REQUIREMENT OF NAVIGATOR IN C-17 AIRCRAFT INTRODUCTION 1.

The IAF has one of the largest transport aircraft fleet in the world. It has aircraft of various types in its inventory ranging from aged workhorses like HS- !"# A$-%& and I'- ( to modern state of art aircraft like I'- "# )m*raer# ++,# A-A.S and .-1%/,. The transport fleet has proven its mettle *oth during war and peace in various operational roles like air*orne assault operations# *om*ing *y A$-1&# )- role# and air logistics in $orthern and )astern sector. It has also rendered yeoman service during national and international disaster relief operations *ringing succour to the victims and pride to the nation. -ith the recent ac0uisition of force multipliers like A-A.S# AA1# .-1%/, and the planned induction of .-1 the transport fleet will transform into a truly potent force# at par with the *est in the world. &. 2odernisation is the key to out-manoeuvre an opponent in the *attle field of tomorrow which is envisioned to *e fluid# multidimensional and populated with agile# widely dispersed fighting units. As part of the modernisation of the IAF# the induction of the .-1 # which has a cockpit crew complement of pilot# co-pilot and load master# has already *egun. This is a departure from the traditional airlift crew complement that included additional crew mem*ers to handle navigation and aircraft systems 3navigator and flight engineer4. The e5tensive use of cockpit automation pro*a*ly allowed this crew reduction. 1ecent research has shown that automation can rather than decreasing workload# actually increase cockpit workload *eyond that of less automated aircraft during those periods where workload is already traditionally high. The mission of the .-1 is likely to see a less e5perienced crew flying ultra low-level in a high threat environment# talking to multiple controlling agencies# and trying to get into a location they have never seen after a 16 hour dou*le air-refuelling flight. These issues warrant operational consideration when employing the .-1 on some of its most demanding missions. AIM %. The aim of this service paper is to study and analyse the re0uirement of a navigator as the *est suited additional crew mem*er in the .-1 in order to enhance operational efficiency# decision making and provide the *est redundancy to automation. OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF C17 IN USAF C-17 Design !. The .-1 is 1 ! feet 36% m4 long and has a wingspan of a*out 1 / feet 36& m4. It is powered *y four 7ratt 8 -hitney F11 -7--1// tur*ofan engines. )ach engine is fully

& reversi*le and rated at !/#!// l*s 31"/ k$4 of thrust. The aircraft re0uires a crew of three 3pilot# co-pilot# and loadmaster4 for cargo operations. .argo is loaded through a large aft ramp that accommodates rolling stock# armoured vehicles# trucks and trailers# along with palleti9ed cargo. The cargo compartment is "" feet 3&(."& m4 long# 1" feet 36.!: m4 wide and 1& feet ! inches 3%. ( m4 high. The cargo floor has rollers for palleti9ed cargo that can *e flipped to provide a flat floor suita*le for vehicles and other rolling stock. -hen re0uired it can airdrop 1/& paratroopers and their e0uipment. The ma5imum payload of the .-1 is #6// kg# and its 2a5imum Takeoff -eight is &#(6#%6/ kg. 6. -ith a payload of &#(// kg and an initial cruise altitude of &"#/// ft 3"#6// m4# the .-1 has an unrefueled range of a*out &#"// nautical miles 36#&// km4. It has a cruise speed of a*out !6/ knots 3"%% km;h or /. ( 2ach4. The aircraft is designed to operate from runways as short as %#6// ft 31#/(! m4 and as narrow as :/ ft 3& m4. In addition# it can operate from unpaved# unimproved runways and use the thrust reversers to *ack the aircraft and reverse direction on narrow ta5iways. C-17 Aut !"ti n P#i$ s %#& (. In the early 1:"/s# the aviation industry *egan to em*race the new capa*ilities made possi*le with the growth in computer technology. As the automated systems and levels of information availa*le to pilots grew# accidents and incidents related to the new systems also grew# as aircrew took time to get familiar with them. The increased automation also made possi*le smaller crew si9es *ecause of the a*ility to automate the systems traditionally monitored and controlled *y dedicated navigators and flight engineers. This is the environment in which the <nited States Air Force 3<SAF4 and the prime contractor 2c=onnell =ouglas designed and *uilt the .-1 . . The aircraft it was designed to replace# the .-1!1# had included as part of the crew *oth a navigator and flight engineer. Although *orrowing heavily from the e0uipment in the automated cockpits of its civilian transport counterparts# some *asic cockpit design philosophies in the .-1 were significantly different. +ill .asey# .hief 7ilot for 2c=onnell =ouglas# descri*ed the differences as >instead of automated high technology# like the commercial world# we used a simplified# >dum*? cockpit approach. If you don@t know what it does# don@t touch it# and it won@t do anything?. This philosophy was designed to allow for the lower e5perience level and more demanding missions of the average military pilot. A trade off in this decision was that >an e5pert in the .-1 cockpit will have to push more *uttons to command a specific action than his airline counterpart.? ". The automation philosophy outlined in the directive that governs flight operations for the .-1 supports this *y saying >pilots should use appropriate levels of automation as re0uired *y the flight conditions - their first priority is to fly the aircraft?. It goes on to say that >The Automatic Flight .ontrol System 3AF.S4 and 2ission .omputer 32.4 are intended to aid in workload management# not complicate it. As the flight situation changes# pilots should not feel locked into a level of automation.? :. The implication of such a design philosophy is that even an e5perienced pilot will have to give a significant amount of time and attention towards making automation work the way it should. Another fall out of this design philosophy is that the pilot will *e forced to divert his attention from flying the aircraft to tackling pro*lems of automation in situations where his first priority should *e to fly the airplane.

