A methodological comparison of the structures of scientific research and engineering design: their similarities and differences

J Eekels
Prinses Christinalaan 55, 1421 BE Uithoorn, The Netherlands

N F M Roozenburg
Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Jaffalaan 9, 2628 B X Delft, The Netherlands

The misunderstanding that engineering is just a part of science (at the most applied science) and that engineering design is only a kind of scientific research (often considered rather trivial) is still widespread, especially among scientists. Yet it is a misunderstanding. In the present paper the structures of scientific research and of engineering design will be compared and, apart from a few very evident similarities, a large number of essential differences will be discussed. The conclusions are on the one hand that science and engineering are strongly interwoven and mutually dependent on each other, but on the other hand that there are fundamental differences between scientific research and engineering design. They consequently require specific methodologies. Keywords: engineering design, scientific research
Both scientific research and engineering design are iterative processes exhibiting a cyclic structure. Structural models for these processes are presented in the literature. These structural models (the research cycle and the design cycle) indeed show a striking similarity. They look isomorphic, and it is not surprising that one wonders whether the differences might be only of a linguistic nature. That the latter is not the case will be argued by a closer consideration and comparison of the elements of both models. A number of essential differences will thereby become apparent. But, before we enter into the comparison of these cycles proper, a few general remarks of a more philosophical nature concerning knowledge and action must be made. Our problem has everything to do with an old distinction which has probably been criticized as long as

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it has existed, but which in one or other form always survives. It is the distinction between the internal mind and the external word; between subjective thinking and objective reality; in short, between mind and matter. We shall not enter into metaphysical discussion on this point. We will just start from the naive experience which strongly impresses upon us that there exists a distinction between a spiritual mind and a bodily world (which may even compromise our own bodies) but yet remains 'external' to the mind. We shall use this distinction as a methodological tool in order to get to grips with the object of our inquiry. During life the mind and the external world are in constant interaction. Interaction is reciprocal action and presupposes influences from both sides. Yet the interaction-cases between mind and external world can roughly be classified into two classes with opposite overall effects. Although not strictly correct (as it holds for the overall effects, but not for the two-sided interactions themselves) we shall speak of interactions in opposite directions. The interaction from the outside world towards the mind is called perception and may lead to mental structures that are called knowledge. The interaction from the mind towards the outside world is called action, and may lead to real structures that can be taken together under the name of cultural objects. Both interactions require reasoning. This reasoning can be of a primitive nature, as in most day-to-day situations, or of a scientific character for more complicated knowledge- or action-problems. It is not true that scientific reasoning is restricted to only the domains of science. Also the reasoning for complex action problems can be, and generally is, of a scientific nature. This scientific reasoning is guided and guarded by methodology. We consequently distinguished betwen the methodology of science and the methodology of action, in particular of technological action. An important part of the latter is (engineering) design methodology. This state of affairs is schematically depicted in Figure 1, in which the term 'matter' must be understod in a broad sense, as anything that is (or seems to be) external to the reasoning mind. One may object that scientific inquiry also requires action. That is true. The concept of action applies to both interaction types. But the aims of the actions in the two processes are different. In one case (the perception and knowledge process) the aim is to bring about a change in the realm of the mind: new or improved knowledge. In the other case (technical action, making) the aim is to bring about a change in the realm of the external material world (the realm of matter in Figure 1). We therefore designate this as technical action. Both pouring a cup of coffee and building an oil refinery fall under this heading, although in the former the technicality is much less evident than in the latter. We now have to say a few more words on the structure of action in general, whereby we shall take our starting point in technical action as just defined. Action always has roots in dissatisfaction with either an existing state of affairs or an expected future state of affairs. The

