1.G.R. No. 127820, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, on September 20, 1993 a complaint for expropriation against private respondent over two parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its answer alleging in the main that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code. The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994 order and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government which may delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utilities. A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. AIDTHC A local government unit, like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a law for the purpose. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. 2. Estate or Heirs of the late ex-Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. City of Manila [GR 132431, 13 February 2004]; also Estate or Heirs of the late ex-Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 137146] Third Division, Corona (J): 2 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Jose B. L. Reyes and Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )are being occupied and leased by different tenants,

among whom are respondents Dr. Rosario Abiog, Angelina Maglonso and members of the Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). The Reyeses leased to Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd328345, with an area of 191 square meters and to Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the same consolidation plan, with an area of 112 square meters. On 9 November 1993 and 26 May 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes and the Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against Abiog and Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. The heirs obtained favorable judgments in Civil Case 142851-CV (Metropolitan Trial Court [MTC] of Manila, Branch 10, 9 May 1994) against Abiog, and in Civil Case 144205-CV (MTC of Manila, Branch 3, 4 May 1995) against Maglonso. Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the same were denied by the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in 1998. During the pendency of the two ejectment cases against Abiog and Maglonso, the City of Manila filed on 25 April 1995 a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation) of the properties of Reyeses at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by Abiog, Maglonso and members of SBMI. The complaint was based on Ordinance 7818 enacted on 29 November 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land with an aggregate area of 9,930 square meters, more or less, owned by Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes situated along the streets of Rizal Avenue, Tecson, M. Natividad, Sampaguita, Oroquieta, M. Hizon, Felix Huertes, Bulacan, Sulu, Aurora Boulevard, Pedro Guevarra and Kalimbas in the third district of Manila. The complaint alleged that, on 10 March 1995, the City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the Reyeses a written offer to purchase the subject properties for P10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. On 15 May 1995, SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties, filed a motion for intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for injunction. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an order dated 2 June 1995. On the day SBMIs motion for intervention was denied, the Reyeses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for lack of merit, alleging various grounds, among them, "that instead of expropriating the subject property which enjoys the least priority in the acquisition by the City of Manila for socialized housing under Sec. 9(t) of R.A. 7279, the money to be paid should be channeled to the development of 244 sites in Metro Manila designated as area for priority development." On 6 June 1995, the trial court allowed the City to take possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount of P1,542,793, based on the P10,285,293.38 offer by the City to the Reyeses which the trial court fixed as the provisional amount of the subject properties. On 14 June 1995, the City filed an opposition to the Reyeses motion to dismiss. On 3 October 1995, the Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed. The Citys motion for reconsideration was denied. On 12 January 1996, the City appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, several motions seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction were filed by the City to prevent petitioners from ejecting the occupants of the subject premises. On 21 March 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motions for lack of merit. The Citys motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, on 27 January 1997, in view of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case against Abiog, the MTC of Manila, Branch 10, issued a writ of execution. On 31 January 1997, SBMI filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for leave to intervene with prayer for injunctive relief praying that the ejectment cases be suspended or that the execution thereof be enjoined in view of the pendency of the expropriation case filed by the City over the same parcels of land. Abiog also filed a reiteratory motion for issuance of TRO and to stop the execution of the order of the MTC of Manila, Branch 10. On 26 August 1997, the Court of Appeals issued

a resolution finding prima facie basis to grant SBMIs motions, and issued a TRO to Judge Salvador, his employees and agents to maintain the status quo. On 27 January 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as valid Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain over the Reyeses properties. From the aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the Reyeses filed on 19 March 1998 the petition for review before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Issue: Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the manner their property were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila. Held: The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the present case. In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of often-times helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public use. Herein, the City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. The City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, the City in its pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the Reyeses.