69 MX Protective Order - Inability To File Joint Statement

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 69 Filed 10/31/2007 Page 1 of 60
1 Mark A. Wasser CA SB # 60160

LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER
2 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1100
Sacramento. CA 95814
3 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
4 E-mail: mwassenwmarkwasser.com
5 Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.

KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
6 Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
1115 Truxton Avenue. Fourth Floor
7 Bakersfield, CA 93301
Phone: (661) 868-3800
811 (661)868-3805
II E-mail: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
9
I0 Attorneys for Defendants County Kern.
Peter Bryan, Harris, Eugene Kercher,
11 Jennifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Smith
and
12
13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
14 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORJ"<"IA
15
16 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: l:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG
)
17 Plaintiff, ) DECLARATION OF MARK A. WASSER
) RE: INABILITY TO PREPARE AND
18 VS. ) EXECUTE A JOINT STATEMENT RE:
) DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT
19 I COUNTY OF KERN. et )
) Date: November 5, 2007
20 Defendants. ) Time: 9:30 a.m.
) Place: U.S. Bankruptcy Courthouse,
21 ) Bakersfield Courtroom 8
)
22 ) Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
23 )
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24
Defendants submit this Declaration of Mark A. Wasser pursuant to Local Rule 37-251(d)
25
in lieu of a joint statement rei discovery disagreement.
26
III
27
III
28
I
DECLARATION OF MARK A. WASSER RE: INABILITY TO PREPARE AND

EXECUTE A JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT
1 I, Mark A. Wasser, deelare as follows:

2 1. I am counsel of record for Defendants. The facts in this Deelaration are true and
3 correct of my personal knowledge and I can testify competently to them if called as a witness.
4 2. The parties have attempted to prepare and execute a joint statement rei discovery
5 disagreement as required by Local Rule 37-251 but have been unable to do so.
6 3. Attached hereto as Attachment A, is a true and correct copy of the draft joint
7 statement that Defendants prepared. Plaintitf objected and prepared his own draft joint
II
8 ,I a true correct copy IS mLRr.<lPf1 as At!tacJlment Defendants objected to I
9 Plaintiff s draft joint statement because it suffers from the same inaccuracies that plagued the
10 parties' attempt to resolve this dispute through the meet and confer process.
11 4. states Defendants diselosed business address" as
12 the address for U'Ov'UO~U witnesses. This is not correct. disclosed each
13 individual employee's actual business address. The employees work at Kern Medical Center.
14 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have offered only "informal assurances and representations"
15 regarding making all the employees available to Plaintiff upon request. This is not correct.
16 Defendants have made repeated written assurances. There is nothing "informal" about them.
17 Plaintiff simply refuses to acknowledge that he has been given full and accurate contact
18 ,information all employee witnesses.

II
19 5. Defendants regret that the parties have been uu,'u,~ to prepare a statement.
20 6. The issue presented by the discovery disagreement is whether Plaintiff is entitled

21 to individual employee home addresses, over the employees' privacy and safety objections,
22 despite the fact that actual business addresses for each employee have been disclosed along with
23 Defendants' written representations to produce them on request.

24 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
25 Executed this 3151 day of October, 2007, in Sacramento, California.
26
27 By: /s/ Mark A. Wasser
28 Mark A. Wasser
2
DECLARATION OF MARK A. WASSER RE: INABILITY TO PREPARE AND

EXECUTE A JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT
ATTACHMENT A
Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE LEE
2 555West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, CA 90013
3 Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487
4 E-maiLeleeialLOEL.com
5 Joan Herrington SB# 178988
BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT OFFICE
6 5032 Woodmlnlster Lane
Oakland, CA 94602
7 Phone: (510) 530-4078
10) 530-4725
8 ~)bael0.conl
Of Counsel to LAW OFFICE OF
9
Attorneys for Plaintiff David F. D.O.
10
MarLA.. W",,<pr SB #060160
11 OF MARK A.
400 1]
12 Sacramento. ]4
Phone: (916) 444-6400
13 Fax: (9]6) 444-6405
E-mail: mwasseria1markwasser.com
14
Bernard C. Barman, Sr.
15 I KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
16 i 1115 Truxtun Avenue. Fourth Floor
! Bakersfield, CA 93301
17 i Phone: (661) 868-3800
Fax: (661) 868-3805
II
8 i. E-maiLmnations@co.kern.ca.us
19 I Attorneys for Defendants County of Peter Bryan, irwin Eugene Kel-ch"f,
Jennifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Toni Smith and William Roy
20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
21
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
22
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-26
23 )
Plaintiff, ) JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY
~)
24 DISAGREEMENT
vs.
25 Date: November 5, 2007
~
COUNTY OF KERN, et a!., Time: 9:30 a.m.
26 Place: U.S. Bankruptcy Courthouse,
Defendants. ) Bakersfield Courtroom 8
27 )
) Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
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28 Trial Date: August 26, 2008
JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT
1
II
I This joint statement re: discovery disagreement is submitted pursuant to Local Rule 37-
2 251(a) in advance of the November 5, 2007 hearing on Defendants' motion for protective order.
3 I. Details ofthe Parties' Discovery Conferences.
4 The parties engaged in a prolonged "meet and confer" process that was conducted by
5 letter and email over the course of several weeks.
6 Plaintiff objected to Defendant's initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l on the
7 grounds that Defendants had not disclosed the home addresses of County employees. Plaintiff
8 a mr,tlc,n to cOll1p,el Defendants a motion to
9 protect the home addresses. of these steps was preceded by an extensive exchange
10 correspondence and email between parties. stipulations were exchanged.
1 ,
, i nnemno~ two PIO,po:sed stljpuiall,JnS Defendants prepared a proposed stipulation.
agreed to language.
13 Plaintiffs position appeared to harden throughout the "meet and confer" process.
14 Initially, Plaintiff had stated his position has demanding home addresses for employees who left
15 ,County employment during pendency of the case. Plaintiff s last correspondence to Defendants
16 before the motion for protective order was filed indicated that Plaintiff wants the home addresses
17 for County employees who were listed in the initial disclosures.
18 Copies parties proposed stipulations correspondence is attached to joint
19 statement behind Tab A
20 It A Statement of the Nattire ofthe Case.

21 Plaintiff filed a 52 page complaint listing II claims for relief including violation of civil
22 rights, deprivation of due process, retaliation, failure to comply with the Family Medical Leave
23 Act, California Family Rights Act and defamation.

24 The dispute arose out of Plaintiff s tenure as a pathologist at Kern Medical Center.
25 Plaintiffs relationship with other members of the medical staff deteriorated to the point of
26 intimidation, hostility and antagonism. Plaintiff claims a hostile work environmen was caused
27 by Defendants. Defendants claim, to the extent it existed, it was caused by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
28 seeks unspecified damages for personal injury.
2
I
The parties have made their initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(l). The
2 Defendants' initial disclosures included, among other things, a list of possible witnesses.
0
~ Defendants provided actual business addresses and telephone numbers for every employee.
4 Defendants made repeated written representations to Plaintiff that each and every employee
5 would be made available to Plaintiff, upon request, for informal interview or deposition, that
6 Defendants' counsel would accept service all notices and process on behalf of all employees
7 and that Defendants would provide Plaintiff with updated contact information, to the extent
8 on an)' emnliWf'p left r~nnj, eimp-lo'/ment during the pe-nd'cnc:v case.
9 found disclosures unacceptable and rejected Defendants' written

10 Plaintiff the wv"uvu that he is entitled to the addresses of
11 elnployees.
12 0VjUV. if not alL emipli)Yc,es Plaintiff are afraid or
13 intimidated by him as a result of the hostility he brought to the workplace and are unwilling to
14 tell him where they live. Defendants, therefore, filed a motion for protective order to protect
15 from disclosure employee home addresses. employees remain availabie to Plaintifffof
16 informal ml"rv·If'W or deposition through Defendants' counsel at the addresses that have been
17 disclosed.
18 liS to
19 only contested issue is whether Defendants are obligated to disclose the
20 addresses of employees for whom full contact infonnation (including address and telephone
21 number) has already been disclosed. Defendants contend that Rule 26(a)(l) requires disclosure
22 of contact information that allows access to potential witnesses. Defendants have fully complied
23 with the Rule and, in addition, have coupled their disclosures with representations that all
24 employees will be available to Plaintiff upon request.
25 Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he is entitled to home addresses regardless of
26 the other addresses that have been disclosed.
27 The parties' respective legal positions are set forth in the correspondence behind Tab B.
28
3
1 IV. Conclusion.
2 Despite the extensive correspondence between the parties. it does not appear that this
,
J dispute can be resolved without assistance from the Court.
4 Respectfully submitted.
.6 October _ _. 2007 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
8
Eugene Lee
9 Attorney for Plaintiff. Jadwin, D.O.
10
11
12
By:_ _--:-_--:-,-----, _
13
Mark A. Wasser
14 Attorney for Defendants, County of Kern, et al.
15
16 Ii
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18
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• C 1 '07 .- Law Offices of .-
ase ,-cv-OOO W~~Jt~WA~ERii 0/12/2007 Page 4 of 10
400 Capitol Mall, Suite J J 00
Sacramento, California 95814
Office: 9 J6-444-6400 Fax: 916-444-6405
rowasser@markwasser.com
Sep~rnber 13.2007
Eugene Lee
31
Re: Jadwin v. COUllty ofKern, et al.
Dear Mr. Lee:
\Ve have revised the Vy'itness list we enclosed as part of our initial disclosure so
that it describes the subjects of information the various witnesses are believed to have in
more detaiL \Vhen OUT O\V11 investigation is complete, we may knoV\' more about the
witnesses' kno\vledge but these descriptions fairly SUmmfu-lZe vvhat we presently knovv'.
\Ve deleted the names of vlltnesses for v:ihom we have no specific subject information~
even though doing so seems to Dr, Jad'i~Iin:s interests. 1\1} intent in giving you
the nameS in firsl was to be indus1ve if you 'ivam: \Ve will give you
less, I have always subscribed to The -'lie'.ii that it is better to have a \Vltnesses~ 1131-ne thaT}
to not have it butl have no interest in COnVL'1ci"ng you of that Your suggestion that OUI
initial disclosure was deficient or that we "acknowledge" the baseless position you have
taken does not warrant further comment
We are not providing home addresses for any persons who are employed by the
County, Unlike Dixon v. Certainteed Corporation, which you cite, the County has not
and will not resist making its employees available to you for deposition or informal
interview. As I have told you from the outset, (I believe I first represented this to you in
March) I will accept service of all papers on behalf of the Defendants and all County
employees and will make arrangements to produce any employees you want. Thus,
employment addresses afford you complete access to all employees,
Also, because of Dr. Jadwin's threatening and intimidating behavior towards his
co-workers at Kern Medical Center, many employees are afraid of him and are unwilling
to let him know where they live,
Admitted m Practice in California and Nevada

Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG
Case 1:07 -cv-0002L- TAG
Eugene Lee
September 13,2007
Page 2
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Even though Dr. Jadwin knows the street address of Kern Medical Center, having
worked there for several years (and having referred to it as simply "KMC" in his o"n
witness Jist) we have included it for you.
Finany, -".ve are providing a copy of a memOrandful1 of coverage ,:vim the CSAC
Excess insurance Authority_ It 'was not included in our first disclosure because the
County had not been able to verify its coverage. As you ,,,ill note, the County has a
self·irlsured ret.cntion h"fm·e any is available.
Y (}UTS,
cc: Karen Bames

Joan Herrington
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This message is sent by a law firm and may can lain information that is privileged or confidential. If you received
this transmisskm in error, please notify the sender by reply e-mail and delete the message and any attachments.
From: Mark Wasser [mailto:mwasser@markwasser.com]

Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 8: 13 AM
To: elee@lOEL.com
Subject: RE: Jadwln/KC Initial Disclosures
Gene,
I will be out of the office a lot today and tomorrow. i do not know where this stands and, as i wrote last night, do
not even know what the issue is. Could you remind me what we are disagreeing about?
This recent exchange started with your demand that we rename and reserve the supp!emental initial disdosures.
i declined your request to do that. The topic then transitioned to providing empioyees on request, as i recaii, and
agreed as I have in the past. Our position on that has never changed. What is the current dispute?
The stipulation you have sent me is not necessary and nothing In the rules you cite is applicable. I know you
enjoy disagreements but I cannot find one here Remind me what the disagreement Is And what It Is that needs
to be compelled.
Is this whole tempest simply that you want a stipUlation for something we have already to?
Also, as I wrote last night, send me whatever CME expenses Dr. Jadwin believes are outstanding. I cannot find
any record of them in my files or e-mail.
Mark
From: Eugene D. lee [mallto:elee@lOEl.com]

Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2007 5:04 PM
To: mwasser@markwasser.com
Cc: 'Joan Herrington'
Subject: RE: Jadwin/KC: Initial Dlsciosures
Mark,
It is a shame that each time we attempt to meet and confer with you and comply with basic court rules and
regulations, you derail the discussion into personal attacks and insults. This is truly regrettabie and demonstrative
of all that is wrong with the justice system today.
Given your emails, I am not sure that you are familiar with USDC EDCA local rule 83-143 and FRPC 29.
Hopefully after you have had a ohance to familiarize yourself with these rules, you will understand why we insist
on haVing a written stipulation and are unwilling to rely on simply your "word". The fact that your "word" has
changed with every communication only demonstrates why these rules exist In the first plaoe.
Your have staunchly and inexplicably refused to exeoute, or even negotiate, a valid written stipulation with us
despite our best efforts and intentions. We therefore have no choloe but to bring a motion to compel seeking
sanotions. This is unfortunate and does not bode well for our ability to work with each other as this litigation
proceeds.
Sincerely,
Gene
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Mark Wasser
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Page 10 of 10
From: Mark Wasser [mwasser@markwasser.com]

Sent: Thursday, September 20,2007 11:48 AM
To: 'elee@LOEl.com'
Subject RE: Jadwin/KG: Initial Disclosures
Gene,
First, here is the address for The Camden Group, David Culberson's emp!oyer: The Camden Group, 100 N,
Sepulveda Blvd" Ste, 600, E! Segundo, California 90245,
I have beer: toid that David Culbe,son is in ~0innesota on an ;""innn',p;;; but have not verified :+
Second l I assumed you understood that the witness list we ser;ted with the supplemental disclosures was a new
llst that replaced the previous list If you were not dear about that: this should clarify it. \Nhy else would we
send a new nst? I do not understand your confusion or that woujd be an issue, I am not reser'i~ng the
inltjal disclosures, 'vVe covered that yesterday or the day before, I
I am lost on this one, You say you arE \"enVtlec! to contact information fo: ali v!imesses" \/\/6
agree 100% and we gave you contact information on ail ';,vitnesses. We even accompanied that with our written
representation that we will make all employees available to you on request. We have fully complied with both the
spirit and letter of all rules and offered the additional courtesy of providing contact Information for any employees
that may leave Gounty employment during the pendency of this case. How you can extract a dispute from this Is
beyond me. No rule requires that all agreements between counsel be reduced to stipulaton. In my 30+ years of
federal court practice, no opposing attomey has ever suggested they must be. Rule 29 clearly states that the
parties may " prepare stipUlations, HaVing said that, I am not adverse to stipulations but I am not wining to sign
H
the one you sent because jt aoes beYond what we have discussed and wouJd impose time limits that I find
unreasonable, It is also one=-sid€d. The Plaintiff is not the only party who wi!! need discovery. Our agreement is
fine the way it is. If you believe it must be reduced to a stipulation, then you will have to explain why and we wil!
have to discuss the terms. 1am open to that but don't send me documents and tel! me to sign them by such-and~
such date on threat of sanct~ons.
You opened your e-maH \vith a that I "leave the insults out of our interactions"~ but proceed tc
accuse me of "pjaying hardball" being "abusive" and being "ridiCUlOUS" (among other tflings) in an overa!! tone
that is snotty and condescending. if you want the tone of our commun~cations to improve, it wW require
reciprOCIty. Your communications invariably come from a positfon of take-it-or-leave-it that is arrogant and
unhelpful. Lighten up, What will you do when we get to issues that actually matter?
If you can tell me how we have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1), please do so. Otherwise, I
suggest we move on to the next issue, whatever that will be. This is the most extreme case of form over
SUbstance I have encountered In memory.
Mark
10/8i2007
•
Eugene D. Lee
Document 69
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Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page I of2
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Page 5 of 6
From: Mark Wasser [mwasser@markwasser.com]

Sent: Thursday. September 20,20072:55 PM
To: 'Joan Herrington'
Cc: 'Gene Lee'
SUbject: RE: 070920 Wasser re JadwlnKC Initial Disciosures
Follow Follow up
Flag Status: Completed
We are not to evade anything. I am flabbergasted at this dispute.
As I wrote In an e-mail several days a90, the Certalnteed case Is distinguishable because, there, the employer
was refusing to produce Its employees so tha plaintiff naeded home addresses so he could get the employees
directly. Here, we are offering to produce ali employees upon request as well as provide contact Information for
employees who may leave (By the way, that last piece Is not new, contrary to what you write. It was Ilrst offered
weH over a week as ! wrote earlier, the employees are afraid of Dr- Jadwin and do not want him to
know where Nothing in Rule 26 requjres production of home addresses. The ruie requires name and
address, il known. it does not say "home" address. Any contact information that permits production 01 the
witness Is sufficient. We have proposed a completely acceptable resolution.
To my knowledge, we are not varying the rules of discovery but, even If we were, that is not what Rule 29 says. It
says the parties "may by written stipulation" do certain things. I am not aware that we are doing any of the things
Rule 29 addresses. Gene's proposed stipulation would vary the rules on notice and so forth but I object to that.
The normal provisions on notice are fine. Hence, I do not think Rule 29 has any application.
Apparently, the current dispute revolves around the legitimacy 01 agreements between counsel. I have relied on
agreements between oounsel for over 30 years and find no authority that prohibits them. If it is your position that
there can be no agreements between counsel that are not reduced to formal stipulation and order, then, perhaps
we shouid litigate that. doubt any court wili hold that counsel of record cannot have any agreements between
them that are not reduced to formal stipulation and order. Such a holding would revolutionize oraciice. There is
certeinly no authority that says that now.
The semantic debate between 'amended' and "supplementai" is not uselul. We may have amended the witness
list but we supplemented the information on insurance. I explained that several days ago. Had I chosen to label
the new disclosures "amended," I imagine Gene would have objected that they were really "supplemental." I will
not engage In a debate over the title of the document. The substance should prevail. Substantively, It oontained
a new witness list that replaced the former list and new Information about Insurance.
As with many disputes, I suggest the real issue here is something else. Perhaps, If we could get to that we could
resolve this. What is your real concern?
This does not warrant the time we are spending on it.
I am going to a meeting out of the office at 3:00 that wili last the rest of the day but will be here tomorrow.
Mark
From: Joan Herrington [mallto:jh@baelo.com]
9/20/2007
•
Sent: Thursday, september 20, 2007 2: 17 PM

To: Mark Wasser
Document 69
Document 51
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Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 2 of2
Page 14 of 60
Page 6 of 6
Cc: Gene Lee

Subject: 070920 Wasser re JadwinKC Initial Disciosures
Plaintiff has previousiy provided you with iegal authority showing the foilowing:
1. Rule 26 requires parties to provide the home contact information of each disciosed witness. See, e.g.,
Dickson v. Certain-Teed Corp. 164 FRD 685, 689 (1996)
2. Ruie 29 require parties to enter into formal stipulations to vary rules of discovery, etc. inciuding those
regarding service of subpoenas on witnesses.
3. Locai Ruie 83-143 requires parties to convert such stipulations into a court order.
Defendants have offered to accept service of subpoenas on any current county empioyees, in exchange for
nleintifh"alvma his right to of their home contact information, but refuse to reduce this agreement to
a binding stipuiation and order as by the ruies cited above.
Today. for the first time, Defendants have aiso offered to prOVide the home contact information of any current
county empioyee whose employment with the county may cease prior to deposition or trial; but object to the 5-
10 period between the departure and production of the home contact Information to pi211ni:Iff
that was Plaintiff. Yet Defendants make no counter-proposal of what period other than 5-10 days
is reasonab!e. Defendants refuse to reduce this agreement to a stipulation and order as the
ruies cited above.
Defendants assert that their so-calied "Supplemental initiai Disclosures" are in fact "Amended Initial
Disclosures" but are unwiiling to re-serve them with a corrected caption that accurately reflects this. i propose
that the stipulation be amended to include that parties agree that Defendants "Supplementai Initial Disclosures"
dated September ~ 2007 replace and supercede its Initial Disclosures dated _,2007."
If Defendants continue to evade compliance with the rules cited above, then Plaintiff will be forced to move to
compel Defendants' compliance with them, and request sanctions. For the last time, please reconsider
Defendants' unreasonable refusal to reduce its agreement to the required stipuiation and order required by the
ruies cited above. Piaintiff has repeatedly provided Defendants with the proposed and requested
them to either sign or propose amendments.
This dispute arose because Defendants failed to comply with Rule 26 in its initiai Disciosures. The only current
dispute appears to be that Defendants are unwilling to reduce its assertions to the required stipulation and
order. We have less than three hours to resolve this dispute.
Joan Herrington
Bay Area Employment Law Office
5032 Woodminster Lane
Oakland, CA 94602-2614
(SI0) 530-4078 ext 109
jh@baeio.com
9/20/2007
- .
Case
(213) 992"3299
TELEPHONE
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1:07-CV-00026~-TAG
LAW
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OFFICE
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OF
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ELEE@LOEL.COM
E-MAIL
EUGENE L E E
12 ! ::1) 596-0487 ~55 WEST F"lF"TH STREET, SUITE 3100 WWW.LOEL.COM
F"ACSIM1LE LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90013-1010 WEBSITE
EUGENE D LJ:',.E, ESQ JOAN E. HERR1.NGTON, ESQ
PRINCiPAl.. OF COUNSEL
October 1, 2007
VIA FACSIMTLE & US MAIL
lv1ark Wasser 100011.001

Law Offices of Mark Wasser
400 Capitol Mall Ste 1100
~'l(Tarne!i((), CA 93814
Re: Defendants? lvlotion for Protective Order

Jadwin ~VVH'j of Kern, e1 a1. (VBDC EDCA 1:07-cv-00026-01J/\~i
lvlr. Vi asser:
1 a..-rr1 1!1 of your letter of 27, '{ ou srate as the basis for J " Q " i 2 H ' C
motion for the protectIve order the allegation that ;"Severa] County ernployees object 10
disclosure of their home addresses to Dr. Jadwin on grounds of persona1 safety."
Plaintiff requests an offer of proof Who are these objecting employees? What specilkally are
they afraid ofl On what do they base these alleged fears? In other words, demonstrate that this is
not just the latest example of the County's attempt to blame the victim for their own illegal
actions.
PJaintiffhas a right to investigate, informally contact and serve documents on the witnesses. As
Plaintiff has repeatedly explained, the \vitnesses' availab~H1y at work is not the only relevarn
here,
Defendants have orally "represented" that they are willing to accept service on behalf of its
"current employees" and to prodnce them as needed. In exchange, Plaintiff has stated its
willingness to forego disclosure oftheir home contact information. However, Plaintiff has
several concerns about relying on Defendants' oral representations.
First, what happens when current Kern County employees quit or are terminated before
deposition or trial? Plaintiff needs to ensure that it receives their home contact information in a
timely manner. The written stipulation which Plaintiff has proposed, attached hereto, addresses
this issue.
Second, the case of KMC Interim CEO David Culberson - whom Defendants later informed
Plaintiff was not an employee but an independent contractor - highlights the ambiguity of
Defendants' "representation". Which of the witnesses listed on Defendants' "Supplemental"
Initial Disclosures are employees of Kern County as opposed to independent contractors? The
written stipulation which PJaintiffhas proposed, attached hereto, addresses this issue.
. e,
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Finally, FRCP Rule 29 and USDC EDCA Local Rule 83-143 require that Plaintiff and
Defendants enter into a written stipulation when varying discovery procedures. Defendants'
representation that they will accept service on behalf of certain witnesses represents a variance of
discovery procedures. Plaintiff is wiJling to enter into a stipulation with Defendants but has
requested that the stipulation be memorialized in writing. Defendants have refused.
Plaintiff and Defendants appear to agree in principle. What is the basis for Defendants' refusal to
negotiate a written stipulatioIl; a copy of which is attached hereto? Both Plaintiffs motion to
compel and Defendants' proposed motion for protective order could have been avoided had
Defendants been wining to do so.
ce: Joan Herrington, Esq.