C-17 Missi n Des'(i%ti n 1/. The nature of military operations involves flying into unpredicta*le and sometimes hostile environment which often re0uires e5ecution of challenging flight manoeuvres designed to limit e5posure to other e5ternal threats. Some of these manoeuvres include formation flight with multiple aircraft occupying a relatively small airspace# e5tended lowlevel flight re0uiring constant manoeuvring *oth to avoid terrain and to use it for threat avoidance# specially designed threat avoidance approach and departure procedures which involve greater manoeuvring and clim*;descent rates than normally used# and landings;takeoffs on short;austere unimproved runways which the crew may never have seen *efore. Further# changes in routeing due to tactical re0uirements or revised threat perceptions would *e the order of the day. The .-1 is designed to *e capa*le of flight manoeuvres which allow it to operate in this environment. These capa*ilities increase workload and themselves may *ecome threat sources. 11. Another consideration related to the mission of the .-1 is that of flight duty periods. Flight duty period# is the period that starts when an aircrew reports for a mission# *riefing# or other official duty and ends when engines are shut down at the end of a mission. The standard flight duty period for a two-pilot crew in the .-1 is 1( hours. =uring contingency operations# it is not uncommon to have this standard flight duty period e5tended *y an hour or two *ased upon the nature of the operation. -ith an additional pilot# a crew may *e considered >augmented? and have their allowa*le flight duty period e5tended to &! hours. C(e) St"n*"(* O%e("ting P( 'e*u(e 1&. To enhance flight safety and efficiency in aircraft operations# the crew standard operating procedure provides for seamless integration of aircrew# discourage individual practices and provide standard area of responsi*ility for the pilot flying 37F4# pilot monitoring 3724 and the loadmaster 3'24. For e5ample# under =efensive Tactics the 7F is responsi*le for maintaining situational awareness 3SA4# avoiding terrain# manoeuvring the aircraft# integrating defensive inputs and visually ac0uiring threats. The 72 is responsi*le for maintaining SA# clearing terrain# visually ac0uiring *oth air and ground threats# maintaining visual separation from other friendly aircraft# giving a visual picture to the rest of the crew and radio communication. The loadmaster is the key element in the defence of the aircraft. His responsi*ilities are to maintain SA# assist the visual ac0uisition of air and ground threats# maintain separation from other friendly aircraft and direct initial defensive manoeuvres to the 7F. 1%. Some of the other tasks and duties of the loadmaster as given in the flight 2anual are as followsA3a4 To guide the pilot during push *ack and start. 3*4 To advise the 7F on ta5iway slope trends and suggested speed changes. 3c4 To monitor the primary AT. fre0uency during all critical phases of flight 3e.g. departure# AA1# ''$# arrival and airdrop4. 3d4 To *uild and maintain Tactical SA prior to the mission and during e5ecution. 3e4 To familiari9e with mission charts# terminology and techni0ues for proper chart reading in the tactical; low level environment.

