LOCGOV - 029 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v COMELEC, (Feb 2011) Doctrine: The enactment of the Cityhood

Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009 and when it enacted the Cityhood Laws. Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy. Facts: Petitions for prohibition were filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, denied the first motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,4 which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading. In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution. In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.5 In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court Petitioners arguments: Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the just share that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress

is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. Respondents arguments: Issue/s: 1) Whether the 16 Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution? 2) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution? Held/Ratio: 1) The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. Article X, Section 10 provides No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income of at least P20, 000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years. Before R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws. Notwithstanding that the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. These municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They were centres of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable

indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locallygenerated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC. 2) There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist. The justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the privilege that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or class as the respondent

municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very mandate of the Constitution. Dissenting opinion: CARPIO As I have consistently opined, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. First, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Second, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The th pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterionmere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11thCongress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. The exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. I vote to DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 24 August 2010. Digested by: Andrew Velasco