The Republic of the Philippines. Vibrant democracy. Former American possession. Predominantly Christian.

Not the type of place or conditions readily associated with Islamist-inspired insur ency. !et nowhere else in "ast Asia o#er the last forty years has an Islamist mo#ement arnered reater public support amon st its base or en$oyed e%ual success& so much so that the central o#ernment actually reco ni'ed its claims as le itimate and initiated a peace-process to address the underlyin issues. For all the concern o#er Indonesia and its ()* million +uslims, [1] it is the Philippines that occupies center-sta e in the -lobal .ar on Terrorism in /outheast Asia. 0espite this reality and the presence of si nificant numbers of 1./. personnel in the re ion ad#isin the Armed Forces of the Philippines, few Americans 2now of this insur ency, and fewer understand it. This paper see2s to pro#ide a wor2in primer there is nothin 2nowled e of the so-called Bangsamoro insur ency3s it. As a ori ins to Americans in#ol#ed in the re ion, or others interested in better understandin

new or no#el in this paper3s obser#ations& howe#er, it does place

the Bangsamoro insur ency into the conte4t of lobal Islamic political de#elopments, a perspecti#e other studies sometimes lac2. 5ecause the de#elopment of Bangsamoro identity is the result of re ional and lobal interactions centered on the /outhern Philippines datin bac2 o#er a millennium, its political manifestation since the 6789s is li2ewise a product of importation and adaptation of outside ideas& the Bangsamoro mo#ement cannot be understood in isolation. The Origins of the Bangsamoro Ideal The term Bangsamoro is loosely translated as :+oro Nation,; [2] a term used by secessionists to identify the predominantly +uslim inhabitants of the /outhern Philippines <centered mainly on the western side of the ma$or southern island of +indanao and the islands of the /ulu Archipela o= #ersus the ma$ority Christian northerners. [3] For all its currency howe#er, Bangsamoro is a fairly recent construct with little historical $ustification. [4] Prior to the arri#al of the Americans in 6>7>, the inhabitants of the Philippines were occupyin enerally considered part of the broader ?+alay3 race present-day +alaysia and Indonesia by .esterners& [5] the term ?Filipino3 reser#ed only consists of 6* historically distinct ethno-lin uistic entities local routine

for local elites of /panish stoc2 born in the Philippines. [6] The reality is more comple4. The modern Bangsamorohomeland interests resultin dominated by the +a uindanao and Tauso tribes, [7] each often pursuin competin

in inter-ethnic conflict. The common element is faith. .hile conductin /panish coloni'ation, producin

trade and interaction with the islands of present-day Indonesia and /outheast Asia these tribes imported Islam in the four centuries precedin an ?other3 identity between these +uslim con#erts and their pa an nei hbors to the north. This identity was further reinforced after /panish contact as the /paniards first con#erted the northern tribes to Christianity, then pursued the forced con#ersion of southern +uslims in a series of wars to e4ert direct /panish control.[8] The 1nited /tates reco ni'ed the cultural hetero eneity of the Philippines upon assumin and ci#ic control of the archipela o in 6>7>[9] and deliberately fostered a new ?Filipino3 identity throu h education o#ernment. Ironically this would foster the de#elopment of the Bangsamoro ideal. The communities of +anila and the all inhabitants closer in line with this Filipino ideal Filipino identity was centered on the Christian, Ta alo -spea2in north& inte ration was the process of brin in usin

American-imported concepts of public education, representation, and mass media as the

#ehicles. In the south these de#elopments cut a ainst +uslim sensibilities& the +oro insur ency of

the first two decades of the twentieth century left the traditional sultan and datu leadership structure in shambles and replaced sharia law with secular .estern practices. [10] Further, in order to facilitate the inte ration of +uslims into the new Filipino ideal, the o#ernment initiated an immi ration policy brin in [11] a practice continued landless Christians from the north south to settle in +uslim areas& throu hout the 6789s. [12] These de#elopments resulted in many, re$ection of the Philippine nation-

