THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION Petitioners, vs. JOSE O.

VERA, Judge . of !e Cou" of F#"$ In$ an%e of &an#'a, and &ARIANO C( (NJIENG, Respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government. De Witt Per!ins and Ponce "nrile for the #on$!on$ and Shan$hai %an!in$ Corporation. &icente '. Francisco Feria and (a O Orense and %elmonte and Gi))s and *cDonou$h for respondent Cu +n,ien$. -o appearance for respondent 'ud$e. LA(REL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First nstance of !anila so that this court "ay review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First nstance in cri"inal case #o. $%&$9 entitled 'The (eople of the (hilippine slands vs. !ariano Cu )n*ieng, et al.', "ore particularly the application of the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act #o. $%%1, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First nstance fro" ta+ing any further action or entertaining further the afore"entioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng "ay be forthwith co""itted to prison in accordance with the final *udg"ent of conviction rendered by this court in said case ,-. .. #o. $1%//0. ) chanrobles virtual law library (etitioners herein, the (eople of the (hilippine and the 1ong+ong and 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein !ariano Cu )n*ieng is one of the defendants, in the cri"inal case entitled 'The (eople of the (hilippine slands vs. !ariano Cu )n*ieng, et al.', cri"inal case #o. $%&$9 of the Court of First nstance of !anila and -... #o. $1%// of this court. .espondent herein, 1on. 4ose 5. 6era, is the 4udge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First nstance of !anila, who heard the application of the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng for probation in the aforesaid cri"inal case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The infor"ation in the aforesaid cri"inal case was filed with the Court of First nstance of !anila on 5ctober 17, 1931, petitioner herein 1ong+ong and 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of (hilippine *urisprudence both in the length of ti"e spent by the court as well as in the volu"e in the testi"ony and the bul+ of the e8hibits presented, the Court of First nstance of !anila, on 4anuary 9, 193$, rendered a *udg"ent of conviction sentencing the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng to indeter"inate penalty ranging fro" four years and two "onths of prision correccional to eight years of prision "ayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the 1ong+ong and 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation. )pon appeal, the court, on !arch %&, 1937,

"odified the sentence to an indeter"inate penalty of fro" five years and si8 "onths of prision correccional to seven years, si8 "onths and twenty:seven days of prision mayor, but affir"ed the *udg"ent in all other respects. !ariano Cu )n*ieng filed a "otion for reconsideration and four successive "otions for new trial which were denied on ;ece"ber 17, 1937, and final *udg"ent was accordingly entered on ;ece"ber 19, 1937. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in #ove"ber, 193&. This court, on #ove"ber %$, 193&, denied the petition subse<uently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative "otion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter re"anded the case to the court of origin for e8ecution of the *udg"ent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng on #ove"ber %7, 193&, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act #o. $%%1 of the defunct (hilippine =egislature. 1erein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the cri"e of which he was convicted, that he has no cri"inal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First nstance of !anila, 4udge (edro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the nsular (robation 5ffice which reco""ended denial of the sa"e 4une 19, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First nstance of !anila, seventh branch, 4udge 4ose 5. 6era presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 7, 1937.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5n April %, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of !anila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 7, 1937, alleging, a"ong other things, that Act #o. $%%1, assu"ing that it has not been repealed by section % of Article >6 of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection ,10, Article of the Constitution guaranteeing e<ual protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not unifor" throughout the slands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to "a+e said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supple"entary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act #o. $%%1, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces ,sec. 1, Art. 6 , Constitution0. The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution e8cept with respect to the <uestions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5n 4une %9, 1937, herein respondent 4udge 4ose 5. 6era pro"ulgated a resolution with a finding that 'las pruebas no han establecido de

una"anera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y <ue todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia' and concludes that the herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng 'es inocente por duda racional' of the cri"e of which he stands convicted by this court in -... #o. $1%//, but denying the latter?s petition for probation for the reason that@ . . . 2i este 4uAgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social <ue se han e8puesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, <ue hacen al peticionario acreedor de la "is"a, una parte de la opinion publica, atiAada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un siste"a de probacion <ue per"ite atisbar en los procedi"ientos ordinarios de una causa cri"inal perturbando la <uietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones entera"ente differentes, en "enoscabo del interes publico <ue de"anda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto *udicial. 5n 4uly 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng filed an e8ception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a "otion for reconsideration. An alternative "otion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 4uly 13, 1937. This was supple"ented by an additional "otion for reconsideration sub"itted on 4uly 1$, 1937. The aforesaid "otions were set for hearing on 4uly 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng because a "otion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty:three ,thirty:four0 attorneys had *ust been filed with the trial court. Attorney Bulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid "otion subse<uently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the "otion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a ban<uet given by counsel for !ariano Cu )n*ieng on the evening of 4uly 3/, 1937, and that he signed the sa"e 'without "ature deliberation and purely as a "atter of courtesy to the person who invited "e ,hi"0.' chanrobles virtual law library 5n August &, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of !anila filed a "otion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of e8ecution of the *udg"ent of this court in said case and forthwith to co""it the herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng to *ail in obedience to said *udg"ent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5n August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the "otion for leave to intervene as amici curiae afore"entioned, as+ing that a date be set for a hearing of the sa"e and that, at all events, said "otion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the sa"e who were "e"bers of the legal staff of the several counsel for !ariano Cu )n*ieng. 5n August 1/, 1937, herein respondent 4udge 4ose 5. 6era issued an order re<uiring all parties including the "ovants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 1$, 1937. 5n the last:"entioned date, the Fiscal of

the City of !anila "oved for the hearing of his "otion for e8ecution of *udg"ent in preference to the "otion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon ob*ection of counsel for !ariano Cu )n*ieng, he "oved for the postpone"ent of the hearing of both "otions. The respondent *udge thereupon set the hearing of the "otion for e8ecution on August %1, 1937, but proceeded to consider the "otion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Bvidence as to the circu"stances under which said "otion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and sub"itted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. 3ut at this *uncture, herein petitioners ca"e to this court on e8traordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an inter"inable proceeding in the Court of First nstance of !anila which fostered 'the ca"paign of the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng for delay in the e8ecution of the sentence i"posed by this 1onorable Court on hi", e8posing the courts to criticis" and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the *udicial "achinery to "a+e effective a final *udg"ent of this court i"posed on the defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng.' chanrobles virtual law library The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a te"porary restraining order by this court on August %1, 1937.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To support their petition for the issuance of the e8traordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent *udge has acted without *urisdiction or in e8cess of his *urisdiction@ . 3ecause said respondent *udge lac+s the power to place respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng under probation for the following reason@ ,10 )nder section 11 of Act #o. $%%1, the said of the (hilippine =egislature is "ade to apply only to the provinces of the (hilippinesC it nowhere states that it is to be "ade applicable to chartered cities li+e the City of !anila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,%0 Dhile section 37 of the Ad"inistrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the ter" 'province' "ay be construed to include the City of !anila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act #o. $%%1 is not a law of general application because it is "ade to apply only to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,30 Bven if the City of !anila were considered to be a province, still, Act #o. $%%1 would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as re<uired by section 11 thereofC it being i""aterial that there is an nsular (robation 5fficer willing to act for the City of !anila, said (robation 5fficer provided for in section 1/ of Act #o. $%%1 being different and

distinct fro" the (robation 5fficer provided for in section 11 of the sa"e Act. . 3ecause even if the respondent *udge originally had *urisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng, he nevertheless acted without *urisdiction or in e8cess thereof in continuing to entertain the "otion for reconsideration and by failing to co""it !ariano Cu )n*ieng to prison after he had pro"ulgated his resolution of 4une %9, 1937, denying !ariano Cu )n*ieng?s application for probation, for the reason that@ ,10 1is *urisdiction and power in probation proceedings is li"ited by Act #o. $%%1 to the granting or denying of applications for probation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,%0 After he had issued the order denying !ariano Cu )n*ieng?s petition for probation on 4une %9, 1937, it beca"e final and e8ecutory at the "o"ent of its rendition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,30 #o right on appeal e8ists in such cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,$0 The respondent *udge lac+s the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to "odify or change the sa"e. . 3ecause the respondent *udge "ade a finding that !ariano Cu )n*ieng is innocent of the cri"e for which he was convicted by final *udg"ent of this court, which finding is not only presu"ptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is further"ore in conte"pt of this court and a violation of the respondent?s oath of office as ad interim *udge of first instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 6. 3ecause the respondent *udge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which beca"e i"perative when he issued his order of 4une %9, 1937, denying the application for probation, to co""it his co:respondent to *ail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (etitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and ade<uate re"edy in the ordinary course of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library n a supple"entary petition filed on 2epte"ber 9, 1937, the petitioner 1ong+ong and 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation further contends that Act #o. $%%1 of the (hilippine =egislature providing for a syste" of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of cri"e, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection ,10, Article , of the Constitution of the (hilippines guaranteeing e<ual protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to "a+e said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because

it constitutes an unlawful and i"proper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the 4ones =aw ,section 90 in the (hilippine =egislature and by the Constitution ,section 1, Art. 6 0 in the #ational Asse"blyC and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution ,section %, Art. 6 0 and the 4ones =aw ,section %90, the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First nstance of different provinces without unifor"ity. n another supple"entary petition dated 2epte"ber 1$, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of !anila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the (eople of the (hilippine slands, concurs for the first ti"e with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1, and on the oral argu"ent held on 5ctober &, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a for" of reprieve and therefore Act. #o. $%%1 is an encroach"ent on the e8clusive power of the Chief B8ecutive to grant pardons and reprieves. 5n 5ctober 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two "e"orandu"s in which he contended that Act #o. $%%1 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the e8ecutive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the e<ual protection of the laws. 5n 5ctober 9, 1937, two "e"orandu"s, signed *ointly by the City Fiscal and the 2olicitor:-eneral, acting in behalf of the (eople of the (hilippine slands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the 1ong+ong and 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to i"pugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act #o. $%%1 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another *oint "e"orandu" was filed by the sa"e persons on the sa"e day, 5ctober 9, 1937, alleging that Act #o. $%%1 is unconstitutional because it denies the e<ual protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void@ that the Co""onwealth is not estopped fro" <uestioning the validity of its lawsC that the private prosecution "ay intervene in probation proceedings and "ay attac+ the probation law as unconstitutionalC and that this court "ay pass upon the constitutional <uestion in prohibition proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library .espondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argu"ent and "e"orandu"s, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As special defenses, respondents allege@ ,10 That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,%0 That the aforesaid petition is pre"ature because the re"edy sought by the petitioners is the very sa"e re"edy prayed for by the" before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition

was filed with court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary virtual law library

this chanrobles

,30 That the petitioners having the"selves raised the <uestion as to the e8ecution of *udg"ent before the trial court, said trial court has ac<uired e8clusive *urisdiction to resolve the sa"e under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,$0 That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent *urisdiction with the Court of First nstance to decide the <uestion as to whether or not the e8ecution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot e8ercise said *urisdiction while the Court of First nstance has assu"ed *urisdiction over the sa"e upon "otion of herein petitioners the"selves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,70 That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in see+ing to deprive the trial court of its *urisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it i"pairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in the probation cases is 'a court of li"ited *urisdiction but of great dignity.' chanrobles virtual law library ,&0 That under the supposition that this court has *urisdiction to resolve the <uestion sub"itted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealableC for although the (robation =aw does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation "ay appeal fro" a resolution of the Court of First nstance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this *urisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,70 That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng being appealable, the sa"e had not beco"e final and e8ecutory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative "otion for reconsideration and new trial within the re<uisite period of fifteen days, which "otion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order i"providently and erroneously issued by this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,90 That the Fiscal of the City of !anila had by i"plication ad"itted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the "otion for reconsideration and agreed to the postpone"ent of the hearing of the said "otion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,90 That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incu"bent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of

certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticis" because the accused is a rich "anC and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular e8ercise of *urisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incu"bent upon the petitioner to file a "otion for reconsideration specifying the error co""itted so that the trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the sa"e.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,1/0 That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its *urisdiction within a reasonable ti"e to correct or "odify it in accordance with law and *usticeC that this power to alter or "odify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and "ay be e8ercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case ta+ing the for" of a "otion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ,110 That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order e8ecution of the sa"e while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed fro" the "o"ent the accused co""ences to serve his sentence ,Act #o. $%%1, sec. 1C ).2. vs. Coo+, 19 Fed. E%dF, 9%70. n their "e"orandu"s filed on 5ctober %3, 1937, counsel for the respondents "aintain that Act #o. $%%1 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the e<ual protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the B8ecutive. n an additional "e"orandu" filed on the sa"e date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act #o. $%%1 is free fro" constitutional ob*ections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution "ay not intervene in probation proceedings, "uch less <uestion the validity of Act #o. $%%1C that both the City Fiscal and the 2olicitor:-eneral are estopped fro" <uestioning the validity of the ActC that the validity of Act cannot be attac+ed for the first ti"e before this courtC that probation in unavailableC and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act #o. $%%1 is separable fro" the rest of the Act. The last "e"orandu" for the respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng was denied for having been filed out of ti"e but was ad"itted by resolution of this court and filed anew on #ove"ber 7, 1937. This "e"orandu" elaborates on so"e of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library n the scrutiny of the pleadings and e8a"ination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the "erits of the application of the respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng and in denying said application assu"ed the tas+ not only of considering the "erits of the application, but of

passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronounce"ent of guilt by this court. ,-... #o. $1%//.0 (robation i"plies guilt be final *udg"ent. Dhile a probation case "ay loo+ into the circu"stances attending the co""ission of the offense, this does not authoriAe it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefro" its own ad"ission reliance was "erely had on the printed briefs, aver"ents, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shio,i vs. #arvey ,E19%%F, $3 (hil., 333, 3370, and reiterated in subse<uent cases, 'if each and every Court of First nstance could en*oy the privilege of overruling decisions of the 2upre"e Court, there would be no end to litigation, and *udicial chaos would result.' A beco"ing "odesty of inferior courts de"ands conscious realiAation of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated *udicial syste" of the nation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After threshing carefully the "ultifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the -ordian +not and ta+e up at once the two funda"ental <uestions presented, na"ely, ,10 whether or not the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1 has been properly raised in these proceedingsC and ,%0 in the affir"ative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental <uestions raised by the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first <uestion, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. t is a well:settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be deter"ined by the courts unless that <uestion is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a deter"ination of the caseC i.e., the issue of constitutionality "ust be the very lis mota presented. ,!c-irr vs. 1a"ilton and Abreu E1917F, 3/ (hil., 7&3, 7&9C & .. C. =., pp. 7&, 77C 1% C. 4., pp. 79/:79%, 793.0 chanrobles virtual law library The <uestion of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is fre<uently raised in ordinary actions. #evertheless, resort "ay be "ade to e8traordinary legal re"edies, particularly where the re"edies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and ade<uate. Thus, in Cu +n,ien$ vs. Patstone ,E19%%F0, $% (hil., 9190, this court held that the <uestion of the constitutionality of a statute "ay be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings ,see, also, 1% C. 4., p. 7930C and in Government of the Philippine .slands vs. Sprin$er ,E19%7F, 7/ (hil., %79 Eaffir"ed in 2pringer vs. -overn"ent of the (hilippine slands ,19%90, %77 ). 2., 199C 7% =aw. ed., 9$7F0, this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of /uo 0arranto brought in the na"e of the -overn"ent of the (hilippines. t has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute "ay be <uestioned in ha)eas corpus proceedings ,1% C. 4., p. 793C 3ailey on #a)eas Corpus, 6ol. , pp. 97, 1170,

although there are authorities to the contraryC on an application for in*unction to restrain action under the challenged statute ,"andatory, see CruA vs. Goungberg E1931F, 7& (hil., %3$0C and even on an application for preli"inary in*unction where the deter"ination of the constitutional <uestion is necessary to a decision of the case. ,1% C. 4., p. 793.0 The sa"e "ay be said as regards prohi)ition and certiorari.,Gu Cong Bng vs. Trinidad E19%7F, $7 (hil., 397C E19%&F, %71 ). 2., 7//C 7/ =aw. ed., 1/79C 3ell vs. First 4udicial ;istrict Court E19/7F, %9 #ev., %9/C 91 (ac., 977C 113 A. 2. .., 97$C & Ann. Cas., 99%C 1 =. .. A. E#. 2F, 9$3, and cases cited0. The case of 1u Con$ "n$ vs. Trinidad supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, li+e the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act #o. %97%, popularly +nown as the Chinese 3oo++eeping =aw, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not "et s<uarely by the respondent in a de"urrer. A point was raised 'relating to the propriety of the constitutional <uestion being decided in original proceedings in prohibition.' This court decided to ta+e up the constitutional <uestion and, with two *ustices dissenting, held that Act #o. %97% was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates which reversed the *udg"ent of this court and held that the Act was invalid. ,%71 ). 2., 7//C 7/ =aw. ed., 1/79.0 5n the <uestion of *urisdiction, however, the Federal 2upre"e Court, though its Chief 4ustice, said@ 3y the Code of Civil (rocedure of the (hilippine slands, section 71&, the (hilippine supre"e court is granted concurrent *urisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original *urisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are e8ercising functions without or in e8cess of their *urisdiction. t has been held by that court that the <uestion of the validity of the cri"inal statute "ust usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the 2upre"e Court. ,Cadwallader:-ibson =u"ber Co. vs. ;el .osario, %& (hil., 19%0. 3ut in this case where a new act seriously affected nu"erous persons and e8tensive property rights, and was li+ely to cause a "ultiplicity of actions, the 2upre"e Court e8ercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act?s validity pro"ptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly ad"inistration of *ustice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of "2 parte Goung ,%/9 ). 2., 1%3C7% =aw ed., 71$C 13 =. .. A. E#. 2.F 93%C %9 2up. Ct. .ep., $$1C 1$ Ann. Ca., 7&$C Trau8 vs. .aich, %39 ). 2., 33C &/ =aw. ed., 131C =. .. A. 191&;, 7$7C 3& 2up. Ct. .ep., 7C Ann. Cas., 19173, %93C and Dilson vs. #ew, %$3 ). 2., 33%C &1 =aw. ed., 777C =. .. A. 1917B, 939C 37 2up. Ct. .ep., %99C Ann. Cas. 1919A, 1/%$0. Although ob*ection to the *urisdiction was raise by de"urrer to the petition, this is now disclai"ed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties as+ a decision on the "erits. n view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the sland Code, we ac<uiesce in the desire of the parties. The writ of prohibition is an e8traordinary *udicial writ issuing out of a court of superior *urisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose

of preventing the inferior tribunal fro" usurping a *urisdiction with which it is not legally vested. ,1igh, B8traordinary =egal .e"edies, p. 7/7.0 The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the "erit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has *urisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is <uestioned, because in such cases the interior court having *urisdiction "ay itself deter"ine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision "ay be sub*ect to review, and conse<uently the co"plainant in such cases ordinarily has ade<uate re"edy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. %ut 0here the inferior court or tri)unal derives its ,urisdiction e2clusively from an unconstitutional statute it may )e prevented )y the 0rit of prohi)ition from enforcin$ that statute . ,7/ C. 4., &7/C "2 parte .ound tree E197$, 71 Ala., $%C .n re !acfarland, 3/ App. E;. C.F, 3&7C Curtis vs. Cornish E191%F, 1/9 !e., 39$C 9$ A., 799C (ennington vs. Doolfol+ E199/F, 79 Hy., 13C 2tate vs. -odfrey E19/3F, 7$ D. 6a., 7$C $& 2. B., 197C Arnold vs. 2hields E1937F, 7 ;ana, 19C 3/ A". ;ec., &&9.0 chanrobles virtual law library Courts of First nstance sitting in probation proceedings derived their *urisdiction solely fro" Act #o. $%%1 which prescribes in detailed "anner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has beco"e final and before they have served their sentence. t is true that at co""on law the authority of the courts to suspend te"porarily the e8ecution of the sentence is recogniAed and, according to a nu"ber of state courts, including those of !assachusetts, !ichigan, #ew Gor+, and 5hio, the power is inherent in the courts ,Co""onwealth vs. ;owdican?s 3ail E197$F, 117 !ass., 133C (eople vs. 2tic+el E19/9F, 17& !ich., 777C 1%1 #. D., $97C (eople e2 rel. Forsyth vs. Court of 2ession E199$F, 1$1 #. G., %99C Deber vs. 2tate E1999F, 79 5hio 2t., &1&0. 3ut, in the leading case of "2 parte )nited 2tates ,E191&F, %$% ). 2., %7C &1 =aw. ed., 1%9C =. .. A., 1917B, 1179C 37 2up. Ct. .ep., 7%C Ann. Cas. 19173, 3770, the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates e8pressed the opinion that under the co""on law the power of the court was li"ited to te"porary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent *udicial power saying, through Chief 4ustice Dhite@ ndisputably under our constitutional syste" the right to try offenses against the cri"inal laws and upon conviction to i"pose the punish"ent provided by law is *udicial, and it is e<ually to be conceded that, in e8erting the powers vested in the" on such sub*ect, courts inherently possess a"ple right to e8ercise reasonable, that is, *udicial, discretion to enable the" to wisely e8ert their authority. 3ut these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here "ade, since it "ust rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to per"anently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers "ade by the Constitution will beco"e apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fi8 the punish"ent for cri"e is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within *udicial discretion, for the purpose of e8ecuting the

statute, ele"ents of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of *udicial authority, and that the right to relieve fro" the punish"ent, fi8ed by law and ascertained according to the "ethods by it provided belongs to the e8ecutive depart"ent. 4ustice Carson, in his illu"inating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. 'ud$e of First .nstance of Cavite ,%9 (hil., %&70, decided by this court in 1917, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the e8ecution of sentences pronounced in cri"inal cases is not inherent in the *udicial function. 'All are agreed', he said, 'that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions.' ,at p. %79.0 3oth petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First nstance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of li"ited *urisdiction. ts *urisdiction in such proceedings is conferred e8clusively by Act #o. $%%1 of the (hilippine =egislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library t is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the <uestion has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by ob*ection of so"e +ind ,1ill vs. Tarver E19/1F, 13/ Ala., 79%C 3/ 2., $99C 2tate e2 rel. Helly vs. Hirby E191$F, %&/ !o., 1%/C 1&9 2. D., 7$&0. n the case at bar, it is un<uestionable that the constitutional issue has been s<uarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, 1on. 4ose 5 6era, however, acting as *udge of the court below, declined to pass upon the <uestion on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, "ay not raise said <uestion. The respondent *udge cited Cooley on Constitutional =i"itations ,6ol. , p. 339C 1% C. 4., sec. 177, pp. 7&/ and 7&%0, and !c-lue vs. Bsse8 County ,E191&F, %%7 !ass., 79C 113 #. B., 7$%, 7$30, as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attac+ "ade on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent *udge further stated that it "ay not motu proprio ta+e up the constitutional <uestion and, agreeing with Cooley that 'the power to declare a legislative enact"ent void is one which the *udge, conscious of the fallibility of the hu"an *udg"ent, will shrin+ fro" e8ercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility' ,Constitutional =i"itations, 9th ed., 6ol. , p. 33%0, proceeded on the assu"ption that Act #o. $%%1 is constitutional. Dhile therefore, the court a /uo ad"its that the constitutional <uestion was raised before it, it refused to consider the <uestion solely because it was not raised by a proper party. .espondents herein reiterates this view. The argu"ent is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant !ariano Cu )n*ieng in cri"inal case #o. $%&$9 of the Court of First nstance of !anila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a

general rule, only those who are parties to a suit "ay <uestion the constitutionality of a statute involved in a *udicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without *urisdiction is void, where the *urisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in <uestion, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.,1% C. 4., sec. 19$, p. 7&&.0 And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue "ay not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. t is true that, as a general rule, the <uestion of constitutionality "ust be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it "ay not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. ,1% C. 4., p. 79&. See also Cadwallader:-ibson =u"ber Co. vs. ;el .osario, %& (hil., 19%, 193:197.0 3ut we "ust state that the general rule ad"its of e8ceptions. Courts, in the e8ercise of sounds discretion, "ay deter"ine the ti"e when a <uestion affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. , .n re Doolsey E199$F, 97 #. G., 137, 1$$.0 Thus, in cri"inal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the <uestion "ay be raised for the first ti"e at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. ,1% C. 4., p. 79&.0 Bven in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional <uestion, though raised for the first ti"e on appeal, if it appears that a deter"ination of the <uestion is necessary to a decision of the case. ,!cCabe?s Ad"?8 vs. !aysville I 3. 2. .. Co., E191/F, 13& +y., &7$C 1%$ 2. D., 99%C =oh"eyer vs. 2t. =ouis Cordage Co. E19/9F, %1$ !o., &97C 113 2. D. 11/9C Car"ody vs. 2t. =ouis Transit Co., E19/7F, 199 !o., 77%C 97 2. D., 913.0 And it has been held that a constitutional <uestion will be considered by an appellate court at any ti"e, where it involves the *urisdiction of the court below ,2tate vs. 3ur+e E1911F, 177 Ala., 7&1C 77 2., 97/.0 As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional <uestion raised for the first ti"e before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with e"phasis to the case of 1u Con$ "n$ vs. Trinidad supra . And on the hypotheses that the 1ong+ong I 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional <uestion here : a point we do not now have to decide : we are of the opinion that the (eople of the (hilippines, represented by the 2olicitor:-eneral and the Fiscal of the City of !anila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who i"pugns the validity of a statute "ust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct in*ury as a result of its enforce"ent. t goes without saying that if Act #o. $%%1 really violates the constitution, the (eople of the (hilippines, in whose na"e the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. 5f grater i"port than the da"age caused by the illegal e8penditure of public funds is the "ortal wound inflicted upon the funda"ental law by the enforce"ent of an invalid statute. 1ence, the well:settled rule that the state can challenge the

validity of its own laws. n -overn"ent of the (hilippine slands vs. 2pringer ,E19%7F0, 7/ (hil., %79 ,affir"ed in 2pringer vs. -overn"ent of the (hilippine slands E19%9F, %77 ).2., 199C 7% =aw. ed., 9$70, this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the -overn"ent of the (hilippines. n Attorney -eneral vs. (er+ins ,E1999F, 73 !ich., 3/3, 311, 31%C $1 #. D. $%&, $%9, $%90, the 2tate of !ichigan, through its Attorney -eneral, instituted <uo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a "ining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it i"paired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to <uestion the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit "ay <uestion the constitutionality of a statute involved in a *udicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without *urisdiction in void, where the *urisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in <uestion, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. ,1% C.4., sec. 19$, p. 7&&.0 And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue "ay not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. t is true that, as a general rule, the <uestion of constitutionality "ust be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it "ay not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. ,1% C.4., p. 79&. 2ee, also, Cadwallader:-ibson =u"ber Co. vs. ;el .osario, %& (hil., 19%, 193:197.0 3ut we "ust state that the general rule ad"its of e8ceptions. Courts, in the e8ercise of sound discretion, "ay deter"ine the ti"e when a <uestion affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. , n re Doolsey E1999$F, 97 #.G., 137, 1$$.0 Thus, in cri"inal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the <uestion "ay be raised for the first ti"e at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. ,1% C.4., p. 79&.0 Bven in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional <uestion, though raised for first ti"e on appeal, if it appears that a deter"ination of the <uestion is necessary to a decision of the case. ,!cCabe?s Ad"?8 vs. !aysville I 3. 2. .. Co. E191/F, 13& Hy., &7$C 1%$ 2. D., 99%C =oh"eyer vs. 2t. =ouis, Cordage Co. E19/9F, %1$ !o. &97C 113 2. D., 11/9C Car"ody vs. 2t. =ouis Transit Co. E19/7F, 199 !o., 77%C 97 2. D., 913.0 And it has been held that a constitutional <uestion will be considered by an appellate court at any ti"e, where it involves the *urisdiction of the court below ,2tate vs. 3ur+e E1911F, 177 Ala., 7&1C 77 2., 97/.0 As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional <uestion raised for the first ti"e before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with e"phasis to the case of 1u Con$ "n$. vs. Trinidad supra . And on the hypothesis that the 1ong+ong I 2hanghai 3an+ing Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional <uestion here : a point we do not now have to decide : we are of the opinion that the (eople of the (hilippines, represented by the

