B.PHIL. CLASS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION A Selective General Bibliography The historical background Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, espec.

III, VI & VII (The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, contains an excellent bibliography: see espec. IV, A-E & VIII, I-N) Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologi, 1a2ae.1 & 6-17 R. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Part 1, espec. 17-18 J.Hobbes, Leviathan, espec. Part 1, ch.6 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, ch.21 D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 7-8 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, espec. chs.7-10 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, Lectures 18-19 J.S. Mill, System of Logic, Book 3, ch.5, 11 Key books published since 1945 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events J. Hornsby, Actions A.J.P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will A.J.P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action Other books published since 1945 J. Bennett, The Act Itself M. Brand, Intending and Acting M. Bratman, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason J. Dancy, Practical Reality A. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action A. Donagan, Choice: the essential element in human action F. Dretske, Explaining Behavior C. Ginet, On Action A. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action K. Lennon, Explaining Human Action A.I. Melden, Free Action A.R. Mele, Springs of Action C. Moya, The Philosophy of Action B. OShaughnessy, The Will C. Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour R. Taylor, Action and Purpose J. Thomson, Acts and other Events Collections M. Brand and D. Walton, Action Theory J. Heil and A.R. Mele, Mental Causation E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, Actions and Events A.R. Mele, The Philosophy of Action T. OConnor, Agents, Causes and Events J. Raz, Practical Reasoning B. Vermazen and M.B. Hintikka, Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events G. Watson, Free Will

A.R. White, The Philosophy of Action Abbreviations A EAE APQ JP M PAS PQ PR Analysis Essays on Actions and Events American Philosophical Quarterly Journal of Philosophy Mind Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Philosophical Quarterly Philosophical Review * Topics 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Actions and Volitions Practical Reasoning The Causal Theory of Action The Logical Form of Action Sentences The Nature of Actions Basic Actions Acting and Trying Intentions Abilities Freedom of the Will Weakness of the Will Knowledge and Action Pleasure

An item in bold type is the target item for the topic. * 1. Actions and Volitions J. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, ch.6 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, ch.21 E.J. Lowe, Locke on Human Understanding, ch.6 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, ch.26 B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, ch.3 D.F. Pears, Russells theory of desire, in Questions in the Philosophy of Mind L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 611-28 P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, ch.5 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind , ch.3 H.A. Prichard, Acting, willing, desiring, in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. White A.I. Melden, Willing, in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. White G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, PAS 1957

P.T. Geach, The will, Newman Philosophy of Science Bulletin, 1958

H.L.A. Hart, Acts of will and responsibility, in Punishment and Responsibility A.R. White, Grounds of Liability, ch.5 A.J.P. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, ch.3 Is willing a mental act which precedes a voluntary action? What sort of mental act is a volition supposed to be? Can voluntary action be defined in terms of acts of will? What is left over when one subtracts the fact that my arm rose from the fact that I raised my arm? *

2. Practical Reasoning G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, 33-41 (or Anscombe, On practical reasoning, in Practical Reasoning, ed. J. Raz) G.H. von Wright, On so-called practical inference, in Practical Reasoning, ed. J. Raz D. Davidson, Actions, reasons and causes, in EAE A.J.P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, ch.5 J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, ch.1 Introduction to Practical Reasoning, ed. J. Raz Articles by Anscombe and Black in The Philosophy of G.H. von Wright, ed. P.A. Schilpp B.A.O. Williams, Internal and external reasons, in Moral Luck J. Dancy, Is there a theory of motivation?, PAS 1995 What is a reason? What is the difference between a good reason and a bad one? Is a reason for acting a different sort of thing from a reason for believing or wanting? Does a cogent piece of practical reasoning preserve truth, satisfactoriness, or what? Is the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning an action, an intention, or what? * 3. Reasons and Causes G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention A.I. Melden, Free Action, chs.8 & 9 G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, ch.1 D.F. Pears, Sketch of a causal theory of wanting and doing, in Questions in the Philosophy of Mind D. Davidson, Actions, reasons and causes, in EAE D. Davidson, Freedom to act, in EAE F. Stoutland, The causation of behaviour, in Essays on Wittgenstein, Acta Philosophica Fennica 28 H. Frankfurt, The problem of action, in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A. Mele A.J.P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power , chs.5 & 6 C. Peacocke, Holistic Explanation, ch.3 J. Heil and A.R. Mele, Mental Causation, Part 1 The Philosophy of G.H. von Wright, ed. P.A. Schilpp, articles by Anscombe, Malcolm & Stoutland Do reasons or desires cause intentional actions? If not, what is the difference between acting for a reason and acting consistently with a reason? Is the problem of deviant causal chains a decisive objection to Davidsons theory of action? (See bibl. notes in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. Mele, p.7.) Does anomalous monism imply that beliefs and desires are epiphenomena?

