Remembering Agha H Amin

Major general Naushad Kiani

10 November 2013 Note My dear class fellow Major general Naushad Kiani is not the main subject of this write up. The subject is Pakistani apathy . Pakistan has degraded to such a level that when a commander who remains calm even when real hell is played with the country is regarded as great commander ! what a great general who calmly smokes as the country burns ! that is coolness under fire ! that is a fighting general ! my friend Brig Simon calls him ROYAL SALUTE !

the pakistani style of naukri is stay out of trouble . the civilians or the country can go to hell ! THE PRIME STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IS TO MAKE REAL ESTATE ! TO GET RICH ! TO BLOCK KAMRAN SHAFIS APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO UK ! THE PRIME AIM IS NOT TO FIGHT AND TO MAKE CAREERS WITHOUT THE DIGNITY OF DANGER ! Remembering Agha H Amin It was November 1977 and I had joined the Forman Christian College , Lahore. Major general Naushad Kiani

Brigadier Ajit Mudholkar from India, and Brigadier Naushad Kayani from Pakistan, members of the Jim Thorpe Sports Day tennis team, share a laugh with one of the coaches, Capt. Derek Leo, post Judge Advocate. Photo by Thomas Zimmerman. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/newsArticle.cfm?id=4

A stunningly handsome young man sat next to me in the statistics class conducted by the legendary Hafiz Tariq.

I soon made acquaintance of the gentleman , one Naushad Kiani.

Also with us was Pervez Afzal , son of a PTDC official from Mansehra. Adeel Kazi who was my school fellow in Saint Marys Lalazar since 1971 was also there and headed the students union. Ehtesham broter of Colonel haroon (Lal Masjid-commando) was an year

senior.Shahid hamid (later major generalnow deceased) was one year senior. Taimur Aslam son of Briadier Aslam Dandy (SP- artillery) , another classfellow from Saint Marys Lalazar, had joined the college one year late.

younger brother of Pervez Afzal , gulrez on extreme right Yet another class fellow , Aamir from Saint

Marys had joined the junior cadet battalions course JC 3 and was later commissioned in 7 Baloch , passing out with 64 Long Course. So had Waqar , a dear friend and class fellow from Saint Marys who had again joined JC 3 and was commissioned in the Punjab Regiment with 64 Long Course.Later Waqar joined aviation. We frequently interacted in the college and sometimes Naushad came to the weekend movies at the Services Club. Naushad was stunningly handsome as earlier stated and thus very popular in Lahores female crowd. We left the FC College in December 1979 and Naushad joined the army with 65 Long course. I joined an year late in May 1981.

First meeting with Naushad at the PMA reception was memorable with Naushad wearing corporals stripes. Naushad instantly recognised me and was courteous and very friendly. We met at the PMA till Naushad passed out in March 1982 for one year. When I attended the Company eavy Weapon Course another future MI chief Captain Asif

was my instructor.Captain Naveed Zaman was also an instructor but not wit our course.Other eminent instructors include hameed ulla Qazi from 6 FF , perhaps the most outstanding.Naveed Zaman and Asif were particularly friendly with my mess mate Captain Raja Khalid from 29 S and T and frequently partied with him. My friend Syed Abid ussain was quite friendly with this group Naushad was commissioned in the Punjab regiment and we met 12 years later at the command and staff college quettas front stairs in July 1994 . i had left the army in December 1993 and was visiting old instructor and dear friend Colonel Naeem (27 Cavalry-later major general)

Naushad was attending the staff course. Waqar was staff officer with the commandant major general saeed uz zafar.

