TITLE: U.S.A. vs.

RUIZ CITATION: 136 SCRA 487

FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the U.S.

DATE: May 22, 1985

A letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co in June 1972 indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy.

The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

THE COURTS RULING: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts).

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.

The petition was granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

TITLE: FROILAN vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CITATION: G.R. No. L 6060 DATE: September 30, 1954

FACTS: On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendantappellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased a vessel from the Shipping Commission and agreeing to pay the balance in installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for various reason, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission took possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines; that he appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting on August 25, 1950, the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel. The defendant filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel. After the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic f the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question. The Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bare-boat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic of the Philippines succeeded in obtaining possession of the said vessel, to comply with its obligations of delivering to it (Pan Oriental Shipping co.) or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan. A motion to dismiss the counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its answer to the complaint in intervention was filed.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the counterclaim of the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. THE COURTS RULING: The lower court erred as the intervenor had not made any claim against the defendant, the latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the plaintiff who alleges in his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from the defendant. At any rate a counterclaim should be judged by its own allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse party. It should be recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his rights under the contract with the Shipping Administration and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter contract executed in its favor by the intervenor which is bound to protect the defendant in its possession of the vessel. In other words, the counterclaim calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor. As to whether this counterclaim is meritorious is another question which is not now before us. The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed for the reason that the State is immune from suit. This is untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains: "No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.) It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in question. The appealed order was reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. So ordered, without costs.

TITLE: AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA CITATION: 43 SCRA 360

FACTS: The appellant herein, Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959. On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Amigable appealed to the Court of Appeals, Unable to secure reconsideration, which subsequently certified the case to us, there being no question of fact involved.

DATE: February 29, 1972

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellant, Amigable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

THE COURTS RULING: Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu: where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.

As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking

The plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. The government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

The government is NOT immune to the suit.

The decision appealed from was set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE: BASCO vs. PAGCOR CITATION: G.R. No. 91649 DATE: May 14, 1991

FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because: It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo) In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo). The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not PD 1869 is constitutional.

THE COURTS RULING: Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of whether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila. LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply means decentralization. A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional. The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TITLE: TOLENTINO et al vs. COMELEC CITATION: G.R. No. 148334

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC. Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645) (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;1[5] and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646). Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate.2[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections.

DATE: January 21, 2004

Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.

In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12 th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the issue. (2) Whether or not the petition is moot. (3) Whether or not the Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001.

THE COURTS RULING: The Court has jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Regarding the validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid. The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources.

Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the COMELEC.

TITLE: KURODA vs. JALANDONI CITATION: 83 PHIL 171

FACTS: Former Lieutenant-General, Shinegori Kuroda of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines were charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war. In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments. (1) "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." (2) That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. (3) That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in interest in the case. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

DATE: March 26, 1949

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention.

Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional. (2) Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.

THE COURTS RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3, Article II of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law include those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law. The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.

TITLE: PHILIP MORRIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS CITATION: G.R. No. 91332 DATE: July 16, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners, Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling MARK cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners respective symbols MARK VII, MARK TEN, and MARK, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation. For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with the Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated (p.158, Court of Appeals Rollo in A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132). Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. Plaintiffs- petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark. Plaintiffs admit in the complaint that they are not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction. This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, exportation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there has been an invasion o plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name. (2) Whether or not the International Agreement on protection of trademarks is violated.

THE COURTS RULING: There is no proof whatsoever that any of the plaintiffs products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by the defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners as foreign corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows: Section 21-A : Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fiftynine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 638) To drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. The petition was DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14, 1989 and November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED.

TITLE: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. LANTION CITATION: G.R. No. 139465 DATE: January 18, 2000

FACTS: President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 13, 1977 issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5) (a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America". On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC).

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there is a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

THE COURTS RULING: No, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the abovecited constitutional provision. This Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The

respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date. Petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TITLE: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES vs. PURGANAN CITATION: G.R. No. 148571
FACTS: The United States Government, in pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 --dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on

DATE: September 24, 2002

April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371 (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201 (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2 (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2 (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2.

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
11 10

which prayed that

After he had surrendered his passport and

posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued. (2) Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

THE COURTS RULING:

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. (4) the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.

Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefore, The Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma: A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. The Petition was GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 was declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 was SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent was CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila was directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

TITLE: ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ CITATION: 101 PHIL 1155

FACTS: Republic Act 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Phils., and against associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Phils., from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade (2) prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law and that it violates international treaties. In answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

DATE: May 31, 1957

THE COURTS RULING: Police power has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare.

So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

The petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs

TITLE: GONZALES vs. HECHANOVA CITATION: 9 SCRA 230 DATE: October 22, 1963

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents.

ISSUES: (1) Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

THE COURTS RULING: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question.

In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

The judgment was rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied.

TITLE: AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ CITATION: 64 PHIL 201 DATE: March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing ("In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."). The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

THE COURTS RULING:

Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or purpose of the Government. The petition for a writ of prohibition was denied, without pronouncement as to costs

TITLE: VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE CITATION: 170 SCRA 256 DATE:

FACTS: ISSUES: THE COURTS RULING:

TITLE: CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS CITATION: 70 PHIL 726 DATE:

FACTS: ISSUES: THE COURTS RULING: