robert Menzies in 1949, and only the second Labor Prime Minister to do so, A subtle defrosting in Chinas chilly war with America, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2013, June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ZJU1aaCD)
In Beijing

analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the China-US relationship. As one said to me not a hot war, its not a cold war; its more like a chilly war. The problem for leaders, diplomats and analysts is that the relationship defies simple definition. Variants range from strategic engagement, strategic co-operation and strategic competition to China as a responsible global stakeholder. The problem with these ideas is that they mean very little to the Chinese. The phrase that hits home in both capitals these days is strategic trust deficit a gap between China and the US which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such a deficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionage and cyber warfare; in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, where hundreds of naval and air assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula; and in the UN Security Council stalemate over Syria. That is why the working summit between presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the weekend was so important. There had been no high-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage these and other apparently intractable challenges facing the regional and global order. With this summit, with more to follow, we at last have the capacity to build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself (simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary of the Communist party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart, Chinas political system is geared to the defence of the status quo. In the US, the secretaries both of state and defence are able to make some strategic calls in negotiations. But their Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most senior officials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls. Despite opposition in both capitals, both
recently: Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan. Or, in the Queens English: Its presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for the past 40 years and convened a working summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits. This is a success in its own right. More importantly, both camps are privately delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement, with neither expecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this as the cyber summit described in the US media. So, what are the outcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military dialogue is critical. It could contribute to rules of the road on cyber security; crisis management for the Korean peninsula; the management of incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating a mechanism to develop basic confidence and security-building measures for the region. Second, the summit represented the first systematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea, including their reported public commitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, there was agreement on climate change, perhaps reflecting the start of a commitment to make the global rules-based order more effective. No one should expect Chinese policy to change quickly. Much could go wrong. But, without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much of strategic importance right. After 20 years of drift in the relationship following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for the previous 20 years provided the underlying rationale for co-operation this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente. We were headed towards strategic competition or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship, creating a framework to manage the growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face. It could even lead to what Mr Xi himself described as a new model of great power relations for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicate the bloody history of the rise and fall of great powers in centuries past.

Africa Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Saving the African Economy, Infrastructure, Society and Politics He 13 (Wenping, a senior fellow with the Chahar Institute and a professor and director of the African
Studies Section of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)., An Important Step Forward: China-US Cooperation in Africa, China-United States Exchange Foundation, July 17, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forwardchina-us-cooperation-in-africa/)
In the past

few months, Africa has welcomed two leaders from the first and the second biggest economies in the world. After Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Africa, Tanzania and the Republic of Congo in late March, US President Barack Obama also visited Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania in late June. And, whether by coincidence or by careful arrangement, the two leaders visited exactly the same
number of African countries with exactly the same combination of English-speaking and French-speaking citizenry. This all reflects a high degree of consistency. People are wondering whether it is because great

minds thin alike, or whether Obama's goal in Africa is to counter China. As a matter of fact, the common feature of the two leaders visits is that both China and the US have realized the great development potential of the African continent. However the difference is that China realized this potential and the historic chance for strengthening China-Africa ties much earlier than that of the US. Actually, Africa has been high on Chinas diplomatic agenda in the most recent decade. As earlier as 2000, China established the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Along with the release of the first White
Paper on Chinas Africa Policy in January 2006 and the first China-Africa Summit in early November 2006, which brought more than 40 African heads of state to Beijing, Chinese high-level officials including President Xi Jinping, his predecessor Hu Jintao, former Premier Wen Jiabao, other cabinet members and members of the Political Bureau have all been frequent visitors to Africa. As a result, trade

between China and Africa has soared in the last decade, reaching a record high of over $200 billion in 2011 from a mere $ 10.5 billion in 2000, leading China to surpass the United States and to become Africas biggest trading partner since 2009. On the contrary, the US has long regarded Africa as a hopeless continent full of problems such as conflict, disease and famine,. Being the very first African-American President in the US and having Kenyan family roots,
President Obama seems to have had no time for Africa during his first term in office, and spent only 20 hours in Ghana in 2009, which resulted in deep disappointment and dissatisfaction throughout Africa. Partly due to his election campaigns need for wooing African-American voters for his second term, and the intention to pacify the increasing criticism of losing Africa, and perhaps also due to avoid being labeled as an African-American President who unfortunately has had "the least interest in Africa", President Obama unveiled a new strategy towards subSaharan Africa in June 2012. The new strategy sets forth four strategic objectives in Africa, namely: strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth and strengthening trade and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. The U.S. now believes that Africas economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with technological change sweeping across the continent and offering tremendous opportunities in banking, medicine, politics, and business. With the change in mindset about Africas rise and the motivation of catching up with Chinas pace in Africa, President Obama recently announced a $7 billion power initiative over five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa, and also pledged to host a US-Africa Summit next year in the United States. To a large extent, the US new focus on Africas infrastructure and establishment of a US-Africa Summit have been inspired by the FOCAC and

the US and Chinas approach of engaging with Africa is indeed quite different, but Obamas characterization of US interactions with Africa including goals of social and political development, whereas China more narrowly focuses on commercial benefits is false. Actually, it is no need to mention that one of the focus of Obamas trip in Africa was to appeal and push American enterprises to do business in Africa and to firmly grasp the potential of Africas rising. As for Chinas engagement in Africa, it is certainly too simple and too one-sided to say that China-Africa relations is mainly for commercial benefits. Apart from building many infrastructure projects such as dams, ports, railways and stadiums, China has also engaged in education and health areas, such as providing scholarships, technical training and malaria treatment. And even the economic interaction has also laid a solid foundation for social and political development. However, it should be pointed out that the US and China do have a big difference in military engagement and security interactions, . To uphold and abide by
Chinas extensive engagement in Africas infrastructure industry. Clearly,

its non-interference policy, Chinas involvement in Africas security issues has long been limited to taking part in the UN multi-national peacekeeping forces for missions in Africa, rather than setting up military bases and taking military actions like the US has been doing on the Continent. Since the US established the US Africa Command in 2007, it has accelerated its pace of gathering information, setting up military and drone bases and directly participating in attacking extremist forces and terrorism in Africa. This

has generated unease and worries from African countries and African people. It is also worthwhile to point out that Obamas speech about China and other emerging countries entry into Africa is quite encouraging and can be seen as an important step forward for future US-China cooperation in Africa. This is quite unlike his former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who made accusations against China's so-called "new colonialism" during her visit to Zambia in June 2011, and then criticized Chinas development and investment model in Africa as extracting value rather than adding value. President Obama made clear during his Africa trip that he sees no threat by the growing trade and investment in Africa by emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, etc. In

Obamas words, I dont feel threatened by it (Chinas entry in Africa). I feel its a good thing. The more investment in Africa, the more the worlds least-developed continent can be integrated into the global economy.

Laundry List Mpx

US China relations are key to solve extinction conflict, economic collapse, and multiple trans-national threats become inevitable without cooperation Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting
firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf) The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitordeliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognizeand acceptthat the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is

not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement ofand cooperation betweenthe United States and China. The United States and Chinathe worlds first- and third-largest economies are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holderby farof U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interestand central rolethat both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-

to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATOChina cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gainedand much to be lost in terms of trust and respect by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposaldiplomatic, economic, military, political and culturalpicking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor softit is the skillful combination of bothIt is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

War Mpx
China war escalates draws in other countries
Hunkovic, American Military University, 09 *Lee J, 2009, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible
Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf] war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose
A actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Warming Mpx
US-China Cooperation Key to Environment Cohen 9 (William S., The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.,
U.S. defense secretary from 1997-2001, is chairman of The Cohen Group, a global business consulting firm., April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html)
Recent events confirm that we're living in a new world of disorder. North Korea tested a missile that could reach the U.S., and is threatening to resume its nuclear-weapons program; the Taliban is using drug money to destabilize Afghanistan and turn that country back into a terrorist safe haven; the financial crisis has sparked a global recession; and unchecked

greenhouse gas emissions are transforming the global climate. These disparate challenges share one thing in common: They cannot be addressed successfully without cooperation between the U.S. and China. The most immediate opportunity for cooperation is in confronting the international financial crisis. China currently holds $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, and it is by far the world's largest holder of U.S. government debt. As the Obama administration increases that debt to finance its economic stimulus plan, China will almost certainly be
called upon to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments. China also has an interest in working with the U.S. to ensure those efforts succeed, because it depends on economic growth in the U.S. (still its largest single trading partner) to ensure stability at home. There is a compelling need to create a new dialogue on finance and economics. This conversation began with President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao's discussions at the G-20 summit this month in London. Meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders have been dubbed the "G-2" by some to reflect the crucial role of economic negotiations between our two countries. This first meeting between the two men, and the agreement reached by world leaders at the close of the summit, mark a positive beginning to the effort to harmonize our financial management and banking regulatory practices, and explore ways to expand bilateral trade opportunities in areas such as energy and environmental technologies. The

U.S. and China are the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. This means that our nations have the opportunity, and the primary responsibility, for shaping the global response to climate change. To date, both sides have used each other as an excuse for inaction. This must end. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will work hard on energy and environmental issues within our bilateral relations. China and the U.S. together have the power to set the de facto global standard for energy efficiency and emissions control. To do so, we should jointly promote the development and transfer of clean energy technology between our countries, initiate bilateral projects on energy and climate issues, and develop common principles to drive the multilateral negotiations on a new international climate-change agreement.

Impact Turn Shield

A2: Democracy
No democratic reformanti-US sentiment, legislative gridlock, and systematic abuse. Dibbert 11 [t aylor Dibbert earned a BA in political science from the University of Georgia and a Master of International Affairs degree from
Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) Democratic Speed Bumps in Latin America http://fpif.org/democratic_speed_bumps_in_latin_america/ Dec 9 2011]//BMitch After a decade of growing popularity, democracy Economist in late October underscores this point. In

has hit a slump in Latin America. A recent Latinobarmetro poll cited by The all but three Latin American countries, fewer people than last year believe that democracy is preferable to any other type of government. In the cases of Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the drop in support for democracy is significant. The 2009 removal of democratically elected Manuel Zelaya and the post-coup human rights abuses of the government of Porfirio Lobo are obvious indicators that Honduras is on the wrong track. Dozens of political murders have taken place in Honduras, and there has been little outrage from Washington. Additionally, Novembers presidential elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala (and recent polling on Mexicos 2012 election) reinforce the notion that many in the region have grown skeptical about democratic governance. Reasons to be Skeptical Many reasons could explain this change in perceptions. Increased crime particularly around the flow of illegal drugs is perhaps the most obvious factor. Latin Americans want law and order and are willing to overlook an administrations democratic lapses to achieve domestic security. As people get wealthier, the Latinobarmetro poll suggests, they expect more and better government services. This craving is understandable, although the highly inefficient tax regimes in the region make this difficult to achieve. Large informal economies and numerous loopholes or exemptions to current tax collection systems pose challenges that most politicians have been unwilling to address. For example, Mexicos rate of tax collection is the worst of any country in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). But Guatemalas is even worse; it was only 10.5 percent of GDP last year. The average rate in Latin America is about 14 percent of GDP. Legislative inertia is also Latin America, many countries

a factor. Since the end of military dictatorships in have been plagued by frustrating legislative gridlock. The truth is that people in Latin America care very little about parties and congresses, and expect even less from them , according to a Brookings Institution analysis. Global financial crises have also not helped. In terms of economic prosperity, Latin America remains the most unequal region in the world. During these crises, the poor and lower-middle classes prioritize meeting their daily needs. If their ability to make ends meet declines, they tend to blame the ruling parties and give in to the temptation to simply throw the bums out and bring in new leaders, regardless of their stances on human rights, transparency, good governance, or the rule of law. At a time when electorates view their
leaders as weak and ineffectual, those who promise a strong hand become more attractive. Backward Steps in Nicaragua, Guatemala During his campaign for a third term as president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega repeatedly reassured voters that he was a strong, experienced leader who knew how to get things done. To a certain extent, he is right: Nicaragua

has a history of economic volatility, but the situation has remained relatively stable under Ortegas recent stewardship. His anti-poverty programs and subsidies, partly a result of generous Venezuelan loans, also helped persuade voters. Nevertheless, from banished term limits to
alleged corruption, and from a judiciary stacked with Ortega loyalists to convincing evidence of electoral fraud (which was not even necessary),

Ortega is already well on his way to bringing Nicaragua back to the authoritarianism that the country is all too
familiar with. In 2006, Ortega was instrumental in changing Nicaraguan electoral law to lower the threshold for a first-round presidential victory from 45 percent to either 40 percent of votes cast or 35 percent, as long as there is at least a five-point difference between the first- and second-place candidates. In the 2006 presidential election, Daniel Ortega captured 38 percent of the vote, thereby precluding a run-off that many analysts believehe would have lost. Ortega accepted electoral defeat back in 1990, although Nicaragua has remained, at best, a fledgling democracy since then. Nicaraguans were again reminded of Ortegas perennial presence on the Nicaraguan political scene in 1999 with the implementation ofel Pacto, or the Pact, an agreement reached between Ortega and then-President Arnoldo Alemn of the Partido Liberal Constitutional. Although the two leaders were not close at the time, their two parties held almost all the power in the count rys National Assembly. This pact shielded both leaders from criminal prosecution and consolidated power in the judiciary and the Supreme Electoral Council. (This agreement is still in place, even though it has now become clear that Ortega has gotten more out of the deal than Alemn.) Alemn still did get a 20-year prison sentence for numerous charges of corruption in 2003. In 2009, Nicaraguas Supreme Court exonerated Alemn; his conviction was conveniently overturned. Transparency International recently honored Alemn in their list of The Worlds Ten Most Corrupt Leaders in recent history. The 2009 Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruling that exempted Ortega from only serving two presidential terms sent a strong message that good governance in Nicaragua was waning. Under the Nicaraguan constitution, presidents are not allowed to run for consecutive terms and are supposed to respect a two-term limit. But because Mr. Ortega essentially controlled the Supreme Court, its judges ruled that the previous laws constituted human rights violations and should not apply to him. Legally speaking, Ortega could be president for the rest of his life. Nicaraguas institutions were never particularly strong, but as its extremely politicized court makes clear, they are undoubtedly weakening under Ortegas watch. Due to rampant fraud committed by Ortegas Sandinista party in 2008

municipal elections, the EU and the United Statessuspended aid. In Otto Perz promises

Guatemala, meanwhile, the incoming administration of to be astep backwards in terms of human rights. Perz held a number of high positions in the Guatemalan military during Latin Americas bloodiest civil war. Many voters were too young to remember the massacres in the countrys western highlands, most of which occurred during the early 1980s. Crime statistics in Guatemala are atrocious, and security was voters foremost concern throughout the campaign. Guatemala has one
of the worlds highest homicide rates. In 2010, there were more than 40 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, rising to an astound ing 110 per 100,000 in the capital. To put this in perspective, the homicide rate in the United States is less than five per 100,000. Guatemalas neighbor Mexico, which is in the throes of a bloody drug war, has a homicide rate of about 14 per 100,000. With a pitiful prosecution rate hovering around 2 or 3 percent, Guatemalan voters are desperate for a solution to what they consider their most pressing problem. Perzs

campaign slogan of mano dura or the strong hand promised to crack down on violent crime and pursue offenders relentlessly. Security concerns dominated the presidential campaign, as runner-up Manuel Baldizn
also put an anti-crime message at the top of his agenda. Once in office, Perz will likely involve the military in police matters, reversing a trend toward civilian control. Feckless Governance in Mexico Mexicans, meanwhile, have

grown tired of the feckless governance the country has experienced since its democratic breakthrough in 2000. Nowhere is the lack of compromise or legitimate negotiation more obvious than in Mexicos federal legislature. Under Partido Accin Nacional (PAN) leadership, legislative gridlock has plagued Mexican political life for the
past decade. President Felipe Caldern has fared slightly better than former President Vicente Fox, although frustration among the Mexican citizenry remains. Voters have finally gotten a taste of multiparty democracy and discovered how bittersweet it is. A recent report published by Human Rights Watch, which documents widespread abuses by state security personnel and even judicial actors, has shown how damaging President Calder ns misguided war on drugs has been for ordinary Mexican citizens. Calder ns egregious mismanagement of Mexican security policy has exacerbated citizens growing exasperation, and rightfully so. Systematic

and widespread abuses by state security personnel under the auspices of PAN democracy would make anyone question whether democracy has developed in Mexico over the past decade. Certainly, the media environment has improved since 2000,
and the countrys judicial system is more relevant and unbiased than it was under the rule of the long-serving Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Nevertheless, much of the political power in Mexico has moved from the federal executive to the country s various governorships and, perhaps most tellingly, to Congress and key players within Mexicos three big political parties. During the 70 years of PRI authoritarianism, political actors from disparate groups did not need to work together. Mexican politicians are still learning how to accomplish this. Calderons drug war has undoubtedly failed, but more fundamentally, Mexican citizens simply do not trust the countrys existing institutions, of which political parties would probably top the list. For next years presidential election, the PRI candidate Enrique Pea Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, is the current frontrunner. As in Guatemala, many votersare too young to remember the authoritarian past and the PRIs connection to it. In a 2010 Latin barometro survey that included 18 Latin American nations, Mexicans were more apathetic about democracy than anyone else. Nothing would indicate that things have changed since then. A recent UN study revealed that 36 percent of households were victims of crime last year, a year that witnessed around 22 million common crimes. This is not entirely drug-related violence; criminal activities are more pervasive than that. There is no evidence to suggest that these statistics will improve between now and next Julys presidential election. Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala may be bellwethers for a regional shift away from democracy, or they may simply be exceptions. The counter-examples of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama suggest that democracy is not completely on the decline in the region. Nevertheless, challenges

from crime to legislative gridlock are likely to persist in the region, and these challenges will put pressure on what are still fragile democracies. U.S. Foreign Policy vis--vis Latin America There was a real and not unfounded hope that the administration of George W. Bush would make a concerted effort to engage with Latin Americas political leaders. But after 9/11, the region fell to the bottom of U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Obama administration has not done much better. Plan Colombia and
the Mrida initiative, which deal largely with security issues and fighting an unwinnable drug war, do not constitute a coherent grand strategy. More recently, U.S.

policymakers have again been reminded of the tight links between energy security and national security. This provides another reason to strengthen U.S.-Latin American ties, especially since Chinas influence in Latin America will only grow over the coming decades. In 2009, China became Brazils biggest trading partner. Placing a greater emphasis on human rights and respect for civil liberties is crucial. Washingtons lackluster response to post-coup violence in Honduras only encourages further democratic backsliding elsewhere. Revisiting
comprehensive immigration reform would be another good place to start. The devastating effects of the 40-year war on drugs are related to current violence in Central America. And yet, there is little to suggest that anyone in Washington is willing to reexamine U.S. drug policy. As

the United States shifts its focus to East Asia, reengagement with Latin America will probably be a gradual process. U.S. policymakers must approach the region with more nuanced strategies . Latin America
is not a monolithic entity, where a certain set of policy goals in one country will be relevant or entirely applicable to another. In spite of many similarities, Mexico is not Guatemala. Andean nations should not just be lumped together in the same policy category. Although there are no easy answers, appreciating the specific context of each country will be essential. Strengthening

relationships must go beyond military or security-related bonds. Right now, American foreign policy in the region is unacceptable,

counterproductive, and will likely presage a continued rise in authoritarianism. Latin America is not the Cold War hot spot it once was, but it is a region that still merits attention. Diplomacy on the cheap usually produces undesirable outcomes. The perpetuation of current U.S. policy will be no exception.

A2: Cyber Attacks

China and U.S. cooperating over cybersecurity now VOA News 13 *VOA News, Asian Security Forum Addresses Cyber Attacks, South China Sea http://www.voanews.com/content/asian-security-forum-addresses-cyber-attacks-south-chinasea/1673025.html May 31]//BMitch Defense officials from the Asia Pacific region have begun an annual security forum with talks focusing on cyber security, maritime territorial disputes and North Korea's nuclear program. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said he will address cyber security Saturday in his speech to the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore. He told reporters on the plane to Singapore that the issue will also likely come up in a brief meeting with Chinese delegates on the sidelines of the conference. Recent U.S. reports said that Chinese computer hackers have stolen data from dozens of Pentagon weapons programs and other defense technologies. "There's only one way to deal with these issues and that's straight up," said Hagel. "We intend to use all these venues, and that closer cooperation and closer venue-building to hopefully get us in a position where we can get some better understanding, closer understanding of what these rules of the road are." Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said in a speech
Friday that Southeast Asian nations need to find unity on the issue of the energy-rich South China Sea. He said any conflict could disrupt the region's economy and he urged all countries to agree on a code of conduct. "Maritime security and safety, as well as the freedom of navigation, have indeed caused deep concern to the international community," said the prime minister. China claims almost all of the South China Sea, which may be rich in oil and natural gas. Parts of the sea are also claimed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and territorial disputes in the waters are common.

U.S. China cooperating to solve cyber security now Nusca 7/10 *Andrew Nusca, China, U.S. pledge to improve cybersecurity cooperation http://www.zdnet.com/china-u-s-pledge-to-improve-cybersecurity-cooperation-7000017898/ July 10 2013]//BMitch The United States and China have only just begun their fifth annual session on bilateral matters both political and economic, but talk to improve cooperation on cybersecurity is already progressingeven as
former U.S. government contractor Edward Snowden remains at large aftermaking relevations about U.S. electronic surveillance activities. Xinhua, China's

state news agency, reported today that discussion for the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, has been "candid" and with the aim to enhance "mutual trust" and reduce "mutual suspicion." The overall sentiment seems positive, Reuters notes in its own report on the summit, which takes place
this week in Washington, D.C. There was widespread concern leading up to the meeting, held annually in alternating locations since 2009, that the ongoing Snowden affair would overshadow positive talks between the world's two largest economies. "For

many Chinese, it is bizarre that how Washington can continue to pose as the biggest cyber espionage victim and demand others behave well after former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. spy agencies hacked deep into China and other countries' computer networks, including those of government, military, research, educational and business organizations," Yang Qingchuan wrote in recent commentary for Xinhua. But the tone this week has been optimistic, if a little cautious, China Daily notes, even as both countries engage in and defend cyber spying activities that aggravate the other. The attitude is a likely extension of the unprecedented, rather informal meeting between U.S. president Barack Obama and China president Xi Jinping in California last month. China vice-premier Wang Yang, China state councilor Yang Jiechi,
U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and U.S. secretary of treasury Jack Lew are co-chairs for the event; U.S. vice president Joe Biden delivered the opening address. "We don't have to agree on everything," Biden reportedly said during his address. "We have to trust."

A2: U.S. China War

China rise specifically in the context of Latin America will be peaceful Hsiang 09 *Antonio C. Hsiang Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than
Challenges http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem November]//BMitch

China has been rising in Latin America since the twenty-first century for two reasons. The first is the relative decline in the economic and political pre-eminence of the United States after its brief moment of unchallenged power at the end of the cold warThe second factor is that many Latin American countries have become more self-confident and bent on asserting their diplomatic independence.14 As the United States comparative position erodes and China gets more powerful, some realists predict that, The result of these developments will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. But for G. John Ikenberry, professor at Princeton University, The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition . The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confrontedTodays Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.15 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria also
argues that, the greater the openness of the global system is, the better the prospects for trade, commerce, contact, pluralism and liberty. Any strategy that is likely to succeed in todays world will be one that has the active support and participation of many countriesthere are many good signs in the world today. The most significant rising powerChinadoes

not seem to seek to overturn the established order (as have many newly rising powers in the past) but rather to succeed within it.16 There are encouraging
signs that the U.S. leadership shares Zakarias optimism that the interconnectivity of the global system serves a tempering function to Chinas increasing power. It fact, as early as September 21, 2005, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on China to act as a responsible stakeholder in global affairs. Later, when hosting Chinese President Hu Jintao in Washington in April 2006, former President Bush said, The United States and China are two nations divided by a vast ocean yet connected through a global economy that has created opportunity for both peoples. The United States welcomes the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous, and that supports international institutions.17 Since then, China

has tried to play the role of a responsible stakeholder in global affairs, particularly in Latin America. On the international level, Chinas rising levels of wealth and education, improvement of property rights and the establishment of the rule of law greatly contribute to the global political and economic development. For Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, the fact that autocracies such as China are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point
toward integration and accommodation in the future. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system . . . In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states.18 While

some argue that a globally-ascending China is a revisionist power seeking important changes in the international system, most agree that China seeks the desired change in a patient, prudent, and peaceful fashion. Americans who deal in foreign affairs especially appreciate the fact that Chinese strategic thinking has moved away from notions of a global class conflict and violent revolution. Instead, today's China emphasizes a peaceful rising in global influence while seeking a harmonious world. Former Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts that the Chinese emphasis on harmony can serve as a useful point of departure for U.S.Chinese relations during the Obama presidency. Thus, it is a task that President-elect Barack Obama who is a conciliator at heart
should find congenial, and which President Hu Jintao who devised the concept of a harmonious world should welcome. It is a mission worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future.19 In

Latin America, Chinas engagements have been mostly politically neutral. Despite its disagreements with the United States about many issues, Beijing has adopted a low-key approach and managed to avoid any public confrontation with the United States in the Western Hemisphere.20 Nevertheless, China's growing clout is hard to miss. At the APEC summit in
2008, all eyes were on Hu Jintao as he declared that China now wants to show it is a responsible stakeholder in the region, according to Dan Erikson, a specialist in ChinaLatin American relations from the Inter-American Dialogue.21 Compared with Russias involvement in Latin America, which includes holding joint military exercises with Venezuela and selling arms to the region,

Chinas engagement has been decidedly dovish. Although the neo-conservatives loudly worry about Chinas close relations with Venezuela, *the+ oil interest actually plays a rather limited role in SinoVenezuelan ties in the foreseeable future.22 This is because while China is obviously keen to enter into oil agreements with Venezuela, Beijing has shown no intention to be drawn into any tensions between Hugo Chavez and the U.S. government

China isnt threatening in Latin America Xiaoxia 13 [Wang Xiaoxia () April 27, 2013 Economic Observer Online In Americas Backyard: China in Latin America http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml]//BMitch Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil, copper and
soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become

Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of
the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18 percent. This

trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion. Some prominent Chinese have condemned the United States' high-profile Return to Asia strategy, with its intention of containing China's front door. Shouldnt the United States, which put forward the Monroe Doctrine two centuries ago, also question how China is quietly arriving in Americas backyard? An American Blind Spot? In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez,
Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South Americas "China factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they investigate Latin Americas subtle choice between China and the United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and economic development, while China rises on the back of globalization. Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military means largely without restraint. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin Americas strategic significance has quickly slipped to a secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The realism that ran through Americas foreign policy during the Cold War has gradually transformed towards idealism, which in consequence weakens its influence in Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism,

America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the protection of American interests was its pragmatic principle. Washington didnt care that some Latin American countries were dictatorial or that they violated human rights, as long as their leaders firmly stood on the side of the anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is also best for the rest of the world. Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights and a free market economy around the world. America began to demand that its former dictatorial allies quit their attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S. has pushed Latin American countries many facing a severe debt crisis - to accept the Washington Consensus oriented by market economy theory. The ultimate goal set by this theory may not be a problem. However, it did not pull Latin America out of the quagmire of its lost decade of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe economic downturn, which exacerbated the division between the rich and the poor, leading to serious social problems. The idealism exported by the United States intensified the existing contradictions in Latin American society, and eventually led to the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments. China as a New Favorite Initially, Chinas activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China; and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most
powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's secondlargest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that

China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is

exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States. The
global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-forassets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what

does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in Latin America doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that
it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood; and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is

Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies.

