United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Study Guide
Table of Contents
Chair Introduction Topic Area A Topic Area B 1 5 31

Chair Introduction

Dear delegates, It is an honour to welcome you to the sixth annual edition of the Lahore Grammar School Model United Nations conference, and the United Nations Security Council in particular. The Security Council is by far the most important organ of the United Nations, and the vanguard of upholding the values entrenched in the UN Charter. Although the Council has been met with significant criticism since its inception, its services in safeguarding international peace and security have been indispensable. At LGSMUN VI, the Security Council aims to find solutions to some of the most gripping issues that have plagued the global socio-political arena in recent times. Cogent argumentation, razor sharp wit and diplomacy are just some of the skills youll need to survive in the Security Council at LGSMUN VI. The slightest of imprudence is sure to land you in a world of hurt, so tread cautiously and think twice before any of you wants to declare war or bomb each other. My ACDs and I expect a remarkable level of debate and above all, exciting committee sessions. So come well researched, know your stance, be willing to challenge yourself and prepare for a memorable MUN experience as we set off on a four day journey to reassert key values such as equality, respect and tolerance, which the UN has stood for since the day it was created. Anxious to see you all come November! Hamza Hashim

Introduction to the Committee

The Security Council of the United Nations has primary responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and its resolutions are binding on all member states. During the first forty-five years of its existence, the Council was largely paralyzed by the Cold War, but since 1990 and the thawing of the global political climate, it has been very active. The Security Council is composed of fifteen UN member States, five of which are permanent members -- United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and China. The permanent members have the power to veto a substantive decision of the Council by voting against it. The veto is cast much less often now than it was during the Cold War, but it is still very much in use as a threat which blocks Council action. The other ten members of the Council are elected by the General Assembly to two-year nonrenewable terms, with five new members elected each year. The ten elected members, known in Charter language as "non-permanent members," are selected according to a distribution formula from each of the world's major regions. The Security Council meets formally in both private and public sessions. The meetings normally take place in the Security Council Chamber at UN headquarters in New York and there the Council votes on resolutions and conducts other official business. The Security Council meets occasionally in private, mainly to decide on its recommendation of a candidate for the position of the UN Secretary-General. Since 1990, the Council has conducted most of its business in private "consultations" (informal and off-the-record meetings) which are held on most weekdays during the year. Meetings are chaired by the powerful President, an office that rotates each month on an alphabetical basis among the Council's membership. In addition to recommending the name of new secretaries-general, the Council recommends new State members of the UN, and it elects judges to the International Court of Justice, jointly with the General Assembly. In the key realm of peace and security, it performs three main functions. It assists in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It establishes and oversees UN peace-keeping forces. And it takes enforcement measures against recalcitrant States or other parties.

Acting under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (Article 33). And it may, if all the parties to a dispute request make recommendations to the parties with a view to a peaceful settlement (Article 38). In practice, the Council often asks the Secretary-General or one of his Special Representatives to mediate or negotiate under guidelines the Council has established. Increasingly the Council members themselves have travelled to conflict areas in an effort to directly negotiate settlements or mediate conflicts. Though the first UN peace-keeping force was established by the General Assembly, subsequent forces have been established by the Security Council, which exercises authority and command over them. The Council delegates to the Secretary-General its powers to organize and to exercise command and control over the force, but it retains close management and oversight -- too much so in the view of many Secretariat officials and military commanders. Though the Charter does not expressly provide powers to the Council for peace-keeping forces, the International Court of Justice in a 1962 case found that the Council has an implied power for this purpose. Peacekeeping forces are usually deployed by the Council only after ceasefires have been agreed upon and so the peacekeepers are only lightly armed and should not be confused with an army fighting an opposing force. In the post-Cold War period, with greater consensus among its members, the Council has established far more peacekeeping operations than in the past. At a peak in the mid-1990s there were over 70,000 peacekeepers deployed. Some large and complex operations not only include soldiers but also civilian police, election monitors, de-mining and demobilization experts, and civilian administrative personnel. The Security Council may also take enforcement measures which are more robust than peacekeeping. These enforcement powers are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, which authorizes the Council to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has occurred, and authorizes it among other things to impose economic and military sanctions. The peace referred to in Article 39 may involve conflicts other than those between states. At the time the Charter was established, it was envisaged that conflicts within the borders of a state could also constitute a threat to or breach of the peace, and thus that the Council could order the use of enforcement measures. The Council has broadened its definition of these cases over time, so that gross violations of human rights may now be seen as a threat to the peace, as was the case with the genocide in Rwanda. In exercising its enforcement powers, the Security Council has imposed economic sanctions against a number of States and other parties. The great majority of these sanctions regimes have been imposed in the post-Cold War period. The Council imposed general trade sanctions on Iraq in 1990, but since then the Council has preferred to impose more "targeted" sanctions such as arms embargoes, travel bans, restrictions on diplomatic relations, and bans on key commodities like petroleum and diamonds. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the power to order the use of force to maintain or restore peace and security. However the collective use of force as a military sanction does not operate in the way originally intended. It was envisaged that States would conclude agreements with the United Nations, enabling the Council to require troop contributions to create and carry out military enforcement operations. Due to the Cold War this procedure was not implemented, and more recently there has not been the political will to return to the original intentions of the Charter.

Nonetheless the Security Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States who volunteer their forces to carry out the enforcement action. These delegations of power include a delegation of a power of command and control over such forces, usually to those volunteering. Recently, the Council has delegated its enforcement powers to NATO in certain Balkan conflicts, to a force assembled by the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to a multinational force led by Australia in East Timor. These are sometimes referred to as "coalitions of the willing." The best-known case is the coalition led by the United States that assembled under Resolution 678 in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States for the attainment of various objectives including to counter a use of force, to carry out a naval interdiction against a state, to achieve humanitarian objectives, to protect UN declared 'safe areas,' and to ensure implementation of a peace agreement. Member states are often less than satisfied with the results of these operations, which are frequently seen as reflecting the interests of the powerful states taking part, and not sufficiently reflecting the will of the Council or the international community as a whole. But as long at the United Nations is relatively weak and short of resources, such compromises in the face of urgent crises are likely to continue. States and non-state actors have made a wide variety of proposals concerning potential reform of the work, size, and composition of the Security Council. Concerning size and composition, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/26 in 1993 which established an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council. The non-permanent membership of the Security Council has already been enlarged once in 1965 from six to its present ten. However any changes in the membership of the Security Council require an amendment of the Chartser which can only take place with the consent of all the permanent members.

The Committee at LGSMUN VI

The Security Council at LGSMUN VI aims to resolve the most pressing situations that the real world faces as the year 2013 draws to a close. The first topic area, on the situation in Mali, is unique in the sense that it is perhaps the most complicated conflict that the world has seen in recent times, regardless of how clichd the deployment of peacekeepers in Africas conflict zones has become. Issues in this agenda will range from standards of intervention, to the possibility of reconciliation and political negotiations with a marginalised minority, to the international communitys response to an ethnic conflict, and the political and humanitarian crises that ensue. The second topic area aims to address the most pertinent criticism of the Council itself its undemocratic nature and its range of responses to situations that demand its attention worldwide. While this Study Guide has a comprehensive account of the issues in both Topic Areas, research beyond the scope of this guide is strongly recommended for all delegates who wish to do well. Come prepared and well researched as we try to explore and re-evaluate the objectives of the United Nations and the Security Council itself.

Topic Area A: The Situation in Mali

Abstract
Mali has been facing a situation of political turmoil after years of relative stability in the region. After a military coup that toppled the government in March 2012, ending the democratic development that was in order since the end of the countrys dictatorship, Tuareg rebels in the north started an insurgence against the central government and, seizing parts of Northern Mali and declaring an independent state. However, after the Tuareg called for the creation the Azawed State, al-Qaeda militants of the Maghreb took the opportunity and to advance their own plan for the region: to create an independent Islamic state. In November 2012, ECOWAS agreed to launch a coordinated military expedition to recapture the north, an effort that was already backed by the United Nations. However, before long the Islamic groups were controlling considerable portions of Northern Mali. The new government in Bamako requested military aid to France, a request to which Paris responded by sending warplanes and troops to its former colony. Later, ECOWAS also prepared its own mission, mainly commanded by Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

On January 11, 2013, headlines around the world declared that the French had deployed troops into the northern region of Mali, a republic in northeast Africa. To many members of the worldwide community, the movement may have appeared sudden or even drastic; however, any level of scrutiny beyond the superficial could have foretold this development as just one chapter in a long, complicated story. The Azawad region of Mali had been the location of intense strife and political discord for almost a year prior to the French invasion. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) fought for independence in this national hotbed of political turmoil, caught in the throes of the Arab Spring. In the midst of general revolt, the Malian government failed to take any action, and the MNLA declared the northern city of Douentza to be theirs. This political crisis has come to be known as the Tuareg Rebellion, named after the ethnic group that has waged the war. While governmental order had been restored in the wake of president Tours oust from power by Dioncounda Traors interim presidency as of early April 2012, the conflict in Northern Mali continued to rage on. The involvement of Ansar Dine has proven to be extremely important to issues of politics and security in the region; initially supporting the NMLA, this Islamist group has since turned against their former allies. With support from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MOJWA), the movement has gained unprecedented traction in this region. As the situation grew more and more desperate, the government of Mali formally called upon international help, to which many foreign actorsmost notably the Frenchhave responded. It is up to the Security Council to monitor this extremely tense and volatile situation and to respond by setting appropriate standards for intervention and resolving ethnic conflict. Peace is imperative, but the Security Council cannot simply utilize a band-aid approach; rather, it must attack the fundamental and deep-seeded roots of this conflict. Northern Mali has served as the site of a violent separatist insurgency since January 2012. Following a coup dtat that ousted President Amadou Tomani and bred considerable political instability in its immediate aftermath, the once-nomadic Tuareg rebels claimed control of Northern Mali with the help of their organization, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The MNLA subsequently declared Azawads formal independence from Mali. Notably, the United Nations Security Council condemned the coup, along with many other international diplomatic bodies. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for instance, suspended Malis membership and imposed sanctions against the country. ECOWAS also presided over negotiations that stipulated that both Tomani and the leader of the interim government would resign, sanctions would be removed, rebels would be granted

amnesty, and power would be transferred to the National Assembly of Mali, led by its Speaker Dioncounda Traore. However, renewed offensives have seen armed groups loot massive amounts of food from the World Food Programmes warehouses in several parts of Northern Mali, which caused the WFP to cease its operations there at the start of April. Thus the violent insurgency has not only crafted a landscape rife with political uncertainty but also highlighted a critical humanitarian dimension of the conflict for the Councils immediate attention.

Historical Background
The Tuaregs (or so-called Blue Men of Desert because of the indigo dye coloring their traditional clothes) are a pastoral nomadic people who occupy a large portion of the land in the Sahara and the Sahel ranging from Libya to the northern part of Niger to southern Algeria to northern Mali and to Burkina Faso. Mali is home to roughly one million of this regions Tuareg population, which totals anywhere between two to three million. The Tuareg can be further divided into regional groups such as the Kel Adrar (Kidal in Mali), Iwellemeden (West Niger), and Kel Owey (Air in north central Niger). Throughout post-colonial history, the Malian Tuaregs have experienced marginalization by state policies of modernization and sedentarization. Following the appropriation of dune rangelands for cultivation by sedentary farmers, the pastoral Tuaregs were displaced to lands of poorer biological productivity. Historical tensions between the Tuaregs and the Malian government have catalyzed three major rebellions in the countrys recent history, outside of the present ongoing conflictin 1962- 1964, 1990-1995, and 2007-2009. French West Africa (LAfrique-Occidentale Franaises, AOF) experienced decolonization largely due to the outcomes of World War II. Charles de Gaulle thereafter pledged to give Frances colonial subjects a stronger voice in the broader French political arena. By October 26, French Sudanwhich would eventually become the Republic of Malihad elected a Constitutional Assembly that went on to draft a new Constitution allowing political parties. The creation of the Republique Soudainaise in 1958 dissolved the AOF. By February 1959, French Sudan and Senegal had together formed the francophone Mali Federation. However, disagreements regarding the political future of this Federation led the Republique Soudainaise to declare its independence from the Mali Federation, under the new (and current) name of the Republic of Mali on 22 September 1960. Despite the Malian Republics proclamation of its independence in September of 1960, both the state and the Malian nation had yet to be created. The new country faced a weak infrastructure and lacked a professionally trained population devoted to industry. Moreover, at this time, the Malian political elite constructed the Malian national identity around Malis largest ethnic groups, the Mande and Bambara, to the notable exclusion of the Tamasheq-speaking Tuaregs. To compound this tension, the Kel Tamasheq and other minority groups such as the Moors also did not see themselves as Malian. This early identity distinction would lay the historical groundwork for future sentiments of marginalization among the Tuaregs. Furthermore, because the idea of a Malian nation was not yet significantly entrenched in the minds of the countrys citizens, the governments early treatment of the Tuaregs would shape the Tuareg minoritys conception of and allegiance to the Malian nation-state. The First Tuareg Rebellion, 1962-1964 The First Tuareg Rebellion, also known as the Alfellaga, occurred shortly after Mali gained independence. Already disenchanted with their position in the new Malian state, the Tuaregs began to imagine their own state, made up of the Tuareg populated territories of northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria, called Azawad.

