Transatlantic Security Debate Series

November 2013

Policy Brief
today. It argues in favor of a prudent, realistic, and forward-looking approach by both the United States and Europe. The Five Illusions of Peace A reality check should begin with dispelling five illusions, which remain all too frequent in the debate about the peace process. Illusion #1: The Solution is Obviousand Simple: Israel Should Withdraw There is a legal debate about the exact status of Israeli military presence and civilian settlements in the West Bank and of Israeli commitments under existing United Nations Security Council resolutions.1 Nevertheless, the discussion of these points of legality overlook the fact that today there is a widespread consensus, both in the region and around the world, that the current situation will eventu1 Israel disputes the applicability of Article 49-6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is the basis for stating that settlements are illegal. Israel claims that the territories are disputed (not occupied), and that settlements do not contradict the spirit of Article 49-6. These arguments are hotly debated. There are good grounds, however, to say that Israel has complied with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 by withdrawing in 1982 (Sinai) and 2005 (Gaza) from occupied territories. Proponents of the ambiguity thesis point out that the French text (which has equal legal force) mentions des (i.e. from the); but the negotiating record leaves no doubt regarding the framers intents, especially given that the resolution was negotiated in English.

About the Transatlantic Security Debate Series This joint GMF-FRS paper series provides valuable transatlantic insights into the major issues that shape security and foreign policy cooperation between the United States and Europe: the Middle East and North Africa; NATO and burden-sharing after Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali; Russias role on the global stage; the shift in the global military balance. The series explains how the transatlantic relationship remains the central actor in providing the tools to resolve these current and future challenges. Paper Series Directors: Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, director, GMF Paris Office, and Camille Grand, director, FRS Paper Series Coordinators: Martin Michelot, research and program officer, GMF Paris Office, and Alexandre Houdayer, secretary general, FRS

The Middle East Peace Process: Time for a Reality Check

by Bruno Tertrais
Introduction The recent series of meetings involving the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians in July 2013 is the first successful attempt by Washington to lead the peace process since the 2007 Annapolis conference. This latest U.S. attempt to send Israelis and Palestinians on a path to a final status settlement is unlikely to succeed. The core obstacles to peace remain as strong as ever. Events since 2007 have hardly improved the chances of an agreement. It is unrealistic to believe that Israel could step into the unknown at a time when the regional environment is beset by ever-so strong instability; the continued growth of settlements has made a territorial arrangement ever more complex; and the Palestinian Authority has been weakened due to the takeover of Gaza by Hamas. Nevertheless, any attempt to rejuvenate the peace process is certainly worth a try, if only to gauge the evolution of the parties positions and attempt to build trust among them. In a context where expectations are so low, Washingtons effort hardly runs the risk of fostering disappointment. This brief aims to take a dispassionate look at the factual and political realities of the Middle East peace process

GMF-Paris 71 Boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris T +33 1.47.23.47.18 infoparis@gmfus.org

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
ally have to come to an end, and that the Palestinians have developed a separate national identity and deserve a state of their own. However, the proponents of the obvious and simple solution overlook three key elements. The first is that the unilateral (that is, non-negotiated) nature of the 2005 Gaza withdrawal was heavily criticized by the Palestinian authorities. Another is that any unilateral withdrawal assuming it was politically feasible to repatriate at least several tens of thousands of settlers by force without bloodshed, a daunting task that would be even more difficult without a bilateral agreement would still have to take into account the most basic requirements of Israeli security. The two previous unilateral Israeli withdrawals (in 2000 from South Lebanon and in 2005 from Gaza) led to rockets and missile attacks from those same territories. In an era of growing missile ranges, deliberate transfers of sophisticated weaponry to Israels enemies by Iran, and dispersal of weapons from unstable Arab states, any complete unilateral withdrawal not accompanied by security guarantees is unrealistic and would be unacceptable for most Israeli governments, even assuming that by some miracle most settlers were to voluntarily move back to pre-1967 Israel.2 A third element is that the Israel/Palestinian conflict not only concerns territories: it is also a battle of narratives and legitimacies based on mutual historical grievances. In particular, the Palestinian leadership has consistently considered that the exercise of a right of return (of Palestinians who left their homes in 1948) should be an important and integral part of any just and lasting peace, whereas Israel does not acknowledge the existence of such a right. Illusion #2: The International Recognition Route is an Alternative to Negotiations, and will Force Israel to Compromise In 2011, Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas decided to explore a different path to statehood and announced that he would seek full UN membership, a process that ultimately led to the recognition of Palestine as a non-member State in 2012. The UN vote is not without consequence: it certainly goes one step further in cementing the international communitys recognition of the Palestinians right to statehood.3 However, even a full membership would not have forced Israel to withdraw
2 Amos Yadlin, a prominent Israeli expert, has suggested an almost complete unilateral withdrawal as the first step toward a peace solution. See Ben Birnbaum, The End of the Two-State Solution. Why the Window is Closing on Middle East Peace, The New Republic, March 11, 2013. 3 From an international legal standpoint, whether Palestine qualifies as a state today is dubious. The extent of its territory is uncertain, and its sovereignty remains limited.

The Israel/Palestinian conflict not only concerns territories: it is also a battle of narratives and legitimacies based on mutual historical grievances.
from the West Bank. Moreover, such Palestinian moves could tend to be counterproductivein both the short and long term: Israels reaction was to confirm that there will be construction projects in the area known as East-1, an area that would connect East Jerusalem with the Maale Adumim settlement and make it more difficult for a future Palestinian state to have East Jerusalem as its capital. Even more damaging perhaps were the economic retaliation measures taken by Israel and the U.S. Congress, at a time when Palestinians believe that the most serious problem confronting their society is the spread of poverty and unemployment.4 Any further moves by the PA on the international track for example, attempts to seize international legal bodies in particular will only contribute to harden the Israeli rights position. Finally, even if one were to adopt a generous definition of what a state means in international law, there is no way to ignore that the PA has no control over a significant part of the territories (the Gaza Strip); this makes its claims of recognition of Palestine as a full-fledged state less convincing.5 Illusion #3: If Onlythe United States (and Europe) Really Pressured Israel A widespread argument in the peace process debate is that the international community does not pressure Israel enough. It has often been suggested that Washington should leverage its annual military assistance (currently approximately $3 billion), but is is doubtful that the United States could ever consider withdrawing such a package
4 When asked in September 2013 what the most serious problem for Palestinian society was, 28 percent of respondents cited the spread of poverty and unemployment, 24 percent the continuation of occupation and settlements, 19 percent the absence of national unity, and 9 percent the siege of Gaza and the closure of border crossings. Press Release, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll n 49, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 23, 2013. 5 The 2013 victory of a Palestinian candidate at the Arab Idol song contest, which triggered celebrations all around the West Bank and Gaza, may have done more for the Palestinian national identity than the 2012 UN vote.

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
(which enormously benefits the U.S. defense industry) and risk endangering precious security benefits from its cooperation, notably in the field of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.6 In addition, U.S. support for Israel remains very popular for a variety of strategic, political, cultural and religious reasons,7 and pressuring Israel can be counterproductive, as witnessed by the countrys reaction to the 2012 vote on Palestinian UN membership or to the 2013 EU decision on eligibility of Israeli entities to EU assistance and bilateral cooperation.8 A strategy based on pressuring Israel would also disincentivize the Palestinian leadership to make concessions. More to the point, Israel would not back off under pressure if it felt that its most essential interests are at stake. Despite its current economic difficulties, the country is no longer the cash-strapped state that it was until the 1990s: it would almost certainly judge that losing U.S. assistance is a price worth paying. Proponents of this solution point out to a 1991 precedent, in which Washington successfully pressured Israel to freeze the settlements by withholding $10 billion in loan guarantees that the country needed to absorb immigrants. However, the times then were different and the stakes much more limited. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such an approach overestimates the role of outside parties. Indeed, the role of the United States is useful, if not even necessary, but looking back to history, one should bear in mind that the three major peace achievements of the past 35 years (Camp David-1, Oslo-1, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty) came from the parties themselves. This means that outsiders can nudge the parties and occasionally condition part of their assistance to such or such positioning in the negotiating process, but cannot force them to peace. Illusion #4: Settlements are the Biggest Obstacle to Peace Israels settlement policy is a major obstacle to a long-term solution, not so much for purposes of border delineation, since the majority of settlers are in blocks located near
6 No more than 25 percent of the U.S. financial assistance can be used to buy non-U.S. equipment. 7 Sixty-six percent of Americans believe that U.S. support for Israel is about right or not supportive enough. As Hagel Fight Begins, Wide Partisan Differences in Support of Israel, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, January 8, 2013. 8 In June 2013, the European Commission adopted guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the Palestinian territories for grants, prizes, and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards. These guidelines implement a EU Council of Ministers December 2012 decision according to which all agreements between the state of Israel and the EU must indicate their inapplicability to the Palestinian territories. Statement by the Delegation of the European Union to the State of Israel on the European Commission Notice, July 16, 2013. Israel was to decide before November 2013 whether it would confirm its participation to the Horizon 2020 program.

