INFOTECH TECHNOLOGY VS COMELEC Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct

a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III Electronic Transmission. On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid". On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding. Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional; Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional; Whether the petitioner has standing; and Whether the petition is premature. Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project. Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:

1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding 2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements 3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31 Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA 5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a rebidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology 6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated counting machines After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion: A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their effect on the present controversy In view of the bidding process Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and reappraised and thereafter given the passing mark. The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the following: 1. Evaluation of Technical Bids 2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures 3. Election Day Use." In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software, 4.

which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form?

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." In view of prematurity The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows: "(1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA judicial power and judicial function

In view of awarding of contract The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity. However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest. In view of standing On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

 Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3rd Honors (3rd placer). 3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors. They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only. o 1 to 5 That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive) It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. The phrase judicial power is defined: as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. rights. The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal

o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair advantage) o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.

o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced with second place o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances. The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded). Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial functions) ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power? SC: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, (TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS) 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. , and 2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties. There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions. In re LAURETA IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPTPROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLAILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, ET AL G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987 Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (aland dispute involving large estate) by

a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolutiondeliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyondthe limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finishedby a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference.Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was establishedthat Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for theopponents.The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued,the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and thatJustice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear thatJustice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to exposethe kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justiceswith knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also chargedof using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without anycopy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were chargedwith graft and corruption.The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor thecourt. Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises isunmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filedwith the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerfulinfluence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of thecomplaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio.Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separationof powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)? SC: NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enactedRA. 7227 (The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation intoalternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayanof Moron, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 Serye 1993 , expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a Petition with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong toannul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993 The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayanng Morong acted upon the petition bypromulgatingPambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993 requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under theLGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not anordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued

Proclamation No. 53 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein theportion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848 adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of thereferendum On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes anamendment of a national law ISSUE: 1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 2.WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i .e., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a national law." HELD: 1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE butrespondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislativebody and which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome a law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration andsupervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent of legislation.

2.The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. TheCommission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review powers TANO VS SOCRATES Facts:Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the ff: a) Ordinance No. 15-92 (an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto prinsesa city from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998 enacted by Sangguniang panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by city mayor Lucero for checking or conducting necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources c) Resolution No. 33, issued by Sangguniang Panlalawigan of palawan (resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms) They contend that the, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other

words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. The LGU contends that this was a valid exercise of power under the general welfare clause and the specific power to protect the environment Issue/s WON the said ordinances and resolutions are unconstitutional Held/Ratio: No. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall

include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance." Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned." Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province," which "shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province." It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 45 insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC. (2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance Judgment : petition dismissed MALAGA VS PECHOS Facts: 1.Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF), through its Pre-qualification, Bidsand Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) published in Western Visayas Daily anInvitation to bid for the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF containing the following:a.last day of submission of pre-qualification requirements is Dec. 2, 1988b.bids to be received and opened on Dec. 12, 3PM2.Pets. Malaga and Najarro submitted their pre-qual req at 2PM of Dec. 2 but they werenot allowed to participate since their documents were considered late. PBAC said cut-off time is 10AM.3.Pets. filed a complaint with Iloilo RTC against PBAC chairman and members for refusingto accept their pre-qual doc w/o just cause resulting to their non-participation on thebidding. They prayed that the bidding be rescheduled and their docs accepted and if the bidding is over, that the project be not awarded pending the resolution of complaint. A TRO was issued. 4.On Dec. 16, respondents filed a motion to lift TRO alleging that under PD 1818, thecourt cannot issue restraining orders of injunctions. They added that the injunction ismoot and academic since bidding ended at 11:30AM and the restraining order wasreceived at 2PM.PD 1818, Sec 1: No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue anyrestraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction inany case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project,oramining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of thegovernment, or any public utilityoperated by the government, includingamong others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities,stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity orgovernment official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution orimplementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, orpursuing any lawful activity necessary for such

execution, implementation oroperation.5.Pets. argued that PD 1818 is not applicable since ISCOF is not part of the natl govt orany local political subdivision thereof having its own charter. And even if it wascovered, it is not a legal govt project within the scope of PD 1818.6.The RTC ruled in favor of resp. saying ISCOF is part of the govt and is therefore w/inthe ambit of PD 1818. And even if not, the injunction will still fail as it was receivedwhen the bidding was closed. Non-awarding of project cannot be sought as it is in thepower of the ISCOf President to do so and he is not a party to the case. 7.Irregularities on the details of invitation to bid:a.No time for deadline of submission of pre-qual req on Dec. 12.b.Time and date of bidding published was 3PM but it was held at 10AM8.Pets. aver that injunction is not moot because the projects was not yet awarded andISCOF pres. is not an indespensable party since his function to award is only ministerialupon the recommendation of the PBAC. At any rate, the complaint was amended toinclude him. 9.Resp. contend that since the members of the board of trustees of the ISCOF are allgovernment officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the operations andmaintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it shouldbe considered a government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D.1818. 10.Pets added that the rule is that when the amount of the project is P1M-5M, theproposal book forms should be submitted 30 days prior to bidding but PBAC issuedthem only on Dec. 2.11.Resp., in their reply, contended that pets licenses were expired. Issues:1.W/N ISCOF is part of the govt2.W/N ISCOFs project is covered by PD 1818Ruling:1.ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818 The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, notintegrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usuallythrough a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, charteredinstitutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. 2.Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibitionin the said decree. There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the biddingand the award of the project. a.PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and thenchanged these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. It isan irregular notice. As a general rule, non-compliance with the requirement willrender the same void and of no effect. b.PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specificationsand proposal book forms for the project to be bid 30 days before the date of bidding if the estimated project cost was between P1M and P5M. These formswere issued only on December