ene: Proposed Stipulation
2
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LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE

Eugene D. Lee (SB#: 236812)
2 555 West Fifth Street, Suile 3100
Los Angeles, CA90013
3 Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487
4 !l email: elee@LOEL.com
II
5 II Joan Herrington, SB# 178988
Ii BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LAW OFFICE
6 115032 Woodminster Lane
I Oakland, CA 94602-2614
Ii Telephone: (51 530-4078
ii Fac ;ml!e-
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(';;;10)/
" ' , -' ~
8 iI Email: jh@baelo.com
II Of Counsel to LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE
9 '
\i Attorneys f.VOf
10ii'DAVIDFJ, AD:\,V1IN"D.O.
!i f·Aark /l, Vi asser Cj\t #06160
-j"1 Ii
;~Ij I~~'~~~I'i1a~I:)s:~~Vi~oA W
: Sacramento, CA 95814
13 Ii Phone: (916) 444-6400
'I Fax: (916) 444-6405
14 Email: m\vasser@mark",:vasser.c01TI
:
15 I Bernard C. Barrnann, Sr.
: KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
16 11 MarkNations, Chief Deputy
Ill115 Truxton Avenue~ Fourth Floor
II
17 Bakersfield, CA 9330 i
ii Phone: (661) 868-3800
18ii Fax (661)868-380S.
'1 Emall: mnatlonS@co.Kern.ca.us
19 :
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher, Jennifer
20 Abraham, Scott Ragland,Toni Smith, and William Roy.
22 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
23 FRESNO DIVISION
24 J DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Civil Action No. 1:07-cv.Q0026 OWW TAG
25 Plaintiff, STIPULATION RE HOME CONTACT

v. INFORMATION OF DISCLOSED KERN
26 COlJ'NTY EMPLOYEES.
COUNTY OF KERN, et aI.,
27 Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
Defendants. Trial Date: August 26, 2008
28
USDC, ED Case No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
I STIPULATION RE ADDRESSES OF DISCLOSED WITNESSES
11
..
Case 1:07-CV-00026.W-TAG•
Document 58 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed.12/2007
Page 18 of 60
Page 9 of 20
I In order to avoid Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures that comply with Rule 26, as
2 well as Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff and Defendants hereby stipulate that:
3 1. Defendants shaH within 10 days of signing of this Stipulation and Order by the Court
4 disclose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. the last known home address and phone
5 number if not k.110\VH, t<J.:!e last kno\vn address and phone nun1ber) of any and all
6 individuals who are not employees of Defendant County of Kern that Defendants list
as \vnnesses Hl
8 Independent contractors, such as Da"/id CUlberson, shaH DOl be de-emed 10 be
9
10 10 Stipu]lation and Court
disclose to Plaintiff David F, .i?,tw,n D.O. the last knov<cl home address and
12 number of any and all former employees of Defendant County of Kern that
13 Defendants Jist as witnesses in their Initial and any Amended or Supplemental
14 Disclosures.
15 3. Defendants shaH discIose to Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D,O, the last knO\tiTI home
16 address and phone number of any and ali current employees of Defendant County
Kern that Defendants as 'witnesses in their Inltial and ful)! Amended or
Supplemental Disclosures within five of lUi]' termi:nathm of their empl('JIl1er,~
19 with the County of Kern, or such shorter time as is reasonably necessary so as to
20 pennit Plaintiff to compel their attendance at depositions and/or triaL
21 4. Defense counsel shall accept service by facsimile of Plaintiffs deposition subpoenas
22 and Rule 45 subpoenas on behalf of any and all current employees of Defendant
23 County of Kern, and Defendant County of Kern shall take all necessary steps to
24 compel compliance with either or both of these.
25
26
27
28
USDC, ED Case No. I :07-cv-00026 OW\V TAG
STIPULATION RE ADDRESSES OF DISCLOSED WITNESSES 2
•
Case 1:07-CV-00026-.-TAG
Document 69
Document 58 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed.212007
Page 19 of 60
Page 10 of 20
1
2 Dated: October_, 2007
3
4 Eugene D. Lee
Attomcy for Plaintiff
5 DAVID F JADWIN, DO
Dated: October , 2007
6
-';
8 Attorney for lJe'ten,jants

COuNTY OF KERN, PETER BRY A"i lR,VfN
nM,""D,10, EUGENE KERCHER, JEY~NJFER
9
."I.til\.!'il1,""·l, SCOTT RAGL,~ND_TONI" " W T U
10 'L! '?UVI P,-O'{ -
11
12
13
ORDER
14
The parties having stipulated as hereinabove set forth and good cause appearing therefore;
15
16 IT IS SO ORDERED
17
,2007 l!},JITED STATES
18
By:_-=~",...._~~~ _ _c-;~'7"'_
19 The Honorable Theresa A Goldner
United States Magistrate Judge
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
USDC, ED Case NO.1 :07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
STIPULATION RE ADDRESSES OF DISCLOSED WITNESSES 3
.
,,
••
c ~ 1'0~ 0 ... .
. a"e . I-cv- 0026-¥VV~RKo~.nwASSERed
Document 69
Law Offices of
400 Capirol Mall. Suite 1100

• •
Filed 10/31/2007
2/2007
Page 20 of 60
Paga 11 of 20
Sacramento, California 95814

Office, 916-444-6400 Fa'" 916-444-6405
mwasser@markwasseLcom
October 1, 2007
Eugene Lee
Law v.,,,".o Lee
90013-
Re: Jadwill v. COUllty ojKern, et al.
Dear Mr. Lee:
This is in response to your letter this morning.
The Defendants representations to you regarding acceptance

j sen;jce on behalf
of an parties employees fujd making employees available to you on request
have not been '''oral. '" You and 1 ha"ve had no communications rllonths, QUI
representations~indeed, all our commuD1catlons to you on this topic a'1d all other topics
for the past few months have been, and still are, written. Hence, the statements in your
letter about oral representations are false. I will not spend any time referring you to the
many writings in which I have made the representations. They will be provided to the
Court in our motion and you have them.
Neither Rule 29 nor Local Rule 83-143 "require" a stipulation. Rule 29 states that
parties may by written stipulation provide that depositions "may be taken before any
person, at any time and place, upon any notice, and in any manner ... " and "modify
other procedures governing or limitations placed on discovery" except for certain
enumerated rules that do not apply to our circumstances. As you know, the word "may"
is discretionary, not mandatory. Thus, your statement that Rule 29 requires a stipulation
is false. Local Rule 83-143 imposes certain requirements on the form of stipulations and
requires that stipulations be approved by the Court but does not "require" stipulations.
Thus, your statement that it does is also false. Further, even if Rule 29 did apply, we are
not proposing to change any of the things Rule 29 addresses. We are not proposing to
Adrnitted w Practice in California and Nevada

.,•
CEu'ierie%P-00026-l-TAG
October 1, 2007
Page 2
Document 69
Documenl58 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed .2/2007
Page 21 of 60
Page 12 of 20
vary any terms of discovery. Neither Rule 29 nor Local Rule 83-143 have any
application, As foreign as it may be to your style of practice, we are simply proposing an
accommodation to make it easier for you to contact County employees by offering to
make them available. It really is that simple.
So you are dear~ let me 'NTite again7 ".:vhat I have 'written pre-viously: I 'NiH accept
J
service of all process and notices on behalf of all parties and all County employees fuld,
further, will make all parties and employees available to you upon request. 1 will provide
you all known contact information on any employees who leave County
IS no1 10 deposit,orlS or
attendance at trial, It applies to any request you have for an eillployeewitness, such as 2,
request to meet ,,\lith them or conduct an informal interview.
letter is Dot
As fElT as your questle,11S about

afraid of and what they base their I rra\'e declarations
employees at KMC who all worked with Dr. Jadwin and, on the basis of their
observations of his behavior, have safety and privacy concerns about disclosing their
home addresses to him. One declarant mentions his physical aggression towards Dr. Lan,
On the basis of my interviews to date, I believe every employee I have talked to would
sign a similar declaration if asked but 1 do not believe 20 or 30 declarations are
necessary. The evidence win come out at triaL So; I have settled on five.
The stipulation you have proposed is not acceptable because itl like earlier
versions you have sent, proposes terms that modify the normal rules in ways "'JYe have
never \Vfitten about or agreed to, Consequently; we are not signing it. I am not opposed
TO stipulations but 1 do not believe one is necessary' and 1 do nol sign <itake-it~or-
leave-it" stipulations sent with threats and deadlines.
1 plan to have our motion for a protective order, along ,,~th the supporting
declarations, filed within the next few days. As much as I dislike requesting fees from
opposing counsel, 1 will request fees because this entire exercise is wasteful and
unnecessary. If there are other issues you would like to discuss, in writing, let me know.
Very Truly Yours,
Mark A Wasser
cc: Karen Barnes (via first class mail)

Joan Herrington (via first class mail)
· , Case 1:07-CV-00026.W-TAG
Document 58
r':;f )..I;J
Filed 10/31/2007
.~II Il.;.. . Page 22 of 60
Filede12/2007 Page 13 of 20
(21::=) 99Z-3299
TELEPHONE
LAW OFFICE OF EL.EE@1,..OEL.COM
E-MAiL
EUGENE LEE
lZ13) 596"0487 555 WEST FIFTH STREET, SUiTE '3100 WWW.LDEL.COM
-'cFA=G="-"'M,,,'",L'CEc-:c:c:-~ L=-O="CCA"N,-oGEL.E5, CALlF"ORN1A 900 1 ::I-I 010 WEBSITE
EUGENE D. LEE, ESQ JOA.N E. HERRl."NGTON, ESQ
P.lUNClPAL OF COUNSEL
October 2, 2007
V1A FACSIMILE
}v1ark Wasser 10001 l.001

400 Capitoi Mall Ste I I 00
CA95814
Re: Defendants; :Motjon for Protective Order

Jadwin / 000';,')' of el at (USDC EDCA No. I :07-cv-00026-0WW/TAG)
Dear tv11' 1,1/ ass er:
T. _ .
",amm faxed letter of October 1.
In response to Plaintiff's request for an offer ofproof; the Fax mentions the existence of 5
witness declarations. Defendants have a duty to share the declarations with Plaintiff as part of
their good faith meet and confer. [Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Power Co., lSI F.R.D. lIS,
120 (D. Nev. j 993)]. Plaintiffrequests access to these declarations in order to detennine
whether there is a genuine need to withhold l1',e witnesses' home contact info. IfPiaintiffis
convinced ofsuch a nee~ then Plaintiff may concede the point and Defendants' motion for
protective order wili then become unnecessary. However, Plaintiff cannot and will not rely OIl
your "representations" regarding these declarations.
Defendants have the idea a written stipulatior~ stating that: ~;I &rrl not
opposed to stipulations but I dD not believe one is necessary here and I do not sign 'take-ii-Dr
leave-it' stipUlations sent with threats and deadlines." Piaintiffhas aJwavs been willing to
negotiate the written stipulation with Defendants. Plaintiff even emailed the MS Word file to
Defendants so as to facilitate any revisions which Defendants might have wished to propose. To
date, Defendants have refused.
In addition, unlike Defendants, Plaintiff believes a written stipulation is necessary. Defendants

made the following "representation" in the fax of October 1:
I will accept service of all process and notices on behalf of all parties and all
County employees and, further, will make all parties and employees available to
you upon request. I will provide you with all known contact information on any
employees who leave County employment during the pendency of this case. This
is not limited to depositions or attendance at triaL It app lies to any request you
have for an employee witness, such as a request to meet with them or conduct an
informal interview.
10: narl\ wasser e ~ I b-q&fq-oqro r':j , , ) J . . i . V l l V ; .... fJII
" Case 1:07.CV-00026-Cttv-TAG Documen158 Filed .212007 Page 14 of 20
This "representation" is too uncertain to meet Plaintiff's needs. For instance, how soon after an
employee leaves County employment will Defendants provide Plaintiff with that employee's
home contact information? Soon enough to ensure Plaintiff can subpoena them for depositions or
trial? Does "employees" include independent contractors (this became an issue with regard to
David CoJberson)? Because of these uncertainties, Plaintiff needs to memorialize Defendants'
representations in a negotiated "Written stipulation.
Defendants have also stated: "The stipulation you have proposed is not acceptable because it,
!ike earlier versions you have sent, proposes terms that modify the normal rules in ways we have
never written or agreed to." Plaintiff would like clarification on what you consider the
"'normal rules "" and Defendants are to offer any modiflcatio:rJS1D the Of{)p(osed
st.ipulation.
The Fax also stated: All our represenWions indeed; aH our corruTlunications to you on t.~is topic
"I.
t
and all other topics for the past few months have beerL and are, written. the
statements in your letter about oral representations are false, " The Fax went on to state: "Plt:·ase
this letter is not oral, It is \.witten on the p2rfJer you are readjng,"
Plaintiff is aware of the difference between oral and viritten representations. However, ::iOU
should recall that, on September 19,2007, you sent me an email regarding the witness home info
issue where you wrote: "I have made consistent representations to you, since our first telephone
conversation over 6 months ago, and have stood by them." Any representations which you made
to me during that call were ora] representations.
\Ve look forward to your response. Hopefully, we can avoid the need for a motion fOr protective
order by amicably resolving this aUlOng ourselves. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any
questions.
cc: Joan Herrington, Esq.