the 1949 line and thus may be subjected to land swaps, but for the feasibility of an Israeli withdrawal. In addition, the Israeli policy of post hoc legalization of some of the settlements is particularly troubling because it concerns outposts located in the middle of the West Bank. However, to make settlements as such the key obstacle to peace is misleading: there were almost no settlements in the decade extending from 1967 to 1977, which did not contribute to making peace any easier. Other core, pre-1967 issues such as the status of Jerusalem (including the holy places) and the right of return have proven to be as important in the failure of previous attempts to negotiate a final status agreement.9 Some would also argue that the settlements policy has occasionally helped the negotiating process, either by acting as a catalyst for Palestinians to negotiate, or by providing a safety valve allowing Israeli prime ministers to ease off pressures against concessions. Illusion #5: There are Alternatives to the Two-State Solution This is perhaps the biggest and most dangerous illusion of all, and one that is, unfortunately, increasingly propagated on both sides, as much within the Israeli extremes as among some Palestinian circles. Of course, proponents do not all hold the same view of what a one-state solution could be. Most Israelis supporting it believe it would mean annexation of part or all of the West Bank;10 as for those Palestinians defending it as well as some Israelis on the extreme left it would mean the creation of one single country from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River. Neither of these two options can reasonably be pursued, for a variety of reasons. Total annexation without giving Palestinians Israeli citizenship would create a state of apartheid.11 Partial annexation would lead to widespread violence and international isolation. A bi-national state even if it were politically workable, which is a dubious assumption would shatter the Zionist project without

9 For several years, the Palestinian leadership insisted that it would not resume negotiations without a settlements freeze, a condition that was easily given up in July 2013. 10 The concept of a Three-State Solution, whereby Egypt would take control of Gaza and Jordan part of the West Bank has a few proponents (including the Israeli deputy defense minister: see Danny Danon, Israel Should Annul the Oslo Accords, The New York Times, September 20, 2013). But the implementation of such a plan appears even more improbable than the early establishment of an independent Palestine in the West Bank. (An exotic variant is the concept of Three States for Three Nations, which would create a Palestinian state by carving out the whole northeastern region of Jordan, largely consisting of desert.) 11 The term apartheid cannot decently be used to qualify the situation as it exists today, neither in Israel (despite social discrimination, Israeli Arabs have the same legal rights as Israeli Jews) nor in the West Bank (Palestinians are not Israeli citizens).