2, 1988, or only ten days before the biddingscheduled for December 12, 1988.P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularites committed byadministrative agencies such as the anomalies above described.3.Restraining order upheld, nominal damages of 10K to be paid by each member of PBACboard of trustees to each pet separately, PBAC chairman and members removed fromboard for malfeasance in office. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010. FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. 3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice. 4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. HELD: 1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. 2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous

ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. 4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. FORTICH VS CORONA The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory. FACTS: On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96 -C6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable. ISSUE: Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives? 1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable. 2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.

3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality. HELD: 1.No.Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. 2.No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest. Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for er ring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. 3.No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.

When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. BAKER VS CARR Facts Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would therefore not be heard by the court. Issues Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment? What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question? Holding and Rule (Brennan) Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question are: Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)? Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue? The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.

The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made? Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question? The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may be able to decide the case. The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches. See Brown v. Board of Education for a constitutional law case brief featuring an interpretation and application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in an opinion involving segregation in public schools. REPUBLIC VS GINGOYON G.R. No. 166429 (E)December 19, 2005FACTS The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courtsdecision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangementof the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government(Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments andsupplements thereto.The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise tooperate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that theagreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities hadalready been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities

following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursementfor its expenses in the construction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despitethe avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCOconducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filingof the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control overthe NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) inCash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. TheGovernment insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusionof all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. ISSUE Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case? HELD The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take overthe NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling inthe present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructureprojects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructureprojects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of atleast the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for thedetermination of just compensation. Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held inabeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

TORRECAMPO v. MWSS Doctrine: Despite the presence of judicial power under Article I, Section VIIIof the Constitution, a review of Executive policy is not under the jurisdictionof the courts for such policies lies only within the wisdom of the Executivebranch. Petition:Petition for Injunction in the Supreme Court Plaintiff & Appellees:Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo Defendant & Appellant: Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System Date: May 30, 2011 Ponente: Justice Carpio Summary: Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo filed a petition forinjunction in the Supreme Courtregarding the C5 Road ExtensionProject for the said project wouldresult to injury to the petitioner andeight million residents of MetroManila. The project would endangerthe health of the residents foraqueducts responsible for thewater supply in the area could bedamaged. The Supreme Courtruled, however, that Torrecampo isnot entitled to an injunction for heseeks judicial review of anExecutive policy which is outside of the wisdom of the courts. Facts: 1. Torrecampo filed the petition forinjunction pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A8975 on July 1, 2009, a day afterDPWH entered a portion of Barangay Matandang Balara toimplement the C-5 Road ExtensionProject. Torrecampo insists that theRI-PADA area is a better alternativeto subject lots for the project.2. Atty. Agra for MWSS finds thepetition immature for the roadproject has yet to be implemented. The entry of DPWH in the area isdone to conduct study on the areaand on the location of theaqueducts.3. Through RA 6234, MWSSexplains its participation in the C5Road Expansion Project. The MWSSexplains that they have jurisdiction,supervision, and control over allthe sewerage and waterworkssystems located in Metro Manila,Rizal province, and a portion of Cavite province.4. MWSS issued Board ResolutionNo. 2009-052 on March 12, 2009that allowed DPWH to use the 60-meter Right-of-Way for preliminarystudies of the road expansionproject.5. DPWH entered the Right-of-Wayon June 30, 2009 to conductnecessary studies for the project.6. The court issued that Torrecampo is not entitled to aninjunction. Thus, Torrecampospetition is denied. Issue: 1. WON respondents should beenjoined from commencing withand implementing the C-5 RoadExtension Project along TandangSora Road, affecting MWSSproperties. Held:

1. The court rules that Torrecampois not entitled to an injunction for judicial review does not apply tomatters concerning the Executivebranch KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995. FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no

constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. FRANSISCO VS HOR FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed againstSupreme CourtChief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this casewas the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvertthe rules of impeachment providedfor by law.ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, andcrisis. HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in ImpeachmentProceedingswhich were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional.Consequently, thesecond impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, is barred underparagraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, thisCourt is evermindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by nomeans prescribes for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of thegovernmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.At the same time, thecorollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefullycalibrated by theConstitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches mustbe giveneffect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists noconstitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review overimpeachment proceedingswould upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, theConstitution is to be interpreted as awhole and "one section is not to be allowed todefeat another." Both are integral componentsof the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that nobranch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.Theframers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thuswhen aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all theMemberswas met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House doesnot initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.Havingconcluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral orendorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with theSecretary General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachmentcomplaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period.The Courtin the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the meritsonlythe main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against theChief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar

rule. Beyondthis, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all thebusiness of this Court to assert judicialdominance over the other two great branchesof the government PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION ACTUAL CASE / CONTROVERSY Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706 It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 is void and unconstitutional. Ruling:

The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition. DAVID VS ARROYO Facts: Consists of 7 cases consolidated alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion On February 24, 2006 issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency saying that the Communist insurgents are in a systematic conspiracy to bring down the government with Magdalo Group and Gen. Lim and Marine Commander Ariel Querubin (clear and present danger); suppress terrorism and lawless violence Pursuant to the order, warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities may be done During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue During the hearing, the Solicitor General narrated the events that led to the proclamation of the Decree: from the discovery of bomb in the PMA Reunion Arroyo was suppose to attend to factual documents seized from a Magdalo member detailing the military takeover of the government led by the Philippine Marines The petitioners did not contend the facts stated by the Solicitor General Issue: WON the implementation of PP 1017 is unconstitutional It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress/they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees It is a deception to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly Ratio Decidendi: Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: o There must be a war or other emergency. o The delegation must be for a limited period only o The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. o The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency

can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees The President also cannot call the military to enact laws such as laws on family, corporate laws, obligations and contracts, etc. Under the PP 1017, she can only call out the military to suppress lawless violence The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However, without legislation, she has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress Decision: PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as far as the calling out of the military to suppress lawless violence. However, the military cannot enforce other laws PP 1017 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL when it comes to promulgating Decrees. Only the 2 Houses of Congress can legislate laws Warrantless arrests and seizures conducted without proof that they are part of rebellion, lawless violence, and takeover is UNCONSTITUTIONAL LINA VS. PURISIMA power to dispense rules Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.

Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.

Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits. SC reinstated Lina to work. TAN VS MACAPAGAL Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people.The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the Deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power,under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals whichseek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form nowoutlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to thepresent Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." Issues:WON the petitioners has locus standiWON the court has jurisdiction over the caseHeld: 1.NOJustice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct

Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 14-A / LOI # 19-A for being notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition because:

o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

injury as a result of its enforcement ."Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a directinjury, in consequence of its enforcement .Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for thepurpose of administering an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 2.NO At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually doessomething already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature arenot bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. Thecourt may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness TELEBAP vs COMELECG.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on theground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcastcompanies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excessof the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate theoperation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC tosupervise or regulate the operation of media of communication orinformation during the period of election. Held: No. The petition is dismissed.With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, theCOMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means throughwhich candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads,the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by thegovernment would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,7 of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to informationon matters of public concern shall be recognized, while Art. XII, 6 statesthat the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own,establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of theState to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the commongood so demands. To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcastersto their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate onissues in an election is maintained.

For while broadcast media are notmere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, theyare also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that thepeople have access to the diversity of views on political issues . This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the peoplesright to information on matters of public concern. The use of propertybears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene forthe common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest rewardin the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connectionwith the holding of elections is for that common good CONCEPTION VS COMELEC (1) EO No. 94 issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELEC s April 2, 2007 Resolution conditionally granting NAMFREL s accreditation, subject to the conditions that the petitioner and similarly situated barangay officials shall not be included as members or officials of NAMFREL; and (3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2, 2007 Resolution. -Jose Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner-the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City) "seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 Apri l 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007" of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)-on January 5, 2007, the National Citizen s Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001-COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798: -Section 3to insure that elections are peaceful, orderly, regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by theConstitution, the Omnibus Election Code, EO No. 94, and other election laws RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby RESOLVES to prohibit BARANGAY OFFICIALS AS CHAIR PERSON AND/OR MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OR AS OFFICIAL WATCHER OF ANY CANDIDATE, MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY, ETC IN THE 2007 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS and from STAYING INSIDE ANY POLLING PLACE EXCEPT TO CAST THEIR VOTE-COMELEC ruled on NAMFREL s petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting NAMFREL s petition-Pursuant to Section 2(5), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 52(k) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, this Commission en banc hereby resolves to accredit petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens arm in the 14 May 2007 national and local elections, subject to its direct and immediate control and supervision-Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman of said organization. As cor

rectly pointed out by the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL-petitioner is hereby enjoined and encouraged by the Commission to re-organize in accordance with its own internal rules and procedures as an independent organization, and to submit before election day a list of its responsible officers and members, deleting therefrom the names of any previous officer or membersimilarly situated with Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr. who are disqualified to be part of the citizens arm in view of the passage of COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 on 5 January 2007-xxx 9. This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case petitioner violates any of the provisions and conditions set forth herein. -NAMFREL filed a "Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination" that: (1) contains information regarding NAMFREL s reorganization and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFREL s acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; and (3) includes NAMFREL s request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioner s membership with NAMFREL-COMELEC Order noted the info re: new officers but reiterated the prohibition re: petitioner s direct participation as member and National Chairman of NAMFREL -NAMFREL did not question the COMELEC's ruling-Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present petition, ostensibly questioning the COMELEC s April 2, 2007 Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798-COMELEC GADLEJ when it issued Res. 7798 which has no statutory basis -retroactive application upon acting on NAMFREL's petitionConcepcion denied of due process-Concepcion moved for invalidity of Res. 7798-EO 94 could not have been the statutory basis of Res 7798-Res 7798 invalid IRR-Res 7798's prohibition is harsh and oppressive, violates petitioner's right to association and it denied him of his right to due process Held:-resolve to DISMISS the petition for blatant misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of C ourt-first defect lies in the petitioner s personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution-would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling-could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in