:mar inality, dissatisfaction, and ultimately, amon state,;[13] dri#in ?Filipino3 identity. The Political Origins of Bangsamoro Unrest

the de#elopment of the Bangsamoro identity in opposition to the imposed

0espite discussions o#er +oro independence durin

the 67*8 constitutional con#ention,

theBangsamoro identity@with Islam as its core@:was not used as a tool for political mobili'ation until the 6789s,;[14] because the re%uisite internal and international conditions did not support such a mo#e. In order to fully understand the Bangsamoro insur ency, one must place e#ents in the /outhern Philippines within a lobal@specifically pan-Islamic@conte4t. Conditions radically chan ed in 67)6 with the Aapanese occupation of the islands. As in other colonial possessions@Indonesia and +alaya included@the Aapanese occupation authorities sou ht to de#elop competin identities within their newly ac%uired territories to disassociate the local power-base from their former masters while dissuadin resistance to Aapanese administration. [15] Reli ion played a 2ey role in this process. Followin the war, an independent Republic of the Philippines unwittin ly facilitated the further a ma$or blac2 mar2et economy centered on the with trade howe#er, these cross-border contacts the de#elopment of +uslim autonomy by toleratin routes with +alaysia and Indonesia.[16] Alon

/outhern Philippines conductin illicit trade in American ci arettes throu h traditional +uslim trade facilitated Philippine +uslims3 inte ration in a wider Islamic world under oin radical chan e. The same post-colonial forces responsible for Philippine independence were also transformin +uslim world. Across Africa, the +iddle "ast, and /outhB/outheast Asia newly independent +uslim states were emer in from collapsin "uropean empires. Aust as it did durin the centuries before +a ellan, and a ain at the turn of the twentieth century, [17] trade and pil rima e from the Arab core throu h the /traits of +alacca was importin new ideas into the +uslim communities in /outheast Asia. .hat scholar 5ruce Cawrence terms Islamic revivalism and reformism be an to transform communities in +alaysia, Indonesia, and ultimately the /outhern Philippines. Cawrence defines re#i#alism as :the affirmation of Islamic identity and #alues; while reformism was :the product of the colonial presence; that sou ht to blend the secular nationalism of the .est with +uslim identity.[18] Re#i#alism came first, initially penetratin the /outheast Asian +uslim community in the first decades of the twentieth century throu h the mo#ement of students to Arab uni#ersities in, amon other places, " ypt& and by pil rims e4posed to contemporary Arab thou ht as a byproduct of their hajj to +ecca.[19] This strain of thou ht e4horted +uslims to return to the roots of their reli ion, pur in the faith of impurities as a reaction to the challen e of .estern rod for the anti-colonial stru le throu hout +uslim colonialism. As such, it became a li htin

/outheast Asia,[20] particularly in Indonesia. Re#i#alism, howe#er :was timid on the %uestion of the stateD EitF pro#ided no comprehensi#e blueprint for political or ani'ation,; [21] which limited its intellectual usefulness as an en ine for political chan e. Re#i#alist thou ht primarily

manifested itself in increased +uslim reli iosity@the self-e4pression of one3s personal faith [22]@ rather than in political action. This is one e4planation for the lac2 of political momentum behind +oro separatism prior to .orld .ar II. The concomitant rise of independent +uslim states and reformism be an to chan e this dynamic in the /outhern Philippines. The percei#ed success of secular Islamic o#ernments throu hout the +uslim world con#inced some Bangsamoro that independence was possible. -amal Abdel Nasser3s " ypt personified secular Islamic reformism durin the 67G9s and 89s, with its stron emphasis on the borrowed .estern concept of ethnic nationalism. The Philippine -o#ernment unwittin ly fueled theBangsamoro separatist mo#ement durin e4posin this period by enactin educational reform +uslim youth to imported Islamic education. (99 /outhern Philippine +uslims recei#ed raduates of the uni#ersity to preach and educate in the islands. These

scholarships to attend al-A'har Islamic 1ni#ersity in Cairo, with reciprocal #isits by " yptian teachers and Indonesian (99 raduates would then return to teach in Islamic education centers and madrasas funded by

