THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT

Overview: UIFSA

Since 1950, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) has been the
primary mechanism used to resolve interstate litigation of family support cases.
Although URESA and the revisions thereto (most recently the 1968 [R]evised URESA}
Were considered revolutionary when created and remained so far many decades
thereafter, they failed to reflect the advent of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act
or technological advances. Recognizing the dramatic changes in child support
enforcement since the 1968 revisions, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA) in 1992 to replace[R}URESA. UIFSA was drafted over 3 ½ years with
Substantial input from judges, private and public attorneys, State legislators, and the
Professional child support enforcement community. During the summer of 1996,
NCCUSL, approved amendments to UIFSA, mostly designed to correct
misinterpretations and fill in oversights. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 required States to have UISFA
in effect by January 1, 1998, including the 1996 amendments officially adopted by
NCCUSL. UIFSA has been enacted in all States, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

The Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act

The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA) (Public Law 103-383, 108 Stat. 4063,
codified at 28 U.S.C. §1738B (1994)), as amended by PRWORA, was enacted at the recommendation of
the U.S. Interstate Commission on Child Support to impose UIFSA’s limitation on the ability of
jurisdictions to modify the orders of sister States. This Federal law (requiring States to give full faith and
credit to valid child support orders) had been in effect and controlling on all States since October 20, 1994.
Until August 22, 1996, however, when President Clinton signed welfare reform into law. FFCCSOA did
not comport with UIFSA in several critical areas:

FFCCSOA did not contain UIFSA’s priority scheme for determining the controlling order and continuing
exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) when multiple orders exist.

FFCCSOA thus required recognition of orders that would not be prospectively enforce under UIFSA.

The term originally used in FFCCSOA to determine whether a State had lost CEJ was “contestant,” which
Included the child support enforcement agency. Thus, unlike UIFSA, a State would retain CEJ (precluding
modification elsewhere) even if the individual parties and the child had left the State where the IV-D
agency was a contestant.

The writing evidencing an agreement to vest jurisdiction in another State was to be filed in the State that
would assume CEJ. UIFSA requires a filing in the State that loses CEJ.

Absent a CEJ State, under UIFSA a party seeking modification must litigate in the opposing party’s State.
FFCCSOA contained no similar requirement of non-residency, allowing a court to assert jurisdiction in a
modification filing under any long arm basis.
The amendments to FFCCSOA contained in welfare reform addressed these differences. Thus, as of
August 22, 1996, FFCCSOA ensured that UIFSA’s “one order, one time, one place” principles controlled,
even in the jurisdictions that had not yet enacted the new uniform law.

The Top Ten Things to Know about UIFSA

1. One State and Two State Proceedings

Key to UIFSA is its applicability to all cases where the individual seeking an order resides in a different
State from that of the responding party. This re-definition of a “two-State” case is a radical departure from
URESA. The drafters sought a “one-stop shop” approach to the act. UIFSA thus has both one-State and
two-State procedures under which either the custodial party or the non-custodial parent can obtain a
support order.

Long-Arm Jurisdiction: The UIFSA drafters stopped short of adopting the “child home State”
jurisdictional model contained in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). But §201
incorporates virtually every other basis that was believed to be constitutionally permissible. Jurisdiction
over non-residents may be based on one or more of the following circumstances. Of course, jurisdiction
under these sections is still subject to challenge, based on the due process claims that the nexus between the
act involved and the jurisdiction is too remote to pass the “fundamental fairness” test:

The individual is personally served with [citation, summons, notice] within the State: [Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)];

The individual submits to the jurisdiction of the State by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;

The individual resided with the child in the State;

The individual resided in the State and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;

The child resides in the State as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;

The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in the State, and the child may have been conceived by that
act of intercourse [language from the Uniform Parentage Act];

The individual asserted parentage in the [putative father registry] maintained in the State by the
[appropriate agency];

or

There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of the State and the United States for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.

Continuing Jurisdiction: A tribunal that issued a valid support order retains jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. UIFSA §206, read in concert with §205, provides: so long as the issuing State
remains the residence of either the individual obligee, the obligor, or the child, the State retains
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) to prospectively modify its child support order unless the
individual parties file written consent with the issuing tribunal to transfer modification jurisdiction to
another State.