2olicitor:-eneral and the Fiscal of the City of !anila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who i"pugns the validity of a statute "ust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct in*ury as a result of its enforce"ent. t goes without saying that if Act #o. $%%1 really violates the Constitution, the (eople of the (hilippines, in whose na"e the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. 5f greater i"port than the da"age caused by the illegal e8penditure of public funds is the "ortal wound inflicted upon the funda"ental law by the enforce"ent of an invalid statute. 1ence, the well:settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. n -overn"ent of the (hilippine slands vs. 2pringer ,E19%7F0, 7/ (hil., %79 ,affir"ed in 2pringer vs. -overn"ent of the (hilippine slands E19%9F, %77 ).2., 199C 7% =aw. ed., 9$70, this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the -overn"ent of the (hilippines. n Attorney -eneral vs. (er+ings,E1999F, 73 !ich., 3/3, 311, 31%C $1 #.D., $%&, $%9, $%90, the 2tate of !ichigan, through its Attorney -eneral, instituted <uo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a "ining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it i"paired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to <uestion the constitutionality of the statute was itself <uestioned. 2aid the 2upre"e Court of !ichigan, through Cha"plin, 4.@ . . . The idea see"s to be that the people are estopped fro" <uestioning the validity of a law enacted by their representativesC that to an accusation by the people of !ichigan of usurpation their govern"ent, a statute enacted by the people of !ichigan is an ade<uate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in *ustification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in for", and lac+s the force of law, and is of no "ore saving effect to *ustify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supre"e law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people "ust bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional <uestions. As was re"ar+ed by !r. 4ustice 2tory, in spea+ing of an ac<uiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature@ 'The people have a deep and vested interest in "aintaining all the constitutional li"itations upon the e8ercise of legislative powers.' ,Allen vs. !c+een, 1 2u"., 31$.0 n 2tate vs. ;oane ,E191&F, 99 Han., $37C 179 (ac., 39, $/0, an original action ,"anda"us0 was brought by the Attorney:-eneral of Hansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. n disposing of the <uestion whether or not the state "ay bring the action, the 2upre"e Court of Hansas said@ . . . the state is a proper party : indeed, the proper party : to bring this action. The state is

always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved. ' t has an interest in seeing that the will of the =egislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff "ust, show grounds of fearing "ore specific in*ury. ,2tate vs. Hansas City &/ Han., 719 E77 (ac., 119F0.' ,2tate vs. =awrence, 9/ Han., 7/7C 1/3 (ac., 939.0 Dhere the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state?s law officer, its Attorney:-eneral, or county attorney, "ay e8ercise his bet *udg"ent as to what sort of action he will bring to have the "atter deter"ined, either by <uo warranto to challenge its validity ,2tate vs. 4ohnson, &1 Han., 9/3C &/ (ac., 1/&9C $9 =...A., &&%0, by "anda"us to co"pel obedience to its ter"s ,2tate vs. ;olley, 9% Han., 733C 1/9 (ac., 9$&0, or by in*unction to restrain proceedings under its <uestionable provisions ,2tate e8 rel. vs. City of #eodesha, 3 Han. App., 319C $7 (ac., 1%%0. 5ther courts have reached the sa"e conclusion ,2ee 2tate vs. 2t. =ouis 2. D. .y. Co. E1917F, 197 2. D., 1//&C 2tate vs. 2.1. Hress I Co. E193$F, 177 2., 9%3C 2tate vs. Dal"sley E1937F, 191 =a., 797C 1&/ 2., 91C 2tate vs. 3oard of County Co"r?s E193$F, 39 (ac. E%dF, %9&C First Const. Co. of 3roo+lyn vs. 2tate E1917F, %11 #.G., %97C 11& #.B., 1/%/C 3ush vs. 2tate J1919F, 197 nd., 339C 119 #.B., $17C 2tate vs. Dat+ins E1933F, 17& =a., 937C 1$7 2., 9, 1/, 110. n the case last cited, the 2upre"e Court of =uisiana said@ t is contended by counsel for 1erbert Dat+ins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. n support of the argu"ent three decisions are cited, viA.@ 2tate e2 rel. 1all, ;istrict Attorney, vs. 4udge of Tenth 4udicial ;istrict ,33 =a. Ann., 1%%%0C 2tate e2 rel. #icholls, -overnor vs. 2ha+espeare, !ayor of #ew 5rleans ,$1 Ann., 17&C & 2o., 79%0C and 2tate e2 rel., 3an+ing Co., etc. vs. 1eard, Auditor ,$7 =a. Ann., 1&79C 19 2o., 7$&C $7 =. .. A., 71%0. These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. n 2tate e2 rel. 1all, ;istrict Attorney, vs. 4udge, etc., the ruling was the *udge should not, "erely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of infor"ation charging a person with a violation of the statute. n other words, a *udge should not *udicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the <uestion of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it "ust be decided in order to deter"ine the right of a party litigant. 2tate e2 rel. #icholls, -overnor, etc., is authority for the proposition "erely that an officer on who" a statute i"poses the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is i""une fro" responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. 2tate e2 rel. 3an+ing Co., etc., is authority for the proposition "erely that e8ecutive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perfor" "inisterial duties i"posed upon the" by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is

unconstitutional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library t is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the cri"inal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the state. f, in the perfor"ance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his *udg"ent, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the otherC and, in order to do so, he is co"pelled to sub"it to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. f it were not so, the power of the =egislature would be free fro" constitutional li"itations in the enact"ent of cri"inal laws. The respondents do not see" to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state "ay i"pugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. n fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assu"ption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor "ay it be invo+ed by the City Fiscal in behalf of the (eople of the (hilippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped fro" attac+ing the validity of the Act and, not authoriAed challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. ,Additional "e"orandu" of respondents, 5ctober %3, 1937, pp. 9,. 1/, 17 and %3.0 chanrobles virtual law library The "ere fact that the (robation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that ti"e has not been attac+ed as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of !anila but, on the contrary, has been i"pliedly regarded by hi" as constitutional, is no reason for considering the (eople of the (hilippines estopped fro" nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional <uestions only when presented before it in )ona fide cases for deter"ination, and the fact that the <uestion has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are *ustified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library t re"ains to consider whether the deter"ination of the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, '. . . while the court will "eet the <uestion with fir"ness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdo", and *ust respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points.' , "2 parte .andolph E1933F, %/ F. Cas. #o. 11, 779C % 3roc+., $$7. 6ide, also 1oover vs. wood E1977F, 9 nd., %9&, %97.0 t has been held that the deter"ination of a constitutional <uestion is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case ,1% C. 4., p. 79%, citing =ong 2ault ;ev. Co. vs. Hennedy E1913F, 179 App. ;iv., 399C 1$3 #. G. 2upp., $7$ Eaff. %1% #.G., 1@ 1/7 #. B., 9$9C Ann. Cas. 1917;, 7&C and app dis" %$% ).2., %7%FC 1esse vs. =edes"a, 7 (orto .ico Fed., 7%/C Cowan vs. ;oddridge, %% -ratt

E&3 6a.F, $79C )nion =ine Co., vs. Disconsin .. Co""n., 1$& Dis., 7%3C 1%9 #. D., &/70, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attac+ed. ,1% C.4., p. 79%, citing Central -lass Co. vs. #iagrara F. ns. Co., 131 =a., 713C 79 2., 97%C Cheney vs. 3everly, 199 !ass., 91C 7$ #.B., 3/&0. There is no doubt that the respondent Cu )n*ieng draws his privilege to probation solely fro" Act #o. $%%1 now being assailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Apart fro" the foregoing considerations, that court will also ta+e cogniAance of the fact that the (robation Act is a new addition to our statute boo+s and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courtsC that "ay persons accused and convicted of cri"e in the City of !anila have applied for probationC that so"e of the" are already on probationC that "ore people will li+ely ta+e advantage of the (robation Act in the futureC and that the respondent !ariano Cu )n*ieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional <uestion. Considering, therefore, the i"portance which the instant case has assu"ed and to prevent "ultiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy de"and that the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1 be now resolved. ,Gu Cong Bng vs. Trinidad E19%7F, $7 (hil., 397C E19%&F, %71 ).2., 7//C 7/ =aw. ed., 1/79. 2ee & ..C.=., pp. 77, 79C (eople vs. Hennedy E1913F, %/7 #.G., 733C 1/1 #.B., $$%, $$$C Ann. Cas. 191$C, &1&C 3orginis vs. Fal+ Co. E1911F, 1$7 Dis., 3%7C 133 #.D., %/9, %11C 37 =...A. E#.2.F $99C ;i"ayuga and Fa*ardo vs. FernandeA E19%%F, $3 (hil., 3/$.0 n 1u Con$ "n$ vs. Trinidad supra , an analogous situation confronted us. De said@ ' nas"uch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand "erchants are affected by these proceedings, and inas"uch as Act #o. %97% is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advance"ent of public policy, we have deter"ined to overrule the defense of want of *urisdiction in order that we "ay decide the "ain issue. De have here an e8traordinary situation which calls for a rela8ation of the general rule.' 5ur ruling on this point was sustained by the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates. A "ore binding authority in support of the view we have ta+en can not be found.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library De have reached the conclusion that the <uestion of the constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1 has been properly raised. #ow for the "ain in<uiry@ s the Act unconstitutionalK chanrobles virtual law library )nder a doctrine peculiarly A"erican, it is the office and duty of the *udiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear i"plication fro" the provisions of section %, subsection 1, and section 1/, of Article 6 of the Constitution, "ay declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the funda"ental lay. t will not shir+ fro" its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supre"e law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This

is of the essence duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary virtual law library

of

*udicial chanrobles

This court is not un"indful of the funda"ental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the e8ecutive, is presu"ed to be within constitutional li"itations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. 'The <uestion of the validity of every statute is first deter"ined by the legislative depart"ent of the govern"ent itself.' ,).2. vs. Ten Gu E191%F, %$ (hil., 1, 1/C Case vs. 3oard of 1ealth and 1eiser E1913F, %$ (hil., %7/, %7&C ).2. vs. 4oson E1913F, %& (hil., 1.0 And a statute finally co"es before the courts sustained by the sanction of the e8ecutive. The "e"bers of the =egislature and the Chief B8ecutive have ta+en an oath to support the Constitution and it "ust be presu"ed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously e8ercise its power to overturn the sole"n declarations of two of the three grand depart"ents of the govern"ents. ,& ..C.=., p. 1/1.0 Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the *udiciary to reflect the wisdo" of the people as e8pressed through an elective =egislature and an elective Chief B8ecutive. t follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution e8cept in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to re<uire a citation of authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5ne of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his i"passioned argu"ent, called attention to the fact that the (resident of the (hilippines had already e8pressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the (robation Act, adverting that as to the B8ecutive the resolution of this <uestion was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. De ta+e notice of the fact that the (resident in his "essage dated 2epte"ber 1, 1937, reco""ended to the #ational Asse"bly the i""ediate repeal of the (robation Act ,#o. $%%10C that this "essage resulted in the approval of 3ill #o. %$17 of the #ationality Asse"bly repealing the probation Act, sub*ect to certain conditions therein "entionedC but that said bill was vetoed by the (resident on 2epte"ber 13, 1937, "uch against his wish, 'to have stric+en out fro" the statute boo+s of the Co""onwealth a law . . . unfair and very li+ely unconstitutional.' t is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the (resident e8ercised his constitutional prerogative. 1e "ay e8press the reasons which he "ay dee" proper for ta+ing such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the deter"ination of actual controversies sub"itted for our deter"ination. Dhether or not the B8ecutive should e8press or in any "anner insinuate his opinion on a "atter enco"passed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the sa"e ti"e pending deter"ination in this court is a <uestion of

propriety for hi" e8clusively to decide or deter"ine. Dhatever opinion is e8pressed by hi" under these circu"stances, however, cannot sway our *udg"ent on way or another and prevent us fro" ta+ing what in our opinion is the proper course of action to ta+e in a given case. t if is ever necessary for us to "a+e any vehe"ent affir"ance during this for"ative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the B8ecutive no less than of the =egislative depart"ent of our govern"ent : independent in the perfor"ance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free fro" politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticis" in the acco"plish"ent of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The constitutionality of Act #o. $%%1 is challenged on three principal grounds@ ,10 That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the B8ecutiveC ,%0 that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and ,30 that it denies the e<ual protection of the laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. 2ection %1 of the Act of Congress of August %9, 191&, co""only +nown as the 4ones =aw, in force at the ti"e of the approval of Act #o. $%%1, otherwise +nown as the (robation Act, vests in the -overnor:-eneral of the (hilippines 'the e8clusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and re"it fines and forfeitures'. This power is now vested in the (resident of the (hilippines. ,Art. 6 , sec. 11, subsec. &.0 The provisions of the 4ones =aw and the Constitution differ in so"e respects. The ad*ective 'e8clusive' found in the 4ones =aw has been o"itted fro" the Constitution. )nder the 4ones =aw, as at co""on law, pardon could be granted any ti"e after the co""ission of the offense, either before or after conviction , &ide Constitution of the )nited 2tates, Art. , sec. %C .n re =onto+ E19%%F, $3 (hil., %930. The -overnor:-eneral of the (hilippines was thus e"powered, li+e the (resident of the )nited 2tates, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The fra"ers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following "ost of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be e8ercised 'after conviction'. 2o, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not e8tend to 'cases of i"peach"ent'. This is also the rule generally followed in the )nited 2tates , &ide Constitution of the )nited 2tates, Art. , sec. %0. The rule in Bngland is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an i"peach"entC 'but,' says 3lac+stone, 'after the i"peach"ent has been sole"nly heard and deter"ined, it is not understood that the +ing?s royal grace is further restrained or abridged.' , &ide "2 parte Dells E197&F, 19 1ow., 3/7C 17 =aw. ed., $%1C Co". vs. =oc+wood E197%F, 1/9 !ass., 3%3C 1% A". .ep., &99C 2terling vs. ;ra+e E197&F, %9 5hio 2t., $77C %3 a". .ep., 7&%.0 The reason for the distinction is obvious. n Bngland, 4udg"ent on i"peach"ent is not confined to "ere 're"oval fro" office and dis<ualification to hold and en*oy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the -overn"ent' ,Art. >, sec. $, Constitution of the (hilippines0 but e8tends to the

whole punish"ent attached by law to the offense co""itted. The 1ouse of =ords, on a conviction "ay, by its sentence, inflict capital punish"ent, perpetual banish"ent, perpetual banish"ent, fine or i"prison"ent, depending upon the gravity of the offense co""itted, together with re"oval fro" office and incapacity to hold office. ,Co". vs. =oc+wood, supra.0 5ur Constitution also "a+es specific "ention of 'co""utation' and of the power of the e8ecutive to i"pose, in the pardons he "ay grant, such conditions, restrictions and li"itations as he "ay dee" proper. A"nesty "ay be granted by the (resident under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the #ational Asse"bly. De need not dwell at length on the significance of these funda"ental changes. t is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has re"ained essentially the sa"e. The <uestion is@ 1as the pardoning power of the Chief B8ecutive under the 4ones =aw been i"paired by the (robation ActK chanrobles virtual law library As already stated, the 4ones =aw vests the pardoning power e8clusively in the Chief B8ecutive. The e8ercise of the power "ay not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. '. . . The benign prerogative of "ercy reposed in the e8ecutive cannot be ta+en away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can li+e power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate depart"ents of govern"ent have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the depart"ents can e8ercise any powers appertaining to either of the others e8cept in cases e8pressly provided for by the constitution.' ,%/ ..C.=., pp., , and cases cited.0 ' . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the e8ecutive without e8press or i"plied li"itations, the grant is e8clusive, and the legislature can neither e8ercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper e8ercise thereof, . . .' ,1% C.4., pp. 939, 939, and cases cited.0 f Act #o. $%%1, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. 3ut does itK chanrobles virtual law library n the fa"ous Hillitts decision involving an e"beAAle"ent case, the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates ruled in 191& that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. , "2 parte )nited 2tates E191&F, %$% ).2., %7C &1 =aw. ed., 1%9C =...A. 1917B, 1179C 37 2up. Ct. .ep., 7%C Ann. Cas. 19173, 377.0 Chief 4ustice Dhite, after an e8haustive review of the authorities, e8pressed the opinion of the court that under the co""on law the power of the court was li"ited to te"porary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and per"anently was vested in the e8ecutive branch of the govern"ent and not in the *udiciary. 3ut, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. 2aid the court through its Chief 4ustice@ '. . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the i"position of penalties as fi8ed to be sub*ect, by probation legislation or such other "eans as the legislative "ind "ay devise, to such *udicial discretion as "ay be ade<uate to enable courts to "eet by the e8ercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which "ay be presented to

the" for *udg"ent, recourse "ust be had Congress whose legislative power on the sub*ect is in the very nature of things ade<uately co"plete.' ,Luoted in .iggs vs. )nited 2tates E19%&F, 1$ F. E%dF, 7, &.0 This decision led the #ational (robation Association and others to agitate for the enact"ent by Congress of a federal probation law. 2uch action was finally ta+en on !arch $, 19%7 ,chap. 7%1, $3 2tat. =. 179, ).2.C. title 19, sec. 7%$0. This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and e8penses of a certain nu"ber of probation officers chosen by civil service. ,4ohnson, (robation for 4uveniles and Adults, p. 1$.0 chanrobles virtual law library n )nited 2tates vs. !urray ,E19%7F, %77 ).2., 3$7C $9 2up. Ct. .ep., 1$&C 7% =aw. ed., 3/90, the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates, through Chief 4ustice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to i"prison"ent by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the (robation Act of !arch $, 19%7 to grant hi" probation even though the ter" at which sentence was i"posed had not yet e8pired. n this case of !urray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assu"ed. The court traced the history of the Act and <uoted fro" the report of the Co""ittee on the 4udiciary of the )nited 2tates 1ouse of .epresentatives ,.eport #o. 1377, &9th Congress, % 2ession0 the following state"ent@ (rior to the so:called Hillitts case, rendered in ;ece"ber, 191&, the district courts e8ercised a for" of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. n this case, however ,B8 parte )nited 2tates, %$% ).2., %7C &1 =. Bd., 1%9C =...A., 1917B, 1179C 37 2up. Ct. .ep., 7% Ann. Cas. 19173, 3770, the 2upre"e Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. n the sa"e opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to e8ercise probation powers in the future . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2ince this decision was rendered, two atte"pts have been "ade to enact probation legislation. n 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the 4udiciary Co""ittee and passed the 1ouse. n 19%/, the *udiciary Co""ittee again favorably reported a probation bill to the 1ouse, but it was never reached for definite action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library f this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal govern"ent with reference to its treat"ent of those convicted of violations of its cri"inal laws in har"ony with that of the states of the )nion. At the present ti"e every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and *uvenile offenders. ,see, also, 4ohnson, (robation for 4uveniles and Adults E19%9F, Chap. .0 The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. n .iggs vs. )nited 2tates supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said@

2ince the passage of the (robation Act of !arch $, 19%7, the <uestions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the #inth Circuit ,7 F. E%dF, 79/0, and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the sa"e held in no "anner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the (resident. This case will be found to contain an able and co"prehensive review of the law applicable here. t arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is "ade ,#i8 vs. 4a"es, 7 F. E%dF, 79/, 79$0, as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 2eventh Circuit ,Hriebel vs. ).2., 1/ F. E%dF, 7&%0, li+ewise construing the (robation Act. De have seen that in 191& the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tatesC in plain and une<uivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the re<uisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 19%7, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assu"ed by the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates in 19%9 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a nu"ber of earlier cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library De are fully convinced that the (hilippine =egislature, li+e the Congress of the )nited 2tates, "ay legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fi8 the punish"ent of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. n "2 parte 3ates ,E1917F, %/ #. !., 7$%C =...A. 191&A, 1%97C 171 (ac., &99, the court said@ ' t is clearly within the province of the =egislature to deno"inate and define all classes of cri"e, and to prescribe for each a "ini"u" and "a8i"u" punish"ent.' And in 2tate vs. Abbott ,E191/F, 97 2.C., $&&C 33 =...A. E#. 2.F, 11%C 7/ 2. B., &C Ann. Cas. 191%3, 11990, the court said@ 'The legislative power to set punish"ent for cri"e is very broad, and in the e8ercise of this power the general asse"bly "ay confer on trial *udges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be i"posed, as to the beginning and end of the punish"ent and whether it should be certain or indeter"inate or conditional.' ,Luoted in 2tate vs. Teal E1919F, 1/9 2. C., $77C 97 2. B., &9.0 ndeed, the (hilippine =egislature has defined all cri"es and fi8ed the penalties for their violation. nvariably, the legislature has de"onstrated the desire to vest in the courts : particularly the trial courts : large discretion in i"posing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. t is believed that *ustice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best deter"ine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circu"stanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain fro" i"posing a sentence "erely because, ta+ing into consideration the degree of "alice and the in*ury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly e8cessive, the courts being allowed in such case to sub"it to the Chief B8ecutive, through the ;epart"ent of 4ustice, such state"ent as it "ay dee" proper ,see art. 7, .evised (enal Code0, in cases where both "itigating and aggravating circu"stances are attendant in the co""ission of a cri"e and the law provides for a penalty co"posed of two

indivisible penalties, the courts "ay allow such circu"stances to offset one another in consideration of their nu"ber and i"portance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such co"pensation. ,Art. &3, rule $, .evised (enal CodeC ).2. vs. .eguera and Asuategui E19%1F, $1 (hil., 7/&.0 Again, article &$, paragraph 7, of the .evised (enal Code e"powers the courts to deter"ine, within the li"its of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the e8tent of the evil produced by the cri"e. n the i"position of fines, the courts are allowed to fi8 any a"ount within the li"its established by law, considering not only the "itigating and aggravating circu"stances, but "ore particularly the wealth or "eans of the culprit. ,Art. &&, .evised (enal Code.0 Article &9, paragraph 1, of the sa"e Code provides that 'a discretionary penalty shall be i"posed' upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discern"ent, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the cri"e which he has co""itted. Article &9 of the sa"e Code provides that in case of 'inco"plete self:defense', i.e., when the cri"e co""itted is not wholly e8cusable by reason of the lac+ of so"e of the conditions re<uired to *ustify the sa"e or to e8e"pt fro" cri"inal liability in the several cases "entioned in article 11 and 1% of the Code, 'the courts shall i"pose the penalty in the period which "ay be dee"ed proper, in view of the nu"ber and nature of the conditions of e8e"ption present or lac+ing.' And, in case the co""ission of what are +nown as 'i"possible' cri"es, 'the court, having in "ind the social danger and the degree of cri"inality shown by the offender,' shall i"pose upon hi" either arresto "ayor or a fine ranging fro" %// to 7// pesos. ,Art. 79, .evised (enal Code.0 chanrobles virtual law library )nder our .evised (enal Code, also, one:half of the period of preventive i"prison"ent is deducted for" the entire ter" of i"prison"ent, e8cept in certain cases e8pressly "entioned ,art. %90C the death penalty is not i"posed when the guilty person is "ore than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the 2upre"e Court, all the "e"bers thereof are not unani"ous in their voting as to the propriety of the i"position of the death penalty ,art. $7, see also, sec. 133, .evised Ad"inistrative Code, as a"ended by Co""onwealth Act #o. 30C the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a wo"an within the three years ne8t following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age ,art. 930C and when a convict shall beco"e insane or an i"becile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the e8ecution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or i"becility ,art. 790.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3ut the desire of the legislature to rela8 what "ight result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is "ore clearly de"onstrated in various other enact"ents, including the probation Act. There is the ndeter"inate 2entence =aw enacted in 1933 as Act #o. $1/3 and subse<uently

a"ended by Act #o. $%%7, establishing a syste" of parole ,secs. 7 to 1// and granting the courts large discretion in i"posing the penalties of the law. 2ection 1 of the law as a"ended providesC 'hereafter, in i"posing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the .evised (enal Code, or its a"end"ents, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeter"inate sentence the "a8i"u" ter" of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circu"stances, could be properly i"posed under the rules of the said Code, and to a "ini"u" which shall be within the range of the penalty ne8t lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offenseC and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeter"inate sentence, the "a8i"u" ter" of which shall not e8ceed the "a8i"u" fi8ed by said law and the "ini"u" shall not be less than the "ini"u" ter" prescribed by the sa"e.' Certain classes of convicts are, by section % of the law, e8cluded fro" the operation thereof. The =egislature has also enacted the 4uvenile ;elin<uency =aw ,Act #o. 3%/30 which was subse<uently a"ended by Act #o. 3779. 2ection 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the a"endatory Act have beco"e article 9/ of the .evised (enal Code, a"ended by Act #o. $117 of the (hilippine =egislature and recently rea"ended by Co""onwealth Act #o. 99 of the #ational Asse"bly. n this Act is again "anifested the intention of the legislature to 'hu"aniAe' the penal laws. t allows, in effect, the "odification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by per"itting the suspension of the e8ecution of the *udg"ent in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circu"stances of the offenses, the cri"inal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The =egislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punish"ent at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. t this be so, then, it cannot be said that the (robation Act co"es in conflict with the power of the Chief B8ecutive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the 2upre"e Court of #ew !e8ico, 'the ele"ent of punish"ent or the penalty for the co""ission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a *udicial function under and within the li"its of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of cri"inal causes, with which the e8ecutive can have nothing to do.' , "2 parte 3ates, supra.0 n Dillia"s vs. 2tate ,E19%&F, 1&% -a., 3%7C 133 2.B., 9$30, the court upheld the constitutionality of the -eorgia probation statute against the contention that it atte"pted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been i"posed by the courts, the power of the courts to i"posed any penalty which "ay be fro" ti"e to ti"e prescribed by law and in such "anner as "ay be defined cannot be <uestioned.' chanrobles virtua De elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts "ay be legally authoriAed by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establish"ent of a syste" of probation however characteriAed. 2tate e2 rel. Tingstand vs. 2tarwich ,E19%%F, 119 Dash., 7&1C %/& (ac., %9C %& A. =. .., 3930, deserved particular "ention. n

that case, a statute enacted in 19%1 which provided for the suspension of the e8ecution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and re<uired that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the ter" of such suspension, on such ter"s as the court "ay deter"ine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief e8ecutive of the state. ,6ide, also, Re -iannini E191%F, 19 Cal App., 1&&C 1%% (ac., 931.0 chanrobles virtual law library (robation and pardon are not coter"inousC nor are they the sa"e. They are actually district and different fro" each other, both in origin and in nature. n (eople e2 rel. Forsyth vs. Court of 2essions ,E199$F, 1$1 #. G., %99, %9$C 3& #. B., 39&, 399C %3 =. .. A., 97&C 17 A". Cri". .ep., &770, the Court of Appeals of #ew Gor+ said@ . . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The for"er was always a part of the *udicial powerC the latter was always a part of the e8ecutive power. The suspension of the sentence si"ply postpones the *udg"ent of the court te"porarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, re"ain and beco"e operative when *udg"ent is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punish"ent prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. t releases the punish"ent, and blots out of e8istence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never co""itted the offense. t re"oves the penalties and disabilities, and restores hi" to all his civil rights. t "a+es hi", as it were, a new "an, and gives hi" a new credit and capacity. , "2 parte -arland, 71 ). 2., $ Dall., 333C 19 =aw. ed., 3&&C ). 2. vs. Hlein, 9/ ). 2., 13 Dall., 1%9C %/ =aw. ed., 719C Hnote vs. ). 2., 97 ). 2., 1$9C %$ =aw. ed., $$%.0 chanrobles virtual law library The fra"ers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly fa"iliar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instru"ents upon the e8ecutive with full +nowledge of the law upon the sub*ect, and the words of the constitution were used to e8press the authority for"erly e8ercised by the Bnglish crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. , "2 parte Dells, 79 ). 2., 19 1ow., 3/7C 17 =aw. ed., $%1.0 As this power was understood, it did not co"prehend any part of the *udicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the e8ercise of that power in regard to its own *udg"ents, that cri"inal courts has so long "aintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be e8ercised by the e8ecutive, and the other by the *udicial depart"ent. De therefore conclude that a statute which, in ter"s, authoriAes courts of cri"inal *urisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, : a power inherent in such courts at co""on law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary

*udicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been e8ercised of legislative power under the constitution. t does not encroach, in any *ust sense, upon the powers of the e8ecutive, as they have been understood and practiced fro" the earliest ti"es. ,Luoted with approval in ;irectors of (risons vs. 4udge of First nstance of Cavite E1917F, %9 (hil., %&7, Carson, 4., concurring, at pp. %9$, %97.0 n probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free "an. 1e is not finally and co"pletely e8onerated. 1e is not e8e"pt fro" the entire punish"ent which the law inflicts. )nder the (robation Act, the probationer?s case is not ter"inated by the "ere fact that he is placed on probation. 2ection $ of the Act provides that the probation "ay be definitely ter"inated and the probationer finally discharged fro" supervision only after the period of probation shall have been ter"inated and the probation officer shall have sub"itted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has co"plied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, re"ains in legal custody : sub*ect to the control of the probation officer and of the courtC and, he "ay be rearrested upon the non:fulfill"ent of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, "ay be co""itted to prison to serve the sentence originally i"posed upon hi". ,2ecs. %, 3, 7 and &, Act #o. $%%1.0 The probation described in the act is not pardon. t is not co"plete liberty, and "ay be far fro" it. t is really a new "ode of punish"ent, to be applied by the *udge in a proper case, in substitution of the i"prison"ent and find prescribed by the cri"inal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a *udicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law dee"ed applicable to the offense. The e8ecutive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the cri"inal law, which binds and directs the *udges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the (robation Act for this cause. ,Archer vs. 2noo+ E19%&F, 1/ F. E%dF, 7&7, 7&9.0 (robation should also be distinguished fro" reprieve and fro" co""utation of the sentence. 2nodgrass vs. 2tate ,E191%F, &7 Te8. Cri". .ep., &17C$1 =. .. A. E#. 2.F, 11$$C 17/ 2. D., 1&%0, is relied upon "ost strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested e8clusively upon the Chief B8ecutive by the 4ones =aw, "ay not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by "eans of probation law authoriAing the indefinite *udicial suspension of sentence. De have e8a"ined that case and found that although the Court of Cri"inal Appeals of Te8as held that the probation statute of the state in ter"s conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of cri"e, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and co""utation of sentence on the other. 2aid the court, through 1arper, '.@ That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the -overnor to grant

reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courtsC it being held that the distinction between a 'reprieve' and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the e8ecution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite ti"e. ,Carnal vs. (eople, 1 (ar+er, Cr. .., %&%C n re 3uchanan, 1$& #. G., %&$C $/ #. B., 9930, and cases cited in 7 Dords I (hrases, pp. &117, &11&. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the -overnor to grant co""utations of punish"ent, for a co""utations is not but to change the punish"ent assessed to a less punish"ent. n 2tate e2 rel. 3otto"nly vs. ;istrict Court ,E19%7F, 73 !ont., 7$1C %37 (ac., 7%70, the 2upre"e Court of !ontana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 1%/79:1%/9&, .evised Codes of 19%1. The court held the law valid as not i"pinging upon the pardoning power of the e8ecutive. n a unani"ous decision penned by 4ustice 1olloway, the court said@ . . . . the ter" 'pardon', 'co""utation', and 'respite' each had a well understood "eaning at the ti"e our Constitution was adopted, and no one of the" was intended to co"prehend the suspension of the e8ecution of the *udg"ent as that phrase is e"ployed in sections 1%/79:1%/9&. A 'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding fro" the power intrusted with the e8ecution of the laws which e8e"pts the individual on who" it is bestowed fro" the punish"ent the law inflicts for a cri"e he has co""itted ,)nited 2tates vs. Dilson, 7 (et., 17/C 9 =aw. ed., &$/0C t is a re"ission of guilt ,2tate vs. =ewis, 111 =a., &93C 37 2o., 91&0, a forgiveness of the offense ,Coo+ vs. !iddlese8 County, %& #. 4. =aw, 3%&C "2 parte (owell, 73 Ala., 717C $9 A". .ep., 710. 'Co""utation' is a re"ission of a part of the punish"entC a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally i"posed ,=ee vs. !urphy, %% -rat. E6a.F 799C 1% A". .ep., 7&3C .ich vs. Cha"berlain, 1/7 !ich., 391C &7 #. D., %370. A 'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of ti"e ,$ 3lac+stone?s Co""entaries, 39$0, a postpone"ent of e8ecution ,Carnal vs. (eople, 1 (ar+er, Cr. .. E#. G.F, %7%0, a te"porary suspension of e8ecution ,3utler vs. 2tate, 97 nd., 3730.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Few ad*udicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute si"ilar to our section 1%/79 has been deter"inedC but the sa"e ob*ections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to who" the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld <uite unifor"ly, as a reference to the nu"erous cases cited in the notes to Doods vs. 2tate ,13/ Tenn., 1//C 1&9 2. D.,779, reported in =. .. A., 1917F, 7310, will disclose. ,2ee, also, %/ .. C. =., 7%$.0 De conclude that the (robation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the B8ecutive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,

re"ains as full and co"plete as if the (robation =aw had never been enacted. The (resident "ay yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and i"prison"ent. ,.iggs vs. )nited 2tates E19%&F, 1$ F. E%dF, 7, 7.0 chanrobles virtual law library %. %ut 0hile the Pro)ation (a0 does not encroach upon the pardonin$ po0er of the e2ecutive and is not for that reason void does section 33 thereof constitute as contended an undue dele$ation of le$islative po0erK chanrobles virtual law library )nder the constitutional syste", the powers of govern"ent are distributed a"ong three coordinate and substantially independent organs@ the legislative, the e8ecutive and the *udicial. Bach of these depart"ents of the govern"ent derives its authority fro" the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest e8pression of popular will. Bach has e8clusive cogniAance of the "atters within its *urisdiction, and is supre"e within its own sphere.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The power to "a+e laws : the legislative power : is vested in a bica"eral =egislature by the 4ones =aw ,sec. 1%0 and in a unica"iral #ational Asse"bly by the Constitution ,Act. 6 , sec. 1, Constitution of the (hilippines0. The (hilippine =egislature or the #ational Asse"bly "ay not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any atte"pt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas dele$ata non dele$are potest . This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into Bnglish law through a "isreading of 3racton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by =ord Co+e in the Bnglish public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of *udicial power, and found its way into A"erica as an enlightened principle of free govern"ent. t has since beco"e an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. ,7 Bncyc. of the 2ocial 2ciences, p. &&.0 The classic state"ent of the rule is that of =oc+e, na"ely@ 'The legislative neither "ust nor can transfer the power of "a+ing laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.' ,=oc+e on Civil -overn"ent, sec. 1$%.0 4udge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft:<uoted language@ '5ne of the settled "a8i"s in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to "a+e laws cannot be delegated by that depart"ent to any other body or authority. Dhere the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it "ust re"ainC and by the constitutional agency alone the laws "ust be "ade until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose *udg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis" this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the *udg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis" of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.' ,Cooley on Constitutional =i"itations, 9th ed., 6ol. , p. %%$. Luoted with approval in ). 2. vs. 3arrias E19/9F, 11 (hil., 3%7.0 This court posits the doctrine 'on

the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be perfor"ed by the delegate by the instru"entality of his own *udg"ent acting i""ediately upon the "atter of legislation and not through the intervening "ind of another. ,). 2. vs. 3arrias, supra, at p. 33/.0 chanrobles virtual law library The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and infle8ible. t ad"its of e8ceptions. An e8ceptions sanctioned by i""e"orial practice per"its the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. ,.ubi vs. (rovincial 3oard of !indoro E1919F, 39 (hil., &&/C ). 2. vs. 2alaveria E1919F, 39 (hil., 1/%C 2toutenburgh vs. 1ennic+ E1999F, 1%9 ). 2., 1$1C 3% =aw. ed., &37C 9 2up. Ct. .ep., %7&C 2tate vs. #oyes E1977F, 3/ #. 1., %79.0 ' t is a cardinal principle of our syste" of govern"ent, that local affairs shall be "anaged by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authoritiesC and hence while the rule is also funda"ental that the power to "a+e laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the "unicipalities e8ercising local self govern"ent has never been held to trench upon that rule. 2uch legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to i""e"orial practice, sub*ect of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity.' ,2toutenburgh vs. 1ennic+, supra.0 5n <uite the sa"e principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the )nited 2tates as it "ay select. A territory stands in the sa"e relation to Congress as a "unicipality or city to the state govern"ent. ,)nited 2tates vs. 1einsAen E19/7F, %/& ). 2., 37/C %7 2up. Ct. .ep., 7$%C 71 =. ed., 1/99C 11 Ann. Cas., &99C ;orr vs. )nited 2tates E19/$F, 197 ).2., 139C %$ 2up. Ct. .ep., 9/9C $9 =aw. ed., 1%9C 1 Ann. Cas., &97.0 Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. 2o"e authorities "aintain that this "ay not be done ,1% C. 4., pp. 9$1, 9$%C & .. C. =., p. 1&$, citing (eople vs. Hennedy E1913F, %/7 #. G., 733C 1/1 #. B., $$%C Ann. Cas., 191$C, &1&0. 1owever, the <uestion of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in for" because of its adoption of the initiative and referendu" has been held not to be a *udicial but a political <uestion ,(acific 2tates Tel. I Tel. Co. vs. 5regon E191%F, %%3 ). 2., 119C 7& =aw. ed., 377C 3% 2up. Cet. .ep., %%$0, and as the constitutionality of such laws has been loo+ed upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the "ore conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. ,5pinions of the 4ustices E199$F, 1&/ !ass., 79&C 3& #. B., $99C %3 =. .. A., 113C Hiernan vs. (ortland E191/F, 77 5re., $7$C 111 (ac., 379C 113% (ac., $/%C 37 =. .. A. E#. 2.F, 33%C (acific 2tates Tel. I Tel. Co. vs. 5regon, supra.0 ;oubtless, also, legislative power "ay be delegated by the Constitution itself. 2ection 1$, paragraph %, of article 6 of the Constitution of the (hilippines provides that 'The #ational Asse"bly "ay by law authoriAe the (resident, sub*ect to such li"itations and restrictions as it "ay i"pose, to fi8 within specified li"its, tariff rates, i"port or e8port <uotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.' And section 1& of the sa"e article of the Constitution provides that ' n ti"es

of war or other national e"ergency, the #ational Asse"bly "ay by law authoriAe the (resident, for a li"ited period and sub*ect to such restrictions as it "ay prescribed, to pro"ulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.' t is beyond the scope of this decision to deter"ine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the (resident could be authoriAed to e8ercise the powers thereby vested in hi". )pon the other hand, whatever doubt "ay have e8isted has been re"oved by the Constitution itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The case before us does not fall under any of the e8ceptions hereinabove "entioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble The challenged section of Act #o. $%%1 in section 11 which reads as follows@ This 4ct shall apply only in those provinces in 0hich the respective provincial )oards have provided for the salary of a pro)ation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. 2aid probation officer shall be appointed by the 2ecretary of 4ustice and shall be sub*ect to the direction of the (robation 5ffice. ,B"phasis ours.0 n testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to in<uire whether the statute was co"plete in all its ter"s and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the *udg"ent of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. ,& .. C. =., p. 1&7.0 n the )nited 2tates vs. Ang Tang 1o ,E19%%F, $3 (hil., 10, this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertoo+ to authoriAe the -overnor:-eneral, in his discretion, to issue a procla"ation fi8ing the price of rice and to "a+e the sale of it in violation of the procla"ation a cri"e. , See and cf. Co"paMia -eneral de Tabacos vs. 3oard of (ublic )tility Co""issioners E191&F, 3$ (hil., 13&.0 The general rule, however, is li"ited by another rule that to a certain e8tent "atters of detail "ay be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or pro"ulgated by e8ecutive officers and ad"inistrative boards. ,& .. C. =., pp. 177:179.0 chanrobles virtual law library For the purpose of (robation Act, the provincial boards "ay be regarded as ad"inistrative bodies endowed with power to deter"ine when the Act should ta+e effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to ad"inistrative and e8ecutive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An e8a"ination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to ad"inistrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action : or the sufficiency thereof : in the statute, to aid the delegate in e8ercising the granted discretion. n so"e cases, it is held that the standard is sufficientC in others that is insufficientC and in still others that it is

entirely lac+ing. As a rule, an act of the legislature is inco"plete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the ad"inistrative officer or board "ay be guided in the e8ercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. , See 2checter vs. )nited 2tates E19%7F, %97 ). 2., $97C 79 =. ed., 177/C 77 2up. Ct. .ep., 937C 97 A.=..., 9$7C (eople e2 rel. .ice vs. Dilson 5il Co. E193&F, 3&$ ll., $/&C $ #. B. E%dF, 9$7C 1/7 A.=..., 17// and cases cited. 2ee also .. C. =., title 'Constitutional =aw', sec 17$.0 n the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the e8ercise of their discretionary power to deter"ine whether or not the (robation Act shall apply in their respective provincesK Dhat standards are fi8ed by the ActK De do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fi8 and i"pose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the e8ercise of their discretionary power. Dhat is granted, if we "ay use the language of 4ustice CardoAo in the recent case of 2checter, supra, is a 'roving co""ission' which enables the provincial boards to e8ercise arbitrary discretion. 3y section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not see"ingly on its own authority e8tend the benefits of the (robation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire "atter for the various provincial boards to deter"ine. n other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to deter"ine for the"selves, whether the (robation =aw shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the (robation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. f the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed a"ount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our "inds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 'The true distinction', says 4udge .anney, 'is between the delegation of power to "a+e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its e8ecution, to be e8ercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be doneC to the latter no valid ob*ection can be "ade.' ,Cincinnati, D. I N. .. Co. vs. Clinton County Co"rs. E197%FC 1 5hio 2t., 77, 99. 2ee also, 2utherland on 2tatutory Construction, sec &9.0 To the sa"e effect are the decision of this court in *unicipality of Cardona vs. *unicipality of %inan$onan ,E1917F, 3& (hil., 7$70C Ru)i vs. Provincial %oard of *indoro ,E1919F,39 (hil., &&/0 and Cruz vs. 1oun$)er$ ,E1931F, 7& (hil., %3$0. n the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the -overnor:-eneral authority to ad*ust provincial and "unicipal boundaries. n the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non:Christian inhabitants to ta+e up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. n the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the -overnor:-eneral authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the

i"portation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised 'if the conditions of the country "a+e this advisable or if deceased a"ong foreign cattle has ceased to be a "enace to the agriculture and livestoc+ of the lands.' chanrobles virtual law library t should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the si"ple transference of details of e8ecution or the pro"ulgation by e8ecutive or ad"inistrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. f we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. ,). 2. vs. 3arrias E19/9F, 11 (hil., 3%7C ).2. vs. !olina E191$F, %9 (hil., 119C Alegre vs. Collector of Custo"s E19%9F, 73 (hil., 39$C Cebu Autobus Co. vs. ;e 4esus E1931F, 7& (hil., $$&C ). 2. vs. -o"eA E1917F, 31 (hil., %19C .ubi vs. (rovincial 3oard of !indoro E1919F, 39 (hil., &&/.0 chanrobles virtual law library t is connected, however, that a legislative act "ay be "ade to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. t is true that laws "ay be "ade effective on certain contingencies, as by procla"ation of the e8ecutive or the adoption by the people of a particular co""unity ,& .. C. =., 11&, 17/:17%C Cooley, Constitutional =i"itations, 9th ed., 6ol. , p. %%70. n Day"an vs. 2outhard ,E19%7F, 1/ Dheat. 1C & =aw. ed., %730, the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tate ruled that the legislature "ay delegate a power not legislative which it "ay itself rightfully e8ercise. ,6ide, also, ;owling vs. =ancashire ns. Co. E199&F, 9% Dis., &3C &7 #. D., 739C 31 =. .. A., 11%.0 The power to ascertain facts is such a power which "ay be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the e8istence of facts or conditions as the basis of the ta+ing into effect of a law. That is a "ental process co""on to all branches of the govern"ent. ,;owling vs. =ancashire ns. Co., supraC .n re 6illage of #orth !ilwau+ee E199&F, 93 Dis., &1&C 97 #.D., 1/33C 33 =...A., 939C #ash vs. Fries E19/&F, 1%9 Dis., 1%/C 1/9 #.D., %1/C Field vs. Clar+ E199%F, 1$3 ).2., &$9C 1% 2up. Ct., $97C 3& =aw. ed., %9$.0 #otwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to rela8 the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the co"ple8ity arising fro" social and econo"ic forces at wor+ in this "odern industrial age ,(fiffner, (ublic Ad"inistration E193&F ch. >>C =as+i, 'The !other of (arlia"ents', foreign Affairs, 4uly, 1931, 6ol. >, #o. $, pp. 7&9:779C 3eard, '2<uirt:-un (olitics', in 1arper?s !onthly !agaAine, 4uly, 193/, 6ol. C=> , pp. 1$7, 17%0, the orthodo8 pronounce"ent of 4udge Cooley in his wor+ on Constitutional =i"itations finds restate"ent in (rof. Dilloughby?s treatise on the Constitution of the )nited 2tates in the following language : spea+ing of declaration of legislative power to ad"inistrative agencies@ 'The principle which per"its the legislature to provide that the ad"inistrative agent "ay deter"ine when the circu"stances are such as re<uire the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the ti"e this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is deter"ined by the legislature. n other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, deter"ines that, under given circu"stances, certain e8ecutive or ad"inistrative action is to be ta+en, and that, under other circu"stances, different of

no action at all is to be ta+en. Dhat is thus left to the ad"inistrative official is not the legislative deter"ination of what public policy de"ands, but si"ply the ascertain"ent of what the facts of the case re<uire to be done according to the ter"s of the law by which he is governed.' ,Dilloughby on the Constitution of the )nited 2tates, %nd ed., 6ol. , p. 1&37.0 n !iller vs. !ayer, etc., of #ew Gor+ E1993F, 1/9 ).2., 3 2up. Ct. .ep., %%9C %7 =aw. ed., 971, 97$0, it was said@ 'The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will "ust, of course, co"e fro" Congress, but the ascertain"ent of the contingency upon which the Act shall ta+e effect "ay be left to such agencies as it "ay designate.' , See also, 1% C.4., p. 9&$C 2tate vs. (ar+er E197$F, %& 6t., 377C 3landing vs. 3urr E1979F, 13 Cal., 3$3, %79.0 The legislature, then "ay provide that a contingencies leaving to so"e other person or body the power to deter"ine when the specified contingencies has arisen. 3ut, in the case at bar, the legislature has not "ade the operation of the (rohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. t leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non:operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unli"ited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. t is bound by no rule, : li"ited by no principle of e8pendiency announced by the legislature. t "ay ta+e into consideration certain facts or conditionsC and, again, it "ay not. t "ay have any purpose or no purpose at all. t need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a "atter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at so"e future ti"e : we cannot say when : the provincial boards "ay appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The ti"e of its ta+ing into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertain"ent of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the (robation =aw in their respective provinces. n so"e *urisdiction, constitutions provided that laws "ay be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section %9, article of the Constitution of Te8as provides that '#o power of suspending laws in this state shall be e8ercised e8cept by the legislature'C and section %&, article of the Constitution of ndiana provides 'That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, e8cept by authority of the -eneral Asse"bly.' Get, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. Dhile it "ay be undoubted that the legislature "ay suspend a law, or the e8ecution or operation of a law, a law "ay not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be en*oyed by others. The suspension "ust be general, and cannot be "ade for individual cases or for particular localities. n

#olden vs. 'ames ,E191$F, 11 !ass., 39&C & A". ;ec., 17$, 177, 1790, it was said@ 3y the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this co""onwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the e8ecution of the laws, ought never to be e8ercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived fro" it, to be e8ercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall e8pressly provide for. !any of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted fro" the !agna Charta of Bngland, and fro" the bill of rights passed in the reign of Dillia" and !ary. The bill of rights contains an enu"eration of the oppressive acts of 4a"es , tending to subvert and e8tirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the +ingdo"C and the first of the" is the assu"ing and e8ercising a power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the e8ecution of the laws without consent of parlia"ent. The first article in the clai" or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the e8ercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parlia"ent, is illegal. n the tenth section of the sa"e statute it is further declared and enacted, that '#o dispensation by non o)stante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowedC but the sa"e should be held void and of no effect, e8cept a dispensation be allowed of in such statute.' There is an i"plied reservation of authority in the parlia"ent to e8ercise the power here "entionedC because, according to the theory of the Bnglish Constitution, 'that absolute despotic power, which "ust in all govern"ents reside so"ewhere,' is intrusted to the parlia"ent@ 1 3l. Co"., 1&/.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The principles of our govern"ent are widely different in this particular. 1ere the sovereign and absolute power resides in the peopleC and the legislature can only e8ercise what is delegated to the" according to the constitution. t is obvious that the e8ercise of the power in <uestion would be e<ually oppressive to the sub*ect, and subversive of his right to protection, 'according to standing laws,' whether e8ercised by one "an or by a nu"ber of "en. t cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle fro" the Bnglish bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by i"plication on the general court one of the "ost odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient +ings of Bngland. t is "anifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural *ustice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citiAen should en*oy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under li+e circu"stancesC or that ant one should be sub*ect to losses, da"ages, suits, or actions fro" which all others under li+e circu"stances are e8e"pted. To illustrate the principle@ A section of a statute relative to dogs "ade the owner of any dog liable to the owner of do"estic ani"als wounded by it for the da"ages without proving a +nowledge of it vicious disposition. 3y a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to deter"ine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the

provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. t was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no "ore confer such a power than to authoriAe the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on co""ercial paper, or to suspend the statute of li"itations. ,2linger vs. 1enne"an E1977F, 39 Dis., 7/$.0 A si"ilar statute in !issouri was held void for the sa"e reason in 2tate vs. Field ,E1973, 17 !o., 7%9C79 A". ;ec., %77.0 n that case a general statute for"ulating a road syste" contained a provision that 'if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they "ight, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the sa"e for any specified length of ti"e, and thereupon the act should beco"e inoperative in such county for the period specified in such orderC and thereupon order the roads to be opened and +ept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force.' 2aid the court@ '. . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a for"er act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not sub"it the <uestion to the county court as an original <uestion, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall co""ence its operation within the countyC but it beca"e by its own ter"s a law in every county not e8cepted by na"e in the act. t did not, then, re<uire the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. 3ut being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . e"powered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the for"er act. Dhen the <uestion is before the county court for that tribunal to deter"ine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be e8ercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of "en in the state. n the present case, the <uestion is not presented in the abstractC for the county court of 2aline county, after the act had been for several "onths in force in that county, did by order suspend its operationC and during that suspension the offense was co""itted which is the sub*ect of the present indict"ent . . . .' , See !itchell vs. 2tate E19/1F, 13$ Ala., 39%C 3% 2., &97.0 chanrobles virtual law library True, the legislature "ay enact laws for a particular locality different fro" those applicable to other localities and, while recogniAing the force of the principle hereinabove e8pressed, courts in "ay *urisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the sub"ission of option laws to the vote of the people. ,& ..C.=., p. 171.0 3ut option laws thus sustained treat of sub*ects purely local in character which should receive different treat"ent in different localities placed under different circu"stances. 'They relate to sub*ects which, li+e the retailing of into8icating drin+s, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, "ay be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what see"s to us the i"pregnable ground, that the sub*ect, though not e"braced within the ordinary powers of "unicipalities to "a+e by: laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the

class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local *udg"ent should control.' ,Cooley on Constitutional =i"itations, 7th ed., p. 1$9.0 2o that, while we do not deny the right of local self:govern"ent and the propriety of leaving "atters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of s"all co""unities to pass upon, we believe that in "atters of general of general legislation li+e that which treats of cri"inals in general, and as regards the general sub*ect of probation, discretion "ay not be vested in a "anner so un<ualified and absolute as provided in Act #o. $%%1. True, the statute does not e8pressly state that the provincial boards "ay suspend the operation of the (robation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to deter"ine whether or not the law should ta+e effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality e"powered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the (robation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what "ay be done under its provisions. ,Dalter B. 5lsen I Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad E19%%F, $3 (hil., %79C 1% C. 4., p. 79&.0 chanrobles virtual law library t in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the e8pression of what "ay be ter"ed legislative policy but in the elaboration and e8ecution thereof. 'Dithout this power, legislation would beco"e oppressive and yet i"becile.' ,(eople vs. .eynolds, 7 -il"an, 1.0 t has been said that popular govern"ent lives because of the ine8haustible reservoir of power behind it. t is un<uestionable that the "ass of powers of govern"ent is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our syste" than by the e8press language of the instru"ent i"posing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intend"ent, have that effect. ,Angara vs. Blectoral Co""ission E193&F, 37 5ff. -a., %3C 2chnec+enburger vs. !oran E193&F, 37 5ff. -aA., 1317.0 3ut, it should be borne in "ind that a constitution is both a grant and a li"itation of power and one of these ti"e:honored li"itations is that, sub*ect to certain e8ceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library De conclude that section 11 of Act #o. $%%1 constitutes an i"proper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. .t is also contended that the Pro)ation 4ct violates the provisions of our %ill of Ri$hts 0hich prohi)its the denial to any person of the e/ual protection of the la0s ,Act. , sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the (hilippines.0 chanrobles virtual law library

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand depart"ents of our govern"ent and on the subordinate instru"entalities and subdivision thereof, and on "any constitutional power, li+e the police power, ta8ation and e"inent do"ain. The e<ual protection of laws, sententiously observes the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates, 'is a pledge of the protection of e<ual laws.' ,Gic+ Do vs. 1op+ins E199&F, 119 ). 2., 37&C 3/ =aw. ed., %%/C & 2up. Ct. .ep., 1/$&$C (erley vs. #orth Carolina, %$9 ). 2., 71/C 39 2up. Ct. .ep., 377C &3 =aw. ed., 737.0 5f course, what "ay be regarded as a denial of the e<ual protection of the laws in a <uestion not always easily deter"ined. #o rule that will cover every case can be for"ulated. ,Connolly vs. )nion 2ewer (ipe Co. E19/%F, 19$, ). 2., 7$/C %% 2up. Ct., .ep., $31C $& =aw. ed., &79.0 Class legislation discri"inating against so"e and favoring others in prohibited. 3ut classification on a reasonable basis, and nor "ade arbitrarily or capriciously, is per"itted. ,Finely vs. California E1911F, %%% ). 2., %9C 7& =aw. ed., 77C 3% 2up. Ct. .ep., 13C -ulf. C. I 2. F. .y Co. vs. Bllis E1997F, 1&7 ). 2., 17/C $1 =aw. ed., &&&C 17 2up. Ct. .ep., %77C 2"ith, 3ell I Co. vs. #atividad E1919F, $/ (hil., 13&.0 The classification, however, to be reasonable "ust be based on substantial distinctions which "a+e real differencesC it "ust be ger"ane to the purposes of the lawC it "ust not be li"ited to e8isting conditions only, and "ust apply e<ually to each "e"ber of the class. ,3orgnis vs. Fal+. Co. E1911F, 1$7 Dis., 3%7, 373C 133 #. D., %/9C 3 #. C. C. A., &$9C 37 =. .. A. E#. 2.F, $99C 2tate vs. Cooley, 7& !inn., 7$/C 73/:77%C 79 #. D., 17/C =indsley vs. #atural Carbonic -as Co.E1911F, %%/ ). 2., &1, 79, 77 =aw. ed., 3&9, 377C 31 2up. Ct. .ep., 337C Ann. Cas., 191%C, 1&/C =a+e 2hore I !. 2. .. Co. vs. Clough E1917F, %$% ).2., 377C 37 2up. Ct. .ep., 1$$C &1 =aw. ed., 37$C 2outhern .y. Co. vs. -reene E191/F, %1& ). 2., $//C 3/ 2up. Ct. .ep., %97C 7$ =aw. ed., 73&C 17 Ann. Cas., 1%$7C Trua8 vs. Corrigan E19%1F, %77 ). 2., 31%C 1% C. 4., pp. 11$9, 11$9.0 chanrobles virtual law library n the case at bar, however, the resultant ine<uality "ay be said to flow fro" the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the e8a"ple given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argu"ent, one province "ay appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province "ay refuse or fail to do so. n such a case, the (robation Act would be in operation in the for"er province but not in the latter. This "eans that a person otherwise co"ing within the purview of the law would be liable to en*oy the benefits of probation in one province while another person si"ilarly situated in another province would be denied those sa"e benefits. This is obno8ious discri"ination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no ine<uality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affir"ative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. 5n that hypothesis, every person co"ing within the purview of the

(robation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. #either will there be any resulting ine<uality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any a"ount for the salary of the probation officer : which is the situation now : and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the (robation Act, the City of !anila should be considered as a province and that the "unicipal board of said city has not "ade any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while ine<uality "ay result in the application of the law and in the confer"ent of the benefits therein provided, ine<uality is not in all cases the necessary result. 3ut whatever "ay be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the (robation Act creates a situation in which discri"ination and ine<uality are per"itted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities re<uiring actual denial of the e<ual protection of the law before court should assu"e the tas+ of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but pre"ises and circu"stances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act #o. $%%1 per"its of the denial of the e<ual protection of the law and is on that account bad. De see no difference between a law which per"its of such denial. A law "ay appear to be fair on its face and i"partial in appearance, yet, if it per"its of un*ust and illegal discri"ination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. ,3y analogy, Chy =ung vs. Free"an E197&F, %9% ). 2., %77C %3 =aw. ed., 77/C 1enderson vs. !ayor E197&F, 9% ). 2., %79C %3 =aw. ed., 7$3C "2 parte 6irginia E199/F, 1// ). 2., 339C %7 =aw. ed., &7&C #eal vs. ;elaware E1991F, 1/3 ). 2., 37/C %& =aw. ed., 7&7C 2oon 1ing vs. Crowley E1997F, 113 ). 2., 7/3C %9 =aw. ed., 11$7, Gic+ Do vs. 1op+ins E199&F,119 ). 2., 37&C 3/ =aw. ed., %%/C Dillia"s vs. !ississippi E1997F, 17/ ). 2., %19C 19 2up. Ct. .ep., 793C $% =aw. ed., 1/1%C 3ailey vs. Alaba"a E1911F, %19 ). 2., %19C 31 2up. Ct. .ep. 1$7C 77 =aw. ed., 2unday =a+e ron Co. vs. Da+efield E1919F, %$7 ). 2., $7/C 39 2up. Ct. .ep., $97C &% =aw. ed., 117$.0 n other words, statutes "ay be ad*udged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation ,-eneral 5il Co. vs. Clain E19/7F, %/9 ). 2., %11C %9 2up. Ct. .ep., $77C 7% =aw. ed., 77$C 2tate vs. Cle"ent #at. 3an+ E1911F, 9$ 6t., 1&7C 79 Atl., 9$$C Ann. Cas., 191%;, %%0. f the law has the effect of denying the e<ual protection of the law it is unconstitutional. ,& .. C. =. p. 37%C Civil .ights Cases, 1/9 ). 2., 3C 3 2up. Ct. .ep., 19C %7 =aw. ed., 937C Gic+ Do vs. 1op+ins, supraC 2tate vs. !ontgo"ery, 9$ !e., 19%C $7 Atl., 1&7C 9/ A. 2. .., 39&C 2tate vs. ;ering, 9$ Dis., 797C 7$ #. D., 11/$C 3& A. 2. .., 9$9C 19 =. .. A., 979.0 )nder section 11 of the (robation Act, not only "ay said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province "ay appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year : and have probation during that year : and thereafter decline to "a+e further appropriation, and have no probation is subse<uent years. Dhile this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation i"plies, it is here indicated to show that the (robation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a govern"ent of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to "a+e the guaranty of the e<uality clause but 'a rope of sand'. ,3rewer, 4. -ulf C. I 2. F. .y. Co. vs. Bllis

E1997F, 1&7 ). 2., 17/ 17$C $1 =aw. ed., &&&C 17 2up. Ct. .ep., %77.0 chanrobles virtual law library -reat reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of 5ca"po vs. )nited 2tates ,E191$F, %3$ ). 2., 91C 79 =aw. ed., 1%310. n that case, the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates affir"ed the decision of this court ,19 (hil., 10 by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the e<ual protection of the laws because, as held in !issouri vs. =ewis ,3ow"an vs. =ewis0 decided in 199/ ,1/1 ). 2., %%/C %7 =aw. ed., 9910, the guaranty of the e<uality clause does not re<uire territorial unifor"ity. t should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preli"inary investigations in cri"inal cases originally granted by -eneral 5rders #o. 79. #o <uestion of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the e<ual protection of the laws was the result of the subse<uent enact"ent of Act #o. &1%, a"ending the charter of the City of !anila ,Act #o. 9130 and providing in section % thereof that 'in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of !anila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preli"inary e8a"ination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an infor"ation against hi" in proper for" . . . .' )pon the other hand, an analysis of the argu"ents and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney : although not in the for" had in the provinces : was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of !anila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and ta+en into account by the legislature itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library .eliance is also placed on the case of !issouri vs. =ewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of !issouri per"its appeals to the 2upre"e Court of the state fro" final *udg"ents of any circuit court, e8cept those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called 2t. =ouis Court of Appeals. The provision co"plained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that "a+es the apportion"ent of territorial *urisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library De are of the opinion that section 11 of the (robation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to e<ual:protection clause of our Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2ection 11 of the (robation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the ne8t in<uiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided. n see+ing the legislative intent, the presu"ption is against any "utilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to eli"ination only where an unconstitutional provision is inter*ected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its re"oval will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act

substantially unaffected by the process. ,.iccio vs. 1obo+en, &9 #. 4. =aw., &$9, &&%C &3 =. .. A., $97C 77 Atl., 11/9, <uoted in Dillia"s vs. 2tandard 5il Co. E19%9F, %79 ).2., %37, %$/C 73 =aw. ed., %97, 3/9C $9 2up. Ct. .ep., 117C &/ A. =. .., 79&.0 n %arrameda vs. *oir ,E1913F, %7 (hil., $$, $70, this court stated the well:established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language@ chanrobles virtual law library . . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the 5rganic =aw, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable fro" the valid, "ay stand and be enforced. 3ut in order to do this, the valid portion "ust be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presu"e that the =egislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. ,!utual =oan Co. vs. !artell, %// !ass., $9%C 9& #. B., 91&C 1%9 A. 2. .., $$&C 2upervisors of 1ol"es Co. vs. 3lac+ Cree+ ;rainage ;istrict, 99 !iss., 739C 77 2ou., 9&3.0 Bnough "ust re"ain to "a+e a co"plete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. ,(earson vs. 3ass. 13% -a., 117C &3 2. B., 799.0 The void provisions "ust be eli"inated without causing results affecting the "ain purpose of the Act, in a "anner contrary to the intention of the =egislature. ,2tate vs. A. C. =. .., Co., 7& Fla., &17, &$%C $7 2ou., 9&9C 1arper vs. -alloway, 79 Fla., %77C 71 2ou., %%&C %& =. .. A., #. 2., 79$C Connolly vs. )nion 2ewer (ipe Co., 19$ ). 2., 7$/, 7&7C (eople vs. 2trasshei", %$/ ll., %79, 3//C 99 #. B., 9%1C %% =. .. A., #. 2., 1137C 2tate vs. Cognevich, 1%$ =a., $1$C 7/ 2ou., $39.0 The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what re"ains "ust e8press the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. ,2tate vs. 4un+in, 97 #eb., 1C 1%% #. D., $73C %3 =. .. A., #. 2., 939C 6ide, also,. ). 2., vs. .odrigueA E1919F, 39 (hil., 779C (olloc+ vs. Far"ers? =oan and Trust Co. E1997F, 179 ). 2., &/1, &37C 39 =aw. ed., 11/9, 11%7C 17 2up. Ct. .ep., 91%C & ..C.=., 1%1.0 t is contended that even if section 11, which "a+es the (robation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the re"ainder of the Act would still be valid and "ay be enforced. De should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably lin+ed with the other portions of the Act that with the eli"ination of the section what would be left is the bare idealis" of the syste", devoid of any practical benefit to a large nu"ber of people who "ay be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that syste". The clear policy of the law, as "ay be gleaned fro" a careful e8a"ination of the whole conte8t, is to "a+e the application of the syste" dependent entirely upon the affir"ative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Dithout such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the 2ecretary of 4ustice to act in the provinces. The (hilippines is divided or subdivided into provinces

and it needs no argu"ent to show that if not one of the provinces : and this is the actual situation now : appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act #o. $%%1 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. #either can there be a probation officer without the probation syste".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2ection % of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Bvery probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. t is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are i"posed by the court upon the probationer under his care are co"plied with. A"ong those conditions, the following are enu"erated in section 3 of the Act@ That the probationer ,a0 shall indulge in no in*urious or vicious habitsC chanrobles virtual law library ,b0 2hall avoid places or persons of disreputable or har"ful characterC chanrobles virtual law library ,c0 2hall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officersC chanrobles virtual law library ,d0 2hall per"it the probation officer to visit hi" at reasonable ti"es at his place of abode or elsewhereC chanrobles virtual law library ,e0 2hall truthfully answer any reasonable in<uiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or conditionC ',f0 2hall endeavor to be e"ployed regularlyC ',g0 2hall re"ain or reside within a specified place or localityC chanrobles virtual law library ,f0 2hall "a+e reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual da"ages or losses caused by his offenseC chanrobles virtual law library ,g0 2hall co"ply with such orders as the court "ay fro" ti"e to ti"e "a+eC and chanrobles virtual law library ,h0 2hall refrain fro" violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by:law or regulation, pro"ulgated in accordance with law. The court is re<uired to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and ter"s of probation. )nder section $, it is only after the period of probation, the sub"ission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has co"plied with the conditions of probation that probation "ay be definitely ter"inated and the probationer finally discharged fro" supervision. )nder section 7, if the court finds that there is non:co"pliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it "ay issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer "ay be co""itted with or without bail. )pon arraign"ent and after an opportunity to be heard, the court

"ay revo+e, continue or "odify the probation, and if revo+ed, the court shall order the e8ecution of the sentence originally i"posed. 2ection & prescribes the duties of probation officers@ ' t shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a state"ent of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct the" concerning the sa"eC to +eep infor"ed concerning their conduct and conditionC to aid and encourage the" by friendly advice and ad"onition, and by such other "easures, not inconsistent with the conditions i"posed by court as "ay see" "ost suitable, to bring about i"prove"ent in their conduct and conditionC to report in writing to the court having *urisdiction over said probationers at least once every two "onths concerning their conduct and conditionC to +eep records of their wor+C "a+e such report as are necessary for the infor"ation of the 2ecretary of 4ustice and as the latter "ay re<uireC and to perfor" such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or *udge "ay direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act "ay act as parole officers for any penal or refor"atory institution for adults when so re<uested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the 2ecretary of 4ustice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act #u"ber Forty:one 1undred and Three, without additional co"pensation.' chanrobles virtual law library t is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers "aybe appointed in the provinces under section 1/ of Act which provides as follows@ There is hereby created in the ;epart"ent of 4ustice and sub*ect to its supervision and control, a (robation 5ffice under the direction of a Chief (robation 5fficer to be appointed by the -overnor:-eneral with the advise and consent of the 2enate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annu". To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the nsular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the su" of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the 2ecretary of 4ustice, who is hereby authoriAed to appoint probation officers and the ad"inistrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations fro" a"ong those who possess the <ualifications, training and e8perience prescribed by the 3ureau of Civil 2ervice, and shall fi8 the co"pensation of such probation officers and ad"inistrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act. 3ut the probation officers and the ad"inistrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers re<uired to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. t "ay be said, reddendo sin$ula sin$ulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 1/ above: <uoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office +nown as the (robation 5ffice established in the ;epart"ent of 4ustice, under the supervision of the Chief (robation 5fficer. Dhen the law provides that 'the probation officer' shall investigate and "a+e reports to the court ,secs. 1 and $0C that 'the probation officer' shall supervise and visit the

probationer ,sec. %C sec. &, par. d0C that the probationer shall report to the 'probationer officer' ,sec. 3, par. c.0, shall allow 'the probationer officer' to visit hi" ,sec. 3, par. d0, shall truthfully answer any reasonable in<uiries on the part of 'the probation officer' concerning his conduct or condition ,sec. 3, par. $0C that the court shall notify 'the probation officer' in writing of the period and ter"s of probation ,sec. 3, last par.0, it "eans the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. t never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to re<uire the probationer in 3atanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of !anila, or to re<uire a probation officer in !anila to visit the probationer in the said province of 3atanes, to place hi" under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct hi" concerning the conditions of his probation or to perfor" such other functions as are assigned to hi" by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That under section 1/ the 2ecretary of 4ustice "ay appoint as "any probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. 3ut this would be arguing on what the law "ay be or should be and not on what the law is. 3etween is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdo" and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. De "ay thin+ a law better otherwise than it is. 3ut "uch as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and *udicial legislation we decline to a"end the law. De are not per"itted to read into the law "atters and provisions which are not there. #ot for any purpose : not even to save a statute fro" the doo" of invalidity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library )pon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to "a+e the nsular -overn"ent defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to "a+e the provinces defray the" should they desire to have the (robation Act apply thereto. The su" of (7/,///, appropriated 'to carry out the purposes of this Act', is to be applied, a"ong other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at !anila. These probation officers are to receive such co"pensations as the 2ecretary of 4ustice "ay fi8 'until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act'. t was the intention of the legislature to e"power the 2ecretary of 4ustice to fi8 the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the su" of (7/,/// appropriated in section 1/ is to cover, a"ong other things, the salaries of the ad"inistrative personnel of the (robation 5ffice, what would be left of the a"ount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even no"inal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. De ta+e *udicial notice of the fact that there are $9 provinces in the (hilippines and we do not thin+ it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. f this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act #o.

$%%1 said act is co"plete is an i"practicable thing under the re"ainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a syste" of probation in the provinces without probation officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l (robation as a develop"ent of a "odern penology is a co""endable syste". (robation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to per"it what "odern cri"inologist call the 'individualiAation of the punish"ent', the ad*ust"ent of the penalty to the character of the cri"inal and the circu"stances of his particular case. t provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. t is believed that, in any cases, convicts "ay be refor"ed and their develop"ent into hardened cri"inals aborted. t, therefore, ta+es advantage of an opportunity for refor"ation and avoids i"prison"ent so long as the convicts gives pro"ise of refor". ,)nited 2tates vs. !urray E19%7F, %77 ). 2., 3$7 377, 379C 7% =aw. ed., 3/9C 31%, 313C $9 2up. Ct. .ep., 1$&C Haplan vs. 1echt, %$ F. E%dF, &&$, &&7.0 The Delfare of society is its chief end and ai". The benefit to the individual convict is "erely incidental. 3ut while we believe that probation is co""endable as a syste" and its i"plantation into the (hilippines should be welco"ed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our funda"ental law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library n arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their "e"orandu"s as in their oral argu"ent. De have e8a"ined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short ti"e at our co""and for the study and deliberation of this case. n the e8a"ination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is "ore conducive to the general welfare. ,2"ith, 3ell I Co. vs. #atividad E1919F, $/ (hil., 13&.0 .ealiAing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain ad*udicated cases brought to our attention, e8cept where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear i"plication by the "ore authoritative pronounce"ents of the 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates. This line of approach is *ustified because@ ,a0 The constitutional relations between the Federal and the 2tate govern"ents of the )nited 2tates and the dual character of the A"erican -overn"ent is a situation which does not obtain in the (hilippinesC chanrobles virtual law library ,b0 The situation of s state of the A"erican )nion of the ;istrict of Colu"bia with reference to the Federal -overn"ent of the )nited 2tates is not the situation of the province with respect to the nsular -overn"ent ,Art. , sec. 9 cl. 17 and 1/th A"end"ent, Constitution of the )nited 2tatesC 2i"s vs. .ives, 9$ Fed. E%dF, 9710, chanrobles virtual law library

,c0 The distinct federal and the state *udicial organiAations of the )nited 2tates do not e"brace the integrated *udicial syste" of the (hilippines ,2chnec+enburger vs. !oran E193&F, 37 5ff. -aA., p. 13170C chanrobles virtual law library ,d0 '-eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases' ,4ustice 1ol"es in =ochner vs. #ew Gor+ E19/$F, 199 ). 2., $7, 7&C $9 =aw. ed., 937, 9$90 and, 'to +eep pace with . . . new develop"ents of ti"es and circu"stances' ,Chief 4ustice Daite in (ensacola Tel. Co. vs. Destern )nion Tel. Co. E1999F, 9& ). 2., 1, 9C %$ =aw. ed., 7/9C Gale =aw 4ournal, 6ol. >> >, #o. %, ;ec. 1919, 1$1, 1$%0, funda"ental principles should be interpreted having in view e8isting local conditions and environ"ent. Act #o. $%%1 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Dithout any pronounce"ent regarding costs. 2o ordered.c G.R. No. )*)++ Fe,"ua"- +*, ).++

THE (NITED STATES, plaintiff:appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant:appellant. Williams 5 Ferrier for appellant. 4ctin$ 4ttorney6General Tuason for appellee. JOHNS, J.: At its special session of 1919, the (hilippine =egislature passed Act #o. %9&9, entitled 'An Act penaliAing the "onopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under e8traordinary circu"stances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authoriAing the -overnor:-eneral, with the consent of the Council of 2tate, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and "a+ing an appropriation for this purpose,' the "aterial provisions of which are as follows@ 2ection 1. The -overnor:-eneral is hereby authoriAed, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an e8traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and pro"ulgate, with the consent of the Council of 2tate, te"porary rules and e"ergency "easures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit@ ,a0 To prevent the "onopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn. ,)0 To establish and "aintain a govern"ent control of the distribution or sale of the co""odities referred to or have such distribution or sale "ade by the -overn"ent itself. ,c0 To fi8, fro" ti"e to ti"e the <uantities of palay rice, or corn that a co"pany or individual "ay ac<uire, and the "a8i"u" sale price that the industrial or "erchant "ay de"and.

,d0 . . . 2BC. %. t shall be unlawful to destroy, li"it, prevent or in any other "anner obstruct the production or "illing of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereofC to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this ActC . . . 2ection 3 defines what shall constitute a "onopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the "eaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fi8ing the price. 2BC. $. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees pro"ulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not "ore than five thousands pesos, or by i"prison"ent for not "ore than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court@ Provided, That in the case of co"panies or corporations the "anager or ad"inistrator shall be cri"inally liable. 2BC. 7. At any ti"e that the -overnor: -eneral, with the consent of the Council of 2tate, shall consider that the public interest re<uires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by procla"ation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall fro" then on be te"porarily suspended. )pon the cessation of the reasons for which such procla"ation was issued, the -overnor:-eneral, with the consent of the Council of 2tate, shall declare the application of this Act to have li+ewise ter"inated, and all laws te"porarily suspended by virtue of the sa"e shall again ta+e effect, but such ter"ination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such ter"ination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense co""itted during the period covered by the -overnor:-eneral?s procla"ation. August 1, 1919, the -overnor:-eneral issued a procla"ation fi8ing the price at which rice should be sold. August 9, 1919, a co"plaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang 1o, charging hi" with the sale of rice at an e8cessive price as follows@ The undersigned accuses Ang Tang 1o of a violation of B8ecutive 5rder #o. 73 of the -overnor:-eneral of the (hilippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, % and $ of Act #o. %9&9, co""itted as follows@ That on or about the &th day of August, 1919, in the city of !anila, (hilippine slands, the said Ang Tang 1o, voluntarily, illegally and cri"inally sold to (edro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos ,(.9/0, which is a price

greater than that fi8ed by B8ecutive 5rder #o. 73 of the -overnor:-eneral of the (hilippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act #o. %9&9. Contrary to law. )pon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five "onths? i"prison"ent and to pay a fine of (7//, fro" which he appealed to this court, clai"ing that the lower court erred in finding B8ecutive 5rder #o. 73 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in i"posing the sentence. The official records show that the Act was to ta+e effect on its approvalC that it was approved 4uly 3/, 1919C that the -overnor:-eneral issued his procla"ation on the 1st of August, 1919C and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919C and that the procla"ation itself was first published on the %/th of August, 1919. The <uestion here involves an analysis and construction of Act #o. %9&9, in so far as it authoriAes the -overnor:-eneral to fi8 the price at which rice should be sold. t will be noted that section 1 authoriAes the -overnor:-eneral, with the consent of the Council of 2tate, for any cause resulting in an e8traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and pro"ulgate te"porary rules and e"ergency "easures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 3y its very ter"s, the pro"ulgation of te"porary rules and e"ergency "easures is left to the discretion of the -overnor:-eneral. The =egislature does not underta+e to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the -overnor: -eneral shall issue the procla"ation, but says that it "ay be issued 'for any cause,' and leaves the <uestion as to what is 'any cause' to the discretion of the -overnor:-eneral. The Act also says@ 'For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an e8traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.' The =egislature does not specify or define what is 'an e8traordinary rise.' That is also left to the discretion of the -overnor:-eneral. The Act also says that the -overnor:-eneral, 'with the consent of the Council of 2tate,' is authoriAed to issue and pro"ulgate 'te"porary rules and e"ergency "easures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.' t does not specify or define what is a te"porary rule or an e"ergency "easure, or how long such te"porary rules or e"ergency "easures shall re"ain in force and effect, or when they shall ta+e effect. That is to say, the =egislature itself has not in any "anner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole *udge"ent and discretion of the -overnor:-eneral to say what is or what is not 'a cause,' and what is or what is not 'an e8traordinary rise in the price of rice,' and as to what is a te"porary rule or an e"ergency "easure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. )nder this state of facts, if the law is valid and the -overnor:-eneral issues a procla"ation fi8ing the "ini"u" price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a cri"inal. There "ay not have been any cause, and the price "ay not have been e8traordinary, and there "ay not have been an e"ergency, but, if the -overnor:-eneral found the e8istence of such facts and issued a

procla"ation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller co""its a cri"e. 3y the organic law of the (hilippine slands and the Constitution of the )nited 2tates all powers are vested in the =egislative, B8ecutive and 4udiciary. t is the duty of the =egislature to "a+e the lawC of the B8ecutive to e8ecute the lawC and of the 4udiciary to construe the law. The =egislature has no authority to e8ecute or construe the law, the B8ecutive has no authority to "a+e or construe the law, and the 4udiciary has no power to "a+e or e8ecute the law. 2ub*ect to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supre"e within its own *urisdiction, and it is for the 4udiciary only to say when any Act of the =egislature is or is not constitutional. Assu"ing, without deciding, that the =egislature itself has the power to fi8 the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act #o. %9&9K n other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the -overnor:-eneralK 3y the 5rganic =aw, all =egislative power is vested in the =egislature, and the power conferred upon the =egislature to "a+e laws cannot be delegated to the -overnor: -eneral, or any one else. The =egislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. f Act no %9&9 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing "ore than to authoriAe the -overnor:-eneral to "a+e rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the =egislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. 5n the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define cri"e, and is not a law, and so"e legislative act re"ains to be done to "a+e it a law or a cri"e, the doing of which is vested in the -overnor:-eneral, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. The 2upre"e Court of the )nited 2tates in what is +nown as the Gran$er Cases ,9$ ).2., 193:197C %$ =. ed., 9$0, first laid down the rule@ .ailroad co"panies are engaged in a public e"ploy"ent affecting the public interest and, under the decision in !unn vs. ll., ante 77, are sub*ect to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters. The llinois statute of !ar. %3, 197$, to establish reasonable "a8i"u" rates of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the 2tate is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the )nited 2tates or to that of the 2tate. t was there for the first ti"e held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the 2tate had power to establish reasonable "a8i"u" freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the 2tate of !innesota in enacting a si"ilar law, providing for, and e"powering, a railroad co""ission to hear and deter"ine what was a *ust and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attac+ed and upheld by the 2upre"e Court of !innesota in a learned and e8haustive opinion by 4ustice !itchell, in the case of 2tate vs. Chicago,

!ilwau+ee I 2t. (aul ry. Co. ,39 !inn., %910, in which the court held@ Re$ulations of rail0ay tariffs 7 Conclusiveness of commission8s tariffs. O )nder =aws 1997, c. 1/, sec. 9, the deter"ination of the railroad and warehouse co""ission as to what are e<ual and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway co"pany is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to co"pel co"pliance with the tariff of rates reco""ended and published by the", no issue can be raised or in<uiry had on that <uestion. Same 7 constitution 7 Dele$ation of po0er to commission. O The authority thus given to the co""ission to deter"ine, in the e8ercise of their discretion and *udge"ent, what are e<ual and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power. t will be noted that the law creating the railroad co""ission e8pressly provides O That all charges by any co""on carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be e<ual and reasonable. Dith that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad co""ission to investigate all the facts, to hear and deter"ine what is a *ust and reasonable rate. Bven then that law does not "a+e the violation of the order of the co""ission a cri"e. The only re"edy is a civil proceeding. t was there held O That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to re<uire either argu"ent or citation of authority. The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and deter"ine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to "a+e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be e8ercised under and in pursuance of the law. The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be *ust and reasonable. t had the undoubted power to fi8 these rates at whatever it dee"ed e<ual and reasonable. They have not delegated to the co""ission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, O which would not be allowable, O but have "erely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be e8ercised in the e8ecution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely

per"issible. The legislature itself has passed upon the e8pediency of the law, and what is shall be. The co""ission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these <uestions. t can neither "a+e nor un"a+e a single provision of law. t is "erely charged with the ad"inistration of the law, and with no other power. The delegation of legislative power was before the 2upre"e Court of Disconsin in ;owling vs. =ancoshire ns. Co. ,9% Dis., &30. The opinion says@ 'The true distinction is between the delegation of power to "a+e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its e8ecution, to be e8ercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be doneC to the latter no valid ob*ection can be "ade.' The act, in our *udg"ent, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a unifor" policy re<uired to ta+e the place of all others, without the deter"ination of the insurance co""issioner in respect to "aters involving the e8ercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confir"ity to which all fire insurance policies were re<uired to be issued. The result of all the cases on this sub*ect is that a law "ust be co"plete, in all its ter"s and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the govern"ent, and nothing "ust be left to the *udge"ent of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in for" and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which "ay be left to ta+e effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertain"ent of any prescribed fact or event. The delegation of legislative power was before the 2upre"e Court in )nited 2tates vs. -ri"aud ,%%/ ).2., 7/&C 77 =. ed., 7&30, where it was held that the rules and regulations of the 2ecretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on govern"ent land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the 2ecretary of Agriculture '. . . "ay "a+e such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the ob*ect of such reservationsC na"ely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon fro" destructionC and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and re$ulations shall )e punished , . . .' The brief of the )nited 2tates 2olicitor:-eneral says@ n refusing per"its to use a forest reservation for stoc+ graAing, e8cept upon stated ter"s or in stated ways, the 2ecretary of Agriculture "erely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the )nited 2tates over land which it owns. The regulation of the 2ecretary, therefore, is not an e8ercise of legislative, or even of

ad"inistrative, powerC but is an ordinary and legiti"ate refusal of the landowner?s authoriAed agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different fro" govern"ental authority. The opinion says@ Fro" the beginning of the govern"ent, various acts have been passed conferring upon e8ecutive officers power to "a+e rules and regulations, O not for the govern"ent of their depart"ents, but for ad"inistering the laws which did govern. #one of these statutes could confer legislative power. 3ut when Congress had legislated power. 3ut when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill up the details' by the establish"ent of ad"inistrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or i"prison"ent fi8ed by Congress, or by penalties fi8ed by Congress, or "easured by the in*ury done. That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recogniAed as vital to the integrity and "aintenance of the syste" of govern"ent ordained by the Constitution.' f, after the passage of the act and the pro"ulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and graAed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were "a+ing an unlawful use of the govern"ent?s property. n doing so they thereby "ade the"selves liable to the penalty i"posed by Congress. The sub*ects as to which the 2ecretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. 1e is re<uired to "a+e provisions to protect the" fro" depredations and fro" har"ful uses. 1e is authoriAed ?to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests fro" destruction.? A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is "ade a cri"e, not by the 2ecretary, but by Congress.' The above are leading cases in the )nited 2tates on the <uestion of delegating legislative power. t will be noted that in the '-ranger Cases,' it was held that a railroad co"pany was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fi8 and deter"ine *ust and reasonable rates for freight and passengers. The !innesota case held that, so long as the rates were *ust and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and deter"ine fro" the facts what were *ust and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the co""ission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.