Hr ani'ation of the Islamic Conference <HIC= members " ypt, Cibya, and /audi Arabia. [23] As a result, Bangsamoro e4posure to outside pan-Arabic and Islamic ideas sur ed. Compoundin the hei htened reli ious awareness were a series of internal threats to Philippine +oreo#er, a recently concluded peace settlement with communist +uslims. Thousands of colle e raduates educated in the north returned to communities with little economic opportunity. insur ents in the north resulted in increased mi ration of landless Christian peasants awarded land titles in the south.[24] The situation was primed for ethnic conflict. Rise of the M !" Althou h the history of +uslim insur ency in the /outhern Philippines e4tends bac2 centuries, the pro4imate cause of the current Islamist-inspired mo#ement can be traced directly bac2 to the 678> Aabidah massacre. In response to a territorial dispute with +alaysia, Philippine President Ferdinand +arcos directed a co#ert action a ainst +alaysian authority in the territory of /abah. All the commandos in#ol#ed were +uslim, and e#idence su -o#ernment=, resultin a full-scale insur ency. "4ternally, the political leader of /abah@Tun +ustapha, a Tauso the first #iolent separatist with relati#es in Aolo@be an armin small roups of Bangsamoro to fi ht the Philippine -o#ernment. This led to the creation of roup@the +oro Islamic +o#ement <+I+=@which conducted lowintensity #iolence a ainst Christians in +indanao. [26] The Arab defeat in the 678I /i4 0ay .ar further fueled the insur ency as HIC states consciously sou ht out pan-Islamic causes to support as an e4tension of the Arab reaction to what it percei#ed as .estern hostility to Islam. Internally the massacre prompted mass student protests and increased acti#ism. /imultaneously, a small scale operations.[27] Violence increased throu hout 678>-I6, with increased o#ernment control of southern towns and #illa es. roup founded by Nur +isuari@the +oro National Ciberation Front <+NCF= .ith #iolence spiralin out for of control, in Auly 67I6 all sectors @trained and e%uipped with Cibyan weapons in /abah and +alaysia prepared to commence fullof Bangsamoro society published a manifesto callin o#ernment inter#ention, an action the is a ests that these operati#es mutinied when informed that their tar ets were fellow +uslims <diplomatically claimed by the Philippine o#ernment crac2down and the death of all but one. [25] This e#ent initiated a chain of e#ents both within and outside the Philippines that resulted in the emer ence of

o#ernment treated as a threat to Philippine so#erei nty. [28] The +arcos re ime retaliated in 67I( by declarin martial law and restructurin the lucrati#e blac2 mar2et trade, denyin control to the army. In a stro2e +arcos local elite and en endered a strident the Bangsamoro elite traditional laizze faire and awardin intensified the insur ency by directly challen in 67I(-67I( the *9,999 stron

independence platform heretofore constrained only by the economic benefits of illicit trade. From +NCF@funded by +alaysia and Cibya@tied down I9->9 percent of an a#era e of 699 casualties per month. [29] The +NCF the Philippine military, inflictin because of spiralin

mo#ement itself howe#er was woefully uncohesi#e& out unned, it %uic2ly lost popular support ci#ilian casualties. +oreo#er, in the mid 67I9s a turn of +alaysian policy induced by that country3s own Islamist challen e@the Dakwah mo#ement[30]@and the electoral defeat of Tun +ustapha in /abah depri#ed the +NCF of critical outside support. The +arcos re ime e4ploited the +NCF3s loss of momentum with a multi-faced strate y. .hile maintainin military pressure the Philippine President directed relief and reconstruction operations the /outhern Philippines 0e#elopment Authority to in the worst affected areas while establishin leaders@further e4ploitin

addressBangsamoro social and economic concerns. +arcos also reached-out to non-+NCF +uslim the wed e between the +NCF and populace@and reali ned his forei n policy to court international +uslim fa#or. "irst Interregn#$ +arcos3 approach combined with the shiftin sides to the ne otiatin table. In 67IG the international en#ironment finally brou ht the two panels to insur ent field o#ernment and +NCF leaders entered ne otiations in