No U.S. China war- our interests are aligned- Xi visit proves Zhang and Shi 13 [Yuhan Zhang is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former
researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lin Shi is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former consultant at the World Bank. Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-notinevitable/]//BMitch President Xi

Jinpings official visit to the United States in February 2012 as Chinas then vice president suggests that conflict between the two states is not inevitable. This goes against the ideas of American offensive realists, who have publicly argued that conflict is an unavoidable consequence of the will to survive, which requires large states to maximise power and pursue hegemony in their own regions. But Xis visit saw China and the United States reach consensus on a number of important issues. They agreed to prioritise shared interests and mutual respect as a means of ushering in an era of winwin cooperation between China and the United States. Xis visit had three main goals: first, to strengthen trust between the two powers through an official visit; second, to familiarise American leaders with the basic political, economic, ideological and diplomatic style of Chinas next leader; and, third, to consolidate SinoUS trade relations. The timing of Xis visit coincided with the 40th anniversary of
President Nixons visit to China and the publication of the SinoUS joint communiqus, which played a critical role in normalising relations between the two states. Upon his arrival, Xi met with a number of former secretaries, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright and former secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. Xi also met with many policy makers from the current administration, includingPresident Barack Obama. His visit laid a good foundation for the positive development of China-US political and economic relations for at least the next decade. There are two key reasons for this. The first is that the

visit successfully delivered the message that China is willing to engage in political communication and economic cooperation with the United States. During meetings with current and former politicians, business people and the media, Xi repeatedly stressed the importance of cooperation and friendship between China and the United States. This message is necessary to reduce the possibility of future strategic misunderstandings, especially because the United States, as a representative Western capitalist power, has been seen as ideologically prejudiced against China since the Cold War. It is also timely because Chinas rapid economic growth in the past decades has arguably aroused envy and fear in the United States and some European countries, which have been suffering from the consequences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis.
These anxieties have hardly been assuaged by statements from a growing pool of commentators who predict that China will soon equal the United States in economic power, and will eventually supplant its hegemony. But this prediction fails to account for the philosophical grounding of Chinese leaders, which indicates that China has neither the intention nor the capacity to challenge Americas hegemony. As Mao Zedong pointed out in the early 1960s, We *China+ are a socialist country. We do not invade other countries, not in 100 years or 1000 years. Maos successors have consistently reiterated this principle and repeated many times that China will never seek hegemony. Xis visit served as another reminder that Chinas

and Americas interests are in many ways aligned, and that there is considerable scope for the largest advanced economy and the largest emerging economy in the world to establish a new type of partnership. Secondly, Xis visit helped to further China-US trade and economic relations. In
recent years, as part of Chinas going out strategy, more and more state-owned enterprises and private companies in China have engaged in

mergers and acquisitions activities in North America and Europe, with the intention of absorbing Western advanced technologies and management techniques. After Xis visit to the US, hundreds of accompanied Chinese entrepreneurs have now moved closer to possessing an accurate understanding of local policies and the investment environment in America. This deepening of China-US relations will encourage more Chinese enterprises to invest in the United States. High-tech, clean energy and manufacturing industries are bound to become new hotbeds of bilateral cooperation in the next few years. The trade orders signed in Iowa and California by Xis team also included preferential agricultural policies for American farmers, which have been welcomed and endorsed by the federal government, state governments and the American public. Admittedly, the 2012 US presidential election campaign saw candidates from both the Democratic and the Republican parties score political points by criticising many of Chinas policies, including its exchange rate and trade policies. But, overall, Xis

visit indicated that the future of China-US relations under his presidency will be shaped by cooperation, despite the intrusion of domestic politics.

No SOI Good Turn

No negative impact to China influence Xiaoxia 13 (Wang, staff writer and economic observer at Worldcrunch. In Americas Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America. Worldcrunch. 6 May 2013 http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesnt constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region. China doesnt pose a threat Hanna, 2012 (Don, Managing director of Global Liquid Markets Research at Fortress Investment Group Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere? January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254) Chinas emergence as a global economic force, surpassing in many ways the political influence the country wielded in the 1950s and 1960s, is a development with profound and multifaceted implications for the Western Hemisphereimplications that arent sensibly encapsulated in terms like threat or opportunity. The
important issue for the people of the Western Hemisphere is to understand the nature of those implications and to respond in a fashion that

Demonizing (or sanctifying) China is not a sensible response. One crucial aspect to understand about Chinas emergence is that it is not an emergence, but a reemergence. Prior to Europes industrial revolution, global income was distributed largely on the basis of population because technologyand hence labor productivitydidnt differ much. Chinas reemergence, then, owes much to its ability to put in place policies that have allowed it to catch up with frontiers of technology and improved productivity. Learning which elements of Chinas success can be replicated should be a welcome spur to development in
magnifies the gains for the region from Chinas astonishing emergence.

the Western Hemisphere . Another crucial aspect of China is its sheer sizewith all the demands that creates on resources and the
environment. Higher terms of trade for commoditiesa boon to the regions commodity producersowe much to the surge in Chinas economy. At the same time, Chinas surging greenhouse gas emissions, among the highest in the world, highlight the urgency of a coherent, global program to control such emissions. Chinas sheer size, though, makes it more likely that the country will realize that its own actions will matter in solving this global problem. The

Western Hemisphere needs to contribute to the fashioning of global institutions that can accommodate Chinas reemergence, providing an opportunity for China to share in the burdens of global macroeconomic, political and environmental stability that come with its resurgence.

A2: Heg Turn

Chinese regional presence doesn't challenge US regional security or hegemony Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077) Chinese military engagement with Latin America has been one of the most broadly discussed, but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in the region.2 The PRCs military initiatives in Latin America are arguably not the largest or most strategically significant part of its rapidly expanding interac- tions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in the same fashion as Soviet military engagement with Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives, however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the
Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999, evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

China will not harm regional US interests Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)
In general, as this section has suggested, the the medium or long term is

course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in likely to dif- fer significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

A2: LA SOI Causes War

China wont go to war with the US rise is peaceful Jenkins, 10 - Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, Chinas Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge Journals, 2010, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KG Chinas main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials and market access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic and political stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States, could also adversely aect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example, expressed concerns over the implications for his countrys oil interests of institutional uncertainties created by the revision of the countrys constitution and bilateral investment agreements.66 Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, Chinas policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological . Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of dierent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.

Poverty, Environment, Terrorism

China Influence solves poverty, environment, violence, and terrorism
Weiwei 12 (Zhang, Chinese professor of international relations at Fudan University, and a senior research fellow at the Chunqiu Institute. He was a senior fellow at the Centre for Asian Studies, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and a visiting professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, The rise of China's political soft power, September 4th, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm) For all of the above questions, China's soft power has been a guiding light. "Soft power" does not only include cultural items like
martial arts and Chinese food, but also political soft power, political values and China's governance model. As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the

Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Westerndominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of
resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In

contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their
own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China

strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why
few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries

and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to
surprise the world.

China Econ
Chinese influence key to secure Latin American resources key to growth. Lettieri 5. [Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14
-- www.coha.org/bush-goes-to-beijing-china-goes-to-latin-america/]

Latin Americas Strategic Importance to China As Chinas economy has boomed, racking up continuous growth rates of 9%, and its population has become increasingly urbanized, the countrys need for raw materials has skyrocketed.
The need was exacerbated by the decision to become a fully motorized consumer economy, meaning that in short order China would require in the order of twice of its present level of consumption of petroleum. It is relevant to note that today China is the third largest manufacturer of automobiles in the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that according to the Washington Post, Beijing has estimated that by 2020 the country would need 600 million tons of crude oil annually. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in a report in Februarys issue of Poder magazine, China

has displaced the United States as the worlds largest consumer of most industrial raw materials, America offers in abundance many of those key resources now coveted by China, and its history and experience of serving as a rawgoods-exporting economic enclave for the industrialized metropolis be it Spain, the U.K. or the U.S., has been at different stages of its history further enhances the regions appeal to Beijing. In its eagerness to secure access to the Latin American resources it so prizes, the PRC has skillfully wielded its economic soft power to convince regional governments to amicably open up their countries to Chinese penetrations. Not that much persuasion
including copper, aluminum, nickel, platinum, and iron ore. An Embarrassment of Riches Latin was necessary, considering the desire of countries like Brazil to find an outside foreign partner capable of counterbalancing the U.S.

Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse Lewis 8. [Dan, Research Director Economic Research Council, The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse, World Finance, 5/13,
http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]
In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the worlds largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned China Hands rejected Changs thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. Chinas expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter which we in the West hear very little about are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile,

rural unrest in China is on the rise fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the Citys most accurate and
respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, Chinas undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong cu rrencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease Chinas rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, ste rling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in Chinas economic growth rate. That is alarming. It

has been calculated that to keep Chinas society stable ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesnt end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at

least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they dont become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. Theres a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan whom America is pledged to defend.

CCP collapse Goes nuclear and draws in the US. Fisher 11 (Max, Associate Editor at the Atlantic, Editor of the International Channel, 5 Most Likely Ways the US and China Could Spark
Accidental Nuclear War) (4) China or India occupies disputed territory. In 1962, China seized a disputed district called Tawang along its border with India. Since then, China hasn't shown much interest in using military force to invade disputed territory. But

Indian politics have become increasingly nationalist and its leaders insecure about the rising Chinese power. India's decades-long territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir -- which came very close to sparking nuclear war in the 1990s -- means that India is extremely sensitive about its borders. It's not hard to foresee an erratic Indian politician or a twitchy general trying to preempt some imagined Chinese invasion of a disputed territory. If that happens, China's response could easily escalate the stand-off, whether intentionally or not. India, like China, not yet clarified precisely when it will and will not consider using nuclear weapons. The U.S., a close ally of India, would probably be compelled to step in -- as it has between India and Pakistan. But that might add to the volatility and the ways things could spiral out of control.Photo: Indian army Brahmos missile launcher passes on a flotilla towards the India Gate
memorial during rehearsal for the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.

Strong Chinese growth key to solve Asian stability, North Korea, prolif, and terrorism. Krawitz 10. *Howard M., Visiting Senior Fellow @ NDU, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Chinas trade opening and implications for
regional stability The Peoples Liberation Army and China in Transition National Defense University Press -http://www.scribd.com/doc/3099389/the-peoples-liberation-army-and-china-in-transition]

A strong services sector, and the millions of jobs it will create, would not only support a real middle class but also slow growth in Chinas chronically unemployed underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pres- sure. China must
place over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a number expected to swell by at least 5 to 6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue.

Domestic stability in China

benefits America. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share concerns similar to those Americans have and be more willing to cooperate on the range of issues relating to such concerns. For example, China already shows increased interest in working with U.S. officials and private experts on environmental problems (for example, pollution, hazardous
waste, and transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of real concern for Chinese citizens in more prosperous areas of the country. They are also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the international arena as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation, and, ultimately, trust. A

wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests. A China that risks tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior should be less likely to favor precipitous action and conflict. It should be more likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability, more open to consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors, and more willing to cooperate on regional security issues, strategies, and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic strength and military capability would give Beijing the respect, prestige, and diplomatic stature it craves, making it easier for China to see itself as a player whose opinion is given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being marginalized or contained, making it easier for China to find common cause with the United States, Japan, and others in the region in maintaining calm and promoting dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating international terrorism and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

AT No CCP collapse
Econ decline Causes CCP collapse. Cheng 9. *Li, research director and senior fellow at the Brookings Institutions John L. Thornton China Center, "China's Team of Rivals"
Foreign Policy -- March 1 -- www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/china_s_team_of_rivals]
The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Partys leadership in Beijing, are worried. What

was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to Chinas searing
economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the countr ys unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, is a te st of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our partys governing ability.With this rapid downturn, the

Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the partys legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer Chinas massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitudeand survive the political challenges it will bring. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Peoples Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, Chinas most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions that compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the
reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republics history that the transfer of power didnt involve bloodshed or purges. Whats more, Hu was not a protg of Jiangs; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days,

post-Deng China

has been run by a team of rivals. This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007, President Hu surprised many China watchers by abandoning the partys normally straightforward succession procedure and designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi Jinping and Li Keqiangtwo very different leaders in their early 50sto the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will be the candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policyand they are expected to lead the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft Chinas political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.

AT No CCP Lashout
nuclear war. Yee and Storey 2. [Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University
and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, p. 5+
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the

fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of
its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These

problems are putting a strain on the central governments ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of Chinas neighbours . A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

Biological and chemical lashout. Rexing 5. (San Epoch Times International August 3

rd

-- http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life . The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who
demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow , the bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people,

bloody confession affirmed the CCPs

now plans to hold one billion people hostage and

gamble with their lives.

China-India war. Cohen 2. (Stephen, Senior Fellow Brookings Institution, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future, May,
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf) A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation. A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States or both might become involved in a major crisis with India, perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly with American assistance.

I/L Aerospace, Biotech, Nuke power

Chinese Sphere of Influence is key to aerospace, biotech, and nuclear power.
Wise 09 (Carol, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, 2009, China in Latin America: The
Whats and Wherefores, http://es.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/19/es.kht015.full)//DR. H At the same time, as

Chinas commercial and political relationship with the countries in the region continues to grow, so will the influence of Chinese communities, businesses, and organizations now present in Latin America. Here, a good deal of diplomatic footwork remains to be done on both sides. Ellis cites the numerous conflicts between
Chinese oil companies and indigenous groups, Ecuador being a prime example; the Argentine truck drivers strike against Chinese shop owners in 2006 is cited as further evidence of a troublesome trend underway in the region. The question of Chinas ability to continue treading lightly with the United States is another potential problem. Chinas

improvement of its military capabilities through the acquisition of new technology is now a reality, as is the PRCs willingness to form partnerships with various Latin American countries in this realm. This development is likely to be met with increased uneasiness in the United States, as is Chinas propensity to increase technology cooperation in areas such as aerospace, biotechnology, and nuclear power.

ensures regional security and prevents regional conflict

Erickson 4 - Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.
(Andrew, Seizing the Highest High Ground: Chinas Aerospace Development and its Larger Implications February 21, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/IGSCwp003.pdf)

Beijings aerospace focus is normal for a rising great power. All states seek security; potential great powers seek security through aerospace. Countries of significant size, population, and development level naturally compete for great power status: contingent on regional domination, it confers significant security. Regional domination hinges on military superiority, especially capacity to determine the nature of conflict and to deter it before it occurs (e.g. satellite detection of enemy military deployment followed by threats of sanctions if troops were not withdrawn). Military capacity and societal support for governmental grand strategy demand economic growth. Dual use
potential of most technology unites military and economic sectors. Therefore, both current and aspiring great powers strive to seize the technological high ground.

Conflict in Asia escalates to nuclear war extinction

Landay 2000 National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Lexis Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized

security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the regions
tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea

conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international
attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Bio tech
Solves bioterror. Zhao et al 06 China National Center for Biotechnology Development (Qinghua, Qing Li, Yihong Hu, Hongguang Wang, 2006,
Biotechnology and bioeconomy in China, pdf)//DR. H

It will be important to establish and perfect the technical system to meet an emergency for the defense against bioterrorism and the prevention and treatment of the major epidemic diseases, ensuring peoples health and social stability; to develop the vaccines and medications directed against the major bioterrorist factors is the utmost goal. Breakthrough is made in monitoring and detecting biotechniques with rigorous monitoring network and standard protocols and laboratories founded. The physical protection and
equipment reaches the international advanced level.

Breakthrough is made in the surveillance, warning and defense techniques of foreign invading organisms to contain them efficiently.
The evaluation and monitoring techniques of the safety of transgenic plants and their products are standardized and applied to provide technical support for guaranteeing the safety of transgenic plants.

Advanced bio-safety laboratories (P3, P4) and standardization of the administration procedures and criteria, providing the bases for R&D of the prevention and treatment of the major infectious diseases, and of defense against bioterrorism have to be established. The code of life ethics for biotherapy stem cell research and cloning techniques, bringing the research, development and application of BT into the legal system has to be established and perfected.

Extinction and rapid dissimination9 hour timeframe - linear risk Discovery 09 Chandra: Published over 350 peer-reviewed journals, Director of the Cardiff Centre for Astrobiology, former professor at
multiple prestigious universities Award-winning source of credible, unbiased, and easy-to-understand explanations of how the world actually works (How Stuff Works, February 19, 2009, 10 Ways the World Might End: A Monster Plague, http://videos.howstuffworks.com/science/10ways-the-world-will-end-videos-playlist.htm)//DR. H [Narrator:] Conventional science

holds the deadly viruses that typically originate in other species, and then jump to humans. Some scientists believe the biggest threat from plague could come from outer space.
*Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:+ Looking at thethe pattern of diseases and the how they extract the earth, I would say that every new strain of virus, new subtype of virus, it has a space connotation to it. [Narrator:] If Chandra is right, it is possible an asteroid could one day deliver a deadly new strain of plague. [Dr. Chandra Wickramisinghe:] There

is the possibility that sometime in the future, there will be a strain of virus or bacteria that we have not encountered throughout evolution history that could cause absolute devastation. [Narrator:] A killer plague from outer space isnt the only concern. Deadly new bioweapons are also being developed in the barges around the world . Fringe cults, and apocalyptic madmen could right now be developing such bioweapons. As deadly as atomic bombs, and far cheaper to produce , infection with a few particles could mean a slow, agonizing death. It might only take one moment of madness from an absent minded buffet to release such a deadly new strain of plague. Once out of the lab, this grotesque killer would quickly begin to spread. [Guest] Anywhere in the world, infection is on our doorstep, or moving around the world, within nine hours , that virus could arrive here in London, or anywhere else. [Narrator:] No one will be safe, as the deadly invisible assassin will swiftly bring entire cities to a standstill.

*Guest+ Theres two features, of actually meeting your cad. And what we ask is, how long is the incubation period. Thats the time between the time you get infected, and the time you show symptoms. And the other thing we look for is whats called its reproductive number, and its reproductive number is basically how many people are going to be infected by one person with that virus. If

the reproductive number is high, and the incubation period is short, then youve got a problem on your hands. [Narrator:] This monster plague, will bring death on an unprecedented scale, economies will collapse , the medical system will be unable to cope, no one will be spared a terrible, ugly death.

Aerospace
Weak Chinese aerospace industry increases their use of ballistic missiles. Stokes 10 - Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, Chinas Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR. H So with that in mind in terms of some of the reasons why they're problematic, why

is the PRC relying upon ballistic and land attack cruise missiles? Well, the first reason has to do with the relative shortcomings of the aviation industry. This does not mean that the aviation industry and the PLA Air Force are not modernizing. They are. But in a relative sense, under a program where they've emphasized nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and satellites, aviation industry in the past has not had this much emphasis as a space and missile industry. When you say aerospace industry, of course, in China, they're neatly divided between aviation and space and missile. But it also offers an inexpensive means, a relatively inexpensive means, to be able to achieve their operational objectives. That's the second reason.

That causes nuclear war. Stokes 10 - Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute., 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran
(Mark, May 20, Chinas Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities US China Economic and Review Commission)//DR. H

The centrality of theater ballistic and ground launch cruise missiles in PRC political and military strategy is problematic. Filling the vacuum created by the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, the PRC has relied on theater missiles to compensate for shortcomings in its conventional air forces. In addition to modernizing existing short range (SRBM) variants, China is expanding its medium range ballistic and ground launch cruise missile infrastructure. The conventional theater missile build-up has the potential to create strategic competitions that increase the risks of conflict in the future. China's successes in fielding advanced ballistic and land attack cruise missiles also dilutes international efforts to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Nuke Power
Chinese nuclear powers key to energy security. Lyons et al. 9 ((*Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), United States-China
Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security, Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center Both the U.S. and China are pursuing activities to develop advanced nuclear power reactor technology. The 2005 Energy Policy Act created a program for the U.S. at the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate a next generation light water reactors. China Consortium. Both the U.S. and China are pursuing R&D on high temperature gas reactors

intends to develop an indigenous advanced nuclear reactor based on the technology being transferred by the
that can be used for both electricity production as well as hydrogen production due to its high temperatures. The latter program offers a significant opportunity for collaboration between the U.S. and China. Looking to the future, advanced fuel cycle technologies will be needed. Given the difficulty of establishing waste repositories, fuel cycle technologies that can minimize the volume and heat load of the waste forms will be at a premium. Increasing proliferation resistance and maximizing the energy from uranium will also drive their development. GIF and GNEP programs specifically address these concerns. Specifically, the Chinese dialogue participants commented that there is a significant need for R&D on advanced fuels that can be remotely fabricated (regardless whether China chooses between an open or closed fuel cycle). It also calls for the development of advanced recycling technologies (through the GIF program activities) with cost effectiveness in mind. There are a number of major challenges facing Gen IV R&D programs and opportunities for international cooperation, including: Complexity of the technologies: As the complexity of the technology increases, the difficulty of achieving success increases. Innovative R&D is very time-consuming, requires huge amounts of capital, as well as demonstration facilities. Fuel cycle and resource requirements: Several Gen IV reactor systems will require a closed fuel cycle foundation, which is not uniformly supported by all key policy makers in the U.S. system. While each country will choose its preferred fuel cycle option on the basis of many factors, economics will be particularly important. (Many Dialogue participants discussed the need to factor ways to make advanced technologies more affordable into the R&D decision-making process.) The economics of reprocessing, a key element of an advanced closed fuel cycle technology, is sensitive to high plant throughput. Regional or international centers that provide either sensitive services, or cradle to grave services, could take advantage of the economies of scale that will be needed for the advanced fuel cycles to be competitive. Intellectual property: International, as well as national, laws and practices are needed to protect intellectual property. This becoming an even more important issue as a result of multinational collaboration on RD&D. 4 .4 Regardng Commercal Deployment of Small-Scale Nuclear Reactors While most of the Dialogue was devoted to issues related to the deployment of large-scale nuclear power plants, recent advancements towards the commercialization of smallscale nuclear power plants was also reviewed. There are several potential opportunities for advanced, small, m odular reactor technologies to be used in both distributed and gridconnected applications. Such facilities are seen as increasing the flexibility and security of electricity grids. Some note that the smaller-scale designs might provide terrorists with less attractive targets than large-scale nuclear facilities. Small sized reactors also have several uses in addition to base load electric supply, for example, in providing site power for remote oil and gas production or high demand applications like desalinat ion. In addition, they could provide emergency backup to critical facilities in the event of an attack on the electric grid, such as secure/on-site power plant at military sites or for critical industrial complexes. Additional factors driving the small-sized reactor market include potential bottlenecks in the supply chain for large reactors and the difficulties obtaining a large qualified workforce to build and operate a large reactor. Another intriguing possibility is to utilize self-contained, easily moved small nuclear power plants in less developed countries. In many developing countries, 1000 MWe plus s ize reactors are simply not compatible with countries transmission grids. Billions of people currently live without access to electricity and without ad equate water supplies. The utilization of distributed nuclear power could provide a major new power option in many less developed countries. There are various proposals for various types of small-sized reactors that have potential applications in developed and developing countries alike. As noted in section 3.2, the Chinese are interested in commercial application of small modular pebble bed reactors. The Hyperion Power Module, based on reactor technology developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New M exico, is a sealed, 27 MWe reactor using uranium hydride fuel, which can be delivered on the back of a flat-bed truck at a cost currently estimated (by the reactor developer) at $25 million per unit beginning in 2014. The Babcock & Wilcox Company reports t hat it has provided nuclear power plants for U.S. government applications and maintains the industrial capability to offer modular reactors in the 100 MWe range to commercial entities. It was noted that since China and the U.S. have an Agreement for Cooperation and as required by U.S. law, the DOE 810 technology transfer approvals 17 , B&W and China could cooperate on further commercial development and marketing of such reactors. Some liability issues would, however, have to be resolved first. NuScale Power is also interested in commercializing this type of technology. It is in the process of commercializing a modular, scalable 40 MWe light water reactor plant. It features a combined containment vessel and reactor system, and an integrated turbine-generator set. It is scalable in that as many as one to 24 units could be tied together within a single facility, with the ability to take out one unit at a time for servicing. NuScale make use of testing facilities at the Oregon State University to benchmark vendor and NRC safety evaluation models and is seeking certification by the NRC. T hroughout the dialogue, participants called for ways to accelerate commercial nuclear power cooperation between the U.S. and China on a government-togovernment level and throughout the commercial sector. Given the importance of developing nuclear trade between the two countries, and the necessity of ensuring safe and reliable plant operations, pragmatic and integrated cooperation is needed. In addition, global acceptance of nuclear power over the long term will depend upon viable solutions to nuclear waste and the creation of (even more) proliferation resistant technologies. Both China and the U.S. have the capability of leading in the creation of solutions to these issues. Specific recommendations coming from the dialogue include: 1 . As it becomes more clear that nuclear power will be an important part of Chinas and the U.S.s energy portfolio throughout this century and well into the next, so too does the need for adequate planni ng. To make the right decisions, energy policy makers need to expand their horizons to consider the longer term, i.e., past 2050, and what fuel cycle R&D must be initiated now. 2 . This dialogue represented a good first step to bring together some of the k ey players in the U.S. and Chinese nuclear sectors. At a future meeting, the Dialogue could be enhanced by broadening participation. For example, the meetings should include Chinese counterparts to attending U.S. organizations, a diverse range of Chinese utilities, other U.S. reactor design vendors and representatives from U.S. national laboratories The U.S. government should continue to promote U.S.Sino cooperation, especially in the nuclear area. Such cooperation would be supportive of the ongoing efforts to expanded cooperation on fossil fuel and climate change efforts that will not only

regard to how to structure a robust commercial program. China could benefit from the U.S.s experience to create viable utilities, vendors, a worldclass regulator as well as supporting universities and institutes. 5 . Commercial
benefit each country, but also developing countries such as India and Indonesia. 4 . The U.S. nuclear industry is mature; many lessons have been learned with

nuclear power deployment is a truly global endeavor demanding absolute quality assurance without compromise. There were several suggestions as to how it can be fostered: Increased engineering and construction cooperation by sharing best practices, utilizing 3D and 4D design techniques, better information management (taking advantage of communications