The Disconsin case was a civil action founded upon a 'Disconsin standard policy of fire insurance,' and the court held that 'the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a unifor" policy re<uired to ta+e the place of all others, without the deter"ination of the insurance co""issioner in respect to "atters involving the e8ercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated.' The case of the )nited 2tates 2upre"e Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were pro"ulgated by the 2ecretary of Agriculture for -overn"ent land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the 2upre"e Court of Disconsin says@ That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other depart"ent of the govern"ent, e8ecutive or *udicial, is a funda"ental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and "aintenance of the syste" of govern"ent established by the constitution. Dhere an act is clothed with all the for"s of law, and is co"plete in and of itself, it "ay be provided that it shall beco"e operative only upon so"e certain act or event, or, in li+e "anner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to "a+e a law, but it can "a+e a law to delegate a power to deter"ine so"e fact or state of things upon which the law "a+es, or intends to "a+e, its own action to depend. The 6illage of =ittle Chute enacted an ordinance which provides@ All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o?cloc+ (.!. each day and re"ain closed until 7 o?cloc+ on the following "orning, unless by special per"ission of the president. Construing it in 13& Dis., 7%&C 1%9 A. 2. .., 11//,1 the 2upre"e Court of that 2tate says@ De regard the ordinance as void for two reasonsC First, because it atte"pts to confer arbitrary power upon an e8ecutive officer, and allows hi", in e8ecuting the ordinance, to "a+e un*ust and groundless discri"inations a"ong persons si"ilarly situatedC second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law:"a+ing power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a "ere ad"inistrative officer

power to "a+e a law, but it can "a+e a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertain"ent of a fact or state of facts by an ad"inistrative officer or board. n the present case the ordinance by its ter"s gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the e8ercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an atte"pt to vest legislative discretion in hi", and cannot be sustained. The legal principle involved there is s<uarely in point here. t "ust be conceded that, after the passage of act #o. %9&9, and before any rules and regulations were pro"ulgated by the -overnor: -eneral, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per 'ganta,' and that he would not co""it a cri"e, because there would be no law fi8ing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a cri"e. That is to say, in the absence of a procla"ation, it was not a cri"e to sell rice at any price. 1ence, it "ust follow that, if the defendant co""itted a cri"e, it was because the -overnor:-eneral issued the procla"ation. There was no act of the =egislature "a+ing it a cri"e to sell rice at any price, and without the procla"ation, the sale of it at any price was to a cri"e. The B8ecutive order% provides@ ,70 The "a8i"u" selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fi8ed, for the ti"e being as follows@ n !anila O (alay at (&.77 per sac+ of 77P +ilos, or %9 centavos per ganta. .ice at (17 per sac+ of 77P +ilos, or &3 centavos per ganta. Corn at (9 per sac+ of 77P +ilos, or 3$ centavos per ganta. n the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the "a8i"u" price shall be the !anila price less the cost of transportation fro" the source of supply and necessary handling e8penses to the place of sale, to be deter"ined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies. n provinces, obtaining their supplies fro" !anila or other producing provinces, the "a8i"u" price shall be the authoriAed price at the place of supply or the !anila price as the case "ay be, plus the transportation cost, fro" the place of supply and the necessary handling e8penses, to the place of sale, to be deter"ined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies. ,&0 (rovincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to co""unicate with,

and e8ecute all instructions e"anating fro" the ;irector of Co""erce and ndustry, for the "ost effective and proper enforce"ent of the above regulations in their respective localities. The law says that the -overnor:-eneral "ay fi8 'the "a8i"u" sale price that the industrial or "erchant "ay de"and.' The law is a general law and not a local or special law. The procla"ation underta+es to fi8 one price for rice in !anila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the (hilippine slands, and delegates the power to deter"ine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. 1ere, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the -overnor:-eneral, and a delegation by hi" of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who 'are hereby directed to co""unicate with, and e8ecute all instructions e"anating fro" the ;irector of Co""erce and ndustry, for the "ost effective and proper enforce"ent of the above regulations in their respective localities.' The issuance of the procla"ation by the -overnor:-eneral was the e8ercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power. Assu"ing that it is valid, Act #o. %9&9 is a general law and does not authoriAe the -overnor: -eneral to fi8 one price of rice in !anila and another price in loilo. t only purports to authoriAe hi" to fi8 the price of rice in the (hilippine slands under a law, which is -eneral and unifor", and not local or special. )nder the ter"s of the law, the price of rice fi8ed in the procla"ation "ust be the sa"e all over the slands. There cannot be one price at !anila and another at loilo. Again, it is a "ater of co""on +nowledge, and of which this court will ta+e *udicial notice, that there are "any +inds of rice with different and corresponding "ar+et values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and <uality. Act #o. %9&9 "a+es no distinction in price for the grade or <uality of the rice, and the procla"ation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fi8es the selling price of rice in !anila 'at (17 per sac+ of 77P +ilos, or &3 centavos per ganta,' and is unifor" as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or <uality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the (hilippine slands. 1e"p, tobacco, coconut, chic+ens, eggs, and "any other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn fro" the nu"erous other products of the slands is not general or unifor", but is a local or special law. f such a law is valid, then by the sa"e principle, the -overnor:-eneral could be authoriAed by procla"ation to fi8 the price of "eat, eggs, chic+ens, coconut, he"p, and tobacco, or any other product of the slands. n the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and unifor". 5therwise, there would be an un*ust discri"ination of property rights, which, under the law, "ust be e<ual and infor". Act #o. %9&9 is nothing "ore than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a procla"ation of the -overnor: -eneral, "a+es it a floating cri"e to sell rice at a

price in e8cess of the procla"ation, without regard to grade or <uality. Dhen Act #o. %9&9 is analyAed, it is the violation of the procla"ation of the -overnor:-eneral which constitutes the cri"e. Dithout that procla"ation, it was no cri"e to sell rice at any price. n other words, the =egislature left it to the sole discretion of the -overnor:-eneral to say what was and what was not 'any cause' for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not 'an e8traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,' and under certain undefined conditions to fi8 the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or <uality, also to say whether a procla"ation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The =egislature did not specify or define what was 'any cause,' or what was 'an e8traordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,' #either did it specify or define the conditions upon which the procla"ation should be issued. n the absence of the procla"ation no cri"e was co""itted. The alleged sale was "ade a cri"e, if at all, because the -overnor:-eneral issued the procla"ation. The act or procla"ation does not say anything about the different grades or <ualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale 'of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos ,(/.9/0 which is a price greater than that fi8ed by B8ecutive order #o. 73.' De are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act #o. %9&9, in so far as it underta+es to authoriAed the -overnor:-eneral in his discretion to issue a procla"ation, fi8ing the price of rice, and to "a+e the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to "a+e the sale of rice in violation of the procla"ation a cri"e, is unconstitutional and void. t "ay be urged that there was an e8traordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which wor+ed a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an e"ergency e8isted, but the <uestion here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such "atters is an argu"ent for, or against, its constitutionality. The Constitution is so"ething solid, per"anent an substantial. ts stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor ali+e, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any e"ergency condition. The funda"ental <uestion involved in this case is the right of the people of the (hilippine slands to be and live under a republican for" of govern"ent. De "a+e the broad state"ent that no state or nation, living under republican for" of govern"ent, under the ter"s and conditions specified in Act #o. %9&9, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fi8 the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican for" of govern"ent. n the fi8ing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with govern"ent property. t was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred

under the Constitution. f this law should be sustained, upon the sa"e principle and for the sa"e reason, the =egislature could authoriAe the -overnor:-eneral to fi8 the price of every product or co""odity in the (hilippine slands, and e"power hi" to "a+e it a cri"e to sell any product at any other or different price. t "ay be said that this was a war "easure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be suspended. 3ut the 2tubborn fact re"ains that at all ti"es the *udicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in ti"es of war. t "ay be clai"ed that during the war, the )nited 2tates -overn"ent undertoo+ to, and did, fi8 the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the )nited 2tates had declared war, and at the ti"e was at war with other nations, and it was a war "easure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the sa"e act, the )nited 2tates co""andeered all the wheat and flour, and too+ possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the govern"ent itself beca"e the owner of the wheat and flour, and fi8ed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. 1ere the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his custo"ers. The govern"ent had not bought and did not clai" to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the ti"e of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the defendant. t "ay be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the "e"bers of this court have ta+en on sole"n oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to "eet the changing winds or e"ergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican for" of govern"ent ever enacted a law authoriAing any e8ecutive, under the conditions states, to fi8 the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and "a+e the broad state"ent that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act #o. %9&9 here in <uestion. 3y the ter"s of the 5rganic Act, sub*ect only to constitutional li"itations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested e8clusively in the =egislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the (hilippine slands. As to the <uestion here involved, the authority of the -overnor:-eneral to fi8 the "a8i"u" price at which palay, rice and corn "ay be sold in the "anner power in violation of the organic law. This opinion is confined to the particular <uestion here involved, which is the right of the -overnor: -eneral, upon the ter"s and conditions stated in the Act, to fi8 the price of rice and "a+e it a cri"e to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. t does not decide or underta+e to construe the constitutionality of any of the re"aining portions of the Act. The *udg"ent of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. 2o ordered. G.R. No. *//00 O% o,e" )1, ).11

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS E&PLO2&ENT AD&INISTRATION 3POEA4, &INISTER OF LABOR AND E&PLO2&ENT, HEARING OFFICER ABD(L BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents. 'imenea Dala petitioner. 5 9ara$oza (a0 Office for

The Solicitor General for pu)lic respondent. Dizon (a0 Office for respondent :athleen D. Saco. CR(5, J.: The private respondent in this case was awarded the su" of (19%,///.// by the (hilippine 5verseas B"ploy"ent Ad"inistration ,(5BA0 for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the (5BA had no *urisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas wor+er. 6italiano 2aco was Chief 5fficer of the !Q6 Bastern (olaris when he was +illed in an accident in To+yo, 4apan, !arch 17, 1997. 1is widow sued for da"ages under B8ecutive 5rder #o. 797 and !e"orandu" Circular #o. % of the (5BA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the co"plaint was cogniAable not by the (5BA but by the 2ocial 2ecurity 2yste" and should have been filed against the 2tate nsurance Fund. The (5BA nevertheless assu"ed *urisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the co"plainant. The award consisted of (19/,///.// as death benefits and (1%,///.// for burial e8penses. The petitioner i""ediately ca"e to this Court, pro"pting the 2olicitor -eneral to "ove for dis"issal on the ground of non:e8haustion of ad"inistrative re"edies. 5rdinarily, the decisions of the (5BA should first be appealed to the #ational =abor .elations Co""ission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case co"es under one of the e8ceptions, however, as the <uestions the petitioner is raising are essentially <uestions of law. ) !oreover, the private respondent hi"self has not ob*ected to the petitioner?s direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her pre*udice. The (hilippine 5verseas B"ploy"ent Ad"inistration was created under B8ecutive 5rder #o. 797, pro"ulgated on !ay 1, 199%, to pro"ote and "onitor the overseas e"ploy"ent of Filipinos and to protect their rights. t replaced the #ational 2ea"en 3oard created earlier under Article %/ of the =abor Code in 197$. )nder 2ection $,a0 of the said e8ecutive order, the (5BA is vested with 'original and e8clusive *urisdiction over all cases, including "oney clai"s, involving e"ployee:e"ployer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract wor+ers, including sea"en.' These

cases, according to the 1997 .ules and .egulations on 5verseas B"ploy"ent issued by the (5BA, include 'clai"s for death, disability and other benefits' arising out of such e"ploy"ent. + The petitioner does not contend that 2aco was not its e"ployee or that the clai" of his widow is not co"pensable. Dhat it does urge is that he was not an overseas wor+er but a ?do"estic e"ployee and conse<uently his widow?s clai" should have been filed with 2ocial 2ecurity 2yste", sub*ect to appeal to the B"ployees Co"pensation Co""ission. De see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the (5BA that 6italiano 2aco was an overseas e"ployee of the petitioner at the ti"e he "et with the fatal accident in 4apan in 1997. )nder the 1997 .ules and .egulations on 5verseas B"ploy"ent, overseas e"ploy"ent is defined as 'e"ploy"ent of a wor+er outside the (hilippines, including e"ploy"ent on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 0 A contract wor+er is described as 'any person wor+ing or who has wor+ed overseas under a valid e"ploy"ent contract and shall include sea"en' 6 or 'any person wor+ing overseas or who has been e"ployed by another which "ay be a local e"ployer, foreign e"ployer, principal or partner under a valid e"ploy"ent contract and shall include sea"en.' 7 These definitions clearly apply to 6italiano 2aco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of e"ploy"ent with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner?s vessel, the !Q6 Bastern (olaris, while berthed in a foreign country. / t is worth observing that the petitioner perfor"ed at least two acts which constitute i"plied or tacit recognition of the nature of 2aco?s e"ploy"ent at the ti"e of his death in 1997. The first is its sub"ission of its shipping articles to the (5BA for processing, for"aliAation and approval in the e8ercise of its regulatory power over overseas e"ploy"ent under B8ecutive 5rder #5. 797. * The second is its pay"ent 1 of the contributions "andated by law and regulations to the Delfare Fund for 5verseas Dor+ers, which was created by (.;. #o. 1&9$ 'for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas wor+ers.' 2ignificantly, the office ad"inistering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent?s signature, described the sub*ect of the burial benefits as 'overseas contract wor+er 6italiano 2aco.' . Dhile this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner?s own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had "ade contributions considered 2aco to be an overseas e"ployee. The petitioner argues that the deceased e"ployee should be li+ened to the e"ployees of the (hilippine Air =ines who, although wor+ing abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas wor+ers. f this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to sub"it its shipping articles to the (5BA for processing, for"aliAation and approval or to contribute to the Delfare Fund which is available

only to overseas wor+ers. !oreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the e"ployees of the (A= cannot under the definitions given be considered sea"en nor are their appoint"ents coursed through the (5BA. The award of (19/,///.// for death benefits and (1%,///.// for burial e8penses was "ade by the (5BA pursuant to its !e"orandu" Circular #o. %, which beca"e effective on February 1, 199$. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and do"estic shipping co"panies in the hiring of Filipino sea"en for overseas e"ploy"ent. A si"ilar contract had earlier been re<uired by the #ational 2ea"en 3oard and had been sustained in a nu"ber of cases by this Court. )8 The petitioner clai"s that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased 2aco, but that is hardly a serious argu"ent. n the first place, it should have done so as re<uired by the circular, which specifically declared that 'all parties to the e"ploy"ent of any Filipino sea"en on board any ocean:going vessel are advised to adopt and use this e"ploy"ent contract effective /1 February 199$ and to desist fro" using any other for"at of e"ploy"ent contract effective that date.' n the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless dee"ed written into the contract with 2aco as a postulate of the police power of the 2tate. )) 3ut the petitioner <uestions the validity of !e"orandu" Circular #o. % itself as violative of the principle of non:delegation of legislative power. t contends that no authority had been given the (5BA to pro"ulgate the said regulationC and even with such authoriAation, the regulation represents an e8ercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not sub*ect to delegation. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in 2ection $,a0 of B8ecutive 5rder #o. 797, reading as follows@ ... The governing 3oard of the Ad"inistration ,(5BA0, as hereunder provided shall pro"ulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the e8ercise of the ad*udicatory functions of the Ad"inistration ,(5BA0. 2i"ilar authoriAation had been granted the #ational 2ea"en 3oard, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the sa"e as the for"at adopted by the (5BA. The second challenge is "ore serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. Dhat can be delegated is the discretion to deter"ine ho0 the law "ay be enforced, not 0hat the law shall be. The ascertain"ent of the latter sub*ect is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Gnot v. nter"ediate Apellate Court )+ which annulled B8ecutive 5rder #o. &%&, this Court held@

De also "ar+, on top of all this, the <uestionable "anner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the <uestioned e8ecutive order. t is there authoriAed that the seiAed property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other si"ilar institutions as the Chair"an of the #ational !eat nspection Co""ission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.? , talics supplied.0 The phrase 'may see fit' is an e8tre"ely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. t is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. 5ne searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the li"itations that the officers "ust observe when they "a+e their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Dho shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosenK 5nly the officers na"ed can supply the answer, they and they alone "ay choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own e8clusive discretion. ;efinitely, there is here a ?roving co""ission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canaliAed within ban+s that +eep it fro" overflowing,? in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. There are two accepted tests to deter"ine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the co"pleteness test and the sufficient standard test. )nder the first test, the law "ust be co"plete in all its ter"s and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. )0 )nder the sufficient standard test, there "ust be ade<uate guidelines or stations in the law to "ap out the boundaries of the delegate?s authority and prevent the delegation fro" running riot. )6 3oth tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and e8ercise a power essentially legislative. The principle of non:delegation of powers is applicable to all the three "a*or powers of the -overn"ent but is especially i"portant in the case of the legislative power because of the "any instances when its delegation is per"itted. The occasions are rare when e8ecutive or *udicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. n the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have beco"e "ore and "ore fre<uent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has beco"e the rule and its non:delegation the e8ception.

The reason is the increasing co"ple8ity of the tas+ of govern"ent and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the "yriad proble"s de"anding its attention. The growth of society has ra"ified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated proble"s that the legislature cannot be e8pected reasonably to co"prehend. 2pecialiAation even in legislation has beco"e necessary. To "any of the proble"s attendant upon present:day underta+ings, the legislature "ay not have the co"petence to provide the re<uired direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions "ay, however, be e8pected fro" its delegates, who are supposed to be e8perts in the particular fields assigned to the". The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to ad"inistrative bodies. Dith the proliferation of specialiAed activities and their attendant peculiar proble"s, the national legislature has found it "ore and "ore necessary to entrust to ad"inistrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the 'power of subordinate legislation.' Dith this power, ad"inistrative bodies "ay i"ple"ent the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in? the details which the Congress "ay not have the opportunity or co"petence to provide. This is effected by their pro"ulgation of what are +nown as supple"entary regulations, such as the i"ple"enting rules issued by the ;epart"ent of =abor on the new =abor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. !e"orandu" Circular #o. % is one such ad"inistrative regulation. The "odel contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant nu"ber of the cases without challenge by the e"ployer. The power of the (5BA ,and before it the #ational 2ea"en 3oard0 in re<uiring the "odel contract is not unli"ited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the e8ercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the e8ecutive order itself which, in creating the (hilippine 5verseas B"ploy"ent Ad"inistration, "andated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino wor+ers to 'fair and e<uitable e"ploy"ent practices.' (arenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards '(ublic interest' in People v. Rosenthal )7 '*ustice and e<uity' in 4ntamo! Gold Fields v. C.R )/ 'public convenience and welfare' in Calalan$ v. Williams )* and 'si"plicity, econo"y and efficiency' in Cervantes v. 4uditor General, )1 to "ention only a few cases. n the )nited 2tates, the 'sense and e8perience of "en' was accepted in *utual Film Corp. v. .ndustrial Commission, ). and 'national security' in #ira)ayashi v. +nited States. +8 t is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a "onthly death benefit pension of (71$.$% since !arch 1997 and that she was also paid a (1,///.// funeral benefit by the 2ocial 2ecurity 2yste". n addition, as already observed, she also received a (7,///.// burial gratuity fro" the Delfare Fund for 5verseas

Dor+ers. These pay"ents will not preclude allowance of the private respondent?s clai" against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of e"ploy"ent for Filipino sea"en under !e"orandu" Circular #o. %, 2eries of 199$, thatO 2ection C. %enefits.O Compensation and

the sea"an or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws. The above provisions are "anifestations of the concern of the 2tate for the wor+ing class, consistently with the social *ustice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the wor+ing class and the pro"otion of its interest. 5ne last challenge of the petitioner "ust be dealt with to close t case. ts argu"ent that it has been denied due process because the sa"e (5BA that issued !e"orandu" Circular #o. % has also sustained and applied it is an uninfor"ed criticis" of ad"inistrative law itself. Ad"inistrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the <uasi:legislative and the <uasi: *udicial. The first enables the" to pro"ulgate i"ple"enting rules and regulations, and the second enables the" to interpret and apply such regulations. B8a"ples abound@ the 3ureau of nternal .evenue ad*udicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central 3an+ on its own circulars, the 2ecurities and B8change Co""ission on its own rules, as so too do the (hilippine (atent 5ffice and the 6ideogra" .egulatory 3oard and the Civil Aeronautics Ad"inistration and the ;epart"ent of #atural .esources and so on ad infinitum on their respective ad"inistrative regulations. 2uch an arrange"ent has been accepted as a fact of life of "odern govern"ents and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by 4ustice =aurel in the land"ar+ case of 4n$ Ti)ay v. Court of .ndustrial Relations +) are observed. Dhatever doubts "ay still re"ain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the e8press "andate of the =abor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have "ore in law. Dhen the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social *ustice, the heavier influence of the latter "ust be counter: balanced by the sy"pathy and co"passion the law "ust accord the underprivileged wor+er. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of "anage"ent, with which he can negotiate on even plane. =abor is not a "ere e"ployee of capital but its active and e<ual partner. D1B.BF5.B, the petition is ; 2! 22B;, with costs against the petitioner. The te"porary restraining order dated ;ece"ber 1/, 199& is hereby = FTB;. t is so ordered.

1. n case of death of the sea"en during the ter" of his Contract, the e"ployer shall pay his beneficiaries the a"ount of@ a. (%%/,///.// for "aster and chief engineers b. (19/,///.// for other officers, including radio operators and "aster electrician c. ( 13/,///.// for ratings. %. t is understood and agreed that the benefits "entioned above shall be separate and distinct fro", and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the sea"an is entitled to under (hilippine laws. ... 3. ... c. f the re"ains of the sea"an is buried in the (hilippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the sea"an an a"ount not e8ceeding (19,///.// for burial e8penses. The underscored portion is "erely a reiteration of !e"orandu" Circular #o. %%, issued by the #ational 2ea"en 3oard on 4uly 1%,197&, providing an follows@ .ncome %enefits under this Rule Shall )e Considered 4dditional %enefits.7 All co"pensation benefits under Title , 3oo+ Four of the =abor Code of the (hilippines ,B"ployees Co"pensation and 2tate nsurance Fund0 shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the sea"an or his beneficiaries "ay be entitled to under the e"ploy"ent contract approved by the #23. f applicable, all benefits under the 2ocial 2ecurity =aw and the (hilippine !edicare =aw shall be en*oyed by

;ece"ber %$, 19&7 -... #o. =:%39%7 E&&AN(EL PELAE5, petitioner, vs. THE A(DITOR GENERAL, respondent.