NAMFREL s Manifestation and Request for Examination-could have expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed out-none of these actions took place and petitioner simply questioned the COMELEC's resolution without explaining to the Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium-requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof-This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 -Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari-An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65-aggrieved party (Tang vs CA):-the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court s order or decision can question the said court s disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court -"person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court -not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionsThe real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit must prosecute or defend an action. We have held that "interest" means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest-petition thereby converts an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution made without the requisite standing into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition for certiorari-A standalone challenge to the regulation could have been made through appropriate mediums, particularly through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to his situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions-it was a backdoor approach to achieve

what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65-petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works Case Digest WENCESLAU PASCUAL, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, an item of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision'"; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donationcopy of which is annexed to the petitionof the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a

contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation." ISSUE: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional and void? HELD: "It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398400; Italics supplied.)

The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:

"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states: "Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. * * * "The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public

interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.) The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. JOYA vs. PCGGG locus standi private funds Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok, Polotan, Kasilag, Almario, et. al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the Auction Sale by Christies of New York of Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang during people power. They claim that the items are part of protected cultural properties and part of Filipino CULTURAL HERITAGE and hence cannot be disposed. They contend that the items are PUBLIC PROPERTIES collectively owned by Filipinos. And that they have legal personality to protect and preserve the countrys ARTISTIC WEALTH. They allege that some of the items were in fact donated by private persons, and that the real ownership of the paintings belongs to the foundation or corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to view and appreciate the items on exhibit. First, the PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the consignment agreement between the Philippines and Christies COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was of doubtful legality, and that it was highly disadvantageous to the Philippines. The Director of National Museum issued a certification that the items were NOT part of protected cultural properties. President Cory also approved it. The sale proceeded earning $13M.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have locus standi

SC: NO LOCUS STANDI. The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter, 1) the question must be raised by the proper party 2) there must be an actual case or controversy 3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

The courts will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing. LEGAL STANDING means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as the result of governmental act. INTEREST means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. Moreover, it must be PERSONAL and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party. The exceptions to this rule are : 1) CITIZENSs SUIT, 2) TAXPAYERs SUIT IT IS NOT A TAXPAYERS SUIT. A taxpayers suit can only propsper if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at the instance of a taxpayer. MOOT AND ACADEMIC. For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy, one which involves a conflict of legal rights. The case must not be moot or academic. A case is moot and academic if the purpose has become stale. Since the purpose of this petition is to enjoin the sale, the case has become moot since the sale has long been consummated. However, it should be emphasized that the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED.

LEGASPI VS CSC Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Issue: whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right to information Held: Yes. Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Issue: whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit Held: Yes. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.

The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. Issue: whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern Held: The above question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]). But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioners right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about ones civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioners request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. ColetG.R. No. 122241, July 30 , 1996Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writof preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the hereinpetitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised

Optometry Law or anyregulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practiceof Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, "otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995.Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief andfor prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogationin the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violatesthe principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it isviolation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press.Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that thebody of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addressesof the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770,merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession andhome addresses.As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess therequisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents haveno legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of thequestioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed toovercome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law.The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. Thecourt was inclined to find prima facie , that petitioners have legal rights affected bythe Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflictserious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may beparties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in thename of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of

the Civil Code, anassociation is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personalityseparate and distinct from that of its members.There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP,COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses.Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These runcounter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that factsshowing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organizedassociation of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even inthe sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations,"which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, intheir Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remainsilent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations."For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, privaterespondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to bedevoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition.Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties ininterest.Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned order rendered by theRegional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulledand set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the lawgrants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitledRedirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailedexecutive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being thesole provider of health services to being a provider of specifichealth services and technical assistance, as a result of thedevolution of basic services to local government units.Issue: WON EO102 is constitutional?Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declaredvoid, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of theFilipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim thatthe HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, andrevenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in makinginaccessible free medicine and free medical services. Thiscontention is unfounded.As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution areconsidered self-executing, and do not require future legislationfor their enforcement. For if they are not treated as selfexecuting, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easilynullified