enc: Proposed Stipulation
2
Case •
107-CV-00026.MAR~X~1~sE:ft'd.12/2007
Document 69
400 Capitol Mall, Suire J 100

•
Filed 10/31/2007 Page 24 of 60
Page 15 of 20
Sacramenro, California 95814
Office: 916-444-6400 Fax: 916-444-640)
mwasser@marh.-wasser.com
October 3. 2007
Eugene Lee
of Lee
StreeL 5 ui1:t 31
Re,' Jadwin v, COUIl(V ofKern, el al.
Dear I\1r. Lee:
Corresponding ~\'ith you could become 8 full-lime job.
,\eV<.!dCi POl,rei' Co. )", .Aionsanto Power does not require the Defendants to
"'share the dccIar8.tions ptaiIiti:tI as of theJI" faith rneet
case that all offer such factual support fOT i15
allow the pan)'- seeking discovery to ma~e aD inform.ed evaluation of the claim . . '~. Vve
have done that To be doubly sure we have done that, let me summarize the declarations
again for you.
Five employees have signed declarations objecting to disclosure of their home

addresses to Dr. Jadwin on grounds of safety and privacy. The declarations recite that
this case arose out of work-related issues, does not involve any of the employees in their
personal or private lives, that they all believe their private lives should be kept separate
from their work careers, that they are all available at their work addresses to be contacted
in connection with this case and they do not want Dr. Jadwin to know where they live.
Two of the employees state that Dr. Jadwin is emotional and confrontational and one
states that Dr. Jadwin verbally assaulted her several times, physically assaulted another
physician at KMC and that she does not trust him.
As with your last letter, you pose a series of questions to make this appear more
complicated than it is. We will provide contact information on departing employees
Admitted 10 Practice in California and Nevada

Case 1 :07-CV-0002+w-TAG
Eugene Lee
October 3, 2007
•
Document 58 •
Filed 10/31/2007
File./12/2007
Page 25 of 60
Page 16 of 20
Page 2
when it is available. This is not a "trick" answer. We have no interest in concealing any
employee and we will do our best to insure that all employees are kept available to
testify, either formally or informally. I am, as usual, surprised that you raise these
concerns because I would suspect Dr. Jadwin would be the one to want employees
concealed. Their testimony \Viii hun him, not the Defendants. The employees wili be the
source of information about Dr. Jadv,:in's behavior. They are the ones who know how he
dro\'e other people out of the Patholog;-' Department. how he to acted by intin1idation fuld
hostility. ho"'y he fbreatened his co-vv'orkers and hO\\i he created stress in the workplace.
\\'] 11 to the case and ,,'c'e "\Ni11 do al] in our power to make them
available' to yct:
':{our eomment about en) Septerno,er 19 Jetter makes my point Yes,ouf

representstions have been consiste.nt fer over 6 months. 1 flrst made therrl orally but
hav'c been Inade and ie!,c',cc'U m since then because :;,"01) and 1 no
commtmlcate
a motion to compel and a protective order seems advisabie.
Very Truly Yours,
rvlark A. \Vasser
cc: Karen Barnes {V13 fIrst class

Joan Hen-ington (via first class mail)
TO: MarK wasser '~ ~lb-qqq-~
Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG Document 58 Filed 10/12/2007 Page '17 of 20
IZ I~) 9S1Z-~2S1S1
TELEPHONE
LAW OFFICE OF ELE:E@LOEL.COM
E-MAiL
EUGENE L E E
(2,1:3) 596-04137 555 WEST ~I"'TH STREET, SUITE := 1 00 WWW.LOEL.COM
FACSIMILE .~ LOS ANGELES, CAU.,-ORNIA 9001::.':1-)010 WESSITE
EUGENE D. LEE, ESQ JOAN E HEIUUNGTQN, ESQ.
PRfNCl"PAL OF COUNSEL
October 5, 2007
InA FACSIMILE
Mark Wasser 100011,001

400 Capitol Mall Ste 1] 00
Sa:oram"nhJ, CA 95814
Re: Defendants' Motion lor Protective Order

Jadwin / County of Kern et a1. (USDC EDCA No. 1 :07-cv-00026~O\VV!/TAG)
Dear Mr. \Vasscr:
I am in receipt of your faxe-d letter of October 3
According to the Fax, the employee-declarants state,
that this case arose out of work-related issues~ does not involve any of the
employees In their personal or private lives, that they all believe their private lives
should be k.ept separate from the-ir work careers~ that they are aU available at their
work addresses to be contacted in connection vvith tms case and the} do not want
Dr, Jadwin to know where they Jive,
In other the dec1arants have ordinary privacy cone-erns.
FRCP 26(a)(l) expresses the legislature'S wiE thai parJes be wilnesses' home contact
information notwithstanding privacy concerns. In FoLsom y~ Heartland Bank, the court ruled that
defendants have a duty to disclose the home contact information for witnesses under FRCP
26(a)(1):
The identified former and current employees directly worked on the loan between
plaintiffs and Heartland which is the subject of this litigation [, . . ,1 Such
individuals appear likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity, Fed, R eiv, p, 26(a)(lXA) thus requires
Heartland to disclose their known addresses and telephone numbers, without
awaiting a discovery request 'It may not satisfY this obligation by disclosing its
business address and phone number, unless it knows of no other address and
number,' DIXOn v, Certaimeed Corp" 164 F,R.D, 685, 689 (D, Kan, 1996), Rule
26(a){1){A) contemplates disclosure of the personal address and telephone
number of identified individuals.
1999 U.S. DisL LEXIS 7814 (D, Kan, 1999) (emphasis added),
f,I.MevrrHiG VI
l..~11C L=
Document 69 Filed 10/31/2007 Page 27 of 60
Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG Document 58 Filed 10/12/2007 Page 18 of 20
Ordinary privacy concerns do not trump Plaintiff's right to the witnesses' home contact
information as expressed by FRep 26(a)(1} If you have caselaw suggesting otherwise, please
provide us such citations as part of your good faith meet and confer.
The Fax leaves a number of Plaintiff's questions unanswered. Defendants had stated in their fax
of October 1: "The stipUlation you have proposed is not acceptable because it, like- earlier
versions you have sent, proposes terms that modify the normal rules in ways we have never
written about or agreed to." Plaintiff still awaits darlfication on what Defendants consider the
"normal rules".
Plaintiff's letter of October 1 had also asked: \\Thieh Dfthe 'tvltness2s listed on Defendants
"Supplemental" Initial Disclosures are employees of Kern as tv meiopen.,ie!1;
contractors [and how can Plaintiffbe sure which are encompassed 'within Defendants'
'''representations'']? Plaintiffs proposed stipulation addresses this issue.
TIle Fax fi,:giher states "Like you, vve wDutd liketD avoid the need for a ofder.'~
Plaintiff would like 10 take this base of one further and revisit the idea Df a
v"TItlen stipulation, A \-\-Titten ",,,,,-culd avoid frie need for Defendants' motion for
protective order v/bile accomplishing the goals ofthe parties. Plaintiff has ahvays been., and
remains, wi !ling to negotiate a written stipulation with Defendants which completely ob\~ates the
need for such a motion,
Plaintiff has already on numerous occasions provided Defendants with the draft stipulation as a
starting point for discussions. Please jet us know jf you require another copy.
\Ve look forward to your response. HopefuHYt we can avoid the need for a motion for protective
order by amicably resolving this among ourselves. Please do not hesitate 10 contact me with any
questions.
cc: Joan Herrington, Esq.
2
••
_" Law Offices of
Case 10 (-cv-0002o-0WW-IWAR1~G)6r:~SS
Document 69
•
Filed 10/31/2007
ERd 10/12/2007
400 C",pito! i\1all, Suite 1100
Page 28 of 60
Page 19 of 20
S"'"cramemo, California 95814

Office, 9 J 6-444-6400 Fax, 9] 6-444-6405
mwasser@marl.;:,vasser.com
October 5, 2007
Lav,' of r Cl"CHC Lee
Dear rv1 r. Lee:
\\"'hjJe we both apparently \\'anl to avoid the Illotion for a protective order. your
motion 10 compells still pending and the letter ;/OU faxed late last night seenlS to take an
even less llexible position on honK addresses than your earlier correspondence.
Comparing it with, for example, the e-"mail and draft stipulation you sent me on
September 18, 11 appears your position on home addresses has hardened. Then, you were
focusIng on home addresscs for forrner employees, No""\'. )"on \vant home addresses
e-yer}"onc:. contraCTOrs. You may recalL vv"e ga"ve you the
address of D,:1'vid Culberson' s .o~·.~1o. does not ha\iC his h0l11e address.
Dr. Roy has relocated to Alabmna. To my kno\\;ledge~ no one a1 the Count)' >cnrm1S
where he lives. There are other examples but two suffices to make the point.
1 think we just disagree. You believe Rule 26 requires home addresses while we
believe it simply requires addresses that will ensure witness availability. The goal, after
all, is to contact witnesses. If the address disclosed enables that contact it should not
matter whether it is a "home" address or a business address. We have gone to some
lengths to guarantee that we will make all employee witnesses available but you still find
our efforts unsatisfactory. As far as a stipulation goes, 1 do not know what to propose.
You insist on home addresses and we continue to believe we have fully satisfied Rule 26
by disclosing individual business addresses and guaranteeing availability of all
employees. As 1 wrote several days ago, 1 do not understand your concern. Maybe if I
did, we could better meet it.
Admitted to Pracrice in California and Nevada

•
Eugene Lee
October 5. 2007
Document 69
Document 58 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 10i12i2007
Page 29 of 60
Page 20 of 20
Page 2
As much as I wish it were otherwise. it appears the Court will need to provide
guidance on this. I see no other resolution in sight.
'{ ours,
cc: Karen Barnes (via fIrst class mall)

.,loaf'} Herrington (via first class D1ail)
October 9, 2007
VIA FACSIMILE & FIRST CLASS MAIL
Eugene Lee
Offices
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90013-1010
Jailwin v. Coun,rv et at.
Dear Lee:
Our opposition to your motion to compel and our motion for protective order with
supporting declarations are finished and we were going to file them with the Court
yesterday. However, because yesterday was a court holiday we decided to wait and file
them this morning. When I got to my office today, I found your letter that I received at
II :23 p.m. last night.
As I have written before, I am tired of corresponding with you about the initial
disclosures. None of the letters either of us has written seem to have had any effect in
bringing this matter closer to resolution. You write that the parties agree "in principle".
Actually, I believe we disagree in principle. You want addresses and we not
provide them. Nothing we have exchanged indicates agreement. Nevertheless, and
against my better judgment, I will give it one more try.
I have prepared the enclosed stipulation. If it meets with your approval, please
sign it and return it. I will submit it to the Court for signature.
Very Truly Yours,
Mark A. Wasser
cc: Karen Barnes (via first class mail)

Joan Herrington (via first class mail)
1 Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

LAW OFFICES OF EUGENE LEE
2 555West Fifth Street. Suite 3100
Los Angeles, CA 90013
3 Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487
4 E-mail: eleeiWLOEL.com
5 Joan Herrington SB# 178988

BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LAW OFFICE
6 5032 Woodminister Lane
Oakland. CA 94602
7 Phone: (510) 530-4078
Fax: (510) 530-4725
8 ! E-mail: jh@baelo.com
. Of Counsef to LAW OFFICE EUGENE
9
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
II Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

OFFICES MARK
Sacramento, CA 95814
13 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
14 E-mail: mwasser@markwasser.com
15 Bernard C. Barman, Sr.

KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
1115 Truxtun Avenue, Fourth Floor
Phone: (661) 868-3800
18 , Fax: (661) 868-3805
I' E-mail: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
19
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher,
20 Jennifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Toni Smith and William Roy

23
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-26
24 )
Plaintiff, ) STIPULATION RE: ADDRESS
25 ) INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL
vs. ) WITNESSES LISTED IN THE INITIAL
26 ) DISCLOSURES
COUNTY OF KERN, et ai., )
27 ) Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
Defendants. ) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
28 ------------)
STIPULAnON RE: ADDRESS INFORMAnON FOR POTENTIAL WITNESSES
LISTED IN THE PARTIES INITIAL DISCLOSURES
1
1 It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto through their respective counsel
2 as follows:
3 1. Defendants shall make all employees identified in Defendants' initial disclosures
4 available to Plaintiff for deposition or informal interview on reasonable notice by request to
5 Defendants' counseL
6 2 Defendants shall provide Plaintiff with updated address and contact information,
7 if known, for any employees who leave County employment during the pendency of this case on
8 ~'1"~0' by PlfiintitI's counsel to
9 Defendants' counsel shall accept service all process and notices for all
10 employees,
lJ 4, home addresses personal contact mtOf!J1at::on for all employees
12 shall bc protected and not disclosed to Plaintiff and Defendants shall forebear filing a
13 motion for a protective order to protect that information,
14 5. Plaintiff shall take his motion to compel, presently set for hearing on November 5,
15 2007, off calendar.
16
17 Dated: October __, 2007 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE
18
19 By: _
20 Eugene D. Lee
Attorney for Plaintiff, David F. Jadwin, D.O.
21
22 Dated: October __, 2007 LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER

23
24 By: _
25 Mark A. Wasser
Attorney for Defendants, County of Kern, et al.
26
27
28
STIPULATION RE: ADDRESS INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL WITNESSES
2
1 ORDER
2 The parties having stipulated as hereinabove set forth and good cause appearing
3 therefore;
4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
Dated: October .2007 lJNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
By: _
7
The Honorable Oliver W. Wanger
8 District Court
9
10
llj
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
STIPULATION RE: ADDRESS INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL WITNESSES
3
B
Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG • Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 35 of 60
Page 1 of 11
1 j Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

2 . 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90013
3 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487
4 I Email: elee@LOEL.com
5 Joan Herrington, SB# 178988

BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LA W
6 5032 Woodminster Lane
I Oakland, CA_94602-2614
I, Telephone: () 10) ~ou·-'tV
II'I
'7
Facsimile: (5iO) 530-4725
8 Email: jh@baelo.com
'Of Counsel to LAW OFFiCE OF EUGENE
9 j for Plaintiff
10 I F.
111 j
I;
UNITED I
II
12 r FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFOR<"lIA
13 1 I
14 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Case No. 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG 1
15 Plaintiff. PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTsl
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF II
16 v. MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLETE,
INITIAL DISCLOSURES FROM I
17 11 COUNTY OF KERN; lOt al. DEFENDANTS; REQUEST FOR I
SANCTIONS I
18 II Defendants.
.R.C.P. RIB lOs 26(a)(J) 37(a)]
19 I
Date: November 5, 2007
20 1 Time: 9:30 a.m.
Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroom
th
21 1300 18 St., Bakerstield, CA
22 Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007

Date Set for Trial: August 26, 2008
23
24
1 Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O., F.C.A.P., hereby submits this memorandum in support of its
25] motion to compel Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Eugene Kercher, Irwin Harris, Scott
26 J
Ragland, Jennifer Abraham, William Roy and Toni Smith to serve complete Initial Disclosures which
27
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(a)(I), and of its request for an award against
28
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITI.ES IN SUPPORT OF

j.
• MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 1
!
•
Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 36 of 60
Page 2 of 11
I Defendants and/or their counsel of fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this motion and
2 such other relief as the Court deems appropriate, pursuant to Rule 37(a).
3
I. CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH ATTEMPTS TO MEET AND CONFER
4
Plaintiff hereby certifies that he has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with
5
Defendants in an effort to secure the required disclosure without court action. Despite meet and confers
6
occurring from August 10 to September 20, 2007, Defendants have refused to sign or even negotiate a
~ I
have resoiv'ed
9 II made this final plea:

iI Forthe please reconsider Defendarlts' unreasonable refusal to reduce its
101 i agl'ee'ment to the' stipulation and order bv the rules above.
re:qw~stE:d
II
has provided Defendants the proposed stijJul:aticm
1 h
' 1.1 t em to
12 Defendants refused, stating "perhaps we should litigate" matter. has been ieft no
13 choice but to bring this motion to compel seeking fees and costs.
14
n. BACKGROUND
15
Plaintiff David Jadwin, D.O., F.CA.P., former Chair of Pathology at Kern Medical Center
16
, ("KMC") and senior pathologist since 2000, flied a Complaint on January 6, 2007. The Complaint
17
18
I
1'1
lj
alleges, among that Defendants engaged in the following illegal acts: whistleblower
II retaliation, discrimination, medical leave and retaliation, and pay

19 I
reduction without due process, and Fair Labor Standard Act violations. When Plaintiff began reporting
20
several patient care quality issues at KMC starting in 2001, Defendants responded by singling out and
21
targeting Plaintiff for harassment, retaliation and humiliation over the course of the next six years. In
22
2005, Defendants' conduct finally caused Plaintiff to suffer clinical depression. When Plaintiff began
23
reduced work schedule sick leave in 2006 to treat his depression, Defendants responded by demoting
24
him and retaliating against him further, effectively ending Plaintiff's pathology career.
25
On August 6,2007, the parties served Rule 26(a)(l) Initial Disclosures on each other.
26
On August 10, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants informing them that
27
Defendants' Initial Disclosures ("Disclosure I") were deficient in several respects. Later that day,
28 1
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTiONS 2
• Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 37 of 60
Page 4 of 11
1 Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. The email requested Defendants serve the signed
2 Stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by September 20.
3 On September 19, Defendants sent two replies to Plaintiffs email of September 18, stating
4 Defendants' refusal to sign or even negotiate the Stipulation, and instead offering an informal assurance
.5 that Defendants would provide "contact information for all fOl"m,,,·employees". Later that day, Plaintiff'
6 sent a meet and confer email to Defendants stating "I think the name-calling is unnecessary" and asking
7 II to given vagueness of Defendants' informal assurance.
8 II Defendants responded by citing "representations" they had made recently and in emails dating back to
9 I "at least if not March" They "1 am not going to take the time to iook for them because this
10 I is a waste of at refuses to someone it controls H"'''!iiD'''1

'I -
11 II to you. you can with it Defer,dants at one stated "ifthat is not enoujgh, bring your
12 I motion. Your contentiousness is tiring."
13 On September 20, Defendants sent an email to Plaintiff Slating "[t]he Stipulation you have sent
14 me is not necessary and nothing in the rules you cite is applicable. 1 know you enjoy disagreements but
15 cannot find one here. Remind me what the disagreement is. And what it is that needs to be compelled."
16 Later that day, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants stating ask you, not
17 the first (and probably not the last), please leave the personal insults out of our interactions." The
18 then ~A,~Wl!l!'U at length USDC LiJ'--r\ Rule 83-143 and FRCP Rule 29 reml;re
19 agreements between counsel which vary discovery procedures and deadlines be memorialized in a
20 written stipulation and order signed by the Court. Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. The
21 email slated that the deadline of September 20 remained and that Defendants should serve the signed
22 Stipulation and corrected Initial Disclosures by the close of business hours that day.
23 Plaintiff and Defendants went on to exchange three more meet and confer emails throughout the
24 day. Finally, Plaintiff stated:
25 For the last time, please reconsider Defendants' unreasonable refusal to reduce its
agreement to the required stipulation and order required by the rules cited above.
26 Plaintiff has repeatedly provided Defendants with the proposed stipulation and requested
them to either sign or propose amendments.
27
Attached to the email was the draft Stipulation. Defendants, however, refused to sign or negotiate the
28
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 4
•
Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 38 of 60
Page 5 of 11
Stipulation, stating "[i]f it is your position that there can be no agreements between counsel that are not
2 reduced to formal stipulation and order, then, perhaps we should litigate that."
3 As of the close of business hours on September 20, Defendants had served neither the signed
4 Stipulation nor complete Amended Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff.
5
HI. ARGUMENT
6
ENTITLED HOME CONTACT INFORMATION FOR ALL
DEFENDANTS' INITIAL DISCLOSURES
8 Rule 26(a)( I FRep provides that a party must, without awaiting a discovery request,
9 II to other parties: "the name if known, the address and telephone number of each
10 Ilikely to the party may use to support claims or

11 I defenses, unless tor nnnp"rh the subjects information, "
12 In their Initial Disclosures, Defendants have indicated only the address for Kern Medical Center
13 (and in some cases, the work phone number) as the contact information for those witnesses who are
14 Lcurrently employees of Defendant Kern County ("Witnesses') Plaintiff has requested the Witnesses'
15 ! home address and phone number, but Defendants have refused, contending that Rule 26 contains no
16 such requirement.
17 11 disclosure requirement contained in Rule 26(a)(I )(A) serves several important purposes, As
II
18
II
I court noted in Biltrite Corp v. World Rd Markings, Inc: I
I
19 The obvious purpose of the disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(I)(A), Fed, K eiv, p"
is to give the opposing party information as to the identification and location of persons
20 with knowledge so that they can be contacted in connection with the litigation, either for
purposes of serving a proposed amended complaint (as occurred in this case) or for
21 being interviewed or for being deposed or for doing background investigation,
202 F,RD, 359, 362 (D, Mass, 2001)
22
To facilitate such purposes, Rule 26(a)(l)(A) mandates disclosure oftlie home address and
23
phone number of witnesses, As Moore's Federal Practice states: "Furthenmore, if some or all of the
24
identified individuals are employees of the disclosing party, their home addresses and telephone
25
numbers must be disclosed. The disclosing party does not satisfy its initial disclosure obligation by
26
providing only its business address and telephone number, even for current employees with
27
managerial responsibilities, unless the disclosing party knows of no other address or telephone number,"
28

•
Document 69
Documenl49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2.007
Page 39 of 60
Page 6 of 11
I 6-26 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 26.22 (emphasis added).
2 Likewise, in Dixon v. CertainTeed Corp., the court expressly held that disclosure of only
3 business addresses for witnesses does not satisfy the obligation under Rule 26(a)(l). 164 F.R.D. 685, I
4 688 - 689 (D. Kan. 1996). Defendants have contended in meet and confers that Dixon is distinguishable I
,5 because the employer had refused to produce its employees, thereby compelling plaintiff to seek their . I
6 home addresses so he could directly contact them. In contrast, Defendants claim they are offering to
7 II procluce emj)lo)'ces upon as nr0.,,;;:P contact inf()rm for employees
II who may leave.