Tuaregs at this time felt that they were acutely and disproportionately plagued by early post-colonial Malis economic struggles and the oversight of a government administration that was not sympathetic towards Tuaregs pastoral culture compared to that of other sedentary farming groups in Mali. For some especially dissatisfied Tuareg leaders, the states efforts at modernization became synonymous with land dispossession. Furthermore, the disappointing economic realities of the early 1960s in Mali appeared in direct contrast to the optimistic rhetoric routinely propagated by the government. In 1962, the first governor of the Gao region of Mali, Bakary Diallo, discussed the place of the nomadic Tuaregs in postcolonial Mali: the existence of an ethnic minority of Tamasheq and Arabs (white and black) we call the Nomads, coexisting with black sedentary populations [] Nomad society, as it is left to us by the colonial regime, undoubtedly poses us problems in light of the objectives of our socio-political programme. [] Our objective is to know the problems which we, in reference to the colonial regime, call the Nomad problem. The regime of the first president of Mali, Mobido Kieta, sought to focus the countrys economic growth on its industrial sectorsspecifically on cattle exports, an area where Mali enjoyed a regional comparative advantage. This effort initiated partial and forced sedentarization of nomads. Further to the resentment of the Tuaregs, Kietas regime made women work on Service Civique sites as well as part of a para-military force of agricultural labourers, recruited parallel to the army, despite the fact that in Tamasheq tradition, women of free descent do not work. The Tuareg rebellion began in 1962 as small scale attacks on government targets but escalated by 1963 in northern areas of Mali. Ultimately, the Malians governments army, possessing greater and more advanced resources than the rebels, decisively quashed this first rebellion. Under these circumstances, many Tuaregs migrated to richer neighboring countries such as Libya, where better wage labor in the oil industry and in Muammar Gaddafis regular military forces offered enticing opportunities. Gaddafi additionally welcomed some Tuaregs into the Libyan-backed Islamic Legion from which he deployed Islamic militants to Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan. The Second Rebellion, 1990-1995 Periodic droughts in Western Africa in 1968- 1974 and 1980-1985 further unraveled the pastoral lifestyle of the Sahelian nomads, both destroying livestock and displacing Tuareg populations to areas in the south where pastoralism offered minimal economic survival value. The land reform policies of Mobido Kieto had already rendered the Tuaregs more vulnerable than other groups to droughts. In addition to persistent Tuareg discontent, the 1990- 1995 rebellion also occurred against the backdrop of a pro-democracy opposition movement against President Moussa Traores corrupt regime. The accumulation of democratic pressures in the capital city of Bamako combined with Tuareg rebels assault of the army brought about negotiations between the two sides. This opening likely presented itself because President Traore could not simultaneously afford to deploy state resources in the north to quell the Tuareg insurgency and to the south to bring the pro-democracy movement under control. On 6 January 1991, the rebels and the Malian government signed the Tamanrasset agreement pledging to continue negotiations aimed at bringing a final peace to the conflict. The agreement included a ceasefire, the mutual transfer of war prisoners, army withdrawal from northern Mali, rebel withdrawal to their base camps, opportunities for former rebels to join the Malian army, and a monitoring commission to ensure that the stipulations of the agreement would be implemented. While this agreement was never fulfilled to the degree of its original intent, it did provide a basis for future peace negotiations. More

importantly, perhaps, the signing of the Tamanrasset agreement marked the beginning of the rebellions second phase, in which the rebels disunity became more clear: the FPLA (Front Populaire de Liberation de LAzawad) supported Tuareg independence achieved through military action, whereas the MPA (Mouvement Populaire de lAzawad) sought political negotiation of its aim and potential to transform itself into a viable political party in the future. The pro-democracy movement, meanwhile, had become even stronger. In the aftermath of a government crackdown on protestors that led to hundreds of deaths, a military coup ousted Traore from power, ushering in Amadou Toumani Toure (who would himself be elected as president of Mali in 2002) as interim leader. After being elected president in the 1992 elections, Alpha Konare granted greater autonomy to the heavily Tuareg-populated Kidal region of northern Mali, temporarily abating the conflict. A soldier mutiny in 1994 exacerbated tensions between the government and Tuaregs once again: recently integrated Tuareg militants in the Malian army (per one of the stipulations of the earlier Tamanrasset agreement) murdered their fellow soldiers, as mutual suspicion ran deep between Tuareg and non-Tuareg members of the army. Additionally, several Songhoi speaking militia units that had mobilized to protect themselves against unprovoked Tuareg aggression combined in 1994 to form the Malian Patriotic Movement Ganda Koi. This action stemmed from perceptions among some groups in Mali that the government was now providing disproportionately positive relief efforts and resources to Tuaregs and thus was being too accommodating towards an allegedly violent minority. By 1995, the Malian government had nevertheless managed to secure a precarious peace, suppressing militant aggression on the part of the Ganda Koi and pursuing greater measures to reintegrate Tuaregs into Malian society. It is important to note that at this age the conflict had assumed an unmistakably economic character competition over scarce environmental and state resourcesrather than a primordial ethnic one. The Third Tuareg Rebellion, 2007-2009 In late August of 2007, a splinter Tuareg group under the leadership of Ibrahim ag Bahanga claimed it had entered into an alliance with Tuareg rebels in bordering Niger, who had commenced a military initiative against the Niger government that year. The group launched attacks against government supply convoys, soldiers, and mining roads in the regional capital city of Kidal. This development unfolded despite the fact that the main Tuareg movement in Mali maintained it was adhering to a 2006 peace agreement brokered with the Malian government that had brought an end to the second Tuareg insurgency. By September of that year, land mine explosions had killed dozens of individuals, some 35 soldiers were being held captive, and the rebel alliance began to assault army outposts at the border of Mali and Algeria. The pattern of low intensity warfare at this time can be summarized as follows: Tuareg fighters would lay siege to isolated government outposts, lay mines and ambush military convoys, launch periodic armed raids, and seize hostages before returning to their mountain hideouts. Government forces would respond to these incidents by attempting to hunt down the marauding bands and seize rebel supply cashes. Whereas the beginning of 2008 witnessed a deepening of the conflict, Malis government later made inroads engaging moderate elements of the Tuareg militancy, as a Libyan-mediated ceasefire was achieved by April. But as with earlier peace agreements forged between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels, accusations abounded on both sides of poor commitment to the terms of the agreement. By the end of 2008, violent rebel activity had relatively subsided but no conclusive peace was established. Having thus far employed a tactical strategy alternating use of military force with accommodation of Tuaregs political and economic requests, the Malian government now shifted to executing a full scale offensive operation against one particularly intransigent faction of the Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC), that was led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga. With ag Bahangas forces beleaguered by

the Malian army more than ever, hundreds of Tuareg fighters shed the lingering defiance of their leader and began to surrender their arms. A significant portion of ag Bahandas forces fled to Algeria and then Libya, where many would fight in dictator Muammar al-Gaddafis army. This peace would effectively last fewer than three years before the current iteration of the historical Tuareg insurgency.

Timeline of the Conflict (January 2012-present)

Self-determination in the Sahara The proximate cause of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion was the return of an estimated average of two to three thousand well-trained Tuareg fighters from Gaddafis Libya.169 These returning Tuaregs joined forces with the ATNMC formerly led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga, who had died in August 2011, to form the Mouvement National de Liberation de lAzawad (MNLA) on 16 October 2011. The MNLA sought to protect and progressively reoccupy the Azawad territory in response to the governments failure to engage in productive dialogue with the Tuaregs and its deployment of troops to the Azawad region, comprised of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao. These three capitals quickly became the primary focal points of the fourth and current Tuareg rebellion. In January 2012, the MNLA launched a full-scale attack on Menaka in the Gao region of northern Mali, accusing the government of dishonoring its commitments to the Tuaregs and for undue military provocation. Not only did the Malian government of President Amadou Toumani Toure reportedly lose ground during the first month of renewed combat, but the human rights NGO Amnesty International also criticized the governments use of military helicopters on civilian targets, describing the situation as the worst human rights crisis in northern Mali for 20 years. On 18 February 2012, the United Nations reported that upwards of 44,000 Malian refugees had fled to neighboring Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso to escape the conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also declared in February that the fighting in northern Mali had caused internal displacement of 60,000 Malians, separate from UNHCRs estimates regarding conflict-induced forced migration from the country. Lastly, the month of February was significant because a commission within Toures government announced that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had collaborated with the MNLA to kill government soldiers in Aguelhoc, a rural village in the Kidal region. The findings arrived despite the MNLAs persistent denial of involvement with Islamic extremist groups. A Competing Vision for Rebellion: The Ansar Dine Movement On 13 March 2012, Iyag Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg leader, published a video suggesting that the Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), a movement which had thus far fought alongside the MNLA, seeks to impose sharia law across northern Mali rather than to establish a separate and sovereign Azawad, the latter being the MNLAs principal goal. Ag Ghali has become the renegade leader of Ansar Dine within the broader anti-government rebellion and allegedly maintains relations with AQIM via his cousin, who serves as one of AQIMs local commanders. Ag Ghali had not always played an antagonistic role in Mali; indeed, he had long secured a reputation for functioning as one of the principal power brokers in northern Mali before he formed the Salafi Islamist Ansar Dine and effectively commandeered the insurgency with the help of AQIM and competed with MNLA-affiliated Tuaregs for control over the Sahel. The Ansar Dines own ambitions for all of Mali would later exacerbate the conflict to unseen levels of humanitarian and human rights distress. March Coup: Traore Displaced from Power Despite President Amadou Toumani Traores stated willingness to once again open dialogue with rebels on 15 March, a group of soldiers calling themselves the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and Rule of Law (CNRDR) and emphasizing grievances with the way Traores government had thus far handled the insurgency, initiated a coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo against Malis elected government and proceeded to suspend the Malian Constitution. Comprised of mainly lower-ranking

officers, the CNDRE additionally claimed it had not been equipped with the proper resources to combat the Tuareg rebels, who were meanwhile emboldened by the influx of weapons from Colonel Gaddafi s Libya. The coup elicited international outcry from the United States, the African Union, and this United Nations Security Council, who expressed concern about Malis rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation, referring to growing food insecurity in the Sahel given that the CNRDR had closed off the countrys land and air borders. Political analysts, on the other hand, cited the coup as an unexpected political [mutation] and destabilizing consequence of Gaddafis overthrow in Libya, ushering in even greater uncertainty to Western Africa. In a troubling sign of this uncertainty, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared on 29 March 2012 that it was cancelling its mission to Mali due to security concerns over its members safety. ECOWAS provided the CNRDR a timeframe of 72 hours to relinquish power or be subject to comprehensive economic sanctions. In response to noncompliance by the CNRDR, ECOWAS adopted measures to close Malis borders off to trade and freeze its access to bank accounts, with observers highlighting that landlocked Mali could not survive economically in the face of a widespread blockade. Captain Amadou Sanogo, the coups leader, shared tentative plans to instate a transition body possessing the intent to organizing free and unfettered elections in which the CNRDR would not assert a stake. By the end of March, witnesses to coup-related violence observed that both the MNLA and Ansar Dine were fighting on the same side against government forces. But this dynamic, as mentioned previously, shifted decisively after the coup detat. Although the MNLA had captured Gao by 31 March, reports arriving on 1 April indicated that the Ansar Dine had in the meantime seized Timbuktu from the MNLA, signaling divergence in their aims.In Timbuktu, the Ansar Dine had [now] begun ordering women to cover themselves with veils, declaring that they wanted imposition of Islamic sharia law rather than seeking an independent Azawad. Ansar Dines leader, Ag Ghali, appeared publicly in Timbuktu with Algerian AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar the following day, on the heels of Belmokhtars alleged shopping trip to Libya for weapons, further confirming a link between the terrorist group Al Qaeda and the Ansar Dine. On 6 April, MNLA rebels seized control of Gao, declaring it the capital city of a new independent state called Azawad. The African Union, European Union, and former West African colonial power France refused to recognize this declaration of independence. Nevertheless, ECOWAS and the CNRDR managed to reach a deal in which the junta surrendered power to parliament speaker Dioncounda Traore, who was sworn in as the new interim president of Mali on 12 April. Current Situation in Mali: From Tuareg Self-Determination to Radical Islamic Terror Although the standoff between the MNLA and Malian government had been tentatively stabilized, the northern Mali conflict had already expanded to involve several insurgent groups. From April onwards, the MNLA found itself fighting the Ansar Dine, other newly mobilized Arab militia groups, and protestors setting up a more complex insurgency landscape than ever before. The National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA), a local ethnic Arab militia that had been allied with the Malian government prior to the coup but defected sides after the ousting of Traore from power in March, entered the fray on 8 April when it announced its decision to oppose Tuareg rule. The FLNAs Secretary-General Mohamed Lamine Sidad stated that his group sought to neither gain independence nor impose sharia law, but rather to secure the Arab trading communitys economic interests in Timbuktu, which had been overrun by MNLA rebels. To further complicate allegiances after the coup, those Malians who did not support partitioning of the country vis--vis the MNLAs separatist push for an independent Azawad often cast their support to Islamist groups who challenged the largely-Tuareg MNLA. Following the Battle of Gao, the Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), an al-Qaeda offshoot that has allied with the Ansar Dine, has claimed complete control over Malis desert north. The shootout in Gao on 26 June

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between Tuareg separatists and al-Qaeda-linked Islamists culminated in 20 deaths. Ansar Dines role in the northern Mali conflict has progressed beyond wresting control of the void left by Malian government forces after the March coup. To the Tuaregs acute discontent, the ascendency of Ansar Dine threatens the fate of Azawad, with northern Mali firmly under Islamist control. Moreover, the focus of the Islamist insurgency is more ambitious in scopethe imposition of sharia law throughout all of Maliand has therefore proven to be more violent than perhaps the Tuareg rebellion that preceded it. On September 1, the Ansar Dine gained a strategic victory when MOJWA fighters seized control of the central Malian town of Douentza after a brief skirmish with Douentzas local militia, causing the broader conflict to spread beyond northern Mali. Earlier in August, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the deeply troubling situation in Mali and called on the UN Security Council to take a more active role in the conflict, specifically the use of targeted financial and travel sanctions against those individuals and groups in Mali involved in terrorist, religious extremist, or criminal activities.

Analyzing the Causes of the Problem

The formation of Malis State blends itself with Western Africa history. The countrys genesis refers to the year 1235, when the battle of Kirina, won by the mandinga people against the Sosso former conquerors of the region, served as the founder of the State (Maglia, Closs and Noronha 2013). Mali rose in the vacuum of power left by the fall of Ganas empire, then hegemonic in Western Africa (Macedo 2013). It would turn itself into the regional hegemony, based on an extensive tributary system with Malis capital as the center (Ki-Zerbo 1972). Thereaft er, Mali became the major military power and the most dynamic economy in the region, building a structure of power similar to an empire. The development of the civilization is deeply connected with Malis territorial position between the Niger and the Senegal rivers. A large group of ethnics formed Malis State, among them the Malinke group, the Fulani group, the Sonike group and the Tuareg people (Visentini 2012). The empire was the richest, the most powerful and had the greatest reserves of minerals (especially gold) below the Sahara desert (Diallo 2011), a region of dynamic commercial transaharian activities (Pergher and Tocchetto 2013). The civilization was deeply influenced by the Islam (Maglia, Closs and Noronha 2013). Since that moment, the religion has been followed by a large percentage of the population. Eventually, Malis hegemony would end in the XIV century due to the rise of new powers in the region, such as the Songai, and the Fula people (Visentini 2012). In 1855, Mali was colonized by France after the decisions of the Berlin Conference. According to Diallo (2011, 36), during the period of occupation, Africa lost its sovereignty and the European colonialism was responsible for destroying the whole social fabric of African communities. Moreover, the colonials powers destroyed and remodeled the African map, building a new social hierarchy that would be the base for the modern African states future elites (Diallo 2012, 36). The Sahel region was under Frenchs colonialism: the French West Africa commonly known as AOF, Afrique occidentale francaise, formed by eight French colonial territories: Cote dIvore, Dahomey current Benin, French Sudan current Mali, French Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta current Burkina Faso. The AOF was similar to a federal structure, divided in local governments subaltern to the colonial governor of Dakar, the capital of OAF, which by its turn reported directly to Paris. According to BD (2013), the Tuareg people were not part of Mali until the French colonialism, when the metropolis established the borders to the administrative districts without respecting former ethnics and political frontiers. The Tuareg people, located overwhelmingly in Northern Mali due to their close relation with the Sahara desert, since then aims to achieve their self-independent and autonomous zone, the Azawed. The first Tuareg rebellion that pressed for this erupted in 1916, when the French refused to release such territory, violently suppressing the rebellion (BD 2013). In the Second World War period,

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France ended internally divided after Germanys invasion between the Nazi-collaborationist Vichys Republic in the north and the not-occupied south. Therefore, regarding the metropolis situation, the AOF took side of the Nazi-fascisms Vichys imperialism (Mazrui and Wondji 2010). Vichys France thus increased the economic exploration of AOF and hardened its colonial policy. Nonetheless, the AOF had changed in some aspects: in 1937 labor unions and union movements appeared for the first time in the region (Mazrui and Wondji 2010). At the same time that these social and workers movements were developing themselves, the awareness on their subaltern situation grew between African elites vis-a-vis the metropolis. The post-War period brought together a context of relative economic development in AOF regarding agriculture and some industrial sectors. Such development, however, occurred overwhelmingly in port towns; therefore, Malis development was considerably restricted. Nevertheless, the international context would irreversibly distance Western Africa from France domination, which would be crystallized in Frances 1958 Constitution of its Fifth Republic, dissolving the AOF structure and enabling the independences. The formation of the Nation-State in Mali Malis evolution towards a modern State embraces the complex unification process of its region into a single Nation, which first can be seen in the attempt to form the Mali Federation (1959-1960). The Federation, formed by two majoritarian Muslim countries, was apolitical, economic and religious endeavor integrating the Sudanese Republic (current Mali) and Senegal into a homogeneous nation under the French Community, adopting the name Mali Federation (Diallo 2011). Such development may be understood as part of a continuous process that would unify the whole francophone Africa. Also according to Diallo (2011), this Federation was a turning point for the emergence of the African states in the region, especially for Mali, even if such political organization was under French rule when it came to defense and international relations issues. This is due to the fact its political leaders saw the Federation as the beginning of a reconstruction of what was once the great Mali Empire. Nevertheless, it would become clear that such a project could not emerge under the rule of a foreign dominator and thus the Federation became independent from France in June 1960, by a power transfer agreement signed on the 4th April. However, due to the many divergences that arose between the leaders, in August 1960 the Federation would be dissolved. A number of its causes are related to religious and political (exterior and interior) divergences between the parts. In regard of religious issues, it was not clear how the Federation, a secular State, should conduct its relationship with the Muslim leaders (Clark 1999). At the same time, the political lack of convergence between both States posed serious difficulties: at one side, Federations PrimeMinister Modibo Keita, of Mali, defended a socialist option towards a radical africanization, at the other, deputy Leopold Senghar, of Senegal, had preference for an economic liberalization, guided by the French Franc (Diallo 2011). Under these circumstances, the Federation eventually reached an end and the Sudanese Republic became the independent Republic of Mali. The same happened with Senegal, turning into the independent Republic of Senegal. The Federation was one between many possibilities of creating a forum for cooperation and national integration amid the African States. Another endeavor for integration in the region was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created in the 1970s. Within the Communitys objectives were the creation of a common front against external domination, the establishment of a strong and viable economy that could eradicate poverty and the cooperation and protection of the many cultures and social institutions of the State-members (Fernandes 2011).

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The political events that came after Malis independence from France are related with its internal stabilization and the countrys external aims. To achieve international stability, Modibo Keita, the first leader of the independent country, turned to the USSR for political support and, therefore, led Mali to become a socialist regime. Such regime, sustained between 1960 and 1968, created a sense of nationalism, consolidating the Mali State and its territory. However, the regime could not fully stabilize its institutions yet. In 1968, the Lieutenant Mousa Traore came to power through a military coup, gaining popular legitimation through the promise of economic and political reforms. Nevertheless, with the passing of the years, unemployment, high birth rates and economic inefficiencies increased, placing Mali as one of the poorest countries in the world (Keita 1998). Traores government, though, would be maintained through strong repression and intense corruption until the beginning of the 1990s. During this period, with the collapse of the bipolar world order, a growing demand from the civil society emerged, pressing for more freedom and also for political reform. The opposition to the regime resulted in innumerous crackdowns, which created a more intensive separatism between the minorities in the north of the country and the government in the south (Smith 2001). The geographical and ethnical polarization of this civil uprising is one of the many historical unsettled disputes of the country. To better understand the brewing separatism in Mali, it is necessary to take in account the history of the Tuareg people. Also known as Blue Men of The Desert, they are spread in a region which encompasses not only Mali, but also Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger and, in a smaller part, Nigeria (Keita 1998). Seen as a minority by the government, the Tuareg faced political and cultural isolation since Keitas regime, when the rejection of their demands (integration within the State and land reforms) resulted in many uprisings (Lecocq 2010). By the beginning of the 1960s, such crackdowns ignited a short rebellion, which resulted in a period of guerrilla warfare between such minority and the new-established socialist regime. Despite the small number of combatants, this was one of the first uprisings against the Malian government and it resulted in a harsh resentment from the Tuareg, which would lead to a continuous instability between the two sides (Keita 1998). After the end of the Cold War, the transition to a multiparty democracy turned out to raise innumerous internal and regional conflicts. Nonetheless, the political transition of the authoritarian regime to a democracy was possible, resulting in the first presidential elections in 1992, bringing Alpha Ounar Konare to power. Despite its democratic institutions, Mali was facing economic instability, resulted from Traores structural adjustments to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) norms (Heisbourg 2013). Such economic instability augmented inequality and, by the beginning of the 1990s, resulted in innumerous protests from students and professors throughout the country. Also, leveraging the situation, new Tuareg rebellions extended the regional instability in the Northern Mali, being only minimized in 1997 by State force (Keita 1998). Developments in contemporary Mali In its new political phase, during the last three decades, Mali has been facing innumerous social and institutional problems. The democratic process can be characterized by the constitution of weak institutions and strong leaders, both correlated with high corruption rates (Smith 2001). Therefore, Mali entered the millennium with a democratic regime and increasing political freedom, but facing innumerous insurgencies and minor protests.

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In 1997, Oumar Alpha Konare was reelected with large percentage of votes. The election was marked by national fervor as well as allegations of corruption by Konares opposition to the elected candidate. The new President inherited an unstable situation in the country. The 1992 April National Pact between the Malian government and a number of Tuareg groups which gave more autonomy to northern Tuareg provinces and, simultaneously, tried to integrate the ethnicity in Malis economic and social reality renewed and re-inflamed the debate around the Azawed state due to the relative decentralization granted by Bamako. Internal violence once again escalated, resulting in almost 8.000 deaths (BD 2013). In 2002, the ex-military Amadou Toure was elected President of Mali, backed by the former President Konare. Toures mandate is known as a period of democratic evolution in Mali (Smith 2010), where he pushed for a consensus government as well as trying to strengthen national unity through the dialogue between the different national groups in order to build Malis stability (Visentini 2012). Thus, Toure named a Tuareg as his Prime-Minister; however, according to Visentini (2012), Toure couldnt consolidate the politics he aimed to. The consequence of Toures failure was the Tuaregs insurgency of 2006, when groups attacked Malian military installations in Kidal, a city of Mali, demanding greater autonomy and development assistance (BD 2013). President Toure was reelected with 71% of votes in the 2007 elections (Visentini 2012, 40). Nonetheless, once more he was not capable of maintaining a political institutional system strong enough to govern and hold together the complex situation of the country. In March 2012, Toure was deposed by a coup headed by a military junta in the capital Bamako, while insurgent Tuareg groups occupied strategic parts of Northern Mali, unleashing the current crisis and removing from the country the status of one of the most democratic African States. Developments after the 2012 coup: The seizing of Northern Mali One of the reasons for the governments fall in Bamako was its incapacity to deal with the spreading rebellion in Malis northern territory, as well as the lack of resources at the disposal of the army to deal with the brewing insurgence. Thus, when Captain Amadou Sanogo, leader of the junta which took control of the nation, assumed, he was commissioned to deal with such issue (Nossiter 2012). However, the coup would eventually bring even more instability to the countrys situation. After the coup, the ECOWAS hurried in trying to achieve a commitment with Malis new established junta. The organization stated that it could contribute with a stand-by-force to intervene against the northern rebels once the civil government was restored. On April 6, an agreement mediated by ECOWAS was reached between Sanogo and former president Toure, where both would resign and power would pass to the National Assembly Speaker Diouncounda Traore (The Daily Star 2012). Taking advantage of the power vacuum caused by the coup and the incertitude surrounding Bamako, the insurgents in the north carried forward their task for an independent State. Days aft r the coup, the cities of Gao, Kidal and the historical Timbuktu were taken by the rebels. This was headed mainly by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawed (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, two of the biggest Tuareg movements in the country. On 6 April 2013, having already expelled government troops and seized the territory they wanted, the MNLA declared the independence of the Azawed State in Malis north. The endeavor, though, was not recognized by the African Union or any other country (BBC 2012a). The MNLA, created in 2010, is embedded with an ideology of secular nationalism and presses for the independence of Azawed, thus being the group responsible for igniting the rebellion (Guardiola 2013). Before 2012, the MNLA attached itself only to the realm of political fighting, turning into a political-military movement when it joined forces with Ansar Dine, in the beginning of that year. The Ansar Dine emerged

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in 2012 and was composed of Tuareg Islamists. This group presents a synthesis between the discourses of the Northern populations liberation and the promotion of a sociopolitical model based upon the traditional Islamic values mainly the Sharia, which they wished to lay down on the new independent State that the group intended to create (Poupart 2013). The lack of power in Bamako can be one of the reasons for the Tuareg reaching part of their goals, since the States instability facilitated a possible achievement of their demands. However, the rebellion this time had a main difference from previous attempts which is the fact that the rebels gained access to a huge influx of weapons entering in Malis territory since the downfall of Gaddafi s regime in Libya. Moreover, there were many insurgents who fought aside Gaddafi s loyal forces returning to Mali, endowed with recent fighting and insurgent experiences (Luntumbue 2013). After the independence declaration of the Azawed State and the Malis army withdrawal, MNLA and Ansar Dine, now in virtual control of the North, soon dragged themselves in conflict with each other due to the differences that each movement envisioned for the future of the Azawed State. While the MNLA wished to impose a secular regime, Ansar Dine began to impose a radical form of the Sharia in a variety of towns, which resulted in popular protests and clashes between forces from both movements (BBC 2012b). The lack of formal institutions and the absence of firm control in the Azawed region, as well as the conflicts among both factions, resulted attracting other transnational regional groups that thought such opportunity could be utilized to their proper goals. These were groups such as the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), both radical Islamist movements. The AQIM was founded in 2006 and proposes a return to the original principles of Islam as well as the recourse to armed fight against its enemies, calling as its final objective the restitution of the Islamic caliphate. Supplying other contesting movements in the Maghreb with weapons, training and personal, AQIM soon acquired status and consolidated itself in the region. With such assistance, in 2011 was founded MUJWA, which also began preaching for the Sharia imposition not only in the Sahel, but in the whole West Africa. Both movements receive funds through drug and weapon trafficking in the region (Poupart 2013). Such groups soon preached for radical Islamic imposition in Northern Mali, clashing with the secular MNLA and even the Islamic Ansar Dine. The jihadists groups manage to seize the rebellion initiated by the Tuareg, using Malis instability in order to achieve their aims. Taking control of important cities such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, the groups expelled MNLA forces from it. The MNLA will in vain seek different attempts to regain the cities control, but in the end of 2012 it would be defi nitely out of such towns. While Malis northern territories were under clashes between the different groups, the government in Bamako struggled to form any governance in order to get under its control the countrys territory. In August 2012, in a meeting at Ouagadougou, ECOWAS claimed for the formation of a national union government at Bamako. Weeks later, Malis interim president Diouncounda Traore announced the creation of the High State Council, which he would direct, as well as a national union government presided by Cheik Modibo Diarra, that would integrate personal from the military junta (Aljazeera 2012a).

Discussion of the Problem

Human Rights Violations and War Crimes Following a 10-day mission in April 2012 to Malis capital, Bamako, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that separatist Tuareg rebels, Islamist armed groups, and Arab militias alike have committed war crimes. These crimes have included summary executions, amputations, rape of women and young

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girls, use of child soldiers, and raids of medical facilities and humanitarian aid agencies. In a report to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay stated, the various armed groups currently occupying northern Mali have been committing serious human rights violations and possibly war crimes. Pillay similarly pointed to the recruitment of child soldiers and also stoning of victims, violations of freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and encroachment upon cultural rights. She further warned, I am afraid the humanitarian and human rights situation in the whole of the Sahel region will dangerously deteriorate if the crisis in northern Mali is not urgently addressed.In early October, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic issued a press release declaring, [w]omen are the primary victims of the current crisis and have been disproportionately affected by situation in the north [of Mali].Women in Mali have especially been protesting the forced imposition of sharia law by Islamist groups that have assumed control since the March coup that ousted Amadou Toumani Traore from the presidency. On 6 October, a report surfaced that 200 women had marched in protest against Islamist groups who are requiring women to wear veils. Cisse Toure, one of the protestors, shared, Life has become more difficult with these people. [] We are tired. They impose veils on us and now they are hunting us like bandits for not wearing them. In areas where sharia law is being most strictly enforced, women have also even been barred from attending work. Future of Food Insecurity in Mali Mali is confronting an impending food crisis plaguing an estimated 75 percent of the African continent. Armed conflict in the Sahel, however, has exacerbated food security issues stemming from sparse rainfall in 2011 and stands poised to cause further deterioration of the overall humanitarian situation in the country. In particular, humanitarian agencies have faced difficulty delivering food aid to rebel strongholds throughout the north, where the UN estimates 1.6 million people are at risk for food insecurity. These efforts are taking place against the looming specter of possible military intervention by the Malian government to bring stability to the region. Relief organizations fear that such intervention, depending on how it is executed, could pose a serious setback to humanitarian initiatives. In addition, the Malian Red Cross has reported that it has been facing resistance from the Ansar Dine and MOJWA in gaining access to affected communities. The head of the Malian Red Cross, Abdourahmane Cisse, stated, We have never had this problem in Mali in the past, but the Islamists do not like the cross [hinting at the Red Crosss insignia], seeing it as a Christian thing. Armed assailants looting of reliefrelated equipment and appropriation of vehicles has also severely hampered aid efforts. Islamic Radicalism Until the most recent iterations of the Tuareg rebellions, West Africaand Mali in particularhad remained a buffer area of more moderate political rule, compared to, for example, that of neighboring Mauritania, whose governments have been more repressive215 and religiously intolerant. Prior to the March 2012 military coup, Mali had experienced almost two decades of stable democratic government and hailed as one of the model African democracies during that time. It had further rejected the idea of instating a de jure Islamic republic, but still was still home to tolerant strain of Sufi Islam that largely dismissed the notion of imposing sharia law, a task that Ansar Dine has now violently assumed. Thus, the conflict in Mali, if left unresolved any further, risks the opening up of ungoverned spaces where more radical Islamist rebel groups can launch large-scale recruitment and insurgency efforts. These Islamic extremists believe that US influence in the West Africa has led to a suppression of Islam and seek to revive it by any means they see fit. At stake in a regionally ooperative resolution of the conflict is northern Mali, then, is the effective neutralization of any proliferating radicalism in West Africa. Recent UN Actions

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Following a request from Dioncounda Traores interim government for military resources to assist Malis state armed forces in retaking control of the countrys north, the UN Security passed a resolution that could lead to international military intervention in the near future. The Council urged UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon to contribute military and security planners to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and their partners to help these organizations to put together a recovery force.217 It must be made clear that while this resolution authorized the planning of a possible military interventionwhose detailed recommendations will be presented to the Council 45 days after the resolutions passageit did not authorize the deployment of the use of force. Two days after the France-drafted resolution was passed, Al-Qaeda-linked armed groups in Mali threatened to open the doors of hell for French citizens if France continued its efforts to push for armed intervention to recapture Malis north. A spokesman for MOJWA reportedly warned, if [French President Francois Hollande] continues to throw oil on the fire, we will send him pictures of dead French hostages in the coming days. In the meantime, the European Union began preparations for a possible military mission in Mali. A statement issued by 27 EU ministers pledged that the Union is determined to back Mali in re-establishing the rule of law and a democratic and fully sovereign government across its entire territory.

The Mali crisis international response

As soon as the new government was formed, Bamako pleaded to the United Nations for help in liberating Malis north from insurgents and terrorists, action backed by ECOWAS. The UNSC unanimously adopted on 12 October 2012 Resolution 2071, demanding a plan for military intervention by ECOWAS and the African Union. At 11 November 2012, ECOWAS would authorize a plan to deploy 3,300 military troops in Northern Mali as soon as they were ready (Guardiola 2013). Meanwhile, the situation in the rebel-claimed area would deteriorate for MNLA and Ansar Dine, the original movements behind the Azawed situation. AQIM and MUJWA continued to advance its own forces through the region seizing many cities and imposing radical values and its ideals in them. Perceiving the situation changing, regional forces, mainly ECOWAS, called Ansar Dine and the MNLA to sever any relation they could still have with AQIM and MUJWA and to come negotiate with Bamako. With the radical Islamics onrush in the North, by the end of November 2012 both Ansar Dine and the MNLA renounced the fighting for Azawed and came to the negotiating table in a meeting at Ouagadougou (Luntumbue 2013). The two movements would be incorporated in a national dialogue for reconciliation, where they could press politically for its Azawed related demands, first helping Bamako to expel the now labeled terrorist groups from Malis north. In December 2012, the UNSC would approve Resolution 2085, authorizing the deployment of an Africanled International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year (RES 2085) to be headed by ECOWAS, insisting at the same time in the necessity of a dialogue between the rebels who initially claimed for the independence of the Azawed State, as well as asking for national elections in 20135 (UN 2012). The tide of the events would change in the beginning of January 2013 when the radical forces captured the city of Konna, located just 600km away from Bamako. Such issue represented a real threat to the

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government, since it could mean a future headway to Malis capital. Thus, on the following day, the UNSC approved the fast dispatch of international military forces to Mali to handle the situation (UNSC Report 2013). France was asked by President Diouncounda Traore himself to urgently help Malis government since AFISMA was not ready yet. Hours later, in the afternoon of 11 January 2013, the French military launched Operation Serval, deploying its special forces, infantry and gendarmerie as well as its aviation. The radical groups were not only caught unaware by the suddenness of the attack, but also soon found themselves facing a military force more capable than their own (Segou 2013). During the first week, the declared objective of the operation were to secure Malis capital and stop the terrorist offensive, as well as strike the radical forces bases, destroying its ability to regroup or retreat. All were declared to be preparing the terrain for the arrival of African forces. The main justification given by the French government for the military intervention was the need to prevent Mali from becoming a safe heaven that could be used by terrorist forces to organize attacks elsewhere in the world, which could turn all Saharan regions in a new type of Afghanistan, a Sahelistan. The possibility of Mali turning into a breeding ground for terrorists would be reinforced through the weaponry spilled over from Libya (Economist 2013). Moreover, days after the French troops entered in Mali, a specific event helped to foster such an image of terrorism: the massacre in In Amenas gas factory made by AQIM. On 16 January 2013, a group of AQIM militants crossed the border from Mali into Algeria and captured a natural gas exploring field close to In Amenas. They not only took as hostages nearly 800 Algerians and foreigners who worked at the place, but also threatened to explode Tiguentourine factory, which produces 12% of the natural gas Algeria exports to Europe. The intervention of elite forces from Algerian antiterrorism police allowed the liberation of the majority of hostages; nonetheless, it was unable to avoid the killing of 40 people at the end of the four day crisis. AQMI, which claimed the responsibility for the attack, declared that it was related with the French Operation Serval, demanding the international forces exit from Mali, also threatening to deliver other terrorist attacks elsewhere. Algerian sources informed that the operation was launched by the Libyan territory (Guardiola 2013). The French forces could rapidly be disposed in Mali due to the presence of its military bases in West Africa countries, namely in Burkina Faso, Chad and Cote dIvoire. Despite their knowledge of the terrain and experience of guerrilla war, the rebels chosen to fight like a conventional army, taking and holding cities, travelling along roads in vehicles that presented an easy target for French jets (Segou 2013). At the other hand, as soon as the French troops moved into Mali, there were claims that Paris was acting one more time under a neocolonialist approach in order to guarantee its own interests. After the first two weeks of Operation Serval, the French military would shift its efforts for the restoration of Malis territorial integrity, emphasizing the fight against terrorism. Along with some government troops, the international forces retook all towns by mid-February back to Bamakos rule (Heisbourg 2013). At the end of January 2013, the first African troops entered Northern Mali through the AFISMA, being headed by a Nigerian commander under the banner of ECOWAS (France 2013). During February 2013, new round of talks begun in Ouagadougou between Mali officials and MNLA representatives, as well as the new formed IMA (Islamic Movement for Azawed), to discuss about the collective effort to deal with the jihadists in the North as well as future negotiations about the integrity of Mali (Observateur 2013). In overall, the Operation Serval and all its supporters managed to make Islamist forces retreat to badlands in Northeastern Mali. The worst part of the military conflict seems to have gone. The discussion now in order reflects Malis post conflict rebuilding efforts and the future of the international forces (Segou 2013). Paris showed interest for the establishment of an UN peacekeeping force as soon

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as the situation becomes more stable, at best before elections are held. It is also in discussion the role African forces should have. Whatever the results might be, lot of criticism was raised against the French involvement in Mali. To begin with, it was said that AQIM, demonized as a threat to France since it could develop a Taliban-style regime in Northern Mali, was overestimated. AQIM has never launched any attack in France or Europe since it was established, and its activities in the Sahel have been confined almost entirely to smuggling drugs and kidnapping foreigners (Cockburn 2013). Thus, France was appointed as entering in Mali just to achieve its own national interest goals. Arguments in this line of thinking vary widely. There are opinions that Francois Hollande could be using Mali as the easiest way for him to be seen as a man able to preserve Frances rank among the great powers since its popularity until the operation was very slow inside France (Ndiayeis 2013). Also, there are critics stating that Operation Serval is another neocolonial-style intervention in the region where it was the former metropolis, even though Hollande pledged that such an era was ending for France (Economist 2013). Such claims appoints to the interests France may have in controlling Saharas natural resources oil, gas, uranium and gold as well as additional objectives related with Paris strategies for countries such as Nigeria and Algeria (Guardiola 2013). Furthermore, it is important to notice that [] there is more than one center of power in Bamako and their positions differ with regard to foreign intervention. While transitional president Diouncounda Traore and his government welcome the intervention, there are those who generally view African troops and foreign intervention in Mali with suspicion and fear. This latter position is held by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who has [], on numerous occasions, confirmed his rejection of the presence of foreigners on Malian territory (Aljazeera 2013). The impacts and the importance of developments in Mali The conflict in Mali has brought numerous problems not only for the country, but also for its region. Concerns were raised by the international community, mainly by Western countries, in relation to issues such as humanitarian impacts and the jihadists destination. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyze the importance of what happened in Mali through the lens of the regional problems. This includes the trafficking routes of weapons and drugs, Sahels strategic resources and the African organizations role in assuring stability in the region. Regarding the crisis humanitarian impacts, the radicals reign over Mali and the conflicts which followed it generated a huge number of refugees. About 370,000 people fled their homes, most of them to Southern Mali, but nearly 140,000 went to neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger (McConnell 2013). This number rose even more after the deployment of the French military. Only in Bamako there are more than 50.000 displaced (McConnell 2013), most of them arriving in the city with only what they could carry. Moreover, Northern Mali is currently suffering from a huge lack of food, a problem recurrent in this country, but which has been aggravated recently. The World Food Program (WFP) said 1.2 million Malians face food shortages due to the lingering effects of the 2011 drought and because of disruption to normal trade caused by the conflict (McConnell 2013). The organization affirms that food is simply not reaching markets, contributing for the statistics of nearly 2,1000 people at risk of severe malnutrition. To make things even worse, the northern economy situation, weak since before the clashes, has deteriorated catastrophically under the extremists rule, due to the fact that it caused legal regional trade to dry up (McConnell 2013).

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The combat against the Islamic extremists, by its turn, also brought problems to the region since a number of them may have fl ed to other countries. It was one of the aims of French and Malian troops to separate the most extremist zealots from Tuareg natives in order to permit a dialogue between Bamako and the rebels of the North. However, now that this aim may have been accomplished, the terrorists could eventually use neighboring territories to concentrate efforts from henceforth. While still helping in the pursuit of terrorist sanctuaries alongside Mali and African troops, the French operation found itself in the need to deal with rising suicide bombers and explosive terrorist attacks in some cities, which seem to be a new guerrilla-style tactic from the remaining radical Islamic forces (Segou 2013). Analysis also should be drawn in respect to the regions problems and the possible effects that Mali crisis could have upon them. The Sahel region is known for the presence of narco-Islamists that control routes of weapon and drug trafficking. One of the main groups, AQIM, has as its zone of action the whole region between Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Algeria as well as parts of Libya, Chad, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Regarding drug trafficking, there are flows of cocaine coming from South America to West Africa, where the drug travels across the Sahara Desert under the aegis of the terrorist groups into Europe, the consumer market. More recently, there is a new destabilizing factor which is the huge inflow of weapons coming from Libya that are now being illegally sold in the region. The main receptors of Libyan weapons were radical groups in Sudan and Nigeria, probably the group Boko Haram, and, until now, Mali (Luntumbue 2013). The Sahel region is also important for its strategic resources, which draw attention from all world powers. Arguments that characterize interventions in Africa by external powers as neocolonialists are based on the profits that such countries could draw from the regions economic potentials. Mali has important reserves of gold in its northern and southern territories as well as uranium, mineral also found in neighboring Niger and Algeria. It is also important to notice that the Guinea Gulf is developing as a significant center of energy, since oil reserves are being discovered in West Africas shores. Furthermore, also in relation to the energy market, there are important pipelines crossing Algeria and Libyas territory. Projects to develop new routes for energy transportation to Europe are currently under process, and could run though Niger and Nigeria, countries localized near Mali. Finally, attention should be given to Operation Servals impact in the African continent and its regional organizations. As Guardiola (2013) puts it, Whatever Malis war results may be, this new foreign military intervention brings to memory South Africas warning from the Libyan war time: Africans will not be able to effectively oppose external interference in Africas conflicts while they do not have the political willing and the military means to resolve such problems by themselves in a collective and supportive way. It is up to the [] African Union [] to accelerate the formation and to give autonomy for the quick intervention African Military Force, created in 2003, but that will not be operational before 2015. Searching stability in the long term: current developments and structural problems There were debates about what was the most pressing issue when dealing with the Mali case: the international community, mainly led by Western countries, claimed that the terrorist threat is the most important to be dealt with, securitizing the whole Mali affair; on the other hand, it was appointed, mainly by African countries, that most pressing is the necessity to keep Mali as a whole territorial unit, rejecting any secessionist movement. Whatever the case may be, both are apparently solved at the present time, although such kind of discussion is still at the table when dealing with Mali in the long term, since the country must prioritize one of these agendas.

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In fact, the countrys problems are just initially being settled. The newest Tuareg insurgency and the taking of Northern Mali by jihadists are symptomatic of a juxtaposition of deep-rooted structural problems. Such are some of the issues that must be tackled in order to full address the instability in Mali, especially now that efforts are being directed to a post-conflict reconstruction. Four main areas could be highlighted that must be taken in consideration: national reconciliation, security governance, electoral process and the economy and the development of Malis peripheral regions. The process of national reconciliation must address the ongoing historical conflict between the Tuareg people from the north and the central government in Bamako. This was not the groups first insurgency and may not be the last if the issue is not resolved. During all the previous conflicts between the government and the Tuareg, the former responded with harsh military measures as well as a strategy of arming different opposition groups for them to neutralize each other. Ex-president Toure itself rested on a personal network of loosen alliances with Malis periphery leaders that disintegrated itself in face of the rebellion and the opportunism of the jihadist groups. Thus, the crisis breakthrough is a sign of the central governments weak governance and instability. The new elected government will have to deal with a group of people the Tuareg that has been maintained in distance for a long time, sidelined from Mali itself (Beaumont 2013). There is the possibility that the recent crisis may force Bamako to either grant greater autonomy for the region or treat it diff erently, fully integrating the North in the countrys governance and in a new model of democracy. Attention must be paid to the fact that President Diouncounda Traore is not yet strengthened enough in the government, which may loosen its position vis-a-vis negotiations with the Tuareg. This may lead to an unprecedented political control in the hands of the Tuareg regarding Northern Mali, but it might also result in an even greater lack of state presence in the region, eventually making harder to Bamako to hold its territory altogether, thus possibly threatening Malis foundations (Ndiayeis 2013). In regard to the countrys security governance, one of the reasons for the breakout of the most recent crisis was Malian armys lack of capacity to defend its own territory properly. The initial plan delineated by the international community to help Bamako was composed by three overlapping phases: the reconstruction of the Malian army, the deployment of AFISMA, and the operation to take the north back, which would then lead to the withdrawal of international troops. However, the attack against Konna disrupted the planning: the incapacity of the Malian army to respond urgently and the impossibility to deliver AFISMA at that moment would lead to the deployment of Operation Serval. In order to improve such field, the Malian army is expected to be rebuilt in order to be engaged in operations on the ground. Moreover, now that the north is apparently liberated, the area must be secured and stabilized in order to consolidate the military gains achieved. Regarding the international forces in Mali, Frances expressed desire to scale down its presence or, at least, to multilateralise its commitment, the idea now is to deploy a UN operation that will take over from AFISMA. While this operation seems to be supported in principle by several members of the UNSC, it nevertheless raises serious issues given the volatile nature of the region, which calls for the kind of coercive action that the UN has so far been reluctant to undertake. The UN has instead preferred the conventional concept of consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense. () [However,] the debate on a possible UN operation should not distract attention from the need to put in place an efficient and adequate security governance system in Mali and to strengthen regional defense and security cooperation.

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It is also necessary to address the electoral process and the democratic issue. The electoral process was extensively debated in Mali, since it is expected that the holding of elections be related to the restoration of states authority. Part of the governments authorities argues that elections could only be envisaged if the North is completely liberated, otherwise the partition of Malis territory would be legitimated. On the other hand, it has been said, particularly within the international community, that only an elected government could help the country emerge from the crisis. This way, it is of utmost importance to create conditions to free, transparent and fair elections. However, it is important to notice that the electoral process and the advent of an elected government alone will not resolve Malis problems. Such procedure is important, but must be the first step in a more complex debate to overhaul Malian governance systems structure. As Penney (2013) puts it, restoring Malis democracy by reverting to the pre-coup status quo poses a major threat to Malis long-term future. After all, it was precisely this pre-coup status quo that allowed the countrys dramatic collapse to begin with. Finally, economical problems in Mali also must be tackled since they are one of the main root causes for the conflicts to arise. Short-term measures, such as the foreign intervention to contain the jihadist expansion in the northern territory, will not address the reasons why the people may fall in the hands of terrorism or separatism. Most of times, they follow such paths if they are not fully incorporated by the State apparatus, which should grant enough public goods for their survival as well as opportunities for them to develop themselves economically. Until the recent crisis, there was a clear lack of State presence in the whole Northern region. In order to reconstruct and stabilize Mali, this sort of problem must be tackled with the elaboration of long-term solutions. In Southern Mali resides 90% of the population, whom survives mainly from agriculture. The crops produced in this region are the ones responsible to feed the whole country, including Northern Mali. The North accounts for two-thirds of Malis territory, but consists almost entirely of sparsely populated desert, inhabited mainly by the Tuareg, which are less than 10% of the population. However, what is produced is not enough to feed the whole populace since the country suffers from food distribution and shortage problems, thus resulting in chronic malnutrition (Penney 2013). Moreover, the population suffers with lack of electrical energy production, with a per capita rate from just 60kWh, an extremely low number even by Western African standards, which result in the vast majority of Malians continuing to rely on biofuels (wood, charcoal) for their energy needs (NERINT 2009). It is important to keep in mind that all such fields to be addressed in Mali are related to the first debate presented, where threats emanating from terrorism are sided by the necessity of tackling all the countrys issues while managing to maintain its territory united. This presents all parties involved in Mali with challenges when creating an agenda for the most pressing issues to be dealt with, making necessary to distinguish where points converge or diverge. Previous international actions The situation in Mali has been dealt with by different levels and layers of international organizations. Malis crisis first phases were managed initially at the regional level through ECOWAS, evolving to a wider support and effort of the African Union (AU). Even though the international level was also playing a role during this first period, its full involvement would come through Operation Serval. Then, the following step would see a greater participation by the part of the United Nations. All process would be composed by an overlay of the different levels, all affecting the situation on Malis ground.

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The regional level: ECOWAS and the AU Triggered by Malis coup detat in June 2012, the first international response consisted of a regional articulation. ECOWAS was at the center, being led by the ECOWAS-appointed mediator, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso. The organization followed two parallel tracks: negotiations with the coup authors to ease the constitutional order restoration and complete the transition process, also fostering negotiations with groups in the north to address the Azawed crisis and keep Malis unity (Aff aa-Mindzie and Perry 2013). Days after the coup, the regional bloc suspended Mali from the organization, imposing legal, economic and diplomatic sanctions, actions followed by the African Unions own sanctions against the military juntas leaders. Having managed to apply enough pressure on Bamako, a framework agreement was signed in April 2012, transferring power from the junta to Dioncounda Traore. Also, in January 2013, a transition roadmap was endorsed by the Malian parliament after being adopted by the government. In regard to the negotiations with the northern groups, Mali initially recognized only MNLA as a rebel group, and Ansar Dine was considered a criminal faction. Only in November 2012, through the ECOWAS mediation, alongside the United Nations Office for West Africa, talks with MNLA and Ansar Dine were set up. Calling them both to suspend any action related to MUJAO and AQIM, the parties would eventually recognize the need to establish an inter-Malian dialogue framework, involving representatives from various communities in the north (Aff aa-Mindzie and Perry 2013). In parallel to the negotiation track, ECOWAS also planned to deploy a multidimensional mission to Mali the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICENA) in order to resolve the situation in the north if the rebels did not cede power in a peaceful way. However, problems were raised and the mission never went farther than the planning stages. According to Theroux-Benoni (2013b), among MICENAs obstacles were the Malis military juntas hostility to any armed presence in Bamako; the lack of consensus and a way forward with Algeria - an important player in the region, absent in ECOWAS; and logistical and financial constraints which made impossible the missions deployment without international support. The African Union, by its turn, initially limited its efforts in supporting ECOWAS plans, adopting a more active role in the second half of 2012. Differences among Malian actors and ECOWAS were being overcome, since it was accorded that the Malian army would lead any envisaged regional military operation. The African Union played an important role containing the reluctance of Algeria regarding MICENA when it turned such option into a continental initiative, transforming ECOWAS mission in the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Also, AU facilitated the provision of support to the mission trough the United Nations, framing the military action in a more global perspective (Theroux-Benoni 2013b). Through Resolution 2085, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on December 2012, AFISMA would be deployed by an initial period of one year in Mali. The broader level in the crisis management: the UN and Frances role As seen above, since the beginning of Malis crisis the United Nations has played at least a supportive role, either through backing up negotiations with the rebels in the north or fostering the planned military options. The UNSC has adopted three resolutions on the situation before Frances intervention: Resolution 2056 (July 5, 2012), calling for a road map for restoration of constitutional order in Mali, giving its support to ECOWAS and AU and considering a UN mandate for a West African Stabilization Force; Resolution 2071

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(October 12, 2012), stating its readiness to consider requests for International Military Forces, calling than an actionable plan for military intervention to be made by ECOWAS and the African Union; and Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012), authorizing the deployment of AFISMA (Aff aa-Mindzie and Perry 2013). AFISMA, however, would face its first problem in the Malian armys capacity to lead the campaign to regain control of the north. On January 10, 2013, jihadist groups launched an offensive against Konna, taking control of the city. Such attack called for an urgent action spearheaded by the Malian army, which reorganization was still under process. AFISMA was at its planning stages, also unable to be deployed at that moment. Th us, at the request of Malis government, France launched Operation Serval, marking an important shift in the international response to this crisis. In the offi cial declarations, Paris said that the intervention was not a long-term solution, urging for a UN mission to be deployed as soon as the situation on the ground was safer. There was a subsequent discussion about UNs role in Mali after the fight with the jihadists, being won by France. The UN Secretariat was reluctant to allow any deployment of force with harsh conditions on the ground, since that would lead to an operation unable for the UN to conduct, requiring high employment of force. At March 2013, as put by Theroux-Benoni (2013b), two options were being provided: either an integrated and multidimensional presence alongside a military force under African leadership; or an integrated and multidimensional stabilization mission authorized under Chapter VII and supported by a parallel force. On July 1, 2013, the UNSC established a peacekeeping force for Mali to be effective on July 1, 2013, unanimously adopting Resolution 2100 (2013). It was stressed that terrorism could only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach to isolate the terrorism threat. The deployment of 12,600 troops in Mali was authorized, setting up the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), transferring the functions of AFISMA to the new entity (UN 2013). MINUSMA, according to its mandate granted by the UNSC, should support the transitional authorities of Mali to reestablish State administration throughout the country and also help to stabilize key population centers, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements. The seven-part mandate also included responsibilities to support the implementation of Malis transitional road map to restore democracy and stability (UN 2013). Furthermore, the UNSC urged presidential and legislative elections to be hold, welcoming the commitment to organize presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative polls on 21 July 2013 (UN 2013).

Bloc Positions
Relations between France and Mali are deeply complex, since Malis situation is linked to Frances social, political, economic, strategic and energetic development. Firstly, the African country is one of the main access points into Sahara/Sahel regions natural resources such as oil, gas, gold and minerals, which are demanded by France - due to its geographic position. The French Republic is also concerned with the rise of terrorist groups in Mali, an issue considered as a national threat. Therefore, France has a full commitment with Malis stability, which resulted in Operation Serval. Thus, France is interested in keeping itself involved in Malis future in order to rebuild an African state which can more effectively correspond to Frenchs national interests. The country has already announced its pledges in helping Malis rebuilding (BBC 2013) and sees that the international community should focus on aid to Northern Mali (Irish 2013). The French Republic supports Malis integrity, condemns any sort of separatism by the MNLA group and does not recognize the Azawed state (Aljazeera 2012b). Due to Frances advances since

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Operation Serval, the French Republic already proposed a French permanent force in Mali with 1000 troops, in order to create a permanent force equipped to fight terrorism (New York Times 2013). Finally, France supports the transition from African Mission to Mali AFISMA - to UN Mission MINUSMA authority in Mali, since the country is interested in reducing its military contingent to 1000 troops until the end of the year (Nichols 2013). Frances nuclear power plants are supplied from the uranium mines in Niger (Bhadrakumar 2013) and the Republic has flirted possibilities of exploration in Mauritania (Aljazeera 2013). 75% of Frances electricity resources for nuclear reactors comes from Niger and are explored by Areva, the French nuclear company (Erlanger 2013). The United States of America considers that violent extremism is increasing in the northern region of Mali, where civil conflict has been intense. For the USA, the confl ict is giving ground for terrorist13 and/or criminal organizations to perform attacks and to traffic weapons and other illicit materials. Therefore, Washington considers a United Nations strategy and the action of the Special Envoy as a necessary way to foster cooperation not only between international actors, but also between the UN and sub-regional organizations. A military intervention in Mali must be thought comprising not only military operations, but also humanitarian participation in order to respond to the local humanitarian needs (UNBISnet 2012). The United States is helping with intelligence, military transportation and more than 1.200 tons of equipment and supplies not only to help current French forces, but also to support domestic institutions in Mali (Sisk 2013). A small number of American troops were deployed to Mali to support allied forces (The Washington Post 2013) and to train national forces, also in its neighbor, Niger (Reuters 2013b). Thus, it can be understood that Mali is part of the informally known War on Terror campaign, since the United States aims to eliminate organizations considered terrorists as a national security objective. For this reason, a UN Mission not only helps to diminish Malis instability, but also creates an intensive US military presence in the continent. Although voting in favor of the international intervention in Mali in December of 2012 (UNBISnet 2013), the Russian Federation believes that regional organizations and the Sahelian states should take the initiatives to solve Malis problems. Deeply concerned with the instabilities spillover effect over the Sahara/Sahel region and in arms and drugs flow, Russia claims that the situation in Mali must be addressed not only to achieve immediate and urgent goals, but also taking into consideration the whole Sahel regions situation in order to prevent the disappearance of secular regimes (Lavrov 2013). Russian Federation condemned the MNLA actions, standing for Malis territorial integrity (Ria Novosti 2012) and believing that institutions such as ECOWAS and regional and continental institutions must be the major actors in Malis situation. Moreover, Russia blames the vacuum of power left by the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi as one of the main reasons of the current instabilities in Mali, since the Federation believes that armed groups now fighting in the region are the same who were armed by Western countries in the overthrow of Libyas former leader (Heritage and Baczynska 2013). Committed with this position, Russian Federation refuses to send any military troop to the country (The Brics Post 2013). Nonetheless, the government declared it is delivering military light and hardware weapons to Bamakos government (Zarks 2013). The Russian Federation, however, is concerned with a rowing shift involving force aspects within MINUSMA, since the country believes that the peacekeeping mission must not evolve to a peace enforcement operation (Nichols 2013). The United Kingdom understands that the main reason fostering the current conflict is the religious extremism present in the north of Mali. For the UK, such external factor has increased Malis criminality rates, destabilizing the country and violating many Human Rights. It is for such reason that the option for military action against such destabilizing factor was needed. The United Nations integrated strategy for

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the Sahel, through the actions of the Special Envoy, is considered by the UK as the main form of leadership to maintain stability in the region (UNBISnet 2012). UK is also one contributor to Mali national forces, providing training, logistics and surveillance packages to it in order to enhance current military operations (United Kingdom 2013). Financial aid for the country has also increased, and UK has granted a 150 million aid package for the next three years (e Guardian 2013). Furthermore, it should be understood that the UK sees the UN Mission as a form to maintain its presence in the region, especially to fight the consolidation of terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda. China considers that the current humanitarian situation in the Sahel has deteriorated due to severe food crisis as well as with the ongoing conflict in Libya and Mali, which increased transnational crime and other terrorist and extremist activities. Furthermore, China has interests in Mali, since it has applied large investments projects in the whole African continent. Therefore, the scenario of a formalization of new African interventionism could destabilize Chinas relations with African countries (Asia Times 2013). For the country, the integrated United Nations strategy (developed under the views of the countries in the region as well as African regional organizations) is necessary to create specific objectives in the short term. Chinas response to the French intervention in Mali also originates from its concern about a potential abuse of the UN mandate, similarly to what happened in Libya (Sun 2013). In the long term, it considers that donors and international financial institutions must assist with regional development in order to diminish the humanitarian crisis (UNBISnet 2012). To achieve such objectives, the external troops in the country have to pull out and hand over the military responsibility to the African-led mission. Australia sees that African forces under the AFISMA banner are essential to halt the extremist advance from the north of Mali (Australia 2013b), since the country argues that the major threat in such country is the extremist Islamism militants. Thus, Australia is supporting actions taken against Tuareg rebels with material supplies to the UN operations (Sydney Morning Herald 2013). For the long term, Australia will provide US$ 10 million in humanitarian assistance to Mali (Australia 2013) and the country financially helps the UN Trust Fund in order to maintain the operations of the African-led International Support Missionin Mali (AFISMA). The United States has recognized the merits of a political solution to the armed conflict in Malinamely the value of reaching out to moderate Tuaregsbut has also emphasized readiness for a probable military campaign in the region. In September, Secretary Clinton also pointed out new emerging dimensions of the conflict in northern Mali, saying, its not only the violent extremists. We now have drug traffickers and arms smugglers finding safe havens and porous orders, providing them a launching pad to extend their reach throughout not only the region, but beyond [] This is not only a humanitarian crisis; it is a powder keg that the international community cannot afford to ignore. The United States is acutely concerned about possible expansion of al Qaedas influence in the region through its potential penetration of ungoverned lands and through its alleged connection with Ansar Dine. Like the United States, the United Kingdom is keen to prevent regional instability. And further like the U.S., it perceives neighboring Algeria as a key partner in this cause. Visiting Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair Burt visited Algiers in June 2012, where he stated that the UK views military intervention in Mali as a last resort and stands in support of Algerias call for the crisis in Mali to be ameliorated through dialogue and negotiation. France has the most intimate historical ties with Mali, which was its former colonial subject. France seeks to prioritize an African solution to the Mali crisis and does not intend to intervene directly in the country. It is, however, committed to offering logistical support to ECOWAS as it executes ground operations.

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China first entered into diplomatic relations with Mali in 1960, and Sino-Malian relations have since been strengthened over time. Chinas trade with Mali was valued at USD $280 in 2008, according to the Chinese embassy in Mali.226 While China generally pursues a foreign policy of non-interference in countries internal matters, it does assign weight to the influence of regional bodies (its veto of the Morocco-backed Arab-European draft resolution on Syria was the most recent notable exception to this trend). China has, to that end, pledged its support to ECOWAS to protect Malis civilians and bring peace to the Sahel. China has also not challenged debate about possible African military stabilization force in Mali. Pakistan has been implicated in the northern Mali conflict via allegations that it is providing jihadists to train and arm Malian Islamist rebels. Most notable, Nigers president Mahamadou Issofou claimed in July 2012, We have information of the presence of Afghans, Pakistanis in northern Mali operating as trainers. [] They are training those that have been recruited [to rebel against the government] in West Africa. Pakistan can be expected to vehemently deny these allegations when it takes the floor in the Councils next session. The Russian Federation has its own history of contending with radical Islam in the republic of Tatarstan, located east of Moscow, and can thus offer valuable perspective on the threat posed by Ansar Dine in the Islamic Maghreb. Russia condemned the March 2012 coup and demanded that the junta leaders should restore the constitutional order and ensure the return of the democratically elected president to power. Like China, Russia has not contested the possibility of deploying an African military stabilization force to northern Mali. Latin American countries stake in the Mali crisis largely has to do with trade and investment, as the LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) region and Africa have both largely defied the global trend of economic downturn. Argentina, for example, has signed an agreement with 22 other African countries, including Mali, that covers interchange and cooperation in agriculture, science and technology, trade, culture and education, and technological development, energy, fishery, health, credit lines. If instability persists in the Sahel, these interests and lucrative bilateral relationships will likely be severely disturbed. Rwanda and Togo are the current African Union members on the UN Security Council and will be responsible for delivering the views of the AU. They will be especially vocal regarding what resources they deem necessary to halting the violence in northern Mali. Togo is additionally a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and thus possesses the dual responsibility of expressing that bodys views as well. Whereas members of the Morrocan press have allegedly stated that the Moroccan people sympathize with some of the Tuaregs grievances and wanted to see their country serve as a regional mediator in the conflict, the Moroccan Foreign Ministry rejected the Tuareg rebels declaration of an independent Azawad. Morocco can be expected to push for a more inclusive resolution to security threats to the Sahel that take into account other economic and social concerns.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

1. Should the Security Council definitively authorize and pursue actual deployment of international military force in brining stability to Malis rebel-held north? 2. How should the forced imposition of sharia law by Islamist groups in Mali be tackled? 3. How will punitive action be taken against various actors in the insurgency (the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and MOJWA) that have committed human rights violations and war crimes? 4. How will Malis borders be protected to both prevent the illegal entry of arms that could embolden militant groups and ensure the safe transport of Malian refugees?

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5. What measures will be taken to provide relief to Malis over 170,000 internally displaced persons in the northern cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu? 6. Should MINUSMAs mandate be reviewed in order to ensure that all post conflict projects be correctly developed? In which circumstances should the mission withdraw from Mali? 7. Which is the best way to provide national reconciliation between Northern Mali and the Tuareg and the rest of the country? How this might be ensured? How can further problems in such relation be avoided in the medium term future? 8. In which way should the terrorism problem be tackled in Mali and in the region? Further shortterm measures should be prioritized or long-term measures to address the roots of the problem must come to the forefront? 9. What might be done in relation to the fundamentalist groups that fled from Mali into the region?

Bibliography and References

Aff aa-Mindzie, Mireille; Perry, Chris. Mali and the Sahel-Sahara: From Crisis Management to Sustainable Strategy. http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/161082/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/cff 0475b-58b9-4cf6-a5f8-5f0d13580930/en/ipi_e_pub_mali_and_sahel__2_.pdf (accessed June 29, 2013). Aljazeera. French Intervention in Mali: Causes and Consequences. Aljazeera. February 11, 2013. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2013/01/2013120113020737609.htm (accessed July 2, 2013). Mali interim president urges unity government. July 30, 2012a. http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/africa/2012/07/2012729225435334513.html (accessed June 23, 2013). Tuaregs claim independence from Mali. AlJazeera . April 6, 2012b. http://www.aljazeera. com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html (accessed July 12, 2013). BBC. French President Hollande pledges to help rebuild Mali. BBC News. February 2, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21308310 (accessed July 04, 2013). BBC. Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north. April 6, 2012a. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-africa-17635437 (accessed April 26, 2013). Mali: Islamists seize Gao from Tuareg rebels. June 28, 2012b. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-africa-18610618 (accessed April 26, 2013). BD, Devon. Global Research. February 1, 2013. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-maliahistorical-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407 (accessed May 5, 2013). Beaumont, Peter. As raizes da guerra no Mali. Carta Capital, 2013: 56-57. CNN Security Clearance. France says cooperation on Mali crucial. CNN Security Clearance. January 18, 2013. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/18/france-internationalcooperationcrucial-to-success-of-mali-mission/ (accessed June 28, 2013). Economist, Th e. France goes it alone. January 14, 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/ charlemagne/2013/01/french-foreign-policy (accessed April 27, 2013). Erlanger, Steven. France Is Increasing Security at Sites in Niger and at Home. Th e New York Times. January 24, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/europe/france-isincreasingsecurity-at-uranium-sites-in-niger.html (accessed July 15, 2013). France. Operation Serval: Point de situation du 29 de janvier de 2013. January 29, 2013. http:// www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/operation-serval-point-de-situation-du-29janvier-2013 (accessed April 27, 2013). Heisbourg, Francois. A surprising little war: fi rst lessons of Mali. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). April 3, 2013. http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/ sections/2013-94b0/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2013-b2cc/55-2-02heisbourg-2805 (accessed April 27, 2013).

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Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Reuters. January 23, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/01/23/us-sahara-crisis-russia-idUSBRE90M12X20130123 (acessed March 17, 2013). Keita, Kalifa. Confl ict And Confl ict Resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali. Carlisle, May 1, 1998. Ki-Zerbo, J. Histoire de LAfrique Noire. Paris: Libraire Hatier, 1972. Kwbuka, Eugene. Rwanda: Mali Lobbies Rwanda On UN Peacekeeping Mission. All Africa. March 12, 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201303130115.html (accessed July 13, 2013). Lecocq, Baz. Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Macedo, Jose Rivair. Historia da Africa (unpublished text, awaiting publication).Porto Alegre: Contexto, 2013. Maglia, Cristiana, Marilia Bernardes Closs, and Renata Schimitt Noronha. Sociedades Africanas Antigas: historias e caracteristicas. In Relacoes Intenacionais para Educadores: Africa em Foco, by Klei Medeiros, Marjorie Stadnik Alexandre Piff ero Spohr, 31-65. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2013. Mazrui, Ali A., and C. Wondji. Historia Geral da Africa VIII: Africa desde 1935.Brasilia: UNESCO, 2010. McConnell, Tristan. Mali: First the war, now the crisis. February 1, 2013. http://www.globalpost. com/dispatch/news/war/confl ict-zones/130131/mali-crisis-human-impact-confl ict-zonesmilitary (accessed April 27, 2013). Ndiayeis, Souleymane. French intervention will cost Mali its independence. February 8, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/08/mali (accessed April 27, 2013). NERINT. Janes Mali Country Profi le. Porto Alegre, 2009. New York Times. Mali: France Proposes Permanent Force. New York, April 5, 2013. Nichols, Michelle. Reuters. Th e U.N. Security Council unanimously approved on Th ursday the creation of a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force in Mali starting July 1, which will be supported by French troops if needed to combat Islamist extremist threats in the West African country. April 25, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/us-mali-crisisunidUSBRE93O0R420130425 (accessed July 15, 2013). Nossiter, Adam. Soldiers Overthrown Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa. March 22, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-callsforelections.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed June 23, 2013). Ria Novosti. Russia Upholds Malis Territorial Integrity. Ria Novosti. April 6, 2012. http:// en.rian.ru/russia/20120406/172654558.html (accessed July 20, 2013). Sisk, Richard. U.S. Steps Up Support for French in Mali. 19 de March de 2013. http://www.military. com/daily-news/2013/03/19/us-steps-up-support-for-french-in-mali.html (acesso em 21 de July de 2013). Smith, Zeric Kay. Malis Decade of Democracy. Journal of Democracy, July 2001: 73-79. Sydney Morning Herald. Mali crisis is Australias big UN test, says envoy. Th e Sydney Morning Herald. 12 de January de 2013. http://www.smh.com.au/world/mali-crisis-is-australias-biguntest-says-envoy-20130115-2crlv.html (acesso em 21 de July de 2013). The Washington Post. Pentagon deploys small number of troops to war-torn Mali. Th e Washington Post. 30 de April de 2013. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-30/ world/38921208_1_robert-fi rman-mali-bamako (acesso em 21 de July de 2013). Theroux-Benoni, Lori-Anne. Lessons from the Malian crisis for the international security architecture. April 15, 2013b. http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-the-maliancrisis-

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for-the-international-security-architecture (accessed June 29, 2013). Mali in the aftermath of the French military intervention. February 25, 2013. http://www. issafrica.org/publications/situation-reports/mali-in-the-aft ermath-of-the-french-militaryinterventionle-mali-au-lendemain-de-de-landapos;operation-militaire-francaise (accessed May 3, 2013). Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel. Argentina y Mali. Pagina 12. February 2, 2013. http://www.pagina12. com.ar/diario/elmundo/subnotas/213088-62255-2013-02-02.html (accessed July 5, 2013). United Kingdom. Defence Secretary visits UK forces training Mali troops. Gov.uk. 22 de May de 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-visits-uk-forces-trainingmalitroops (acesso em 21 de July de 2013). UN (United Nations). Security Council authorizes deployment of African-led international support mission in Mali for initial year-long period. December 20, 2012. http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2012/sc10870.doc.htm (accessed June 23, 2013). . Security Council establishes peacekeeping force for Mali eff ective 1 July. April 25, 2013. http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htm (accessed June 29, 2013). UNBISnet. Security Council on Sahel: Towards a more comprehensive and coordinated approach. UNBISnet - United Nations Bibliographic Information System. December 10, 2012. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N12/636/37/PDF/N1263637. pdf?OpenElement (accessed July 12, 2013). . Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) [on establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)]. UNBISnet - United Nations Bibliographic Information System. April 25, 2013. http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp? session=137361058P09C.2406&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20& profi le=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term=S%2FRES%2F2100+%282013%29&matchopt=0% 7C0&oper=AND&x=10&y=13&aspect=power&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0& (accessed July 8, 2013). UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Report. February 2013 Monthly Forecast. http://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-02/mali_4.php (accessed June 23, 2013). Visentini, Paulo Fagundes. Os Paises Africanos - Diversidade de um Continente.Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI, 2012. Whats in Blue. Resolution Stablishing a UN Mission in Mali. Whats in Blue. April 24, 2013. http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/04/resolution-establishing-a-un-mission-in-mali.php# (accessed July 10, 2013).

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Topic Area B: Reformation of the United Nations Security Council

Despite the worlds rapidly changing geopolitical situation, the Security Council has seen little change and reform since it was established along with the other United Nations committees in 1945. The only reform that was significant enough was made in 1965. The number of non-permanent members had been increased to a maximum of 10. There are many issues regarding reform that have been brought up in the Security Council, which includes the limited membership, the power of the veto, the types of representatives that should be present, and even the procedures that a newly reformed Security Council would follow. Now, nations from many regions in the world are in great favour of the notion that regions should be allowed to assume seats as a permanent member on the Security Council. The countries that heavily support this reform policy are the G4 nations: Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. The reformation of the Security Councils composition and its operations is an initiative that has come out of the General Assembly in the past twelve years. This initiative has come from the belief in much of the world that the current structure of the UNSC is an outdated model of world politics dating from after World War Two. The council is inevitably divided on this issue, with many countries with varying degrees of wealth determined to change the role and the use of the United Nations Security Council.