Aeddah, /audi Arabia while the Philippine military sent ne otiatin

commanders. .hile +NCF leaders debated, international +uslim leaders@an4ious for resolution@ endorsed ?autonomy3 as the basis for Philippine-+NCF ne otiations at the Gth Islamic Conference of Forei n +inisters <ICF+=, dama in presidential insur ent aspirations for independence. Cocal cease-fires and rie#ances uarantees of immunity for +NCF leaders e#entually resulted in a Cibyan-bro2ered

peace-treaty on (* 0ecember 67I8@the Tripoli A reement@that accepted +NCF sub$ect to a local plebiscite. [31] "#nda$entalis$ and the M !"%MI!" &'lit

The Tripoli A reement pro#ed to be little more than a cease-fire with lon -term implications. Fi htin resumed in 67II despite the o#ernment3s adoption of a Code of +uslim Personal Caws@ incorporatin sharia courts into the national system@in part due to another ma$or influ4 of Christians into the re ion, and partly o#er si nificant disa reements o#er the settlement3s implementation.[32] Relyin on his almost unlimited powers, +arcos sou ht to manipulate the plebiscite process in his fa#or& a mo#e stron ly resisted by the +NCF. The political deadloc2 prompted +isuari to address the +NCF3s concerns to the >th ICF+, which #oted to continue ne otiations.[33] The >th ICF+3s decision compounded by the mo#ement3s earlier decision to accept autonomy rather than outri ht independence prompted an irre#ocable split in the +NCF, separatin +isuari3s supporters from hard-line elements led by /alamat Jashim, a +a uindanao. [34] This splinterin of the mo#ement dramatically shaped the course of the Bangsamoro insur ency o#er the ne4t decade, first because it split +uslim political and financial supporters into opposin camps, with

Cibya continuin

to support +isuari while Jashim established himself in Cairo. +ost si nificantly

howe#er, the split coincided with the emer ence of fundamentalist undercurrents throu hout the Islamic world& a de#elopment that would shape the future character of the political process, and which may only be understood in the lar er conte4t of pan-Islamic fundamentalist thou ht. Islamic fundamentalism emer ed in the 67I9s as the result of a number of factors includin the emer ence of the Hr ani'ation of Petroleum "4portin Countries <HP"C=, and as an intellectual and popular reaction to secular states3 percei#ed failure to crush a #ulnerable Israel in the 678I /i4 0ay and 67I* !om Kippur .ars. [35] It essentially filled the political #oid in Islamic re#i#alism, offerin an alternati#e to the secular nation-state inherited by +uslim countries from the .est. At its core, fundamentalism re$ects the .estern concept of a separation of church and state, ar uin about a mos%ue-state di#ision in Islam is to tal2 about di#idin that because Islam is :both the spiritual and the political, the pri#ate and the public domainsD to tal2 Islam.; [36] In this re ard, ideolo y& and li2e its fundamentalism@li2e its antithesis, communism@is an all-encompassin the pre#ailin

communist antecedent, fundamentalism is politically di#ided between radicals, bent on reformin political order, and moderates, who are content to wor2 within the present order. states [38] on the at the time of [37] In the fundamentalist case radicals wholly re$ect the le itimacy of e4istin

rounds that nationalism is simply a recurrence of the Arab tribalism pre#ailin

+ohammed&[39] tribalism the prophet #ehemently opposed and only o#ercame by the unification of belie#ers under the political banner of faith. +oderates on the other hand are content to build Islam in one state for the foreseeable future. 5oth share in common a literal interpretation of the Quran and the sharia tradition. Contrary to con#entional wisdom, fundamentalism is not inherently #iolent@althou h many fundamentalist mo#ements employ #iolence as a means to their end@but is certainly anti-pro ressi#e and anti-modern. 67I7 pro#ed a crucial year for both the Bangsamoro insur ency locally, and fundamentalism lobally. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran pro#ided +isuari with another supporter as he continued to resist the +arcos re ime, [40] while the /o#iet in#asion of Af hanistan al#ani'ed +uslim militants worldwide and pro#ided the impetus for renewed Bangsamoro resistance in the /outhern Philippines. [41] Capitali'in on the re#olutionary momentum initiated by the mujahidin resistance to the /o#iets, Jashim mo#ed his partisans to Pa2istan, establishin 2ey lin2s with pan-Islamist militants worldwide. [42] There, 899 of his oin on to conduct acti#e operations followers underwent structured military trainin , with 6>9

a ainst the /o#iets.[43] This cadre returned to the Philippines and established trainin camps and pro rams to indoctrinate a new eneration of insur ents, led by bloodied commanders. [44] Throu hout the early 67>93s +isuari3s +NCF continued to suffer battlefield setbac2s, resultin increased ICF+ pressure to return to the ne otiatin in table. 5y 67>( the situation was so dire that

the +NCF a reed to $oin with local communists of the National 0emocratic Front <N0F= in a $oint insur ent campai n, alienatin lar e se ments of the reli ious public and their leaders, the ulama. [45] In 67>) Jashim percei#ed the opportunity to establish a separate entity, the +oro Islamic Ciberation Front <+ICF= to prosecute an independent Bangsamoro a enda. to recast theBangsamoro homeland into a moderate fundamentalist entity. [46] The +ICF en$oyed tremendous popular support initially, attributed by its leaders to the mo#ement3s twin pillars of Islam and independence. In reality, the deterioratin situation caused by conflict and 1nli2e the secular +NCF, the +ICF demanded total independence and the adoption of fundamentalist political ideals

a decade of martial law was the real source of popular support. [47] +arcos attempted to undercut +ICF support by liftin martial law, but was himself ousted in 67>8 as a result of mountin national bac2lash a ainst his ri The (RMM The ouster of Ferdinand +arcos and inau uration of Cora'on A%uino pro#ided impetus for a new round of peace ne otiations. Althou h both the +NCF and +ICF were en a ed, the +ICF bro2e off tal2s as a result of the responded by reinitiatin o#ernment reco ni'in +isuari3s +NCF as its ne otiatin a shadow partner@than2s The +ICF in lar e part to that mo#ement3s close association with many military operations, and establishin o#ernment elite. in of elections. [48]

o#ernment in the south

with the ultimate oal of Islami'ation, build-up, and self-reliance. [49] 0rawin on the political and cultural capital of its Islamist credentials, the +ICF was able to e4pand its base from the urban poor and ulama to include rowin numbers of urbanites and professionals disillusioned with the +NCF continued between and the peace process. [50] Throu hout the late 67>9s, sporadic fi htin to +uslim

rounds of failed ne otiations, with the o#ernment pursuin le islati#e and constitutional solutions rie#ances. The +NCF and +ICF en$oyed a period of tacit cooperation while impro#in The 67>7 establishment of the Autonomous Re ion of +uslim their own political positions.

+indanao <AR++= prompted hope for a final settlement that de enerated into conflict o#er the results of further plebiscites and elections. [51] Rapprochement) &*O+(, 5y 6779 the insur ency entered its third decade and all parties sou ht a settlement. Real pro ress was imminent as the country went to the polls in 677(. The opposition candidate@Fidel Ramos@ #isited Cibya and secured +uammar Luadaffi3s cooperation in findin a peaceful settlement to the Bangsamoroissue. 1pon his election in +ay, Ramos initiated a National 1nification Commission <N1C= that opened peace tal2s with the +NCF and +ICF bac2ed by Cibya, Indonesia, and other HIC nations.[52] Pro ress was slow, but by 9( /eptember 6778 an official peace a reement between the o#ernment and the +NCF was reached, establishin the /outhern Philippines Mone of Peace and 0e#elopment </MHPA0=. Althou h the +ICF denounced the a reement, it publicly a reed to support peace, obser#in an intermittent cease-fire throu h (999. A subse%uent election named +isuari o#ernor. Corrupt and fond of lar e-scale pro$ects such as mass transit at the e4pense of simple local pro$ects desi ned to address rass-roots concerns such as health and education, +isuari3s administration %uic2ly lost popularity and the support of many in and outside the +NCF,[53] pa#in the way for a new type of roup and a new type of tactic. International Terroris$ in -angsa$oro) "ro$ (fghanistan to .o#sef 0iplomatic efforts were not the only e4ternal de#elopments affectin local and pan-Islamic militancy born of the Af han war was transformin of the Abu Nidal terrorist weapons to both the Bangsamoro %uestion the /outhern Philippines durin the 6779s. /tartin in the late 67>9s and acceleratin throu h the mid-6779s, the ne4us of into a bastion of international Islamic terrorism. In 67>I the Philippine police e4posed a lar e cell roup, and the Palestine Ciberation Hr ani'ation <PCH= be an funnelin The followin year, an obscure /audi ma$orBangsamoro mo#ements.