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dissatisfaction may be present in an individual or in an organization that is able to initiate action by its members. The question is: where does the dissatisfaction stem from? The answer to this question, even in the general sense, is much more complicated than it looks at first sight. To be dissatisfied with a certain state of affairs means, in the first place, that one possesses knowledge of that state of affairs. This knowledge may be based on direct or indirect observation of the situation in question, resulting in an image, a mental picture of the said situation. We must bear in mind that it is always the image we have of a certain state of affairs upon which our satisfaction or dissatisfaction is founded. It is all too well known that this image can be seriously distorted, either by observation errors, misinterpretations or even wilful deceit in the case of indirect observation. The truthquestion as to these mental pictures is therefore not only more than justified, but even necessary. Yet the establishment of the (apparent or probable) truth of a mental picture of a certain state of affairs is in itself not sufficient to lead to satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Therefore the picture has to be evaluated against the background of the values, norms and preferences of the observing subject, either an individual or an organization. These value statements form the ultimate foundation of our satisfaction or dissatisfaction and they trigger, if considered feasible, technical action to improve the unsatisfactory state of affairs. This leads us to make a subdivision of the realm of the mind, dividing it into a region of truth statements and a region of value statements. Value statements not only trigger technical action, they also decide whether and when the action has to be terminated. They rest on images made through observation of the action results. Termination of the action does not imply that the action has been successful. It implies, however, that either renewed or corrective action is not possible or that such corrections require too much effort and/or cost. For a more detailed analysis of the structure of action in general see Eekels 1. The above remarks will suffice for our present inquiry.

THE RESEARCH CYCLE IN SCIENCE AND THE DESIGN CYCLE IN ENGINEERING

It is well known that both scientific research and

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engineering design are processes of a cyclic, and consequently an iterative character. Various descriptions of both cycles can be found 2'3 which agree in outline notwithstanding minor differences. We follow here the description from our recent book 4. The two basic cycles are depicted in Figure 2. The first thing that strikes the eye when comparing the two cycles is their strong similarity. They contain the same number of elements, which are interconnected in the same way. The two cycles as presented here have the same structure: they are isomorphic. The idea might emerge that they are in fact identical and that the difference could be due to just a difference in terminology. This idea would then lead to the conclusion that engineering is just a kind of science, with the consequence that if you dispose of science you automatically dispose of engineering. A similar kind of reasoning can in fact be observed in broad circles. We shall, however, argue that this line of reasoning is false. We shall do this by demonstrating a large number of essential differences between the two cycles. We must thereby keep in mind, as expounded in the introduction, that man as a rational being is active in two realms simultaneously: the realm of material reality (of matter in a broad sense) and the realm of the mind, and that these two realms are strongly interconnected. Yet two main directions can be distinguished in the interaction of the two realms; a process that is 'outside-in', i.e. from the external material reality towards the mind, and a process that is 'inside-out', i.e. from the mind towards the external material reality. The In'st process can be labelled 'knowledge generation', the second 'technical action'. The outside-in process aims at obtaining knowledge of the world, the inside-out process aims at

changing the world. In the first one science is dominant and engineering plays a secondary, instrumental role; in the second engineering (or more generally technology in a broad sense) is dominant and science plays the secondary instrumental role. Also it was argued that the realm of the mind should be divided into two regions: the region of truth-statements and the region of value-statements. This should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion.

THE FIRST ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES: THE PROBLEM

Both cycles start with a problem, but these problems turn out not to be identical and not even similar, although in both cases the problem refers to an unsatisfactory situation which has to be transformed into a more satisfactory one. In the research cycle the problem is that the available knowledge (which consists of a set of propositions for which it makes sense to ask whether they are true or not) does not mesh or insufficiently meshes with experimental facts. The facts are sacrosanct, however, and therefore, the objective of the scientific process (the research) is to change or to extend the set of propositions (that proved insufficiently true) in the realm of the mind in such a way that they again mesh with the facts. In the design cycle the problem is that the facts do not mesh with our value preferences concerning what is the case, i.e. concerning the facts. And as in the first instance our value preferences are sacrosanct, this discrepancy leads to the objective to change the facts. This requires technical action, technical action requires technical

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means and these are generally speaking the objects of the design process. Summarizing we can say the starting problem in the research cycle is a discrepancy between the facts and our set of truthstatements concerning these facts. The purpose of the process is adaption of the truth-statements (our knowledge) to the facts the starting problem in the design cycle is a discrepancy betwen the facts and our set of value-preferences concerning these facts. The purpose of the process is the adaption of the facts (through applications of the designed objects) to our value preferences. The differences are, therefore, that, in the former process changes in the realm of the mind are sought (our knowledge of the facts), and in the latter process changes in the realm of material reality (the facts) are sought. Moreover, in the first case the 'mental' emphasis is in the region of the truth-statements, but in the second case in the region of the value statements. The problems therefore are oppositely directed and they are based in different regions of the realm of the mind.

THE SECOND ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES: OBSERVATION VS. ANALYSIS

Scientific research occupies itself with the real world and with our images of it through truth-statements (propositions). Design, on the contrary, occupies itself with not really existing but hopefully realizable worlds. Design is the construction of possible worlds, such as worlds in which the designed product or process might appear and might function. There exists only one real, factual world, but there are myriads of nonexisting, yet possible worlds. Possible worlds exist only in the realm of the mind. A flawless design-process can completely take place in the realm of the mind. But with a flawless empirical research process this is not possible. In such a process the interaction between the realm of material reality and the realm of the mind must be present. This state of affairs already points to a difference between the second elements of both cycles, viz. 'observation' in the research cycle, and 'analysis' in the design cycle. With respect to the research cycle one might at first wonder whether the elements 'problem' and 'observation' are not put in the wrong sequence. Has not the problem originated from the observation of facts that do not mesh with the theory? Indeed, but, in order to adapt the theory, the recording of one or a few discrepancies is seldom sufficient. From the moment that the problem has been formulated, and one has decided to try to solve it through research, one wants to chart the discrepancies in an area as large as possible, and that requires goal oriented observation, eventually supported by experiments. In the design cycle this is different. Because design is oriented towards possible, but still not existing worlds, nothing can be observed. What one can do,

however, is to investigate through reasoning under which conditions a mentally conceived world could be both realizable and desirable. This reasoning process occurs in the analysis phase of the design process. It often happens that during analysis one perceives that insufficient knowledge is available to perform the analysis in an acceptable way and that the missing knowledge cannot be found in books or journals, either. Then one has to have recourse to scientific research in order to fill up the knowledge gap. Thus one abandons the design process proper in order to make an excursion into scientific research. With the knowledge gained through the latter one re-enters the design cycle in order to conceive one or more possible worlds. There is a second difference between 'observation' in the research cycle and 'analysis' in the design cycle. Both cycles take place predominantly or even totally in the realm of the mind, but the research cycle within this realm of the mind is directed towards the region of the truth-statements, whereas the design cycle emerges from the region of the value statements. Now the relation between truth and value is a difficult philosophical problem, which largely falls beyond this treatise. In any case we can assess that in science one tries to work as value-free as possible, and that the creeping in of other than the scientific values of logical clearness, integrity and similar ones into the research cycle is considered unscientific, at least in the exact sciences. This implies that the observation phase in the research cycle has to be performed as objectively as possible: no witholding of unpleasant observations, no selective sampling, etc. In short, values and interests are to be kept out as far as possible. How different is this in the parallel analysis-phase in the design cycle. The value statements from which the design cycle departs pervade the whole cycle and govern the analysis phase. The analysis is therefore not directed towards possible worlds, but towards desirable possible worlds, and this desirability roots in the value starting points in the problem definition.