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
satisfying the national ambitions of most Palestinians,12 and if such a state included Gaza, Jews would soon be a minority (by 2015 or 2020 according to projections). Needless to say, such options would be absolutely unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of Israels Jewish population.13 There is no sustainable alternative to the two-state solution. Any suggestion that this solution is now dead plays in the hands of ideologues and extremists. To be sure, some creative options could be devised within this framework, such as a bi-national state of the West Bank living side-byside with Israel (a solution that would probably be unsatisfying to all parties), or a confederation between Jordan and a new Palestinian state on the West Bank (which might be more acceptable). have considerably reduced the number of terrorist acts, and the situation in the West Bank is now generally quiet. Efforts by the Palestinian leadership (in particular those led by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad) as well as international assistance have improved the economic and institutional situation in the West Bank. The question of territory and borders is probably not the hardest one to solve, at least in theory. The principles of annexation of a small part of the West Bank and of land swaps have been widely agreed (now even by the Arab League).15 It is wrong, at this point, to suggest that the increase in the number of settlers and constructions have in themselves made the Two-State solution impossible. Eighty to 85 percent of the 350,000 settlers live on 5-10 percent of the West Bank (estimates vary), generally very close to the 1949 armistice line.16 (The built-up areas of West Bank settlements represent less than 4 percent of the land.17) A mutually agreeable solution based on swaps that allow some 75 percent of the settlers to be located in Israel is a realistic goal. No new legal settlement has been created ex nihilo since 1992 and migration to the West Bank is now limited; the population growth of the settlements is mostly organic.18 A precedent has been created by the withdrawal from Gaza (and the concurrent dismantlement of four settlements in the West Bank). Finally, there are indications that the PA would be ready to accept the principle of a symbolic, limited return of 1948 refugees.19 However, there remain daunting obstacles. Some of these obstacles are context-sensitive and may be temporary. They include the current regional security landscape as
15 Divergences include 1) the principle of 1:1 ratio land swaps, which has not been accepted by Israel; 2) the Palestinian insistence on quality of land; and 3) the exact proportion of land to be swapped. Realistic proposals are in the range 4-5 percent. (The 2000 Clinton parameters envisioned a swap of 4-6 percent of the West Bank for 1-3 percent of Israeli territory.) See Michael Herzog, Minding the Gap. Territorial Issues in Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011; and David Makovsky, Imagining the Border. Options for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Issue, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011. Based on the 2008 Olmert-Abbas discussions and taking into account natural growth of the settlements since then, the evacuation of some 80,000 settlers would be a realistic target. Olmert was ready to consider the removal of 63,000 settlers (personal source). See also Birnbaum, op. cit. 16 An important exception is Ariel, the third-biggest settlement (about 20,000, mostly secular). 17 The areas east of the 1949 armistice line and west of the security fence represent about 8.5 percent of the West Bank. 18 The vast majority of new construction projects are built on territory already part of existing settlements: it is vertical rather than horizontal colonization. (Although, to be sure, sometimes Israel presents as vertical expansion what is in reality the construction of a new village on land already bought or taken over.) 19 See Birnbaum, op. cit. as well as the Palestine Papers (http://www.aljazeera.com/ palestinepapers/).

There is no sustainable alternative to the two-state solution.

The Paradox of Peace: Closer, But Ever More Distant? Recent history shows that peace in the Middle East is much like a mirage in the desert: when it looks like it is getting closer, reaching it remains as difficult. On the surface, taking a step back and looking at the achievements of the past two decades offers some grounds for optimism. Whatever its opponents may think, the Two-State solution has become part of the mainstream consensus now that it has been explicitly accepted by three of the most conservative constituencies: the Arab League (in the 2002 initiative), the U.S. Republicans (in the 2002 Rose Garden speech by George W. Bush), and the Israeli right (in the 2009 Bar Ilan speech by Benyamin Netanyahu). Most polls show that it is supported by a majority of Israelis and Palestinians.14 Better Israeli intelligence and the security fence as well as more efficient Palestinian security forces and collaboration between the services
12 The word Zionism is often misused (sometimes in good faith) in the debate about the Israel/Palestine issue. Strictly speaking, Zionism is about the creation and sustainment of a Jewish nation-state in the Southern Levant, not an expansionist policy or the search for a Greater Israel. 13 Arab Israelis make up for about 20 percent of the states citizens, but not all of them support a single state or would be keen to become citizens of an independent Palestine. Polls indicate that many of them would prefer staying in Israel for quality of life and political reasons. Still, any final settlement would need to take care of possible irredentist temptations by the new Palestinian state. 14 For a recent example (62 percent of Israelis and 53 percent of Palestinians supporting a two-state solution) see Press Release, Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, July 2, 2013.