devices such as blackberries), and adopting standardized barcodes. Assisting with the cultivation of Chinas human resources by increasing opportunities for U.S. experts to do on -site training in China as well as for Chinese workers to come to the U.S. for training at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and utility facilities to witness U.S. best policy and practices. Developing a mindset of management and operational excellence by collaborat ion with organizations such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO.) The Chinese might best profit from the WANO experience by all Chinese organizations participating in the same WANO center. Steps are needed by the Chinese government to raise the profile of the profession and encourage the universities to improve the number and quality of their degree-programs. The industry must continue to coordinate with the universities regarding their needs. China should be encouraged to implement establis hment of independent testing labs as is now apparently authorized under the auspices of the Institute of New and Nuclear Energy Technology. 6 . The U.S. NRC should continue to aid Chinas National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the development of its regulatory system and training of regu lators. A follow-on dialogue should focus on obtaining more information to how China plans to ramp up its regulatory structure to meet the demands of a rapid deployment of commercial nuclear power across the spectrum of reactors it is currently planning. 7 . As the Chinese nuclear power industry matures, there will be opportunities for Chinese companies to provide services such as uprating, refueling, maintenance and outage control services. Efforts to establish such cooperation should be initiated in the near term. 8 . To improve the commercial nuclear plant supply chain, China should consider establishing a qualified supplier list. In the process, Chinese companies fabricating components need better training with regard to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards code. 9 . Commercial entities in both the U.S. and China can take advantage of their competitive edges for mutual benefit. The U.S. has technical competitive edges and China has geographic edges vis--vis the developing market for nuclear power. U.S. and Chinese companies can jointly exploit these competitive edges to develop the South East Asian markets. 10 . One of the roadblocks to the development of cooperative opportunities is the U.S. visa issuance system. The Atlantic Council was encouraged to ask the U.S. Department of State to improve its processing of visa applications to significantly shorten the time needed for Chinese nationals involved in nuclear power to obtain a visa for travel to the U.S. Consider, for example, that France provides a dedicated consulate. It is important to recognize that U.S. authorities must take into consideration the security of nuclear facilities but that a better balance can be reached. This is a problem that can be solved. 11 . There is an opportunity for international cooperation on the development of a nuclear waste repository based on the experience the U.S. has already gained through 10 years of operation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) facility and through its Yucca Mountain site characterization and licensing activities. 12 . Chinas 10 MWe High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) scheduled to be in operation by November 2013 in Shandong Province, could serve as an international experimental facility. The currently operating test pebble bed reactor has provided an opportunity for international collaboration. 13 . Cooperation on the development of advanced fuel cycle technologies, already underway in U.S.-China working groups, will provide significant opportunities to share rather than duplicate knowledge and funding. Generation IV (Gen IV) international collaboration on R&D is necessary and beneficial for all participants to share costs, facilities and experience. Specific fuel cycle R&D opportunities proposed by the State Nuclear Power Technology corporation (SNPTC) include the following: Advanced fuel, such as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and metal fuel; Transmutation technology, such as fast reactor and accelerator driven systems; Reprocessing technologies, such as MOX spent fuel reprocessing, dry processing, on-site recycle; and, Repository design technology. 14 . The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) will provide a good framework to deal with intellectual property issues. If prototype or demonstration plants were to be built under the aegis of the GIF, it could also provide experience in dealing with legal and regulatory issues. Issues such as design ownership, who would build the facility, cost sharing would have to be addressed. As countries have vested interests in certain types of technologies, resolution of such issues may be difficult. 15 . The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The U.S., which led the way in establishing the international collaborative effort to develop proliferation-resistant technologies and institutions, should take advantage of its leadership position to nurture and expand GNEPs international activities. As in GIF, there are advantages to sharing technical expertise and pooling financial resources. GNEP is already in place and the Obama Administration can take advantage of the years of effort it took to set up the framework for international collaboration while adapting GNEP goals to current realities and domestic nuclear development policies. Consistency in U.S. nuclear energy policies, especially in relation to international efforts, is crucial to foster global acceptance of a safe, secure and sustainable nuclear power. The time for

and losers in the supply of energy is over. Nuclear energy is needed more than ever as a non-carbon emitting source of electric supply and it can play a role in providing a secure, sustainable, affordable energy supply. The bottom line is that both the U.S. and China need a diversified energy production platform and technology portfolio, including a vibrant nuclear industry. Given the necessity of using all the forms of energy at our
debate about the winners

disposal while transitioning to a de-carbonized portfolio relying increasingly on renewables, integrated solutions are needed. Recognizing that this is not an either-or world, cooperation

on nuclear energy can lead to expanded cooperation on other energy programs such as clean coal technology and renewable energy R&D. As the scientists and engineers begin to work together on nuclear programs, both will find ways to start other joint efforts. Together the U.S. and China have
the ability to set the standards for worlds upcoming climate negotiations. With 2 billion people in the world suffering from a lack of energy and facing increasing shortages of adequate water supplies, developed countries are in a position to spread the benefits of electricity around the globe. To do this, every available source of electric supply must be deployed, and the U.S. and China, who will have the worlds two largest nuclear power programs in approximately 20 years, and who may also be the worlds top two economies, will be able to lead the way This Dialogue provided a very good information base and an excellent platform to help the U.S. and China to work together to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to our nations and to the others in this world suffering from a lack of the basics for life. The U.S. and China are the worlds largest energy consumersand the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gasses. Both countries must

increase their use of nuclear power to help meet energy demands in a carbon-constrained environment. Relevant
government agencies and key stakeholders must educate their publics about the parameters involved in producing a diverse energy supply in order to understand the worth of sacrifices that will be needed. Cooperation between the U.S. and China will be mutually beneficial. It is to the U.S.s benefit that China designs and operates a safe nuclear power program. China is a significant market for the U.S. nuclear industry and provides an opportunity to maintain its manufacturing capabilities until its first new U.S. orders get underway. U.S. industry presence in China also increases relationships and communications thus improving U.S. security. The unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to the Chinese will, in turn, help them develop clean sources of electricity sorely needed to address the fast growing needs of its economy and public. As Chinese capabilities grow, the nuclear supply chain is reinforced, supporting further opportunities for U.S. companies to expand reactor sales abroad. American and Chinese companies together can take advantage of their mutual competitive edges in technology and geography to expand into new markets. Cooperation

and leadership are key and complimentary components in the U.S.s and Chinas efforts to ensure nuclear powers contribution to meeting energy demand . Cooperation on technology development, human resources, security and safety will form the basis for their leadership on the world stage . Their combined actions will matter greatly in providing a quality environment with adequate energy supplies. The world is watching! The Chinese participants signaled their desire to

improve both government-to-government cooperation and commercial sector ties. It appears that the U.S.
government is equally interested in working with China to tackle the overarching challenges of developing a safe and secure commercial nuclear fuel cycle. By supporting and participating in this Dialogue, U.S. industry and government participants have demonstrated their commitment to dealing with the challenges to realize the burgeoning nuclear trade between the two countries.

Solves multiple scenarios for war. Richardson 12 (Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, 6-7-12,
*Thirst for energy driving China's foreign policy, Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120607mr.html] E. Liu SINGAPORE The United States and China, the world's top users of energy, are heading in opposite directions. It is a trend that has major geostrategic implications for the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is more certain that most of its future oil and gas will be produced at home. It is becoming less reliant on imported oil and natural gas as it ramps up domestic output and consumes fewer liquid fuels because of falling demand and energy saving advances, particularly in transport and industry. Meanwhile, China

is becoming ever more dependent on oil and gas shipped or piped into the country, mainly from faraway sources of supply that are often in politically volatile parts of world, including the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. As a result, Beijing's sense of insecurity about future energy supplies is rising. China is modernizing its armed forces not just to reclaim Taiwan by military means if necessary. China wants to protect its maritime trade routes and secure access to offshore energy, mineral and fisheries resources in nearby seas, including the East China Sea where it faces conflicting claims to jurisdiction from Japan and the South China Sea, where its claims to jurisdiction are contested by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia and Brunei. China also wants to enhance its security by establishing an
offshore zone of influence that it will be able dominate, instead of the U.S. and regional allies. Despite America's recently declared strategic "pivot" to Asia, its relative power and influence is declining. This is unlikely to change even if China's growth slows somewhat. As America gains energy security in a time of cost-cutting, it will have less incentive to continue expensive military protection of maritime supply lines in increasingly contested areas such as the seas off China's coast, the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf, and around the Middle East and Africa, prompting China to extend its own military reach

into the Indian Ocean, through which so much of its imported oil and gas comes. This will heighten tensions with India. Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government has projected the outcome of U.S.-China economic, military and energy trends in this way: "If

China is like all previous great powers, including the U.S., its definition of 'vital' interests will grow as its power increases and it will try to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. "Given its dependence on rawmaterial imports (especially energy) and export-led growth, prudent Chinese leaders will want to make sure that no one is in a position to deny them access to the resources and markets on which their future prosperity and political stability depend. "This situation will encourage Beijing to challenge the current U.S. role in Asia. Over time, Beijing will try to convince other Asian states to abandon ties with America, and Washington will almost certainly resist these efforts. An intense security competition will follow." The most recent sign of this regional struggle for supremacy is in the South China Sea where China and the Philippines, an ally of the U.S., have been at loggerheads for nearly two months over ownership and control
of Scarborough Shoal, a reef and fishing ground that is far closer to the Philippines than to China. Such disputes can be contained. Or they can lead to China prevailing over weaker, less determined opponents. Or they

can result in armed conflict. If the U.S. or its ally Japan became involved, there could be a wider war that would destabilize Asia . Is there a way for China to emulate the U.S. and become substantially less dependent on foreign oil and gas? Until 1993, China
produced enough crude oil to meet its needs. But as growth surged, oil imports rose. China now imports 55 percent of its oil consumption, a ratio that is set to increase. Natural gas, the least polluting of fossil fuels, is on a similar trend line. By 2020, China's gas imports by pipeline and sea will make up nearly 33 percent of demand, up from around 20 percent now and none in early 2006, when China cease to be self-sufficient in gas.

China war
A war with china is likely in the short term. Causes massive death tolls. Goldstein 13
[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89]

Sino-American crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains militarily outclassed by the United States, present distinctive dangers. The preceding analysis offers some reassurance that the interaction of
conventional and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so difficult to fully eliminate the adversarys ability to use military force to generate a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can make striking first so tempting in a conventional world are diminished. But because

instability in a nuclear world could result in disaster, even a small chance that the parties would initiate the use of force is troubling. During a crisis, the desire to achieve a favorable outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and may encourage the use of force if only to signal resolve as each side seeks the upper hand. This suggests that the most worrisome possibility is a crisis in which the United States and China fail to grasp each others view about the importance of its interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal
resolve through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Because the risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange, this should be sufcient reason for scholars to provide policymakers with a better understanding of the current prospects for such dangerous instability in U.S.-China crises. Concerns raised by the possibility that China could one day grow strong enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States have received much attention. Although clearly important, that is a discussion about the distant future. In the meantime, greater attention needs to be paid to the immediate danger of instability in the kinds of crises that could ensnare the United States and China while China is still relatively weak. Ironically, perhaps,

whatever new security challenges a much stronger China could one day pose, the end of Chinas currently profound military weakness would at least mitigate the key near-term problem identified herethe potential for crisis instability exacerbated by asymmetry in Sino-American power. But before any such major shift in power occurs, there is a real, if limited, possibility that a mismanaged Sino-American crisis will render all speculation about the long term tragically moot.

US-China conflict escalates to Nuclear catastrophe Goldstein 13

[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89]

In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running . Even though no stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange, some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over
which they could find themselves locked in a warthreatening crisis in the Western Pacic. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese and U.S. statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhaps

increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance. The

most worrisome source of instability, however, is clearthe temptation to use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear catastrophe that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate.

Recent cyber attacks indicate possibility of war is high Feldman 13

[Noah Feldman, constitutional and international law professor at Harvard University, The Coming Cool War With China, Bloomberg, 6/02/2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html] Someone steals your most sensitive secrets. Then, planning a face-to-face meeting, he says he wants to develop a new type of relationship with you. At what point, exactly, would you start thinking he was planning to drink your milkshake? Ahead

of the first summit meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, the two nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight. Chinas
peaceful rise was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for Chinas leaders. Americas peaceful decline will get no one elected, whether Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets and drones, the U.S.s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China. At the same time, trade between the two rivals remains robust. Last week, Henan-based Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. agreed to buy the U.S. pork-processing giant Smithfield Foods Inc. (SFD) for $4.7 billion. This could be the single-largest Chinese acquisition of a U.S. company, and it is reason for enthusiasm. Mutual ownership of significant corporate assets across borders doesnt miraculously guarantee peace, nor can it make conflict disappear overnight. But it gives both sides the incentive to manage geopolitical conflict, and not let it overtake the tremendous mutual benefits created by trade. Entwined Economies The

juxtaposition of rising tensions over cyber-attacks and the pork cooperation perfectly captures the paradoxical state of Chinese-U.S. relations -- and explains why officials on both sides are struggling to come up with a new conceptual framework to understand the change. Never before has a rising
power been so economically interdependent with the nation challenging it. The ties go beyond the U.S.s 25 percent market share for Chinese exports or Chinas holdings of 8 percent of the outstanding U.S. national debt. They include about 200,000 Chinese studying in the U.S. and perhaps 80,000 Americans living and working in China. The

combination of geopolitical competition and economic interdependence sets the terms for the struggle that wont be a new Cold War so much as a Cool War.
If the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided all-out conflict because of mutually assured nuclear destruction, the relations between China and the U.S. today could be defined by the threat of mutually assured economic destruction. The economic costs of violent conflict would be incalculably large. As a practical matter, however, we

mustnt assume that economic interdependence precludes the possibility of old-fashioned violence. On the positive side, China is urging North Korea to re-engage with the six-party talks
and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula -- a sign that the government in Beijing realizes that its unruly ally could do significant damage to regional stability. On the negative side, North Korea seems perfectly content to ignore its mentors directives. As we learned during the Cold War, proxies dont always behave the way their would-be masters want them to. It is far from clear that the Americans and the Soviets wanted their allies in the Middle East to go to war in 1967, 1973 or 1981.

Affirmative

General

Uniqueness
Non-unique: China not projected to gain influence in Latin America Azpuru and Zechmeister 13 (Dinorah, associate professor of political science at Wichita State University and a member of the
Scientific Support Group of the AmericasBarometer. Elizabeth, associate professor of political science and Associate Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. Latin Americans Perception of the United States and China. 24 June 2013. Web.) http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china The U.S. profile in the region remains comparatively strong in general, particularly among countries geographically close to the United States. But what responses to a question asking which country currently has the most influence in the region.

is the Latin American publics expectation of future U.S. influence? Figure 3 presents, on the left, Forty percent selected the United

States. But the right of the figure shows that only 30 percent of respondents believe the U.S. will be the dominant power in the future. Interestingly, the difference in response rates in regard to Chinas current and future influence is only marginal (3.5 percentage points), which indicates that important segments of the public perceive other Latin American countries (e.g., Brazil) and non-Latin American countries (e.g., Japan) as likely contenders for key influence in the future.

Non-unique- US has comparatively more influence- public opinion proves Dyer 7-18-13
Reporter for Tico Times, citing statistics from the Pew Research Center Zachary U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America http://www.ticotimes.net/Morenews/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States. Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report. Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for people older than 50. Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S. remains more influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a great deal or fair amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China.

Non-unique Chinas trade with Latin America is a quarter of the U.S.s and not with topic countries O'Neil, 12 (Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a
nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, Chinas Economic Role in Latin America, Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/, accessed 7/17/13) PE There is much talk of Chinas escalating economic influence in Latin America. But its worth looking at what has (and hasnt) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the regions economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state-owned banks). Trade is the most visible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have

increased some 30 percent per year, bringing todays total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in Chinas favor, with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion [dollars]. While sizable numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin Americas trade with the United States. And it appears to be leveling off, suggesting that China wont overtake the United States as the regions primary trading partner anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to Mexicoa mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment for production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade. But it is worth remembering that it both started from a low base and is unevenly distributedaffecting a few countries significantly and others very little.

Non-unique Despite gains in China/Latin America trade, the U.S. is still far more involved in regional trade Malln, 13 (two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern
Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US?, International Business Times, June 28 2013 9:53 PM, Online, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981, accessed 7/17/13) PE Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, Americas trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.

Obamas recent tour proves non-unique the U.S. isnt done yet American University, 13 (Jun 10, 2013, U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and the
Caribbean?, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online, http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/, accessed 7/18/13) PE The recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff from Washington to Beijing of the role as the regions sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift in influence. The presidents visits were similar in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met with real citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee farmer); and praised the bilateral relationships. Both held sub-regional summits Obama in San Jos and Xi in Port of Spain. Both repackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new accords. Obama pledged another $150 million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), part of the strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in Costa Rica for providing more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase replacement taxis and buses from Chinese manufacturers. Significantly, China is also building Costa Ricas new National Police Academy the sort of project Washington used to thrive on.

China ignoring Cuba and Venezuela Economist 6-6-13

Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela? Jun 6th 2013 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?

US perception in LA higher than China now perceived as better for engagement Dyer July 18, 2013
Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy Policy Activities and Societies: Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association, President (2011) U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America Tico Times Thursday, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/NewsBriefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 SCTM The United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year , and many surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China. US-Chinese influence Latin American
respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese but viewed Chinese acts more positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center Recent

allegations that the United States National Security Agency may have been spying on several Latin American countries has done little to improve the U.S.s image abroad, but a new report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has retained a favorable public image across the region. U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and
Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States. Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report. Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for people older than 50. Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S.

remains more influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a great deal or fair amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China. While the
U.S. may have more impact, respondents said that Chinas influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia were among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light. During Chinese President Xi Jingpings visit to Costa Rica in June, both countries leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Mon refinery expansion project. Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the worlds second-largest economy has gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National Police academy. Popularity contests aside, most

Latin Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the more important country to have strong ties with .
Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

US maintains influence Culture and economic advantages

Ben-Ami 6-5-13

Former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace Is the US Losing Latin America? By Shlomo Ben-Ami http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-byshlomo-ben-ami It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as Americas backyard; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his global war on terror. His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. At the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond Americas sway. China is now Latin Americas second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the regions energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. Similarly, in 2008, Russias then-President Dmitri Medvedev identified the US war on terror as an opportunity to create strategic partnerships with rising powers such as Brazil, and with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-inspired bloc opposed to US designs in the region. The energy giant Gazprom and the countrys military industries have spearheaded the Kremlins effort to demonstrate Russias ability to influence Americas neighborhood a direct response to perceived American meddling in Russias own near abroad, particularly Georgia and Ukraine. Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin Americas broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the USs fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is Americas second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Irans nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obamas recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Piera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New

Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

Chinese unsatisfied with Venezuelan investment- backing out now Hearn 3-12-13
quoting Tom ODonnell, an oil analyst who teaches at the New School University and writes an oilindustry blog, the Global Barrel Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China Monday, March 12, 2012 By Kelly Hearn http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-forchina/?page=all The Chinese have not gotten the kind of preferential access they want [to the tar sands], and my sources tell me they are extremely unhappy , said Mr. ODonnell. In 2010, CNPC signed a deal to help Venezuela develop a major Orinoco oil field known as Junin 4, which includes the construction of a facility to convert heavy oil to a lighter crude that could be shipped to a refinery in Guangdong, China. Although the contract was signed in December 2010, not one barrel of oil has yet been produced, much less upgraded, said Gustavo Coronel, a former PDVSA board member. So far, nothing much seems to be happening, except for the arrival of a large group of Chinese staff to the CNPCs Caracas office, he added, referring to the Venezuelan capital, Caracas. Apart from money, there seems to be little that China can offer Venezuela in the oil industry, he said, adding that a culture gap will make working with China very difficult for Venezuelan oil people, who were mostly trained in the U.S. Erica Downs, a former energy analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency now with the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the Junin-4 project could be key to Chinas future in Venezuela. If all that happens, China will be in a position to take substantial volumes of Venezuelan oil, she said. The problem is that the project hasnt gotten off the ground. Ms. Downs said Venezuela is far from living up to Mr. Chavezs export goals for Beijing and that PDVSAs claims of sending 410,000 barrels a day do not match Chinese customs data, which show 322,000 barrels per day of crude and fuel oil imported from Venezuela last year. Although Venezuelas oil exports to China have grown along with the volume of oil-backed loans extended by China Development Bank to Caracas, the delivered volumes still fall short of Chavezs goal of eventually shipping 1 million barrels per day to China, she said. Critics of the loans say Mr. Chavez is using the so-called China fund as his personal piggy bank. The Chinese also seem to be increasingly wary. Internal PDVSA documents released by a Venezuelan congressman show that the Chinese balked at a $110 billion loan request by Mr. Chavez in 2010, after PDVSA officials failed to account fully for where the money would go.

No future investment- China frustrated with Venezuela Nagel 2-12-13

Professor of Economics at the Universidad de los Andes in Santiago, Chile and co-editor of the blog Caracas Chronicles Venezuela's Devaluation has China written all over it Posted By Juan Nagel Tuesday, February 12, 2013 - 10:06 AM http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/12/venezuela_s_devaluation_has_china_written_al l_over_it By devaluing, the government is lowering the budget deficit, which still lies at a hefty 5.3 percent of GDP, according to estimations by the Bank of America. Narrowing the gap between the official and black market exchange rate lessens the incentive to engage in arbitrage instead of importing goods, which may ameliorate the scarcity problem. However, the move will prove costly. This measure alone means Venezuelan real wages have fallen, in terms of dollars, and inflation is sure to shoot up. One is left wondering what other options the government had but failed to enact. This is where the Chinese angle comes in. In the last few weeks, reports have surfaced that the Chinese, the main underwriters of last years enormous fiscal deficit, are growing frustrated with their Venezuelan counterpart; they are in no mood to continue lending to the government, and felt that Venezuela sacrificed productive investments for cheap pre-electoral spending. In spite of this, reports surfaced that Venezuela is asking China for more cash.

U.S. strategy deters Chinese political influence Rotberg 09

Professor in governance and foreign affairs and director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Obtained his doctorate at Oxford University China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence Edited by Robert I. Rotberg published by Brookings Institution Press Oct. 1, 2009 Page 59 There are few constraining forces that could stop China from asserting its influence. In contrast, the United States can and still will claim Latin America as its traditional sphere of influence, and it has explicitly warned Beijing that Chinas presence in the Western Hemisphere should not harm U.S. interests. This may partially explain the low-key style and nonpolitical nature of Chinas involvement in Latin America.

Balance Thumper
Non-unique Chinese engagement isnt perceived as balanced doesnt increase relations Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE I would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between China and Latin America is not indicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal engagement. In many cases, the cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to new technologies or scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of the playing field, but as an element of Chinas ever-evolving economic statecraft. Chinas cooperative endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are often seen as intervention in the affairs of Chinas commercial actors to ensure a degree of mutual benefit in overseas dealings. Mutual benefit, a guiding principle of Chinas external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure access to and postive relationships with countries and markets in the region.

Plus, Chinese academic literature proves Myers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, China's engagement with Latin America: More
of the same?, Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PE Chinas academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward Latin America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vast majority seeks to derive jiaoxun or lessons from Latin Americas failed experiments in economic and social development. These lessons frequently are taught in Chinas top universities, where students encounter numerous charts documenting Chinas and Latin Americas divergent paths toward economic development. The economic demise of Latin America often linked to import substitution and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside Chinas post-1979 growth miracle. Only one widely-published Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or Another kind of rise, considers Brazils approaches to dealing with rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades, suggesting that China might benefit from similar reforms.

Thumper
Sino-Latin American relations face challenges in future Dominguez 06 (Jorge I., Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico, vice provost of
international affairs, special advisor for international studies to the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue, June, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf) Chinese academics also call attention to four problems in Sino-Latin American relations, though they stress that the reasons for convergence outweigh those for divergence. First, there is increased industrial competition, especially in textiles, where China has been hit by large anti-dumping duties. One reason for its insistence in being recognized as a market economy is to limit the imposition of such penalties. Second, China supports regional integration in Latin America and with the United States but worries about the use of trade barriers against outside countries such as China. Third, there are few cultural contacts between China and Latin America and few of each others peoples speak the others language; both sides suffer from information
deficits regarding the other. Finally, Chinese academics fear that Taiwan may make diplomatic gains.

Link Answers
Alt cause- external countries have strong influence Ellis 12
Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From InterAmerican Dialogue May 2012 Interdependencies among the United States, the PRC and Latin America call attention to the importance for each to consider how engagement with one partner will impact, and will be interpreted by, the other. However, as noted in previous sections, there are several key things that this interdependence does not imply. First, it does not imply that the China-Latin America-US triangle should be assumed to be the most important relationship binding these actors (even though it may be true in some cases). Russia, Iran, India and the European Union, among others, have important relationships in the region, including a role in the dynamics of the China-USLatin America triangle itself. India, for example, may be a useful US partner in certain parts of Latin Americasuch as the English-speaking Caribbean, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Brazil and the Southern Coneas the United States addresses Chinas engagement with those countries. Similarly, it may be better at times to view individual Latin American countries in terms of interactions and tradeoffs among a multiplicity of external partnersamong them the United States, China, India, Russia and the European Unionrather than thinking first of a triangle involving the region, the PRC and the United States. In addition, many of the effects of the interactions between two sides of the triangle, particularly the United States and the PRC, go far beyond the triangle itself. Some are best characterized as global in nature, rather than just influencing Latin America. Indeed, the ripples produced by US-China dynamics on international markets, currency relationships and financial transactions, among others, often produce effects in Asia or Europe that eclipse those felt in Latin America.

No trade-off- joint influence is constructive Ellis 12

Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From InterAmerican Dialogue May 2012 Still, there are interactions for which dialogue that simultaneously involves the PRC, the United States and Latin America is constructive. Among these are discussions of loans and infrastructure projects that ultimately impact all three parties. Because of this, Chinese participation in institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which it formally joined in February 2009, is a positive development. However, it is positive to the extent that such participation is not perceived as pressuring countries that do not embrace diplomatic recognition of the PRC but still find themselves with PRCsupervised loans through the PRCs role in the Fund for Special Operations.43 PRC participation in such institutions may be particularly valuable if future Chinese lending to Latin America can be channeled

through them, reinforcing important norms such as transparency and financial accountability by the recipient countries

US involvement is constructive to Chinas economy Ellis 12

Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From InterAmerican Dialogue May 2012

In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin America, US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region

Triangularity oversimplifies LA relations Ellis 12

Professor of national security studies, with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? R. Evan Ellis From InterAmerican Dialogue May 2012 As with any paradigm for simplifying and organizing thinking about a complex reality, the triangular characterization is incomplete. Such simplification is a common, and perhaps necessary, part of the analytical process. The more serious problem with the paradigm, however, is that the nature of that simplification conceals some of the most important and most consequential behaviors for understanding the dynamics of Chinas increasing engagement with the Western Hemisphere. Like the triangle itself, these flaws take on an interrelated form: N The triangle masks other important actors that must be considered in the dynamic. N The triangle incorrectly encourages a view of Latin America as a unitary actor. N At its core, the triangle is a subtly neocolonialist way of approaching Latin America and its external relations. Other actors The triangle concept downplays the importance of other actors whose interaction with the United States, China and Latin America are also important. These include India, Russia, Iran and Europe. While the triangle does not exclude these other actors per se, the focus on the interaction among China, the United States and Latin America tends to conceal how other states, as well as non-state actors, play key roles in that dynamic. For example, the sometimes competing, sometimes complementary balance in Brazils relationships with India and China, played out in the Brazil-Russia-IndiaChina (BRICS) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forums, is arguably as relevant

to Brazils foreign policy as is its relationship with the United States. Similarly, although much of the foreign policy of the Chvez regime is defined in terms of its opposition to US imperialism, Venezuelas reliance on Russian arms, Chinese money and its anti-US alliance with Iran occupy roughly equal importance. With respect to Argentina, when the PRC ceased taking in that nations exports of soy oil, India stepped up its purchases, helping to save Argentina from a much more significant economic problem and, in the process, weakening the PRCs ability to pressure the Argentine government. In states that were Soviet clients during the Cold War, such as Cuba and Nicaragua, the importance of Russia as a partner arguably rivals, or exceeds, that of China. While the triangle concept conceals other actors that play a fundamental part of the dynamic in the hemisphere, it is important to understand that Latin American nations themselves generally do not define their external relations principally in terms of a triangle involving the United States and China. Indeed, while both China and the United States are important external referents for the region, Latin American countries and actors increasingly look toward the world in terms of a plurality of actual and potential partners, including Russia, India, the European Union and Iran. The importance of those partners varies according to context (political alliances versus economic partnerships versus military sales, etc.). The importance also varies according to which Latin American country is doing the looking.