9ulueta Gonzales Paculdo and 4ssociates for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. Con%e9%#on 3Ped"o4, J.: ;uring the period fro" 2epte"ber $ to 5ctober %9, 19&$ the (resident of the (hilippines, purporting to act pursuant to 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code, issued B8ecutive 5rders #os. 93 to 1%1, 1%$ and 1%& to 1%9C creating thirty:three ,330 "unicipalities enu"erated in the "argin.1 2oon after the date last "entioned, or on #ove"ber 1/, 19&$ petitioner B""anuel (elaeA, as 6ice (resident of the (hilippines and as ta8payer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preli"inary in*unction, against the Auditor -eneral, to restrain hi", as well as his representatives and agents, fro" passing in audit any e8penditure of public funds in i"ple"entation of said e8ecutive orders andQor any disburse"ent by said "unicipalities. (etitioner alleges that said e8ecutive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said 2ection &9 has been i"pliedly repealed by .epublic Act #o. %37/ and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. .espondent "aintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is pre"ature and that not all proper parties R referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in <uestion R have been i"pleaded. 2ubse<uently, the "ayors of several "unicipalities adversely affected by the afore"entioned e8ecutive orders R because the latter have ta+en away fro" the for"er the barrios co"posing the new political subdivisions R intervened in the case. !oreover, Attorneys Bnri<ue !. Fernando and B""a Luisu"bing: Fernando were allowed to and did appear as a"ici curiae. The third paragraph of 2ection 3 of .epublic Act #o. %37/, reads@ 3arrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their na"es changed e8cept under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. (ursuant to the first two ,%0 paragraphs of the sa"e 2ection 3@ All barrios e8isting at the ti"e of the passage of this Act shall co"e under the provisions hereof. )pon petition of a "a*ority of the voters in the areas affected, a new )arrio "ay be created or the na"e of an e8isting one "ay be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon reco""endation of the council of the "unicipality or "unicipalities in which the proposed )arrio is stipulated. The reco""endation of the "unicipal council shall be e"bodied in a resolution approved by at least two:thirds of the entire "e"bership of the said council@ (rovided, however, That no new )arrio "ay be created if its population is less than five hundred persons. 1ence, since 4anuary 1, 19&/, when .epublic Act #o. %37/ beca"e effective, barrios "ay Snot be

created or their boundaries altered nor their na"es changedT e8cept by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board Supon petition of a "a*ority of the voters in the areas affectedT and the Sreco""endation of the council of the "unicipality or "unicipalities in which the proposed )arrio is situated.T (etitioner argues, accordingly@ S f the (resident, under this new law, cannot even create a )arrio, can he create a "unicipality which is co"posed of several barrios, since barrios are units of "unicipalitiesKT .espondent answers in the affir"ative, upon the theory that a new "unicipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the *urisdiction of the new "unicipality. This theory overloo+s, however, the "ain i"port of the petitionerUs argu"ent, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new )arrio i"plies a negation of the bigger power to create "unicipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argu"ent is too obvious to be denied or even <uestioned. Founded upon logic and e8perience, it cannot be offset e8cept by a clear "anifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such "anifestation, subse<uent to the passage of .epublic Act #o. %379, has been brought to our attention. !oreover, section &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code, upon which the disputed e8ecutive orders are based, provides@ The ,-overnor:-eneral0 (resident of the (hilippines "ay by e8ecutive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, "unicipality, EtownshipF "unicipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or di"inish the territory co"prised therein, "ay divide any province into one or "ore subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as "ay be re<uired, "erge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, na"e any new subdivision so created, and "ay change the seat of govern"ent within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare "ay re<uire@ (rovided, That the authoriAation of the ,(hilippine =egislature0 Congress of the (hilippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or "ore subprovinces. Dhen action by the ,-overnor: -eneral0 (resident of the (hilippines in accordance herewith "a+es necessary a change of the territory under the *urisdiction of any ad"inistrative officer or any *udicial officer, the ,-overnor:-eneral0 (resident of the (hilippines, with the reco""endation and advice of the head of the ;epart"ent having e8ecutive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so for"ed. )pon the changing of the li"its of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an e<uitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be "ade in such "anner as "ay be reco""ended by the , nsular Auditor0 Auditor

-eneral and approved by the ,-overnor:-eneral0 (resident of the (hilippines. .espondent alleges that the power of the (resident to create "unicipalities under this section does not a"ount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon !unicipality of Cardona vs. !unicipality of 3inaMgonan ,3& (hil. 7$70, which, he clai"s, has settled it. 2uch clai" is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new "unicipality, but a "ere transfer of territory R fro" an already e8isting "unicipality ,Cardona0 to another "unicipality ,3inaMgonan0, li+ewise, e8isting at the ti"e of and prior to said transfer ,2ee -ovUt of the (. . e8 rel. !unicipality of Cardona vs. !unicipality, of 3inaMgonan E3$ (hil. 719, 719:7%/10 : in conse<uence of the fi8ing and definition, pursuant to Act #o. 17$9, of the co""on boundaries of two "unicipalities. t is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fi8 such co""on boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of *urisdiction between ad*oining "unicipalities, "ay parta+e of an ad"inistrative nature : involving, as it does, the adoption of "eans and ways to carry into effect the law creating said "unicipalities : the authority to create "unicipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. n the language of other courts, it is 'strictly a legislative function' ,2tate e8 rel. 1iggins vs. Aic+len, 119 2. $%7, 4anuary %, 19790 or 'solely and e8clusively the e8ercise of legislative power' ,)dall vs. 2evern, !ay %9, 1939, 79 (. %d 3$7:3$90. As the 2upre"e Court of Dashington has put it ,Territory e8 rel. Helly vs. 2tewart, February 13, 199/, %3 (ac. $/7, $/90, '"unicipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes.' Although1a Congress "ay delegate to another branch of the -overn"ent the power to fill in the details in the e8ecution, enforce"ent or ad"inistration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law@ ,a0 be co"plete in itself : it "ust set forth therein the policy to be e8ecuted, carried out or i"ple"ented by the delegate% : and ,b0 fi8 a standard : the li"its of which are sufficiently deter"inate or deter"inable : to which the delegate "ust confor" in the perfor"ance of his functions.%a ndeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, "a+e or for"ulate such policy, which is the essence of every lawC and, without the afore"entioned standard, there would be no "eans to deter"ine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.%b 1ence, he could thereby arrogate upon hi"self the power, not only to "a+e the law, but, also : and this is worse : to un"a+e it, by adopting "easures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the syste" of chec+s and balances, and, conse<uently, under"ining the very foundation of our .epublican syste". 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code does not "eet these well settled re<uire"ents for a valid delegation of the power to fi8 the details in the enforce"ent of a law. t does not enunciate

any policy to be carried out or i"ple"ented by the (resident. #either does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. n this connection, we do not overloo+ the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of 2ection &9, the (resident@ ... "ay change the seat of the govern"ent within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare "ay re<uire. t is apparent, however, fro" the language of this clause, that the phrase 'as the public welfare "ay re<uire' <ualified, not the clauses preceding the one *ust <uoted, but only the place to which the seat of the govern"ent "ay be transferred. This fact beco"es "ore apparent when we consider that said 2ection &9 was originally 2ection 1 of Act #o. 17$9,3 which provided that, 'whenever in the *udg"ent of the -overnor: -eneral the public welfare re<uires, he "ay, by e8ecutive order,' effect the changes enu"erated therein ,as in said section &90, including the change of the seat of the govern"ent 'to such place ... as the public interest re<uires.' The opening state"ent of said 2ection 1 of Act #o. 17$9 : which was not included in 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code : governed the ti"e at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be e8ercisedC whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred e8clusively to the place to which the seat of the govern"ent was to be transferred. At any rate, the conclusion would be the sa"e, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assu"ed that the phrase 'as the public welfare "ay re<uire,' in said 2ection &9, <ualifies all other clauses thereof. t is true that in Calalang vs. Dillia"s ,7/ (hil. 7%&0 and (eople vs. .osenthal ,&9 (hil. 3%90, this Court had upheld 'public welfare' and 'public interest,' respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to e8ecute the law. 3ut, the doctrine laid down in these cases : as all *udicial pronounce"ents : "ust be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.$ The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the ;irector of (ublic Dor+s, with the approval of the 2ecretary of (ublic Dor+s and Co""unications, the power to issue rules and regulations to pro"ote safe transit upon national roads and streets. )pon the other hand, the .osenthal case referred to the authority of the nsular Treasurer, under Act #o. %791, to issue and cancel certificates or per"its for the sale of speculative securities. 3oth cases involved grants to ad"inistrative officers of powers related to the e8ercise of their ad"inistrative functions, calling for the deter"ination of <uestions of fact. 2uch is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section &9. As above indicated, the creation of "unicipalities, is not an ad"inistrative function, but one which is essentially and e"inently legislative in character. The <uestion of whether or not 'public interest' de"ands the e8ercise of such power is not one of fact. it is 'purely a legislative <uestion ',Carolina:6irginia Coastal 1ighway vs. Coastal Turnpi+e Authority, 7$ 2.B. %d. 31/:313, 317:3190, or a political <uestion

,)dall vs. 2evern, 79 (. %d. 3$7:3$90. As the 2upre"e Court of Disconsin has aptly characteriAed it, 'the <uestion as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the co""unity in any case is e"phatically a <uestion of public policy and statecraft' , n re 6illage of #orth !ilwau+ee, &7 #.D. 1/33, 1/37:1/370. For this reason, courts of *ustice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the *udicial depart"ent, the power to deter"ine whether certain territories should be anne8ed to a particular "unicipality ,)dall vs. 2evern, supra, %79:3790C or vesting in a Co""ission the right to deter"ine the plan and fra"e of govern"ent of proposed villages and what functions shall be e8ercised by the sa"e, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically li"ited by statute , n re !unicipal Charters, 9& Atl. 3/7: 3/90C or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its "etes and bounds, upon petition of a "a*ority of the ta8able inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village ,Territory e8 rel Helly vs. 2tewart, %3 (ac. $/7:$/90C or authoriAing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being ta+en by the inhabitants thereof and on certain deter"ination by a court and subse<uent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to deter"ine whether the lands e"braced in the petition 'ought *ustly' to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be pro"oted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and di"inish the boundaries of the proposed village 'as *ustice "ay re<uire' , n re 6illages of #orth !ilwau+ee, &7 #.D. 1/37:1/370C or creating a !unicipal 3oard of Control which shall deter"ine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the 'public interest' and whether the re<uire"ents of the law had been co"plied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a "unicipal corporation and fi8ing the na"e of the sa"e ,Carolina:6irginia Coastal 1ighway vs. Coastal Turnpi+e Authority, 7$ 2.B. %d. 31/0. nsofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the (resident is concerned, the case of 2chechter (oultry Corporation vs. ).2. ,79 =. Bd. 177/0 is <uite relevant to the one at bar. The 2chechter case involved the constitutionality of 2ection 3 of the #ational ndustrial .ecovery Act authoriAing the (resident of the )nited 2tates to approve 'codes of fair co"petition' sub"itted to hi" by one or "ore trade or industrial associations or corporations which 'i"pose no ine<uitable restrictions on ad"ission to "e"bership therein and are truly representative,' provided that such codes are not designed 'to pro"ote "onopolies or to eli"inate or oppress s"all enterprises and will not operate to discri"inate against the", and will tend to effectuate the policy' of said Act. The Federal 2upre"e Court held@ To su""ariAe and conclude upon this point@ 2ec. 3 of the .ecovery Act is without precedent. t supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. t does not underta+e to prescribe rules

of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact deter"ined by appropriate ad"inistrative procedure. nstead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authoriAes the "a+ing of codes to prescribe the". For that legislative underta+ing, 2ec. 3 sets up no standards, aside fro" the state"ent of the general ai"s of rehabilitation, correction and e8pansion described in 2ec. 1. n view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are i"posed, the discretion of the (resident in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the govern"ent of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. De thin+ that the code "a+ing authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. f the ter" 'unfair co"petition' is so broad as to vest in the (resident a discretion that is 'virtually unfettered.' and, conse<uently, tanta"ount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that 'public welfare,' which has even a broader connotation, leads to the sa"e result. n fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers "ade in 2ection &9 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal i"pedi"ent to a statutory grant of authority to the (resident to do anything which, in his opinion, "ay be re<uired by public welfare or public interest. 2uch grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the B8ecutive, and would bring about a total collapse of the de"ocratic syste" established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. t "ay not be a"iss to note that the e8ecutive orders in <uestion were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the "unicipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said e8ecutive orders entails the e8ercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given. Again, 2ection 1/ ,10 of Article 6 funda"ental law ordains@ of our

The (resident shall have control of all the e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus, or offices, e8ercise general supervision over all local govern"ents as "ay be provided by law, and ta+e care that the laws be faithfully e8ecuted. The power of control under this provision i"plies the right of the (resident to interfere in the e8ercise of such discretion as "ay be vested by law in the officers of the e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus, or offices of the national govern"ent, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the B8ecutive, insofar as local govern"ents are concerned. Dith respect to the latter, the funda"ental law per"its hi" to wield no "ore authority than that of chec+ing whether said local govern"ents or the officers thereof perfor" their duties as provided by statutory enact"ents. 1ence, the (resident cannot interfere with local govern"ents, so long as the sa"e or its officers act Dithin the scope of their authority. 1e "ay not enact an ordinance which the "unicipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty i"posed thereto by law, although he "ay see to

it that the corresponding provincial officials ta+e appropriate disciplinary action therefor. #either "ay he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its *urisdiction, no "atter how patently unwise it "ay be. 1e "ay not even suspend an elective official of a regular "unicipality or ta+e any disciplinary action against hi", e8cept on appeal fro" a decision of the corresponding provincial board.7 )pon the other hand if the (resident could create a "unicipality, he could, in effect, re"ove any of its officials, by creating a new "unicipality and including therein the )arrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby beco"e vacant.& Thus, by "erely brandishing the power to create a new "unicipality ,if he had it0, without actually creating it, he could co"pel local officials to sub"it to his dictation, thereby, in effect, e8ercising over the" the power of control denied to hi" by the Constitution. Then, also, the power of control of the (resident over e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus or offices i"plies no "ore than the authority to assu"e directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the e8ercise of discretion by its officials. !anifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an e8ecutive depart"ent or bureau, or to create a new one. As a conse<uence, the alleged power of the (resident to create "unicipal corporations would necessarily connote the e8ercise by hi" of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus or offices. n other words, 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code does not "erely fail to co"ply with the constitutional "andate above <uoted. nstead of giving the (resident less power over local govern"ents than that vested in hi" over the e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the e8act opposite, by conferring upon hi" "ore power over "unicipal corporations than that which he has over said e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus or offices. n short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said 2ection &9, as part of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code, approved on !arch 1/, 1917, "ust be dee"ed repealed by the subse<uent adoption of the Constitution, in 1937, which is utterly inco"patible and inconsistent with said statutory enact"ent.7 There are only two ,%0 other points left for consideration, na"ely, respondent?s clai" ,a0 that 'not all the proper parties' : referring to the officers of the newly created "unicipalities : 'have been i"pleaded in this case,' and ,b0 that 'the present petition is pre"ature.' As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not clai", that the officers of any of said "unicipalities have been appointed or elected and assu"ed office. At any rate, the 2olicitor -eneral, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor -eneral, is the officer authoriAed by law 'to act and represent the -overn"ent of the (hilippines, its offices and

agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or "atter re<uiring the services of a lawyer' ,2ection 1&&1, .evised Ad"inistrative Code0, and, in connection with the creation of the afore"entioned "unicipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are "ere agents or representatives of the national govern"ent. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.9 Dith respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the e8ecutive order I in <uestion and has not inti"ated how he would act in connection therewith. t is, however, a "atter of co""on, public +nowledge, sub*ect to *udicial cogniAance, that the (resident has, for "any years, issued e8ecutive orders creating "unicipal corporations and that the sa"e have been organiAed and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the e8penditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the -eneral Auditing 5ffice and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new "unicipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been "ade by hi". D1B.BF5.B, the B8ecutive 5rders in <uestion are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent per"anently restrained fro" passing in audit any e8penditure of public funds in i"ple"entation of said B8ecutive 5rders or any disburse"ent by the "unicipalities above referred to. t is so ordered. 3engAon, C.4., 3autista Angelo, .eyes, 4.3.=., 3arrera and ;iAon, 44., concur. Naldivar, 4., too+ no part. 2eparate 5pinions 3B#-N5#, 4.(., 4., concurring and dissenting@ A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new "unicipalities. Fostering their rapid growth has long been the ai" pursued by all three branches of our -overn"ent. 2o it was that the -overnor:-eneral during the ti"e of the 4ones =aw was given authority by the =egislature ,Act #o. 17$90 to act upon certain details with respect to said local govern"ents, such as fi8ing of boundaries, subdivisions and "ergers. And the 2upre"e Court, within the fra"ewor+ of the 4ones =aw, ruled in 1917 that the e8ecution or i"ple"entation of such details, did not entail abdication of legislative power ,-overn"ent vs. !unicipality of 3inaMgonan, 3$ (hil. 719C !unicipality of Cardona vs. !unicipality of 3inaMgonan, 3& (hil. 7$70. 2ubse<uently, Act #o. 17$9?s aforesaid statutory authoriAation was e"bodied in 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code. And Chief B8ecutives since then up to the present continued to avail of said provision, ti"e and again invo+ing it to issue e8ecutive orders providing for the creation of "unicipalities.

Fro" 2epte"ber $, 19&$ to 5ctober %9, 19&$ the (resident of the (hilippines issued e8ecutive orders to create thirty:three "unicipalities pursuant to 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code. (ublic funds thereby stood to be disbursed in i"ple"entation of said e8ecutive orders. 2uing as private citiAen and ta8payer, 6ice (resident B""anuel (elaeA filed in this Court a petition for prohibition with preli"inary in*unction against the Auditor -eneral. t see+s to restrain the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, fro" passing in audit any e8penditure of public funds in i"ple"entation of the e8ecutive orders afore"entioned. (etitioner contends that the (resident has no power to create a "unicipality by e8ecutive order. t is argued that 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the (hilippine Constitution and .epublic Act %37/ ,The %arrio Charter0. 2ection &9 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience@ 2BC. &9. -eneral authority of E-overnor:-eneral0 (resident of the (hilippines to fi8 boundaries and "a+e new subdivisions. : The E-overnor:-eneralF (resident of the (hilippines "ay by e8ecutive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, "unicipality, EtownshipF "unicipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or di"inish the territory co"prised therein, "ay divide any province into one or "ore subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as "ay be re<uired, "erge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, na"e any new subdivision so created, and "ay change the seat of govern"ent within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare "ay re<uire@ (rovided, That the authoriAation of the E(hilippine =egislatureF Congress of the (hilippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or "ore subprovinces. Dhen action by the E-overnor: -eneralF (resident of the (hilippines in accordance herewith "a+es necessary a change of the territory under the *urisdiction of any ad"inistrative officer or any *udicial officer, the E-overnor:-eneralF (resident of the (hilippines, with the reco""endation and advice of the head of the ;epart"ent having e8ecutive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers to the new districts so for"ed. )pon the changing of the li"its of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an e<uitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be "ade in such "anner as "ay be reco""ended by the E nsular AuditorF Auditor -eneral and approved by the E-overnor:-eneralF (resident of the (hilippines. Fro" such wor+ing believe that power to create a "unicipality is included@ to Sseparate any

political division other than a province, into such portions as "ay be re<uired, "erge any such subdivisions or portions with another, na"e any new subdivision so created.T The issue, however, is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the B8ecutive such power. The power to create a "unicipality is legislative in character. A"erican authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegatedC that what is delegable is not the power to create "unicipalities but only the power to deter"ine the e8istence of facts under which creation of a "unicipality will result ,37 A". 4ur. &%90. The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the "unicipal corporation should be created. f so, there is an atte"pted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid ,.)id.0. #ow 2ection &9 no doubt gives the (resident such discretion, since it says that the (resident S"ay by e8ecutive orderT e8ercise the powers therein granted. Further"ore, 2ection 7 of the sa"e Code states@ 2BC. 7. B8ercise of ad"inistrative discretion R The e8ercise of the per"issive powers of all e8ecutive or ad"inistrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given authority to do any act but not re<uired to do such act, the doing of the sa"e shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be e8ercised for the good of the service and benefit of the public, whether so e8pressed in the statute giving the authority or not. )nder the prevailing rule in the )nited 2tates R and 2ection &9 is of A"erican origin R the provision in <uestion would be an invalid atte"pt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of separation of powers. t is very pertinent that 2ection &9 should be considered with the strea" of history in "ind. A proper +nowledge of the past is the only ade<uate bac+ground for the present. 2ection &9 was adopted half a century ago. (olitical change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and rightful place in the fa"ily of nations, have since ta+en place. n 1917 the (hilippines had for its 5rganic Act the 4ones =aw. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to. Conse<uently, 2ection &9 was not constitutionally ob*ectionable at the ti"e of its enact"ent. The advent of the (hilippine Constitution in 1937 however altered the situation. For not only was separation of powers strictly ordained, e8cept only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of the Chief B8ecutive over local govern"ents suffered an e8plicit reduction. For"erly, 2ection %1 of the 4ones =aw provided that the -overnor:-eneral Sshall have general supervision and control of all the depart"ents and bureaus of the govern"ent in the (hilippine slands.T #ow 2ection 1/ ,10, Article 6 of the (hilippine Constitution provides@ SThe (resident shall have control of all the e8ecutive depart"ents, bureaus, or offices, e8ercise

general supervision over all local govern"ents as "ay be provided by law, and ta+e care that the laws be faithfully e8ecuted. n short, the power of control over local govern"ents had now been ta+en away fro" the Chief B8ecutive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one "ust trace its develop"ent and growth. As early as April 7, 19// (resident !cHinley of the )nited 2tates, in his nstructions to the 2econd (hilippine Co""ission, laid down the policy that our "unicipal govern"ents should be Ssub*ect to the least degree of supervision and controlT on the part of the national govern"ent. 2aid supervision and control was to be confined within the Snarrowest li"itsT or so "uch only as S"ay be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient ad"inistration by local officers.T And the national govern"ent Sshall have no direct ad"inistration e8cept of "atters of purely general concern.T ,2ee 1ebron v. .eyes, =:9179, 4uly %9, 1979.0 All this had one ai", to enable the Filipinos to ac<uire e8perience in the art of self:govern"ent, with the end in view of later allowing the" to assu"e co"plete "anage"ent and control of the ad"inistration of their local affairs. 2uch ai" is the policy now e"bodied in 2ection 1/ ,10, Article 6 of the Constitution ,.odrigueA v. !ontinola, 7/ 5.-. $9%/0. t is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the (resident shall have no power of control over local govern"ents. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant hi" such power ,1ebron v. .eyes, supra0. And any such power for"erly granted under the 4ones =aw thereby beca"e unavoidably inconsistent with the (hilippine Constitution. t re"ains to e8a"ine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local govern"ents. 2aid relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in 1ebron v. .eyes, supra. n said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish "unicipalities. .espondentUs view, therefore, that creating "unicipalities and controlling their local govern"ents are Stwo worlds apart,T is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local govern"ents can no longer be conferred on or e8ercised by the (resident, it follows a fortiori that the power to create the", all the "ore cannot be so conferred or e8ercised. a" co"pelled to conclude, therefore, that 2ection 1/ ,10, Article 6 of the Constitution has repealed 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative Code as far as the latter e"powers the (resident to create local govern"ents. .epeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained in ;e los 2antos v. !a lare, 97 (hil. %99. And it was there held that such repeal differs fro" a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so "uch so that only a "a*ority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.

2ince the Constitution repealed 2ection &9 as far bac+ as 1937, it is acade"ic to as+ whether .epublic Act %37/ li+ewise has provisions in conflict with 2ection &9 so as to repeal it. 2uffice it to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the (resident fro" creating a )arrio does not, in "y opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a "unicipality. For although "unicipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new "unicipalities out of pre:e8isting barrios. t is not contrary to the logic of local autono"y to be able to create larger political units and unable to create s"aller ones. For as long ago observed in (resident !cHinleyUs nstructions to the 2econd (hilippine Co""ission, greater autono"y is to be i"parted to the s"aller of the two political units. The s"aller the unit of local govern"ent, the lesser is the need for the national govern"entUs intervention in its political affairs. Further"ore, for practical reasons, local autono"y cannot be given fro" the top downwards. The national govern"ent, in such a case, could still e8ercise power over the supposedly autono"ous unit, e.g., "unicipalities, by e8ercising it over the s"aller units that co"prise the", e.g., the barrios. A realistic progra" of decentraliAation therefore calls for autono"y fro" the botto" upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national govern"ent so"e power over barrios without denying it over "unicipalities. For this reason, disagree with the "a*ority view that because the (resident could not create a )arrio under .epublic Act %37/, a fortiori he cannot create a "unicipality. t is "y view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not .epublic Act %37/, repealed 2ection &9 of the .evised Ad"inistrative CodeUs provision giving the (resident authority to create local govern"ents. And for this reason agree with the ruling in the "a*ority opinion that the e8ecutive orders in <uestion are null and void. n thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfill"ent of our historic desire to be free and independent under a republican for" of govern"ent, and e8ercising a function derived fro" the very sovereignty that it upholds. B8ecutive orders declared null and void. EN BANC Agenda fo" O% o,e" )1, +887 I e; No. 67 G.R. No. )/187/ 3ABAKADA Gu"o Pa" - L#$ Off#%e" Sa;$on S. A'%an a"a, e a'. <$. T!e Hon. E=e%u #<e Se%"e a"- Edua"do R. E";# a4> G.R. No. )/1+8* 3A?u#'#no @. P#;en e', J"., e a'. <$. E=e%u #<e Se%"e a"Edua"do R. E";# a, e a'.4> G.R. No. )/16/) 3A$$o%#a #on of P#'#9#na$ S!e'' Dea'e"$, In%., e a'. <$. Ce$a" V. Pu"#$#;a, e a'.4> G.R. No. )/16/0 3F"an%#$ Jo$e9! G. E$%ude"o <$. Ce$a" V. Pu"#$#;a, e a'4> Aand G.R. No. )/1*08 3Ba aan Go<e"no" En"#?ue T. Ga"%#a, J". <$. Hon. Edua"do R. E";# a, e a'.4

.B25=)T 5# For resolution are the following "otions for reconsideration of the Court?s ;ecision dated 2epte"ber 1, %//7 upholding the constitutionality of .epublic Act #o. 9337 or the 6AT .efor" Act E1F@

by the B6AT =aw, re<uiring the govern"ent or any of its instru"entalities to withhold a 7V final withholding 6AT on their gross pay"ents on purchases of goods and services, and finding that the <uestioned provisions@

10 !otion for .econsideration filed by petitioners in -... #o. 1&9$&3, Bscudero, et al., on the following grounds@ A. T1B ;B=BT 5# 5F T1B ?#5 (A22 5# (.56 2 5#2? F5. T1B 2A=B 5F (BT.5=B)! (.5;)CT2 A#; (5DB. -B#B.AT 5# 2B.6 CB2 C5#2T T)TB; -.A6B A3)2B 5F ; 2C.BT 5# A!5)#T #- T5 =ACH 5. B>CB22 5F 4). 2; CT 5# 5# T1B (A.T 5F T1B 3 CA!B.A= C5#FB.B#CB C5!! TTBB. 3. .B()3= C ACT #5. 9337 -.522=G 6 5=ATB2 T1B C5#2T T)T 5#A= !(B.AT 6B 5# B>C=)2 6B 5. - #AT 5# 5F .B6B#)B 3 ==2 )#;B. ?%$, A.T C=B 6 , 1997 (1 = (( #B C5#2T T)T 5#.

A. are not arbitrary, oppressive and consfiscatory as to a"ount to a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of Article , 2ection 1 of the 1997 (hilippine ConstitutionC 3. do not violate the e<ual protection clause prescribed under Article , 2ection 1 of the 1997 (hilippine ConstitutionC and

C. apply unifor"ly to all those belonging to the sa"e class and do not violate Article 6 , 2ection %9,10 of the 1997 (hilippine Constitution.

C. .B()3= C ACT #5. 9337?2 2TA#;:3G A)T15. TG T5 T1B B>BC)T 6B T5 #C.BA2B T1B 6AT .ATB, B2(BC A==G 5# ACC5)#T 5F T1B BFFBCT 6B .BC5!!B#;AT5.G (5DB. -.A#TB; T5 T1B 2BC.BTA.G 5F F #A#CB, C5#2T T)TB2 )#;)B ;B=B-AT 5# 5F =B- 2=AT 6B A)T15. TG.

. This 1onorable Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of 2ection 11/,30 of the # .C, as a"ended by the B6AT =aw, i"posing a li"itation on the a"ount of input 6AT that "ay be clai"ed as a credit against output 6AT notwithstanding the finding that the ta8 is not progressive as e8horted by Article 6 , 2ection %9,10 of the 1997 (hilippine Constitution.