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
seen through Israeli eyes, whereby the Iranian issue and the Arab uprisings are believed to have created a context that does not lend itself to changing the status quo. There are concerns about neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan not currently being in a position to support and guarantee a peace settlement, embattled Arab governments potentially being tempted to play the old anti-Israeli card to garner support for their regimes, and situations of civil violence in two neighboring countries Syria and Egypt which are not comforting for Israelis when thinking about prospects for future peaceful coexistence. Notwithstanding the mantra according to which solving the Palestinian issue is key for Middle East peace and stability, the reverse is equally true: the stabilization of Israels environment is a prerequisite for a durable solution. Such obstacles also include, of course, the division of the Palestinian territories and leadership, and the brutal rule of Gaza by Hamas. All attempts at reconciliation have failed so far. Instability in Egypt will not help reassure Israel that it has a partner in Cairo to manage Gaza. Adding to the difficulty is the growing lack of legitimacy of the PA, given that new elections should have taken place several years ago according to Palestinian law. In a nutshell, one can doubt that the current leadership would be in a position to successfully negotiate a final status agreement that would be acceptable to a strong majority of Palestinians.20 (in the West Bank) could be an option, but most Israeli settlers would refuse Palestinian rule; and any acknowledgement of even a symbolic right of return would need to be preceded by the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Obstacles also include the question of the Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley after an agreement (which the PA currently refuses but which seems non-negotiable for Israel for security reasons).22 A final category of obstacles relate to the transformation of Israeli society and its eventual political consequences. Russian immigration and high fertility rates among the ultra-orthodox (haredim) have transformed the population of both Israel and the settlements. Religiously motivated individuals (orthodox and haredim) now represent about two-thirds of the settlers,23 a proportion twice as important as was the case at the time of the Oslo agreements.24 The number of settlers living outside the major blocs is growing, thus making their withdrawal more difficult.25 In addition to the vertical expansion of existing legal settlements (about 130), small hilltop (outposts) illegal settlements (about 100), mostly created by orthodox Jews, have proliferated.26 A dangerous precedent has been established in 2012 with the post hoc legalization of three illegal settlements.27 What may further complicate a withdrawal is that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have drawn ever more of its combat soldiers from the religious right and the settlers. In a sense, the trajectory that leads to a peace settlement may be like a geometric progression, with the steps getting increasingly harder, and the final ones being the hardest. At
22 The Israeli demand for the recognition of the Jewish nature of the Israeli state could probably be met by the Palestinian leadership but it would be another reason for Hamas to oppose a peace deal. 23 Israeli Settlements and the Two-State Solution, Palestine Israel Journal, August 2009; Hagit Ofran and Noa Galili, West Bank Settlements, Facts & Figures, Peace Now, 2009;Neve Gordon and Ynon Cohen, The demographic success of Israels settlement project, Aljazeera, December 6, 2012; Shaul Arieli quoted in Noam Sheizaf, The Israeli negotiator who thinks the two-state solution is still possible, +972, March 27, 2013. 24 Gabriella Zvia Weiniger, Poll: Majority of Israelis prefer two-state solution, The Jerusalem Post, December 18, 2012. 25 Reasonable estimates are 50,000 to 75,000, depending on what one calls a major bloc. See Shlomi Eldar, Memo to John Kerry: Two-State Solution Bankrupt, Al-Monitor, May 23, 2013; Douglas Bloomfield, Settlements: Obstacles, Excuses, Opportunities, The Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2013. The 160,000 estimate given by some settlers (Dani Dayan, Israels Settlers Are Here to Stay, The New York Times, July 25, 2012) is obviously inflated for political reasons. 26 Haredim represent more than 30 percent of the settlers today (as opposed to about 5 percent in 1991). But because most of them live in major settlements close to the Green Line, the growth of these settlements is not a major obstacle to a Two-State solution. 27 Note that there is no clear difference between legal and illegal settlements. There are different levels of illegality depending on the status of the settled land, etc.

The stabilization of Israels environment is a prerequisite for a durable solution.