We did not meet after July 1994 but I knew that Naushad was serving. Naushad headed the military intelligence during a fateful time in pakistans history. the picture that i saw in Baluchistan about how intelligence was working was not very bright there was either an excessive over kill in the style of my friend from Chab or there was non chalance which was out of touch with reality the most prized possession was the xli corolla probably introduced by major general nadeem ijaz , out of all the DMIs probably the boldest. after nadeem ijaz risk taking finished but he had annoyed big bosses by refusing lucrative contracts to their brothers what mostly happened was that valuable sources were betrayed as had happened in baloch areas when the army withdrew in 1976. so the state was practically blind at the

operational and strategic level and remains so in FATA the situation was comical were large number of reports were based on inquiry from civilian truck drivers at the qilas gate ! the prime motivation of the intelligence officer was to produce some quick results and make naukri (careers) at low cost and low risk. thus the idea was to kill the pawns while the big insurgent handlers enjoyed pakistani state subsidies in some form. the baloch who collaborated with the state were left high and dry on change of officers and usually eliminated emphasis was on safety of staying in cantonments The picture that my three star general friends conveyed was also not very bright The armys prime security establishment had remained stuck in petty reporting and terrorising commanding officers who invited a regimental officer disliked by

the intelligence bara sahib to a dinner ,and was low in operational and strategic level assessments. thus officers made good naukri but the state did not gain anything Probably Naushad was unwell and not really in effective control having contracted skin cancer in early 2000 or 2001 ? I was particularly disappointed when my regimental officers were harassed in 2013 early for having hosted a special dinner for me at Kohat in early 2013. My blog post of 01 August 2013 probably hit someone very badly . Particularly my views about LT Tariq Khan ! I understand that Naushad Kiani was extremely unwell then and not incharge

with

general Tariq Khan and Brig Ayaz Peer Mohammad , 11 Cavalry

however PAVO Cavalry was asked to close their face book page ! I wrote a demi official letter to Major general Sarfaraz Sattar about this stupid behaviour of his guys at kohat .

the incident had occurred before he took over . Colonel Asad an outstanding gentleman had been harassed for inviting his regimental officer for dinner ! I asked my relative Brig Shafi ullah Qureshi 5 Baloch , what had gone wrong and he said bhai langar kee daal ka asar to hota hai

Colonel Asad , an outstanding man and a gentleman

In late August 2013 I was gladdened to hear that Major general Sarfaraz Sattar had taken over as DGMI I have known Sarfaraz since 1982 October when he joined the PMA and have great hopes that there will be a substantial quality improvement of an operational and strategic level under is most able stewardship. we were operationally blind and dumb ! lets hope that things improve under Sarfaraz Sattar.

We last attended the mid career course together in 1991.

Sarfaraz Sattar now Dg MI standing third row second from left, the author standing first row seventh from left May the soul of Major general Naushad Kiani rest in peace --------------------------------------------

BLOG POST OF 1ST AUGUST 2013 WHICH INSTEAD OF SERIOUS PROFESSIONAL DEBATE RESULTED IN 11 CAVALRY BEING PENALISED FOR INVITING THEIR BROTHER OFFICER TO DINNER http://natural-beautypavocavalry.blogspot.com/2013/07/grandmilitary-and-intelligence-failure_29.html Monday, July 29, 2013 DI Khan is a military failure,Does PM Nawaz Sharif has the Guts or the Wisdom got a very interesting comment on this which is below

Agha Sb. It is not a failure but completion of plan acco director's instructions. Look at the timing. Do you thin wants to deliberate with the FS of only super power fr position of such weakness within 48 hrs of the inciden much more than what is being discussed in press and on DI KHAN JAIL RAID-GRAND MILITARY AND INTELL FAILURE Remove content | Delete | Spam

DI Khan is a military failure Agha H Amin,Major (Retired) DI Khan is a military failure Prime Minister does not have the guts to obtain the Pakistan Armys Explanation. It is doubtful if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has the insight to appoint an army chief who can fight Pakistans real war which is INTERNAL ? D I Khan like other places i.e karachi, Peshawar and Quetta etc, is a display of gross negligence by the Army. Everyone is hiding behind rules and is portraying himself to be a rational and law abiding citizen. They wait for orders rather than get proactively involved.