by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisionshave already been categorically declared by this Court as nonself-executing.In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentinov. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of ArticleXIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moralincentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle,are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as nonself-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceableconstitutional rights.Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the presentcase were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically,Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of whichthe Court categorically ruled to be non selfexecuting in theaforecited case of Taada v. Angara.Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how theHSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and dueprocess clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Sincethey failed to substantiate how these constitutional guaranteeswere breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing therelevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, inannulling the HSRA.In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIIIand Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accordsrecognition to the protection of working women and theprovision for safe and healthful working conditions; to theadoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach tohealth; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children toassistance and special protection, including proper care andnutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement andGaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, theyare mere statements of principles and policies. As such, theyare mere directives addressed to the executive and thelegislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie withthe courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may bemanifested in their votes. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accordwith the rhythm and harmony of nature ANAK MINDANAO V. EXECUTIVE SEC Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) andMamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail theconstitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364TRANSFORMING THE DAR INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORMSECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into theDepartment of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in the country,including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform.SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby

placed under the supervision and control of theDepartment of Land Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be exofficioUndersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379 AMENDING EO 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORMSection 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of ExecutiveOrder No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as follows: Section 3. TheNational Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of theDepartment of Land Reform. Issue: WON placing the Presidential Commission for the UrbanPoor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, andthe National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency was proper?Held: YES. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP andNCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in thePresident who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits thatthis broad power of control including the power to reorganize isqualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President toensure that the laws, including those creating the agencies, befaithfully executed.AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidentialcommission to be clearly an extension of the President, and thecreation of the NCIP as an independent agency under theOffice of the President. It thus argues that since the legislaturehad seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and withdistinct mandates, the President should respect that legislativedisposition.In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of theseadministrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.AMINs position fails to impress x x x Agricultural lands refers to those devoted toagricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and notclassified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and itspredecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans andzoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and LandUse Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precedingcompetent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,commercial or industrial use.[The deliberations of the Constitutional Commissionconfirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only thoselands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands anddo not include commercial, industrial and residentiallands. ] Remman Enterprises v. C.A. ,G.R. No. 132073,September 26, 2006The challenge in this case was decided mainly by referring tothe earlier Small Landowners case as stare decisis. Confederation of Sugar Producers v. DAR . GR 169514, March30, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the HONG KONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION(HSBC) v. JOSE VERA, Judge ad interimof the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CUUNJIENG (65 Phil 56)November 16, 1937FACTS:The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila,with HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor.The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penaltyranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor.(Jan. 8, 1934)-Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prison correccional to seven years, six months and twentyseven days of prison mayor, butaffirmed the judgments in all other respects.-Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial whichwere all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filedfor certiorari to the Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsider ation or new trial,then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has nocriminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in the future.CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5, 1937.HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionalityof the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful andimproper delegation to provincial boards.Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein theprobationary officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincialboards.The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguingthat probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive.Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.ISSUES:1.

Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds: a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive b.It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power c.It denies the equal protection of the lawsHELD/RATIO:1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised andpresented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, lis mota.Constitutionality issues may be raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may alsobe raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest possible opportunity (during proceedings ininitial/inferior courts). It may be said that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws, asin this case. The well-settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have personal andsubstantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of itsenforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the People of the Philippines have substantialinterest in having it set aside. 2. a.No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning power is solelywithin the power of the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary suspension,and the probationer is still not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflictsupon him as he remains to be in legal custody for the time being. b.Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by which theadministrative boards may be guided in the exercise of discretionary powers, hencethey have the power to determine for themselves, whether or not to apply the law ornot. This therefore becomes a surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. Itis unconstitutional. c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some provinces maychoose to adopt the law or not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It isunconstitutional. DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB effects of constitutionality **Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo** Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.

PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. o E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium - extension of the debt

o RA 342 was issued in 1948 moratorium

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed. ISSUE: Has the action prescribed? SC: NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.

People of the Philippines V. Efren Mateo y Garcia G.R. No. 147678-87, 07 July 2004, En Banc (Vitug, J.) Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of the appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death HELD: The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusivein character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused. In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CRIMINAL LAW determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues. While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in 1993 until June 2004, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection. Under the Constitution Article VIII, Section 5, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announce additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of rule 124, Section 3 of rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposes is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court incases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, isrecognized under our laws as having an associative relationshipwith the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powersthat go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to anylocal or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than thePhilippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory statusthat aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than theautonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentallydifferent from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in allbut name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in theMontevideo Convention ,[154]namely, a permanent population,a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter intorelations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarilysever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of theconcept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to thepresent Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specificprovisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of theBJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But evenassuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in theconstitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be inconflict with it.It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated inher oath of office,[178] only to preserve and defend theConstitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extendto allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply torecommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as shelimits herself to recommending these changes and submits to theproper procedure

for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as anunconstitutional act.The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of theabove-discussed standards Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority topropose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee toany third party that the required amendments will eventuallybe put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. Themost she could do is submit these proposals as recommendationseither to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers arevested. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINEES SUMMARYThe petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communitiesaffected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to theConstitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by anybranch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-interventionand intervening respondents the requisite locus standi inkeeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that thepresent petitions provide an exception to the moot andacademic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of theConstitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of thesituation and paramount public interest; (c) the need toformulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreementsnecessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peacesigned by the government and the MILF back in June 2001.Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another onedrawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamushave been rendered moot in view of the respondents action inproviding the Court and the petitioners with the official copy