THE THIRD ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES: INDUCTION, VS. SYNTHESIS

The next two parallel elements in the cycles are 'induction' in the research cycle, and 'synthesis' in the design cycle. Induction is the process in which one moves from the observation of a (limited) number of individual facts to a general law. (This is first degree induction. In second degree induction one concludes from a few more specific laws to an encompassing general theory). Induction always refers to a certain aspect of reality, such as colour, temperature, pressure, chemical behaviour, etc., but never to the relevant reality in its totality. Induction strives for generally valid knowledge concerning a specific aspect of a specific part of reality. Induction provides us, so to speak, with a generally valid photograph of a specific aspect of that specific part of

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reality. But first there was that reality and afterwards came the photograph. The synthesis phase in the design cycle, however, is directed towards the totality of the entity to be designed. A design is a kind of panoramic photograph encompassing all aspects. Moreover, the photograph remarkably comes first, and only in a later stage (when the design is ultimately realized) the photographed object appears. Otherwise said: induction in the reasearch cycle is a posteriori (after) with respect to the considered material reality, synthesis in the design cycle is a priori of a possible material reality that eventually but not necessarily may be realized later. Moreover the logical structure of induction differs from that of synthesis in design. (see Ref. 5) With induction the premises are Pl A ql pz A qz

pn /k qn

The conclusion reads p ---* q (always if p, then q). With synthesis in design only one premise is given (which may be a compound statement), namely q (e.g. the function that has to be realized) Here two conclusions are required, namely p (the description of the designed object) p --~ q (the instructions for use) (This points in outline to the logical difference in question. A more detailed and exact treatment can be found elsewhere4.)

THE FOURTH ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES:

D E D U C T I O N , VS, S I M U L A T I O N We now reach the elements of 'deduction' in the research cycle and 'simulation' in the design cycle. Here terminology is playing tricks on us, because it obscures the fact that deduction in the research cycle is a form of simulation, whereas simulation in the design cycle rests on deduction. The difference therefore is not to be found in the logical structure of the operation (which in both cases is deduction), but on one hand in the fact that the systems that form the basis for the deduction are different, and, on the other hand, in the nature of the deductive results. Let us start with the latter aspect. The ultimate objective of science is to explain present and past phenomena and, on the other hand, to predict future phenomena. (Scientific explanation consists of giving general grounds or causes from which observed phe-

nomena can be deduced. Scientific prediction is the deduction of future phenomena from present ones.) The inductively obtained scientific law or theory has therefore either explanation-power (which generally, although not always, implies prediction-power), or only prediction-power. The genuine scientist strives for explanation-power of his theories; the engineer is in most cases already satisfied with prediction-power. Anyhow, it must be possible to deduce the phenomena (present, past or future) by means of the theoretical relations that have been obtained by induction. That is what one strives for in the deduction phase of the reseach cycle. Do we try to encompass the totality of the phenomena in all their aspects? No, not in the research cycle, because, as was mentioned before, (exact natural) sciences essentially are aspect sciences. The deduction therefore aims only at one or a few specific aspects of the phenomena, and leaves all others out of consideration. Another characteristic of deduction in the research cycle is the categorical character of the deductively obtained conclusion. Scientific laws are either formulated as hypothetical propositions (implications) or can easily be brought into that form. The deduction generally takes the form of a proposition syllogism, often according to the modus ponendo ponens. The implication acts as a major in the syllogism, the minor categorically confirms the antecedent of the implication; the conclusion categorically confirms the consequence. In summary, we may say that deduction in the research cycle leads to an explanation and/or a categorical prediction of one or a few specific aspects of reality. (A more detailed consideration, which might also discuss the role of abduction in this respect is beyond the scope of this article.) Let us now look at the parallel phase of 'simulation' in the design cycle. The synthesis phase has resulted in a first draft of the design of a product (or of a process*), which we labelled as a 'tentative design proposal'. Before manufacturing the product we want to get an idea as to how the product would behave if manufactured. For this reason we are not content with one aspect only, but we want to gain a total image of this behaviour concerning many aspects such as: functionality, durability, safety, energy consumption, environmental impact, cost price, etc. We want to explore, so to say, the possible world in which our new product might appear before making it a real world. Perhaps this exploration leads us to retrace our footsteps and to choose another path. This implies already that the results of such an exploration, which is performed through simulation, cannot be other than hypothetical propositions of the general form: if . . . then. In common parlance one often says that simulation predicts the behaviour of the designed product, but one should keep in mind that in this case conditional predictions are meant (contrasted to the categorical predictions in the research cycle). * From now on we shall limit ourselves to product design. For process design, e.g. the design of manufacturing, transporting or storing processes, similar considerations can be given.