9 I In focusing on an ins:igiliticaJ1t facet pattern, Defendants misinterpret Dixon
II court's hoJdmg, Dixon comi (pCllNJ the as
11 II i~'!~~r! initially 31 individuals to discoverable information. it

has subsequently identified other such individuals. has not disclosed, however, the
12 addresses or telephone numbers of current employees. It contends that Rule 26(a) does
not require such disclosure. In a novel approach it cites correspondence between counsel
13 for the parties as support for such proposition. The cited "authority" consists only of a
collection of letters between counsel. They contain no legal citation for the proposition
14 plaintiff asserts.
Id at 688.
15 IAbsent from the court's recitation is any reference to the employer's willingness or unwillingness to
16
!
Iproduce employees to the plaintiff. In the very next sentences, the court immediately went on to hold:
17 11 Identification individuals pursuant to Fed. R. . 26(a)(1) includes providing their
18 !/ addresses and telephone numbers, if known. The rule expressly states as much. Pursuant
19 I to Rule 26(a)(1), therefore, CertainTeed shail disclose the addresses and telephone
numbers of ail the identified employees. It may not satisfy this obligation by
disclosing its bnsiness address and phone number, unless it knows of no other
20 address and number.
164 F.R.D. 685, 688 - 689 (D. Kan. 1996) (emphasis added).
21
In short, FRCP Rule 26(a)(l)(A) entitles Plaintiffto the home addresses and phone numbers of
22
the Witnesses. Doing so facilitates Plaintiff's investigation of such Witnesses, service of documents
23
upon them, informal interviews of them, etc. Defendants' willingness to produce such Witnesses does
24
not, and should not, bear on Plaintiffs right to such home contact information.
25
26 B. ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO A STIPULATION,

DEFENDANTS REFUSE TO SIGN, OR EVEN NEGOTIATE, A WRITTEN
27 STIPULATION AND ORDER AS IS REQUIRED BY THE FRCP AND LOCAL
RULES
28

•
Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 40 of 60
Page 7 of 11
1. Despite Plaintiff s Right to Obtain the Home Contact Information for the Witnesses,
Plaintiff Proposed a Written Stipulation so as to Avert this Motion
2
Although Plaintiff has a right to obtain the home contact information for the Witnesses, Plaintiff
3
attempted compromise by proposing the draft Stipulation early on to Defendants. The Stipulation
4
required Defendants to produce home contact information for Witnesses only when they leave
5
employment with Defendant Kern County. In exchange, Defendants would be obligated to produce
6
I Witnesses for deposition and/or trial upon Plaintiff s request.
7
Defendants agreed in pnnciple the conclusion meet and process
8
Plaintiff s numerous requests to sign or negotiate the written Stipulation, asserting "it is unnecessary".
9
2.
10
11
II'I
However, the rules state nttlPr·w!<:e Rule 29 of the FRCP ("Stipulations Re2:ardin Discovery
12
Procedure") provides:
13 I Unless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipulation (I)
14 provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon
any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like other depositions,
15
I and (2) modiry other procedures governing or limitations placed upon discovery,
except that stipulations extending the time provided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for
16 I responses to discovery may, if they would interfere with any time set for completion of
discovery, for hearing of a motion, or for trial, be made only with the approval of the
17 court.
(Emphasis
18 II1
Defendants argued in meet and confers that 29 does not apply because the parties are not
19
varying discovery procedures. However, this is not correct.
20
Rule 30(a) states in relevant part: 'The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena
21
as provided in Rule 45." Rule 45(b) states in relevant part: "Service of a subpoena shall be made by
22
delivering a copy thereof to such person ....". Defendants' offer to accept service of deposition
23
subpoenas on behalf of the Witnesses and to compel their attendance at depositions varies the deposition
24
subpoena service procedures set forth in Rules 30(a) and 45(b). Therefore such offer falls under the
25
ambit of Rule 29.
26
Defendants further argued in meet and confers that Rule 29 is permissive rather than mandatory,
27
focusing on the word "may". However, the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 29 suggest otherwise:
28

Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG •
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 41 of 60
Page 8 of 11
"[ilt is common practice for parties to agree on such variations, and the amendment recognizes such
2 agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for giving them effect." Advisory Com. com.,
3 U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules eiv Proc. Rule 29.
4 Moreover, at least one leading treatise has stated: "Although counsel may honor oral stipulations,
.5 discovery procedures and deadlines can be modified only by a stipulation in writing. [FRCP 29J."
I
6 \. Hittner, Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2007) § ]]: ] ]98
7 ,III \,Illp""""
8 III local rules of this also govern this discussion. In particular the local rule regarding
9 .1 stipulations states in part:
10 II!I a deposition and set in the

]] Ii transcript
m propna persona
except as otherwise required by Fed. R.
writinll' signed by all attorneys or parties
action are by stipulation,
P. 41 (a)(1), and filed, or (2) made in open
]2 court and noted by the courtroom deputy clerk upon the minutes or by the court reporter
in the notes, or (3) recited in a pretrial or other court order. Stipulations not in
13 conformity with these requirements will not be recognized unless necessary to
prevent manifest injustice.
14 I U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Cal., Local Rules, rule 83-]43.
]5 I Local rule 83-143 goes on to state that stipulations must be approved by Court orthey "are not
16 i effective".
]7 1 ]n short, because parties have proposed a variation in discovery procedure - i.e., the method
II
] 8 I of service of deposition subpoenas on Witnesses - 29 requires the parties enter
19 stipulation. Local rule 83-]43 similarly requires stipulations to be in writing and further requires the
20 parties to convert the stipulation into a signed court order.

21
C. DEFENDANTS AND/OR THEIR COUNSEL SHOULD PAY PLAINTIFF'S
22 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
23 F.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(I) makes sanctions mandatory where a party has failed to make initial
24 disclosures:
25 A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by

Rule 26(a) ... is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a
26 trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to
27 be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions
28 may include any of the sanctions authorized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C) and
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG •
Document 49
•
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 42 of 60
Page 9 of 11
I may include informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure.
2 Moreover, the party who prevails on a motion to compel is entitled to reasonable attorney fees
3 and costs, unless the losing party was substantially justified in making or opposing the motion or other
4 circumstances make such an award unjust. Hittner, Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil
5 Procedure Before Trial (2007) § ] I: 2380, citing PRCP 37(a)(4); H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear Tir1
6 I & Rubber Co. 536 F2d I I 15, 1124-1125 (6th eiL 1976). I
7 II or intent" not shown in stand:~rd i
8 \1 is whether there was "substantial justification" for the losing party's conduct. PRep 37(a)(4); Reygo I
9 II Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co. 680 647. 649 (9th 1982); Sheppard v. River Valley Fitness .1
10 lOne, IP 428 L 1 i (l 5t Cir. facing the has the hllr<1en of nrr.vir""

I•• ,aUMHJm
I] to cOlnplly was ",,!Jp,i' or "h'in"lp·,," Yeti by 1V1U·tty. Ltd v. Deckers Outdoor
12 Corp. 259 F. 3d 1101, 1106 (9'h Cir.2001); see also Wilson v. Brad/ees a/New England, Inc. 250 F.3d
13 10,21 (I" CiL 2001)). Absent such proof, the court should impose sanctions. This "provides a strong
14 inducement for disclosure of materia! that the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence." Adv.
15 Comm. Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1993) 146 FRD 40J, 691.
16 This motion would not have been necessary had Defendants simply been willing to negotiate and
17 I sign the written Stipulation with Plaintiff. Plaintiff can only speculate as to why Defendants were so
I
J 8 I categorically opposed to memorializing agreements in a written stipulation.
19 This dispute began with Plaintiff s offer to enter into a written stipulation. Several times during
20 the meet and confer process, Plaintiff sent Defendants the draft written Stipulation for their review and
21 signature. Defendants, however, refused to negotiate or sign the Stipulation. Defendants instead issued
22 ultimatums, stating their unilateral intention to produce current employees upon Plaintiff's request but
23 refusing to commit to anything beyond that.

24 By the same token, Plaintiff has good reason not to rely on Defendants' unilateral
25 "representations". Since even the beginning of this action, Defendants have continued to bully, ridicule
26 and retaliate against Plaintiff, and have repeatedly failed to honor his work-related requests. For
27 instance, on July 4, 2007, after Defendants had informed Plaintiff that Defendant Kern County did not
28 intend to renew his employment contract {due to expire on October 4, 2007), Plaintiff requested

MOTION TO COMPEL INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND REQUESTFOR SANCTIONS 9
Case 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG • Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 43 of 60
Page 10 of 11
I permission to retrieve his personal belongings, including valuable medical books, which had
2 accumulated in his office during the last seven years. After almost 3 months of repeated emails, letters
3 and entreaties by Plaintiff, Defendants continue to withhold Plaintiffs personal belongings from him.
4 Worst of all, Defendants have refused to give Plaintiff any explanations, despite his numerous requests
5 I for one.
6.1 It is In this context that Plaintiffs unwillingness to rely on Defendants' "representations" should
7 "be and offers are the latest
j'
8 Ii
d
examples of the harassing and retaliatory behavior Defendants have on Plaintiff.
9 II requests Court sanction Defendants andlor their counsel award Plaintiff attorney
10 II fees in the amount of m of I of the hours Mr. Eugene Lee and I ofthe hours
11 I, Ms. Joan meeting and to avoid this 2
I
12 Mr. Lee and 2 ofthe hours Ms. Herrington spent or anticipate spending in bringing this motion. Ms.
13 Herrington's and Mr. Lee's regular rates for such services are $500 and $400 per hour, respectively. Lee
Dec!. at ~ 16; Herrington Dec!. at ~ 3.
IV. CONCLUSION
17
II For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court (I) compel Defendants to
I serve Wll1""CCC disclose the home addresses and phone numbers of

18 I
witnesses therein pursuant to 26(a)(i and order Defendants andlor their
]9
counsel to pay Plaintiff $2,700 for attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred in bringing this motion,
20
pursuant to Rule 37(a).
21
II
22
II
23
II
24
II
25
II
26
II
27
/11
28

•
Document 69
Document 49 •
Filed 10/31/2007
Filed 09/24/2007
Page 44 of 60
Page 11 of 11
Respectfully submitted on September 24, 2007.
2
3 lsi Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812
4 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90013
5 Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487 I,
6 Email: elee!alLOEL.com
7 Joan SB# 178988 "hn.fn,.,4 on 9/24/07)1

BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT ~7 ,nn
I
••
5032 Woodminster Lane

8 Oakland, CA 94602-2614
9 I Telephone: (510) 530-4078
Facsimile: (510) 530-4725
101 jh@baelo.com
11
I !
Counsel to
Attorneys for n L ' , ' C £
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER
3 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
4 E-mail: mwasserlalmarkwasseLcom
5 Bernard C. Barmann, Sf.
KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
.\1115 Truxton Avenue, Fourth
i Phone: (661) 8608-3~00
8 I Fax: (661) 868-~80)
9 IIE-mail: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
I
i Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern,
Peter Bryan, Irwin Harris, Eugene Kercher,
I[
I
11 ,Jennifer Abraham, Scott Ragland, Smith
12 III and
15 I
16 I DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG
)
17 1\ Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF I
) POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
18 II vs. )
)
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL!
I
1911 COUNTY KERN, et aI., ) Date: November 5. 2007
Time: 9:30 a.m. .
I
)
20 Defendants. ) Place: U.S. Bankruptcy Courthouse,
~)
Bakersfield Courtroom 8
21
Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
22 ) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
)
23 ------------)
24 Defendants respectfully submit this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff s motion to
25 compeL
26 I. DEFENDANTS' HAVE FULLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 26(a)(1)(A)
27 Despite having been provided with addresses and telephone numbers for all County
28
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AN
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPE
1
I employees who may be witnesses in this case as well as the Defendants' writtenrepresentations
2 that all employees will be made available to Plaintiff upon request, that Defendants will provide
3 Plaintiff with contact information on all employees who leave County employment during the
4 pendency of this case, and that Defendants' counsel will accept service of all process and notices
5 on behalf of all Defendants and employees and ensure their availability, Plaintiff asserts that
6 Defendants have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(a)(l)(A), Plaintiffs assertion is so'
7 groundless as to call into question Plaintiffs good-faith,
i
8 II states a ,cc,vel'V request, to
other parties "the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
,: I to discoverab Ie
II initial disclosures thr.mn
12 and completely satisfied Rule, Detendants not only nrr1V1i1"ri addresses
13 and telephone numbers for every employee, they provided additional, written, representations, as
14 described above, A copy of the transmittal letter that contained Defendants' representations in
15 this regard is attached to the Declaration of Mark A Wasser in Opposition to Motion to CompeL
161 The clear policy behind Rule 26(a)(1 )(A) is to inform the opposing party of potential
17 i witnesses and provide sufficlent information to make them available, Defendants fully satisfied
18 ,both the Rule, lai'ntiJ'fls pre:selltly in possession ofthe """"ai,
19 individual, addresses and telephone numbers for each employee who Defendants have initially
20 identified as a potential witness, Plaintiff is also in possession of the Defendants' written

21 promise to provide contact information on employees who leave employment during this case
22 and make each and every employee available upon request and to accept service of all process
23 and notices on their behalf.