Other obstacles remain on standby on questions of principle, and include notably the exact status of Jerusalem and the holy sites, which have proven to be some of the most difficult matters to be dealt with in the negotiations that have taken place over the past two decades. A trade-off (giving up Jerusalem for the right of return) also probably falls in the category of illusions.21 A right of limited return against a right of limited permanent settlement
20 On the Israeli side, the tough language used by Prime Minister Netanyahu and some of his ministers hides the fact that there is probably a majority in the current Knesset for a Two-State deal. 21 See Tad Becker, The End of the Peace Process?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2012.

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
this point, what Martin Indyk, the U.S. special envoy, said in 2012, remains true: the maximum concessions that this government of Israel would be prepared to make fall far short of the minimum requirements for a Palestinian state that Abu Mazen will insist on.28 It is difficult to imagine that a resolution of the conflict can come about without positive developments on at least one of the categories mentioned above: an improvement of the regional security context or an increased flexibility on core issues by at least one of the two parties. How much does the peace process matter?29 Those in particular in Israel who claim that there is no urgency in a settlement point out that there exists more or less peaceful coexistence between the two peoples, and that the Palestinians priorities are economic and social, not political and institutional. They also argue that the Arab upheavals have relegated the Palestinian issue to the backburner, notwithstanding the predictions of a Palestinian Spring that never materialized. This is however another illusion, as time does not work in favor of a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question, and because the settlement policy continues unabated, along with the construction of infrastructure, thus making the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state increasingly difficult (and the possible division of Jerusalem ever more complex).30 Through migration and high birth rates, the rise of haredim and settlers will continue. Haredim represent today about 10 percent of the Israeli Jewish population; this could rise to 20 percent in 2030.31 The number of settlers in the West Bank could reach nearly 450 000 in 2020 (of which close to 40 percent may be haredim according to some projections).32 Settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem may represent nearly 30 percent of the population of that area by the end of the 2040s.33 Meanwhile, frustration, corruption and personal tragedies, as well as well-financed support from outside, have fostered religious extremism among Palestinians. Today, 21 percent of Jews say they are more religiousthan before (14 percent say they are less) and 41 percent of Muslims say the same thing (4 percent say they are less).34 Religious Israelis are now a majority (54 percent in 2009 vs. 49 percent in 1999).35 A word of caution is in order here: the rising proportion of haredim in the West Bank is not a problem in itself for the peace process. Most of them are not militant settlers and, in fact, their leaders have distanced themselves from settler ideology.36 But as religion gains in importance in the politics of the region, rational politics may increasingly take a back seat and compromise made more difficult, in which case the creation of an independent Palestinian state will be made almost impossible. Palestinians will revolt if they realize that Israeli rule will be forever. Secular Israelis will end up opposing a peace plan if it means the risk of a civil war. To add to that point, the generation of Palestinian leaders who decided to make peace with Israel after having fought it will soon disappear. Though some hopeful Israelis believe that they will be more amenable to compromise than the founding Palestine Liberation Organization generation, it is by no means certain that the coming one will be composed exclusively of pragmatic, peace-oriented statesmen. Finally, there is also a danger for the Zionist project itself. As many Israelis themselves point out, the colonization process is corroding the countrys values and society. Some talk of an unmaking of Israel.37 While this statement may be exaggerated, what remains certain is that the legitimacy of Israels existence and security will not be enhanced by the continuation of the status quo.
32 Neve Gordon and Ynon Cohen, The demographic success of Israels settlement project, Aljazeera, December 6, 2012. Such projections are hotly debated. 33 Youssef Courbage, Demographic Trends and Challenges of Statehood in Palestine, 2012-2048, Bir Zeit University Working Paper 2012/3, 2012, p. 16. 34 Data by Sergio Dellapergola quoted in David Aaron Miller, Israels Demographic Destiny, Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013; and Evgenia Bystrov and Arnon Soffer, Israel: Demography 2012-2030 On the Way to a Religious State, University of Haifa, May 2012, p. 60. 35 The Israel Democracy Institute / The AVI CHAI Foundation, op. cit. 36 As a commentator puts it, the ultra-Orthodox are no longer beholden to right-wing interests and the settlements. Mazal Mualem, Israeli Ultra Orthodox Parties Split From Settlers, Al Monitor Israel Pulse, August 14, 2013. 37 Gershom Gorenberg, The Unmaking of Israel, New York, HarperCollins, 2011.