%0 !otion for .econsideration of petitioner in -... #o. 1&973/, 3ataan -overnor Bnri<ue T. -arcia, 4r., with the argu"ent that burdening the consu"ers with significantly higher prices under a 6AT regi"e vis::vis a 3V gross ta8 renders the law unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive and ine<uitable. and 30 !otion for .econsideration by petitioners Association of (ilipinas 2hell ;ealers, nc. in -... #o. 1&9$&1, on the grounds that@

.espondents filed their Consolidated Co""ent. (etitioner -arcia filed his .eply.

. This 1onorable Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of 2ection 11/,A0,%0 and 2ection 11/,30 of the # .C, as a"ended by the B6AT =aw, i"posing li"itations on the a"ount of input 6AT that "ay be clai"ed as a credit against output 6AT, as well as 2ection 11$,C0 of the # .C, as a"ended

(etitioners Bscudero, et al., insist that the bica"eral conference co""ittee should not even have acted on the no pass6on provisions since there is no disagree"ent between 1ouse 3ill #os. 37/7 and 3777 on the one hand, and 2enate 3ill #o. 197/ on the other, with regard to the no pass6on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the 2enate and the 1ouse were in agree"ent that the 6AT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end:consu"er. As to the no pass6on provision for sale of petroleu" products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass6 on provision in the 1ouse version and the absence thereof in the 2enate 3ill "eans there is no conflict because ?a 1ouse provision cannot be in conflict with so"ething that does not e8ist.

2uch argu"ent is flawed. #ote that the rules of both houses of Congress provide that a conference co""ittee shall settle the ?differences? in the respective bills of each house. 6erily, the fact that a no pass6on provision is present in one version but absent in the other, and one version intends two industries, i.e., power generation co"panies and petroleu" sellers, to bear the burden of the ta8, while the other version intended only the industry of power generation, trans"ission and distribution to be saddled with such burden, clearly shows that there are indeed differences between the bills co"ing fro" each house, which differences should be acted upon by the bica"eral conference co""ittee. t is incorrect to conclude that there is no clash between two opposing forces with regard to the no pass6on provision for 6AT on the sale of petroleu" products "erely because such provision e8ists in the 1ouse version while it is absent in the 2enate version. t is precisely the absence of such provision in the 2enate bill and the presence thereof in the 1ouse bills that causes the conflict. The absence of the provision in the 2enate bill shows the 2enate?s disagree"ent to the intention of the 1ouse of .epresentatives "a+e the sellers of petroleu" bear the burden of the 6AT. Thus, there are indeed two opposing forces@ on one side, the 1ouse of .epresentatives which wants petroleu" dealers to be saddled with the burden of paying 6AT and on the other, the 2enate which does not see it proper to "a+e that particular industry bear said burden. Clearly, such conflicts and differences between the no pass6on provisions in the 2enate and 1ouse bills had to be acted upon by the bica"eral conference co""ittee as "andated by the rules of both houses of Congress.

nu"ber of "e"bers have agreed to a particular "easure. E3F

Bscudero, et. al., also contend that .epublic Act #o. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional i"perative on e8clusive origination of revenue bills under 2ection %$ of Article 6 of the Constitution when the 2enate introduced a"end"ents not connected with 6AT. The Court is not persuaded. Article provides@ 2ec. %$ All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authoriAing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, e8clusively and in private the bills 1ouse shall of originate 6, 2ection %$ of the Constitution

.epresentatives, but the 2enate "ay propose or concur with a"end"ents. 2ection %$ spea+s of origination of certain bills fro" the 1ouse of .epresentatives which has been interpreted in the Tolentino case as follows@

!oreover, the deletion of the no pass6on provision "ade the present 6AT law "ore in consonance with the very nature of 6AT which, as stated in the ;ecision pro"ulgated on 2epte"ber 1, %//7, is a ta8 on spending or consu"ption, thus, the burden thereof is ulti"ately borne by the end:consu"er.

Bscudero, et al., then clai" that there had been changes introduced in the .ules of the 1ouse of .epresentatives regarding the conduct of the 1ouse panel in a bica"eral conference co""ittee, since the ti"e of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance E%F to act as safeguards against possible abuse of authority by the 1ouse "e"bers of the bica"eral conference co""ittee. Bven assu"ing that the rule re<uiring the 1ouse panel to report bac+ to the 1ouse if there are substantial differences in the 1ouse and 2enate bills had indeed been introduced after Tolentino, the Court stands by its ruling that the issue of whether or not the 1ouse panel in the bica"eral conference co""ittee co"plied with said internal rule cannot be in<uired into by the Court. To reiterate, ?"ere failure to confor" to parlia"entary usage will not invalidate the action ,ta+en by a deliberative body0 when the re<uisite

To begin with, it is not the law ? but the revenue bill ? which is re<uired by the Constitution to 'originate e8clusively' in the 1ouse of .epresentatives. t is i"portant to e"phasiAe this, because a bill originating in the 1ouse "ay undergo such e8tensive changes in the 2enate that the result "ay be a rewriting of the whole At this point, what is i"portant to note is that, as a result of the 2enate action, a distinct bill "ay be produced. To insist that a revenue statute ? and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process cul"inating in the enact"ent of the law ? "ust substantially be the sa"e as the 1ouse bill would be to deny the 2enate?s power not only to 'concur with a"end"ents' but also to ' propose a"end"ents.' t would be to violate the coe<uality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact "a+e the 1ouse superior to the 2enate. -iven, then, the power of the 2enate to propose a"end"ents, the 2enate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are re<uired by the Constitution to originate in the 1ouse. ... ndeed, what the Constitution si"ply "eans is that the initiative

for filing revenue, tariff, or ta8 bills, bills authoriAing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application "ust co"e fro" the 1ouse of .epresentatives on the theory that, elected as they are fro" the districts, the "e"bers of the 1ouse can be e8pected to be "ore sensitive to the local needs and proble"s. 5n the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are e8pected to approach the sa"e proble"s fro" the national perspective. 3oth views are thereby "ade to bear on the enact"ent of such laws. E$F

percentage ta8 and e8cise ta8 would no longer be 6AT e8e"pt, thus, the consu"er would be burdened "ore as they would be paying the 6AT in addition to these ta8es. Thus, there is a need to a"end these sections to soften the i"pact of 6AT. The Court finds no reason to reverse the earlier ruling that the 2enate introduced a"end"ents that are ger"ane to the sub*ect "atter and purposes of the house bills.

Clearly, after the 1ouse bills as approved on third reading are duly trans"itted to the 2enate, the Constitution states that the latter can propose or concur with a"end"ents. The Court finds that the sub*ect provisions found in the 2enate bill are within the purview of such constitutional provision as declared in the Tolentino case.

(etitioners Bscudero, et al., also reiterate that ..A. #o. 9337?s stand: by authority to the B8ecutive to increase the 6AT rate, especially on account of the reco""endatory power granted to the 2ecretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They sub"it that the reco""endatory power given to the 2ecretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the -ross ;o"estic (roduct ,-;(0 as a bench"ar+ necessarily and inherently re<uired e8tended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy "a+ing.

The intent of the 1ouse of .epresentatives in initiating 1ouse 3ill #os. 3777 and 37/7 was to solve the country?s serious financial proble"s. t was stated in the respective e8planatory notes that there is a need for the govern"ent to "a+e significant e8penditure savings and a credible pac+age of revenue "easures. These "easures include i"prove"ent of ta8 ad"inistration and control and lea+ages in revenues fro" inco"e ta8es and value added ta8. t is also stated that one opportunity that could be beneficial to the overall status of our econo"y is to review e8isting ta8 rates, evaluating the relevance given our present conditions. Thus, with these purposes in "ind and to acco"plish these purposes for which the house bills were filed, i.e., to raise revenues for the govern"ent, the 2enate introduced a"end"ents on inco"e ta8es, which as ad"itted by 2enator .alph .ecto, would yield about (1/.7 billion a year. !oreover, since the ob*ective of these house bills is to raise revenues, the increase in corporate inco"e ta8es would be a great help and would also soften the i"pact of 6AT "easure on the consu"ers by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consu"ers.

As to the other #ational nternal .evenue Code ,# .C0 provisions found in 2enate 3ill #o. 197/, i.e., percentage ta8es, franchise ta8es, a"use"ent and e8cise ta8es, these provisions are needed so as to cushion the effects of 6AT on consu"ers. As we said in our decision, certain goods and services which were sub*ect to

There is no "erit in this contention. The Court reiterates that in "a+ing his reco""endation to the (resident on the e8istence of either of the two conditions, the 2ecretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the (resident or even her subordinate. 1e is acting as the agent of the legislative depart"ent, to deter"ine and declare the event upon which its e8pressed will is to ta+e effect. The 2ecretary of Finance beco"es the "eans or tool by which legislative policy is deter"ined and i"ple"ented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and infor"ation and has a "uch broader perspective to properly evaluate the". 1is function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent infor"ation and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. Congress granted the 2ecretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the e8istence of a fact, na"ely, whether by ;ece"ber 31, %//7, the value:added ta8 collection as a percentage of -;( of the previous year e8ceeds two and four: fifth percent ,%$Q7V0 or the national govern"ent deficit as a percentage of -;( of the previous year e8ceeds one and one:half percent ,1V0. f either of these two instances has occurred, the 2ecretary of Finance, by legislative "andate, "ust sub"it such infor"ation to the (resident. Then the 1%V 6AT rate "ust be i"posed by the (resident effective 4anuary 1, %//&. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what *ob "ust be done, who "ust do it, and what is the scope of his authorityC in our co"ple8 econo"y that is fre<uently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the e8ecution of a law. This is constitutionally per"issible. Congress did not delegate the power to ta8 but the "ere i"ple"entation of the law. The intent and will to increase the 6AT rate to 1%V ca"e fro" Congress and the tas+ of the (resident is to si"ply e8ecute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to use the -;( as a bench"ar+

to deter"ine econo"ic growth is not within the province of the Court to in<uire into, its tas+ being to interpret the law.

As the Court stated in its ;ecision, the right to credit the input ta8 is a "ere creation of law. (rior to the enact"ent of "ulti:stage sales ta8ation, the sales ta8es paid at every level of distribution are not recoverable fro" the ta8es payable. Dith the advent of B8ecutive 5rder #o. %73 i"posing a 1/V "ulti:stage ta8 on all sales, it was only then that the crediting of the input ta8 paid on purchase or i"portation of goods and services by 6AT:registered persons against the output ta8 was established. This continued with the B8panded 6AT =aw ,..A. #o. 771&0, and The Ta8 .efor" Act of 1997 ,..A. #o. 9$%$0. The right to credit input ta8 as against the output ta8 is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can li"it. t should be stressed

Dith regard to petitioner -arcia?s argu"ents, the Court also finds the sa"e to be without "erit. As stated in the assailed ;ecision, the Court recogniAes the burden that the consu"ers will be bearing with the passage of ..A. #o. 9337. 3ut as was also stated by the Court, it cannot stri+e down the law as unconstitutional si"ply because of its yo+es. The legislature has spo+en and the only role that the Court plays in the picture is to deter"ine whether the law was passed with due regard to the "andates of the Constitution. nas"uch as the Court finds that there are no constitutional infir"ities with its passage, the validity of the law "ust therefore be upheld.

Finally, petitioners Association of (ilipinas 2hell ;ealers, nc. reiterated their argu"ents in the petition, citing this ti"e, the dissertation of Associate 4ustice ;ante 5. Tinga in his ;issenting 5pinion. The glitch in petitioners? argu"ents is that it presents figures based on an event that is yet to happen. Their illustration of the possi)le effects of the 7/V li"itation, while see"ingly concrete, still re"ains theoretical. Theories have no place in this case as !e Cou" ;u$ on'- dea' B# ! an e=#$ #ng %a$e o" %on "o<e"$- !a #$ a99"o9"#a e o" "#9e fo" Cud#%#a' de e";#na #on, no one !a #$ %onCe% u"a' o" ;e"e'- an #%#9a o"-. E7F The Court will not intervene absent an actual and substantial controversy ad"itting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished fro" an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. E&F The i"pact of the 7/V li"itation on the creditable input ta8 will ulti"ately depend on how one "anages and operates its business. !ar+et forces, strategy and acu"en will dictate their "oves. Dith or without these 6AT provisions, an entrepreneur who does not have the +en to adapt to econo"ic variables will surely perish in the co"petition. The argu"ents posed are within the real" of business, and the solution lies also in business.

that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. E7F

The concept of vested right is a conse<uence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that e8presses a present fi8ed interest which in right reason and natural *ustice is protected against arbitrary state actionC it includes not only legal or e<uitable title to the enforce"ent of a de"and but also e8e"ptions fro" new obligations created after the right has beco"e vested. .ights are considered vested when the right to en*oy"ent is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fi8ed and irrefutable. E9F As adeptly stated by Associate 4ustice !inita 6. Chico: #aAario in her Concurring 5pinion, which the Court adopts, petitioners? right to the input 6AT credits has not yet vested, thus ?

(etitioners also reiterate their argu"ent that the input ta8 is a property or a property right. n the sa"e breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a 6AT: registered person?s entitle"ent to the creditable input ta8 is a "ere statutory privilege. (etitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input 6AT is "erely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the 2tate cannot re"ove.

t should be re"e"bered that prior to .ep. Act #o. 9337, the petroleu" dealers? input 6AT credits were ine8istent ? they were unrecogniAed and disallowed by law. The petroleu" dealers had no such property called input 6AT credits. t is only rational, therefore, that they cannot ac<uire vested rights to the use of such input 6AT credits when they were never entitled to such credits in the first place, at least, not until .ep. Act #o. 9337. !y view, at this point, when .ep. Act #o. 9337 has not yet even been i"ple"ented, is that petroleu" dealers? right to use their input 6AT as credit against their output 6AT unli"itedly has not vested, being a "ere e8pectancy of a future benefit and being contingent on the

continuance of 2ection 11/ of the #ational nternal .evenue Code of 1997, prior to its a"end"ent by .ep. Act #o. 9337.

The elucidation of Associate 4ustice Arte"io 6. (anganiban is li+ewise worthy of note, to wit@ !oreover, there is no vested right in generally accepted accounting principles. These refer to accounting concepts, "easure"ent techni<ues, and standards of presentation in a co"pany?s financial state"ents, and are not rooted in laws of nature, as are the laws of physical science, for these are "erely developed and continually "odified by local and international regulatory accounting bodies. To state otherwise and recogniAe such asset account as a vested right is to li"it the ta8ing power of the 2tate. )nli"ited, plenary, co"prehensive and supre"e, this power cannot be unduly restricted by "ere creations of the 2tate. !ore i"portantly, the assailed provisions of ..A. #o. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdo". 2o long as there is a public end for which ..A. #o. 9337 was passed, the "eans through which such end shall be acco"plished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. As stated in Carmichael vs. Southern Coal 5 Co!e Co.@

EDDIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. P(RISI&A, #n !#$ %a9a%# - a$ Se%"e a"- of F#nan%e, HON. G(ILLER&O L. PARA2NO, JR., #n !#$ %a9a%# a$ Co;;#$$#one" of !e Bu"eau of In e"na' Re<enue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, #n !#$ Ca9a%# - a$ Co;;#$$#one" of Bu"eau of Cu$ o;$, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: This petition for prohibition 1 see+s to prevent respondents fro" i"ple"enting and enforcing .epublic Act ,.A0 9337% ,Attrition Act of %//70. .A 9337 was enacted to opti"iAe the revenue: generation capability and collection of the 3ureau of nternal .evenue ,3 .0 and the 3ureau of Custo"s ,35C0. The law intends to encourage 3 . and 35C officials and e"ployees to e8ceed their revenue targets by providing a syste" of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a .ewards and ncentives Fund ,Fund0 and a .evenue (erfor"ance Bvaluation 3oard ,3oard0.3 t covers all officials and e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C with at least si8 "onths of service, regardless of e"ploy"ent status.$ The Fund is sourced fro" the collection of the 3 . and the 35C in e8cess of their revenue targets for the year, as deter"ined by the ;evelop"ent 3udget and Coordinating Co""ittee ,;3CC0. Any incentive or reward is ta+en fro" the fund and allocated to the 3 . and the 35C in proportion to their contribution in the e8cess collection of the targeted a"ount of ta8 revenue.7 The 3oards in the 3 . and the 35C are co"posed of the 2ecretary of the ;epart"ent of Finance ,;5F0 or hisQher )ndersecretary, the 2ecretary of the ;epart"ent of 3udget and !anage"ent ,;3!0 or hisQher )ndersecretary, the ;irector -eneral of the #ational Bcono"ic ;evelop"ent Authority ,#B;A0 or hisQher ;eputy ;irector -eneral, the Co""issioners of the 3 . and the 35C or their ;eputy Co""issioners, two representatives fro" the ran+:and:file e"ployees and a representative fro" the officials no"inated by their recogniAed organiAation.& Bach 3oard has the duty to ,10 prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the FundC ,%0 set criteria and procedures for re"oving fro" the service officials and e"ployees whose revenue collection falls short of the targetC ,30 ter"inate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the 3oardC ,$0 prescribe a syste" for perfor"ance evaluationC ,70 perfor" other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and ,&0 sub"it an annual report to Congress.7 The ;5F, ;3!, #B;A, 3 ., 35C and the Civil 2ervice Co""ission ,C2C0 were tas+ed to pro"ulgate and issue the i"ple"enting rules and regulations of .A 9337,9 to be approved by a 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee created for such purpose.9

f the <uestion were ours to decide, we could not say that the legislature, in adopting the present sche"e rather than another, had no basis for its choice, or was arbitrary or unreasonable in its action. 3ut, as the state is free to distribute the burden of a ta8 without regard to the particular purpose for which it is to be used, there is no warrant in the Constitution for setting the ta8 aside because a court thin+s that it could have distributed the burden "ore wisely. Those are functions reserved for the legislature. E9F D1B.BF5.B, the !otions for .econsideration are hereby DENIED DITH FINALIT2. The

te"porary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

G.R. No. )//*)7

Augu$ )6, +881

ABAKADA G(RO PART2 LIST 3fo";e"'AASJS41 OFFICERSE&E&BERS SA&SON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RO&EO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and

(etitioners, invo+ing their right as ta8payers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of .A 9337, a ta8 refor" legislation. They contend that, by establishing a syste" of rewards and incentives, the law 'transfor"EsF the officials and e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C into "ercenaries and bounty hunters' as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the syste" of rewards and incentives invites corruption and under"ines the constitutionally "andated duty of these officials and e"ployees to serve the people with ut"ost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. (etitioners also clai" that li"iting the scope of the syste" of rewards and incentives only to officials and e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C violates the constitutional guarantee of e<ual protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a syste" should not apply to officials and e"ployees of all other govern"ent agencies. n addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fi8 revenue targets to the (resident as it lac+s a sufficient standard on that "atter. Dhile 2ection 7,b0 and ,c0 of .A 9337 provides that 3 . and 35C officials "ay be dis"issed fro" the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.7V, the law does not, however, fi8 the revenue targets to be achieved. nstead, the fi8ing of revenue targets has been delegated to the (resident without sufficient standards. t will therefore be easy for the (resident to fi8 an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dis"iss 3 . or 35C personnel. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight co""ittee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Dhile the legislative function is dee"ed acco"plished and co"pleted upon the enact"ent and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight co""ittee per"its legislative participation in the i"ple"entation and enforce"ent of the law. n their co""ent, respondents, through the 5ffice of the 2olicitor -eneral, <uestion the petition for being pre"ature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. (etitioners have not asserted any right or clai" that will necessitate the e8ercise of this CourtUs *urisdiction. #evertheless, respondents ac+nowledge that public policy re<uires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward syste" will breed "ercenaries is "ere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. 2een in con*unction with the declared ob*ective of .A 9337, the law validly classifies the 3 . and the 35C because the functions they perfor" are distinct fro" those of the other govern"ent agencies and instru"entalities. !oreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the e8ecutive in the i"ple"entation of its provisions. =astly, the creation of the congressional oversight co""ittee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. t ensures the fulfill"ent of the legislative policy and serves as a chec+ to any over:accu"ulation of power on the

part of the e8ecutive and the i"ple"enting agencies. After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overco"e the presu"ption of constitutionality in favor of .A 9337, e8cept as shall hereafter be discussed. A% ua' Ca$e And R#9ene$$ An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal clai"s susceptible of *udicial ad*udication. 1/ A closely related re<uire"ent is ripeness, that is, the <uestion "ust be ripe for ad*udication. And a constitutional <uestion is ripe for ad*udication when the govern"ental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for *udicial ad*udication, the petitioner "ust show a personal sta+e in the outco"e of the case or an in*ury to hi"self that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.1% n this case, aside fro" the general clai" that the dispute has ripened into a *udicial controversy by the "ere enact"ent of the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal clai" or to de"onstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on the". They are unable to show a personal sta+e in the outco"e of this case or an in*ury to the"selves. 5n this account, their petition is procedurally infir". This notwithstanding, public interest re<uires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presu"ption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it beco"es not only the right but in fact the duty of the *udiciary to settle the dispute.1$ A%%oun a,#'# Pu,'#% Off#%e"$ of

2ection 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states@ 2ec. 1. (ublic office is a public trust. (ublic officers and e"ployees "ust at all ti"es be accountable to the people, serve the" with ut"ost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotis", and *ustice, and lead "odest lives. (ublic office is a public trust. t "ust be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for who" he holds it in trust. 3y de"anding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotis" and *ustice, all govern"ent officials and e"ployees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. (ublic officers en*oy the presu"ption of regularity in the perfor"ance of their duties. This presu"ption necessarily obtains in favor of 3 . and 35C officials and e"ployees. .A 9337

operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a syste" of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C to e8ceed their revenue targets and opti"iAe their revenue: generation capability and collection.17 The presu"ption is disputable but proof to the contrary is re<uired to rebut it. t cannot be overturned by "ere con*ecture or denied in advance ,as petitioners would have the Court do0 specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. (etitionersU clai" that the i"ple"entation of .A 9337 will turn 3 . and 35C officials and e"ployees into 'bounty hunters and "ercenaries' is not only without any factual and legal basisC it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress en*oys the strong presu"ption of constitutionality. To *ustify its nullification, there "ust be a clear and une<uivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and e<uivocal one.1& To invalidate .A 9337 based on petitionersU baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdo" not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the e8ecutive which approved it. (ublic service is its own reward. #evertheless, public officers "ay by law be rewarded for e8e"plary and e8ceptional perfor"ance. A syste" of incentives for e8ceeding the set e8pectations of a public office is not anathe"a to the concept of public accountability. n fact, it recogniAes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving govern"ent personnel. n +nited States v. *atthe0s ,17 the ).2. 2upre"e Court validated a law which awards to officers of the custo"s as well as other parties an a"ount not e8ceeding one:half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against s"uggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. +nited States,19 the ).2. 2upre"e Court said@ The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to sti"ulate and reward their Aeal and industry in detecting fraudulent atte"pts to evade pay"ent of duties and ta8es. n the sa"e vein, e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C "ay by law be entitled to a reward when, as a conse<uence of their Aeal in the enforce"ent of ta8 and custo"s laws, they e8ceed their revenue targets. n addition, .A 9337 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be clai"ed if it will be either the fruit of 'bounty hunting or "ercenary activity' or the product of the irregular perfor"ance of official duties. 5ne of these precautionary "easures is e"bodied in 2ection 9 of the law@ 2BC. 9. (ia)ility of Officials "2aminers and "mployees of the %.R and the %OC. ; The officials, e8a"iners, and e"ployees of the E3 .F and the E35CF who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of "alfeasance or "isfeasance or fail

to e8ercise e8traordinary diligence in the perfor"ance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or in*ury suffered by any business establish"ent or ta8payer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, "alfeasance, "isfeasance or failure to e8ercise e8traordinary diligence. E?ua' P"o e% #on B<uality guaranteed under the e<ual protection clause is e<uality under the sa"e conditions and a"ong persons si"ilarly situatedC it is e<uality a"ong e<uals, not si"ilarity of treat"ent of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the ob*ect to be acco"plished.19 Dhen things or persons are different in fact or circu"stance, they "ay be treated in law differently. n &ictoriano v. "lizalde Rope Wor!ers< +nion,%/ this Court declared@ The guaranty of e<ual protection of the laws is not a guaranty of e<uality in the application of the laws upon all citiAens of the E2Ftate. t is not, therefore, a re<uire"ent, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against ine<uality, that every "an, wo"an and child should be affected ali+e by a statute. B<uality of operation of statutes does not "ean indiscri"inate operation on persons "erely as such, but on persons according to the circu"stances surrounding the". t guarantees e<uality, not identity of rights. T!e Con$ # u #on doe$ no "e?u#"e !a !#ng$ B!#%! a"e d#ffe"en #n fa% ,e "ea ed #n 'aB a$ !oug! !eBe"e !e $a;e. T!e e?ua' 9"o e% #on %'au$e doe$ no fo",#d d#$%"#;#na #on a$ o !#ng$ !a a"e d#ffe"en . I doe$ no 9"o!#,# 'eg#$'a #on B!#%! #$ '#;# ed e# !e" #n !e o,Ce% o B!#%! # #$ d#"e% ed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The e<ual protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other depart"ents of +nowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of si"ple ine<uality. The very idea of classification is that of ine<uality, so that it goes without saying that the "ere fact of ine<uality in no "anner deter"ines the "atter of constitutionality. A'' !a #$ "e?u#"ed of a <a'#d %'a$$#f#%a #on #$ !a # ,e "ea$ona,'e, B!#%! ;ean$ !a !e %'a$$#f#%a #on $!ou'd ,e ,a$ed on $u,$ an #a' d#$ #n% #on$ B!#%! ;aFe fo" "ea' d#ffe"en%e$, !a # ;u$ ,e ge";ane o !e 9u"9o$e of !e 'aB> !a # ;u$ no ,e '#;# ed o e=#$ #ng %ond# #on$ on'-> and !a # ;u$ a99'- e?ua''- o ea%! ;e;,e" of !e %'a$$. This Court has held that !e $ anda"d #$ $a #$f#ed #f !e %'a$$#f#%a #on o" d#$ #n% #on #$ ,a$ed on a "ea$ona,'e founda #on o" "a #ona' ,a$#$ and #$ no 9a'9a,'a",# "a"-.