A tribunal of one State may initiate an action into the State that retains CEJ over the controlling order.
In spousal support cases, CEJ continues through the existence of the obligation. FFCCSOA contains
similar provisions.

Two-State Actions: UIFSA contains a two-state litigation procedure that looks very similar to practice
under URESA. There are some key changes.

Direct Filing: The [R] URESA Certificate and Order has been eliminated. A petitioner has the election of
filing through the initiating State tribunal or directly into the responding State. In IV-D matters, Federal
regulations require that a filing to be received through the responding State’s Central Registry ,regardless
of how it is initiated.

Note: Although federal regulations encourage the use of long-arm jurisdiction when available and
appropriate, that decision is in the control of initiating jurisdiction (45 C.F.R. 303.7(b)(I)). The
responding State does not have the option of declining the petition if, in the opinion of the IV-D agency
or tribunal, the initiating jurisdiction could have legally asserted jurisdiction over an out of State
respondent.

It is important to remember that UIFSA refers to “tribunal”. URESA made exclusive use of a court-to-
court process. UIFSA grants to each State the election to place the decision making role in either, “a
court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial entity [or a combination of these] authorized by the State to
establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage,” (UIFSA §§101(22) and 102).

2. One Controlling Order

Support orders entered under URESA exist independently, often resulting in multiple, conflicting orders
governing the same parties and children (although any payment made under one order must be credited
against all). The UIFSA drafters were committed to ending this de novo interstate practice and creating
a new system under a “one order, one time, one place” precept. Thus, under UIFSA there is only one
order controlling the current support obligation, even where multiple States are involved in enforcing it.
The tribunal which issued the controlling order has CEJ to modify it prospectively, so long as either
individual party or the child continues to reside there.

“The law of one:” UIFSA and FFCCSOA (1996) have the same decision-making rules for reducing
multiple valid support orders to one prospectively controlling order. Nothing about either law invalidates
any support order. Until a controlling order determination is made by a tribunal, all orders remain in full
force and effect with payments made under one being credited (pro tanto discharge) against the others.
The bottom line is the obligor owes the total amount of current support due under the highest order.

The controlling order sets the non-modifiable terms (principally duration of the obligation) for the life of
the obligation. A tribunal issuing an order that is not controlling retains jurisdiction to enforce pre-existing
arrearages, prior contempt and non-modifiable terms (UIFSA §205 (c)). Following are the decision rules; a
simplified decision matrix also is provided separately in these materials, [“Determination of the Controlling
Order and CEJ”]:

If only one State has issued a child support order, that order must be recognized as controlling even if that
tribunal cannot prospectively modify the order because all the individual parties and the child have left the
jurisdiction and the parties have consented to modification in another State. (UIFSA §207(a)).

If there are multiple orders and only one of the tribunals has CEJ, that order is controlling and must be
recognized. (UIFSA §207(b)(1)).

If there is more than one State with a support order regarding the parties and the child and one of the parties
or the child continues to reside in each State (in other words both or several jurisdictions have CEJ), UIFSA
provides rules for deciding which State’s order is prospectively controlling. (UIFSA §207(b)(3)).
If there are two or more CEJ States, the “child home State” (defined as in the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) prevails.

If there are two or more CEJ States and none is the child home State, the one with the most recent order
prevails.

Where there as been no prior determination of a controlling order and there is more than one child
support order, but none of the States involved have CEJ, UIFSA §207 (b)(3) directs that a new order must
be issued by the tribunal of the State with jurisdiction over the parties. That order is controlling and must
be recognized; the order also sets the non-modifiable terms.

Note: Even though the tribunal is setting the original controlling order, it is still a modification proceeding
in that orders of other jurisdictions do exist. Accordingly, to have jurisdiction to enter that order, the party
seeking the modification must be a non-resident, and the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the tribunal..

The Federal Case Registry (FCR) and CSENet’s role: The FCR, implemented on October 1, 1998,
consists of information on individuals in IV-D cases and on non IV-D orders entered or modified after
October 1, 1998. This information includes, but is not limited to, names, Social Security numbers (SSNs)
uniform identification numbers, and State case identification numbers. In addition, the FCR contains an
order indication that will identify whether an order have been entered in the case. The FCR has been
designed as a pointer system that will quickly provide information to enable States to identify other States
that have an order pertaining to the same individuals.