D I Khan is an outcome of doing a sitzkrieg in North Waziristan and these things will continue to happen till we take the Pakistani military takes the battle to the TTP in FATA and wherever they are ? When Major General Tariq Khan was the IG, if a single shot fired in the town; if it was a consequence of a marriage, the brides father and bridegroom would spend the night in jail; if it was a consequence of some other reason, then the house would go down. Haroon rashid the JI leader in KPs house was blown up and he tried running around on TV complaining, but no one had ever touched the Jamat e Islami before and they decided to calm down before another few houses come down. This reasonable mannerism will not get anyone anywhere. GEO Pakistan House of JI leader demolished in Bajaur

Updated at: 2238 PST, Monday, February 15, 2010 KHAR: Security forces on Monday carried out bombings on militant hideouts situated in Bajaur Agency region. While Jamaat-e-Islami alleged that the bombing killed the mother and sister of party's provincial Amir Haroon Rashid and destroyed his house. The FC Media Cell clarified that foreign militants targeted the house of ex-MNA Haroon Rashid. It further said that security forces conducted a thorough search operation before demolishing the house. No causality was reported, it said. The FC Media Cell continued that a house was collapsed due to incessant rains in the same village, in which an elderly woman and a girl died. On the other hand, JI NWFP General Secretary Shabir Ahmed Khan alleged that security forces blew up the house of Haroon Rashid with explosives. As a result, Rashid's

80-year-old mother and 20-year-old sister were killed, he said. GRAND MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AT DI KHAN AGHA H AMIN There is a basic flaw in Pakistan Armys training philosophy .The fault is at the highest level and trickles downward ? Whats wrong with Pakistan Army ? There is a clear line of such failures starting from 2003 and things are deteriorating ? Darbaris cannot lead the army ! WHEN I APPROACHED MILITARY POSTS IN CANTONMENTS TO MEET FRIENDS I COULD SEE FEAR IN THE EYES OF THE SENTRIES ! FEAR AFTER SEEING MY LONG HAIR AND BEARD ! ITS A FEAR WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO DESCRIBE ! THIS IS MORE THAN JUST A RAID OR JUST AN INCIDENT , ITS A HISTORICAL BATTLE WHICH STARTED FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD OF ISLAM ! IN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN THIS BATTLE IS NOW BECOMING A MONSTER WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL ? WHAT I WRITE WILL NOT BE

PUBLISHED BY ANY MAIN PAKI NEWSPAPER , BUT THAT DENIAL DOES NOT CHANGE THE HARSH AND BITTER TRUTH ? I AM NOT A MULLAH ! I AM A WHISKEY DRINIKING MAN WHO DRINKS SCOTCH EVERY DAY , RAMZAN OR NO RAMZAN ! I HAVE NOT BEEN TO A MOSQUE FOR 36 YEARS ? BUT I SEE A GROWING MORAL ASCENDANCY IN THE ISLAMISTS AND INSURGENTS ! DI KHAN WAS JUST ONE EXAMPLE ! AN ARMYS MILITARY VIRTUE IS A SUBTLE AND COMPLEX THING AND IF NOT HANDLED RIGHTLY , CAN DETERIORATE AND EVAPORATE ? WHAT WAS BUILT BY THE BRITISH WITH A 150 YEAR EFFORT CAN COLLAPSE WITHIN MONTHS AND YEARS. GENERAL KIANI MAY GO IN HISTORY AS THE MOST UNFORTUNATE CHIEF ? ONE WRONG STEP AND WE ARE GONE ! http://low-intensity-conflictreview.blogspot.com/2012/11/assessmentof-officers-and-military.html

It is hilarious that police is being blamed whereas the DI Khan faux pas was a military failure at the corps and divisional level. If intelligence was there about the impending raid , why was the army so sleepy on the Jail raid night ! Ramzan !

Visiting PAVO 11 Cavalry , my parent regiment in Kohat.The regiment is deployed in Waziristan

At Tank 2012

At DI Khan April 2012 When I travelled to DI Khan ,Bannu and Tank in 2012 I could feel that the police feared to even stop any vehicle. There was that this invisible fear in the air . The army was boxed in cantonements ? The audacious , dynamic and bold manner in which the Pakistani Taliban attacked DI Khan Jail depicts two cardinal facts ! There is something seriously wrong with the

Pakistani military at the operational level ? The civilians were always hopeless ! It appears that the military is also getting civilianised. What lessons learnt at staff college Quetta , war course islamabad and infantry school quetta applied at DI Khan ! How is that a Pakistani corps commander and two general officer commanding were paralysed and failed to launch a counter attack with superior force tha they had available in a 10 mile radius ? Pathetic par excellence ? One that the Pakistani Taliban are a force to reckon with at the strategic level ! Second that it was a grand intelligence and military failure on part of the Pakistani military. DI Khan houses Headquarters of 14 Division and an army artillery division. That the Pakistani military failed to counter the Taliban is a grand military failure. In all probability there was no contingency plan on part of the military to deal with this eventuality.