Definitions of Key Terms

Reform The process of changing and/or improving on principles that will bring beneficial change Veto Power The veto power allows the delegate to reject and prevent the adoption of a policy brought up at any meeting. This power is given to what is known as the P5 nations: USA, UK, Russian Federation, China, France. The P5 Nations These nations are the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Statement of the Problem

Enlarging the Security Council has been a hotly debated issue for years. Supporters of expanding the number of permanent seats contend that, in the newly evolving global arena, the Security Council no longer adequately reflects the international structure. Some countries argue that economic influence should now be considered, in addition to political and military, while other countries stress deliberations that affect them. Broadening the Security Council's constituency would certainly make it more democratic and more reflective of today's realities. As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the Security Council is assigned primary responsibility by the Charter of the United Nations for maintaining peace and security in the world. The Security Council currently consists of five permanent members (China, France, Great Britain, The Russian Federation, and the United States) and ten (originally six) elective members which serve two-year terms. Half of the elected members are chosen each year by the General Assembly under a "gentleman's agreement" that allots the ten elective seats to major geographical areas. Five seats are allotted to Asia and Africa, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America and two to Western Europe. All decisions require an affirmative vote of nine members, but substantive decisions, unlike procedural ones, may be vetoed

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by a permanent member by casting a negative vote. Nations not represented on the Council may be invited to participate in Security Council deliberations if they are parties to a dispute being considered. A Security Council member that is a party to a dispute must abstain from voting when questions concerning peaceful settlement procedures or terms are brought to a vote. Under the Charter, the Security Council's peace-preservation role provides for the peaceful settlement of international disputes or, following the determination that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression exists, it may call upon members to undertake collective actions against the peace violator. The office of the President of the Security Council rotates monthly among the members, and the Security Council is considered to be in permanent session. The logic of the Charter Framers' search for peace was embodied in the formula that delegated primary responsibility to the great powers functioning within the framework of the Security Council. So long as unanimity prevailed among them, no power or group of powers could effectively challenge the peace. Each permanent member was accorded a veto power so that the organization could not be used by one group of great powers against another; this would not be a police action but a third world war. However, the assumption of the framers that in most cases the great powers would have common cause has not prevailed. No other organ of the United Nations has suffered a greater disparity between theory and practice. Most of the serious threats to peace since 1946 have involved great-power rivalry, direct or indirect. The Cold War, ideological hostility, disputes over admission of new members, and direct power confrontations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union have resulted in several hundred vetoes, a primary dependence for security on regional alliances, and an expanding role for the General Assembly and the Secretariat in peace and security matters. Although the Security Council has dealt with many disputes successfully and has helped to stop the fighting in many areas of the world, when greatpower interests have collided, the Security Council has been paralyzed. The increasing inability of the great powers to influence voting decisions in the General Assembly in recent years and the end of the Cold War have had the effect of revitalizing the Security Council. The Security Council remains a significant forum for great-power negotiation on major issues involving peace and security matters. Germany and Japan have endeavoured to strengthen their credentials for permanent membership by participating in peace-keeping efforts despite constitutional restrictions. In its first-ever contribution of personnel to an United Nations operation, Germany donated flight crews to reconnaissance missions over Bosnia in April 1993 and promised to send a transportation and support battalion to Somalia in June of 1993. Japan, which had contributed civilian election monitors to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), supplied 75 civilian police, 8 military observers, and 598-man engineering battalion to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). While the General Assembly has considered the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council since 1979, the debate became much more substantive and urgent in 1992 than in the prior years. Most Third World and /or developing countries feel that the Security Council's new structure should enable the Organization to shift its intense focus from a world order revolving around a small number of Powers to one characterized by greater openness, cooperation, representation, and solidarity. The predominant view of First World countries (especially Japan and Germany) is that by virtue of their global interests and contributions to international security Germany and Japan could claim a right to a Security Council seat. In addition, it must be kept in mind that no nation is going to willingly give up power or decrease its power. Thus, nations that are already permanent members will be very leery of any measure that would result in a decrease in their power within the United Nations.

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History of the problem

After World War II, the Allies, specifically the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the USSR, were determined to prevent allowing future genocides and conflicts from ever reaching the scope of World War II. To do this, the Allies resurrected President Wilsons dream of a united world body. At the time, the League of Nations was still in existence, albeit with very little power. The Allies sought to give such a world body power and credibility. To do this, the League was disbanded in 1946 and in its place the United Nations was created. In the UN, the majority of power would be held by the Security Council. This Council would include the five allies as permanent members with the right to veto any resolution and 6 temporary members selected on a rotating basis. The Security Council was intentionally formed as a small body in order to make it more capable of acting effectively in times of crisis. Ineffectiveness had been the defect in the League of Nations as the body was far too large to come to any consensus. Through the Security Council, these problems were hoped to have been solved. From its inception, the Security Council was faced with challenges. The peaceful coexistence that existed between the capitalist West and the communist East as a result of a common enemy quickly turned cold, and by 1948 it seemed as though there would soon be another major war, one that had the potential to go nuclear and result in millions of deaths. With the creation of NATO in 1949 and the subsequent response of the USSR with the creation of the Warsaw Pact, it seemed as though the world were heading down a path towards nuclear war. This danger instantly put a lot of pressure on the UN and the Security Council. As the Cold War unfolded, the world was again forced to draw sides. As the main body for world affairs, these sides were evident in the UN and in the Security Council. In 1950, when the DPRK invaded the ROK, the United States asked for the UN to intervene. While the UN was able to provide aid, it is important to note that this was due to the absence of the Soviet Union, who was protesting the exclusion of the Peoples Republic of China from the UN in favor of the Nationalists in Taiwan. Should the USSR been present, the resolution would have been vetoed. If the USSR had vetoed this resolution, then it is likely that South Korea would have not been able to withstand the DPRKs assault, and with the fall of Seoul, the UN would have lost much of its credibility. Because of the lines that were drawn, the Security Council was often powerless to do its stated job. By 1963, the first wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia had taken place, and UN membership more than doubled from 51 nations to 114 nations. More than half of the UN was now from either Africa or Asia. Soon, these countries demanded to be better represented in the Security Council, and by 1965, in the only resolution passed concerning Security Council reform, the number of temporary members was increased from 6 to 10, making the total members for the Council 15. Resolution 1990 was ratified by twothirds of the UN members and then approved by the P-5. Still, the P-5 remained the only veto powers. Due to the increase polarization of the world, there were no attempts at reform until the 1990s. The Cold War had since ended, and there was increasing cooperation between the P-5 countries. This cooperation resulted in the powers reaching consensus on issues before they had been introduced to the entire Security Council. This led to new complaints about the lack of equity in the Council. It is important to note that the complaints werent based on military or economy, but on the sheer numbers of countries in the world compared to the number in the Security Council, as well as the absolute veto that was held by only 5 countries. In the next few years, peacekeeping began to pick up, especially in regions of the world that the UN has previously been unable to act in. The new peacekeeping initiatives, along with the councils hands on

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approach to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN seemed to have decided upon increased activism and authority in regards to international peace and security. This was how the Security Council was intended to act. Countries that previously had been excluded began defend their viewpoints from being ignored by the P-5. In addition, the P-5 was reluctant to cast vetoes, as they were seen as antiquated. The veto powers only cast 12 vetoes from 1990 to 2003, compared to 193 in the previous 45 years.

Historical Account of Security Council reform

The Security Council (SC) was created by the United Nations (UN) Charter, which came into effect on October 24, 1945. The SC shares responsibility with the General Assembly (GA) for the UNs primary goal of maintaining international peace and security. Provisions in the UN Charter, however, demonstrate that the founders envisioned the SC as the UNs premier body, charged with the most essential security tasks. This is evident in three ways. First, the GA can address issues related to international peace and security only if they are not currently under consideration by the SC. Second, GA resolutions are simply recommendations, while Security Council resolutions are binding. When a state joins the UN, it agrees to abide by SC decisions. Finally, unlike other UN committees, the SC can take steps to enforce its decisions. Thus, although they are both charged with addressing international peace and security, the SC has much more authority than the GA. The UN budget is the only exception to this authority; the GA exercises full control in that area. The Security Council not only plays a unique role in the United Nations. It also has a unique structure, as it has five permanent member states with veto power. These states, known as the P-5, are the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. The total membership of the SC consists of 15 states, ten of which are elected biannually by the GA based on a geographical distribution system. In general, five elected seats go to Africa, two seats each go to Latin America and Western Europe, and one seat goes to Eastern Europe. Rotating members have a vote but do not have a veto. In addition to giving the SC priority on issues related to international peace and security, the founders also gave the Council important tasks related to the operation of the UN. For example, the UN SecretaryGeneral is appointed and new Member States are admitted to the UN by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Similarly, approval by both the SC and GA is required to appoint judges to the International Court of Justice. The issue of UN reform is much the same. To revise the Charter, the GA and SC must both call for a review conference. Any resulting amendments require a twothirds vote in the GA and ratification by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Together, these provisions mean that the Security Council in general and the P-5 in particular have both short-term and long-term control over much of the UN. In principle, this would seem to give the P-5 countries considerable weight to alter the UN to their advantage. In fact, however, disagreements among P-5 members mean that the SC is often stymied. For example, from 1945-1990, the SC was largely paralyzed by the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. When the Cold War ended, many observers hoped that it would be able to act more decisively and become more inclusive. In the ensuing 20 years, many Charter amendments related to Council membership have been discussed, but not one has been passed by the GA and approved by the P-5. From its first meeting in 1946 to the present, the SC has been strongly criticized. Most of the criticisms relate to the veto power of the P-5 countries. If just one P-5 member objects to a SC draft resolution, the resolution will fail. This gives P-5 countries the ability to evade criticism of their own policies and to target countries with whom they disagree. The results are seen in three ways. First, the P-5 members often hold

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closed-door meetings to decide which issues should be put on the agenda and to draft resolutions for the approval of the full Council, which they allegedly treat as a rubber-stamp. Second, when rotating members are able to put items on the agenda during the month-long presidency of the Council that each member enjoys, the P-5 are able to veto draft resolutions that are not to their liking. For example, the US vetoes resolutions critical of Israel, while Russia and China veto sanctions against governments such as Iran, Sudan, and Syria. As a result, the Council has failed to take action on many severe and persistent security problems. Third, the P-5 is quick to act on issues that threaten their interests (such as the 1990 invasion of oil-rich Kuwait by Iraq) but slow to act on issues that do not affect them (such as the 1994 genocide in resource-poor Rwanda). According to critics, the SC has double standards and is unwilling to act in the interest of global peace and security. For example, the SC has only recently passed its first significant resolution related to the situation in Syria, a resolution focuses on chemical weapons disarmament, not ending the civil war that has killed more than 100,000 people. Can the GA draft and pass a resolution that would make the Security Council more effective? How should such a resolution be crafted to gain the approval of the P-5? History and Current Events To understand the challenges of and possibilities for Security Council reform, one must understand the origins and privileges of the Council, as well as past efforts to reform Council membership. When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the World War II Allies (the US, UK, France, Russia, and China) were concerned, above all, with limiting the possibility for war. After all, in just 45 years, the world had seen two terrible wars. Together, World War I and World War II killed 78 to 90 million people. The Allies gave the official name of their alliance (the United Nations) to an organization they created to replace the League of Nations, which had failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II. As scholars Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns explain, The participants agreed that the organization would be based on the principle of the sovereign equality of members and that all peace-loving states would be eligible for membership, thereby excluding the Axis powers -- Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. It was also agreed that decisions on security issues would require unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council -- the great powers. The Security Council was created by the United Nations Charter, which came into effect on 24 October 1945. According to the Charter, the UN has three purposes: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights... Responsibility for each of these goals is shared between the General Assembly, in which each member state has one vote, and a council with limited membership. The SC shares responsibility for the first goal (international peace and security) with the GA, especially the General Assembly First Committee (disarmament and security). Responsibility for the second goal (equal rights and self-determination) is

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shared by the GA and Trusteeship Council.20 Responsibility for the third goal (international economic and social cooperation, and human rights) was originally shared by the GA and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Since 2006, responsibility for the human rights portion of the third set of goals has rested with the GA and the new Human Rights Council (HRC). Although the SC, Trusteeship Council, ECOSOC, and HRC are each charged with supervising the achievement of one UN goal, these councils have very different capabilities. Specifically, the SC is much more powerful than the others. The UN Charter gives the SC both the authority to decide what constitutes a security matter and the ability to demand compliance from UN member states on such matters. In addition, SC resolutions do not need to be passed by any other UN committee to go into effect. By contrast, the other councils simply make recommendations to the GA. Their resolutions do not go into effect until the GA passes them. Even then, they are simply recommendations. Thus, the SC trumps all of the other UN councils and committees. Previous Efforts to Reform the Council When the Allies formed the SC in 1945, it had 11 members -- six rotating members plus the P-5. In 1965, the GA and SC agreed to increase the number of rotating members to 10 for a total of 15 SC members at one time. The increase in rotating members occurred after former European colonies in Africa and Asia obtained independence, joined the UN, and began to vote in the GA. It was not until 1992 that the GA again gave serious consideration to SC reform. After the Cold War, Germany and Japan (which were originally excluded from the UN because of their attacks on other states during World War II) began to advocate for permanent seats on the SC. The two countries argued that they should be granted status as permanent members of the SC, citing their participation in the Gulf War coupled with the fact that they were, respectively, the second and third largest contributors to the regular budget of the UN. The push by Germany and Japan created a platform for open debate in the GA regarding SC reform and led to numerous other states seeking elusive entrance into P-5 membership. As the debate continued, the GA quickly became divided on the issue, and regional rivalries formed over how expansion of the SC should proceed. In September 1992, India and 35 other Non-Aligned states tabled a GA draft resolution expanding the SC, which had resulted in deadlock within the GA. In the summer of 1993, the GA instead passed resolution A/RES/48/26, which set up an Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council. In 1998, progress was further stymied when the GA passed resolution A/RES/53/30, which stipulated that any resolution expanding the Council would need at least a 2/3 majority to pass. The logic of this voting rule is that since Charter amendments must be ratified by 2/3 of UN member states (including all of the P-5), draft resolutions calling for amendments should also require a 2/3 majority to avoid wasting time. In the mid-1990s, frustrated with the stalemate regarding SC membership, UN member states began to pursue alternative concepts of Security Council reform. This time, states that were not on the Council and had no chance of gaining permanent seats sought to improve their access to and understanding of P-5 deliberations by improving transparency, accountability, and participation in the Councils working methods. Reforming the SCs working methods requires a simple majority vote on an SC resolution, as opposed to the 2/3 majority of the GA and SC (with no P-5 vetoes) needed to change the UN Charter. Proposals have included changing the Councils rules of procedure and requiring more public meetings.