CSENet is a State-to-State communication network used to transfer the detailed information on an order or
case contained in s State Case Registry (SCR) to another State. The FCR in conjunction with statewide
systems linked through a communications network should enhance the accuracy of the information
available to the tribunal as to the existence and terms of existing orders. However, because the FCR and
SCR may not contain information on pre-October 1, 1998 non IV-D orders or on closed IV-D cases,
additional sources may be required to ensure the tribunal is aware of all existing orders when making a
controlling order determination.

Required notification: UIFSA originally provided for a determination of the controlling order only in the
context of a UIFSA action for modification or enforcement. It became clear that this omission was a
significant deficiency in the Act. Particularly once FFCCSOA adopted the same analysis for selecting a
[prospectively] controlling order where multiple orders existed, the law required a mechanism under which
a tribunal would make a determination of the controlling order and communicate that determination to all
jurisdictions where orders exist. As the “answer” is the same under either UIFSA or FFCCSOA, regardless
of which jurisdiction makes the determination, and as UIFSA was to be in place nationwide by January 1,
1998, the drafters opted to grant authority to any tribunal with personal jurisdiction over the parties to
make the “controlling order” determination. Following are the requirement of these sections:

The request must be accompanied by a certified copy of every order in effect and every party whose rights
may be affected by this determination must be given notice of the request (UIFSA §207 (c));

The order determining which of multiple orders is controlling (UIFSA §207(b)(1)) or (2) or finding that a
new controlling order must issue under UIFSA§207(b)(3), must include the basis upon which the
determination was made (UIFSA §207(e));

Within 30 days after such an order is issued the party obtaining the order must file a certified copy with
each tribunal that has issued or registered an earlier order of child support. Failure to do so, subjects the
party to sanctions but has no effect on the validity or enforceability of the controlling order (UIFSA
§207(f)).
3. Evidentiary Improvements

Recognizing the evidentiary challenges in interstate cases and seeking to make decisions based on the
most complete evidence available and to foster participation by the litigants, UIFSA includes innovative
techniques for the transmission of evidence and relaxation of the “best evidence” rule. These key
provisions [§316 (evidentiary provisions) and §318 (assistance with discovery)] apply to “long arm” and
continuing jurisdiction proceedings under UIFSA as well as the traditional two-State cases.

Evidentiary Rules Applying to all UIFSA Cases (UIFSA §316)

Admissibility of verified and sworn pleadings, affidavits, documents complying with federally mandated
forms, and documents incorporated by reference therein, so long as they are no otherwise excluded under
the hearsay rule if given in person and so long as the party or witness making such statements resides in
another State;

Admissibility of a copy of the record of support payments so long as certified as true by the custodian of
the record;

Admissibility of copies of bills for testing for parentage and for prenatal and postnatal health expenses of
mother and child so long as provided to the adverse party at least 10 days before trial;

Admissibility of document evidence transmitted from another State to a tribunal of the forum State by
telephone, telecopier, or other means that do not provide an original writing;

Depositions and testimony by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated
tribunal or other location; and,

The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding tribunal may not be required.

The use of the teleconferenced hearing should prove the most economical and effective means of securing
both parties’ participation in the hearing and an equitable and efficient resolution of the pending matter.

Assistance with Discovery: Section 318 authorizes a tribunal in the initiating or responding State to
request assistance with discovery. Local law applies, regarding the means to compel discovery and the
sanctions for noncompliance.

Communication Between Tribunals: Section 317 authorizes communication between tribunals to obtain
information about a sister State’s laws, the legal effect of a judgement, decree or order in that State, and the
status of a proceeding in the sister State. This section is modeled on §7 of the UCCJA and only applies in a
two-State case.

4. Access to UIFSA

URESA began its life as “The Runaway Pappy Act”. Its remedies remained available only to obligees.
UIFSA addresses this inequity and recognizes that parents move for a variety of legitimate reasons. Thus,
both obligors and obligees may use remedies under the Act UIFSA also addresses family support issues
other than those falling under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. It is left to each State to determine
what State agency or agencies will serve as the UIFSA “support enforcement agency” under §101(20) and
§207.

Representation in UIFSA Cases: UIFSA offers “child support enforcement services” to any petitioner
upon request. It also expressly addresses and authorizes private attorney involvement, including the award
of counsel fees if otherwise permitted under State law.

In IV-D cases, Federal regulations require a responding State to provide any “necessary” services (45 CFR
303.7 (c)(1) and (7)). However, personal legal services are not viewed as necessary. Further, 45 CFR
303.20(f)(1) requires that State ensure that their IV-D program includes attorneys or prosecutors to
“represent the agency” in IV-D proceedings.

Nothing in UIFSA overrides the ethical rules of jurisdiction governing the authorized practice of law or in
any way affects the requirements for admission to the State bar or pro hac vice in an individual case for
either private or public attorneys. However, in furtherance of the law’s purposes and policies. It is hoped
that the Supreme Court of each State will develop court rules to accommodate the unique nature of
interstate litigation in UIFSA matters.

5. Visitation

Visitation issues cannot be raised in a UIFSA proceeding and are not a defense for nonpayment of support.

6. Increased Accountability

Complaints about URESA petitions falling into a “black hole” are legion. To address this problem, UIFSA
includes many notice requirements usually accompanied by timeframes.

The calculations upon which the child support order is based must accompany the order, a copy of which
must be mailed to the petitioner, respondent and any initiating tribunal.

The UIFSA drafters recognized that domestic violence and parental kidnapping are significant problems.
UIFSA includes a provision that permits nondisclosure of certain information because of a risk to one of
the parties or the child. That provision allows a tribunal to direct that identifying information—like an
address—be kept out of the petition or other UIFSA documents that the other party will see. This
mechanism is designed to let the support proceeding go forward, while safeguarding information that
would place a party or child at risk.

7. Paternity

UIFSA permits a party to bring a “pure parentage” action independent from any request for child support
and to litigate paternity in a support action when that issue has not been previously determined. Non-
parentage may not be raised as a defense in a UIFSA proceeding by “a party who has been previously
determined pursuant to law to be the parent of a child….”

Acknowledgements of Parentage: Finding that paternity has been determined under a State’s law has
grown factually more complex, based on the need to interpret the effect of voluntary acknowledgments (in-
hospital and other wise) that exist in every State.

Prior to PRWORA, the legal effect of these acknowledgments varied according to State option—from
creating a presumption of parentage that was admissible, but did not preclude blood testing and full
litigation of the issue, to establishing a legal determination of paternity.

Under PRWORA, State law must provide that these acknowledgments automatically become legal findings
of parentage.

The signatory may rescind the acknowledgment within the earlier of (1) 60 days; or (2) the date of an
administrative or judicial proceeding to establish a support order in which the signatory is a party.

After this period, States mu st have procedures to contest these findings in court based only on fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact.

The person challenging the acknowledgment bears the burden of proof.

The support or other legal obligation of a signatory may not be stayed during those proceedings.
Federal regulations, 45 CFR 302(70) (a) (11), require all States to have procedures under which full faith
and credit is given to a determination of parentage made by any State, regardless of whether paternity was
established through a voluntary acknowledgment or through administrative or judicial process. The law of
the State where the acknowledgment was filed determines its legal effect.

If paternity has not been determined, the alleged father can raise the issue as defense to the duty of support.
However, UIFSA §401 (b) permits the tribunal to order temporary support during any continuance, if there
is a verified acknowledgment of paternity or any other clear and convincing evidence that he is the father.

Where no prior determination exists, the law of the forum State applies regarding presumptions of
paternity, the admissibility of genetic tests or other issues governing litigation of the issue.

Federal regulations (45 CFR 303.7(d)(2)) continue in effct for IV-D cases, placing responsibility on the
initiating State to advance the cost of genetic testing, subject to reimbursement. The forum State uses its
testing laboratory and procedures.

8. Direct Enforcement

UIFSA provides two new procedures for direct interstate enforcement: Direct Income Withholding and
Administrative Enforcement.

Direct Income Wittholding: Mandatory universal withholding from the source of the obligor’s income
has long been believed to be a panacea that will dramatically reduce support arrears. As early as 1984,
States were required to enact laws that provided for enforcement of income withholding order of other
States (42 U.S.C. §666 (b)(1)). In furtherance of that objective, a Model Interstate Income Wittholding Act
was promulgated in 1985. While this was a two-State procedure, unlike URESA registration it did not put
the underlying support order as risk for modification in the responding State. Although every State enacted
some mechanism to establish interstate income withholding, the Model Act was not universally accepted
and did not fulfill expectations.