*
4. The Logical Form of Action Sentences A.J.P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, ch.7 D. Davidson, The logical form of action sentences & Criticism, comment, and defence, in EAE D. Davidson, Adverbs of action, in Vermazen and Hintikka J. Bennett, Events and their Names, ch.1 D. Wiggins, Verbs and adverbs, and some other modes of grammatical combination, PAS 1985/86 J. Bennett, Adverb-dropping inferences and the Lemmon criterion, in Actions and Events, ed. E. LePore and B. McLaughlin T. Parsons, Underlying events in the logical analysis of English, in Actions and Events, ed. E. LePore and B. McLaughlin T. Parsons, Events in the Semantics of English J. Hornsby, Actions, Appendices A and B M. Alvarez, Actions and events: some semantical considerations, Ratio 1999

What is the problem of the variably polyadicity of actions? Has Davidson solved the problem? Is Davidsons method for formalizing action sentences the best there is? What, if anything, can we learn from the formalization of action sentences about the nature of actions? * 5. The Nature of Actions J.L. Austin, A plea for excuses, in Philosophical Papers G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, ch.3 R. Taylor, Action and Purpose I. Thalberg, Do we cause our own actions?, A 1966/67 D. Davidson, Agency, in EAE M. Brand and D. Walton, Action Theory, Parts 5 & 6 J. Montmarquet, Actions and bodily movements, A 1978 J. Hornsby, Actions, chs. 1 & 2 K. Bach, Actions are not events, M 1980 J. Hornsby and E.J. Lowe, articles in A 1981, 1982, 1983 J. Bishop, Agent causation, M 1983 A.R. White, Grounds of Liability, ch.3 M. Alvarez and J. Hyman, Agents and their actions, Philosophy 1998 What is an action? Are actions events? Are there inanimate agents or unintentional actions? Do agents cause their actions? Are all of our actions movements of our bodies? * 6. Basic Actions A. Danto, Basic Actions, in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. White M. Brand, Danto on basic actions, Nous 1968 A. Baier, The search for basic actions, APQ 1971 D. Davidson, Agency, in EAE L. Davis, The individuation of actions, JP 1970 A. Goldman, The individuation of action, JP 1971 J. Hornsby, Actions, chs.1 and 2 J.J. Thomson, The time of a killing, JP 1971 C. Ginet, On Action, ch.3 J. Bennett, The Act Itself, ch.2 D. Mackie, The individuation of actions, PQ 1997 M. Alvarez and J. Hyman, Agents and their actions, Philosophy 1998 What is a basic action? Are some actions basic? If so, which ones? Are all actions basic? If not, how should the by locution be analysed? How are actions dated and located? What are the criteria of identity for actions? * 7. Acting and Trying S. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp.121-37 & 170-92 D.F. Gustafson, Hampshire on trying, Theoria 1964 F. Broadie, Trying and doing, PAS 1965/66 H.P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, ch.1 B. OShaughnessy, Trying (as the mental pineal gland), in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. Mele J. Hornsby, Actions, ch.3 J. Hornsby, Actions, ch.4 O.R. Jones, Trying, M 1983 P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, ch.5