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Simulation in the design cycle also is based on deduction. Deduction requires a logical system in which the deduction can be performed. Here we meet with another important difference between the two cycles. In the research cycle the logical systems in which the deductive operations can be performed lie anchored in the inductively obtained theory. Induction immediately produces the logical system for deduction. As said before this is an aspect system. In the design cycle this is not the case. The design proposal which results from the synthesis phase is the description of a product, but it is surely not a logical system which enables performing deductive operations. At the start of the simulation phase we stand in this respect with empty hands. Therefore we cannot immediately start with deduction (as in the research cycle), but we have first to construct a relevant system in order to make this possible. And because in design a multitude of aspects is relevant this generally implies that we have to construct a number of such relevant systems for deduction. Such relevant systems are called models of the original system (the product). Now deduction always occurs in a logical system. Logical systems belong to the realm of the mind (although they can be materially interpreted in books and the like). Several simulation models such as for example mathematical models, directly form logical systems for deduction. However, many simulations refer to experiments with material models, which are considered homomorphic with the original with respect to a certain aspect. These simulations are based on the hypothetical proposition: if the experiment shows p this means q for the original. The deduction can restrict itself then to the following syllogism according to the modus ponendo ponens: well then, the experiment actually shows p and therefore the original will show q under similar circumstances. How the starting conditions and p are connected is not derived through elaborate calculations, but simply read from the experiment. (The generation of the implication p ~ q is a question of model theory, which again is beyond the scope of this paper. For a treatment of that problem see Ref. 4.) We therefore see that the simulation phase in the design cycle contains an element more than the deduction phase in the research cycle, namely the construction of the simulation model(s). Moreover, scientific deduction completely takes place in the realm of the mind, whereas simulation in the design cycle in many cases makes an excursion to the realm of material reality in order to perform experiments with material models.

laws or theories (a theory is more encompassing than a single natural law). For simplicity's sake we shall restrict ourselves further to the testing of prediction power. Based on inductively obtained insight, future facts are deductively predicted. In many cases these future facts will be the outcome of experiments. In the testing procedure the future facts are observed and compared with the prediction. Do they agree or not? And if not, how serious is the disagreement? In the testing procedure the research cycle again enters the realm of material reality. The conclusions of the testing procedure are truth statements in the realm of the mind. As with 'evaluation' in the design cycle comparisons are made, but in this case not between fact and theory, but between the simulated behaviour of the designed product and the desired behaviour according to the programme of requirements. In the evaluation, the value of the designproposal is assessed. The evaluation wholly occurs in the realm of the mind, with emphasis on the region of the value statements.

THE SIXTH ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES: EVALUATION, VS. DECISION

In the next phase we meet, in the research cycle (surprisingly) the element 'evaluation' and in the design cycle the element 'decision'. Here also terminology may mislead us. We formulated both cycles in terms that did not deviate too much from the customary vocabularies in science and engineering. Unfortunately these are, terminologically speaking far from unified. This may cause misunderstanding. For instance the 'evaluation' phase in the research cycle also contains a decision aspect. It not only evaluates the results of the process up to now (here we meet a value statement in the research cycle, but this restricts itself to the scientific value); it is also decided whether the target (more knowledge) has been sufficiently reached, or that through one or more iterations, these results have to be accentuated. Hence the feedback arrows in Figure 2 that lead from the element evaluation upwards. But if the evaluation has led to satisfaction with the results, it is decided to add the new knowledge which the research has generated to the knowledge area in the realm of the mind. In many cases this is explicitly done in the form of a scientific publication. In the design cycle the 'decision' element appears on this level. The decision aspect appears, however, throughout the design process. Time and again the designer has to choose between different possible continuations. In the first place the design proposal in question may be worked out in one or more iterations. This is indicated by the feedback arrows in Figure 2. But the decision can also be to generate more design alternatives. The feedback arrows also take account of this possibility. And finally the decision may refer to choosing the most attractive alternative from the set of generated design alternatives. The design process ends with the delivery of one or a number of acceptable

