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60%
55%
40% B B
B
35%
30%
25%
20%
All Buyout Venture Other
Secondary Market Prices Continue 2008 Trend pricing than buyout funds in this sample with an
average high bid of 39.4% of NAV, an average
As the effects of the weakening economy cascaded
median bid of 37.7% of NAV and an average low bid
through the financials of private equity portfolio
of 33.9% of NAV. The average high, median and low
companies, pricing for the funds continued to
bids for buyout funds were 37.7% of NAV, 33.0% of
weaken as a percentage of the stale reported NAVs.
NAV, and 28.8% of NAV, respectively.
For the first half of the 2009, the average high bid (the
simple average of the highest individual bid received
Pricing as a Percentage of the Year-End Valuation
for each asset) across all assets in the sample was
39.6% of the NAV of the funds’ most recent financial While the above analysis is consistent with the
statements, with an average median bid of 35.7% of methodology used in previous first-half pricing
NAV and an average low bid of 31.6% of NAV (Figure analyses, the volume of prices received early in the
1). This pricing level represents a continuation of the year (prior to the availability of the general partner
pricing decline for secondary transactions observed year-end valuations) and the level of markdowns
in 2008, when pricing fell from above NAV in 2007 to taken at the end of 2008 versus previous years
61.0% in the second half of 2008. Prices have fallen skews the pricing considerably. This effect can be
to the lowest levels seen since the publication of seen by disaggregating the pricing by the quarterly
this analysis (Figure 2). statements the funds were priced against. Funds
priced off of the year-end numbers achieved an
The decline in pricing is not specific to fund types, average high bid of 52.4% of NAV, while funds priced
though venture funds did achieve slightly higher prior to the release of the year-end financials had
Secondary Pricing Analysis Interim Update, Summer 2009 3
120%
110%
B
B
100%
B
90%
B Average High
B
80%
% NAV
70% B
50%
20%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 H1 2008 H2 2008 H1 2009 H1 2009
As a % of
12/31 NAV
Bid Spreads By Year
an average high bid of 38.1% of the 9/30/08 reported for the funds in the survey. Even amidst the broad
NAVs. When those NAVs are adjusted for the write decline in pricing, the highest value received for
downs taken at year end, the pricing improves a buyout fund was 100.0% of NAV, while the most
to 44.1% of the subsequently released year-end highly valued venture fund was priced at 102.0% of
financials. The delta between the bids based off NAV. However, only 12% of the buyout funds and
of 12/31 NAVs and the bids originally based off of 13% of the venture funds priced above 60% of NAV.
9/30 NAVs and rolled forward to 12/31 may indicate
that secondary pricing had actually improved by the At the other extreme, 17% of the funds received a
time 12/31 financial statements began becoming high bid of 20% or less of NAV. In these instances,
widely available. Further bids received after the it was not that the underlying investments were
first half of 2009 also suggest that secondary pricing deemed to be nearly worthless, but that the bidders
is improving. required a discount of nearly the full NAV to assume
large unfunded commitments associated with the
Pricing is Asset Specific funds.
While overall pricing levels certainly declined in
Unfunded Capital Has a Dramatic Effect on Pricing
the first quarter, pricing for funds continues to be
primarily driven by the underlying assets in the Given the liquidity squeeze that has been affecting
portfolio, not typical trading ranges for particular nearly every institution since the beginning of the
GPs. Table 1 details the pricing level dispersion downturn, more highly unfunded partnerships were
4 Secondary Pricing Analysis Interim Update, Summer 2009
2006
2007
2008
marketed in the first half of 2009 than in any other pricing for 2006-2008 funds was more interesting.
time in recent memory. While it can be argued Pricing for 2006 and 2008 funds, at 39.7% and 41.3%
that, with highly unfunded partnerships, pricing of NAV respectively, was actually significantly
as a percentage of NAV is less meaningful, the higher than might be expected. However, pricing
perceived liability of unfunded commitments has for 2007 funds was abysmal at 26.1% of NAV,
caused buyers to place, and sellers to accept, lower approximately 40% lower than the pricing for 2005
bids as a percentage of NAV. and earlier vintages. This may be explained by
the fact that, while 2006 funds may have made bad
For buyout funds, Cogent found a discrepancy of investments and 2008 funds have large amounts of
more than 50% between funds less than 50% called unfunded capital, 2007 is the only vintage which has
and those more than 50% called. These funds had both issues.
an average high bid of 27.2% and 42.7% of NAV,
respectively. However, venture funds that were Achieving the Best Price – Know the Market!
less than 50% funded actually had significantly
The most striking data from the pricing analysis
higher pricing than funds greater than 50% funded,
comes from a review of the profile of the winning
at 51.7% and 36.0% of NAV, respectively. This
bids for the funds marketed. As losses have
additional discount applied to mature venture funds
rolled through private equity funds, many of the
is likely explained by concerns that the funds will
traditional secondary buyers, both dedicated
not have enough capital to protect positions in the
secondary buyers and active fund-of-funds buyers,
anticipated future financing rounds of the portfolio
have changed their behavior considerably. These
companies. Therefore, the general partners will
buyers, who have traditionally represented the
either invest in those companies in subsequent
bulk of buyers in the secondary market, have
funds, or need to raise annex funds to protect their
become much less aggressive with pricing and
position.
much more selective in the funds they are willing
to price at reasonable levels. At the same time,
Vintage Year Matters
a large number of non-traditional buyers have
While pricing was relatively consistent in the mid- ventured out of their core competency of primary
40% range for funds with vintage years of 2005 and investing, and are purchasing secondary fund
earlier (representing nearly 50% of the sample), interests. Cogent maintains ongoing dialogues and
Secondary Pricing Analysis Interim Update, Summer 2009 5
Fund-of-funds (39.7%)
GP (9%)
Foundation (11%)
Pension (36.8%)
Endowment (11%)
Insurance (17.5%)
The Value of Deep Market Knowledge seller to close is viewed as a sign of weakness that
only further erodes pricing. The current environment
It can be unequivocally stated that the economic
has increased the importance of knowledge of
rationale for institutions seeking liquidity in the
buyer preferences, bidding history and transaction
secondary market to use an informed advisor has
strategy in executing a successful secondary sale.
never been more compelling. Institutions that
negotiate either with only one or a small number of
Considering these market facts, it is not surprising
potential buyers and thus receive large portfolio bids
that the most sophisticated market participants
are leaving money, terms, and transaction timing on
are seeking the market expertise and assistance
the table. This point is made by the secondary buyers
of intermediaries. With the pricing insight, market
themselves, which in their fund marketing materials
knowledge, and process and negotiation expertise
universally point to proprietary deal flow as a signal
an experienced advisor can provide, institutional
of superior returns. This fact is emphasized by
investors can intelligently look to the secondary
the data in this study as well, in which dedicated
market to help achieve liquidity and rebalancing
secondary buyers were the high bid on only 17% of
needs in their portfolio.
the funds, and no single dedicated secondary buyer
was the high bid on more than 4% of the funds.
If you are interested in a confidential discussion of your alternative asset portfolio paths to liquidity, with
detailed insight into pricing for assets you would consider selling, or other avenues to generate liquidity,
please don’t hesitate to contact us. All conversations are held in the strictest confidence.
Brad Heffern
Mr. Heffern is an associate in the firm’s Dallas office and works in Cogent
Partners’ Research Business Unit, performing portfolio analysis and
valuations, and assisting in client engagements. He joined Cogent Partners
in 2005.
www.cogent-partners.com