fundamentalist@Hsama bin Caden@dispatched his brother-in-law to the re ion to de#elop a

support networ2 for the operations of his own or ani'ation, al-Laida. Fundin Laida :effecti#ely united with other into a The

would follow, as al-

roups, bac2ed them, found common cause, and lin2ed them

lobal networ2.;[54] In 6776 Ira%i terrorists e#en sou ht to tar et Americans in +anila as introduction of trans-national terrorism a ain transformed the en#ironment in

retaliation for Hperation 0esert /torm, althou h the plot was foiled. [55] which Bangsamorounrest manifested itself. It shifted the source of fundin and material assistance for both the +NCF and +ICF away from state sponsors such as Cibya@facilitatin the peace process @toward international terrorist or ani'ations usin ci#ic or ani'ations as fronts. [56] It also spar2ed the rowth of newBangsamoro mo#ements employin new tactics towards familiar ends. Al-Laida money and support directly facilitated the creation of the Abu /ayyaf -roup <A/-= in 6776 by a former Bangsamoro mujahidin #eteran of Af hanistan, 1stad' Abdura$a2 Aan$alani, as an alLaida affiliate committed to establishin .ahhabism.[57] Capitali'in a pure Islamist state based on the precepts of /alafi Importin international on militant discontent with +isuari and the +NCF, Aan$alani3s A/- sanctuaries as trainin areas, Aan$alani3s

mo#ement offered a radical alternati#e to the more moderate +ICF. e4plosi#es e4perts pro#ided by al-Laida and usin [58] This process. "#en +ICF, publicly committed to supportin roup rapidly established itself as a si nificant local terrorist cell, recei#in

co#ert Cibyan support.

roup3s terror attac2s between 6776 and 6778 would hamper, but not stop the peace the /MHPA0 a reement, be an to resort to terror to international crime and le itimate business

ad#ance its political a enda. +imic2in al-Laida3s methods, the roup e4panded from a traditional uerilla mo#ement to di#erse areas includin enterprises to compensate for reduced fundin from the HIC nations. [59] +ICF also increased its

direct association with al-Laida, recei#in increased fundin and technical assistance in the form of imported trainers from elsewhere in the +uslim world, and e#en e4ported members to train in camps located in Taliban-controlled Af hanistan and Pa2istan. [60] Hf particular si nificance was the increased cooperation between +ICF and re ional terrorist or ani'ations includin +alaysia3s Kampulan +u$ahidin and Indonesia3s Aemaah Islamiya <AI=. 5ecause of their close physical pro4imity and 2inship, the intersection of all three mo#ements complemented the rise of the others& an e4ample bein AI fund-raisin for +ICF in e4chan e for trainin . Hf reater international concern should ha#e been the wider al-Laida networ2 in the Philippines to Khalid /hei2 that facilitated spectacular attac2s a ainst .estern tar ets. The AR++B /MHPA0 ser#ed as a #irtual sanctuary for international terrorists@particularly the cell belon in +ohammed, mastermind of 7B66 amon the Philippines as a safe-ha#en after conductin after capturin other hi h-profile attac2s, and Ram'i !ousef@who used the 677* .orld Trade Center bombin , and in $etliners as weapons. [61] 1nfortunately,

preparation for further attac2s both a ainst and usin

!ousef and a number of his associates as a result of the botched Hplan 5o$in2a

operation to down ma$or $etliners in 677G, both Philippine and 1./. in#esti ators failed to appreciate the e4tent and si nificance of the al-Laida networ2 in the re ion, allowin crucial nodes to remain in place until 6778.[62] International Terroris$ in Bangsamoro) "ro$ .o#sef to 9%11 Followin !ousef3s capture, the Philippines decreased in importance for al-Laida as bin Caden networ2 on /udan and then, the radically fundamentalist Taliban in centered his emer in