of thefinal draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The peoples right to information on matters of publicconcern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution isin splendidsymmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all itstransactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizesthe duty of officialdom to give information even if nobodydemands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision onpublic disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subjectonly to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be providedby law.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount publicconcern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaringthat the right to information contemplates steps and negotiationsleading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence findsno distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep acontinuing dialogue or process of communication between thegovernment and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is thedesign for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultationwas envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutionalimperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples right to beconsulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuingconsultations on both national and local levels and for a principalforum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of thePresidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, andrecommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and humanecology including those that may call for the eviction of a

specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions flyin the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondentseffectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosedthe official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicialcompliance and public scrutiny.In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committedgrave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinentconsultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic ActNo. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process bywhich the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to andin excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal toperform the duty enjoined.The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitutionand laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very conceptunderlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisionedbetween the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for theconcept presupposes that the associated entity is a state andimplies that the same is on its way to independence.While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that theprovisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal frameworkwill not be effective until that framework is amended, the samedoes not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE andthe Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandumof Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001,addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as theclause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessaryamendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually beput in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the Presidentherself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding suchan act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituentpowers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for theonly way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of theamendment process is through an undue influence or interferencewith that process.While the MOA-AD would not amount to an internationalagreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippinesunder international law, respondents act of guaranteeingamendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violationthat renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. WHEREFORE, respondents motion to dismiss is DENIED. Themain and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE andhereby GRANTED. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral DomainAspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

particular group of people residing in such locality, is implementedtherein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocallyand unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to theBangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drasticallyresult to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples RightsAct of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognitionand delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize anancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defenseto the general right to information or the

PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ transfer of venue to avoid miscarriage of justice This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty. AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special term in Ilocos Sur. AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court in La Union. Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses. The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction. SC: The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of AOs trenches upon the time honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle. Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the possibility of miscarriage of justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side. Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Anyway, regardless of the place where the case is tried, the prosecution will always be obligated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE TRIAL OF CASES from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands. Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer. Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez.

*judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent attributes necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.* PNB Vs. ASUNCION power to promulgate rules / procedural vs. substantive rights PNB granted credit accommodations and advances to Fabar Inc, for the importation of machinery and equipment. The outstanding balance was P8.4M The credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Barredo, Borromeo (respondents). For failure to pay their obligations, PNB instituted a collection suit against Fabar and the Barredo, Borromeo. Before the case could be decided, one of the respondents, BARREDO, died. So the court issued an order of dismissal of the case, since money claim is a personal action, it is extinguished upon death, and that the remedy is to file a claim with the estate during settlement proceedings. The case was dismissed against ALL defendants.

PNB filed a MR claiming that the dismissal should only be against the deceased Barredo. Hence they file this certiorari. SC: According to the Rules of Court, nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor choose to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. What is applicable in this is Art 1216 of the Civil Code. The creditor has the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor can choose to proceed against the surviving debtors, without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtor. To require the creditor to proceed against the estat would deprive him of his substantive rights under the Civil Code. If the Rules of Court (Rule 86) would be applied literally, in effect, it would repeal the Civil Code (Art 1216), because the creditor would have no chose but to proceeed against the estate of Barredo only. Obviously, this would diminish the PNBs right under the Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle that, SUBSTANTIVE LAW CANNOT BE AMENDED BY PROCEDURAL LAW. The rules of

Court cannot be made to prevail over the Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter substantive. Moreover, the Constitution provides that the rules promulgated by the SC should not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. SANTERO ET AL VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITEG.R. No. L-61700, September 14, 1987153 SCRA 728, Paras FACTS: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, hadthree children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (hereinpetitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private respondents). These children are all naturalchildren since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, PabloSantero died.During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving theestate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with theSupreme Court questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedlywithout hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includestuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the handsof the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that privaterespondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, thatall of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not havesufficient funds to cover the said expenses.Before the Supreme Court could act on said petition, the private respondents filedanother motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita andPedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz,praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.Later on, the CFICavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional threechildren included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previousmotions, only the last four minor children were included for support and the threechildren were then of age should have been included since all her children have theright to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get backthe allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners. ISSUE: whether or not the lower court erred in granting the motion forallowance. RULING:

The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the NewRules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows: Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social position of the family.Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until hecompletes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, evenbeyond the age of majority.Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to thesurviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoriedproperty and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall bededucted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rentspertaining to them. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfullyemployed, or married is of no moment and should not be regardedas the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor orincapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives thesurviving spouse and his/her children without distinction . Hence, theprivate respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamedSantero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in theinheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of theCivil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to thechildren the right to receive support during the liquidation of theestate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule . Be it notedhowever that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimatespouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the childrenhere). DAMASCO VS. LAGUI speedy disposition of cases. Atty Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted only of light threats. He was order to pay a fine of P100. Damasco filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositve portion of the decision. He claims that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but the information was filed 70 days after) The lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for grave threats,

the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats. SC: Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited or punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading is deemed to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the RPC extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of substantive law. This position is further strengthen by the Rules on CrimPro, which added the extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash. The claim that when an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within a graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed can only be done through an overhaul of some existing rules on crimpro to give prescription a limited meaning (ie, a mere bar to the commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable). BUT this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of rights.. such rules shall not diminish, modify or increase substantive rights. THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED! PETITION IS GRANTED! (Damasco wins.) BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS VS. CORTES The Case For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees The Facts Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.[3] Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives: from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.[4]