Chinas engagement is strictly commercial- doesnt spill over to diplomacy Arnson et al 11

Quoting Nelson Cunningham, President and a co-founder of McLarty Associates, special advisor to President Clinton on Western Hemisphere and trade matters, and previously was general counsel to then-Senator Joseph Biden China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Jeffrey Davidow January 2011 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt.pdf Nelson Cunningham of McLarty Associates argued that from a strategic perspective, Chinas interests appear to be purely commercial. This is distinct from Russias ideologically-based military and diplomatic alliance with the government of Venezuela, described by Cunningham as aimed at balancing U.S. influence in the region. Latin American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese market to serve as a strategic counterweight to the regions historical commercial and political dependence on the United States. Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations. For example, popular accusations have been leveled against Brazilian President Lula da Silva that China took advantage of him through both the commercial arrangements between the two countries and in negotiations over Chinas accession to the WTO.

No link Latin America will be controlled by neither the U.S. or China Valencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, US
and China: The Fight for Latin America, World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Online http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE Both the United States and China use infrastructure investment, diplomacy, and trade as leverage, but Latin America wants to be seen as a socioeconomic partner, not a subordinate. The Pacific Alliance, for example, hopes to become a powerful bloc that can stand up to the worlds two super powers. Comprised of Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and possibly soon Panama, the Pacific Alliance is a new economic bloc that seeks economic integration oriented toward Asia-Pacific markets.

Additionally, the Pacific Alliance can become a springboard for other Latin American nations with a Pacific shore to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement among AsiaPacific, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, and the United States. Being part of the Pacific Alliance is significant, because for countries like Costa Rica, it would otherwise be an unlikely candidate for the TPP. Taken together, the Pacific Alliances GDP totals $3 trillion, making it easier to integrate itself to the TPP and for it to fight for better terms. The United States will still hold the lions share of the TPP with an economy that hovers around $13 trillionbut an alliance worth $3 trillion will give it more leverage than it would otherwise have. The battle for influence in Latin America may have the effect of pushing the countries closer together, allowing them to stand up to both the United States and China.

No link Brazil is key Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.

No competition for Latin America, China wont challenge US Global Times 2013 (Global Times-Agencies; daily Chinese newspaper focusing on global issues;
China, US not competing over Latin America: expert; The Global Times; 5-31-2013; http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Ueh3dNKyDMU) Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.

US faces more challenges in obtaining influence Reuters 13 (The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America. Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.) http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW The challenges

facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washingtons domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions

that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost
exclusively on commercial terms there.

US will struggle to keep up with China financial struggles Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, Patricia holds two BAs from Universidad
Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean. International Business Times 30 May 2013. Web.) http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean1284839 EW

China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging from $3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now, China seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations, reports the South China Morning Post. The U.S., on the other hand, which has had deep involvement in many Latin American nations for the past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent trade policies, said Boston University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer, but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to, he told Bloomberg.

Chinese industries beating out the US Ellis 13 (Evan Ellis, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic,
political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with China and other extraregional actors. U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America. The Manzella Report 7 June 2013. Web.) http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america EW Similarly, the willingness

of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired Western corporations. Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRCs indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to
remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

Chinese relations with Latin American are neither a threat nor zero-sum multiple warrants Jiang 11 (Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of
Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations, China & US Focus, November 3, 2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-insino-latin-american-relations/)
The U.S.

concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two

decades. It endeavors result, China

to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in
November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out milita ry exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China

does not wish to be used as a card against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. For instance,
Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster *economic+ performance. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western H emisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American Dialogue, pointed out that while Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it

is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and wellbeing in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Erikson added, Chinas engagement in Latin America is not yet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score. So, President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave.

No trade-off; China treading carefully, values US too much Jenkins 10 (Rhys, Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, research focus on
development in Latin America, MA from University of Cambridge, Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Sussex, Chinas Global Expansion and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf) Another factor that inuences Chinas policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically. 67 As a result, Chinas policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of dierent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identied closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Chavez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of
developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.

Uniqueness overwhelms the link Chinese military engagement guarantees strong ties this is their author Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International, February 2012, page 2, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/20122/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE

For the PRC, military engagement is one tool, among many, for building political good-will and leverage in a country, in order to make it more likely that the regime will not oppose the entry of Chinese products or act against its investments. Military activities are useful in this context because the armed forces remain an important political actor in most Latin American countries, although thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist and pre-communist philosophy. Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin American country helps the Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken against PRC commercial interests, influence the political leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be taken by the armed forces in the political arena that could impact Chinese interests.

Link Turn
Chinese soft-power benefits from US economic engagement multiple warrants Ellis 12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics
and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship? Inter-American Dialogue, May 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)
In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade

agreements between the United States and Latin American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable to go. Chinese
auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22 The

possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned in the
context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin America, US

consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include
goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United States to serve as

a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and
investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention

also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

A2: Zero Sum

U.S. and Chinese influence arent zero sum recent visits prove GT, 13 (Global Times-Agencies, China, US not competing over Latin America: expert, 2013-5-31
1:13:01 , Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UebisNJtN2w, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

Influence not zero-sum, competition for influence normal Zhou 11

(Jianghou Zhou, Associate Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, PhD, Baylor University US-China Rivalry Still a mismatch April 14, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html)

China's soft power does not hurt global interests . There is a view that soft power is becoming more important to a country's comprehensive power in international society, while hard power is becoming somewhat less important. [13] Since the 1990s, China has
achieved impressive gains in using soft power through implementing its "smiling" foreign policy, providing scholarships for foreign students in Chinese studies, financially aiding many countries, playing critical roles in many international organizations and meetings, and hosting the Summer Olympic Games in 2008. Joshua Kurlantzick believes one of reasons for China's success is that China is using soft power to appeal to other countries and position itself as a model of social and economic success. As a result, China is winning friends and influencing people around the world almost as fast as the United States is doing the opposite. Chinese government spending on education is still low. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggests that Chinese traditional culture is waning on the mainland. The

CCP has recently attempted to revive Confucianism to help in developing harmonious society, but the result of this effort is uncertain. It will take a long time for the West to accept Chinese culture. While China's trade surplus exceeded $21 billion in 2010, its cultural trade deficit is growing. According to a China Daily report in 2006, the ratio of China's imports of cultural products to its exports was 10:1, and is believed to be much higher today. This reflects that the influence of Chinese culture in the West is very limited. More importantly, the CCP has not solved the puzzle of how to integrate its political system, one of the most important aspects of soft power, into the current mainstream of the global order. The US is worried about

China's expansion in Africa and Latin America. In fact, China's policies toward Africa and Latin America obviously are more economically driven than cultural or political. The relationship between the two countries in Latin America and Africa in particular is not zero-sum. China is acting similarly in Europe, the Chinese
government has promised to help helping Spain and other European Union countries deal with their financial crisis and to regain market confidence. Ideologically and politically, the world today is still pretty much dominated by Western ideas and values. Most of the accepted "cosmopolitan values" originated in the West, such as human rights and democracy. According to Joseph Nye, despite China's efforts to enhance its soft power, the US remains dominant in all soft power categories. In terms of soft power influence, China is still no match for the US. And there is no telling how and when China will catch up with, let alone surpass, the US in this regard. Non-democratic China can peacefully co-exist with US. Generally, Western societies view the political system in China as directly contradicting the core values of the West and see no fundamental way for the two sides to co-exist, because they assume that a democratic government would inevitably runs in conflict with a non-democratic one. However, this is a misconception. A democratic government does not necessarily make peace with another democratic one. For example, there are many conflicts between the US and other democracies. On the other hand, a democracy could make friends with a non-democracy, such as the US and Saudi Arabia. So there is no reason why US could not co-exist with China, non-democratic as it may be for the time being. To be sure, different nations have different national interests; and every nation puts its national interests as top priority. Conflicts

of interest between

different nations are very normal.

The U.S. doesnt crowd out China countries became dependent on China without having to push the U.S. out Castaneda, 11 (Sebastian, graduate student at the University of Hong Kong and a contributor to
Foreign Policy in Focus, South America awake to risks of China ties, Asia Times, Apr 21, 2011, Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD21Ad01.html, accessed 7/19/13) PE In the wake of US President Barack Obama's recent tour of Latin America, media reports and commentators claimed that China has been economically outmuscling the United States in the region. The reality, however, is that Beijing's economic presence has not come at the expense of the United States. Although Washington still maintains an overwhelming edge, its influence is decreasing. This decline will be exacerbated by Obama's focus on boosting US exports to the region rather than importing more of Latin America's manufactured goods. True, China has become a key trading partner in Latin America during the last decade. Sino-Latin American trade has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to more than $140 billion today (though the region's trade deficit also rose from $950 million to $32 billion in 2009). Nevertheless, China's relations with Latin America need qualifying. In 2008, 90% of the region's exports to China originated in four South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru). The disparity of trade with China explains to some extent the different growth patterns within subregions in Latin America. In 2010, Central America's economy grew by 4.9% while South America's expanded by 6.6%. The current trade dynamic between China and South America is becoming a relationship of economic dependence that benefits Beijing. China is the largest export market for Brazil and Chile, and comes in second with Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Most exports consist of commodities such as iron ore, copper, copper ores and concentrates, and soya derivatives. In turn, up to 92% of Latin America's manufactured exports compete directly or indirectly with China's products, which ultimately results in deindustrialization for Latin America. In 2010, Brazil lost approximately 70,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector and $10 billion in income.

Economics is not zero-sum Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

In Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributorsWorld

Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international tradecome down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin
America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolster s the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). Some of the empirical methods used in Chinas and Indias Challenge to Latin America are nevertheless imperfect: trade data are somewhat outdated and insufficiently disaggregated to drill down to the level of particular products; there are possibly problems of endogeneity bias and reverse causality (as noted in the footnotes to page 32); and some trade models employ dangerously simplifying assumptions. However, the

evidence is overwhelming that a burgeoning Chinese economy has given Latin America a measurable boost.

Lack of cultural influence causes decrease of soft power and not zero sum Nye 2012 (Joseph S. Nye Jr; University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and
author of The Future of Power; Why China Is Weak on Soft Power; New York Times; 1-17-12; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=0) As Han Han, a novelist and popular blogger, argued in December, the restriction on cultural activities makes it impossible for China to influence literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to raise our heads up proud. The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries can gain from finding attraction in one anothers cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon.

China and US not competing for Latin America China Media 13 (China, US not competing over Latin America: expert. China Media 31 May 2013. Web.)
http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/ EW While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some

media reports described dueling visits by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the competition between the worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display. Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages . Tao Wenzhao, a
fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China

has no intention to challenge US influence in the

area.

China doesnt want to compete with the United States Carlson 13 (Benjamin Carlson, GlobalPosts senior correspondent covering China. Chinese insider: Chinas rise is not Americas
demise. Global Post 25 January 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130124/china-japantensions-Senkaku-Islands-conflict-zone-ruan-zongze EW

Online, nationalism is even more strident. One Chinese web user mocked the Japanese dogs *who+ once again go to their
daddy for support. In Japan, commenters joked Now that the US is really involved, China is scared out of its mind, according to a translation by Tea Leaf Nation, an online magazine about China. Remarking

on the United States, Ruan said Beijing has no reason or desire for conflict with America. "We do not want a zero-sum game," he said. "We dont want to say that Chinas rise is the demise of the United States.

Soft Power Low

No Chinese Soft Power- Only an illusion quickly shattered by repression Minas 2010 (Stephen, Master of International Relations from the London School of Economics, research associate with the Foreign
Policy Centre, London, The Hard Truth About Chinas Soft Power November 24, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/41252.html) The recently finished Shanghai World Expo was Chinas second coming out party, so-called, in three years. Like the Beijing Olympics before it, it went off without a hitch. Like the Olympics, it was widely declared a success. And it was. As an expo a big, public event. But some

had grander hopes for the Expo namely, that it would showcase Chinas soft power. Prior to the Expo opening,
Jin Canrong of Renmin Universitys School of International Studies predicted: The message will remain one of how China's rise is characterised by soft power. The Expo is a very safe way for *the government+ to show China's soft power, concurred Ding Xueling of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. As it happened, the

events that swirled around the Expos closing weeks showcased something quite else: Why China doesnt have much soft power and why the West, broadly defined, still has it in spades. Harvard Universitys Joseph Nye coined the term soft power. He defines it as the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. For nations, according to Nye, soft power rests on culture, values and policies. It is therefore difficult to manufacture. Which brings us to Chinas problem. Take Shanghai itself the city not the Expo site. It is a tableau of Western soft power. Young men while away evenings in Western bars, playing not majiang but pool.
Young women self-consciously answer Hello when their phone rings, before launching into Chinese. Expensively dressed Chinese drink at the French-themed Bar Rouge, perched high above the grand, colonial-era Bund. During Halloween, skeletons, vampires and witches lurch merrily out of the darkness. The release of the iPad prompted scenes of public jubilation. And those people wearing Manchester United and Liverpool football shirts are not expats but locals. Its to the great credit of Shanghais government and people that the citys Western heritage has been preserved and enhanced. It gives Shanghai much of its character and marks it out from the megacities rising up around it. But Western

soft power undoubtedly remains on show in mainland Chinas greatest city. East of the Huangpu River, at the main Expo site, the limits of Chinas commitment to even pursue a soft power strategy eventually became clear. In September the Japanese government detained a Chinese fishing captain and a heated row over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands flared up. Among its various responses, China revoked an invitation to 1,000 Japanese youths issued by Premier Wen Jiabao to visit the Expo. If the Expo was meant to showcase Chinas soft power, the cancelled invitation did the exact opposite. The young Japanese were finally re-invited after Japan released the Chinese fisherman. Even more telling is that, as the Expo came to an end, the standout soft power play came not from China but from the Nobel Committee. It awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed critic of Chinas government. President Barack Obama reacted by urging China to release his fellow Nobel Laureate as soon as possible.
Political reform *in China+ has not kept pace, the president said. The basic human rights of every man, woman and child must be respected.

This was a pure exercise in soft power. The Nobel Committee cannot coerce. It can only attract. It does so through its prestige and through the common recognition that it stands for certain principles. What happened next? A media blackout punctuated by official criticism of Liu and the Nobel Committee. A celebratory dinner abruptly broken up, with Lius friends and comrades
hauled off to the slammer. The newly minted Nobel Laureates wife put under house arrest, her phone line cut. And now, reports of Lius supporters prevented from leaving the country. Behaviour

like this throttles the development of Chinese soft power values, culture and policies that can attract. And the Nobel reaction is hardly an isolated event. China is still a nation where typing any of the forbidden words into a search engine causes the internet to reset (The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy, Firefox artlessly suggests). And yet China has a lively Twitter conversation
evidence for the truism that bad laws tend to be flouted and invite derision and contempt. Chinas leadership did not want the Nobel Committees criticism. In 2008, it did not want Kevin Rudds. Australias then prime minister addressed students at Chinas top university, Peking. Speaking in excellent Chinese, Rudd presented himself as a zhengyou, which Rudd defined as a friend who offers unflinching advice. Rudd raised the significant human rights problem in Tibet and urged China to do more on climate change. Of course, no nation wants foreign criticism. But ignoring it is not always the best course. Jerome Cohen, another zhengyou and the doyen of Chinese law studies at New York University, puts it bluntly: Until the party leaders are persuaded to *embrace+ the rule of law, China will not have soft power. Some will disagree that China lacks soft power. They might point to Chinas increasing influence in emerging economies. And its true, governments and businesses in Africa, South America and all parts of Asia are trading with China in increasing volumes. But how

many of their elites would consider sending their kids to university in China ahead of the US or Europe? How many of their workers dream of migrating to China to start a new life? How many of their consumers watch Chinese

TV shows and use iconic Chinese brands every day? How many nations are influenced by China through attraction not payment or coercion? China has a long way to go before it develops soft power assets that can significantly augment
its foreign policy. But the good news for China is that the biggest obstacles are not inherent but a matter of choice.

China soft power in rapid decline now all around the world Shambaugh 13
David, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of ''China Goes Global: The Partial Power.''Falling Out of Love With China The New York Times March 19, 2013 Lexis SCTM
Washington NOW image and the

that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the importance of its global need to enhance its ''soft power.'' It is tracking public opinion polls worldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, ''external propaganda work'' and public diplomacy. Unfortunately for China, that's not enough. While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, but that is now matched in America and Asia. There are likewise increasing signs of strain with Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lie lingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's military sales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia. China's reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to the country's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that has also sullied its image in Central Asia. Even in Africa -- where relations remain positive on the whole -- China's image has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, its rapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent in Latin America for the same reasons. Finally, China's most important relationship -- with the United States -- is
also troubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.

Alt cause to soft power Chinese support for dictators Gill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor at
the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power', http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13) The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in the developing world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to project soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasise liberalism, pluralism and autonomy.76 Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting political and economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honours on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban eviction programme.77 Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorships afloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political change. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against Sudan, which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its Darfur region.78 China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greater scrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In justifying its

activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.79 Yet coddling dictators can antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.80 To the extent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing international commitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at a time it is trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally the only three countries with a plurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies. Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine China's claim to moral high ground even at a time of overall decline in US soft power.81 In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% of the people queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to the aid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China.82

Internet Censorship blocks Chinas Soft Power Keck 2013 (Zachary Keck; assistant director of The Diplomat, international current affairs for AsiaPacific region; Destined to Fail: Chinas Soft Power Push; The Diplomat; 1-7-13; http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/) Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijings soft power, a number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCPs charm offensive is doomed to fail. For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet. After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials, the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete illegal posts and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China, authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned.

Soft Power Fails

China doesnt understand soft power well enough to use it effectively its social not governmental Nye 13
JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_po wer?page=0,1 SCTM
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China

has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's
influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea. Even

China's soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu
after the last international athletes had departed, China's Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia

make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda
is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for

China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.

Too many cultural and economic differences this is their author Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE The growth and exercise of soft power by the Peoples Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each others culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even

fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chineselanguage programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social Sciences, which currently has the worlds largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as not one of usa reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.

Economic leverage doesnt translate into soft power Pew, 13 (Pew Research Center, Americas Global Image Remains More Positive than Chinas, Global
Attitudes Project, Online, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remainsmore-positive-than-chinas/, accessed 7/18/13) PE Publics around the world believe the global balance of power is shifting. Chinas economic power is on the rise, and many think it will eventually supplant the United States as the worlds dominant superpower. However, Chinas increasing power has not led to more positive ratings for the Peoples Republic. Overall, the U.S. enjoys a stronger global image than China. Across the nations surveyed, a median of 63% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., compared with 50% for China. Globally, people are more likely to consider the U.S. a partner to their country than to see China in this way, although relatively few think of either nation as an enemy. America is also seen as somewhat more willing than China to consider other countries interests. Still, both of these world powers are widely viewed as acting unilaterally in international affairs.

Chinese culture projection doesnt help their position in Latin America Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE Despite PRC marketing efforts, by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRCs weakest levers of soft power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, Chinas influence in the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in

those countries. Such perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived differentness of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products.

Sino-Latin America relations fail; Cultural and language barriers, poor corporate citizenship by Chinese Ellis 2011 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and an author and researcher on topic of Latin Americas relations with external actors, Ph.D in Political Science, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University Press, January, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-powerlatin-america.html) The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutessuch as the China Academy of Social
Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTEthe general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting

the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us"a reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of ChinaLatin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.

China Soft power is infective and fails DeLisle 2010 (Jacques deLisle is the director of the Asia Program at FPRI, the Stephen A. Cozen
Professor of Law and professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania. Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf) SJH
In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and fragile. The ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Beijing Consensus is only supercially understood and disappointments that would accompany attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China may prove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. These are not the most pure or robust forms of softpower. In some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power. With Chinas growing economic presenceconcentrated in extractive industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured exportscome looming and already-materializing risks to Chinas image in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. Complaints

of labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface. Nearer Chinas periphery, economic integrationdriven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated. As more careful analyses have pointed out, East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. values than PRC ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States through strategies that can be
variouslyif not wholly satisfactorilycharacterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.64 Throughout much of the non-Western world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent super-cial and self-indulgent tweaking of a sole superpower that is seen as havingbeen on a binge of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys and inuential Chinese scholars own estimates, China has scored only limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft power.65 Second, as we have seen,

Chinas soft power resources are plagued by internal contradictions. To build and emphasize some dimensions is to undermine others. Playing up residual
communism can narrow the relevance and appeal of the China Model. Trumpeting strong commitments to sovereignty can raise doubts especially when Taiwan is the issue or when Beijing backs pariah regimesabout Beijings claims to be a benevolent, peace-seeking and responsible power. And so on. Third, key

types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. As many analysts at home and abroad have noted, Chinas political institutions and ofcial values do not enjoy broad appeal, nor does Chinas record on socialequity, the environment, international human rights and other matters.66 The international relevance, content and even existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter foreigners attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests. Chinas soft power remains heavily statist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions that provide much of the might of American soft power.67A slowing of Chinas growth rate or rise in its perceived collateral costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model. Even continued success could sap soft power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less relevant to the developing world. Fourth, China may suffer from a particularly pronounced case of the general problem that soft power resources can be difcult to deploy, especially to achieve afrmative (as opposed to defensive) policy aims. The attractive force of a China Model of development or vigorous defenses of sovereignty or traditional Chinese culture do not translate neatly or more than very indirectly into support in the international system for likely PRC policy agendas that go beyond defusing fears of a rising China.68 Many of Chinas high-prole soft power-building international activities have been pro-status quo (for example, supporting a state-centric international system and a relatively liberal international economic order and largely accepting thenDeputy Secretary of State Zoellicks call on China to be a responsible stakeholder) or have served values that are more like the United States than the PRCs (in the case of humanitarian and democracy-promotion agendas associated with UN peacekeeping operations and other PRC moves to engage with the international human rights regime).69 Seemingly more revisionist efforts (mostly on economic issues and especially with the advent of the 2008 global nancial crisis) so far have been, variously, rhetorical, vague, tentative and not very inuential. Especially in the closing years of the twenty-rst centurys rst decade, China has given reason to doubt its will or ability to stick to a line that will maximize its soft power. Some of what Beijing says and does is bad for Chinas soft-power inuence with key international constituencies. Examples include: newly haughty (if, on the merits, plausible) lectures about the shortcomings of

American-style capitalism and Washingtons regulatory regime; proud and sometimes strident nationalism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in response to perceived provocations from alleged foreign-backed separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang; high-prole actions against pro-democracy, prohuman rights and pro-civil liberties elements; declarations that Western-style democracy is not appropriate for China; and prominent statements implying or asserting that theworld needs to learn to deal with China on Chinese terms.

Entanglement Mpx Turn

Turn Chinese involvement in Latin America means they get drawn in to Latin America conflicts means Sino/U.S. war Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement, API International, February 2012, page 4, Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/20122/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed 7/19/13) PE Chinese decision-makers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence of the PRC as a principal global actor, including the possibility that it may have to one day fight a major war involving not only Asia, but other theaters of operations in which it has interests, or where it might wish to hold its would-be adversary at risk. While there is nothing to suggest that the PRC desires or anticipates such a struggle in the short term, it is reasonable to anticipate that its military strategic thinkers are preparing for the possibility. To this end, Chinas military ties in Latin America afford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of US forces, creating diversionary crises or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United States.

A2: China modeled Mpxs

China is only a trading partner, not a model nations dont follow its policies Ford 11
Peter is The Christian Science Monitors Beijing Bureau Chief and was educated in England and graduated from Durham University with an honors degree in Politics and Sociology The rise of an economic superpower: What does China want? The Christian Science Monitor November 5, 2011 Lexis SCTM
With the United States it's cultural and political - the two countries share many interests that China doesn't," such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, and transparent governance, he adds. Indeed, for a government that says it is generally content with the current world order, Beijing is on unusually good terms with regimes cast out by that order, such as those ruling Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar),

China challenges the [global] democratic system and works at cross purposes to the international mainstream," complains Mao Yushi, a well-known reformer who has mentored many of
and Zimbabwe. "By making friends with dictators, China's leading economists. This does not inspire confidence in Western capitals but is less of an issue in developing countries, whose own experience with Western governments - under their rule or trading with them - has often left them feeling seriously hard done by. China

has fewer opportunities to exert international political influence commensurate with its economic clout. That's partly because few governments around the world, and even fewer electorates, regard China's repressive, authoritarian one-party system as a model to be admired or imitated, regardless of its economic achievements. Though China's readiness "to voice different opinions from the only country in the world that has had a say up until now
... is attractive to other nations," says Gong Wenxiang, a professor at Peking University's Journalism School. "I can't see people being happy with

supporting dictators. That is not a positive image." "China is a power in terms of its resources, but it's not a power in terms of its appeal," adds David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at George Washington University. Deficient in soft power, "it's not a model, not a magnet others want to follow." Nor does Beijing show much sign at the moment of seeking to push any particular model of governance or political mind-set, which is music to the ears of men like Mr. Mende, the Congolese communications minister. "We don't believe in that
a very strong power often trend of Western powers mixing with internal affairs of countries," he says. "We don't like people giving us orders. China is more about respecting the self-determination of their partner." That hands-off approach also steers the country clear of alliances that might enmesh Beijing in the costly defense of other people's interests. Even those Pakistani officials who would like to play Beijing off against Washington recall that not once has Beijing stepped in to help Pakistan in any of its wars with India, all of which Pakistan lost. "China

wants to make the deals but not to shoulder responsibilities," says Zhu, the Peking University international relations scholar. "We
are far from ready, psychologically, to make ourselves a dependable power." The government's recent white paper acknowledged as much: "For China, the most populous developing country, to run itself well is the most important fulfillment of its international responsibility." Recent events in Libya illustrate how far China is from playing a creative international diplomatic role. Throughout the crisis, Beijing was a passive, reactive bystander, going along with Western intervention. But, focused on protecting its oil interests above all else, it was the last major power to recognize the new Libyan government. That cautious attitude was on display again last week in China's reluctance to contribute as heavily to the eurozone's bailout fund as European leaders had hoped it would. China was not, after all, going to save the world. "China's

diplomacy is cost-benefit-oriented, not dealing in terms of global public goods," argues Professor Shambaugh. "It's a very self-interested country, looking after themselves." One result of that attitude? "China is rising, but we are a lonely rising power," says Zhu. "The US has alliances; no one is an ally of China's."

A2: US China Relations Mpx

Other Asian player put pressure on US, China to maintain relations for sake of their own dependencies Fingar 11 (Thomas, inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies at Stanford University, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, former Research director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub_pdfs/One%20Step%20Fingar.pdf) The United States and China have an additional incentive to cooperate and avoid antagonistic behavior in Northeast Asia, namely, the strong desire of others in the region to escape having to make either/or choices about alignment. Other states want to maintain good relations with both and to avoid jeopardizing the dependent dimensions of their relationships with both China and the U.S. Thus, for example, Japan and the ROK do not want to put their economic dependence on China at risk by having to side with the U.S. against China. They also want to avoid jeopardizing the security benefits they derive from U.S. extended deterrence by having to tilt toward China in order to protect their economic stakes. Moreover, in a region where balance of power thinking is endemic, all prefer the benefits they think they derive from their relationships with both of the major players. This is strikingly different than the situation during the Cold War when all willingly practiced what Mao described as leaning to one side. No one wants to draw a line through the region with adversaries grouped on either side. Preferences of and pressure from others in the region will reinforce already strong desires in Washington and Beijing to avoid confrontation.

