CUENCO v CA GR L-24742 October 26, 1973 | TEEHANKEE, J.

: FACTS: Senator Cuenco died and was survived by widow (petitioner) and 2 sons residing at Quezon City; and by his children of first marriage (respondents) residing in Cebu. Respondent filed Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI Cebu, which set it for hearing, but ordered that it was premature since there was yet publication of notice of hearing. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with CFI Quezon probate of deceaseds last will and for issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Having learned of intestate proceeding in CFI Cebu, petitioner opposed petition of appointment of special administrator and filed Motion to Dismiss (MtD). CFI Cebu deferred to probate proceedings in CFI Quezon. Respondent did not oppose in CFI Cebu, but in CFI Quezon the probate; assailed jurisdiction of CFI Quezon due to lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. CFI Quezon denied MtD and MfR and admitted to probate the will. Respondents filed special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored respondents since CFI Cebu had jurisdiction first. Petitioners MR was denied; hence, petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not CFI Quezon is the proper venue. HELD: YES. Court with whom petition is first filed, must first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts (R73 of Rules of Court). Implicit in CFI Cebus order was that if will was admitted to probate by CFI Quezon, then it would decline to take cognizance of intestate petition which would be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to CFI Quezon to the exclusion of all other courts. In effect, CFI Quezon will determine decedents residence and whether he did leave a will upon which would depend the proper venue of estate proceedings.

GARCIA FULE V. CA Nov. 29, 1976; J. Martin FACTS: On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix over the estate. Motion was granted. (there was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio) Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in behalf of their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. (Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed 1 from him ) CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k. ISSUES: a.) Venue v. jurisdiction b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean? c.) Who is entitled? HELD/RATIO: a.) RULE 73 SECTION 1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
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NCC Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate. The court 1 taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper. Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4), but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased. RULE 79 SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed. b.) Resides ex vi termini actual residence - Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. - Same meaning as inhabitant. - Popular sense the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode - Must be more than temporary
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Distinguished from legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.

c.) Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the basis for appointment of special administrator (temporarily) to take possession and charge of the estates of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and (regular) executors or administrators appointed. Old rules basis ay: appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will; New: added - xxx delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause (includes parties cannot agree among themselves) including an appeal of allowance of disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a xxx The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not is with the probate court, the paramount consideration is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. In re: Fule, it is not required that the administratrix be entitled to share in the estate of the decedent only that one is entitled to the administration; but the preference of Preciosa is with sufficient reason the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED.

G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984 PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES, respondents. Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972. He left behind three (3) parcels of titled land. Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepins will nine (9) offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares. Moslares alleged that on October 9, 1970, Despin executed a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his favor. He also alleged that pn June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement" where it was agreed that Drepin shall be the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. But before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died. Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed the Judicial Administrator that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. On September 25,1979, with the courts permission, a Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow. Moslares failed to pay as agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court which approved the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale was duly registered. Mosrales filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the probate court. Under the theory of Moslares, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. On May 18, 1981, Pio Barreto Realty filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the CFI of Rizal to determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands.

A petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the Court of Appeals. Issues: Can the Court of Appeals act upon the issue of exclusion of properties in the estate when it is not passed upon by the court a quo? Can the probate court order the execution of the deed of sale with Pio Barreto? Held: As to the first issue: No. The question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be determined with finality by the Supreme Court in this case, because in this petition We are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to include those properties "is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion of the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be ventilated and finally resolved in the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. In view of this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there was novation of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or not. As to the Second Issue: Yes. Actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate. Thus, by estoppel,

respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent. Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and ownership