Intelligence was totally flawed and faulty , for if it was otherwise the Pakistani military in DI Khan should have been ready to counter any such incident ! The incident was a grand blow to civilian morale as it amply proved that the Pakistani military and police cannot protect even a city where they have the benefit of numbers and a relatively safe location ! The most weak link in the chain was Pakistani military response ! Pathetic ! Rollo Gillespie with a small manpower intercepted the Vellore mutineers ! Here a whole brigade plus and possibly a divisional strength gave a pathetic performance ! The Pakistani police are simplt not the right force to fight the Taliban ! The incident was a grand failure on part of the 11 Corps in Peshawar and the military response in pursuing the Pakistani Taliban from DI Khan to borders of South Waziristan was non existent ! A Tariq Khan on the spot in DI Khan could have made all the difference ? The issue is serious ? Absence or presence of

one man can change the whole strategic and operational game ? THE ISSUE IS SERIOUS . THAT IS WHY THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN MAKE SUCH HARD EFFORTS TO RESCUE THEIR JAILED LEADERS.MEN LIKE ADNAN RASHID ARE EQUAL TO AN ARMY DIVISION . 5 % US PILOTS DESTROYED MOST OR AT LEAST 40 % GERMAN AIRCRAFTS IN SECOND WORLD WAR.ONE KHALID BIN WALEED , ONE NAPOLEON CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

If you go to the DI Khan cantonment it is most well protected as is Quetta Cantonment.But when you go the civilian area , the civilians are at the mercy of insurgents in both cities.

In both cities the military has made good arrangements to guard the cantonment but left the civilian army to the mercy of terrorists. After 2300 police also hides like mice and rightly so because they are not trained or armed to fight the terrorists. It is failure of Paklstani military as well as Pakistani civilian leadership at the highest level ? How hollow were General Kianis claims that all is well and Waziristan has been pacified and conquered ! Pakistani civilians role as always was meek and non existent ! In the end the Pakistani intelligence claimed that we had given warning of the attack 48 hours earlier ! What a response and an utter white lie ! Role of Pakistani military is to protect the civilians and not to create DHA Housing schemes ! Perhaps the latter is the prime aim. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009 MY FRIEND MAJOR GENERAL ASIF KHATTAK

STATES THAT THIS ARTICLE ANNOYED MANY GREAT COMMANDERS ! http://low-intensity-conflictresearch.blogspot.com/2009/10/ghq-attackserious-questions-ah-amin.html TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009 GHQ Attack -Serious Questions-A.H Amin The attack on Pakistani GHQ raises more serious questions about Pakistan Armys military effectiveness and potency than answers. The most crucial and grave question is that the Pakistani military seems to have lost in a great degree its coercive value amd moral deterrence.Something which is the foundation of any political system and on which all agree starting from Freud,Aristotle,Plato down to Marx Lenin Mao and Khomeni. Once General Musharraf decided to make a U turn under coercion by USA the army lost its moral credibility in the eyes of a large section of Pakistani populace,not the majority but a sizeable minority far more effective in tangible potency than a far larger minority. The first most serious question is not from where the threat originated but how did a