! 3f4 To actively participate in the mission preparation process and *e availa*le to assist the crew in planning for o*Bective area analysis# load factors# ground times and e5ecution checklists. 3g4 To listen and communicate on several radio fre0uencies while e5ecuting tactical missions. 3h4 To use and follow correct communication procedure on 1;T and I;.. 3g4 To *e thoroughly familiar with proper authentication procedures when communicating with aircraft and ground controllers. 3B4 To plot mission threats on a *ulls eye chart and update the current tactical picture to the crew. 1!. The loadmaster# who is normally placed at a station in the cargo compartment# has to *e in the cockpit to carry out most of these duties. This is an area that is not as familiar to the Flt Cunners of IAF# as his station is in the cargo compartment. Further# e5perience gathered during the flying of many missions *y the <SAF indicated that the need to achieve a higher degree of .12 closer to the target area# where the threats are naturally higher and the scope for error is the least. This was not *eing met with the designated crew composition. As a result# in the <SAF# all missions undertaken outside .lass A and + airspaces in the .-1 are flown with an additional cockpit crew mem*er who is a pilot cleared to fly as an aircrew and carry out the duties of the specified role or mission. In a demonstration flight# he is called a Safety D*server# in a tactical situation he plays the role of the 7ilot o*serving 37D4 and for strategic tasks he is simply called the A.2 3Additional .rew 2em*er4. The nature of his role is very versatile and at most times he undertakes the cockpit duties of the loadmaster. NEED FOR A NAVIGATOR IN C 17 AC 16. At present during e5ercises;operations the entire mission planning including selection of main =E and alternate =E# =irection of =rop# tactical routing factoring in 1F with friendly forces like A=;)- escorts# enemy radar D1+AT# calculation of si9e of stick *ased on winds and =E dimension# ensuring ac fly correct track and profile# initiation of change in profile# e5ecution of drop# operation of I1 flares in case of threat# 1T contact with en route agencies is done *y the navigator. He is solely responsi*le for making the ac reach the target on time. )nsuring maintenance of accurate TDT is of vital importance as it can decide the fate of the entire formation in a hostile enemy territory. )ven an inaccuracy# of the order of few seconds# can lead to missing 1F with other formation and A= elements or potential mid air collision situation. Any error *y the navigator# in terms of wrong =irection of =rop or release point# can threaten the lives of Special Forces *eing dropped and Beopardi9e the entire mission even *efore it has commenced. Thus a navigator plays a very crucial role in such operational missions. If he is neither a part of the decision making nor a part of the crew complement then all of the a*ove has to *e done either *y the 7F or *y the 72. The 7F and 72 of the IAF are neither trained for it as in the other air forces of the world nor is the training psychology indoctrinating these facets in them. 1(. In a tactical formation the pilots are re0uired to maintain close formation with other formation elements in order to reduce trail length and hence e5posure to hostile enemy A= environment. .lose formation is highly skilled and e5tremely tiring effort. The captain and co-pilot take turn to fly ac in formation. -hile one pilot flies the ac *y accurately maintaining