H.L.A. Hart, The House of Lords on attempting the impossible, in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy A.R. White, Misleading Cases , ch.2 Is trying a mental act, a physical exertion, or what? What can and cant we try to do? Is every voluntary action a successful attempt? Does every voluntary action involve an attempt? Does the fact that we dont normally describe people as trying to do the things they do without difficulty or undue effort imply that they dont normally try to do these things? * 8. Intentions L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 629-60 P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, exegesis of 629-60 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention H.L.A. Hart and S. Hampshire, Decision, intention, certainty, M 1958 A.J.P. Kenny, Intention and purpose, in Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. R. Summers H.P. Grice, Intention and uncertainty, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1971 D. Davidson, Intending, in EAE M. Bratman, Davidsons theory of intention, in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, ed. B. Vermazen and M.B. Hintikka J. Meiland, The Nature of Intention H.L.A. Hart, Intention and punishment, in Punishment and Responsibility A.R. White, Grounds of Liability, ch.6 Is intending analysable in terms of beliefs and desires? (See bibliographical notes in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A.R. Mele, p.17.) Is intending a mental state or event, an experience, an act, or a disposition? What can and cant we intend to do? If a doctor administers a drug in order to relieve the suffering of a dying man, knowing that the drug will certainly shorten the mans life, does it follow that he intends to shorten the mans life? Is someone who expresses an intention to do something committed to the truth of a prediction? * 9. Abilities G.E. Moore, Ethics, ch.6 J.L. Austin, Ifs and cans, in Philosophical Papers P. Nowell-Smith, Ifs and cans, Theoria 1960 D.F. Pears, Ifs and cans, in Questions in the Philosophy of Mind M. Ayers, The Refutation of Determinism Articles by Aune and Lehrer, in Free Agency, ed. G. Watson B. Gibbs, Real possibility, APQ 1970 A.J.P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, ch.7 A.J.P. Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, ch.5 Are cans constitutionally iffy? If A Ns, does it follow that A can N? What different sorts of possibility are there? Is spontaneity possible without indifference? * 10. Freedom of the Will D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 8 P.F. Strawson, Freedom and resentment, in Freedom and Resentment and other essays K. Lehrer, An empirical disproof of determinism?, in Freedom and Determinism, ed. K. Lehrer N. Malcolm, The conceivability of mechanism, PR 1968 J.R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will, 21-30 H. Frankfurt, Freedom of the will and the concept of a person, in Free Will, ed. G. Watson

G. Watson, Free agency, in Free Will, ed. G. Watson P. van Inwagen, The incompatibility of free will and determinism, in Free Will, ed. G. Watson D. Wiggins, Towards a reasonable libertarianism, in Needs, Values, Truth A.J.P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power , chs. 7 & 8 H. Frankfurt, Alternative possibilities, JP 1969 D.C. Dennett, Elbow Room, ch.6 Does freedom imply indifference? Are freedom and determinism compatible? Does Strawson provide an argument for compatibilism, or does he show how much of our lives is absurd if freedom is illusory? Is mechanism conceivable? * 11. Weakness of the Will Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII R. Robinson, Aristotle on akrasia in Articles on Aristotle, Vol.2, ed. J. Barnes et al. A.J.P. Kenny, The practical syllogism and incontinence, Phronesis 1966 G. Santas, Aristotle on practical inference, the explanation of action, and akrasia, Phronesis 1969 J.C.B. Gosling, Mad, drunk, or asleep? Aristotles akratic, Phronesis 1993 D. Davidson, How is weakness of the will possible?, in EAE H.P. Grice and J. Baker, Davidson on weakness of the will, in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, ed. B. Vermazen and M.B. Hintikka D. Wiggins, Deliberation and practical reason, PAS 1975/76 D. Wiggins, Weakness of will, commensurability and the objects of deliberation and desire, PAS 1978/79 J. Mc Dowell, Incontinence and practical wisdom in Aristotle, in Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, ed. S. Lovibond and S. Williams W. Charlton, Weakness of the Will Can I do of my own free will something which I clearly perceive at the time it would be better not to do? How is akratic behaviour, or apparently akratic behaviour, to be explained? * 12. Knowledge and Action G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, ch.2 E. Gettier, Is justified true belief knowledge?, A 1963 C. Radford, Knowledge by examples, A 1966/67 B.A.O. Williams, Knowledge and reasons, in Problems in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. G.H. von Wright R.K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing, espec. ch.6.1 J. Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, chs.2 & 3 A.R. White, The Nature of Knowledge, ch. 5 O. Hanfling, A situational account of knowledge, Monist 1985 E. Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature J. Hyman, How knowledge works, PQ 1999 (or Hyman, Knowledge and self-knowledge in Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Schroeder) Is knowing how to do something the same as being able to do it, or being skilled at doing it? Are knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case essentially different kinds of knowledge? Is knowledge a species of belief, a species of ability, or what? What is the relation between knowledge and intentional action? *

13. Pleasure G. Ryle, Dilemmas , ch.4 G.H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness, ch.4 A.J.P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, ch.6 C.C.W. Taylor, Pleasure, A suppl. vol. 1963 J.L. Cowan, Pleasure and Pain J.D. Wallace, Pleasure as an end of action, APQ 1966 A.R. White, Attention, ch.8 J. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire Is pleasure a sensation, a pattern of behaviour, a mode of attention, or what? Can one enjoy doing something if one doesnt know that that is what one is doing? What is the relation between pleasure and activity, when one engages in an activity for the sake of pleasure?

J. Hyman January 2004