small minority of a few handpicked young men developed the resolution to attack the citadel of Pakistani military,the GHQ ? Its an intangible question but far more serious than whether these men had their organisational centre in Wazirstan or Afghanistan. The second serious question is the response to the attack.Or one may say the lack of response ! If ten or so armed men can terrorise and paralyse a half a million plus armys headquarter for 22 plus hours the issue is strategic rather than tactical ! If ten civilians trained by irrational mullahs can penetrate a citadel hitherto considered impregnable and unpenetrable and 1600 officers inside it are like chicken in a barbed wired coop at mercy of ten armed and highly motivated men then the situation is grave,not routine. In a nutshell the serious aspects of the issue are :-1. The most serious threat to Pakistan is internal and not external. 2. The military has lost its strategic and coercive deterrent value. 3. That ten armed civilians penetrated a military headquarters guarded by an infantry battalion and a similar number of DSG soldiers is a serious strategic

imbalance. 4. That 6 plus armed men were roaming the GHQ for many hours and had the opportunity to kill many generals,an opportunity that they for some mysterious reasons chose not to exercise is a cause of grave strategic concern. 5. The fact that the perimeter guarding battalion 10 Punjab although it killed some four intruders failed to hold the few attackers from penetrating the GHQ is a grave matter. 6. The fact that the battalion plus DSG soldiers although armed with G 3 and SMG rifles just bolted away is a grave matter. 7. The fact that it took more than 18 hours and the fact that SSG troops had to be brought from some 70 miles away to redeem the situation is ironic par excellence. 8. The fact that Pakistans enemies both state and non state are so ineffective still is the only consoling part of the issue. Here is a case of a military machine :-1. Fighting a civil war with serious internal fractures. 2. A military machine which has lost a great degree of its coercive value.

Lack of initiative in the officer rank and lack of forethought in not allowing the some 1600 officers in GHQ not to carry weapons. 4. The primacy of non state actors in Pakistan. Sad is the story.Hilarious are the praises being heaped on the militarys response.Where is the honour and dignity of danger in overcoming six well motivated irregulars by a commando force outnumbering them by 100 to 1.This is not a criticism.I am not a paid journalist.This is a call for reflection .Serious reflection and serious inner thinking that may be the spur to serious reorganisation in the Pakistani military.The enemy is not in Waziristan or Afghanistan.The enemy is our own damn inefficiency and complacency.It merits serious thinking at all plains , tactical,operational and strategic.
3.

-Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." -Albert Einstein !!!

-Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." -Albert Einstein !!! Posted by Agha H Amin at 1:38 AM Pakistan Airforce sees Mohmand Raid as Pakistan Army and Airforce Incompetence and Failure Pakistan Airforce Failed in Mohmand US RaidAn Account received from outstanding Pakistan Airforce pilot Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail Another pack of Lies By NATO by ... Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail Pakistan Air Force Retired Today's papers carry the news that the NATO Chief has said that the attack on Pakistani soldiers was unintentional. Very generous of him!! Yesterday, I (a very old PAF veteran) talked to Lt Col Shahid Jan from

Peshawar. He had just visited CMH Peshawar to meet the wounded in Salah Post by the US/NATO raid on night of 26 November. This is what he told me. There were 14 wounded lying in the surgical ward suffering a variety of wounds. He talked to every one of them and asked them what had happened. The crux of the account of the soldiers and officers was that at about 11pm on 26th Nov a light aircraft came from across the border, flew over the post and fired flares and returned. About half an hour later armed helicopters and light aircraft came . They again fired flares and began firing at the men. They remained in the area for about 5 6 hours. During this time, the helicopter firing at individual personnel at will. The post had only one 12.7 anti-aircraft gun which opened fire. The gunner was shot. The major on the post took

up the gun and began firing at the helicopters. He was fired at again. While changing position he was hit by a rocket or missile. His body was blasted to pieces. Only his name-plate was found. Every one of the men on the post was killed or wounded. They seemed to be in no hurry and going after each individual separately. Having finished the entire post, they peaceably went back without any casualty on their part. And the NATO Chief has the effrontery to say that it was un-intentional. Now my question is, if for 5 to 6 hours this enemy action was taking place and our ground troops were under such deliberate enemy fire, where was the Army's reaction and where was the PAF during all this time? I cannot believe that the Corps HQ or the PAF Northern Command in Peshawar did not know what was going on,on the front. If so, both

