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Usero v CA Digest Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the ban! of the strip of land about "meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion. The #seros claimed ownership of the strip demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a cree!. $owever the Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The %unicipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the e&istence of the cree! between the lots. Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the cree! hence part of public domain Held: '(). Art. *+, of the Philippine -ew Civil Code (-CC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A cree! is included in the phrase .and others of similar character.. A cree! which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public domain therefore not susceptible of private ownership. /eing a public water it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any individual. Viuda de Tan Toco v. Mun. Council of Iloilo 49 !il. "# FACT$: The municipality of 0loilo bought from the widow of Tan Toco a parcel of land for P*+ 122.*, which was used for street purposes. 3or failure of the municipality to pay the debt the widow obtained a writ of e&ecution against the municipal properties and by virtue of such writ was able to obtain the attachment of two auto truc!s used for street sprin!ling one police patrol automobile two police stations and two mar!ets including the lots on which they had been constructed. The issue is the validity of the attachment. H%&D: The attachment is not proper because municipal-owned real and personal properties devoted to public or governmental purposes may not be attached and sold for the payment of a 4udgment against a municipality. 5ust as it is essential to e&empt certain properties of individuals (li!e the bare essentials) from e&ecution so it is also essential and 4ustifi able to e&empt property for public use from e&ecution otherwise governmental service would be 4eopardi6ed. 7-8T(9 $ad the properties been patrimonial they could have been levied upon or attached. ()ee %un. of Pasay v. %anaois et al. :"*;< 5une ", =1<,).>. 'AM()A*+A D%& *),T% V$. CIT- )F 'AM()A*+A. FACT$: After the incorporation of the %unicipality of ?amboanga as a chartered city petitioner province contends that facilities belonging to the latter and located within the City of ?amboanga will be ac@uired and paid for by the said city. $owever respondent city avers that pursuant to AA -o. ","1 providing for the transfer free of charge of all buildings properties and assets belonging to the former province of ?amboanga and located within the City of ?amboanga to the said City. I$$U%: Whether or not facilities which the province shall abandon will be ac@uired by the city upon 4ust compensation. H%&D: 'es 0f the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity the property is public and can be transferred free of charge. /ut if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity then it is

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patrimonial and can be e&propriated upon payment of 4ust compensation ?amboanga Bel -orte v. City of ?amboanga 3ACT)9 After ?amboanga Province was divided into two (?amboanga del -orte and?amboanga del )ur) Aepublic Act ","1 was passed providing that C DAll buildings properties and assets belonging to the former province of ?amboanga and located within the City of ?amboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of ?amboanga.EE )uit was brought alleging that this grant without 4ust compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. 0ncluded in the properties were the capital site and capitol building certain school sites hospital and leprosarium sites and high school playgrounds. Issues: a) Are the properties mentioned properties for public use or patrimonialF b) )hould the city pay for said propertiesF H%&D: a) 0f we follow the Civil Code classification only the high school playgrounds are for public use (in the sense that generally they are available to the general public) and all the rest are PATA0%8-0A: (since they are not devoted to public use but to public serviceG since they are not for public use under Art. *+* of the Civil Code they are patrimonial. 7-8T(9 3or public use if A-'/8B' can useG for public service if only A#T$8A0?(B persons can use.>. 7-8T(9 $ad they been owned by the )TAT( they would not have been patrimonial but would have been properties of public dominion C for this would include public service conformably with Art. *+, par. +.>. /#T if we follow the law of %unicipal Corporations (and not the Civil Code) as long as the purpose is for a public service (governmental service li!e public education public health local administration) the property should be considered for P#/:0C #)(. b) 0f the Civil Code classification is used since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without 4ust compensation. 0f the law on %unicipal Corporations would be followed the properties would be of public dominion and therefore -8 C8%P(-)AT08- would be re@uired. 0t is this law on %unicipal Corporations that should be followed. 3irstly while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the )tate otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. )econdly Art. *+* +nd paragraph itself says Dwithout pre4udice to the provisions (or PA0-C0P:()) of special laws.H

$alas vs 2arencio Facts: 8n 3ebruary +* =1=1 the *th /ranch of the Court of 3irst 0nstance of %anila acting as a land registration court rendered 4udgment declaring the City of %anila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 1 2;1.; s@uare meters more or less. 8n various dates in =1+* the City of %anila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Iillanueva. 8n )eptember += =12, the %unicipal /oard of %anila presided by then Iice-%ayor Antono 5. Iillegas adopted a resolution re@uesting $is (&cellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the Cit y property bounded by 3lorida )an Andres and -ebras!a )treets containing a total area o f J *<, s@uare meters as a patrimonial property of the City of %anila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold to

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bonafide occupants. The bill was passed b y the)enate and approved by the Presiden t and became AA *==;. Issue: W8- the property involved in AA *==; is a private or patrimonial property of the City of %anila. ,uling: The conclusion of the respondent court th at Aepublic Act -o. *==; converted a patrimonial property of the City of %anila into a parcel of disposable land of the )tate and too! it away from the City without compensation is therefore unfounded. 0n the last analysis the land in @uestion pertains to the )tate and the City of %anila merely acted as trustee for thebenefit of the people therein for whom the)tate can legislate in the e&ercise of its legitimate powers. 0f it were its patrimonial property why the City of %anila should be re@uesting the resident to ma!e representation to the legislature t o declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupantsF There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that saidland belongs to the )tate and was sim ply granted in usufruct to the City of %anila for municipal purposes. C%(U )3-+%* A*D AC%T-&%*% C). V. (%,CI&&%$ 44 $C,A 456 FACT$: The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street. Through a resolution it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. $e then sought to register said land but his application was dismissed. H%&D: The portion of the city street sub4ect to petitionerEs application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property of the )tate. 0t is also very clear from the Charter that property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Ce7u )80gen and Acet0lene Co.. Inc. v. (ercilles &94:4;4. Aug. #9. 69;" FACT$: The City Council of Cebu in =12; considered as an abandoned road the terminal portion of one of its streets. :ater it authori6ed the sale thru public bidding of the property. The Cebu 8&ygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. 0t then petitioned the ATC of Cebu for the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by the Provincial 3iscal(Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain and cannot therefore be registered. 0ssue9 %ay the lot be registered in the name of the buyerF H%&D: 'es the land can be registered in the name of the buyer because the street has already been withdrawn from public use and accordingly has become patrimonial property. The lotEs sale was therefore valid. MU*ICI A&ITF%,*A*D%' of $A* MI+U%& vs.

Facts 0n Civil Case -o. 2,*-/ entitled .%argarita B. Ida. de 0mperio et al. vs. %unicipal Kovernment of )an %iguel /ulacan et al.. the then C30 rendered 4udgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents. The court ordered the partial revocation of the Beed of Bonation signed by the deceased Carlos 0mperio in favor of the %unicipality of )an %iguel /ulacan insofar as :ots -os. = + " * and < /loc! == of )ubdivision Plan Psd+,;"= are concerned. 0t also ordered to e&ecute the corresponding Beed of Aeconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the private respondents and to pay them rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from

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=1J, up to and including =1J< plus interest. Petitioner filed a %otion to Luash the writ of e&ecution on the ground that the municipalityEs property or funds are all public funds e&empt from e&ecution. $e said motion to @uash was however denied by the respondent 4udge and the alias writ of e&ecution stands in full force and effect. Aespondent 4udge ordered petitioners to comply with the money 4udgment. When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order respondent 4udge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof. $ence the present petition. Issue: Whether the funds of the %unicipality of )an %iguel /ulacan in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of /ulacan and )an %iguel respectively are public funds which are e&empt from e&ecution for the satisfaction of the money 4udgment in Civil Case -o.2,*-/. Held: Well settled is the rule that public funds are not sub4ect to levy and e&ecution. The reason for this was e&plained in the case of %unicipality of Paoay vs. %anaois .that they are held in trust for the people intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created and that to sub4ect said properties and public funds to e&ecution would materially impede even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose..:i!ewise in Tantoco vs. %unicipal Council of 0loilo it was held that .it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the ta&es and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be sei6ed under e&ecution against them either in the treasury or when in transit to it. 5udgments rendered for ta&es and the proceeds of such 4udgments in the hands of officers of the law are not sub4ect to e&ecution unless so declared by statute.. Thus it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the %unicipal Treasurer of )an %iguel as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of /ulacan are also public funds and as such they are e&empt from e&ecution. /esides PB -o. *JJ !nown as .The Becree on :ocal 3iscal Administration. )ection + (a) provides9 3undamental Principles. C :ocal government financial affairs transactions and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder9 (a) -o money shall be paid out of the treasury e&cept in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. 8therwise stated there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the )angguniang /ayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. 0n thecae at bar it has not been shown that the )/ has passed an ordinance to this effect +overn1ent v. Ca7angis "5 66# !il.

FACT$: 0n =;12 A owned a parcel of land but because of the action of the waves of %anila /ay part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. 0t remained submerged until =1=+ when the government decided to ma!e the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recovered A too! possession of it. Issue: the ownership of the reclaimed land. H%&D: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion because in letting it remain submerged A may be said to have abandoned the same. $aving become part of the sea or the seashore it became property for public use. When the government too! steps to ma!e it land again its status as public dominion remained unchangedG therefore A is not entitled to the land. CHAV%' V. AUTH),IT5<4 $C,A 6"# U(&IC %$TAT%$

FACT$: President %arcos through a presidential decree created P(A which

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was tas!ed with the development improvement and ac@uisition lease and sale of all !inds of lands. The then president also transferred to P(A the foreshore and offshore lands of %anila /ay under the %anila-Cavite Coastal Aoad and Aeclamation Pro4ect. Thereafter P(A was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then years later P(A entered into a 5IA with A%AA0 for the development of the 3reedom 0slands. These two entered into a 4oint venture in the absence of any public bidding. :ater a privilege speech was given by )enator President %aceda denouncing the 5IA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that P(A was conveying to A%AA0 were lands of the public domainG the certificates of title over the 3reedom 0slands were voidG and the 5IA itself was illegal. This prompted Aamos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the 5IA. Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to A%AA0. $e also as!ed for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties. I$$U%: WM- stipulations in the amended 5IA for the transfer to A%AA0 of the lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed violate the Constitution. H%&D: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Aegalian doctrine which holds that the )tate owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The =1;J Constitution recogni6es the Aegalian doctrine. 0t declares that all natural resources are owned by the )tate and e&cept for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain natural resources cannot be alienated. The Amended 5IA covers a reclamation area of J<, hectares. 8nly=<J.;* hectares of the J<, hectare reclamation pro4ect have been reclaimed and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of %anila /ay. 3urther it is provided that A%AA0 will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred. The foreshore and submerged areas of %anila /ay are part of the lands of the public domain waters and other natural resources and conse@uently owned by the )tate. As such foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the P(A doesnEt convert these inalienable natural resources of the )tate into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or @uasipublic use. $ec. of D%*, vs. 0a/ g.r. no. 64;;:; Facts: Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying /oracay into agricultural land. /eing classified as neither mineral nor timber land the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine /ill of =1,+ and Act -o. 1+2 !nown as the first Public :and Act.7"+> Thus their possession in the concept of owner for the re@uired period entitled them to 4udicial confirmation of imperfect title. 8pposing the petition the 8)K argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. /oracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to )ection "(a) of PB -o. J,<. /eing public forest the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the sub4ect of 4udicial confirmation of imperfect title. 0t is only the e&ecutive department not the courts which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition. Issue: 0s PK%ANs presidential proclamation no. =,2< classifying boracay island into *,, hectares of reserved and

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forest land and 2+; hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable) valid and constitutionalF ,uling: 0n issuing Proclamation -o. =,2* President Kloria %acapagal-Arroyo merely e&ercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain presumably sub4ect to e&isting vested rights. Classification of public lands is the e&clusive prerogative of the (&ecutive Bepartment through the 8ffice of the President. Proclamation -o. =,2* classifies /oracay into *,, hectares of reserved forest land and 2+;.12 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation li!ewise provides for a =<-meter buffer 6one on each side of the center line of roads and trails which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Contrary to private claimantsE argument there was nothing invalid or irregular much less unconstitutional about the classification of /oracay 0sland made by the President through Proclamation -o. =,2*. 0t was within her authority to ma!e such classification sub4ect to e&isting vested rights.

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,I+HT$ )F )=*%, >Art. ?

4#<945:?

Hilario v. $alvador Facts: Befendant allegedly constructed a house on the plaintiff land defendant refused to vacate the property in Aomblon Aomblon. Held@Doctrine9 An accion for reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its ob4ect the recovery of possession over the real property as owner while an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess it is also referred to as an e4ectment suit filed after the e&piration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 0n this case it was an accion publiciana. The action of the petitioner does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. they alleged that they are co-owners thereof and are entitled to possession. HI&A,I) vs. $A&VAD), +.,. *o. 64:5<4 . A/ril #9. #::" FACT$: Petitioners herein are coowners of a parcel of land located in Aomblon. 0n =112 they filed a complaint with the ATC of Aomblon against herein respondent alleging that as co-owners they are entitled to possession of the lot and that respondent constructed his house thereon without their !nowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint however failed to allege the assessed value of the land. -evertheless petitioners were able to present during the trial the most recent ta& declaration which shows that the assessed value of the property was Php < 1<,.,,. The respondent filed a %otion to Bismiss on the ground of lac! of 4urisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied.

Aespondent then filed an Answer traversing the material allegations of the complaint contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the con4ugal property of his grandparents the spouses )alustiano )alvador and Concepcion %a6o)alvador. The ATC ruled in favor of the petitioners. 8n appeal the CA reversed the decision holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property and that Dabsent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property the %TC had e&clusive 4urisdiction over the actionH (citing )ec. "" of A.A. -o. J21=). The CA then ordered the refiling of the case in the proper court. I$$U%$9 Whether the ATC has 4urisdiction over the action H%&D: -8. Petitioner argues that the ATC has 4urisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus regardless of the assessed value of the sub4ect property e&clusive 4urisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit. The 4urisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the mar!et value thereof. 7O> 0n the case at bar the complaint does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property sub4ect of the complaint. The court cannot ta!e 4udicial notice of the assessed or mar!et value of land. The Court noted that during the trial the petitioners adduced in evidence at a& de c l a r a t ion showing that the assessed value of the property in =11= was Php< 1<,.,,. The petitioners however did not bother to adduce in evidence the ta& declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in =112. (ven assuming that the assessed value of the property in =11= was the same in =11< or =112 the %TC

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and not the ATC had 4urisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than Php+, ,,,.,,. As the Court of Appeals had held9 DThe determining 4urisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria 7sic> is as AA J21= discloses the assessed value of the property in @uestion. 3or properties in the provinces the ATC has 4urisdiction if the assessed value e&ceeds Php+, ,,,.,, and the %TC if the value is Php+, ,,,.,, or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the ta& rolls in the municipality where the property is located and is contained in the ta& declaration. 0n the case at bench the most recent ta& declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is (&hibit /. The loose remar! made by them that the property was worth ".< million pesos not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. 0t is the amount in the ta& declaration that should be consulted and no other !ind of value and as appearing in (&hibit / this is Php< 1<,.,,. The case therefore falls within the e&clusive original 4urisdiction of the %unicipal Trial Court of Aomblon which has 4urisdiction over the territory where the property is located and not the court a @uo. +*H 0n an obiter the Court discussed the nature of an accion publiciana thus9 DThe action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana or one for the recovery of possession of the real property sub4ect matter thereof. 0t does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its ob4ect the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. 0t involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. 8n the other hand an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. 0t is also referred to as an e4ectment suit filed after the e&piration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 7O>H The )upreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the ATC including the ATC decision are null and void since the ATC had no 4urisdiction over the action of the petitioners. Criticism of the ponencia9 The discussion about the distinction between an accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to be resolved by the court is9 which court has 4urisdiction the %TC or the ATCF 0t is immaterial whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria or accion publicianaG only one court will have e&clusive 4urisdiction. 0 submit that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-ownership by the defendant is true may a plaintiff co-owner then file an action in e4ectment against another co-ownerF Br. Tolentino is of the opinion that a coowner may bring such an action against another co-owner who ta!es e&clusive possession of and asset ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain recognition of the coownership. The defendant co-owner however cannot be e&cluded from possession because as co-owner he also has the right to possess. $a1/a0an v. CA 2anuar0 64.#::" FACT$: Ias@ue6 siblings filed a complaint for forcible entry against sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land and built a house thereon without their !nowledge consent or authority the entry having been supposedly affected through strategy and stealth. The lot was allegedly owned and possessed by the Ias@ue6 deceased mother ( Cristita Luita)- /ayugan and )ibagat Agusan del )ur