Af hanistan. Althou h contacts continued between the or ani'ation and both +ICF and A/-, the fundin stream was reduced promptin increased +ICFBA/- conflict o#er support. 5y the late 6779s howe#er, support for A/- #irtually e#aporated as the or ani'ation resorted increasin ly to criminal acti#ity in the wa2e of Aan$alani3s death in 677>. [63] 5y 7B66, the A/- retained no discernable ties to international terrorism.[64] +ICF3s connection with international, and especially, re ional terrorist was increasin . In addition to continued al-Laida support, durin establishin roups on the other hand reatly facilitated +ICF its the mid-6779s Jamas and the

Tamil Ti ers both sou ht sanctuary in the AR++B/MHPA0 [65] and AI also manifestation of +ICF3s dual own political a enda. The +ost/9%11 Res'onse to Bangsamoro ame of o#ertly supportin

its own terrorist or ani'ation@/pecial Hperations -roup@in 6777& [66] the ultimate peace in the /MHPA0 while pursuin

In (999 a hard-line President@Aoseph "strada@was elected and promptly ended three years of o#ernment-sponsored relief and reconstruction pro rams initiated at Jashim3s re%uest, tri the resumption of ma$or +ICF operations a ainst the o#ernment. [67] erin The +NCF howe#er

remained committed to peace. In April (996 a potentially e4plosi#e situation failed to materiali'e as the mo#ement itself e4pelled +isuari as o#ernor o#er corruption char es. [68] The 66 /eptember (996 terrorist attac2s on the 1nited /tates had profound implications for both sides of the Bangsamoro dispute. The Philippine %uic2ly ali ned itself with .ashin ton, offerin o#ernment@now headed by President -loria +acapa al Arroyo@percei#ed the benefits of American aid to combat +uslim separatism and bases for combat operations a ainst Af hanistan le for sur#i#al. [69] and intelli ence-sharin . In return she secured American financial and lo istic support as well as trainin in combatin the A/-, which continues to stru to e4clude the The +ICF situation was tric2ier. 0espite clear ties to al-Laida, the Arroyo o#ernment lobbied hard roup from both the 1./. and 1nited Nations3 lists of terrorist or ani'ations. These efforts were critical to the on oin peace process& the o#ernment re arded +uslim rie#ances as le itimate, and reco ni'ed the +ICF as a military e4tension of Bangsamoro political aspirations. .hile international labelin of the roup as terrorists would ha#e irre#ocably ended the o#ernment3s efforts towards ne otiations, international ac%uiescence enabled the Arroyo administration to continue its pursuit of a ne otiated end to the lon -runnin insur ency. [70] -i#en the new international en#ironment, +ICF seemed inclined to bar ain. Immediately after 7B66 the roup publicly disa#owed all association with al-Laida, and by droppin its lon -standin demand for independence in fa#or of autonomy, #isibly increased its efforts toward wor2in throu h the political system by participatin in and winnin local elections. [71] In (99* the latest 0espite the presence of peace2eepers as cease-fire was bro2ered by +alaysia, an4ious to emer e as a political as well as economic leader in /outheast Asia and a model +uslim democracy. monitors howe#er, sporadic fi htin continues. (99I and (99> a reements on the boundaries of

ancestral domain were #iewed as preliminaries toward a comprehensi#e peace, [72] but as of early (966 no such a reement has been reached. Followin an aborti#e rebellion by +isuari and a splinter cell of supporters in No#ember (996, +NCF seemed committed to obser#in scale fi htin the 6778 a reements. Then in (99G the roup resumed smallin /ulu@ostensibly as retaliation for operations a ainst the A/-. In (99I +isuari