The introduction of immediate income withholding under the Family Support Act of 1988 made direct
payment from the obligor’s income stream an increasingly powerful tool. Although the practice was
improper and contrary to federal regulations, IV-D agencies were successfully forwarding income
withholding orders across the State lines to the obligor’s employer over which there was no jurisdiction.
UIFSA legalizes this practice and provides for recognition of the income withholding order of a sister State
without first registering it under UIFSA.

An income withholding order may be mailed directly to the obligor’s employer in another State, which
triggers income withholding unless the obligor contests. No pleadings or registration are required.

“Employer” is defined by the receiving State’s withholding law.

Upon receipt, if the document “appears regular on its face,” the employer must treat it as if it had been
issued by the appropriate tribunal with jurisdiction over the employer (UIFSA §502).

UIFSA directs the employer to withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the withholding order with
regard to: the amount and duration of the payments; where payments are to be made; medical support
(either periodic payment or provision of health insurance coverage for the child in question); fees and costs
for the support enforcement agency, issuing tribunal or obligee’s attorney; and, the amount of payment on
arrears and the interest on arrears.

Ordered payments are to be stated as sums certain

With regard to the employer’s fee for processing the income withholding order, the maximum amount to be
withheld from the obligor’s income and the time period for forwarding payment, UIFSA directs the
employer to comply with the law of the obligor’s principal place of employment. Similarly, the law of the
obligor’s principal place of employment governs how the employer established priorities for withholding
and allocating sums withheld when the employer receives multiple orders to withhold for the same obligor.

UIFSA Section 504 protects an employer who complies with these rules from civil liability (to any
individual or agency) regarding the withholding. Correspondingly, under §505, an employer who fails to
comply with the withholding order of another State is subject to the same penalties as would apply if the
order had issued from the State with jurisdiction over the employer.

The employer must “immediately” provide a copy of the withholding order to the obligor. As the in rem
Jurisdiction relates to the employer, the employee need not be in the same State as the holder/payor of the
employee’s assets.

The obligor may request a hearing in the employer’s State pursuant to its procedures. Likewise the grounds
for contest are controlled by the employer’s State.

Generally, the limited defense of “mistake of fact” required in IV-D cases has been applied equally to all
interstate income withholding challenges. Constitutionally based assertions that the i ssuing State lacked
personal jurisdiction over the obligor when the order was set may always be raised together with other
similar due process challenges to the issuing State’s authority.

Administrative Enforcement: UIFSA §509 authorizes a responding State to use available administrative
enforcement remedies to the fullest extent possible. The documents necessary to register the support order
for enforcement are sent to the child support enforcement agency. If the obligor does not contest the
administrative action taken, the order need not be registered. If either the validity of the order or the
administrative remedy sought is contested by the obligor, the agency must register the order and proceed in
the manner set forth below.

The new PRWORA interstate tool—high volume automated administrative enforcement—is separate and
distinct from UIFSA administrative enforcement PRWORA allows a IV-D agency of one State to include
debts received from other States in its periodic financial institution data match.

9. Two-State Enforcement Remedies

This process mirrors URESA, except that the registration process is used exclusively. Defenses continue to
be extremely limited. However, unlike URESA, a contest to the amount of arrearages south to be
registered must be contested at the time registration is sought. There is no subsequent hearing on this issue.
When registered for enforcement, the Act specifically precludes modification. As with URESA,
enforcement remedies are cumulative.

10. Choice of Law

For the most part, when dealing with a UIFSA action, the mantra is “local law applies.” However, there
are certain unique rules for UIFSA cases that apply even if not consistent with local law. Examples
include:

The contents of an interstate petition;

Nondisclosure of information in certain circumstances;

Authority to award fees and costs, including attorneys fees; and

Limitation on the assertion of non-parentage as a defense.

Of specific import are the evidentiary rules described previously (which apply to one-State and two-State
UIFSA actions) and the preclusion of raising visitation issues in a UIFSA proceeding.
The choice of law rule for interpretation of the order is the law of the issuing State.

UIFSA has made a policy election in favor of enforceability of orders. Accordingly, where there is a
difference in the statute of limitations for enforcement between the issuing State and the enforcing State,
The longer period applies.

The Uniform Act with official and unofficial comments can be found at 32 Family Law Quarterly 2
(Summer1998).