THE FIFTH ELEMENT IN THE CYCLES: TESTING, VS. EVALUATION

Next follow the parallel elements 'testing' in the research cycle and 'evaluation' in the design cycle. Often, the possibility of testing is considered the pre-eminent criterion for scientific statements (laws, theories). Testing may direct itself towards the explanation-power or towards the prediction-power of inductively postulated

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Table 1.

Empirical research versus design Design aimed at cultural objects (real structures) occupies itself with the construction of possible worlds can take place completely in the realm of mind

Empirical research aimed at knowledge (mental structures) occupies itself with our images of the real world interaction between 'mind' and 'matter' must be present

Theoretical problem discrepancy between facts and theory theory has to be changed emphasis on truth statements Observations how does the real world look? collecting and classifying empirical facts as value free as possible Induction strives for generally valid knowledge (abstraction) concerning a specific aspect of a part of reality a posteriori of the considered reality logical structure: 'induction' Deduction predictions directly from theoretical relations takes place completely in the realm of mind concerns one or a few aspects only predictions are categorical

Practical problem discrepancy between facts and value preferences facts have to be changed emphasis on value statements Analysis how do preferred and possible worlds look? imagining and argumentation governed by value statements Synthesis strives for a particular solution (concretizing) encompassing all aspects of the problem a priori of the possible material reality logical structure: 'design' Simulation there are two sub-phases: (a) construction of a simulation model (b) deducing predictions from the model often supported by experiments in the material reality concerns many if not all relevant aspects predictions are hypothetical Evaluation predicted facts are compared with requirements occurs in the realm of mind result: value statements Decision realizing the design proposal objects added to realm of material reality

Testing future (experimental) facts are observed and compared with predicted facts takes place in the realm of material reality result: truth statements Evaluations interpreting the evidence knowledge added to realm of mind

designs, or one decision step further: with one chosen, i.e. the most attractive design. All these designs are mental entities (notwithstanding their often impressive material representations in drawings, mock ups, scale models etc.), and accordingly belong to the realm of the mind. But that is not the final station of the engineering process. T h e result of the design-process asks to be realized in the realm of material reality, in order to leave the possible world in which it was conceived and to enter the factual world as a product. Does the end product of the research cycle (more knowledge in the form of natural laws or theories) then not belong to the factual world? Yes it does, but with the difference that it belongs to the realm of the mind in the factual world, and this is also the final station. The design as result of the design cycle is an intermediate station. It points to the manufactured product as the final station of the engineering process, and that belongs to the realm of material reality. CONCLUSIONS In the preceding paragraphs a n u m b e r of similarities but also a n u m b e r of striking differences between the research cycle and the design cycle are elucidated and

summarized in Table 1. Many of the differences are fundamental in character. As design may be considered the core of engineering, and research the core of science these differences should guard us from identifying engineering design with scientific research, or even engineering with science. The recognition of essential differences between science and engineering should, however, not prevent us from acknowledgeing the strong interdependency of modern science and modern engineering. T h e y mutually support each other, and this is to a large extent due to their differences.

REFERENCES Eekels, J, Industrie'le Doelontwikkeling Delftse Universitaire Pers, Delft (1982). (Industrial new business development)
2 De Groot, A D, Foundations of inference and research in the behavioural sciences Mounton, Amsterdam (1969)

Coyne, R D, Rosenman, M A, Radford, A D, Balachandran, M and Gero, J S, Knowledge-based design systems. Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass. (1990) Roozenburg, N G M and Eekels, J, Produktontwerpen: sturctuur en methoden Lemma, Utrecht (1991) (Product design: structure and methods)

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