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended,[6] petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.[7] Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6 October 2004. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioners reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund[8] under the Courts control.[9] Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment), joins causes with petitioner. The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with respondents finding that the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary forms part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.[10] Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues relating to the Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers from Congress interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter judicial rules. The OCAT called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request by a cooperative group for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives fees exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.[11] Lastly, the OCAT recommends the amendment of Section 22, Rule

141 to make explicit the non-exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees. The Issue The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. The Ruling of the Court We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners foreclosure proceeding. Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938 The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives. The Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact Judicial Rules Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees[12] on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS. Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935[13] and the 1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules.[15] The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress:

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x . The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence: [T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. IN RE: CUNANAN FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.) IN RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORINGINTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THEPHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISMAND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURTA.M. No. 10 10-4-SC, 08 March 2011, Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves.The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed theauthority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding thecourts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded thelimits of fair comment and common decency. Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v.Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipinocomfort women during the Japanese occupation, the counsel for the petitionerstherein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamentalresponsibility of states in protecting its citizens human rights specificallypertaining to jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement thereto assertingthat the Vinuyadecision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente Justice Marianodel Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in saiddecision.Vis-a-vis the Courts formation of an ethics committee tasked toinvestigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who werepurportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court,noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in theirarticles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can beclassified as crimes against humanity, thus attaining thejus cogens status;consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya

practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation

decision cited them to support thecontrary stand.In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came upwith a statement entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of theUniversity of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism andMisrepresentation in the Supreme Court (Restoring Integrity Statement), whichstatement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same notonly as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted onlineand at the Colleges bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, theCourt believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondentsto show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance tosuch resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one respondent. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents theirfreedom of expression2.)Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondentsacademic freedom as law professors HELD: PetitionDENIED The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedomof expression A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it wasneither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor thatthey had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the saidResolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious languageby which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case,have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending casefor the proper disposition and consideration of the Court that gave rise to saidResolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated thestatements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under thecircumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission tothis Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement. The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercisedresponsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedomis not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Thus,proscribed are the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteemin courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tendsnecessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of themembers of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present hiscase with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilitiesfor one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,illuminating but not offensive.In a long line of cases, the

Court has held that the right to criticize thecourts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordialconcern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influenceor interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court todiscipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment andcommon decency. The Show Cause Resolution does not violate respondents academicfreedom as law professors There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates uponrespondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of theirinstruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academicfreedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary actionfor contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favorof a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.Academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in thiscase. The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Barmay be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect tothe courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the justicesystem. The Court believes that the reason that freedom of expression may beso delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academicfreedom of law professors. The Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law are consideredengaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and morethan lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath touphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as lawprofessors must be measured against the same canons of professionalresponsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their beinglaw professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. PEOPLE VS. LACSON Lacson et al were charged with multiple murder for shooting and killing 11 male persons who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout. The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 Informations for MURDER, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals.10 Upon motion of the Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. The participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional

Trial Court.12Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. On March 29, 1999 Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing Criminal Cases because: o with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants, there is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. Judge Pasamba denied the TRO (meaning the case could continue). The decision stated that the preveious dismissal of Criminal Cases is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant. filed before the RTC Judge Yadao. Lacson now assails the decision of Judge Pasamba mainly on the ground of : illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. He claims, under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. ISSUE: The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. The rule of provisional dismissal took effect only on December 1, 2000 (in between the period of dismissal and revival). More specifically, 1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.

SC: NO. NOT BARRED. 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.7 Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case9 or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10 does not amount to express consent. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal the cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing. Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. Even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal, and all the heirs of the victims were notified before the hearing the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. In case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former should prevail. The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.35 The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. If a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. Also, It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State. A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a

normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence.55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.56 The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. SARAH P. AMPONG vs. CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSIONG.R. No. 167916 August 26, 2008 On November 10, 1991, a Professional BoardExamination for Teachers (PBET was held in DavaoCity. A certain Evelyn Decir applied for and took theexamination. She passed with a rating of 74.27%. At thetime of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P.Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the supervision of DECS. Later, Ampong transferred tothe RTC in Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she wasappointed as Court Interpreter III.On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI,Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, theCSRO personnel noticed that the woman did notresemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture SeatPlan. Upon further probing, it was confirmed that theperson claiming the eligibility was different from the onewho took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampongwho took and passed the examinations under the nameEvelyn Decir. The CSRO conducted a preliminaryinvestigation and determined the existence of a primafacie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty,Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the BestInterest of the Service. Even before filing an Answer,Ampong voluntarily appeared at the CSRO on February2, 1995 and admitted to the wrongdoing.On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampongand Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from

