LEAL VS. IAC 155 SCRA 394 FACTS: -Reversal of IAC in its Resolution dated Sept.

27, 1983 of the earlierdecision dated June 28, 1978 penned by Justice Paras of the Court of Appeals, in the same case, affirming the trial courts dismissal of theprivate respondents complaint. March 21, 1941: Vicente Santiago and Cirilio Leal entered into a contract which wascalled the Compraventa where V. Santiago sold to the latter three parcels of land.Cited in the contract was: En caso deventa, no podran vender a otrosdichos treslotes de terrenosino al aqui rendedor Vicente Santiago, o los herederos o sucesoresde estepor el niismo precio de P5,600 siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacerla compra.1960-1965: Parts of the properties were mortgaged or leased to the co-petitionersor to third party1966-1957: V. Santiago offered repurchase of the properties but the petitionerrefused the offerAugust 2, 1967: V. Santiago instituted complaint for specific performance. The trialcourt (Court of First Instance in Q.C.) rendered its decision dismissing the case forit was thought to be a premature case or that there was no sale at all. Therespondent was not contented at all that he filed another complaint in the Court of Appeals June 28, 1978: Justice Paras of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courtsdismissal of respondents complaint. Included in the decision was the order for thecancellation of the annotations at the back of the Transfer Certificates of Titleissued which prohibits the petitioner to sell the land to the third party.Respondentsfiled a motion for reconsideration and an opposition to thepetitioners(Leal) motion to amend but the incidents were not resolved since theCourt of Appeals was abolished and was replaced by the IAC.Sept. 27, 1983: The June 28, 1978 decision of the CA was reversed. The petitionerswere to accept P5,600 for re-purchase of Land and they should pay rental of P3,087.50 as rental from 1967-1968 and the same amount every year after. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42535 was ordered to be in the names of V.Santiago & Luis Santiago and to issue another TCT to S. Santiago. ISSUE/S: Whether or not it is quoted in the Compraventa that the private respondent hasthe right of re-purchase. Whether the annotations of the prohibition to sell at the back of the TCTs should becancelled. HELD: The Resolution dated Sept. 27, 1983 was SET ASIDE and the Decision promulgatedon June 28, 1978 is Reinstated. The annotations of the prohibition to sell at the backof TCT Nos. 138837-138842 were cancelled cost against respondent For the following reasons: -In IACs resolution : repurchase was given birth by the phrase siempre y cuandoultimos pueden hacer la compra (when the buyer has money to buy). Under Article1508 (2nd Paragraph) there is agreement as to the time, although it is indefinite, therefore the right should be exercised within ten years, because the law does not favor suspended ownership. -The right to redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of sale in order that it may have legal existence. Under Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines the right to redeem or repurchase, in the absence of an express agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of contract.

-Prohibition to sell the lots to persons other than the vendor (back of TCT) will be cancelled or deleted since the prohibition to alienate should not exceed 20 years otherwise there would be subversion of public policy. -Civil Code of the Phil. Art. 1306 includes that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Public order signifies the public weal public policy. Essentially, therefore, public order and public policy mean one and the same thing. One such condition which is contrary to public policy is the present prohibition to self to third parties(or perpetual restriction to the right of ownership specifically the owners right tofreely dispose of his properties. SANCHEZ VS. RIGOS 45 SCRA 678 FACTS: On April 3, 1961, plaintiff Nicolas Sanchez and defendant Severina Rigos executed an-instrument entitled Option to Purchase, whereby Rigos agreed, promised _and committed to sell to Sanchez at the sum P1,510.00 a parcel of land situated in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, described in TCT No. NT-12528, within two (2) years from said date with the understanding that said option shall be deemed terminated and elapsed, if Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property within the stipulated period. Inasmuch as several tenders of payment of the sum of PI,510.00, made by Sanchez within said period, were rejected by Mrs. Rigos, on March 12, 1963, the former deposited said amount with the CFI of Nueva Ecija and commenced against the latter the present action, for specific performance and damages. After the filing of defendants answer admitting some allegations of the complaint, denying other allegations thereof, and alleging, as special defense, that the contract between the parties is a unilateral promise to sell, and the same being unsupported by any valuable consideration, by force of the New Civil Code, is null and void on February 11, 1964, both parties, assisted by their respective counsel, jointly moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, on February 28, 1964, the lower court rendered judgment for anchez, ordering Mrs. Rigos to accept the sum judicially consigned by him and to execute, in his favor, the requisite deed of conveyance. Mrs. Rigos was, likewise, sentenced to pay P200.00, as attorneys fees, and other costs. Hence, this appeal by Mrs. Rigos. ISSUE: Whether or not Rigos should accept the payment and execute the deed of conveyance. HELD: Yes. Article 1479 of the Civil Code provides that a promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable. An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. An option is unilateral- a promise to sell at the price fixed whenever the offeree should decide to exercise his option within the specified time. After accepting the promise and before he exercises his option, the holder of the option is not bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. In this case, however, upon accepting herein petitioners offer a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensued, and the respondent ipso facto assumed the obligation of a purchaser. He did not just get the right subsequently to buy or not to buy. It was not a mere option then; it was a bilateral contract of sale. If the option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale, which is not binding until accepted. If, however, acceptance is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration. Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending

notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature or an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale. GALLARDO VS IAC 155 SCRA 248 FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners. HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated was violated. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use. It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.