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No substantial changes have passed due to strong resistance both from the P-5 and states seeking permanent membership in the Council. In 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan encouraged the GA to once again take action on Council membership. Specifically, In December 2004, his High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed two models for enlargement, both of which would expand the SC to 24 members. According to researcher Jonas Von Freiesleben, Model A proposed adding six new permanent seats, but with no veto power, and three new two-year term elected seats. Model B created a new category of eight seats, renewable every four years, and one new two-year nonrenewable seat. Apparently the Panel would have preferred not to include the addition of permanent members, but according to one ambassador, the Secretary-General strong-armed the panel into including that option out of fear of alienating Germany and Japan in the upcoming summit. Of the two, Model B received the most support because it did not increase the number of permanent seats. The group that supported this proposal was known as the Coffee Club and was comprised of Italy, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Spain, Pakistan and South Korea, among others. Supporters of Model A, called the G-4, consisted of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil. In his March 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, Annan again urged the GA to expand the SC. According to many analysts, Annan pushed hard for reform because he was concerned by the UNs loss of prestige when the US and UK invaded Iraq in 2003 without SC approval. But, after the 2005 World Summit (a special session of the GA attended by heads of state and foreign ministers), proposals to reform membership and voting in the SC were abandoned due to continuing P-5 resistance both to reform in general and to the admission of particular states to permanent membership. For example, US President George W. Bush refused to support the G-4 proposal giving a permanent seat to Germany because Germany had opposed the US war in Iraq. In March 2006, a group known as the Small Five (S5) composed of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica, and Liechtenstein resumed the effort to reform SC working methods. Their GA draft resolution A/60/L.49 sought to achieve more accountability and transparency in the Council, asking the SC to consult with all GA Member States on resolutions and requesting that the P-5 explain every veto decision to the GA. This proposal encountered resistance from both the P-5 and Member States seeking a permanent seat. Even if it had passed the GA, however, it would have simply been a recommendation to the SC unless the SC adopted it as its own resolution. Recent Committee Work on This Topic Since 2008, the GA has established and renewed annual informal plenary sessions on SC reform. These meetings, known as the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGNs), have become the primary venue for discussing SC reform. Although a number of proposals have been discussed at the IGNs and in GA meetings, none has acquired the requisite number of supporters to reach a 2/3 majority. At present, there are five main proposals, each supported by a particular group (or bloc) of countries. A recent report from the current Chair of the IGNs (Afghanistans Permanent Representative to the UN, Zahir Tanin), reveals that the blocs have budged little in response to more than five years of negotiation. The blocs and their proposals are as follows:

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The G4. This is the most recognized bloc on SC reform. It is comprised of Germany, India, Brazil, and Japan and has support from other UN member states as well. The G4 proposes to add six permanent seats (one for each of its core members and two for African states), as well as an additional four non-permanent seats (one seat each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America). The group states that after 15 years, Member States should review the reforms, at which point states will discuss giving the new permanent members veto powers. To improve working methods, the G-4 believes that public meetings and records should become the norm in the SC, while closed meetings and confidential documents should be used only in exceptional circumstances. It also supports improving communications and coordination between the SC and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The Executive Council of the Africa Union (AU), also known as the Committee of Ten (C10): In 2005, this group developed a reform package known as The Ezulwini Consensus, which focuses on expanding Africas representation. It does not discuss permanent seats or voting for UN member states from other regions except to say that the SC should be expanded to 26 members and that working methods should become more transparent, with more public SC meetings, more effort to consider the positions of countries not in the SC, more consultation with non-state actors such as transnational corporations, and reduced emphasis on military responses to security problems. The Ezulwini Consensus calls for the addition of two permanent seats and the retention of five non-permanent seats for African states. The group opposes the veto in principle but requests that all permanent members of the SC be given the veto so long as the veto exists. Therefore, the AU/C-10 would be willing to accept either a proposal that creates African permanent seats and eliminates the veto or a proposal that adds African permanent seats and eliminates the veto for the P-5. The AU also proposes that it be the body that determines which African states become SC members. The Coffee Club, now also known as Uniting for Consensus (UfC): Since Model B failed in 2005, this group (which includes Italy, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Spain, Pakistan and South Korea) has shifted from supporting the addition of permanent seats to adding only rotating seats.38 According to UfC, permanent seats result in a Council that is unrepresentative and unresponsive to the needs of Member States and that favors individual states interests. The group proposes the addition of only rotating seats to the SC and either extending the term-lengths for rotating seats or allowing for two terms of reelection. It also supports a limiting the use of the veto and the vetos eventual elimination. The group argues that adding more permanent members now will encourage the continued expansion of permanent members in the future, meaning that the SC could have an unwieldy body of 30-35 members in 15 years. The UfC favors giving regions more power in membership decisions and in consultation on security issues. Members of the G4, particularly Germany, have criticized the group for failing to consider the widespread calls for more permanent seats and taking a band-aid approach by solely increasing non-permanent seats. The L69: This group, comprised of approximately 40 countries from Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and the Pacific, seeks a reform plan similar to that of the G-4. The L69 proposes adding six permanent members (four for the G4 and two for Africa) and several non-permanent members, expanding the SC to the mid-twenties. The group further supports a non-permanent seat reserved for small developing countries, in addition to coordination from regional groups to ensure the continual representation of small developing states. The L69 calls for better working methods, including improved transparency and greater SC respect for the GA in both letter and spirit. The L69 differs from the G4 in seeking the veto for the new permanent members, although it argues that the veto should be used more sparingly and with greater consideration of its consequences than has been the case from 1945 to the present. In June 2012, India (a member of the G-4) announced that it supports both the G-4 and the L69.

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Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT): This group was launched in May 2013 by 21 countries, including the members of the S5 group that focused on working methods. The ACT hopes to reform the practices of the SC to bring more informal discussion of security issues so that the SC can stop responding responding reactively and incrementally to evolving crises and instead become strategic and proactive about preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding. The group does call for an increase in SC members gives priority to the goal of improving working methods. Members also aim at creating true discussion in the SC, rather than pre-scripted debates, and hope that the SC can play a stronger role in holding people accountable for serious international crimes by discouraging the use of the veto for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as well as improving the SCs relationship and coordination with the International Criminal Court. The permanent five members of the Security Council disagree on the necessary reforms to the SC. During the IGNs, the United States has supported the expansion of both permanent and rotating seats. The US has added the caveat, however, that additional permanent seats must designate specific countries and should not have the veto. This stands in contradiction to the C10, which wants to choose the permanent African members itself and extend the veto to all permanent members. France and the UK support the accession of the G4 and two African states as permanent members to the SC, as well as adding rotating seats. They have been ambiguous about their positions on veto powers, suggesting that states should create an interim proposal to facilitate progress in SC reform (such as temporarily rotating seats that will become permanent), with details to emerge from negotiation. China has supported increasing the size of the SC, emphasizing that new seats should go to small and medium sized developing states. It has not said, however, whether these countries should have permanent or non-permanent positions. Russia supports maintaining a balance between transparency and effectiveness by improving relations between the GA and SC. It contends that expanding the Council beyond a manageable size (20 members) and infringing on the veto will inhibit the functioning of the SC, not improve it. At the February 2013 IGN, the L69 and C10 collaborated on a draft resolution, suggesting that it is possible that they could overcome their differences over membership, the veto, and regional representation and reminding observers that, if developing countries could unite, they would have enough votes to meet the 2/3 (129 state) requirement in the GA. But many developing countries have joined the UfC bloc and do not want to create additional permanent seats or provide veto powers. Moreover, the need for 2/3 approval by the SC with no veto by a P-5 member remains. During the IGNs, there have increasingly been calls to reform the IGN process itself, which is informal and does not provide for votes, resulting in recurring arguments with no progress. In response, IGN Chair Zahir Tanin has suggested that: 1) Member States could explore a variety of reform models including expansion in both categories, interim and intermediate options. 2) Member States could task the Chair at the annual decision on Security Council reform to draft a concise working document. 3) In case there would be sufficient progress in the intergovernmental negotiations , a high-level meeting could be held, to assess the state of play and propose ways to keep the process moving forward. The second and third suggestions were opposed by the C10 and the UfC, while the second was supported by the G4 and L69. Progress clearly hinges on compromise and negotiations between blocs, yet India and the Africa group have resisted negotiated solutions using intermediate proposals (e.g. creating rotating

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seats that might become permanent in the future). At the end of the 2013 meeting, Tanin noted that if talks continue to stall, it may be time to place negotiations on strategic hold. If the SC remains stymied on serious threats to peace and security, some analysts predict the demise of the UN and its replacement by a new organization, such as a modified G-20. Thus it could be argued that the P-5 have the most to gain from SC reform. Any new organization would be unlikely to give them and only them a veto. For example, the G-20 operates on consensus, meaning that each member state effectively has a veto. Yet the G-20 is far from being a ready replacement for the UN Security Council. Its 20 member states are more diverse than the P-5, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the worlds population and 90% of the worlds production. But the G-20 includes just a few developing countries, and only the most developed among them. Moreover, historically the G-20s focus has been on economic, not security issues, and the organization exists apart from the UN secretariat, which provides research to the SC and administers UN peacekeeping forces. Despite early expectations that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon would avoid the issue of SC reform, since beginning his second term in 2012, he has spoken on the issue, urging Member States to accelerate negotiations and find a consensus on reforms to SC membership, voting, and working methods. In September 2013, the Indian ambassador to the UN used his speech at the High Level GA meeting to promote the G4s call for SC reform by the 70th anniversary of the UN in 2015. According to him more than 120 of 193 U.N. member states support changes to the current structure.

Current situation
Since 1990, there has been a push by many non-veto nations to double the number of permanent members and to remove the veto power. These reforms, particularly the latter, will, of course, have an extremely difficult time coming to fruition. The 5 veto powers, citing the League of Nations, say that they need the veto to avoid circumstances that will cause the UN to become ineffective. However, the rest of the UN, which equals 186 nations, feels as though this is inequitable. Despite this, the P5 are using the veto to safeguard their power. There is nothing in the UN charter, which in Article 108 gives the P5 the right to veto any attempt to weaken their power, which provides that they relinquish the right of veto. Membership, however, has not received the same kind of negative reaction from the P5. However, an increase in members would result in a committee that was too large to be effective and still too small and selective to adequately represent the entire world. Another problem is selecting the new permanent members. What criteria must a country pass before it can be considered? And would these countries get veto power?

Issues to Be Addressed
There are 5 main issues that need to be addressed in any resolution regarding reforms in the Security Council. They are; The entitlement and privileges for veto powers Expansion of the number of permanent members The types of representatives (region/political system etc.) that should be present Procedures that should be adopted by the new Security Council

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When considering the composition of the Security Council, among other views, the following points arise: the establishment of permanent regional seats (to be rotated among the members of various regional groups), the role of the veto as anachronistic and undemocratic and its possible abolition, the fact that the present five permanent members happen to also be nuclear-weapon states, and of course, which country or countries would receive permanent membership, if any at all. Permanent members are assured representation on any UN Committee, enjoy extraordinary access to information, and can influence events worldwide most notably with their veto, which gives permanent members enormous bargaining power in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. In determining who should be granted permanent seats, the focus tends to be on whether a country is capable of carrying out the responsibilities of a Security Council member.

Country positions
P5 Countries, Japan, Germany Japan and Germany, since becoming economic powerhouses in the mid-1990s, have been campaigning for inclusion among the P5 countries. This measure is backed by the P5, specifically the United States,France, and UK. These two argue that their large wealth and the amount of funding that they provide to the UN should result in a Security Council seat. Undeveloped nations, Canada, Nordic Countries, Netherlands, Italy, Australia, and New Zealand In 1993, through Resolution 48/26, the GA established an Open-Ended Working Group to consider Security Council reform. Discussions were then held by the Nordic countries on the topic. At the very least, these countries want more rapport with the Security Council members. They feel as though they give money and peacekeepers to the UN, but the Security Council does not consult them on their actions. Reforms here could result in increased communications between diplomats to increasing the number of regional powers on the committee. This would achieve a more balanced representation on the Security Council. Also, while several countries, such as Nigeria, Brazil, and India, have campaigned for permanent membership, discussions in the Working Group have shown that the majority of nations believe that restrictions on veto powers is a better solution than adding new permanent members. These countries do believe that the size of the council should be increased, with an electoral process to select the new members.

Official Statements on the problem

The United States of America The following statement was made by the U.S Department of State: The United States is open to UN Security Council reform and expansion, as one element of an overall agenda for UN reform. We advocate a criteria-based approach under which potential members must be supremely well qualified, based on factors such as: economic size, population, and military capacity, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the UN, contributions to UN peacekeeping, and record on counterterrorism and non-proliferation. We have to look, of course, at the overall geographic balance of the Council, but effectiveness remains the benchmark for any reform. Bureau of Public Affairs, June 20, 2005 France & the United Kingdom Reform of the UNSC, both its enlargement and the improvement of its working methods, must therefore succeed. We reaffirm the support of our two countries for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for permanent membership, as well as for permanent representation for Africa on the Council. We regret that negotiations towards this goal remain in deadlock and are therefore ready to consider an

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intermediate solution. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than those of the current elected members and those terms would be renewable; at the end of an initial phase, it could be decided to turn these new types of seats into permanent ones. We will work with all our partners to define the parameters of such a reform. UNSC reform requires a political commitment from the member states at the highest level. We will work in this direction in the coming months with a view to achieving effective reform. Part of a joint UK-France Summit Declaration, 27 March 2008 India It is common knowledge that the United Nations is often unable to exert an effective influence on global economic and political issues of critical importance. This is due to what may be called as "democracy deficit", which prevents effective multilateralism, a multilateralism that is based on a democraticallyevolved global consensus. Therefore, reform and restructuring of the United Nations system can alone provide a crucial link in an expanding chain of efforts to refashion international structures, imbuing them with a greater degree of participatory decision-making, so as to make them more representative of contemporary realities. The expansion of the Security Council, in the category of both permanent and non-permanent members, and the inclusion of countries like India as permanent members, would be a first step in the process of making the United Nations a truly representative body. Dr. Manmohan Singh, September 23, 2004 Russian Federation The UN must rationally adapt itself to new world realities. It should also strengthen its influence and preserve its multinational nature and integrity of the UN Charter provisions. The reform of the UN Security Council is an essential component of its revitalization. The time has come to speed up the search for a compromise formula of its expansion and increased efficiency of its work. Dmitry Medvedev, September 23, 2009 Brazil The United Nations has spent 15 years discussing the reform of its Security Council. Todays structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of todays world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world, to which we aspire. Therefore I am much encouraged by the General Assemblys decision to launch negotiations in the near future on the reform of the Security Council. Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, September 23, 2008 South Africa The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) urgently requires reform to rectify inequitable power relations. We reiterate that the reform of the UNSC is urgent and would go a long way in rectifying inequitable power relations within the Security Council. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, June 01, 2011 Portugal The 15-member Security Council must be enlarged so that it is more representative, transparent and efficient. In our view it is illogical that countries like Brazil or India that have today an irreplaceable economic and political role are still not permanent members of the Security Council. Africa also deserves consideration to take due account of the remarkable political and economic progresses that we have witnessed in that vast continent. Jos Scrates, September 2010

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Relevant resolutions
This matter has not had much Security Council discussion. However, in 1965, Resolution 1990 was ratified, which increased the size of the committee to 15 members. Most recently, the General Assembly passed Resolution 48/26 in 1993, which established the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

1. Should the Security Council be expanded to include more permanent members? If so, which nations should be eligible? 2. What criteria should be applied to judge the ability to have permanent Security Council status? 3. Should the current number of seats remain the same and be redistributed on the basis of regional or current international status? 4. Should the veto be abolished? If not, should any new permanent members also have the right to veto? 5. Is a fully democratic representation in the UNSC possible? 6. Is a fully democratic representation in the UNSC effective and efficient? 7. How long will reform take and how much time does the UN have? 8. How ironic is it that the western democracies are the biggest reason for non-democratic practices in the UN and many non-democratic countries are upset about the lack of democracy in the UN, and what can and should be done about this? Linked to the question of composition are questions concerning the Security Council's relationship to other UN organs as well as expanding its functions: 1. Should the General Assembly be permitted to consider issues under discussion in the Security Council? 2. Should the Security Council have the authority to pass resolutions dealing with important economic and social needs?

Bibliography and References

Chapter II: Membership http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml Chapter V: The Security Council http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter3.shtml http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform.html (Global Policy Forum information resources) http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art9.pdf (NGO involvement and position on UNSC Reform) http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (Charter of the United Nations) http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/unitednations/a/SCreform2007.htm (About.com article on fixing the Security Council)

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