Time does not work in favor of a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question.
28 Quoted in Herb Keinon, U.S. peace talks envoy Indyk said hard to believe parties can reach agreement in 2012 interview, The Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2013. 29 There is a broader debate on the importance of the peace process as compared to other unresolved territorial issues such as Kashmir, Taiwan, Cyprus, or Western Sahara. Israel has good grounds to complain about the singularization of the Palestinian question in the international debate, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 30 Overpasses and underpasses could, to some point, solve the issue of contiguity. 31 Sergio Dellapergola quoted in Aaron David Miller, Israels Demographic Destiny, Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013. According to a 2009 poll, Israeli Jews representing themselves as Haredim represent 7 percent of the Jewish population, and those representing themselves as Orthodox represent 15 percent. The Israel Democracy Institute / The AVI CHAI Foundation, A Portrait of Israeli Jews, 2012.

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
What Should Europe and the United States Do? Given that the United States has now embarked in a new effort to lead Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, these recommendations will focus mostly on Europe. The best that Europe can do at this point is to make it clear to both sides that it is ready to help guarantee a final settlement. Europeans often believe that their early political support for the Palestinian cause and constant financial support for the Palestinian institutions and people should give them a seat at the table, and is usefully balancing the U.S. position, which is seen as more leaning toward Israel. This is a mistake on two accounts. Any peace negotiation could only be more complex if it was co-chaired or facilitated by two external powers. There also reigns in Europe a misunderstanding about the U.S. role: Washington is the only party that is accepted by both sides as a legitimate external mediator, not despite its proximity to Israel, but because of it.38 Israel trusts the United States, and the Palestinians believe that it can pressure Israel. Moreover, lest one forgets it, there is an obvious asymmetry in the positions of the two parties: Israel, the strongest one, is not unhappy with the status quo. More pressure on Israel is unlikely to lead to better chances for the peace process and/ or an increased role for Europe. Appearing to be closer to the Palestinian camp is misguided. On the contrary, should Europe want to play a stronger role in the peace process, a priority should be to gain the trust of Israeli elites. Therefore, during the current round of talks or any followon negotiations, a reasonable European policy could: confirm the differentiation between pre- and post-1967 territory in terms of trade and labeling;39 envision a flexible approach to the 2013 decision to avoid penalizing Israeli enterprises, which only have very limited activities west of the Green Line; not condition the further upgrading of the EU-Israel relationship to the settlements policy; continue to support the buildup of Palestinian institutions and economy, and affirm the European willingness to increase its financial assistance if a peace deal is reached; review the policy of support for Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, to ensure that no common funds are used to
38 It is noteworthy in this regard that Martin Indyk, a close friend of Israel, was accepted by the Palestinians as the U.S. point person for the talks that started in 2013. 39 Goods produced in the West Bank settlements do not benefit from preferential tariff treatment under the EU-Israel trade agreement. Labeling is a symbolic measure, for which the EU intended to publish guidelines by the end of 2013.