A2: Heg Mpx

Theres no internal link to heg their argument relies on outdated views of international relations Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin
America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-butus-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PE Yet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century.

A2: US-Sino War Mpx

No US-Sino war Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

Some realists posit that conflict, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising and declining powers,
citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and between China and Japan. The transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by common political institutions and similar visions of the desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from U.S.-China relations. Jack S. Levy

argues that traditional power-transition theorists speak of a single, hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in global regional interactions. Specifically, he asks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional level, including in the Western Hemisphere? The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China might pose to the interests of the United States or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberal institutionalist G. John Ikenberry suggests: The United States is a different type of hegemonic power than past leading states and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. It is a wider and deeper political order than the
orders of the past. In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice in global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so

long as the reigning powers are flexible and accommodate legitimate Chinese interests, tensions stemming from Chinas rise can be managed, and China can be integrated into the existing world system as a responsible stakeholder, in the words of former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Braslia, and other Latin American and world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will they imagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will they seek to avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual international norms?

China SOI Bad

Democracy-Taiwan
Chinese influence in Latin America spreads alternative to democracy and prevents Taiwan recognition.
Follath 10 (Erich, Der Spiegel writer, Chinas Soft Power is a Threat to the West July 29, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/chinas-soft-power-threat-unitedstates/story?id=11277294#.UdGkavlwex4)//MM
'21st-Century Economic Weapon' Beijing recently imposed strict export quotas on rare earths, resources that are indispensable in high technology, where they are essential to the operation of hybrid vehicles, high-performance magnets and computer hard drives. Some 95 percent of metals such as lanthanum, neodymium and promethium are mined in the People's Republic, giving Beijing a virtual monopoly on these resources. It clearly has no intention of exporting these metals without demanding substantially higher export tariffs. In fact, China apparently wants to prohibit exports of some rare earths completely, starting in 2015. Concerned observers in Japan have described the valuable resources are a "21st-century economic weapon." The Chinese have dismissed protests from Washington and Brussels with the audacious claim that World Trade Organization (WTO) rules allow a country to protect its own natural resources. China, a WTO member itself, is now playing a cat-and-mouse game with the organization. Despite several warnings, Beijing still has not signed the Agreement on Government Procurement, and it continues to strongly favor domestic suppliers over their foreign competitors in government purchasing. To secure a government contract in China, an international company has to reveal sensitive data as part of impenetrable licensing procedures and even agree to transfer its technology to the Chinese -- often relinquishing its patent rights in the process. China, for its part, is waging a vehement campaign in the WTO to be granted the privileged status of a "market economy." If it succeeds, it will be largely spared inconvenient anti-dumping procedures in the future. But do China's Communist Party leaders seriously believe that the rest of the world will actually reward them for their dubious trading practices? The answer is yes, and they have good reason to be optimistic. When it comes to diplomacy, Beijing knows how to win. Whether it's at the The

Chinese have paid particular attention to nations with large oil and natural gas reserves, such as Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Nigeria, but they also cultivate relations with third-tier countries -- countries that the West tends to ignore but that have voting rights in international bodies like anyone else. Beijing has forgiven billions in loans to African nations and pampered them with infrastructure projects. It has generally tied its assistance merely to two conditions that are relatively painless for the countries in question, namely that they have no official relations with Taiwan and that they support the People's Republic in international organizations.
What Beijing is not demanding of these countries is even more telling. Unlike Washington, London or Berlin, the Chinese do not tie their development aid to any conditions relating to good governance. While the West punishes authoritarian behavior by withholding funds (and, in some cases, indirectly threatens "regime change"), Beijing has no scruples about pampering the world's dictators by building them palaces and highways to their weekend villas -- and assuring them territorial integrity, no matter what human rights violations they are found guilty of.
Opportunity, Not Problem China has friendly relations with some of the world's most problematic countries, including failed states and countries on the brink of failure such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Myanmar and Yemen. "For the West, failed states are a problem. For China, they're an opportunity," writes American expert Stefan Halper in the magazine Foreign Policy, referring to these countries as "Beijing's coalition of the willing."

The diplomatic weapon is having its intended effect. Already, the pro-Chinese voting bloc led by African nations has
managed to obstruct progress in the WTO. Meanwhile in the United Nations, the People's Republic's influence is clear: Within the last decade,

support for Chinese positions on human rights issues has risen from 50 percent to well over 70 percent.
Washington, in turn, is no longer even included in certain key groups. The United States was not invited to take part in the East Asia Summit, and it was denied the observer status it had sought in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a sort of anti-NATO under China's de facto leadership that includes Russia and most of the Central Asian countries. Iran, on the other hand, was. A Model Worth Emulating Of course, none

of this means that the West has already lost the battle for influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia. While Beijing cozies up to dictators, an approach the West cannot and should not take,

America and Europe can compete, and even excel, in another area: by offering the ideal model of a democracy worth emulating. There has been much speculation in recent months that developing countries could be increasingly eyeing China's blend of a market economy and Leninism, economic diversity and strict one-party control as an attractive alternative to democracy. The United States engages too little in self-reflection while the Europeans
are too involved with themselves, and both make themselves less attractive as a result, says former Singaporean diplomat and political science professor Kishore Mahbubani. He believes that China's momentum is ultimately unstoppable. Many people in the West who have always viewed trade unions as disruptive and given little heed to human rights violations agree with him. But even though the People's Republic may have become more attractive for some authoritarian rulers, only a few see it as a model. Beijing has already installed more than 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, in hopes of promoting what it views as China's cultural superiority. One of the results of a 10-fold increase in scholarships at Chinese universities is that almost twice as many Indonesians are now studying in China as in the United States. But whether it's Harvard, high-tech cell phones or Hollywood, people in many parts of the world still see the West as the home of everything desirable. Besides, many who flirt with Chinese-style dirigisme see it only as a transitional phase that makes sense from an economic point of view, and that ultimately -- as in South Korea, for example -- leads to a democracy with functioning institutions. More Forceful Approach Required

What no one in Asia, Latin America or Africa wants is another messianic US president in the vein of George W. Bush, who believed that he could forcefully impose the American model on other countries. Many people in developing countries can easily distinguish between pompous arrogance and healthy self-confidence. And especially in China, people tend to regard an excessive willingness to compromise as a weakness, and the stubborn adherence to one's own positions as a strength.
Chancellor Angela Merkel, the woman at the helm of the world's former top exporting nation, ought to take a much more forceful approach to dealing with the leaders of the current export champion than she did during her recent visit to Beijing. She ought to point out that Germany has to draw the line somewhere: for instance, that it will not support China's bid for preferential status in the WTO as long as Beijing violates its rules. She should also make clear that Germany will not condone the ongoing industrial espionage activities of Chinese agents in German hightech centers, the continued illegal copying of patents and the fleecing of German small and mid-sized companies in China. When China asks for the lifting of visa restrictions, Germany should ask the Chinese what it can expect in return. And Berlin needs not be concerned that China could react to such criticism by no longer doing business with Germany. The People's Republic acts out of self-interest and needs the West about as much as the West needs China. Besides, the Chinese are used to playing hardball. Ironically, Taiwan serves as a prime example of how to deal with Beijing. In a SPIEGEL interview 15 years ago, then Prime Minister Lien Chan complained to me that the People's Republic was cutting the ground from under Taipei's feet. He said that, although only 30 nations recognized Taiwan at the time, that would change. But it didn't. In fact, the total is now only 23 nations. Nevertheless, Taiwan's new leadership is taking a pragmatic approach and, realizing that it cannot win against China, has decided to embrace the mainland Chinese. After tough negotiations, the Taiwanese are now making deals with their big brother. In a trade agreement signed in late June, Taiwan achieved a reduction in Chinese tariffs on $13.8 billion (10.6 billion) worth of goods it sells to China each year, while Beijing came away from the trade deal with a reduction of tariffs on only $2.9 billion of the goods it exports to Taiwan. "We did not make any compromises when it comes to our independence, and we achieved a favorable agreement," says Wu-lien Wei, Taiwan's representative in Berlin. Perhaps one needs to be Chinese in order to avoid being ripped off by Beijing.

Chinese influence trades off with US influence. That undermines democracy and Taiwan recognition
CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN25 OVERVIEW Chinas growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenom enon that has developed over the past several years. Beginning in April 2001 with President Jiang Zemins 13- day tour of Latin America, a succession of senior Chinese officials have visited Latin American countries to court regional governments, while Latin American leaders also have been frequent visitors in Beijing. Chinas primary interest in the region appears to be to gain greater access to needed resourcessuch as various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel, and oilthrough increased trade and investment. It is also likely that Beijings additional goal is to isolate Taiwan by luring the 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their diplomatic recognition to China. While Chinas economic linkages with Latin America have grown, the U.S. advantage of geographical proximity means that the PRC presence is likely to remain dwarfed by U.S. trade with and investment in the region. Moreover, although many Latin American countries welcome Chinese investment, some have viewed China as an economic threat, and are concerned that both their domestic industries and their U.S. export markets will be overwhelmed by Chinese competition. Nevertheless, some

analysts maintain that Beijings growing role in the region may have longer-term implications for U.S. regional interests and influence.
DIPLOMACY Bilateral Relations and Competition With Taiwan Of the 33 independent countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region,

China currently has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations maintain

relations with Taiwan (see Table 1). For ideological reasons, Communist Cuba was the first nation in the region to recognize China back in 1960, while Chile under Socialist President Salvador Allende was the second in 1970. Mexico established relations with China in 1972, and most South America nations did so in the 1970s and 1980s, including Argentina and Brazil, which were run by military dictatorships at the time. In addition to Cuba, nine other Caribbean nations have diplomatic relations with the PRC, five of which have had relations since the 1970s. Over the years, China has signed a variety of bilateral partnership agreements with several countries in the region in order to strengthen relations. The most politically significant of these are known as strategic partnership agreements. To date, China has signed such agreements with Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), and Argentina (2004). Additional cooperative partnership or friendly and cooperative partnership agreements have been signed with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Peru.26 In the 1980s, China began
to augment its expertise on Latin America through agreements for Chinese officials to travel to the region to study Spanish, and through the development of think tanks such as the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Department of Studies about Latin America of the Chinese Communist Party.27 For many of the regions nations, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, there has been a political dynamic in Chinas expanding economic linkages and foreign assistance. China,

with some success, has been trying to woo countries away from recognizing Taiwan. Taiwans official relations in the region now include five Central American countries, six in the Caribbean, and one in South America. For decades, Taiwan was a consistent provider of financial assistance and investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to nurture its remaining official relationships, a policy often referred to as checkbook or dollar diplomacy. But Taipei now is hard- pressed to compete against the growing economic and diplomatic clout of China, which in recent years has stepped up its own version of checkbook diplomacy. Since 2004, three countries in the region have switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC: Dominica in March 2004, Grenada in January 2005, and most recently, Costa Rica in June 2007. Dominica severed relations with Taiwan in 2004 after Beijing trumped Taiwans $9
million in assistance with a pledge of $122 million in assistance to the tiny country over six years.28 Grenada switched its recognition to China in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan that devastated the island in September 2004 and destroyed a new cricket stadium that Taiwan had helped build. Disappointed about Taiwans response after the hurricane, Grenadian Prime Minister visited China and received support for the rebuilding of the cricket stadium, with workers supplied by China, as well as other grants, support for the agricultural sector, and scholarships. Most recently, Costa Rica under President Oscar Arias switched diplomatic recognition to China in June 2007 in large part because of growing trade relations in recent years and the prospect for increased Chinese trade and investment. China is now Costa Ricas second largest trading partner, after the United States, and the two countries are considering a free trade agreement. Chinas overtures in the Caribbean experienced a setback in May 2007 when St. Lucia switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan after ten years of recognizing the PRC. The diplomatic switch was related to the ouster of Prime Minister Kenny Anthonys St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) from power in December 2006, and the election of a new government led by the United Workers Party (UWP). (In 1997, the ruling SLP government under Anthony had orchestrated a diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China.) Taiwans promises of assistance to the new UWP government in 2007 includes support for public health, education (including the provision of computers and scholarships), and development of the agricultural sector. Regional Organizations Despite the setback with St. Lucia, the PRCs ability to develop and expand contacts with Taiwans friends in the region has been facilitated by a decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) in May 2004 to accept China as a formal permanent observer in the OAS. The OAS has 35 members, including the United States and all 12 of the regions countries currently conferring diplomatic relations on Taiwan. Some 60 countries worldwide are OAS permanent observers, but Beijing has strongly objected to Taiwans efforts to seek observer status. In addition to the OAS, China has participated in several other regional organizations. Dating back to 1975, China has often sent its observers to the annual meetings of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the organization set up in the aftermath of the 1967 signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in the region. The PRC has been an observer since 1994 to the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), a 12-member regional organization focusing on trade integration and the goal of a common market. China is a member of the East Asia-Latin American Cooperation Forum (FOCALAE), an organization first established in 2001 that brings together ministers and officials from 33 countries from the two regions for strengthening cooperation in such areas as education, science and technology, and culture. The PRC also is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that annually brings together leaders of 21 Pacific rim na tions (including Taiwan as Chinese Taipei) as well as the Latin American nations of Chile, Mexico, and Peru. More recently, in March 2007, China signed an agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to formalize talks on the PRCs request to become an IDB member. The bank has launched an internal discussion on whether to accept China as a member. If accepted, China would join Japan and Korea to become the third Asian country to join the IDB. China is already a member of the Caribbean Development Bank based in Barbados. China has also helped support UN peacekeeping operations in the region through its contribution of a special police peacekeeping conti ngent of 125 personnel as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) that began in 2004. This marked Beijings first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere. MINUSTAHs mission, which was due to expire in mid-October 20007, was extended for another year until October 2008. In 2005, China reportedly put pressure on Haiti to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC as a condition for supporting the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission, but Haiti has retained its relations with Taiwan.29 Analysis For

now, it appears that China and Taiwan will continue to battle for diplomatic recognition, using the prospect of increased aid, trade, and investment to sway the decisions of the remaining dozen nations

recognizing Taiwan. Some observers maintain that key countries to watch include the Central American countries of Nicaragua and
Panama, the Caribbean nation of the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay, the sole South American nation that continues to recognize Taiwan.30 In the aftermath of Costa Ricas June 2007 decision to switch diplomatic partners, Chinese officials predicted a domino effec t in which other countries would switch their recognition to China, but Taiwan launched an initiative in the region in order to counter China s attempts to tempt additional countries to switch sides that appears to have been successful in the short term. Nevertheless, over

the long run, Chinas sheer economic size and power bodes well for its ability to entice Taiwans remaining 12 allies in Latin America and the Caribbean to switch diplomatic sides. Beyond competition with Taiwan, Chinas diplomatic efforts in the
larger countries of the region appear to be geared at strengthening relations and expanding cooperation with nations that have potential resources and investment opportunities that could help feed Chinas resource needs and expanding economy. These diplomatic overtures in Latin America also satisfy Chinas efforts to foster relations with other developing countries worldwide and its promotion of South-South cooperation. A 2006 study by the Inter-American Dialogue examined the 19912003 UN voting records of several major Latin American countriesArgentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuelaand concluded that the increased Chinese trade with the region in recent years has had no discernable effect on the voting behavior of these nations. The study also looked at several countries having diplomatic relations with TaiwanCosta Rica (before it switched diplomatic relations to the PRC), Panama, and Paraguayand found little difference in voting coincidence with China between countries that recognize China and those that recognize Taiwan. Cuba, for political reasons, stands out as the Latin American country with a high voting coincidence with China, although increases in economic linkages do not appear to have had an impact on Cubas voting behavior.31 While countries in the region that recognize Taiwan often speak out in favor of its inclusion at the UN and its various agencies, this is not always the case.

During a vote in 2007 on Taiwans membership in the World Health Organization (WHO), Panama and Nicaragua both abstained, while Costa Rica, which recognized Taiwan at the time, voted against its membership.32

Democracy
China promotes market-authoritarianism at the expense of US democracy
Efthymiou 12 (Pavlos, reading for a PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and a BSc in Politics with Economics from the University of Bath, Chinese Soft Power: Sources and Implications for the US December 21, 2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/12/chinese-soft-power-sourcesandimplications-for-the-us/)//MM Chinas rise, fuelled by more than three decades of miraculous levels of economic growth, has equipped Beijing with an impressive and quite unique set of powers (Lampton, 2007). Economic power is at the heart of all other aspects of Chinese power. It has enabled investment in the rapid modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) (Tkacik, 2007), as well as related asymmetric capabilities (Shirk, 2008:194) as cyberwarfare (Fritz, 2008) and advanced military space
technology (Logan, 2007). Moreover, it has allowed Beijing to maximize its security through deals advancing Chinas energy security and securing key raw materials. These issues, and their implications for US security interests, are extensively studied in Washington (e.g. Waldron, 2005; Ridley, 2005; Office of the SoD 2009, 2010). Apart from economic realpolitik, as in the form of securing resources and capacity for economic warfare[1] (Segal, 2004:169-170), Chinas economic growth, has also energized Beijings soft power. Soft power, coined by Nye in 1990, can be broadly defined as non-coercive, co-optive power- the power of attraction. The attractiveness of a state is affected by its culture, history, membership and role in international institutions, as well as its economic performance and stature (Nye, 1990:167). Other crucial sources of soft power are political ideology and diplomacy (Gill and Huang, 2006:17). Chinas economic power is the key motor behind its mounting soft power. This paper focuses on Chinas soft power, with a view to delve deeper into the latters impact on the US and its interests. It begins with an analysis of the sources and complex structure of Chinas soft power. Subsequently, it assesses how the US may be affected by Beijings co-optive power, with an emphasis on both direct and indirect aspects of that influence. It looks at Chinas ideational influence in its near abroad, the MENA region and Latin America to shed light how Beijings influence may affect American interests. It closes with an analysis of Chinas augmenting soft power in multilateral settings, and how this may on occasions marginalize US influence. America remains the most powerful state in the international system. No country in the world has more global interests than the US. Chinas growing soft power affects American interests around the world therefore, a thorough assessment of this process is imperative. II. The Sources of Chinese Soft Power: Economic Performance, an Alternative Development Model and a Unique Culture Economic Performance The preeminent source of Chinas attractiveness is its economic performance. The ability to maintain close to 10 percent growth for over three decades (Kaplan, 2010:22), enjoy substantial stability and lift 300 million people out of poverty[2], together constitute an unprecedented achievement (Ramo, 2004:10-11). Beijing has realized these achievements following a novel, unconventional, non-western development path. Underlying driver behind the Chinese development model is innovation. The continuation of the Chinese miracle depends greatly on incessant innovation, which cuts time-to-reform and is the only cure for the problems of change (ibid.:15). Innovation increases the density in the Chinese society, which in turn decisively boosts economic growth (ibid.:13-16). Cultural values, as national pride of culture may also increase density (ibid.:33); the CCP recognises and uses this accordingly. Economic and Political Ideology Beijing

has embraced many of the key tenants of capitalism and is largely a market economy (McKinnon, 2010:504), with a Chinese twist, that Halper (2010:10) calls state capitalism or market-authoritarianism. The CCP largely controls key business sectors, owns firms of
strategic importance, and restricts political liberties with a view to ensuring stability (Halper, 2010:30). The Chinese way to economic growth and development is increasingly emulated around the world. The

illiberal nature of Chinese market-authoritarianism means developed democracies are unlikely to be lured and show any keenness to emulate this model (Nye, 2006:9). Reversely, growth and development, without western democracy[3] seems a particularly luring package to various illiberal regimes across the developing world, and especially in Afric a and the Middle East (Gill and Huang, 2006:20). The ideology of self-determination and the inviolability of sovereignty which Beijing puts forth simultaneously, further attract those illiberal states which are worried in the light of a more interventionist West*4+ (Halper, 2010:31). The Beijing Consensus The Beijing Consensus (BJC) is a concept / theory, first discussed by Ramo (2004) and further developed by Halper (2010), which draws together the different aspects of Chinese soft power, delineates the powerful links between economic and soft power, and explains Chinas muscle. Ramo (2004:11-12) explains the three central theorems of the BJC: a) the key to development is bleedingedge innovation to create change that moves faster than the problems change creates; b) fundamental need to shift developments focus to individuals, their quality-of-life with sustainability and equality as priorities; c) a security doctrine which stresses self-determination, through the use of leverage and asymmetry. Halper (2010:32) explains that deliberately or not: Beijing

is inadvertently promoting a

most troublesome export: the example of the China model. While many Americans see the BJC as a challenge, an
increasing number of nations, especially those tired of others interfering see Beijing and the BJC as a great opportunity (Vogel, 2006:16).

Latin America will emulate the Confucian globalismshared histories and political ideals
Cesarin 07 (Sergio, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, The Relationship between China and Latin America: Realities and Trends, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM SOFT POWER During the last decade, China has successfully pursued an aggressive image-building policy. Confucian globalism, the purported existence of a harmonious society, and the image of China as a multicultural country have proved to be useful rhetorical tools to gain support for Chinas emerging economic and political global status. Political discourse and the governments promulgation of the idea of Chinas peaceful
rising try to counter negative perceptions about its military empowerment and growing international political inuence. China has been successful in shaping a reputation as a responsible world leader. As

a result of high prole diplomacy, China is now perceived as a constructive power committed to the maintenance of international peace and stability.4 In LAC, public opinion of China is positive. When Chinese leaders speak out about their aims and goals in the region, they utilize concepts like
growth, mutual benets, non-interference in internal affairs and, most importantly, development. To Latin American reformers, progressives, and left-leaning political leaders, these precepts sound much better than the free trade policies or neoliberal trade approaches linked with hemispheric NorthSouth economic asymmetries and high social costs.

One must remember that an essential element of Latin American political culture is the refrain of political utopia. Intellectuals, leftist political forces, and social actors nd this notion congenial, in contrast to the pragmatic views coming from the North and perceived as part of a negative agenda. Chinese discourse engenders a sense of an altruistic, revolutionary model. Political doctrine also provides a framework for understanding Chinas use of diplomatic terms such as friendship, cooperation, and mutual benet in order to shape a positive agenda on both sides. For instance, recent attempts to recast state-private sector relationships in LAC are similar to Chinas state capitalism model in which the statenot the marketmaintains high regulatory power over the economy. Leadership style is another point of mutual identication. Chinas
fourth generation political leaderships social and economic prioritiessuch as welfare needs, income redistribution, social stability, environmental sustainability, and anti-corruption campaignsare similar to the main goals pursued by Latin American political leaders in their respective nations. For China, ofcial and non-ofcial diplomacy are two sides of the same coin, as evidenced by the relationship between China and Latin American political parties. The Chinese Communist Party (ChCP) has historical relations with traditional Latin American parties such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico), the Justicialista party (Argentina), the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Peru), and the Frente Sandinista de Liberacin Nacional (Nicaragua). These

countrys political experiences provide a good empirical model for transitional ruling parties like ChCP in discussing the role that it will play in the coming decades. Given new social conditions in China, ChCPs self-characterization as a progressive party (so denominated by President Hu) also provides common ground for an inter-party dialogue with Latin Americas left-oriented political forces in order to improve southsouth relationships, reach consensus on international issues, facilitate contacts between younger leaders, and promote mutual political afnities.

US soft power key to spread of Democracy

Lagon 11 (Mark P.Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown Universitys Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama World Affairs Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/valuevalues-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM

The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countriesIran, Russia, and Egyptwhere it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power
itself that Obama doubts, but Americas moral standing to project it. Perhaps the most striking example of a lost opportunity to use moral soft power was in Iran. In March 2009, President Obama made an appeal in a video to Iran for a new beginning of diplomatic engagement. In April 2009, he said in an address in Prague that in trying to stem Irans nuclear arms efforts, his administration would seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Two months later questions arose about President Ahmadinejad claiming victory over Mir Hussein Moussavi in the presidential election on June 12th. Within three days, there were large demonstrations in Tehran, Rasht, Orumiyeh, Zahedan, and Tabriz. As Iranians took to the streets, Obama had to choose whether to associate the US with the protestors or preserve what he appeared to believe was a possible channel of dialogue with Ahmadinejad on Irans nuclear program. For several days, the American president deliberately refused to embrace the Green Movement swelling in Irans streets to protest a stolen electionreaching up to three million in Tehran alone. Temporizing, he said, It is up to Iranians to make decisions about who Irans leaders will be. We respect Iranian sovereignty and want to avoid the United States being the issue inside of Iran. But it was inevitable that the US would be scapegoated by Iranian leaders for meddling, even if it chose moral inaction. As Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass wrote in Newsweek seven months later: I am a card-carrying realist on the grounds that ousting regimes and replacing them with something better is easier said than done. . . . Critics will say promoting regime change will encourage Iranian authorities to tar the opposition as pawns of the West. But the regime is already doing so. Outsiders should act to strengthen the opposition and to deepen rifts among the rulers. This process is underway . . . . Even a realist should recognize that its an opportunity not to be missed. Eventually, probably as a result of the influence of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose opposition to Irans leadership she established as a senator, administration policy became more forthright. A year after the protests began, the president signed into law targeted sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard. Yet failing to clearly side with Ahmadinejads opponents in 2009 represented a serious loss of US credib ility. It also failed to encourage the moral change that Obama had appeared to invoke during his campaign. Soft power and its ability to strengthen the protest movement was squandered. Early and active US backing for a more unified opposition might have buoyed and strengthened the Green opposition and helped it to better take advantage of subsequent divisions in the regime: parliamentarians petitioning to investigate payoffs to millions of people to vote for Ahmadinejad, friction between Ahmadinejad and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and efforts by the Revolutionary Guard to assert prevalence over politics. By supporting the opposition in Iran through soft power, the administration would not only have associated the US with the aspirations of the people in the streets of Tehran but also advanced the objective of dislodging a potentially nuclear rogue state. It is particularly ironic that Obama policy toward Russia should have eschewed the projection of soft power given that the NS Cs senior director for Russia and Eurasia, Michael McFaul, is the administration official most closely identified in his career with the cause of democracy promotion. In Advancing Democracy Abroad , published just last year, he writes, The

American president must continue to speak out in support of democracy and human rights. Shying away from the d word . . . would send a terrible signal to the activists around the world fighting for human rights and democratic change. . . . American diplomats must not check their values at the door. In the book, McFaul offers an ambitious vision linking
values to stability for Russia and Eurasia: In Eurasia, a democratic Russia could become a force for regional stability . . . not unlike the role that Russia played in the beginning of the 1990s. A democratic Russia seeking once again to integrate into Western institutions also would cooperate more closely with the United States and Europe on international security issues. But in its haste to hit the reset button on bilateral relations, the Obama White House ignored McFauls counsel. Instead of approaching the Russians with a set of firm moral expectations, the administration has courted President Medvedev as a counterweight to Putinism (missing the fact that rather than a countervailing force, Medvedev was, as noted in a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, Robin to Putins Batman). As events would show, Medvedev offered no real obstacle to Putins resumption of the presidency after a hiatus as prime minister to satisfy term limit laws. Nor, for that matter, is there any significant difference in policy between the Medvedev era and that which preceded it in terms of issues such as the occupation of Georgian territory, internal corruption, or silencing remaining independent media or business figures. Instead of establishing a foundation of clear principles in his reset of relations with the Putin regime, President Obama has seen relations with Russia in terms of a larger picture of strategic arms control. He believes proliferators like Iran and North Korea can be restrained if the major nuclear powers reduce their stockpiles, in fealty to the premises of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hence, the New START Treaty was his singular focus with Russia and the grounds for his appeasement of Putinism. He seems never to have considered asserting a soft power that would have signaled to Russian opposition figures like Boris Nemtsovbadly beaten in December 2010 after flying home from speaking in the USthat the US places little trust in bargains with leaders shredding the rule of law in their daily governance. The Russian security state has chosen to cooperate with the US in a few areas it has concluded are in its own interest. It allowed passage of a watered-down UN Security Council resolution 1929, imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, and cancelled plans to sell the S-300 air defense system to the Ahmadinejad regime. It has also cooperated on counterterrorism and US military access to Afghanistan. Yet would the United States have been unable to secure this discrete cooperation without checking our values at the door, in Michael McFauls phrase? The United States has achieved no cooperation from Russian leaders on issues such as the rule of law and an end to systematic intimidation and the arrests of opposition, press, and business figures, and indeed threats to American businesses private property rights and safety. Leaders of the Solidarity opposition movement continue to be detained, environmental nonprofits continue to be raided for trumped-up tax and software piracy irregularities, lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in detention, and journalist Oleg Kashin was, like Boris Nemtsov, beaten. There is no evidence of concerted bilateral pressure by the Obama administration to protest Russian unwillingness to protect freedoms for its citizens. The

lack of linkage between realist hard-power issues (such as nonproliferation) and domestic

values (such as the rule of law) has limited rather than increased US influence with Russia. The Carnegie
Endowments Matthew Rojansky and James Collins rightly conclude: If the United States erects an impenetrable wall between bilateral cooperation and Russias domestic politics, the Kremlin will simply conclude Washington is willing to give ground on transparency, democracy, and rule of law in order to gain Russian cooperation on nonproliferation, Afghanistan, and other challenges. Indeed, in June 2011, the undeterred Russian regime barred Nemtsovs Peoples Freedom Party from running in the December 2011 parliamentary elections. President Obama has selected Michael McFaul to be his ambassador to Russia. Sadly, dispatching the first non-diplomat in that role in three decades, not to mention a man whose vision of a just Russian policy for the US is at odds with the administrations own practice, is unlikely to dislodge this values-free approach.