6 flight parameters and profile# the other pilot maintains a continuous watch on the other ac position in the formation and warns in case of e5cessive closure. Thus *oth the pilots are thoroughly engrossed in manually flying the ac in close formation and have little energy or time to keep track of fast changing tactical situation in terms of weather# 1F with A= and )- fighter elements# 1T contact and instructions from A-A.S;A)- ac# ground position of ac etc. These can *e monitored and updated *y an automated system. The responsi*ility of updating information in the .1 it is *eing done *y an additional crew mem*er 3A.24 or a loadmaster. 1 . In the IAF an A.2 may not always *e availa*le and the load master does not have the re0uired e5pertise. The $avigator is the only crew in cockpit who is fully aware at all the times a*out these aspects as all of these are part of his Bo*. Hence a navigator is the crew most suited to take any decision like change of route *ecause of any ground threat# go-nogo *ecause of unfavoura*le ground environment in terms of surface winds# visi*ility# securing of =E *y advance party and change of plan to 7lan +# drop at alternate =E# e5act ground position of own ac and other ac in the formation at any time. Thus any mission related decision *y captain may not *e the *est decision as he does not have the full Situational Awareness. $avigators# on the other hand# can take such mission related decision with an uncluttered mind as he has the *est situational awareness among the crew. 1". The success of most of the operational roles of transport ac hinges on the professional competence and skills of the additional crew mem*er. For e5ample *om*ing# 7ara trooping# 7ara drop# cargo drop# low level tactical e5ercises are carried out well *y the IAF with the help of the navigator. +ut as of now we are strongly e5pecting that# in the .1 # either the captain or the co-pilot along with the automated systems undertake this or leave it to the in e5perienced loadmaster. In the 1ed Flag e5ercise in <SA in &//"# the I'- ( ac of IAF was the only ac a*le to reach target despite denial of all navigation aids. This was greatly appreciated *y all other participating air forces. 1:. A navigator is an integral part of military transport ac operations. =espite the latest development in the field of precision navigation there is no replacement for a navigator. A military navigator *uilds up his operational e5perience during peacetime e5ercises and is re0uired to deliver in com*at operations. The navigator plays a pivotal role in the operation philosophy of transport ac. There is need to understand the uni0ueness in operational psychology and increase the situational awareness# .12 and op utili9ation of the crew. 2ost of all the lu5ury of automation should not *e taken for granted and to cope with a phase of transition the presence of the navigator would *e re0uired. CONCLUSION &/. The transport fleet of IAF has proven its mettle *oth in peace and war. Success of a mission in a multi crew environment depends heavily on .12# professional competence and contri*ution of each and every crew mem*er. 2any modifications have *een made to .-1 aircraft systems *ut during that time we have also learned more a*out the potential for automation to add to workload. The addition of a third crewmem*er like a loadmaster could result in a crew that is less prepared to operate under those critical conditions during demanding missions. A navigator in the cockpit significantly *olsters the last line of defence

( against *oth internal and e5ternal threats# and can greatly enhance flight safety and capa*ility to deal with an uncertain environment. -ith these considerations in mind# a formal evaluation of the potential *enefits of a navigator for those missions that are the most demanding may *e warranted. &1. =uring operational missions such as air*orne assault operations# *om*ing# 7ara drop etc navigator# *y virtue of his duties# has *etter Situational Awareness than the pilot and is *etter informed to take any mission related decision. Therefore# there is need to introduce the third crew mem*er as a navigator wherein he is the crew who is *est suited and competent to take on mission related and operational tasks as compared to any other *ranch. This concept will go a long way in enhancing mission related decision making# enhance .12# improve internal and e5ternal threat perception# and increase operational utili9ation of the .1 aircraft. RECOMMENDATIONS &&. The following are recommendedA3a4 $avigator should *e part of the .1 cockpit crew for all operational roles.

3*4 In case of missions and e5ercises where navigator plays a pivotal role like 7ara trooping# air*orne assault ops# cargo drop# *om*ing# AA1# low level tactical e5ercises# ultra low level missions# a navigator should *e detailed as the additional crew mem*er. 3c4 In case of 1T1 or scheduled flights the re0uirement of the navigator would *e only for con Trg and consolidation of e5perience. 3d4 'oadmaster should *e a*le to carry out duties of flight engineer as and when re0uired.

Re!"(+s ,& St"ti n C !!"n*e( 1. The re0uirement of navigator in any platform is to *e decided taking into account the following three factorsA3a4 3*4 3c4 1$7 value of the ac -hether the ac is envisaged to *e used in a military role )rgonomics of the ac

&. Typically two men crew ac are deployed only on 1T1 roles# even though the 1$7 value of *oth the ac and the airspace in India would warrant a three men crew. In the case of the . 1 ac# since the ac is likely to *e deployed in the T+A and also in all Air Transport roles# the re0uirement of a navigator is inescapa*le. The load master of the IAF is not e0uipped to handle 1;T# make the flight plan and carry out duties that are typically done *y the navigator in the IAF. %. Strongly recommended for reconsideration of the complement of crew for .1 ac of IAF and inclusion of navigator as part of flight crew.

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