support organizations promoting BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) campaigns or a One-State solution;40 abstain from pre-judging the final outcome of negotiations through statements such as without Jerusalem as the future capital of two states, a sustainable peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians will not be possible;41 continue to isolate Hamas as long as it does not explicitly renounce terrorism, but be ready for a dialogue, and act as a mediator if needed, if the organization signals that it is ready for a significant policy change; and take into account the Israel/Palestine issue in its dealings with Iran (separately from the nuclear issue on which the EU already has a strong position), with a view to sanction any Iranian support for extremist groups operating in the Palestinian territories. The rejuvenation of the Quartet (which also includes the UN and Russia) is probably useless at this point, especially given Moscows continued active support for the Syrian regime, but could be useful in the future in order to bless a peace agreement and guarantee its enduring nature. Meanwhile, there are at least two actions that the transatlantic partners could undertake together. First, they should challenge the Israeli narrative according to which the Iranian nuclear crisis makes the peace process a secondary priority. Real steps toward a resolution of the Palestinian issue would help cement Israel-Arab relations if the Iranian crisis were to worsen, and also delegitimize the anti-Israel Iranian narrative. At the same time, Europe and the United States should continue to reassure Israel that they will not hesitate in taking whatever initiative may be necessary to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Second, the United States and Europe should demonstrably show their readiness to think about the military contribution they could bring to a peace agreement. Although it is dubious that Israel could ever accept a large-scale foreign presence to guarantee its security, there could be a role for the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) organization here,42 where Europe may come at the forefront. It is by no means
40 On this, see NGO Monitor, Europes hidden hand: EU funding for political NGOs in the Arab-Israeli conflict, April 2008; and Ibid., Lack of due diligence and transparency in European Union funding for radical NGOs, June 2013. 41 EU Heads of Mission Report on East Jerusalem, 2012, Annex 1. 42 A sobering analysis of the difficulties of such a mission was provided by Florence Gaub, NATO: peacekeeping in the Holy Land? A feasibility study, Research Paper n 57, NATO Defense College, March 2010. For a recent discussion, see Jean-Loup Samaan, Is There a Role for NATO in Israel-Palestine Peace Process?, Al-Monitor, August 8, 2013.

Transatlantic Security Debate Series

Policy Brief
certain that the United States would be willing and able to sustain a significant military presence on the ground. For various reasons, neither the United Kingdom, Germany, nor Turkey are likely to be the main providers of troops. It may end up being up to the EU/NATO Mediterranean countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, as well as the Nordic countries (in addition to traditional UN providers such as South Asian countries). Whatever hopes one may entertain, a reality check is in order when it comes to the peace process. The optimistic view taken by the U.S. administration is that the current turmoil in the Middle East, which may be an obstacle from the Israeli standpoint as stated above, might also be an opportunity. The Arab upheavals have weakened hardliners (Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood), and turned the attention of Arab leaders and public opinions away from the issue, therefore alleviating the pressure on negotiators. As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once said, negotiations are like mushrooms; they grow best in the dark. The current instability in the Arab world may also entice some in the two camps to search for an agreement in order to avoid being engulfed by the current violence in their neighborhoods.43 However, just like on other highly symbolic territorial issues inherited from the post- World War II period, such as Kashmir and Taiwan, the positions on the two parties may still be too firmly entrenched, and the status quo not unbearable enough, for a complete solution to be within reach at present. A new interim agreement along the lines of the 1998 Wye River principles, for instance (which were never fully implemented), would already be considered as progress, even if at this point the Palestinian side rejects the concept of a temporary agreement and the United States does not endorse it.44 Sadly, it could take a shock such as a major war in the region, a super-Intifada, or another gamechanging event like the implosion of Jordan to create the dynamics for a durable peace. Meanwhile, the United States and Europe can encourage and support, mediate when they should, nudge when it is needed, and persuade the two parties that they stand ready to play their part when it comes to implementing and sustaining a future peace.
About the Author
Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratgique (FRS). He would like to thank five anonymous Israeli and Palestinian reviewers for their thoughtful comments.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About FRS
The Foundation for Strategic Research, based in Paris, is an independent French research institution in the field of security and defense. As a public interest foundation, it has a twopronged mission: promoting the national public debate on strategic issues related with security and defense; and carrying out research work and studies with the aim of providing an independent expertise to decisionmakers, from the private or public sector. The FRS has an interdisciplinary team of thirty researchers: experts in international and strategic matters, political scientists, engineers, scientists and former military, most of whom teach at major civil and military schools (Ecole Polytechnique, ENA, SaintCyr, Sciences Po, etc.) and universities. FRS has established cooperationbased partnerships with several of them around research programs, either independent or supported by international institutions. The Foundation publishes a number of books, notes and occasional papers on its website, and cooperates closely with French and international newspapers and media.

43 See Martin Indyk, Remarks to J-Street Gala, Washington, DC, September 30, 2013. 44 The Wye River agreement transferred parts of Area C to Areas B and A.