24 Not satisfied, Plaintiff insists he is entitled to "home" addresses for the employees. For
25 authority, Plaintiff relies on a 1996 District Court decision from Kansas, Dixon v, Certain Teed
26 Corp" 164 F,R.D, 685, (Plaintiff also cites Moore's Federal Practice but the language in
27 Moore's is supported only by CertainTeed and, thus, is not additional authority, (See 6-26
28 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 26,22, fn, 23).

2
1 Interestingly, the Certain Teed court did not actually order disclosure of "home"
2 addresses. It simply ordered the employer to "disclose the addresses and telephone numbers of
3 its current employees." Dixon v. Certain Teed Corp., 164 F.R.D. 685, 693. This, of course, is
4 I consistent with the language in Rule 26(a)(l)(A) which does not reference "home" addresses at
5 all. It is doubtful that the Certain Teed decision brings any weight to bear on this issue and,
6 ironically, it actually underscores the absence of support for Plaintiffs position.
7 In Certainteed, the employer refused to provide addresses or telephone numbers for any
8 I employees them employer only ""'ClU'"''
91 address and phone number" (Jd. at 689) contending that the plaintiff could not contact the
101 employees any way (Id. at 688) complaining that disclosing additional addresses would
11 Inc:reilse the em.pJ()yer s dis:coVel"Y costs. at p. 687.
12 facts are a world away. the ~~,~"uumo not fully disclosed the
13 addresses and telephone numbers of all employees, the addresses and telephone numbers the
14 Defendants provided are the individual employees' actual work addresses and telephone
15 numbers· not general addresses or telephones for the employer. Those disclosures, alone, fully
16 satisfy Rule 26. But the Defendants provided more. The Defendants accompanied their
17 disclosures of the employee addresses and telephone numbers with commitments to provide all
18 ! employees upon request to accept service of process notices for Defendants

19 employees and to provide updated eontact information on departing employees. By any
20 measure, this is several steps beyond what Rule 26 requires.

21 One might ask, "Why did Plaintiff file his motion?"
22 There is another issue. As is more fully explained in Defendants' motion for protective
23 order filed herewith (and set for hearing at the same time as this motion), County employees
24 object to disclosing their home addresses to Plaintiff on grounds of privacy and personal safety.
25 Dr. Jennifer Abraham, for example, does not want Plaintiff to know where she lives. She
26 mentions Plaintiff s physical assault on another physician at Kern Medical Center and his verbal
27 assaults on her and expresses safety concerns for her children and family. See Declaration of
28 Jennifer Abraham in Support of Motion for Protective Order. Other employees do not want
3
Plaintiff to know where they live and express their own safety and privacy concerns. See
2 Declarations of Jane Thornton, Denise Long, Toni Smith and Michelle Burris. Defendants could
3 provide many additional declarations to the Court but did not want to burden the Court with
4 multiple, redundant statements.

5 Plaintiff has actual contact information for every employee identified in Defendants'
6 initial disclosures. Plaintiff has Defendants' promise to make them all available on request.
7 II Plaintiff even has Defendants' offer to accept service of all notices and process. Defendants'
8 i I disclosures go substantially is Rule 26.
9 DEFENDANT'S SHOULD RECOVER THEIR RESONABLE ATTORJ'lEY

FEES INCURRED IN OPPOSING THIS MOnON
10 1.
I' PI"intiff"ffiotJon is a waste Court's a waste
Jl II reasonable attorney fees opposmg
12 Iresources. Defendants ""JUJU be awarded ineBr,-pc!
13 m. CONCLUSION
14 Defendants' request that the Court deny Plaintiffs motion to compel and award
15 Defendants' their reasonable attorney fees.
16 Respectfully submitted,
17
18 I 9, A. WASSER
I
19
20 By: /s/ Mark A. Wasser
Mark A. Wasser
21
Attorney for Defendants, County of Kern, et al.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
AUTHORlTIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPE
4
1 Mark A. Wasser CA SB #060160

LAW OFFlCES OF MARK A. WASSER
3 Phone: (916) 444-6400
Fax: (916) 444-6405
4 E-mail: mwassenwmarkwasser.com
5 Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.
KERN COUNTY COUNSEL
,6 Mark Nations, Chief Deputy
1115 Truxton Avenue, Fourth
Phone: (661) 868-3800
8 (661) 868-3805
E-mail: mnations@co.kern.ca.us
11
12
15
16 DAVIn F. JADWIN, D.O. ) Case No.: 1:07-cv-00026-0WW-TAG
)
17 Plaintiff. ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
18 Ys. ) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A
,.
II
~)
PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: HOME
19 . COUNTY OF KERN, et aL. ADDRESSES
20 Defendants. ) Date: November 5, 2007
) Time: 9:30 a.m. (date cleared by eRD)
21 ) Place: U.S. Bankruptcy Courthouse,
) Bakersfield Courtroom 8
~
22
Date Action Filed: January 6, 2007
23 ) Trial Date: August 26, 2008
)
24
-------------)
25
26 Defendants submit this memorandum in support of their motion for a protective order
27 preventing the disclosure or discovery of employee home addresses to Plaintiff David Jadwin.
28
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REI EMPLOYEES' HOME ADDRESSE
1
1 I. THIS COURT MAY ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER ON A SHOWING

OF GOOD CAUSE
2
3 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows issuance of a protective order
4 to limit disclosure or discovery, Foltz 11, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance, 331 F3d 1122,
5 1 1130 (9th CiL 2003),
6 I The party seeking a protective order has the burden of establishing good cause sufficient
7 to justifY' the protection requested, Id, Generally, the party must show that specific prejudice or
8 II
GOOD CAUSE EXSISTS FOR ISSUANCE OF A Dn£VT'vr'v
91' ORDER
III
12
address
re(mires Defendants to disclose to
individual to have
name and, if Knc,wn
r11Scm'c,e
the case, Defendants have done that Defendants have disclosed to Plaintiff the name, address
13
and telephone number of each County employee who may be a witness in this case, The
14
addresses and telephone numbers that have been disclosed are the employees' actual- individual
15
- work addresses and telephone numbers, All potential witnesses are available at the addresses
16
that have been provided and through Defendants legal counsel,
17
18 II to the disclosures, Defendants have provided Plaintiff written assurances
19
II that employees will be available to upon request, Defendants will nrr,vlcie
1
Plaintiff with contact infonnation on any employees who leave County employment during the
20
pendency of this case and that Defendants' counsel will accept service of all process and notices
21
on behalf of all Defendants and employees to ensure their availability to Plaintiff
22
The disclosures fully comply with Rule 26 and the assurances Defendants have provided
23
go substantially beyond the requirements of Rule 26, Plaintiff has more than he is entitled to
24
under the Rule,
25
Despite this, Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel disclosure of "home" addresses,
26
There is no justification for disclosing home addresses and the Defendants and employees object
27
to doing so, Hence, Defendants seek a protective order to protect the home addresses,
28

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: EMPLOYEES' HOME ADDRESSE
2
1 Filed herewith are the declarations of Jennifer Abraham, Toni Smith, Michelle Burris,
2 Denise Long and Jane Thorton. All five individuals are Kern County employees and work at
3 Kern Medical Center where Plaintiff used to work. They all know Plaintiff and had substantial
4 contact with him during the course of his employment. For reasons of safety and privacy, they
5 do not want Plaintiff to know where they live.
,6 Jennifer Abraham is a physician. Her declaraiion recites that Plaintiff assaulted her
7 verbally several times and physically assaulted another physician at Kern Medical Center. She
8 II had several to
9 . and arrogant and does not trust him. She has privacy and safety concerns for children and
1OJ family and does not want Plaintiff to where she is available at her work address
11 and can be COJutacte:c UUV,A"U De:fellcants counsel.

I
12 ! hornton IS a '111')prV1<,nr m Pathology Laboratory where Plzlinliffused to
13 She considers him to be emotional and confrontational and does not want Plaintiff to know
14 where she lives. She considers her personal life to be private. She is available at the work
15 address that has been disclosed and through Defendants' legal counsel.
16 The other three employee, Toni Smifh, Michelle Burris and Denise Long, all recite I
17 privacy concerns and a desire to keep their work lives separate from their personal lives. None ,Ill
18 i of want and all are available at work addresses and

!
19 through Defendants' legal counsel. \:
20 Defendants believe every employee listed in the initial disclosures would express similar
21 concerns if asked. Defendants only submitted fivc declarations for efficiency reasons.
22 Protecting employee home addresses will not prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff has actual
23 addresses for every employee witness. Plaintiff also has individual telephone numbers. He has
24 the Defendants' assurances that all the employees will be made available. He has, in short,
25 guaranteed access to every employee witness. There is no reason to order superfluous
26 disclosures of redundant personal address information, certainly not in the face of the privacy
27 and safety concerns that have been expressed.
28

3
1 Plaintiff has alleged a hostile work environment. The Defendants have alleged that, to
2 the extent the work environment was hostile, Plaintiff was responsible for it. Emotions continue
3 to run strong over Plaintiff s behavior at Kern Medical Center. Several employees remain afraid
4 of him. There is no reason to risk taking those emotions from the workplace and injecting them
5 into individual, private lives - certainly not when Rule 26 has been fully satisfied through the
6 disclosures that have been made. One might ask why Plaintiff is so determined to learn where
7 individual employees live when he already has complete information with which to contact them.1
8 Ii I
I I
I:
IS UNREASONABLE
,ill Although Defendants have attempted to resolve home address dispute through a I
I ' I
11 I, ill prolonged eXCII1aJnge of correspondence counsel, issue remains unresolved andj
I
IPhlintiff's ucmam,o have become more extreme as I
13 unfolded. Plaintiff continues to seek an order compelling disclosure of home addresses as well
14 as sanctions against Defendants for refusing to disclose them. Despite the meet-and-confer
15 process on the initial disclosures, Plaintiff has just served a request for production of documents
16 on Defendants that also seeks discovery of home addresses. Plaintiff s position is manifestly not I
good faith and is entirely unjustified.
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR RESONABLE

:: I
ATTORNEYS ""''''0
19
Because Plaintiff is continuing to insist on disclosures and discovery that exceeds what is
20
required by Rule 26 or the discovery rules and in light of the concerns that employees at Kern
21
Medical Center still harbor over Plaintiff s behavior and their personal safety, Defendants have
22
no alternative but to seek protection of their home addresses. Defendants should be awarded
23
their reasonable attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting this motion.
24
III
25
III
26
III
27
/II
28
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORlTIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REI EMPLOYEES' HOME ADDRESSE
4
1 Wherefore, Defendants request that this Court grant a protective order protecting the
2 home addresses of County employees from disclosure or discovery to Plaintiff.
4 Respectfully submitted,
Dated: October 12, 2007 LAW OFFICES OF MARK A. WASSER
Mark Wasser
Attorney for Defendants, County of Kern, et aL
19
20
21
22·
23
24
25
26
27
28

5
ATTACHMENT B
10: narK wasser e ~Ib-qqq- ..., r~ .JI U IV/LU/Uf ..,; 11.1 pm
Attorneys for Defendants County of Kern, Peter Bryan, Hams, Eugene Kercher, JeMuer
Abraham, Scott Ragland, Toni Smith, and William Roy.
20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
21
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
22
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Civil Action No. 1:07-cv·00026 OWW TAG
23
Plaintiff, JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY
24 v. DISAGREEMENT
25 COUNTY OF KERN, et ai" Date: November 5, 2007