theservice. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction, but the same wasdismissed. The CA also dismissed her appeal noting thatshe never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after theCSC ruled against her. Rather, she willingly appearedbefore the commission, freely admitted her wrongdoing,and even requested for clemency. Thus, she wasestopped from questioning the Commissions jurisdiction.Can the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properlyassume jurisdiction over administrative proceedingsagainst a judicial employee involving acts of dishonestyas a teacher, committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary?Held: NO but the petition must be dismissed on theground of ESTOPPEL. It is true that the CSC hasadministrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Asdefined under the Constitution and the AdministrativeCode, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, andgovernment-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuantto its administrative authority, the CSC is granted thepower to "control, supervise, and coordinate the CivilService examinations."This authority grants to the CSCthe right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that theSupreme Court is given exclusive administrativesupervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court thatcan oversee the judges and court personnelscompliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It maytake the proper administrative action against them if theycommit any violation. No other branch of governmentmay intrude into this power, without running afoul of thedoctrine of separation of powers. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over acourt employee belongs to the Supreme Court,regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bringits complaint against a judicial employee before theOCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to thisprocedure in the present case. However , We are constrained to uphold the ruling of theCSC based on the principle of estoppel . The previousactions of petitioner have estopped her from attackingthe jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed andinvoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercisingquasijudicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction toescape a penalty.Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not bepermitted to adopt a different theory on appeal to impugnthe courts jurisdiction. In Emin v. De Leon

, this Courtsustained the exercise of jurisdiction by the CSC, whilerecognizing at the same time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers belongs to theappropriate committee created for the purpose asprovided for under the Magna Carta for Public SchoolTeachers. It was there held that a party who fullyparticipated in the proceedings before the CSC and wasaccorded due process is estopped from subsequentlyattacking its jurisdiction.Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before theCSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveledagainst her. When the CSC found her guilty, she movedfor a reconsideration of the ruling. These circumstancesall too clearly show that due process was accorded topetitioner. Petitioners admission of guilt stands . Apart from her full participation in the proceedings before the CSC, petitioner admitted to the offense charged that sheimpersonated Decir and took the PBET exam in thelatters place. We note that even before petitioner filed awritten answer, she voluntarily went to the CSC RegionalOffice and admitted to the charges against her. In thesame breath, she waived her right to the assistance of counsel. Her admission, among others, led the CSC tofind her guilty of dishonesty, meting out to her thepenalty of dismissal Maceda v. Vasquez. Facts: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. NITAFAN VS. CIR salaries of judges The judges here seek to perpetually prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is contrary to the Constitution mandating that their salaries shall not be decreased during their term. They also contednt that this is anathema to an independent judiciary. ISSUE: Are the salaries of judges exempt from income tax?

SC: NO. The clear intent of the Con-Com was to delete an express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to give substance to the EQUALITY AMONG THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. The Court has since then authorized the continued deduction of withholding tax from the salaries of all the members of the Judiciary. The Court has discarded the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer which exempted them from payment of income tax. The Court thus reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to the general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such taxes does not fall within the constitutional protection against the decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. (there was a discussion on the intent of the framers.. Fr. B in the deliberations proposed an amendment that the salaries shall not be diminished but may still be subject to the general income tax. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the Constitution was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable. In the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government, they must all share in the burden of general income taxation equitably. VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA security of tenure Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act. Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof. "If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said

Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached." They claim that:

"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned. "6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,' "7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of Court. "8. It is not a bill of attainder. "9. It is not an ex post pacto law. "10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected or to the treason indictees; concerned. "11. It does not amend any constitutional provision. "12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."

(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution. "(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution. "(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court. "(e) It creates two Supreme Courts. "(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation. "(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws "(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation. "(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution. "(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President." The Solgen countered that:

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of a Justice. 2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE 3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC. SC: NO. NO. NO. 1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law. Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of the constitution. Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution.

"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. "2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines. "3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.' "4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section 14, commonwealth Act No. 682.

2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of regular members of the SC. NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. 3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy said requirement. The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed nor confirmed. SEC 14. NULL AND VOID. People v. Gacott G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995 Facts: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the AntiDummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed. Issue:

whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari Held: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads: Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied). General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. Air France v Carrascoso Facts: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded. Held: Yes to both. To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. *Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose FRANCISCO VS PERMSKUL Facts: Francisco leased his apartment in Makati to permskul for a period of one year at 3k/month. Pursuant to the lease contract, Permskul deposited with the petitioner the amount of 9K to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. Permskul vacated the property and asked for the deposit. Petitioner contends that permskul still owed

him expenses sucha as electricity and water bills. Permskul filed a case to the MTC. Francisco was ordered to pay the balance of the deposit. RTC rendered a decision with a memorandum decision. Francisco questions the constitutionality of of the law allowing memorandum decisions. Issue: Whether the memorandum decision was valid. Held: Sec 40 of BP 129 allowing memorandum decisions is not unconstitutional. There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is possible that a different conclusion of law may be arrived by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing incorporation by reference is to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court.