DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R. NOS.

99289-90; 27 JAN 1993]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was
issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the
instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that the Sandiganbayan acted w/o or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing

the

hold

departure

order

considering

that

it

had

not

acquired

jurisdiction

over

the

person

of

the

petitioner.

Issue: Whether the respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over his person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered,aside

from

the

fact

Held: motion denied

See samesame for the continuation

that

she

has

not

validly

posted

bail

since

she

never

personally

appeared

before

said

court.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
-----------------------------------------------PEOPLE v CABRAL
303 SCRA 361
ROMERO; February 18, 1999
NATURE
Special Civil Action
FACTS
- Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15
year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure
temporary liberty, the accused filed a motion for bail
which was opposed by the petitioner.
- The lower court grated the motion on the ground
that despite the crime alleged to have been
committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence thus far presented is not strong enough to
warrant denial of the bail. The judge in concluding
thus cited the fact that the girl went with the
offender voluntarily and did not resist during the
commission of the rape. In addition, the judge quoted
the medico legal report as not conclusion that rape
was in fact committed consideration that the
lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or
months old when the medical examination was
performed six days after the offense occurred.
- The CA affirmed the decision saying that there was
no abuse of discretion in this case. There is grave
abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to

an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to

perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. The People filed the
appeal on the ground that while the judge had
discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused this
discretion.
ISSUE
- WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is
strong evidence proving respondents guilt for the
crime charged.
HELD
YES
- The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed
to mention and include some facts which are
significant factors and circumstances which are
strong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of the
said factors and circumstances would have resulted
in the denial of bail.
Reasoning
- Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights
provides:
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. the right to bail shall not be

impaired even when the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
- Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
criminal prosecution.
- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a
matter of right considering that the punishment for
the offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the
bail is dependent on the evidence of the guilt which
should which should be strong to justify denial. this
determination is a matter of judicial discretion.
- By judicial discretion, the law mandates the
determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or
evident proof is this connection, has been held to
mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well
guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion
that an offense has been committed as charged, that
the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered. Presumption great exists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the inference
of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong,
clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a
great presumption of guilt.
- In the case of an application for bail, the duties of
the judge are as follows:

1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the

application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its discretion
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond. Otherwise the petition should be denied.
- Based on the duties, the courts order granting or
denying bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined
as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or
digest of a test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY
SHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION
OR RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The
Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to
what pieces of evidence should be included in the
summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered
defective in form and substance which cannot be
sustained or be given a semblance of validity.
Dispositive Grant of bail is declared void. The court
should issue a warrant of arrest of Odiamar if his bail
bond has been approved.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG [dissenting]
- The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the
rules of Court are not open when the question is
whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of

sound discretion. These special reliefs are available

only when the judge has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

in his decision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring

the evidence or completely acting on bias and whim.

------------------------------------------BASCO vs. RAPATALO 269 SCRA 220

THE FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for
May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge
reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition
for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecutions witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the
hearing to July 17, 1995.
Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the
petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995was issued on
the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: No objection: P80,000.00,
signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the
basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was aborted and instead arraignment took
place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as the latters recommendation
setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on
whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing
since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the
public prosecutor recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest
was issued on account of complainants motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion
for reconsideration.Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without
receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
ISSUE: WON-the evidence of guilt is strong,being a matter of judicial dicretion,remains with the judge.

HELD: DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is hereby
REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability
of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom
the judges might not want to release.
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal action.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature
of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence
in rebuttal.
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion,
by its very nature involves the exercise of the judges individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules
which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong.
On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
The cited cases (w/c I didnt include kse madami) are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make
an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct
a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. A hearing is
likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v.Domagas, is for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even
if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to
ascertain not only the strength of the state s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should
then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order
granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of
the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecutions declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondents assertion, however,
that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latters familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the
preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated
duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the courts determination after a hearing that the guilt of
the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the
prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutors
recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing since Section 8 of
Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accuseds provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong can be traced to the case ofHerras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons. It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided 50 years ago
under a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy.
The said instructions given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 crucial sentence The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the
Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. is not found in the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to
present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. The prosecution under the revised provision is
duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to
the accused. However, the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If

the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure the
provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, SC reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications.
------------------------------------JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR., ETC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MELECIO B. BORJA, ET AL., respondents.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his

minority had been proved by his birth certificate and that the
offense charged is not capital because even if convicted, he could
not be sentenced to death because of his minority. But such was
denied by the respondent Judge.

A motion praying that he be placed in the care and custody of the

Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant to
Article 191 Child and Youth Welfare Code was filed. But it was
again denied by the respondent judge.

NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted its report declaring

that it was the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not
the petitioner, who killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. When the
murder case was next called for hearing, the defense unilaterally
moved orally that the trial of petitioner be reset in order to give the
City Fiscal more time to study the NBI report, but the motion was
denied as dilatory.

G.R. No. L-65228 February 18, 1985

PLANA, J.:FACTS:

Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the
killing of one Ramon Abiog. He filed a motion for bail based on
two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not strong in view
of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution
witnesses, of his previous statement naming petitioner as the
assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years, entitled as such
to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code which would make the murder charge
against him non-capital. But respondent Judge Borja denied the
motion for bail on the finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt
is strong and his minority was not proved.

Hence the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, with two
supplementary petitions, seeking the release of petitioner on bail
or his transfer to the custody of the MSSD.

Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under

Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, a capital offense is
"an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to
bail, may be punished by death." It is clear from this provision
that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the
penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is
relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the Constitution
or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a
finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying
circumstances.

To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed

would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the
commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a
complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to
render a decision in the case. Such procedure would defeat the
purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending trial.

Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection

that the accused is only 16 years old, it follows that, if
convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law," which effectively rules out the death
penalty. And since in the case at bar, the petitioner has proved his
minority based on the evidence submitted, it has an error on the
part of the respondent judge to deny such.

ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

HELD: YES

Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those charged with

capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties." (Article IV, Section
18.) Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of right before
conviction, unless the accused is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is strong.

The charge against petitioner is murder

qualified by treachery and attended by two
aggravating
circumstances:
evident
premeditation and nocturnity. Punishable by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.
The petitioner however submits that even
assuming that the evidence of guilt against him
is strong, the charge of murder, as to him who is
only 16 years old, cannot be capital because the
death penalty cannot be imposed on account of
his minority which entitles him to a penalty
reduction of one degree. In effect, under
petitioner's submission, the test to determine

-----------------------------------------PEOPLE VS HERNANDO October 28, 1999

Thursday, January 29, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Criminal Law
Facts: Accused, spouses Elpidio and Elena Hernando, were engaged in the business of importing Apple and IBM computers. Complainant, Johnny Sy, is
the owner of Palomino Club Restaurant. Spouses Hernando were good customers of Sy. Because of "pakikisama" and because of Elpidio's assurances that the
checks issued by Elena in five dates, in payment of an obligation, were good, Sy accepted the same. The checks were all dishonored upon presentment
for payment to the bank because the account had been closed. Upon demand, Elpidio refused to pay, and even threatened Sy that he has goons and politician
friends.

The

trial

court

found

the

spouses

guilty

of

estafa.

Issues: Whether the trialcourt committed (1)erroneous application of the cited jurisprudence and commentaries to support the finding of fraud;(2)failure of
the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused spouses beyond reasonable doubt;and(3)conspiracy between accused spouses was never proven.

Held: Appealed decision affirmed with modification. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.Settled is the rule
that,to constitute estafa,the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and,as such,it should
be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud;In this kind of estafa by postdating or issuing a badcheck,deceit and damage are essential elements of
the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
--------------------------------------