returned to the helm of +NCF and the same year, was implicated in further attac2s a ainst o#ernment forces.[73] The +NCF remains a wea2 and di#ided mo#ement, with many supporters tacitly supportin either the +ICF or A/- a enda. Althou h peace remains elusi#e, mainstream +NCF and +ICF are decreasin ly a military threat and increasin ly a political force in the /outhern Philippines. Hf A/- and frin e 0on1l#sion For all its indi enous allure, the concept of Bangsamoro can be woefully inade%uate as either an identity or comprehensi#e term for analy'in +uslim unrest in the /outhern Philippines. .hile Bangsamoroimplies unity, the reality is that the +uslim mo#ements in the re ion are fra mented, often competin , and nearly imper#ious to central control. Further, althou h the central element of commonality remains faith, local politics and tribal identity do play a role in manifestin local politics throu h #iolence. 0espite o#ernmental efforts to address the underlyin causes of the insur ency@economic opportunity, basic %uality of life, and an autonomous ethnoreli ious homeland@history su ests that e4ternal political and intellectual +uslim mo#ements o#er the comin decade may decisi#ely influence the ultimate fate of peace in the re ion. roups of the +NCF and +ICF@includin reater concern are the remnants of /pecial Hperations -roup@with possibly

endurin ties to both al-Laida and re ional terrorists such as Indonesia3s AI. [74]

[1] From

the

CIA

Fact

5oo2

N htt's)%%22231ia3go4%li5rar6%'#5li1ations%the/2orld/

fa1t5oo7%geos%id3ht$l O accessed (8 Aanuary (966. [2] Machary Abu'a, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia <5oulder, CHP Cynne Rienner Publishers, (99*=, p. *). [3] "ric Casino, Case Studies of Islam in Asia: with author3s permission=, p.66. [4] Abu'a, p. *). [5] 0onna A. Amoroso, :Inheritin the ?+oro Problem3P +uslim Authority and Colonial Rule in 5ritish +alaya and the Philippines; from Aulian -o and Anne C. Foster <"ditors=, [6] Casino, p . 69. [7] Abu'a, p. *)& Amoroso, p . 6(8& Casino, p . 6-(. [8] Abu'a, p. *)& Casino, p . )& /oliman /antos Ar., he Moro Islami# Challenge <Lue'on City, PhilippinesP 1ni#ersity of the Philippines Press, (996=, p . 6>G. [9] Amoroso, p . 66>-67. [10] Ibid, p . 6*G-)6. [11] Ibid, p . 6*>& Abu'a, p . *G. [12] Ibid, p . *8. [13] Amoroso, p . 6)*. [14] Ibid, p . 6)(. [15] "4amples from other +uslim communities include Robert Jefner, Civil Islam <Princeton, NAP Princeton 1ni#ersity Press, (999=, p . )6& and Jermawan /ulistiyo, :-reens in the Rainbow; from Robert Jefner <"ditor=, he !oliti#s of Multi#ulturalism <Jonolulu, JIP 1ni#ersity of Jawai3i Press, (996=, p . (7*-). he Ameri#an Colonial State in the !hili""ines <0urham, NCP 0u2e 1ni#ersity Press, (99*=, p. 66>-(6. he Moros of the !hili""ines <unpublished& cited

[16] Abu'a, p . *8. [17] /pecifically the ?modernist3 ideas of Aamal al-0in al-Af hani and +uhammad ?Abduh. /ee -iora "lira', Islam in Indonesia <Portland, HRP /usse4 Academic Press, (99)=, p . 6-(. [18] 5ruce Cawrence, Shattering the M$th <Princeton, NAP Princeton 1ni#ersity Press, 677>=, p . 4#. [19] For more on this transference of thou ht and reli ious interpretation from the Arab core to the +uslim hinterlands, see -iora, p . 6-6I and G8-8G. [22] +ehran Kamra#a, he %ew &oi#es of Islam <5er2ley, CAP 1ni#ersity of California Press, (998=, p . G. [27] Ibid, p . *>& Kristina -aerlan and +ara /tan2o#itch <"ditors=, 'e(els) *arloards) and +lama<Lue'on City, PhilippinesP Institute for Popular 0emocracy, (999=, p . 4i#. [28] -aerlan and /tan2o#itch, p . 4i#. [30] For more on this +alaysian Islamist mo#ement see /hamsul A.5., :Identity Construction, Nation Formation, and Islamic Re#i#alism in +alaysia; from Robert Jefner and Patricia Jor#atich <"ditors=,Islam in an ,ra of %ation-States <Jonolulu, JIP 1ni#ersity of Jawai3i Press, 677I=, p . (9I(I. [47] Abu'a, p . )9.