US Soft power required for leverage to encourage liberalization.

Lagon 11 (Mark P.Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown Universitys Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the former US Ambassador-at-large to Combat Trafficking in Persons at the US Department of State, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama World Affairs Journal, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/world/valuevalues-soft-power-under-obama/p26212)//MM Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions, and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other new players on the international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to confront terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, pandemic disease, mass atrocity, or tyranny.
Although far from omnipotent, the United States is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, the indispensible nation.

Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role as catalyst. That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of Americas foreign policy assets particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egyptsuggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power. In the
1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy. Applying it, President

Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn downover Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and
the Warsaw Pact. For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrains, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones.

To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.

Pink tide
Absent US involvementresurgence of pink tide
Gindin and Weld 07 (Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history at Yale University, Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America Jan 15 2007, https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM

While the U.S imperial presence has emerged as a more or less acknowledged fact of the 21st century, popular references to U.S. power often gloss over a complex, amorphous system of organization and domination.1 What debate and discussion of empire there is in the United States has been almost entirely confined to its most pronounced, military expressions. Yet in terms of the actual administration and continuation of the current global order, the

military occupation of foreign territories is looking more and more like an Achilles heel. And while the Bush Administration is clearly not averse to deploying hard power, it has also expanded key civil and political mechanismssoft powerin order to safeguard U.S. interests worldwide.
The promotion of democracy, for example, emerged as a central expression of U.S. soft power during the Reagan Administration. In 1983, Reagan launched the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), with the mandate to foster the infrastructure of democracy around the world. I just decided that this nation, with its heritage of Yankee traders, ought to do a little selling of the principles of democracy, Reagan explained in a speech at the Endowments inauguration.2 Since then, the NED and other democracy-promoting governmental and nongovernmental institutions have intervened successfully on behalf of democracyactually a very particular form of low-intensity democracy chained to pro-market economicsin countries from Nicaragua to the Philippines, Ukraine to Haiti, overturning unfriendly authoritarian governments (many of which the United States had previously supported) and replacing them with handpicked pro-market allies. Over the past 20 years, the Yankee traders at the NED and elsewhere have expanded democracy promotion into a multibillion-dollar global industry. As President George W. Bush correctly pointed out to members of the International Republican Institute (IRI, a key U.S. democracypromoting institution) last year, the business of promoting democratic change is a growth industry.3 Like many other industries in the United States and Europeand despite passionate rhetoric praising the efficiency of unregulated markets the democracy business is highly subsidized. In 1980, the United States and the European Union each spent $20 million on democracy-related foreign aid. By 2001, this had risen to $571 million and $392 million, respectively. In 2006 the United States is projected to spend $2 billion on democracy assistance, while in 2003the latest figures availablethe EU spent $3.5 billion.4 By combining cooptation, coercion and deep pockets, groups like the NED and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have at times allied themselves with antidemocratic elites, and at other times capitalized on movements and individuals that were genuinely dedicated to democratizing their countries, setting the parameters of the debate by positioning a particular definition of pro-market representative democracy as the only antiauthoritarian option. U.S.

and European organizations have disbursed massive amounts of money, funding some groups and projects while ignoring others, favoring those who share their general ideological conceptions while isolating those that do not. There is very little transparency involved in the
process. Thanks to serious limitations in freedom-of-information legislation in the United States and elsewhere, curious parties have trouble tracing grants that are often passed along a chain of sub-grantees. Accurate information about which groups receive funding and why is extremely hard to come by. Of course, First

World governments clearly have a large stake in the spread of a particular kind of democracy. Thats because, as a former assistant secretary of defense suggests in a recent book for the Council on Foreign Relations, contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own.5 The statement could, perhaps, be restated to say, capitalist democracy does not spread inexorably on its own. In Latin America, however, a new generation of left and center-left leaders is challenging U.S. power in the region and experimenting with home-grown alternatives to the Washington Consensus of restrictive democracies and elite-based economics. These movements are articulating more expansive conceptions of both economic and political life, demanding (and in some cases practicing) the democratization of both, as Zander Navarro
notes in these pages.

This cresting pink tide has already radically turned around Venezuela and Bolivia, with Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil cautiously moving in similar directions. And more than any other single year, 2006 brought this hemispheric political shift into focus, with 10 presidential elections in the regionall of which included credible challenges to U.S. interests. Most of these left and quasi-left leaders (and the national interests they represent) are actually quite compatible with

capitalist democracy on their own.

But the leftward shift represents not just the election of cooptable presidents, but the radicalization of the citizens who voted for them.
The 2006 electoral cycle, then, seemed a tremendously charged moment in two key respects. The year promised intriguing and dramatic changes in Latin Americas political climate, with progressive movements mounting strong and successful challenges in a number of the regions most critical elections. On the flip side, however, Latin Americas shift to the left was widely interpreted as a threat by the Bush Administration.

Considering the volatilityand the stakesof this political moment, we felt that some serious debate and discussion about pro-democracy interventions were in order.

Methodology prodict
Prefer our methodology Gindin and Weld 07 (Jonah, freelance writer and researcher, Kirsten, PhD student in Latin American history at Yale University, Spotlighting U.S. Soft-Power in Latin America Jan 15 2007, https://nacla.org/news/spotlighting-us-soft-power-latin-america)//MM
Our interest in these issues, and our awareness that they would likely never make it into the mainstream media, spurred us to organize an academic conference in order to generate a more serious and theoretical discussion about U.S. democracy promotion in the context of Latin Americas leftward turn. With

questions and criticisms of our own, we sought to create a space in which both proponents and dissenters could address certain questions: What is the link, if one exists, between U.S. political policies and U.S. economic policies toward Latin America? Why has the U.S. policy of democracy promotion provoked criticism from certain Latin American leaders, civil society groups and general publics? Is critics use of the term intervention misplaced in this disc ussion, or not? What sorts of social and political movements does democracy promotion encourage, and which does it discourage or ignore? And, finally, does the recent rise to power of leaders whose views diverge from the Washington Consensus stand as a measure of democracy promotions failure, or of its success?
We wanted to hold a debate, but one in which marginalized (but by no means marginal) critical positions were fairly represented; for this reason, we gave the event the provocative title In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Electoral Intervention in the Americas. The idea was to bring democracy promoters and their critics together; we hoped that instead of both sides speaking into the wind, they could actually speak to each other. It seemed simple enough on paper. But dragging representatives from the various ends of this highly polarized debate into a room together turned out to be no mean feat. The leading critics of democracy promotion, some of them already our friends and colleagues, were relatively easy to enlist; the practitioners and proponents of democracy promotion, however, were more difficult to convince. In several confidential conversations with individuals we had asked to be panelists (and who declined), we were accused of setting up an ideological trap, of being inflammatory, of inviting critics whose published works were supposedly sheer fantasy with no commitment to the truth and informed that the presence of certain of our more critical colleagues had significantly chilled the response of the Washington community to what otherwise might have been a well-received i.e., moderateevent.

As organizers, we genuinely sought to begin a high-level and public discussion that, as far as we could tell, wasnt taking place in Washingtons boardrooms. It was frustrating, yet telling, to discover the extent to which certain
sectors were uninterested in having that discussion, and to see the ways in which the very idea of a trenchant debate was dismissively labeled a trap. The democracy promoters who did agree to come represented their positions with grace and aplomb, and engaged in an honest and direct interchange of ideas with their opponents. But the road to that interchange was, unfortunately, paved with rejection letters from other members of the Washington community. The conference took place at Yale Universityhardly the worlds most subversive locationin April 2006, and once we were finally able to get everyone into the auditorium together, the discussion was extremely lively. Panelists

debated the very meaning of democracy, the long history of U.S. interventions in Latin America, the issue of American credibility on the world stage, the implications of the 2006 electoral cycle in the hemisphere, and more. Because of the depth of the conversation and its timeliness, NACLAwhose Contributing Editor Fred Rosen participated in the conference as a moderatorgraciously invited us to share this discussion by devoting this Report to our special forum on democracy promotion.
This Report, In the Name of Democracy, features seven of our conference panelistsGreg Grandin, Jorge I. Domnguez, William I. Robinson, Michael Coppedge, Zander Navarro, Bryant Garth and Hctor Mondragnwho agreed to rework their panel presentations into short essays for this issue. Grandin and Domnguez establish a historical context for the debates, while Robinson and Coppedges incisive, and competing, analyses of the contested definitions of terms such as democracy, intervention and polyarchy establish a theoretical context for the contributors broader discussions. These broader discussions address the failure of the Washington Consensus to protect economic rights in Latin America; the United States low credibility when it comes to promoting democracy; the role of local Latin American elites in inviting U.S. political and economic collaboration; the mechanics by which democracy promotion is actually conducted; and the need for socially responsive forms of democratic governance that respond to the stated desires of Latin American publics. In our continuing efforts to make these discussions public and open, we hope that policy makers and critics from across the political spectrum will become increasingly motivated to participate and to engage one anothers ideas, not only within Washington but also across the North South divide. The very nature of the democratic ideal demands that any efforts in the name of democracy, whatever ones definition of the term, take place in the open air, with the full light of scrutiny upon them.

Taiwan recognition
China influence prevents recognition of Taiwan in Latin American countries.
Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM Introduction Ever since President James Monroes 1823 declaration that European powers must respect the western hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence, the United States has been the dominant economic, political and military power in Latin America. As such, it has faced a series of challengers, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union and Japan. In the last two decades, the rise of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has been reshaping the politics and economics of the region. How far has the PRC become the new hegemonic challenger? China has not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States in Latin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the background of U.S.China rivalry and potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could change in the future. In the meantime, Chinas economic weight offers its Latin American partners a new freedom to defy U.S. interests, should they choose to. China plays three major roles in Latin America: as an insatiable consumer of commodities; as an exporter of cheap manufactured goods; and as a lender and investor. The regions importance to a rising China is underpinned by its resources: Latin America has the worlds largest reserves of
silver, at 49% of the global total, copper, at 44%, and tin, at 33%. It also has at least 16% of the global oil reserves and the largest quantity of arable land in the world. China plays a flexible hand in different countries, within the framework of a regional strategy. Although Chinas policy papers treat Latin America as a region, this does not get in the way of Chinas ability to work with local differences in pursuit of its objectives: in Venezuela, for instance, China offers large loans in exchange for oil, whereas in Peru it favours direct investment in the mining sector. One

of

Chinas political objectives is to further the OneChina policy, which states that diplomatic relations with the PRC require a country to break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) , as
discussed, for example, in Chinas Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025. htm).

More than half of the countries in the world that still recognise the ROC are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Costa Ricas recognition of the PRC in 2007 was followed by the Chinese purchase of US$300 million in Costa Rican bonds, an investment of $74 million in a football stadium in the capital and, in 2012, a free trade agreement. Similar packages are on offer, no doubt, for other nations willing to switch. China has tried
to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to great power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interests and the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States. China

sees Asia as its own sphere of influence, and the Obama administrations pivot a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy towards Asia has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread carefully in the U.S. backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges to the U.S., including from its Latin American
partners. Resource exports Chinas primary resources imports are largely concentrated in four countries: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, which together account for 90% of the regions exports to China. Agricultural products make up 30% of those exports, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), with about 65% in minerals and resources. for Chinas trade partners, the risks are resource dependency, currency overvaluation and the possibility that other sectors of their economies will become uncompetitive. It also renders them highly vulnerable to price and demand fluctuations, whilst tethering them to unsustainable commodity-led growth with the associated negative environmental impacts. few partner countries are investing sufficiently in economic, social or environmental protection to offset these risks. Chile is the only nation in Latin America that has used its revenues to create a sovereign wealth fund. Chiles Pension Reserve fund and its Economic and Social Stabilization fund have total assets of more than $21 billion, the latter supporting the national budget when copper prices are low. Chinas dependency on relatively few regional suppliers also carries risks for China. The total of soy and iron exports from Latin America to China represent more than half of Chinas imports of these commodities, offering the producer countries the potential to act as a bloc, were they so inclined.

PRC changes diplomatic postures towards Taiwan in Latin America

Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU Press, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For

the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When

Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed
toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch, the

allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran
president Maricio Fuenesalthough all did so prior to assuming office.

Latin America is key factor in Taiwan international legitimacy

HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University, Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM Latin America has been a major battleground of the foreign policy war between China and Taiwan over international legitimacy, recognition, and status. Chinas quest to recover what it calls the province of Taiwan is one of the top issues on its foreign policy agenda. Its strategy against Taiwan has been both
bilateral and global. Bilaterally, China has used a mix of economic diplomacy and military and political moves to keep Taiwan from claiming independence. Globally,

Chinas strategy has focused on developing an international united front designed to marginalize Taiwan. Fearing Taiwans push for international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan. Of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan, twelve are in Latin America and the Caribbean. If these states were to switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the damage to Taiwans political condence and its claims of legitimacy as a state would be seriously undermined. Taiwan has 23 million people and well protected territory. Yet, of the United Nations 193 member states, only 23 recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. According to then-prime minister of Taiwan Yu Shyi-kun in 2002, Taiwans allies in Latin America and the Caribbean have helped us a lot and therefore we consider this an area of maximum diplomatic importance.2 Under such circumstances, the strategic competition between China and Taiwan has been intensied in a region far away from Asia.

Beijing-Taipei competition over status in Latin America

HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University,

Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM
COMPETITION One

of the main goals of Taiwans foreign policy is to maintain full diplomatic relations wherever possible. To achieve this goal, Taiwans government has been promoting trade and investment,
offering economic assistance and increasing international agreements. Twenty years ago, Taiwan sold more goods to Latin America than mainland China did. Yet today, Taiwans trade with the region is lagging far behind that of China. In order to reinforce diplomatic relations and take advantage of Central American countries close economic ties with the United States under the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Taiwan has been embracing free trade agreements (FTAs) with the nations in the region. So far, Taiwan has achieved some limited success. Three countries have entered into FTAs with Taiwan. All three are Taiwans diplomatic partners in Central AmericaPanama, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Taiwan is also in FTA negotiations with Honduras and El Salvador, another two of its 23 diplomatic allies. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Taipei want to sign an FTA with Paraguay, the only ally of Taipei in South America. China

is a relatively new player to Latin America. Both its trade and investment have soared there since the late 1990s. Sino-Latin American trade reached $50 billion in 2005, with China emerging as the regions third largest trading partner. China is also investing more in Latin America than any region outside Asia. In addition, since 2004 China has deployed peacekeeping forces in Haiti. China has participated in peacekeeping missions in many parts
of the world, but has never sent combat troops as peacekeepers.3 It should be noted that Haiti does not have diplomatic ties with the PRC.

Beijing-Taipei competition for recognition demands a greater share of nancial resources. Huge amounts of
Chinese aid to Latin American countries have often prompted Taiwanese offers of even greater aid in an attempt to compete directly with China and to offset Chinese inuence. Beijing states that China has provided Caribbean countries with economic assistance without any preconditions. Nonetheless, all these recipient nations maintain full diplomatic relations with the PRC. With its middle class increasing, China has become the worlds fastest growing tourism source nation in the world. To further relations with the region, Beijing is also working to encourage its citizens to tour Latin America. Six Latin American nations have gained Approved Destination Status (ADS) from the Chinese government, with Cuba being the rst one in 2003. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile followed in 2004, and Mexico and Peru in 2005. In the Caribbean, China has listed Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Dominica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica as tourist destinations. For

years, Taiwan dened itself as free China, the democratic counterpart to Communist China. As China liberalizes and increases its integration with the global economy, the contrast is not quite as sharp as before. Meanwhile, there are signicant changes in Chinese foreign policy. With the end of the
Cold War, Beijing is concerned with exporting goods and services rather than exporting revolution. As a result, promoting regional economic development and stability have become one of the major policy goals of Beijing in Latin America. As David M. Lampton, director of China Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies observed, although other nations generally do not wish to emulate Chinas political sys-tem, its combination of high-speed economic growth and apparent stability is a development path that appeals to many.4

Growing Chinese influence in the region trades-off with diplomatic support of Taiwan
HE 07 (LI, a professor at Merrimack College and has also taught at Weber State University, Texas A&M University-Kingsville, and was a research associate at the University of Texas at Austin, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America April 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/enter-the-dragon-chinas-presence-latin-america)//MM
IMPLICATIONS Indeed,

the increased prole of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in Latin America and its partnerships with Latin American countries have a number of implications. The Chinese presence has increased
pressure on Taiwan to maintain its formal diplomatic presence in Latin America. Given that Latin American states now seek to play an increased role in the

United Nations and other multilateral agencies, they are inclined to seek a closer relationship with the PRC, one of the permanent ve in the UN Security Council. The PRC has major resource interests in Latin America, and the region
could help China mitigate its severe shortage of energy. Chinese active pursuit of energy in the region has political implications as well. According to Taiwanese professor of international trade Antonio Hsiang, Chinas

expanding energy purchases in South America will have a negative impact on Taiwans relations with its diplomatic allies .5
For instance, Paraguay, a member of the South American Common Market (Mercosur), is surrounded by other member countries of Mercosur, including Brazil and Argentina, all of whom have diplomatic relations with China. Argentina acknowledged it had teamed up with Brazil to try to force Paraguay into switching its diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing.6Latin

America has found the rivalry between

China and Taiwan benecial; it has been able to obtain loans, credits, trade concessions, and investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. The growing inuence of the PRC could lead to tension with the United States, given that Latin America is a region where many countries heavily depend on the United States for trade and investment. At the
same time, deep-rooted anti-U.S. feeling persists. Chinas growing dependency on imported oil and gas has put it at odds with U.S. foreign policy in countries such as Venezuela. As China turns into a growth engine, a growing number of countries are beneting from its tremendous economic development, and are reluctant to antagonize Beijing. Latin Americans themselves have no problem viewing investments by and trade with Asian powers such as China and Taiwan in their countries as a counterbalance to the United States. With the Western powers caring little about poor countries, some in Latin America have begun to see China and Taiwan as potential trade allies and partners, as well as providers of economic opportunities. Latin America has found the rivalry between China and Taiwan benecial; it has been able to obtain loans, credits, trade concessions and investments from both the PRC and Taiwan as it has attempted to play one against the other. Chinas rapid economic growth and its huge potential market have contributed to greater willingness in Latin America to explore alternative arrangements. China might have a confrontation with the United States in some places in the world, but denitely not in Latin America, a region long considered the backyard of the United States. Beijing has approached many international issues more from a pragmatic than a principled standpoint. Chinese foreign policy has shown dramatic changes that underscore Beijings putting a priority on economic growth and on assuming a larger role in regional and global affairs. Beijing has tried to t into the U.S.-dominant international system as a responsible stakeholder, as suggested by then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005. In the Western Hemisphere, China has begun to participate in multilateral for a where the United State has heretofore played a prominent role, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). In Chinas backyard, the United States has played a critical role over the issue of political/ security interactions across the Taiwan Strait. From Beijings perspective, Washington could help maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. On

the other hand, Beijing worries that in the diplomatic rivalry between Taiwan and China, Washington still favors Taiwan and prevents China from developing full diplomatic relations with Latin American countries. In addition, Beijing
believes that Washington has a hidden agenda to prevent China from becoming a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Chinas growing inuence in the region may compel Washington to pay greater attention to Latin American and Caribbean leaders when they complain about the neglect from Washington. PROSPECTS The
struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this the year China will host the Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. Taiwan has competed and will compete well with the PRC over a small number of countries on its aid program list, utilizing a large amount of foreign reserves and an increasing number of FTAs. For

Taiwan, Latin America is crucial due to the fact that slightly more than half of the countries with which Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations are in this area. For the PRC, Latin America has become
increasingly important, but still it is regarded as a region of relatively low priority for the pursuit of its grand strategy. Latin America and the Caribbean represented 3.5 percent of Chinas total foreign trade in 2004, and this percentage has remained consistent over the years. China has moved cautiously from a radical to a more pragmatic approach to achieve its goals in Latin America, and is expanding in the region quietly and cautiously. Without any doubt, China will certainly assume an increasingly important role in Latin America. However, China is still a long way from threatening or even really competing with the inuence of the United States in Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than Sino-Latin America trade. The struggle between Taiwan and China for international recognition is likely to intensify this year, because this is the year China will host the Olympics and the year Taiwan might make major moves toward statehood or state-like status. In the future, Chinas

growing involvement could have serious political and military implications. At present, the most important dimension in the relations between China and Latin America is no doubt economic. China will continue leveraging its economic clout in the region to support its political preferences, pressing countries to fall in line regarding its top foreign policy priority: its claims over Taiwan. Over the long run, due to Chinas growing economic might and soft power, as well as the changing dynamics of Latin American domestic politics, it might become increasingly difcult for Taiwan to compete with the PRC in Latin America.

Chinese checkbook diplomacy prevents Taiwan recognition

CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE The exact level of Chinas foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean is uncertain, but reportedly the region receives about 10% of Chinas foreign aid worldwide, far behind assistance that China reportedly provides to Asia and Africa.54 Aid

to the

region appears to focus on bilateral assistance rather than through regional or multilateral institutions, with the objectives of strengthening diplomatic relations and isolating Taiwan. 55 Particularly

in the Caribbean and Central America, China

has used assistance in recent years as part of its checkbook diplomacy to entice countries in the region to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, while a number of countries in the region have been adept at playing the two countries against each other in order to maximize financial benefits. As noted above, Chinese assistance to Dominica and Grenada was instrumental in those
countries deciding to switch diplomatic recognition. Costa Rica was also rumored to have been offered substantial assistance, although Costa Rican officials maintain the prospect of increase trade and investment was the primary rationale for the switch. In preparation for the Cricket World Cup 2007 played in the Caribbean, China provided assistance and workers to build cricket stadiums in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Jamaica, and even St. Lucia, which subsequently switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan. China also had built a cricket stadium in Dominica in 2004. China also has provided assistance for housing, education (including scholarships as well as the construction of schools), health (including the construction of hospitals), and other infrastructure such as railways and highways. In recent years, China also has provided additional types of assistance to the region, including disaster assistance, debt forgiveness, and concessional loans. In the aftermath of such natural disasters as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, China often has responded with assistance. For example, China provided hurricane reconstruction assistance to Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004. In August 2007, China provided support to Peru in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in the southern part of that country. While most of Chinas debt forgiveness has been for low-income African countries, China announced in July 2007 that it would write off over $15 million in debt owed by Guyana, one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere.56 In terms of concessional loans, Chinas Export-Import Bank provided a $12 million loan to Jamaica in the water sector in 2000. In addition to Jamaica, China has signed concessional loan framework agreements with three other countries in the region Suriname, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.57 In September 2007, China announced that it woul d provide about $530 million in favorable loans over three years to Chinese companies investing in the Caribbean.58 In early November 2007, China and Venezuela agreed to establish a joint development fund (with a $4 billion contribution from China and a $2 billion contribution from Venezuela) that would be used to finance loans for infrastructure, energy, and social projects in both nations.59 China also has increased student and educational exchanges with the region. In 2006, it established the first Confucius Institute in the region, in Mexico City, with the goal of promoting Chinese language and culture. While the lack of data on Chinese foreign assistance going to the region makes it impossible to compare Chinese and U.S. assistance levels, it is safe to assume that U.S. assistance is far greater. Looking at 2005 statistics comparing foreign assistance levels from developed countries to Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States was by far the single largest bilateral donor to the region, accounting for 29% of the $4.6 billion in bilateral assistance.60

taiwan impact
Chinese influence in Latin America sparks a Taiwan war
Ferguson 12
Robbie Ferguson, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, 7-23-2012, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, *55+ the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It

refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domnguez suggests that the PRC
has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), *56+ the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. *57+ This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly,

Chinas experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998
the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, [58] further isolating the ROC. The effect on American interests Were

the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not
be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As

Chinas economic and political position in the world improves vis--vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

Taiwan war escalates and goes nuclear

Lowther 13
William Lowther, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS many of them are familiar with its work 3-16-2013, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report, Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a
new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the

CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwans independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible , complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the
US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. T he report also quotes Betts as saying that neither

Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation, Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific
region.

US draw-in
War in Taiwan draws in the US and causes extinction
Hunkovic 9 (Lee J., Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America 2009, http://www.lamp-method.org/ecommons/hunkovic.pdf) A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose
actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Asian intervention
Tit for tat expansions of influence leads to retaliatory tensions.
Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM
U.S. reaction The United States, distracted elsewhere in recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in Latin America. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for m utual transparency through the U.S. China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogue to date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lend its support. Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign. The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also diminished fears of Chinese competition for the regions energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas success in locking up the major sub-salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports less than 50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past. There are warnings within the U.S. security community about

the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuelas 2010 purchase of 18 K -8 fighters from China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles to the China threat. Regardless of whether there is any real threat to the U.S., key decision-makers have not reacted. Chinas presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far
sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administrations pivot to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there

is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin
American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

Chinese presence deters US intervention in Asia

Kurlanzick 06 (Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Charm Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), Chinas Latin Leap Forward, Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: Chinas Strategic Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM
In fall 2004, the president of China, Hu Jintao, embarked upon a trip to Latin America that sometimes seemed more a coronation than a diplomatic offensive. In Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Argentina, Hu was received with the highest honors of a state guest, while local legislators battled to hold receptions for him and for the delegation of Chinese businesses searching for new investments in the region. Latin businesspeople hosted Hu at barbeques and welcomed him into their factories. Latin leaders recognized China as a market economy, one of Beijings major goals, and lavished praise on Hu, with the Brazilian president, Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, announcing, We want a partnership that integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation. Hu also delivered concrete signs of Chinas growing relationship with Latin America. The Chinese leader signed $30 billion worth of new investment deals, upgraded bilateral trade ties with Brazil and announced an all-weather strategic partnership with the Latin giant, and signed some 400 agreements with Latin American nations on a range of topics. Shortly after Hus trip, Chinese vice president Zeng Qinghong led his own entourage of Chinese officials and business leaders to Latin America, where they signed a new deal on oil and gas exploration with Caracas and offered Venezuela $700 million in credits. Hus grand tour of Latin America surprised many U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders, who have long considered the region the United States natural sphere of influence, and who have not contended with another external competitor in the region in decades. An article published in Foreign

Affairs wondered if Washington was losing Latin America. A Senate aide told the New York Times, Theyre taking advantage of it. Theyre taking advantage of the fact that we dont care as much as we should about Latin America. Congress convened hearings to examine Chinas presence in the Western Hemisphere, and the White House instituted a dialogue with China to explore the two powers aims in the region. Behind Chinas Offensive In truth, neither the accolades for Hu nor the fears of Chinas presence in the Western Hemisphere accurately capture the current state of Beijings dynamic new engagement with Latin America. China clearly has a strategy designed to increase its influence in developing regionsSoutheast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin Americabecause Beijing believes it can wield greater influence there than in developed nations in Northeast Asia, Europe, and the United States. China has enjoyed considerable success in achieving its initial goals in Latin America, which include revamping Beijings global image, isolating Taiwan, and securing access to commodities, among other targets. At this point, China has made few difficult demands on countries in Latin America, so, for now, nations in the region get a free ride from Chinas involvement, benefiting from aid, investment, and diplomacy without having to make significant sacrifices to win Beijings favor. Yet, as China expands its presence in Latin America, many of its policies could risk a backlash, lessening its ability to threaten U.S. interests in the region. Until the past decade, Chinese relations with Latin America were extremely limited, and Latin America generally was a low foreign policy priority. Chinas history of fomenting ideological revolution in the developing world alienated conservative governments in Latin America. After 1949, Taiwan developed close links with, and established aid pipelines to, countries in the Western Hemisphere. Even Cuba, a fraternal communist country, was not close to Beijing. Though Cuba was the first Latin nation to recognize Communist China, Cuban leaders criticized Chinese policies at a public rally in 1965, and later complained about Chinas move towards capitalist economics, with Fidel Castro memorably describing Deng Xiaoping as a numbskull. Havana and Beijing did not reestablish full ties until 1989. Chinas leaders also felt little domestic pressure for a more outward-looking foreign policy. Still recovering from the Maoist era and focused on internal economic reforms, many Chinese questioned Chinas ability to become a regional power or even a global actor. A poll taken by the research organization Horizon Group in 1995 asked Chinese citizens their views of the most prominent countries in the world; one-third ranked the United States most prominent, with only 13 percent choosing China. Making relations tougher for China, Beijing was not a major aid donor and did not participate in Latin Americas multilateral institutions. Until the late 1990s, Chinas economy had little need for Latin American exports, which were largely commodities. In 1975, Sino-Latin American trade totaled only $476 million; even 15 years later, total twoway trade totaled less than $3 billion. By 2001, some of the impediments to Chinese influence in Latin America had begun to disappear. Between the late 1970s and 2001, Beijing abandoned its support for communist insurgencies, established diplomatic relations with more than ten Latin nations, and opened its economy to the point that it began to require significant commodities imports. In 2003, China became the worlds second-largest importer of oil, after the United States, and the International Energy Agency estimates that China will import as many as 6.9 million barrels of oil per day by 2020, making it by far the largest consumer. Furthermore, as economic growth, state-sponsored nationalism, the initial outreach of Chinese businesses, and the spread of higher education in China created a worldlier, more confident citizenry, its population put pressure on the leadership for a more proactive foreign policy. Concurrently, Chinas leadership itself was becoming more engaged with the world, as the generation of leaders around Deng, many of whom had never studied outside China, passed from the scene. In 2001, Jiang Zemin embarked upon the most ambitious Latin American trip undertaken by any Chinese leader. Jiangs trip was followed by a series of high-level visits to Latin America. Defense Minister Chi Haotian met with the Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces, and National Peoples Congress chairman Li Peng traveled to Uruguay, Argentina, and Cuba. At the same time, the Bush administration, which had come into office vowing to pay greater attention to Latin America, assigned the region a low priority after 9/11 and then further alienated many Latin American nations by appearing to tacitly support a 2002 coup attempt against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, a populist but elected leader. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one recent Zogby International poll of Latin American opinion leaders found that some 80 percent viewed President Bush unfavorably, and when Bush visited Argentina in November 2005 to attend a trade summit, tens of thousands of protesters greeted him. Chinas Goals and Strategies Since 2001, Chinas goals, strategies, and tools of influence in Latin America have come into clearer focus. As in its relations with developing regions like Southeast Asia, China has several obvious goals. China wants to ensure its access to the regions oil, gas, copper, iron, and other important resources. Unlike most Western energy companies, which operate independently from the state and rely on global markets to set prices, many Chinese firms retain close ties to the government, which distrusts global energy markets. Chinese leaders fear that, in a conflict with the United States, Washington might be able to cut off international supply lanes or pressure American allies not to supply China. Consequently, Chinese firms search for equity stakes in oil overseas and try to secure the entire supply chain in critical industries, according to one observer. 1 In other words, China wants to control the entire process, from oil field to tanker. And Latin America is the current center of Chinas global strategy. China also clearly seeks to diminish Taiwans formal and informal ties to Latin America, a region where Taiwan still retains formal links with Panama, Paraguay, and Guatemala, among others. In addition, China

wants nations that already recognize Beijing to not only adhere to the One China policy but also to prevent Taiwanese officials from participating in nongovernmental regional forums like the Organization of American States. China also may wish to prevent governments from entering into bilateral free trade deals with the island. Beijing also intends to promote itself as a benign, cooperative presenceas a different, more accommodating external power than the United States. If China is perceived as a benign actor, as a nation that does not threaten the region economically or militarily, it will be easier for Beijing to expand trade, boost its diplomatic offensive, and even broaden military-military cooperation such as selling arms, securing strategic shipping lanes, and developing joint training programs with nations like Venezuela. Ultimately, Beijing might even be able to use its engagement with the region to diminish U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, or at least pressure Washington to commit more resources to the hemisphere resources that might otherwise be deployed in Beijings backyard, Southeast and Northeast Asia. The Win-Win Strategies China has adopted several strategies. First, its
leaders enunciate a doctrine of win-win relations, highlighting that even as China rises to great power status it will not interfere or meddle in other countries internal affairsa sharp contrast with the United States, which has a history of interventions in Latin America. Instead, Chinese leaders insist, Beijing will listen to other countries needs and craft responses accordingly. During the 2004 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

summit in Chile (APEC includes several Latin American nations), President Bush focused on counterterrorism cooperation and WMD proliferation. China focused on new investment in Latin America, generating favorable media coverage.2 Chinas win-win rhetoric also capitalizes on the fact that elites and publics in newly democratic nations in the region, like Mexico, often resent U.S. criticism of their human rights records. When these countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes, pressure on human rights resonated favorably with democrats. But today some of the same democrats resent Washingtons censure, which they see as demeaning and failing to recognize their nations progress. In Mexico, when U.S. officials criticized authorities for alleged use of torture,3 Beijing responded by initiating a discussion on human rights, implicitly designed to portray both China and Mexico as unfair targets of American criticism. As part of this strategy, Chinese leaders emphasize their empathetic understanding of issues confronting developing nations. In Brazil, Hu announced that China would always stay on the side of the developing countries, and Hu then met with the leaders of Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa in an attempt to build a broader alliance of leading developing countries.4 Lower-ranking officials constantly echo this message. In an address, National Peoples Congress vice chairman Cheng Siwei said, both *China and Latin America+ belong to the developing world and have identical or similar views on many issues. Chinese officials also have cultivated close relations with Brazil at the World Trade Organization, positioning the two countries as champions of the developing world at the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun. Additionally, Chinese leaders portray their own country as a model of statedirected economic development that has delivered two decades of powerful growth. This can resonate in Latin America, where the neoliberal economic model touted by international financial institutionsthe model known as The Washington Consensusfailed to deliver broad economic growth during the 1990s. Indeed, in a poll of the region taken in 2002, a mere 35 percent of Latin Americans said the state should allow the private sector to control economic activity, suggesting the level of frustration with neoliberal economics. Populist, state-centered, often antiAmerican movements burst into the forward in Venezuela, Bolivia, and other countries. Another study showed that support for democracy was declining sharply, with more than 50 percent of Latin Americans agreeing with the statement, I wouldnt mind if a non-democratic government came to power if it could solve economic problems sentiment that could prove consistent with Chinas model of an economic opening combined with political control.5 Chinas strategy also includes a focus on nations in the region whose bilateral relationships with Washington are strained. This is most obvious in Venezuela, but it is also noticeable in Ecuador, where in December 2004after Washington cut off military assistance when Quito would not agree to exempt U.S. soldiers from prosecution at the International Criminal CourtChina invited Ecuadorian officials to Beijing and offered a pledge of new military assistance.6 Similarly, after the left-wing populist Evo Morales won the presidency in Bolivia late last year and Washington responded by proposing cuts in aid, China invited Morales to Beijing. There, he proclaimed China an ideological ally and asked it to help Bolivia develop its reserves of natural gas.7 China also has become what one observer called a born-again multilateralist. Though its older leaders viewed multilateral organizations as limiting Chinas power, the generation under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao takes the opposite viewthey see joining multilateral groups as a way to reduce fears of China. Consequently, they have enthusiastically embraced regional multilateral groups, from the Organization of American States (where China is now an observer) to the Inter-American Development Bank (where China has applied for donor status). It does not hurt that, as Washington has paid less attention to regional multilateralism, Beijings participation has made it look better by comparison. As China has upgra ded its strategy towards Latin America, it has honed specific tools of influence as well. Chinas aid to Latin America, almost nonexistent ten years ago, now tops $700 million per year, according to an analysis by the National Defense University. Beijing adds to its aid by forgiving or rolling over Latin American debts, as it did with some $1 billion worth of Cuban debt. Much of this assistance goes towards infrastructure, such as railways in Jamaica and Argentina.8 Some of this construction would benefit Chinese firms involved in extractive industries, but it also would address a critical need in a region contending with crumbling roads and ports. Chinas aid also targets nations in the region where Taiwan has traditionally been an aid donor. In Dominica, formerly an ally of Taipei, the prime minister reportedly requested nearly $60 million in aid from Taiwan in 2004. When Taiwan provided Dominica with $9 million, China responded by offering the former British West Indian colony roughly twice as much, and Dominica switched recognition.9 Taiwan may offer a new package of $250 million in aid to Latin America, but it cannot match Chinas largesse, especially as Beijings currency reserves continue to grow.10 Along with aid, Beijing has encouraged its own companies in strategic industries to invest in Latin America. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation selected some 30 top Chinese companies to take the lead in overseas investment. As they look overseas, these national champions enjoy benefits that will help them compete, including low-interest funding from Chinese banks primarily controlled by the government. In 2004, for example, the consulting group Accenture reported that China Development Bank provided Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei with a $10 billion low-cost loan to help it develop internationally competitive mobile phone sales. Beijing appears to be actively pressuring state-linked oil and gas firms to increase acquisitions overseas. In interviews with CLSA Asia Pacific Markets, a leading research company in China, stateowned resources firms acknowledged that Beijing had been pressuring them to invest abroad, though they insisted that their own management made the final decisions. Indeed, nearly 53 percent of Chinas investment abroad in 2004 was concentrated in extractive industries.11 Owing to this focus on resources, commodity-rich Latin America received more Chinese investment in 2004 than any other region of the world.12 Since overall net foreign investment in Latin America had been falling, this Chinese investment is even more importan t. Chinas embrace of free trade also burnishes its image. Some potential deals, like one with Mercosur, the South American free-trade bloc, will not be as comprehensive as any agreements signed by the United States, but Beijing can present itself as a faster-moving trade partner than Washington. And, being first to sign trade agreements with the most developed countries in a region, like Chile, serves a useful purpose. Since Chile is already open to foreign competition, it will not be drastically impacted by an FTA, allowing China to combat the impression that a trade deal means being flooded with cheap Chinese goods. China advertises its increased aid, investment, and trade agreements through effective public diplomacy, such as the promotion of Chinese language and cultural studies. Across Latin America, China is likely to establish Confucius Institutes, language and culture schools paid for by Beijing and set up at local universities. The results are evident: the number of Argentines studying Chinese reportedly tripled in 2005, and the new Mandarin program at the University of Buenos Aires has enrolled more than 1,000 students in two years.13 The new public diplomacy also includes setting up networks of informal summits and meetings, either in China or in Latin America, designed to bring together Chinese and Latin American opinion leaders. These summits allow China to subtly emphasize its role as a potential business partner and as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. These informal summits include the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, initiated by Beijing and attended last year by nearly 1,000 officials from China and the Caribbean, the Latin America-China Friendship Societies, and other forums.14 Chinas formal diplomacy backstops this public diplomacy. For upwards of 15 years, Beijing has begun to retire older, more ideological diplomats, replacing them with a younger generation. As one recent case study found, beginning in the 1980s, Beijing began to upgrade the quality of its diplomats in the Western Hemisphere. It sent 110 young Chinese officials to a university in Mexico to learn Spanish. It improved the capacity of its own think tanks focusing on Latin America, rewarding specialists and ensuring that better research was available on

the Western Hemisphere. And China kept its Latin America specialists focused on the region, so that someone like Jiang Yuande, Chinas ambassador to Brazil in 2006, already had a 30-year tour around the Portuguese-speaking world in countries like Angola and Cape Verde.15 Measuring Chinas Progress For now, Chinas

strategies and tools of influence appear to be working. Beijing has successfully decreased Taiwans formal and informal relationships in Latin America. In addition to convincing Dominica and Grenada to switch recognition, China has opened commercial relations with Guatemala, often the first step towards switching recognition.16 China also has opened a commercial office in Haiti, another Taiwanese ally, and kept Taiwan from obtaining observer status at the Organization of American States17; Haiti, Panama, and the Dominican Republic no longer support Taiwans presence in the United Nations.18 Within a decade, Taiwan may well have no formal allies in Latin America. Beijing also has boosted trade ties.
Trade volumes between China and the hemisphere have grown from only $200 million in 1975 to roughly $50 billion in 2005, though the United States accounts for more than 40 percent of Latin American exports.19 The tide is turning, however: Argentinas exports to China rose by more than 40 percent between 1998 and 2004; Venezuelas exports to China over that same period grew by more than 19 percent; and Colombias exports grew by nearly 10 percent.20 China still lags far behind U.S. trade with the region, howeverthe United States normally accounts for half of total Latin American trade, while China is less than 5 percent. The United States annual investment in Latin America ordinarily tops $30 billion; Chinas total investment is still less than $5 billion.21 Meanwhile, Chinese firms seem to be succeeding in their strategy of amassing resources. In Venezuela, the regions major oil producer, China National Petroleum Corporation has established a joint venture with Petroleos de Venezuela, the state oil companyonce a relatively well-governed firm but now headed by Chavez loyalists. Ultimately, Chinese firms may operate as many as 15 oil fields in Venezuela.22 In Peru, an arm of China National Petroleum Corporation has purchased a stake in Pluspetrol, which has oil fields along the Ecuadorian border.23 Chinese firms also have expressed interest in upgrading Perus pipeline infrastructu re, to better bring oil to Pacific ports.24 Perhaps most important, Beijing has convinced much of Latin America that it can be a benign and constructive actor, a drastic change from regional perceptions of China only 15 years ago, when it was either not on radar screens or was viewed by many as a rising threat. Limited polling suggests that most of the hemisphere enjoys a generally positive view of China. Even in Mexico, whose export sectors compete directly with China and whose press has highlighted the negative impact of Chinas economic growth on Mexican textiles and other industries, a comprehensive opinion survey taken in 2004 shows that Mexicans worry about Chinese economic competition but that the development of China as a world power rank*s+ at the bottom of the list of threats that Mexicans consider critical.25 This sentiment potentially boosts Beijings influence. In democratic nations, leaders can move closer to China, since public sentiment supports better relations, including, potentially, closer military ties. In

less democratic nations, like Venezuela, where a small circle of elites make decisions, Chinas appeal serves the same function, allowing them to build consensus on warmer relations with Beijing.

Heg
Chinas presence in Latin America counters US hegemony
Dowd 12 (Alan W., senior fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes The Dowd Report, a monthly review of international events and their impact on U.S. national security, Countering Chinas Reach in Latin America , February 10th, 2012, ASCF, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas //EH)
The JFQ study adds that China Most Latin

has an important and growing presence in the regions military institutions . American nations, including Mexico, send officers to professional military education courses in

the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary
consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a rang e of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China

is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in Americas neighborhood.

Anti-Americanism
Chinese model in Latin America strengthens anti-democratic and anti-US movements
CRSLC 08 (Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Chinas Foreign Policy and Soft Power In South America, Asia, and Africa April 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//MM
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Chinas increasing linkages with Latin America and the Caribbean prompted growing concerns in Congress about Chinas intentions in the region beginning in 2005. House and Senate subcommittees held hearings that year on Chinas role in Latin America, while the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by Congress, held hearings on Chinas global expansion, including in the Western Hemisphere. A flurry of other research studies emerged on the issue, examining a range of issues related to Chinas growing involvement in the region. In congressional testimony and other statements, Bush Administration officials have downplayed concerns about potential threats to the United States emanating from Chinas engagem ent with Latin American nations, although they have maintained that the United States needs to be watchful of Chinas actions in the hemisphere. In April 2005 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega stated that Chinas influence in the region is minimal today, and that while Chinas presence in the hemisphere is growing, it is safe to say the United States has been and will continue to be the long-term partner of preference. 61 At the same hearing, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio Pardo-Maurer testified that there was no evidence that Chinese military activities in the Western Hemisphere, including arms sales, pose a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nevertheless, both officials cautioned that the United States needed to be aware of Chinas actions in the region. Noriega maintained that the United States would continue to monitor Chinas outreach to Latin America, just as it monitors Chinas outreach around the world. Pardo-Maurer

maintained that the United States needs to be alert to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities, particularly in the field of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible application in the region. U.S. officials have suggested that Chinese engagement with Latin America could lead to increased U.S.Chinese cooperation. At a September 2005 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemi sphere Affairs Charles Shapiro maintained that Chinas engagement with the region could lead to increased cooperation between China, the United States, and other Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters affecting regional stability, especially terrorism, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. 62 In April 2006, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon visited Beijing as part of the first U.S. consultations with China on Latin America. Prior to the trip, Shannon

acknowledged that China is an increasingly important player in Latin America, and that it was important for the two countries to understand what each other is up to in the region. He maintained that the United States sees the region as having achieved a consensus about democracy, free markets and protecting the security of the democratic state, and that the U.S. interest is to make certain that China respects this larger consensus. 63 Shannon described the consultations as constructive and positive, with China assuring the
United States that it has no plans to seek greater influence in the region beyond expanding trade.64 After several years of increased Chinese engagement with Latin America, most observers have concluded that Chinas economic involvement with the region has not posed a threat to U.S. policy or U.S. interests in the region. In terms of economic, political, and cultural linkages, the United States has remained predominant in the region. U.S. trade and investment in Latin America dwarfs that of China, while the future growth potential of such Chinese economic linkages with the region is constrained by the advantages conferred by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin America. Moreover, migration patterns to the United States from the region give the United States greater cultural ties and longer-term economic importance to the region than China could ever have. For example, remittance flows from the United States to the region amounted to $60 billion in 2006a sum greater than both foreign aid and portfolio investment flows to the region, with remittances making a significant contribution to the economies of several Caribbean and Central American nations. In its policy toward Latin America, China has been careful not to antagonize the United States in the region, and appears to understand that the United States is sensitive to involvement in its neighborhood. China has taken a lowkey approach toward the region, focusing on trade and investment opportunities that help contribute to its own economic development and managing to avoid public confrontation with the United States.65 Even Chinese relations with Venezuela are focused on oil resources rather than ideological rapport. China reportedly does not want to become a pawn in a dispute between Venezuela and the United States.66 Moreover, China reportedly has concerns that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavezs efforts at spreading his populist agenda to o ther countries in the region could unleash instability and ultimately be detrimental to Chinese trade and investment interests in the region.67

Nevertheless, other observers contend that China poses a potential threat to U.S. influence and interests in the region. First, some maintain that by presenting an alternative political and economic modelrapid economic growth and modernization alongside political authoritarianismthe PRC undermines the U.S. agenda to advance political reform, human rights and free trade in the region.68 According to this view, the Chinese model could help strengthen anti-democratic and anti-U.S. political leaders and actors in some countries. Second, according to some analysts, Chinas regional presence ultimately could have
significant strategic implications for the United States in the event of a possible military conflict with China. In this scenario, China could use its

human and commercial infrastructure in the region to disrupt and distract the United States in the hemisphere.

According to this view, Chinas increased presence in the region could also provide the country with new opportunities to collect intelligence data against U.S. forces operating in the region.69

China presence allows for the survival of anti-Americanism

Hilton 13 (Isabel, writer and broadcaster. She was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis, February 2013, China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREFNorwegian Peace-building Resource Centre, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afb c054aad9.pdf)//MM
Loans-for-oil deals, in which loans are tied to oil-export agreements, have accounted for over half of Chinas loans to the region since 2006 and 91% of them have gone to Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil (http://ase.tufts. edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChinesefinanceLatinAmerica. pdf).Venezuela has negotiated four such loans, totalling $32 billion, since 2008. Brazil signed one for $10 billion in 2009 to fund an offshore oil project using Chinese inputs. Ecuador signed a $1 billion loan-for-oil agreement in 2009 and a second one in 2010. In July 2011, it added a third for $2 billion. The sales are contractually agreed, but the price paid follows the market. Chinese loans to Latin America indicate that China funds different projects from its Western counterparts or the international financial institutions (IfIs). Whereas Western and IfI loans cover a range of governmental, social and environmental purposes, Chinese banks focus 87% of their loans on the energy, mining, infrastructure, transport and housing sectors. The benefits to China are that better infrastructure can facilitate the exports of resources, as well as providing contracts for Chinese companies. Between 2005 and 2011, the Chinese lent $33.7 billion for housing and infrastructure projects, compared with $4.4 billion from the Inter-American Development Bank and nothing from the World Bank, which favoured lending in microfinance, antipoverty and health programmes. President Hugo Chvez, amongst others, has praised the fact that Chinese

money comes with few strings attached. Some governments are tempted by the lack of stringent environmental, labour or social requirements; others are attracted to China for political reasons. Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia prefer to avoid World Bank loans because they dislike the economic liberalism of the institutions and the supervision that comes with the money. Mexico, Colombia and Peru continue to borrow from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for projects in
which the requirement to purchase from China, or give contracts to Chinese companies, would be inappropriate or burdensome. China, despite relatively high interest rates, serves as the lender of last resort for Ecuador and Argentina, which face international funding difficulties arising from their respective defaults in 20089 and 2001.

The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and social landscape in a number of ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for market reasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than Chinese values. In other cases, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss of political leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance that wish to pursue more radical political and social models. China, however, has exercised caution at times in its readiness to deploy lending. In November 2004,
when Argentinas President Kirchner secretly requested Chinese support to pay off Argentinas debt to the International Monetary fund (IMf), China refused, apparently to avoid a direct challenge to U.S. influence.

Latin America perceives China as a geopolitical alternative to US

Ellis 11 (R. Evan, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study NDU Press, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)//MM
Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and Western Institutions. China's

historical status as a "leader of the developing world" positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing
after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simn Bolvar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the

position of the PRC as a geopolitical "alternative" to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese.

In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West. Nonetheless, the

relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic. 11

China bolsters authoritarian leaders

Kurlanzick 06 (Joshua, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Charm Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale University Press, 2007), Chinas Latin Leap Forward, Portions of this article are drawn from South of the Border: Chinas Strategic Engagement in Latin America and Its Implications for the United States, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/latin_leap.pdf)//MM
How Much of a Threat? Despite Chinas successful engagement with Latin America, its growing presence in the region does not n ecessarily yet threaten U.S. interests. Thus far, there

are few signs that Beijing seeks to directly challenge Washingtons substantial military relationship with Latin America. On his trip to Latin America in 2004, Hu Jintao did not visit Colombia,
perhaps because he did not want to be seen meddling with the closest U.S. ally in South America. Some of Chinas relations in the region could benefit Washington. Chinas growing economic relationship with Latin America may prompt Beijing to take a stronger interest in regional security and thus share important regional burdens with the United States. Indeed, as China becomes more influential, it could help mediate conflicts, as it has done with North Korea in Northeast Asia. It also may play a larger role in peacekeeping operations, as China has already begun to do in Haiti. In addition, as China absorbs more of Latin Americas resources, it will provide funds for Latin governments to pay off their external debts, reducing the possibility of further financial instability in the region, potentially diminishing the flow of Latin Americas economic migrants. Despite its initial gains, though, China could founder, as Latin Americans learn more about its strategies. Less than two years after China and Brazils courtship, strains have developed in Beijings relationship with the largest nation in South America as a flood of Chinese imports has not been matched by Chinese consumption of Brazilian goods. Other Latin American nations echo the same complaint. Argentina has imposed new non-tariff barriers on categories of Chinese imports.26 Moreover, many opinion leaders perceive Beijing as an unfair competitor, due to Chinese labor practices, dumping, undervaluing its currency, and state support for certain industries.27 Some states, such as Ecuador, already fear that while China provides a welcome alternative to the United States, developing close links with Chinese oil and gas firms will leave them completely reliant on Chinese investment.28 This fear of domination may be one reason why Ecuador is weighing a slowdown on approving Chinese investments in Ecuadorian petroleum.29 Latin American companies also fear that Chinese firms will sign joint ventures and then force them to work as subcontractors and not as partners, as China National Petroleum Company allegedly has done with the Ecuadorian firm Dygoil.30 Eventually, Beijing could end up looking little different to Latin Americans than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up the region, doing nothing to improve the capacity of locals. If Chinese investment focuses on extractive industries and adds little to the skills of the local workforce, the region could become trapped in a pattern of mercantilism with China, in which it sells natural resources to buy higher-value manufactured goods, without developing a cadre of local-country managers for Chinese firms. Latin American leaders and publics also recognize that Chinas supposed dedication to developing nations is not always trustworthy, and that Chinas economic model may prove no more effective than the neoliberal model. Chinas own socioeconomic inequalities have exposed some of the failings of Sino-style development. Some scholars even express concerns about the Latin Americanization of Chinai.e. that China is becoming as economically unequal as Latin America.31 Chinas push could eventually constitute a threat to U.S. political, security, and economic interests. Chinas focus on energy could complicate U.S. access to resources. Global reserves of cheaply obtainable oil are decreasing rapidly, and Latin American importsparticularly from Venezuelaare among the nearest and cheapest for the United States. Since reserves in most of Latin America are projected to begin declining by the end of this decade, these imports will become even more crucial to U.S. energy needs.32 Venezuela has not only threatened to cut off all U.S. shipments but also has said that it plans to boost exports to China from the current 140,000 barrels of crude oil per day to 500,000 barrels.33 Even as Venezuela increases shipments to China, U.S. demand for oil is unlikely to decreaseforecasts suggest imports could rise by as much as 60 percent in the next 20 years. Growing U.S. demand, combined with a shift in Venezuelan exports, could force Washington to become vastly more dependent on Middle Eastern oil.34 This has obvious security consequences.35 Furthermore, as it has done in Asia, China

could use its cooperative agreements in Latin America as building blocks for more substantial strategic partnerships that resemble formal alliances. These alliances ultimately could be used to counter U.S. regional interests. In Central Asia, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was
dismissed for years as a talk shop. But China used it to build closer ties with Central Asia and to promote regional support for a reduction in U.S. military bases. Worse, if

Beijings influence undermines democratization in Latin America, it could bolster authoritarian leaders in the region. Finding another major source of economic assistance and diplomatic support might allow actors like Chavez more freedom to undermine U.S. counter-narcotics and counterterrorism initiatives in, for example, Colombia. The best way for Washington to guard against these possibilities, however, is not to inflate the Chinese threat but to re-engage with Latin America, rebuilding a

comprehensive relationship with this regionnot only with a few key allies like Colombia. Chinas success in the Western
Hemisphere derives in good part from failed U.S. policies, such as an overemphasis on counterterrorism and overreliance on a small number of conservative leaders to make policy in the region. Such a renewed relationship could begin by addressing what Latin America scholar Julia Sweig calls the 80/20 problem, in which Washington relies on elites20 percent of the populationto understand entire countries. Interacting with the other 80 percent of populations, including more contacts with non-governmental organizations, political activists, advocates for the poor, and religious leaders, would foster deeper ties. Washington also could re-emphasize core U.S. strengths. When

Latin Americans perceive the United States as helping them achieve a free, rights-oriented system, Americas appeal in the region surges. As Sweig writes, during the 1990s Washington often set forth a positive agenda in Latin America by backing civil
societies recovering from years of war and promoting democracy. Latin America welcomed the new approach...the message from the North was largely positive, inclusive, and respectful, Sweig notes.36 If

Washington returned to that approach, Chinas leap

forward would surely slow down.

US-sino conflict
China presence in Latin America leads to US-China conflict
Ellis 5 (R. Evan, expert who focuses on defense transformation and Latin American security issues, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, June 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf an associate with Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.)//MM
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY It is not necessary

to postulate Chinese troops and bases in Latin America in order to conclude that an expanded Chinese presence in the region has enormous consequences for U.S. national security, and as such, warrants serious examination. During the past century, the U.S. military was deeply engaged in the politics of Asia, consistent with the view that such global engagement made our own hemisphere more secure. In the present century, by contrast, the United States repeatedly will be forced to choose how much Chinese engagement in our own hemisphere we can afford to ignore on the grounds that it does not constitute an immediate threat. In general, the Chinese presence in Latin America reects signicant erosion in the relative power and geopolitical position of the United States, and the advent of a new century in which the United States is preoccupied about Chinese adventurism in the Americas, balancing out traditional Chinese concerns about the U.S. presence in Asia. The dynamics and potential consequences of these trends range from economic damage to the United States to the potential for signicant crises which, if mismanaged, could bring about direct conict between the United States and China in this hemisphere.
Some of the most immediate consequences of the current Chinese engagement in Latin America involve the economic security of the United States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that Latin American countries sign free trade agreements both with China and with the United States, American markets will become increasingly open to duty free Chinese productssomething that China has never been able to obtain through direct negotiations with the United States.129 The free trade accord that Chile has negotiated with the United States, for example, in combination with the one that Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises the possibility that Chile (or other Latin American nations pursuing similar agreements) could be used as a pass through, country, by which Chinese goods were sold without tariffs to U.S. markets. Although the U.S.-led initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently experiencing difculties, its achievement would compound U.S. vulnerability to this Chinese competition.

Increasing Chinese influence triggers realpolitik response from US

Watson 07 (Cynthia A., Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, U.S. Responses to Chinas Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//MM
CONCLUSIONS Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to crea te more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin The basis to Beijings involvement in this region is largely the opening left by Latin Americas virtual despair and utter frustration with the lack of ability to get Washington to engage in this region. CONCLUSIONS Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even

vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benet from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure

economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signicant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will
seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To

accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. With U.S. interests directed
elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors. Washington should not blame Beijing for moving into an area made attractive because of historic and current absence of consistent U.S. policies.

Yes esc
US-China war over Latin America escalates globally.
Fergusson 12 (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.eir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H We have detailed Chinas growing challenge to US dominance in Latin America, dealing for the most part in economic terms, but some

believe that Chinas economic challenge inevitably gives rise to a simultaneous military threat.
Denny Roy suggests that:

[97]

If China fulfils its expected potential, it will soon be a power in the class of 19th century Britain, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Pacific War Japan, and 20th century America. Each of those countries used its superior power to establish some form of hegemony to protect and promote its interests. There is no convincing reason to think China as a great power will depart from this pattern. [98] This is a central tenet of the China threat, that a rising power will seek to borrow a phrase its place in the sun at the expense of global stability. The history of the world suggests that prosperity and advancement will naturally strengthen Chinas military power something that worries the United States. *99+ The U.S is worried because in our current unipolarity, global stability is intrinsically linked to the permanence of the hegemon. The Director of the Asian Studies Centre at the Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, has been quoted as saying that Chinas grand strategy was to gather as many friends and allies as possible to counter U.S dominance in the region [100] in an attempt to balance against US power. [101] The idea that China is trying to create an anti-U.S coalition is a frequently cited one, as many pundits think that Chinas aim is undermining the United States around the world and raising China to a position of dominant international political and military power. [102] This point of view is held by a vocal minority who choose to interpret Chinese actions as designed against the
United States. Military build up and U.S concerns

The U.S is concerned with the potential for China to attain a forward base from which to disrupt key U.S interests. The Commander of the Southern Command General Bantz J. Craddock told a hearing of the House Armed Service
Committee that: The PRCs growing dependence on the global economy and the necessity of protecting access to food, energy, raw materials and export markets has forced a shift in their military strategy. The PRCs 2004 Defence Strategy White Paper departs from the past and promotes a power-projection military, capable of securing strategic shipping lanes and protecting its growing economic interests abroad. [103] The key idea here is that China

might begin to exert itself and the U.S may find that it is not the only player in the Latin American equation. To give you an idea of how alien and disturbing a concept this is to the U.S, the Western hemisphere is not even considered a part of the game board in grand strategy analyst Zbigniew Brzezinskis The Grand Chessboard [104].

Laundry list
Chinese influence in the region leads to cyber-attacks, trafficking, arms sales, and cranks US-Latin American relations.
GIGA FOCUS 13 (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Leibniz-Institut fur Globale und Regionale Studien, The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of Chinas Relations toward Latin America 2013, http://www.gigahamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf)//MM In the future, however, there might be concerns with regard to rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities, particularly in the elds of intelligence, communications, and cyber warfare, and their possible application in the region. In general, there have been some concerns that China has been using surveillance facilities in Cuba to intercept US radio and telephone transmissions and to practice cyber espionage. During the rst cycle of debate about Chinas presence in Latin America, the Taiwan factor was an important topic given that
(at that time) the region (including the Caribbean) contained 12 of the 25 countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Therefore, it was speculated that China would try to lure away Latin American countries and, as a result, negatively aect Taiwans international status. This topic later received less attention in the United States because China only achieved some limited success that is, Costa Rica ceased to recognize Taiwan and also suered setbacks with regard to small Caribbean islands. Today, 11 of the 23 countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan are still located in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The second cycle of US concern regarding the dragon in the backyard started at the beginning of this decade. The US economy had been debilitated by the nancial crisis of 20072008, while Chinese trade with Latin America was still growing
at high rates. Between 2000 and 2011, US participation in Latin American exports and imports went down from 59.7 percent to 39.6 percent and from 50.4 percent to 30.1 percent, respectively. During the same period, Chinese participation in Latin American exports and imports grew from 1.1 percent to 8.9 percent and 1.8 percent to 13.8 percent, respectively. In Brazil (a key country), China overtook the United States as the most important trade partner. In 2011, China was the rst or second most important destination for exports in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries (CEPAL 2012). Moreover, trade with China was increasingly supplemented by Chinese investment and Chinese credits. As Gallagher et al (2012: 27) found, China has committed approximately 75 billion USD in loans to Latin American countries since 2005. Chinas loan commitments of 37 billion USD in 2010 were more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the US Ex-Im Bank combined for that year. In 2009, China also joined the Inter-American Development Bank. China lends money to countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, which have problems borrowing money in the global nancial market. Chinese banks do not attach political conditionality to their loans. However, they do generally tie their loans to the purchase of Chinese goods. Around two-thirds of Chinese loans combined a loan agreement with an oil sale agreement (oil for loans). Chinese loans are also used for infrastructure projects. Dierent Types of Challenges for the United States Taking a broader look at the current perceptions of the challenges that Chinas activities in Latin America present to US interests, one

can dierentiate between economic, military, and geopolitical challenges, on the one hand, and direct and indirect challenges as well as normal challenges and challenges in extraordinary situations, on the other hand. However, in recent documents and declarations, the US governments reaction to Chinas growing presence has generally been quite muted. In their Key Strategic
Issue List for 2012/2013, the US Army War College lists ve issues for the Western Hemisphere (Strategic Studies Institute 2012); one of which is the need to assess the strategic implications of increased Chinese engagement in Latin America. In contrast, the 2012 and 2013 briengs of the Congressional Research Service on Key Issues for Congress in Latin America and the Caribbean do not mention China. Moreover, in an October 2011 hearing before the Committee on Foreign A airs of the House of Representatives on Emerging Threats and Security in the Western Hemisphere, China was not a very prominent topic being mentioned only twice. Responding to one representatives questions as to whether Chinas activities in the Western Hemisphere were considered a serious emerging threat, Philip Goldberg, head of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, answered that there were some economic challenges and some minor diplomatic challenges related to the fact that both China and Brazil are involved in the BRICS group. However,

Chinas weapon sales to the region are not seen as a

major security problem.

From a broader perspective, however, the

delivery of Chinese military equipment to Latin America and ChineseLatin American military cooperation are seen with mixed emotions. China has increased personnel exchanges and institutional contacts with Latin American militaries and has participated with the military police in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004. Much more important from the US point of view are
military sales to Latin America starting with unsophisticated items such as personal equipment and military clothing, and moving up to more sophisticated military equipment such as aircraft (ghters and transport) and radar and telecommunication systems (also for civilian use).

Chinas main clients have been Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia (Ellis 2011a). On the one hand, Chinas donations or
sales of military equipment at relatively low prices were perceived as a contribution to the ability of poor governments in the region to assert

control over national territory and to confront drug tracking. On the other hand, the willingness of China to sell low -cost arms to countries in conict with the US, such as Venezuela, undercuts the ability of the United States to impose sanctions or controls on the arms purchases of such countries (Ellis 2011a, 2012). However, only in

an extreme case of open hostility between the United States and China would Chinas military cooperation with and weapon sales to Latin America become a genuine security threat to the United States. In such a context, China would be able to create diversionary crises or conduct disruption operations in close proximity to the United States for example, by trying to close o strategic choke points such as the Panama Canal (Ellis 2011a) or using the presence of Chinese logistic
companies in major Latin American ports. But for the moment, as one specialist argues (Ellis 2011a: 9), nothing in the public discourse of the Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that Latin America is considered in the short term as a base for military operations. Nevertheless, the US expectation is that Chinese military engagement with Latin America is likely to be a growing and enduring part of the regional dynamic (Ellis 2011a: 46). There

are some minor concerns with regard to the expansion of ties between organized crime in China and Latin America, especially with regard to tracking (of humans, narcotics/precursor chemicals, contraband and arms) and money laundering (Ellis 2012b). But these
developments are not blamed on the Chinese government. In general, US and Chinese cooperation in chemical control and counternarcotic operations is evaluated as positive. In a 2011 congressional hearing, Daniel L. Glaser, assistant secretary for Terrorist Financing at the Department of Treasury, denied there was any Chinese activity in the region that would raise illicit-nancing concerns and argued that cooperating with China will be part of the solution for the problem (U.S. House of Representatives 2011). There have also been criticisms that Washington has been overly complacent with regard to the geo-economic implications of Chinas entrance into the Americas and the loss of markets due to Chinese advances in trade and investment (Farnsworth 2012). However, other analysts see Chinese investments in Latin America as having had a limited impact on US interests. Sullivan (2013), for instance, points out that the United States remains the single largest trading partner for many Latin American countries and that US trade with the region (800 billion USD) was more than three times the amount of Chinas in 2012. While the purchase of goods from China has, to some degree, displaced Latin American purchases of products from US companies, Ellis (2012a: 5) makes the point that in many cases US-registered companies actually produce part or all of their products in the PRC or they source components there, increasing the competitiveness of those goods as they sell them to Latin America and other markets.

Nonetheless, deepening economic relations between China and Latin American countries may have an indirect, negative impact on US-Latin American relations (Ellis 2012a; Farnsworth 2012) by undermining the ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in the region. These growing relations with China send the signal to Latin American governments that economic development can be achieved without adhering to Western proscriptions. Regimes hostile to the United States can turn their backs on Western lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus, countries could sidestep the negative consequences of actions deemed hostile to the interests of the United States and US companies for example, defaulting on loans or nationalizing industries, amongst other things.

Latin American instability

US soft power in Latin America ensures stability
OHanlon and Petraeus 4/30 (Michael E., Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Gen. David, former director of the CIA, FundDont CutU.S. Soft Power Brookings Institute, April 30, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/30-us-soft-power-ohanlon-petraeus)//MM
The presidents budget proposal is now on the streets of Washington, D.C. Currently, it would protect funding for the State D epartment and the Agency for International Development and related activities from further cuts. The combined annual budget for development aid, security aid and diplomacy has averaged close to $60 billion over the past half decade. That is now slated to decline to about $50 billion, partly due to reduced war-related costs. But this amount could come under intense scrutiny. Moreover, if there is no grand bargain between the president and the Congress, sequestration could force reductions of a further 10 percent. Such an outcome would be bad for our nations security. As each of us has testified on Capitol Hill in past years Americas

ability to protect itself and advance its global interests often depends as much on its softer power as it does on our nations armed forces. For example, though Latin American countries were themselves primarily responsible for their progress, the headway many of them made in stabilizing their countries in recent years has been a big plus for American security, too and American aid had a role in that progress.
That is part of why we have supported a budget deal that would repeal sequestration and achieve most further deficit reduction through savings in entitlement spending with similar increases in revenue generation. Implicit in

our approach was the thinking that

lawmakers should avoid the temptation to gut foreign aid just because it generally lacks a strong constituency in the
United States. Americas spending on development and diplomacy and security aid the so-called 150 account has strengthened under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. That has been a positive and long overdue development. Funds for diplomacy and development were starved in much of the 1990s. Some of the reductions in that earlier period were warranted, admittedly, as aid then was not always as productive as it might have been. Today, we are arguably doing a good deal better. Various forms of development assistance and aid have, in fact, produced impressive results on a host of fronts in recent years. The Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a major initiative of Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton and now President Obama, has played a significant role in helping to turn the tide against the HIV/AIDS epidemic even if more work remains to be done. Development assistance has also helped more than 600 million people move out of extreme poverty, achieving one of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals several years before the 2015 target date. Moreover, as John Podesta has recently written, in this century alone, aid

has helped reduce the global childhood mortality rate by one-third impressive, even if only halfway toward the U.N. goal for 2015. The maternal mortality rate has been reduced by almost half, as well. And progress has been seen in other sectors such as agriculture, energy and other realms, including many in the combat zones where each of us spent considerable time in the past decade.
America deserves considerable credit for much of this progress, as the U.S. is the worlds largest aid contributor, at roug hly $30 billion in 2012. The United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan round out the rest of the top five donors, each providing from $10 billion to $15 billion a year. But relative to our economys size, America does not do more than its fair share; it provides just 0.19 percent of gross domestic product in development aid, similar to Japans level but less than half that of the three big European donors listed above, and less than a third the U.N. goal of 0.7 percent of GDP. Private donations improve our net national position somewhat, but only to an extent. The State Department budget is still less than 5 percent of the militarys and the number of Foreign Service officers worldwide is less than half the number of soldiers in a single Army division.

Given our military contributions to international stability and the global economic growth that results from that stability in various areas, American foreign aid doesnt need to grow substantially. But it should not be cut further. Consider some of the ideas we might want to consider in the years ahead. These should not be unconditional offers of help but
would require the right kind of cooperation from key nations abroad whose future stability is central to our own security: A possible deal to help Egypt revive economic growth and service its debt after a two-year economic downturn following its Arab Spring; this would be contingent on President Mohamed Morsi respecting the Egyptian constitution and helping us with Middle East peace; A possible proposal to help Pakistan reinvigorate its energy sector, which currently holds back the countrys growth and compromises its quality of life; this would be contingent on Pakistan contributing more to security in the region and to pursuing reforms that reduce disincentives for significant private initiatives in the energy arena; A major push with other donors to help countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo reform and strengthen their security forces; Aid for transitional governments in Libya, Yemen and Mali, and perhaps someday Syria, to get on their feet so they can stabilize, develop security forces, police their own territories and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuaries; Ongoing help in future years for Afghanistans government provided that it takes steps toward better governance and a sound election in 2014.

This agenda need not break the bank; even taken together, development aid and assistance and these initiatives would not remotely add up to another Marshall Plan. But this discussion suggests that our security will be improved by sustaining foreign aid in the years ahead rather than by making further cuts.

Iran
US key to check Iranian influence
Southern Pulse 2/6 (professional services firm deeply rooted in the field, with a network of investigators that operates across the Americas, Iran: Expanding its sphere of influence in Latin America Open Briefingthe civil society intelligence agency, February 6, 2013, http://www.openbriefing.org/regionaldesks/americas/iran-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america/)//MM
Background State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally.

Recognizing Tehrans growing influence in its backyard, President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Irans growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere. The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGCs Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners. The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its secondlargest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. Not surprisingly, one

of Irans strongest relationships in the region is with fellow anti-imperialist Hugo Chvez in Venezuela. The friendship between Chvez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaraguaall staunch Chvez supporters.
In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, who later defended Irans right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. In 2013 Iran

will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western Hemisphere. Chvez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. On 31
January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcastings (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region. More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence:

On 21 January 2013, German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Tahmasb Mazaher, Irans former Central Bank Director. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German
authorities confiscated the check while they investigate. On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007. Commentary

Although Iranian influence on a certain segment of Latin America, namely the Bolivarian Alliance (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amrica, or ALBA), its burgeoning prominence in the politics of non-ALBA Latin states should worry the U.S. In 2009 the Argentine delegation walked out on Ahmadinejads speech at the U.N. In 2011, they
sat and listened as he verbally attacked Western powers. In the eyes of the United States, the Countering Iran Act is grounded in the precedents of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the Roosevelt Corollary (1904). Both

axioms invoke the United States right to intervene in the event that a nonhemispheric actor disrupts regional peace and safety. That precept justified action against Soviet communism in Latin America during the Cold War, though since the 1990s, Washingtons perennial

preoccupation with other areas of focus across the world significantly diluted any remnant soft power threat the Monroe Doctrine may pose in Latin America in 2013. For its part, an Iranian military commander already predicted the failure of the Countering Iran Act, noting the legislation will not deter Iran from continuing to engage Latin America. For both Iran and its ALBA allies, U.S. annoyance is a motivating factor to move forward with cooperation, not a deterrence. So far in 2013, Iran is gaining ground as support for the U.S. and E.U. erodes.

Enviro
Chinese engagement threatens environmentally sensitive areas Plus, Chinese standards arent adequate Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the
Global Economic Governance Initiative, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon, The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental concerns are at an all-time high.

Cuba

Non-Unique
Non-unique The U.S. increased agricultural and medical exports to Cuba should have triggered the link Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. , author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States, The Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University, June 2009, online, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf, accessed 7/16/13) PE As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term investments, partnerships with Cuba could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009 the Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for future industrial engagement. Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment, medical apparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that have already benefited from Chinese trade credits. Such steps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese counterparts in Cuba, and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would advance U.S. strategic interests if extended to the oil sector.

Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient

of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

A2: Cuba Models China

Cuba wont use the Chinese model its too wary of foreign control Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the
University of Sydney, China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 168-168, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that they intend to follow a China model of development. A historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has long coloured the character of the islands international engagement, and relations with China appear to be no exception. Spanish colonialism in the nineteenth century, along with US domination in the first half of the twentieth century and Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses. Cuba learned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic structures, an admission made by Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Cuban government began to experiment with decentralisation, manifested in the constitutional reforms of 1992, which facilitated the division of Havana into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, and the passage of Decree Law 143, which allowed local management of Havanas historic centre, the countrys most dynamic economic zone. While the revitalisation of Old Havana under the Office of the Historian of the City was a considerable success, the broader push for decentralisation exhibited more ambivalent results. The liberalisation of resources and the devolution of executive capacities did not keep pace with local plans, and overly China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba 169 rigid structures of monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity (Fernndez Soriano 1999).

A2: Oil Link

Chinese drilling co-op with Cuba is a myth Politico, 06-12-08, Politico Live, Report: No Chinese offshore drilling near Cuba,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0608/Report_Chinese_arent_drilling_near_Cuba.html The GOP is in the midst of a coordinated effort to slam Democrats for a seemingly outrageous contradiction: While Democratswith the help of Florida Republicansblock oil drilling off the Florida shore, China is doing just that a mere 60 miles off the coast of Cuba. Vice President Dick Cheney, House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) have all raised the specter of Chinese drilling off Cubas coast. In a recent speech, Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that "drilling is under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation with Cuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." The truth of that claim, however, is seriously in doubt. Democrats today pointed to a February 29, 2008 Congressional Research Service that found *w+hile there has been some concern about Chinas potential involvement in offshore deepwater oil projects, to date its involvement in Cubas oil sector has been focused on onshore oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). Sen. Mel Martinez, a Florida Republican, took to the Senate floor Wednesday and called the alleged Cuba drilling akin to urban legend.

A2: Embargo Link

Theres no link ending the embargo doesnt mean increased trade with the U.S. Suchlicki, 13 (Jaime, Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies, University of Miami, author of multiple books on Cuba and Mexico, What If...the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?, An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Issue 185, February 26, 2013, Online, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications. Trade - All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. - Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba's major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums.

China supports the plan UN 11

United Nations General Assembly Department of Public Information News and Media Division New York Sixty-sixth General Assembly Plenary 41st & 42nd Meetings (AM & PM)SPEAKERS DENOUNCE CUBAN EMBARGO AS SAD ECHO OF FAILED COLD WAR POLITICS; GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FOR TWENTIETH YEAR, DEMANDS LIFTING OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE DIEGO LIMERES (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 developing countries and China, noted that last years announcement by the United States on the relaxation of travel restrictions and transfer of remittances had given hope that steps were being taken in the right direction. But a year later, it was clear that those measures had had only limited effect and that the embargo was still in place. Largely unchanged, it continued to impose severe economic and financial restrictions on Cuba that negatively impacted the well-being of its people. Further, it frustrated efforts towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The embargo against Cuba contravened the fundamental norms of international law, international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, violating the principles of the sovereign equality of States and of non-intervention and non-interference in each others domestic affairs, as the Group of 77 and China had pointed out many times before. At the second South-South Summit in Doha in 2005, the Group had rejected the imposition of laws and regulations with extraterritorial impact and all other forms of coercive economic measures, including unilateral sanctions against developing countries. Recalling that last year a large majority - 187 Member States - had voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by Cuba, he said that the Group of 77 and China fully supported the current text calling for an end to the embargo and urged all Member States to do so.

Mexico

Non-Unique
China will have less influence in Mexico unhealthy trade partnership Funaro 13 (Kaitlin Funaro is a GlobalPost breaking news writer. Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America.
Global Post 3 June 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-usinfluence-latin-ame EW Chinese President Xi

Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas to position China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a threeday visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto are expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal."

Venezuela

Uniqueness
Non-unique Chinas influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low snubs in recent visits H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, Why has China snubbed Cuba and
Venezuela?, Jun 6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PE Xi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as Chinas president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijings strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)two countries that are at least as much a part of Americas orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the Beijing Consensus. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chvez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicitys sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as Chinas is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuelas oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the islands latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xis visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obamas pivot to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in Americas backyard. Chinas business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexicos National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the regions commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil has been modest at best Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and
Professor of International Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in the University of California, San Diego. CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENT INTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf) China also has an obvious interest in Venezuelan oil, and Chvez has visited China six times in his drive to win Chinese investment and energy purchases, and thereby create a soft balance to U.S. power. Yet by all accounts (i.e., Ellis and Halper), Beijing has been cautious in building relations with the volatile Venezuelan caudillo. Chinese investment in Venezuelas energy sector remains modest, and its purchases of Venezuelan crude continue to fall well below the ambitious goals set by Chvez. As Luisa Palacios points out in her essay in Chinas Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, there are technical obstacles: Venezuelan heavy crude is incompatible with existing Chinese refineries, whereas geographic proximity to the United States makes it the more natural market for Venezuelan oil: travel time by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast is only five days, compared to forty days to reach China. Moreover, there is some evidence that China wants to avoid becoming embroiled in Venezuela-U.S. tensions and considers the confrontational Chvez something of a risky bet. Overall, Palacios concludes that, although Chinese natural resource companies are slowly gaining a foothold in Latin America as part of their global drive to diversify their energy portfolios, the region is not poised to become a significant supplier of oil to China.

Relations Unsustainable
China-Venezuelan relations failure inevitable without Chavez. Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former
China Analyst for US government, Perspective on the Future of China-Venezuela Relations, InterAmerican Dialogue, March 22, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3266)
According to Matt Ferchen, however, the

strength of the China-Venezuela strategic partnership will likely be tested in the coming years. China is unprepared for the possibility of significant political and economic instability in Venezuela, he added, and is fearful of losing its preferred status in a post-Chvez government. Ferchen agreed that economic complementarity exists between China and Venezuela, and will play a role in future engagement, but suggested that the extent of future cooperation between China and Venezuela will depend upon economic and political developments in the South American nation. Andrs Rojas Jimnez explained that Chinas loans have done little to strengthen Venezuelas economy. Following the creation of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000 bpd in 2012. But Venezuelas external debt also increased considerably. In 2012, Chinese loans accounted for 25 percent of Venezuelas total external debt. Venezuela is also increasingly dependent upon oil exports for economic growth; exports of non-traditional goods are at the same levels as a decade ago. PdVSA, furthermore, has consistently fallen short of the eventual 800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently criticized Venezuela for delays on certain projects, including some in the Orinoco.