n the e8ercise of its power to "a+e classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over "atters within its *urisdiction, the state is recogniAed as en*oying a wide range of discretion. t is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or "ar+ed differences of things or in their relation. #either is it necessary that the classification be "ade with "athe"atical nicety. 1ence, legislative classification "ay in "any cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the e<ual protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature fro" recogniAing degrees of evil or har", and legislation is addressed to evils as they "ay appear. %1 ,e"phasis supplied0 The e<ual protection clause recogniAes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.%% Dith respect to .A 9337, its e8pressed public policy is the opti"iAation of the revenue:generation capability and collection of the 3 . and the 35C.%3 2ince the sub*ect of the law is the revenue: generation capability and collection of the 3 . and the 35C, the incentives andQor sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. !oreover, the law concerns only the 3 . and the 35C because they have the co""on distinct pri"ary function of generating revenues for the national govern"ent through the collection of ta8es, custo"s duties, fees and charges. The 3 . perfor"s the following functions@ 2ec. 19. The %ureau of .nternal Revenue . R The 3ureau of nternal .evenue, which shall be headed by and sub*ect to the supervision and control of the Co""issioner of nternal .evenue, who shall be appointed by the (resident upon the reco""endation of the 2ecretary Eof the ;5FF, shall have the following functions@ ,10 A$$e$$ and %o''e% a'' a=e$, fee$ and %!a"ge$ and a%%oun fo" a'' "e<enue$ %o''e% edC ,%0 B8ercise duly delegated police powers for the proper perfor"ance of its functions and dutiesC ,30 (revent and prosecute ta8 evasions and all other illegal econo"ic activitiesC ,$0 B8ercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate unitsC and ,70 (erfor" such other functions as "ay be provided by law.%$ 888 888 888 ,e"phasis supplied0

and sub*ect to the "anage"ent and control of the Co""issioner of Custo"s, who shall be appointed by the (resident upon the reco""endation of the 2ecretaryEof the ;5FF and hereinafter referred to as Co""issioner, shall have the following functions@ ,10 Co''e% %u$ o; du #e$, a=e$ and !e %o""e$9ond#ng fee$, %!a"ge$ and 9ena' #e$C ,%0 A%%oun %o''e% edC fo" a'' %u$ o;$ "e<enue$

,30 B8ercise police authority for the enforce"ent of tariff and custo"s lawsC ,$0 (revent and suppress s"uggling, pilferage and all other econo"ic frauds within all ports of entryC ,70 2upervise and control e8ports, i"ports, foreign "ails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entryC ,&0 Ad"inister all legal re<uire"ents that are appropriateC ,70 (revent and prosecute s"uggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its *urisdictionC ,90 B8ercise supervision and control over its constituent unitsC ,90 (erfor" such other functions as "ay be provided by law.%7 888 888 888 ,e"phasis supplied0

3oth the 3 . and the 35C are bureaus under the ;5F. They principally perfor" the special function of being the instru"entalities through which the 2tate e8ercises one of its great inherent functions R ta8ation. ndubitably, such substantial distinction is ger"ane and inti"ately related to the purpose of the law. 1ence, the classification and treat"ent accorded to the 3 . and the 35C under .A 9337 fully satisfy the de"ands of e<ual protection. (ndue De'ega #on Two tests deter"ine the validity of delegation of legislative power@ ,10 the co"pleteness test and ,%0 the sufficient standard test. A law is co"plete when it sets forth therein the policy to be e8ecuted, carried out or i"ple"ented by the delegate.%& t lays down a sufficient standard when it provides ade<uate guidelines or li"itations in the law to "ap out the boundaries of the delegateUs authority and prevent the delegation fro" running riot.%7 To be sufficient, the standard "ust specify the li"its of the delegateUs authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be i"ple"ented.%9 .A 9337 ade<uately states the policy and standards to guide the (resident in fi8ing revenue

5n the other hand, the 35C has the following functions@ 2ec. %3. The %ureau of Customs. R The 3ureau of Custo"s which shall be headed

targets and the i"ple"enting agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. 2ection % spells out the policy of the law@ 2BC. %. Declaration of Policy. R t is the policy of the 2tate to opti"iAe the revenue:generation capability and collection of the 3ureau of nternal .evenue ,3 .0 and the 3ureau of Custo"s ,35C0 by providing for a syste" of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a .ewards and ncentives Fund and a .evenue (erfor"ance Bvaluation 3oard in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and e"ployees to e8ceed their revenue targets. 2ection $ 'canaliAed within ban+s that +eep it fro" overflowing'%9 the delegated power to the (resident to fi8 revenue targets@ 2BC. $. Re0ards and .ncentives Fund. R A .ewards and ncentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced fro" the collection of the 3 . and the 35C in e8cess of !e#" "e$9e% #<e "e<enue a"ge $ of !e -ea", a$ de e";#ned ,!e De<e'o9;en Budge and Coo"d#na #ng Co;;# ee 3DBCC4, in the following percentages@

conditions under which officials and e"ployees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.7V "ay be re"oved fro" the service@ 2BC. 7. Po0ers and Functions of the %oard. ; The 3oard in the agency shall have the following powers and functions@ 888 888 888

,b0 To set the criteria and procedures for "e;o<#ng f"o; $e"<#%e off#%#a'$ and e;9'o-ee$ B!o$e "e<enue %o''e% #on fa''$ $!o" of !e a"ge ,- a 'ea$ $e<en and a !a'f 9e"%en 3*.7G4, B# ! due %on$#de"a #on of a'' "e'e<an fa% o"$ affe% #ng !e 'e<e' of %o''e% #on as provided in the rules and regulations pro"ulgated under this Act, $u,Ce% o %#<#' $e"<#%e 'aB$, "u'e$ and "egu'a #on$ and %o;9'#an%e B# ! $u,$ an #<e and 9"o%edu"a' due 9"o%e$$@ (rovided, That the following e8e"ptions shall apply@ 1. Dhere the district or area of responsibility is newly:created, not e8ceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of collection perfor"ance that can be used as basis for evaluationC and

B8cess of Collection of the (ercent ,V0 of the B8cess%. Collection to revenue or custo"s Dhere the B8cess the .evenue Targets Accrue to the Fund official or e"ployee is a recent 3/V or below R 17V transferee in the "iddle of the period !ore than 3/V R 17V of the first 3/V plus %/V under of the consideration unless the transfer was due to re"aining e8cess nonperfor"ance of revenue targets or potential nonperfor"ance of The Fund shall be dee"ed auto"atically revenue targets@ (rovided, appropriated the year i""ediately however, That when the district or following the year when the revenue area of responsibility covered by collection target was e8ceeded and shall revenue or custo"s officials or be released on the sa"e fiscal year. e"ployees has suffered fro" econo"ic difficulties brought about Re<enue a"ge $ $!a'' "efe" o !e by natural cala"ities or force o"#g#na' e$ #;a ed "e<enue %o''e% #on ma,eure or econo"ic causes as e=9e% ed of !e BIR and !e BOC fo" a "ay be deter"ined by the 3oard, g#<en f#$%a' -ea" a$ $ a ed #n !e ter"ination shall be considered Budge of E=9end# u"e$ and Sou"%e$ only after careful and proper of F#nan%#ng 3BESF4 $u,;# ed ,- !e review by the 3oard. P"e$#den o Cong"e$$. The 3 . and the 35C shall sub"it to the ;3CC the ,c0 To ter"inate personnel in accordance distribution of the agenciesU revenue with the criteria adopted in the preceding targets as allocated a"ong its revenue paragraph@ (rovided, That such decision districts in the case of the 3 ., and the shall be i""ediately e8ecutory@ (rovided, collection districts in the case of the 35C. further, That !e a99'#%a #on of !e %"# e"#a fo" !e $e9a"a #on of an 888 888 888 ,e"phasis supplied0 off#%#a' o" e;9'o-ee f"o; $e"<#%e unde" !#$ A% $!a'' ,e B# !ou .evenue targets are based on the original 9"eCud#%e o !e a99'#%a #on of o !e" esti"ated revenue collection e8pected "e'e<an 'aB$ on a%%oun a,#'# - of respectively of the 3 . and the 35C for a given 9u,'#% off#%e"$ and e;9'o-ee$, $u%! fiscal year as approved by the ;3CC and stated a$ !e Code of Condu% and E !#%a' in the 3B2F sub"itted by the (resident to S anda"d$ of Pu,'#% Off#%e"$ and Congress.3/ Thus, the deter"ination of revenue E;9'o-ee$ and !e An #HG"af and targets does not rest solely on the (resident as it Co""u9 P"a% #%e$ A% C also undergoes the scrutiny of the ;3CC. 5n the other hand, 2ection 7 specifies the li"its of the 3oardUs authority and identifies the 888 888 888 ,e"phasis supplied0

Clearly, .A 9337 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and e"ployees of the 3 . and the 35C. The guarantee of security of tenure only "eans that an e"ployee cannot be dis"issed fro" the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the e"ployee.31 n the case of .A 9337, it lays down a reasonable yardstic+ for re"oval ,when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.7V0 with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and inco"petence in the perfor"ance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 3% The action for re"oval is also sub*ect to civil service laws, rules and regulations and co"pliance with substantive and procedural due process. At any rate, this Court has recogniAed the following as sufficient standards@ 'public interest,' '*ustice and e<uity,' 'public convenience and welfare' and 'si"plicity, econo"y and welfare.'33 n this case, the declared policy of opti"iAation of the revenue: generation capability and collection of the 3 . and the 35C is infused with public interest. Se9a"a #on Of PoBe"$ 2ection 1% of .A 9337 provides@ 2BC. 1%. 'oint Con$ressional Oversi$ht Committee. R There is hereby created a 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee co"posed of seven !e"bers fro" the 2enate and seven !e"bers fro" the 1ouse of .epresentatives. The !e"bers fro" the 2enate shall be appointed by the 2enate (resident, with at least two senators representing the "inority. The !e"bers fro" the 1ouse of .epresentatives shall be appointed by the 2pea+er with at least two "e"bers representing the "inority. After the 5versight Co""ittee will have approved the i"ple"enting rules and regulations , ..0 it shall thereafter beco"e functus officio and therefore cease to e8ist. The 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee in .A 9337 was created for the purpose of approving the i"ple"enting rules and regulations , ..0 for"ulated by the ;5F, ;3!, #B;A, 3 ., 35C and C2C. 5n !ay %%, %//&, it approved the said ... Fro" then on, it beca"e functus officio and ceased to e8ist. 1ence, the issue of its alleged encroach"ent on the e8ecutive function of i"ple"enting and enforcing the law "ay be considered "oot and acade"ic. This notwithstanding, this "ight be as good a ti"e as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee created under .A 9337 ,or other si"ilar laws for that "atter0. The scholarly discourse of !r. 4ustice ,now Chief 4ustice0 (uno on the concept of congressional oversight in *acalintal v. Commission on "lections3$ is illu"inating@

Concept and oversi$ht

)ases

of

con$ressional

3roadly defined, !e 9oBe" of o<e"$#g! e;,"a%e$ a'' a% #<# #e$ unde" aFen ,Cong"e$$ o en!an%e # $ unde"$ and#ng of and #nf'uen%e o<e" !e implementation of 'eg#$'a #on # !a$ ena% ed. C'ea"'-, o<e"$#g! %on%e"n$ post-enactment ;ea$u"e$ unde" aFen ,- Cong"e$$: 3a4 o ;on# o" ,u"eau%"a #% %o;9'#an%e B# ! 9"og"a; o,Ce% #<e$, 3,4 o de e";#ne B!e !e" agen%#e$ a"e 9"o9e"'ad;#n#$ e"ed, 3%4 o e'#;#na e e=e%u #<e Ba$ e and d#$!one$ -, 3d4 o 9"e<en e=e%u #<e u$u"9a #on of 'eg#$'a #<e au !o"# -, and 3d4 o a$$e$$ e=e%u #<e %onfo";# - B# ! !e %ong"e$$#ona' 9e"%e9 #on of 9u,'#% #n e"e$ . The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the chec+s and balances inherent in a de"ocratic syste" of govern"ent. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 5ver the years, Congress has invo+ed its oversight power with increased fre<uency to chec+ the perceived 'e8ponential accu"ulation of power' by the e8ecutive branch. 3y the beginning of the %/ th century, Congress has delegated an enor"ous a"ount of legislative authority to the e8ecutive branch and the ad"inistrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to "a+e sure that the ad"inistrative agencies perfor" their functions within the authority delegated to the". 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Cate$ories functions of con$ressional oversi$ht

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the e8ercise of its oversight powers "ay be divided into three categories, na"ely@ scrutiny, investi$ation and supervision. a. Scrutiny Congressional scrutiny i"plies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to ad"inistrative operations. ts pri"ary purpose is to deter"ine econo"y and efficiency of the operation of govern"ent activities. n the e8ercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress "ay re<uest infor"ation and report fro" the other branches of govern"ent. t can give reco""endations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. 888 888 888

). Con$ressional investi$ation

Dhile congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of loo+ing at the facts that are readily available, con$ressional investi$ation involves a more intense di$$in$ of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recogniAed by the 1997 Constitution under section %1, Article 6 , 888 888 888 c. (e$islative supervision The third and most encompassin$ for" by which Congress e8ercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. '2upervision' connotes a continuing and infor"ed awareness on the part of a congressional co""ittee regarding e2ecutive operations in a given ad"inistrative area. Dhile both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve in<uiry into past e2ecutive )ranch actions in order to influence future e8ecutive branch perfor"ance, con$ressional supervision allo0s Con$ress to scrutinize the e2ercise of dele$ated la06ma!in$ authority and permits Con$ress to retain part of that dele$ated authority. Con$ress e2ercises supervision over the e2ecutive a$encies throu$h its veto po0er. .t typically utilizes veto provisions 0hen $rantin$ the President or an e2ecutive a$ency the po0er to promul$ate re$ulations 0ith the force of la0. These provisions re/uire the President or an a$ency to present the proposed re$ulations to Con$ress 0hich retains a =ri$ht= to approve or disapprove any re$ulation )efore it ta!es effect. 2uch legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will beco"e a law after the e8piration of a certain period of ti"e, only if Congress does not affir"atively disapprove of the regulation in the "eanti"e. =ess fre<uently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will beco"e law if Congress affir"atively approves it. Supporters of le$islative veto stress that it is necessary to "aintain the balance of power between the legislative and the e8ecutive branches of govern"ent as it offers law"a+ers a way to delegate vast power to the e8ecutive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular e8ercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal e8isting law. They contend that this arrange"ent pro"otes de"ocratic accountability as it provides legislative chec+ on the activities of unelected ad"inistrative agencies. 5ne proponent thus e8plains@ t is too late to debate the "erits of this delegation policy@ the policy is too deeply e"bedded in our law and practice. t suffices to say that the co"ple8ities of "odern

govern"ent have often led Congress:whether by actual or perceived necessity: to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an e8ecutive officer. Congress articulates legislative ai"s, but leaves their i"ple"entation to the *udg"ent of parties who "ay or "ay not have participated in or agreed with the develop"ent of those ai"s. Conse<uently, absent safeguards, in "any instances the reverse of our constitutional sche"e could be effected@ Congress proposes, the B8ecutive disposes. 5ne safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change e8isting law. 3ut without so"e "eans of overseeing post enact"ent activities of the e8ecutive branch, Congress would be unable to deter"ine whether its policies have been i"ple"ented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate. ts opponents, however, criticize the le$islative veto as undue en%"oa%!;en u9on !e e=e%u #<e 9"e"oga #<e$. They urge that an9o$ Hena% ;en ;ea$u"e$ unde" aFen ,!e 'eg#$'a #<e ,"an%! $!ou'd ,e '#;# ed o $%"u #n- and #n<e$ #ga #on> an;ea$u"e ,e-ond !a Bou'd unde";#ne !e $e9a"a #on of 9oBe"$ gua"an eed ,- !e Con$ # u #on. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an i"per"issible evasion of the (residentUs veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the e8ecutive or *udicial branches of govern"ent. (roponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the e8ecutive branch and independent agencies fro" accu"ulating too "uch power. They sub"it that reporting re<uire"ents and congressional co""ittee investigations allow Congress to scrutiniAe only the e8ercise of delegated law:"a+ing authority. They do not allow Congress to review e8ecutive proposals before they ta+e effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding e8pressions of congressional intent. n contrast, legislative veto per"its Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of 'su)ordinate la0' or those enacted by the e8ecutive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto 'is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its cha"bers.' n an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto 'is the "ost efficient "eans Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and i"ple"entation of its policy as declared by statute.'

n .mmi$ration and -aturalization Service v. Chadha, !e (.S. Su9"e;e Cou" "e$o'<ed !e <a'#d# - of 'eg#$'a #<e <e o 9"o<#$#on$. The case arose fro" the order of the i""igration *udge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to W %$$,c0,10 of the ""igration and #ationality Act. The )nited 2tates 1ouse of .epresentatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to W %$$,c0,%0 authoriAing either 1ouse of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the e8ecutive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to re"ain in the )nited 2tates. The i""igration *udge reopened the deportation proceedings to i"ple"ent the 1ouse order and the alien was ordered deported. The 3oard of ""igration Appeals dis"issed the alienUs appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The )nited 2tates Court of Appeals for #inth Circuit held that the 1ouse was without constitutional authority to order the alienUs deportation and that W %$$,c0,%0 violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers. 5n appeal, the ).2. 2upre"e Court declared W %$$,c0,%0 unconstitutional. Bu !e Cou" $!#ed aBa- f"o; !e #$$ue of $e9a"a #on of 9oBe"$ and instead held that the provision violates the present"ent clause and bica"eralis". t held that the one:house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is sub*ect to the procedures set out in Article of the Constitution re<uiring the passage by a "a*ority of both 1ouses and present"ent to the (resident. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Two wee+s after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in "e"orandu" decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the #atural -as (olicy Act of 1979 and the Federal Trade Co""ission "prove"ent Act of 199/. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although so"e of these provisions re<uired the approval of both 1ouses of Congress and thus "et the bica"eralis" re<uire"ent of Article . ndeed, so"e of these veto provisions were not even e8ercised.37 ,e"phasis supplied0 n *acalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body li+e the Co""ission on Blections, the Court struc+ down the provision in .A 9199 ,The 5verseas Absentee 6oting Act of %//30 creating a 4oint Congressional Co""ittee. The co""ittee was tas+ed not only to "onitor and evaluate the i"ple"entation of the said law but also to review, revise, a"end and approve the .. pro"ulgated by the Co""ission on Blections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the Co""ission on Blections.3&

Dith this bac+drop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, "eaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroach"ent on the e8ecutive power to i"ple"ent laws nor under"ines the constitutional separation of powers. .ather, it is integral to the chec+s and balances inherent in a de"ocratic syste" of govern"ent. t "ay in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over:accu"ulation of power in the e8ecutive branch. 1owever, to forestall the danger of congressional encroach"ent 'beyond the legislative sphere,' the Constitution i"poses two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 t "ay not vest itself, any of its co""ittees or its "e"bers with either e8ecutive or *udicial power.39 And, when it e8ercises its legislative power, it "ust follow the 'single, finely wrought and e8haustively considered, procedures' specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enact"ent of laws and present"ent. Thus, any post:enact"ent congressional "easure such as this should be li"ited to scrutiny and investigation. n particular, congressional oversight "ust be confined to the following@ ,10 scrutiny based pri"arily on CongressU power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to as+ heads of depart"ents to appear before and be heard by either of its 1ouses on any "atter pertaining to their depart"ents and its power of confir"ation$/ and ,%0 investigation and "onitoring $1 of the i"ple"entation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct in<uiries in aid of legislation.$% Any action or step beyond that will under"ine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. =egislative vetoes fall in this class. =egislative veto is a statutory provision re<uiring the (resident or an ad"inistrative agency to present the proposed i"ple"enting rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a co""ittee for"ed by it, retains a 'right' or 'power' to approve or disapprove such regulations before they ta+e effect. As such, a legislative veto in the for" of a congressional oversight co""ittee is in the for" of an inward: turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash ,other than through scrutiny and investigation0 to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.$3 t radically changes the design or structure of the ConstitutionUs diagra" of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or i"ple"enting its own laws.$$ Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horiAons of its legislative co"petence. $7 t can itself for"ulate the details or it can assign to the e8ecutive branch the responsibility for "a+ing necessary "anagerial decisions in

confor"ity with those standards.$& n the latter case, the law "ust be co"plete in all its essential ter"s and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.$7 Thus, what is left for the e8ecutive branch or the concerned ad"inistrative agency when it for"ulates rules and regulations i"ple"enting the law is to fill up details ,supple"entary rule:"a+ing0 or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation ,contingent rule:"a+ing0.$9 Ad"inistrative regulations enacted by ad"inistrative agencies to i"ple"ent and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.$9 2uch rules and regulations parta+e of the nature of a statute7/ and are *ust as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and en*oy the presu"ption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a co"petent court. 71 Congress, in the guise of assu"ing the role of an overseer, "ay not pass upon their legality by sub*ecting the" to its sta"p of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. n e8ercising discretion to approve or disapprove the .. based on a deter"ination of whether or not they confor"ed with the provisions of .A 9337, Congress arrogated *udicial power unto itself, a power e8clusively vested in this Court by the Constitution. Con$#de"ed O9#n#on &". Ju$ #%e Dan e O. T#nga of

'aB, ,e 9"e$en ed o !e P"e$#den . f he approves the sa"e, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the sa"e with his ob*ections to the 1ouse where it originated, which shall enter the ob*ections at large in its 4ournal and proceed to reconsider it. f, after such reconsideration, two:thirds of all the !e"bers of such 1ouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the ob*ections, to the other 1ouse by which it shall li+ewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two:thirds of all the !e"bers of that 1ouse, it shall beco"e a law. n all such cases, the votes of each 1ouse shall be deter"ined by yeas or nays, and the na"es of the "e"bers voting for or against shall be entered in its 4ournal. The (resident shall co""unicate his veto of any bill to the 1ouse where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereofC otherwise, it shall beco"e a law as if he had signed it. ,e"phasis supplied0 Bvery bill passed by Congress "ust be presented to the (resident for approval or veto. n the absence of present"ent to the (resident, no bill passed by Congress can beco"e a law. n this sense, law:"a+ing under the Constitution is a *oint act of the =egislature and of the B8ecutive. Assu"ing that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot ta+e effect without such present"ent even if approved by both cha"bers of Congress. n su", two steps are re<uired before a bill beco"es a law. First, it "ust be approved by both 1ouses of Congress.7$ 2econd, it "ust be presented to and approved by the (resident. 77 As su""ariAed by 4ustice sagani CruA7& and Fr. 4oa<uin -. 3ernas, 2.4.77, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills@ A bill is introduced by any "e"ber of the 1ouse of .epresentatives or the 2enate e8cept for so"e "easures that "ust originate only in the for"er cha"ber. The first reading involves only a reading of the nu"ber and title of the "easure and its referral by the 2enate (resident or the 2pea+er to the proper co""ittee for study. The bill "ay be '+illed' in the co""ittee or it "ay be reco""ended for approval, with or without a"end"ents, so"eti"es after public hearings are first held thereon. f there are other bills of the sa"e nature or purpose, they "ay all be consolidated into one bill under co""on authorship or as a co""ittee bill. 5nce reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. t is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutiniAed, debated upon and a"ended when desired. The second reading is the "ost i"portant stage in the passage of a bill.

!oreover, the re<uire"ent that the i"ple"enting rules of a law be sub*ected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bica"eralis" and the rule on present"ent.7% 2ection 1, Article 6 of the Constitution states@ 2ection 1. T!e 'eg#$'a #<e 9oBe" $!a'' ,e <e$ ed #n !e Cong"e$$ of !e P!#'#99#ne$ B!#%! $!a'' %on$#$ of a Sena e and a Hou$e of Re9"e$en a #<e$, e8cept to the e8tent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendu". ,e"phasis supplied0 =egislative power ,or the power to propose, enact, a"end and repeal laws0 73 is vested in Congress which consists of two cha"bers, the 2enate and the 1ouse of .epresentatives. A valid e8ercise of legislative power re<uires the act of both cha"bers. Corrollarily, it can be e8ercised neither solely by one of the two cha"bers nor by a co""ittee of either or both cha"bers. Thus, assu"ing the validity of a legislative veto, both a single:cha"ber legislative veto and a congressional co""ittee legislative veto are invalid. Additionally, 2ection %7,10, Article 6 Constitution provides@ of the

2ection %7. ,10 E<e"- ,#'' 9a$$ed ,- !e Cong"e$$ $!a'', ,efo"e # ,e%o;e$ a

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final for" and copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third reading. 5n the third reading, the "e"bers "erely register their votes and e8plain the" if they are allowed by the rules. #o further debate is allowed. 5nce the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other cha"ber, where it will also undergo the three readings. f there are differences between the versions approved by the two cha"bers, a conference co""ittee79 representing both 1ouses will draft a co"pro"ise "easure that if ratified by the 2enate and the 1ouse of .epresentatives will then be sub"itted to the (resident for his consideration. The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the 2enate (resident, the 2pea+er, and the 2ecretaries of their respective cha"bersX
79

Following this rationale, 2ection 1% of .A 9337 should be struc+ down as unconstitutional. Dhile there "ay be si"ilar provisions of other laws that "ay be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains fro" invalidating the" wholesale but will do so at the proper ti"e when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.&$ The ne8t <uestion to be resolved is@ what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of 2ection 1% of .A 9337 on the other provisions of the lawK Dill it render the entire law unconstitutionalK #o. 2ection 13 of .A 9337 provides@ 2BC. 13. Separa)ility Clause. R f any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a co"petent court, the re"ainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall re"ain in force and effect. n Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of "ner$y,&7 the Court laid down the following rules@ The $eneral rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable fro" the invalid, "ay stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presu"ption that the legislature intended separability, rather than co"plete nullity of the statute. To *ustify this result, the valid portion "ust be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presu"e that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Bnough "ust re"ain to "a+e a co"plete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. 8 8 8 The e2ception to the $eneral rule is that when the parts of a statute are so "utually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, induce"ents, or co"pensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended the" as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. n "a+ing the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if so"e parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected "ust fall with the". The separability clause of .A 9337 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision fro" the other provisions so that the latter "ay continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Dithout 2ection 1%, the re"aining provisions still constitute a co"plete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to opti"iAe the revenue:generation

The President<s role in la06ma!in$. The final step is sub"ission to the (resident for approval. 5nce approved, it ta+es effect as law after the re<uired publication.&/ Dhere Congress delegates the for"ulation of rules to i"ple"ent the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law "ust be co"plete in all its essential ter"s and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it "ay be dee"ed to have left the hands of the legislature when it beco"es effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations beco"e available to those entitled by the language of the statute. 2ub*ect to the indispensable re<uisite of publication under the due process clause,&1 the deter"ination as to when a law ta+es effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.&% As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law "ay be e8ecuted and the e8ecutive branch ac<uires the duties and powers to e8ecute the said law. 3efore that point, the role of the e8ecutive branch, particularly of the (resident, is li"ited to approving or vetoing the law.&3 Fro" the "o"ent the law beco"es effective, any provision of law that e"powers Congress or any of its "e"bers to play any role in the i"ple"entation or enforce"ent of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. )nder this principle, a provision that re<uires Congress or its "e"bers to approve the i"ple"enting rules of a law after it has already ta+en effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its "e"bers to overturn any directive or ruling "ade by the "e"bers of the e8ecutive branch charged with the i"ple"entation of the law.

capability and collection of the 3 . and the 35C by providing for a syste" of rewards and sanctions through the .ewards and ncentives Fund and a .evenue (erfor"ance Bvaluation 3oard. To be effective, ad"inistrative rules and regulations "ust be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or i"ple"ent e8isting law pursuant to a valid delegation. The .. of .A 9337 were published on !ay 3/, %//& in two newspapers of general circulation&& and beca"e effective 17 days thereafter.&7 )ntil and unless the contrary is shown, the .. are presu"ed valid and effective even without the approval of the 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee. DHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALL2 GRANTED. 2ection 1% of .A 9337 creating a 4oint Congressional 5versight Co""ittee to approve the i"ple"enting rules and regulations of the law is declared (NCONSTIT(TIONAL and therefore N(LL and VOID. The constitutionality of the re"aining provisions of .A 9337 is (PHELD. (ursuant to 2ection 13 of .A 9337, the rest of the provisions re"ain in force and effect.