should be disbanded for deliberate incompetence. PAKISTAN'S LONG WAR HAS BEGUN 07. May, 2011 by Brig Samson Sharaf (1/5 was not Pakistan's Day) By Brig Samson S Sharaf For Pakistanis, this is not time to feel embarrassed and to hang heads in shame over the simplicity and quickness of the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden. It is rather, a time for a long overdue bugle cry that Pakistan is at War. 1/5 was not Pakistan's Day inasmuch as 9/11 exposed the vulnerabilities in USA's homeland security. Writing in Nation in December 2010, I had assessed the next eighteen months and beyond as crucial for Pakistan and reiterated it in my article 'Pakistan Must Reassert Itself' on 20 February. I had written, 'the next 18 months and beyond will test Pakistan to the verge". Between the 14th and 17th months we have witnessed the Raymond Davis Case, a drone attack on a peaceful jirga, a fully fledged conventional multi directional night attack on a border outpost in Dir, a border skirmish at

Anghoor Adda and now the operation to kill Osama Bin laden. Writing earlier in November 2010, 'Pakistan a Rudderless State with a resilient Nation' I had cautioned the security planners of Pakistan to beware of Cold Start Type operations from across the Durand Line. I had also written about the heavily fortified US and ISAF citadels in Afghanistan that would be used as pivots of such operations against Pakistan. No one in Pakistan's security establishment and the media took notice of the warnings. 2009-2010 had been remarkable years of Pakistan's fight against militancy. During this time, joint intelligence operations led by Pakistani had resulted in elimination of numerous prized targets both from TTP and Al Qaida. The efficiency of information gathering was such that many high value targets deemed missing believed killed had been brought back into focus and neutralised, some amongst them US nationals. But by mid 2010, this cooperation began to wane due to the direct influx of CIA agents into Pakistan. This influx was not part of the working agreements between ISI and CIA. Pakistan's security establishment felt that they were being stabbed in the back.

Counter security efforts on part of Pakistan indentified hundreds of locations in Pakistan in which US agents had hired or located inside Pakistan covertly. Some of these locations were heavily fortified and the activities inside them were always dubious. After much rallying, Pakistan was able to force the closure of some of these locations but not all. Meanwhile, the network of CIA's local informers was spreading, a reason why CIA forced budgetary reallocations for its operations in Pakistan. With huge funds to play around, CIA could now buy off anyone including Al Qaida agents whose data Pakistan had shared with USA. They put tags on many such targets and monitored all their movements and places of visit. Consequently, what they have been able to track with their superior technical resources and heavy monetary disbursements is a trail of redoubts within Pakistan where militants have contacts and hiding places. Then came the Raymond Davis shooting and some issues became public. There is definitely a trove of very important information that USA has extracted from shared sources and double crossing. One such is the hideout of Osama Bin Laden, his courier trails and much more. The biggest

vulnerability that Pakistan faces is that some of its own assets within this Al Qaida trail may have been exposed, or double crossed and could be used to blackmail Pakistan into coercion. With all this information coming from electronic chatter, media and social websites, I was able to piece a MOST DANGEROUS HYPOTHESES that predicted covert sting and intelligence and overt JSOC operations inside Pakistan that subsequently became the theme of my articles on the subject. Having been vindicated, this does not end here. I have followed the information about the Kakul raid on a real timeline with startling conclusions. According to information available on twitter and TV Channels, the explosion and helicopter crash were successively reported before mid night on 1 May 2011. The call to President Zardari came well past midnight implying that it was made much after the operation had been completed. I am also sure that Zardari was told by President Obama to ask PAF not to interfere in the flight path of the US aircrafts. Concurrently, by the time Pakistan Air Force scrambled, the US troops were well outside Pakistan's air space.