Time: 9:30 a.m.
26 Defendants. Place: U.S. District Court, Bankruptcy Courtroo
1300 18th St., Bakersfield, CA
27
Complaint Filed: January 5, 2007
28 Trial Date: August 26. 2008
USDC, ED Case No. I :07·cv·00026 OWW TAG
JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT I
10: narK wasser e ~Ib-qqq-bqwo r~ '11 0 IfJl LOflH .,; 10 JIRf
I This joint statement rei discovery disagreement is submitted pursuant to Local Rule 37-251(a) in
2 advanoe of the November 5, 2007 hearing on Defendants' motion for protective order.
3 I. DETAILS OF THE PARTIES' DISCOVERY CONFERENCES.
4 Pursuant to Local Rule 37-Z51(b), the parties have met lllld conferred by email and letter an
5 to elilnil1late the necessity a hearing on Defendants' m01lion to
6 eliminate as many of the issues as possible. In spite ofthese efforts, the tollloWlll~
7 I: unresolved.
8 I' to
) I o!sp1J1:eo
I aod are atto,ol",d to
II statement lle.l1lmd
12 n. A STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL DISPUTES.
Plalntlff David F, JadWi!1, former of Pathology at Medical Center
14 ("KMC") lllld senior pathologist since 2000, filed a Complaint on January 6, Z007. The Compllaitlt
15 alleges whistleblower reUilllall0l0, IlJ,S/"nmy discl'iminatioltl, medical leave and payroll vm,Il""ms,
16 demotion pey reduction w,lhmll due prooess. Plaintiff contends that Defendants ret'aliated against
17 I patient care qualmy at creating a lloiltl!e
II enV'IT01nmilnt. As a
Plaintiff Wall 011 leave, Defendants demoted him for "unavailability"; refused to reinstate and
20 retaliated against him further, effectively ending Plaintiff's pathology career.
21 Defendants contend that the dispute arose out of Plaintiff's tenure as a pathologist at Kern
22 Medical Center. Plaintiffs relationship with other members ofthe medical staff deteriorated to the point
23 of intimidation, hostility and antagonism. Defendants contend, to the extent that any hostile work
24 environment existed, it was caused by Plaintiff,
25 The parties have made their initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(l). The Defendants' initial
26 disclosures included, among other things, a list of possible witnesses,

27 Plaintiff objected to Defendant's initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(IXA) on the grounds that
28 Defendants had failed to disclose the home contact information of certain witnesses. Instead, Defendants
USDC, ED Case No. I:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT 2
trOl: Lilli utflee or tlJ9llI1" LOO r~ ;J/O IU/LOlfU "1;10 jJIll.
1 had indicated: "Kern Medical Center, 1830 Flower Street, Bakersfield, CA 93305", In some cases,
2 Defendants also indicated the work telephone numbers.
3 Defendants stated that Rule 26 did not require such disclosure, Defendants offered their informal
4 "assurances" and "representations" that each and employee be made available to Plaintiff,
5 m!onnal mt~:rvj.ew or deposition, that Defendants' cot!nsl~l would aC"~I" service
6 notices md process on behalf of all employees and that Defendants would provide Plaintiff updated
7 contsct infDm,ation, to eldent lm,owa on LUIIXUY em,ployment dmi"" the
~
I
:
I
of him or intim"dated do not
I:
11 "
12 Plaintiff stated that it was willing to forego home contact infonnation for the witnesses if
13 Defendants were to reduce lheir representations to a written stipulation lhat KMC would provide
home address of employee independent contractor who left KMC in. sufficient for I:lamnrr
personally.
Deterldllnts refused to negotiate II stipulation, then projpos':d a dnft stipulation, Ho,vev':L
AS
20 The contested issue is whether Defendants are obligated under FRCP Rule 26(aXI )(A) to
21 disclose the home addresses of disclosed witnesses for whom KMC's business address (and in. some
22 cases, business telephone number) have been disclosed.
23
Defendants' Contentions
24
Defendants contend that Rule 26(a)(I) requlres disclosure of contact information that allows
25
access to potential witnesses. Defendants have fully complied with the Rule and, in addition, have
26
coupled their disclosures with representations that all employees will be available to Plaintiff upon
27
request.
28
USDC. ED Case No. 1:07·cv·00026 OWW TAG
ff VII; LOM un 11ft> UI L~IIC I..tAi r~ VI U UJlLU/Vf "1; IU }IIII
1 PlaIntiff's Contentions
2 Plaintiff contends that Rule 26 requires Defendants to disclose the home contact information for
3 its disclosed wimesses.
4 It is well-settled that Rule 26(a)(I)(A) entitles Plailutiff contact infornlatiiorl

5 Defendllllts·" disclosed wiml:sses. ''''[lUll has already
,
6 Isome or all of the identified individuals are employees ofthe disclosing party, their home addresses lIIld
7 I -, numbers mwt be disclosed. not itB initial disclosure
9 jCorp.
10 I ' id",,,tifi,,d employe.'•. It may "ot soti"fv disclosi:ng its
11 I h"""4«adllress nUfnbllf, u" I~I« it K!le'ws

12 The requirement to disclose home addresses of witnesses came again before the U.S. District
13 Court for tbe District of Kansas in 1999. Not surprisingly, tbe court reached tbe same conclusion: tbat
14 defll!ldants have a to disclose home co!ltac! information for witnesses under FRCP ""r 0 '.(1
15 The court cited Cer/alr/Teed support:
The identified former and current employees directly worked on the loan betwe~m
plaintiffs and Heartland is subject litigatIoll [.... l Such mdivHiuals
~
J:;~ to hllve informlltion relevant to disputed fllcts 11ll1:ged
1'" R. p, thm requires Heartland to disclose k.l1c.~'ll
III _~, and telephone awaitmg a discovery request. 'It may not
satisfY obligatlon by disclosing its business address and phone number, unless it
19 knows of no other address and number.' Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 164 F.RD, 685,
689 (D. Kan. 1996). Rule 26(a)(1)(A) contemplates disclosure of the personal
20 address and telephone nwnber of identified individuals.
1999 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7814 (D. Kan. 1999) (emphasis added).
21
The great weight of legalllllthority recognizes Plaintiff's need for and right to home contac!
22
information for Defendants' witnesses.
23
Plaintiff also objects to Defendants' declarations. Defendants submit five declarations in support
24
oftbeir motion. Putting aside the fact that one declarant, Dr. Abraham, is a named defendant in tbis
25
action, Plaintiff objects that two ofthe declarations contain inadmissible testimony as follows:
26
27
28
US DC, ED Case No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
trUII: Law un IGt: or t.U~Ht: Lt:t: r~ fI 0 IfJlLOIfH '1:10 I-""
I
Declaration ofJennifer Abraham in Lacks foundation: declarant fails to provide any facts
2 Support ofDefendants ' Motion for establishing tha! declarant has persona! knowledge oftbese
3
Protective Order (Doc, 59, 2:3),
"Dr, Jadwin is emotional,
I facts and/or is competent to testify concerning them,
Cc:nclusory and invades the province ofthe jury: declarant
4 (Doc, 59,2:4) Lacks foundation: declarant fails to provide any facts
"he physically assaulted at least one establishing that she lIlIll personal knowledge of these
5 other physician at Kern Nle'CllClU and!or is competent to testilY concerning them, including
Center." whether declarant Wllll a percipient witness to such alleged
6 assault
8
(Doc, Lacks foundation: declarant fails to any facts
9 "He establishing declalant has llersorJ,lll knowledge ~c,,"'~~,~
are weliker anclior is competent to them,
10 invades the declllnoot
11
12
Declaration ofJane Thornton in I Lat:ks foundation: declarant fails to provide any facts
13 Support ofDefendants' Motionfor , establlshmg that declarant has persoilal knowledge ofthe56
Protective Order, (Doc, 63, 2:7·8)
14 "Further, having observed Dr, Jadwin's II facts and/or is competent to testify concerning them.
Conclusory and invades the province ofthejury:
behavior at Kern Medical I Ifails to cite facts,
15 know
. .
is II person who Clm become
. " ,
16
concerns, As the court stated in Bell v, Swifl & "[Rule 26] provides expressly that discovery may be
20 had concerning 'the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts', One of the
21 purposes of this provision is to allow all parties equal access to the relevant facts," 283 F. 2d 407, 409
22 (5th Cif. 1960) (emphasis added),
23 Here, Defendants have access to the home contact informa!ion and telephone numbers ofthe
24 disclosed witnesses; Plaintiff does not Under Rule 26, Dafendants are required to share this
25 information with Plaintiff.
26 As for Defendants' "representations" and "assurances", Plaintiff is unable to rely on them,
27 USDC EDCA Local Rule 83.143 and FRCP Rule 29 require agreements between COlUlsel which
28 vary discovery procedures and deadlines be memorialized in a written stipula!ion and order signed by
US DC, ED Case No, 1:07·cv·00026 OWW TAG
10: narK wasser l!' ~Hb-qqq-O'tro r::t Uf U IVfLUIVI "1; III pm
I the Court. Defendants' "representation" that Defendants' counsel wOlild accept service of all notices and
2 process on behalf of all employees represents l\ variance of deposition service procedures. Second, given
:3 the retaliatory conduct Defendants have exhibited throughout this action - includillg refusing to return
4 his personal items to more than :3 months mer had asked to retrieve them from his office,
5 illstructed to go to Kern Medical Cellter over IOO-mile drive) at an appointed
6 pernollal files from his computer ollly to thell be refused and forced to return home empty-handed -
7 Plaintiff is not to
8 II
9
II
12 be resolved without assistance from the Court.
13
14
16
17 MARK
18
By:
Mar·k-A.,......,.W ""a-ss-e-r-------------
20 Attorney for Defendants
COUNTY OF KERN, PETER BRYAN, IRWIN
21 HARRIS, EUGENE KERCHER, JENNIFER
ABRAHAM, SCOTT RAGLAND,TONI SMITH,
22 AND WILLIAM ROY
23
Dated: October_, 2007 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
24
25
By:
26 Eug-e-ne---"'D'.rr:e"CCe- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Attorney for Plaintiff
27 DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
28
US DC, ED Case No. I:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG

69 MX Protective Order - Inability To File Joint Statement

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Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 69 Filed 10/31/2007 Page 1 of 60

1 Mark A. Wasser CA SB # 60160

5 Bernard C. Barmann, Sr.

13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

14 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORJ"<"IA

DECLARATION OF MARK A. WASSER RE: INABILITY TO PREPARE AND

1 I, Mark A. Wasser, deelare as follows:

18 ,information all employee witnesses.

20 6. The issue presented by the discovery disagreement is whether Plaintiff is entitled

23 Defendants' written representations to produce them on request.

25 Executed this 3151 day of October, 2007, in Sacramento, California.

DECLARATION OF MARK A. WASSER RE: INABILITY TO PREPARE AND

Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812

JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT

17 for County employees who were listed in the initial disclosures.

18 Copies parties proposed stipulations correspondence is attached to joint

19 statement behind Tab A

20 It A Statement of the Nattire ofthe Case.

23 Act, California Family Rights Act and defamation.

28 seeks unspecified damages for personal injury.

JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT

9 found disclosures unacceptable and rejected Defendants' written

24 employees will be available to Plaintiff upon request.

26 the other addresses that have been disclosed.

JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT

.6 October _ _. 2007 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE

JOINT STATEMENT RE: DISCOVERY DISAGREEMENT

Re: Jadwin v. COUllty ofKern, et al.

Dear Mr. Lee:

Admitted m Practice in California and Nevada

cc: Karen Bames

From: Mark Wasser [mailto:mwasser@markwasser.com]

From: Eugene D. lee [mallto:elee@lOEl.com]

From: Mark Wasser [mwasser@markwasser.com]

From: Mark Wasser [mwasser@markwasser.com]

We are not to evade anything. I am flabbergasted at this dispute.

This does not warrant the time we are spending on it.

From: Joan Herrington [mallto:jh@baelo.com]

Sent: Thursday, september 20, 2007 2: 17 PM

Cc: Gene Lee

lv1ark Wasser 100011.001

Re: Defendants? lvlotion for Protective Order

ce: Joan Herrington, Esq.

LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE

22 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

24 J DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., Civil Action No. 1:07-cv.Q0026 OWW TAG

25 Plaintiff, STIPULATION RE HOME CONTACT

8 Independent contractors, such as Da"/id CUlberson, shaH DOl be de-emed 10 be

13 Defendants Jist as witnesses in their Initial and any Amended or Supplemental

Kern that Defendants as 'witnesses in their Inltial and ful)! Amended or

Supplemental Disclosures within five of lUi]' termi:nathm of their empl('JIl1er,~

19 with the County of Kern, or such shorter time as is reasonably necessary so as to

20 pennit Plaintiff to compel their attendance at depositions and/or triaL

21 4. Defense counsel shall accept service by facsimile of Plaintiffs deposition subpoenas

24 compel compliance with either or both of these.

8 Attorney for lJe'ten,jants

400 Capirol Mall. Suite 1100

Sacramento, California 95814

Re: Jadwill v. COUllty ojKern, et al.

Dear Mr. Lee:

This is in response to your letter this morning.

The Defendants representations to you regarding acceptance

Adrnitted w Practice in California and Nevada