As an operational planner, I am wary of the fact that Pakistan's surveillance system on the Western Front did not respond. The systems are deployed in layers in multiple redundancies to ensure that some elements of information do manage to beep through. The electronic systems are reinforced with human resources wherein even a section commander in a border post is trained to immediately report a violation/activity in real time. Why such a credible system was forced into passivity should be the subject of an inquiry and a story of the future. Surprisingly, much credible chatter emanated when the US helicopters made the exit. I am also aware of the safety layers in US military procedures and purely on technical grounds feel that this operation was carried out by at least four or even more helicopters including transport versions, with credible fool proof backups all along. Simply put, the operation had a sizable operational and logistical trail. Already information is available that the operation had ground, intelligence and pathfinder support from US assets very close to the target area. Does this also imply that there was some sort of complicity by Pakistan to facilitate such an

operation? Does this mean that US helicopters did not enter Pakistan's air space on the day of the raid and were pre positioned for such an operation? However, what can be concluded with accuracy is that CIA agents have penetrated every nook and corner of Pakistan under the eyes of Pakistan's counter intelligence, a fact that will be vindicated in the near future. Reaction of Pakistan's Defence Forces to the raid was slow in coming. Complicity at the cost of such a disgrace appears a bad bargain and unrealistic. The Army and Air Force cannot absolve themselves. The reaction of ISI that will never become public is perhaps that of betrayal. Many of its intelligence assets that it had shared with CIA have now double crossed and as Shaukat Qadir says made Al Qaida richer. My analysis leads me to conclude that some levels of selective complicity existed, and it is this that combined with pre positioning of US assets inside Pakistan. Foreign aircrafts have operated in Pakistan with impunity during the earthquake in 2005, floods, training missions etc. It is nigh possible that these flights were also used to dump hardware at secret locations that could subsequently become pivots for such

operations. Troops for such operations could move into Pakistan under the garb of training, diplomatic staff and travellers coming to Pakistan from USA/ Europe, and local recruitments. Remember that some US soldiers as reported by the media spoke fluent urdu in a Pakistani accent. Then there is also the much hyped issue of CIA contractors in Pakistan. Many of them have since returned but not before completing the ground work for an effective CIA presence in Pakistan all through the Long War. The retired CGS of GHQ, Lt. Gen (R) Shahid Aziz had once claimed that he himself had reported evidence of US amphibious landing on the Balochistan Coast with the trails leading to interior Balochistan. If these landings indeed took place, where did these forces ultimately go; or where did they dump and move their cargo? There is also the case of over 22,000 missing containers. Even if a mere hundred of them carried military hardware and knocked down helicopters, where has all the cargo gone and has anyone noticed it. The theory gets credence from a fact that in one of the ambushes, a container had a complete disassembled Blackhawk helicopter of the

type used in Kakul. My hypothesis is that from 2010 onwards, USA had built up a considerable covert military presence in Pakistan facilitated through visas bypassing the standing operating procedures, indiscriminate entry of containers into Pakistan, holding back of scanning equipment to scan these containers and bribes offered by the container operators from Karachi to the Afghan Border. Even the NLC was foxed into this in the name of business. As a military professional, I know that you do not need huge radioactive machines to scan these containers. A good thermal imaging device abundant in Pakistan can do the trick. It is these reasons that put the Government of Pakistan and the Defence establishment at odds, something like a reverse replay of Kargil. While President Zardari like ever will use the occasion to push the army and ISI back, shore up new alliances to hedge his government, the security establishment may fight back in the name of national Interest. If this happens, it will set a confrontational environment with re alignment of strange bedfellows. As Pakistan will be destabilised further, Obama's war in Afghanistan would be over and the Long War in Pakistan begun.

PAKISTANI AND INDIAN INTELLIGENCE FAILURES PAKISTANI INELLIGENCE FAILED TO LOCATE INDIAN TANK DIVISIONS LOCATION IN 1965 WAR AND INDIAN INTELLIGENCE ALSO FAILED TO LOCATE PAKISTANI TANK DIVISIONS LOCATION IN 1965 WAR

PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE FAILURE TO CONTAIN CIA INGRESS LIST OF PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE FAILURES INVOLVING PAKISTANS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IS LONG :--1. Failure to detect Indian tank divisions location in 1965. 2. Failure to predict the magnitude of polarisation in East Pakistan in 1970-71 which led to Pakistans breakup.

3. Failure to detect Indian infiltration 35 miles inside Pakistani territory in 1983-84 Agha H Amin

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