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)ampayan9 %aria 'bane6 the overseer of )ps. Terrado (lotNs true owners) gave him permission to enter sub4ect lot. Held@Doctrine: 0n an action for forcible entry the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and tha he was deprived thereof by means force intimidation threat strategy or stealth. $AM A-A* vs . C)U,T )F A %A&$ +.,. *o. 6"454:. 2anuar0 64. #::" FACT$: 8n 5uly ; =11+ in the %CTC of /ayugan and )ibagat Agusan del )ur the siblings Crispulo Ias@ue6 and 3lorencia Ias@ue6-Kilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar )ampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land identified as :ot -o. =1<1 P:)-++< and built a house thereon without their !nowledge consent or authority the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. 0n their complaint Crispulo and 3lorencia asserted that they were coowners pro-indiviso of the said lot their mother Cristita Luita being the ownerand actual possessor thereof. #pon the latterEs death and while they were absent from the said lot Cesar )ampayan through strategy and stealth allegedly built a house on the lot to their e&clusion. After repeated demands Cesar )ampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot. Thus they filed an action for unlawful detainer. 0n his defense Cesar )ampayan asserted that his occupation of the lot was by tolerance of the lotEs true owners %r. and %rs. Terrado who were then residing in Cebu. The permission was given by the lotEs overseer %aria 'bane6. )ampayan further asserted that Crispulo and IalenciaEs action had long prescribed inasmuch as the said lot had already been owned and possessed by the spouses 8riol since =12, as evidenced by the latterEs payment of ta&es. The 8riols in turn sold half the land to the Terrados. Together they maintained possession of their respective portions. /oth the plaintiff siblings and defendant )ampayan submitted their respective evidence consisting of affidavits and ta& declarations. %eanwhile the %CTC 4udge also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises where he found improvements. The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees coconut trees and others on the land in @uestion. The %CTC dismissed the complaint. 0t held that it is clear that defendants have been in possession for more than one year and that the appropriate remedy would have been accion publiciana or lenaria de possession. #pon appeal to the ATC it reversed the decision relying on the involvement of Cristita Luita plaintiffsE mother in a cadastral case involving the lot in =1<J. )ampayan then appealed to the CA which denied the same. Thus this petition for certiorari. I$$U%: =. Whether or not the complaint for forcible entry would prosper +. Whether or not the petitioner had prior physical possession H%&D: 6. '(). 0n )armiento vs. CA the Court held9 D7t>o give the court 4urisdiction to effect the e4ectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court 4urisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The 4urisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. . . .H 0t is clear it is from the above that for the %CTC to ac@uire 4urisdiction over a forcible entry case it is enough that the complaint

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avers the 4urisdictional facts i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force intimidation threats strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case ma!es such an averment. $ence the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the %CTC of its 4urisdiction over the case. The %CTC continues to have that 4urisdiction. #.'(). To begin with the Court is at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the %CTC 4udge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat Dconfirmed the allegations of the defendant 7now petitioner )ampayan> that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees coconut trees and others on the land in @uestionH adding that D7->othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possession of the landH and categorically stating that D7T>he allegation that Cristita Luita the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since =1<J openly e&clusively continuously adversely and in the concept of an owner is a na!ed claim unsupported by any evidenceH. & & & The Court noted that in the assailed decision herein the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private respondentsE mother Cristita Luita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case -o. =*1. The Court ruled and held that the motherEs being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not by itself establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands sub4ect thereof. $antos v. A0on Ma0 4. #::" Bavao City9 Auben )antos filed a complaint for illegal detainer against sps. Ayon. )antos is the registered owner of " lots situated at :an6ona )ubd. Ayons are registered owners of ad4acent land. Previous occupant of the property built a building which traddled both the lots. Ayons using the building as a warehouse. )antos informed respondents that the building occupies portion of his lot but he let them use it. Held@Doctrine: A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessary employing the terminology of the law. Possession but tolerance is lawful but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. $A*T)$ v s . A-)* +.,. *o. 65;:65. Ma 0 $A*D)VA& 4. #::".

FACT$: 0n =112 the petitioner )antos filed with the %unicipal Trial Court in Cities (%TCC) in Bavao City a complaint for illegal detainer against the respondents spouses Ayon. 0n his complaint he averred that a building used by the respondents as a warehouse encroached on a portion of his land. As early as =1;< he had allegedly already informed respondents that the said building occupies a portion of his land but allowed them to continue using the building. 0n =112 needing the entire portion of his lot he demanded that respondents remove the part of the building encroaching on his property but respondents refused and continued to occupy the contested portion. The %TCC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the respondents to vacate and surrender possession of the property. 8n appeal the ATC affirmed in toto the %TCC 4udgment and upheld the finding that respondentsE occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. 8n petition for review however the CA held that petitionerEs proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the ATC

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and not anaction for unlawful detainer and thus dismissing the complaint. I$$U%: Whether the %TCC properly e&ercised 4urisdiction over the complaint. H%&D: '(). All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper %etropolitan Trial Courts the %unicipal Trial Courts and the %unicipal Circuit Trial Courts which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. The said courts are not divested of 4urisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the @uestion of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the @uestion of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. The Court found no error in the %TCC assuming 4urisdiction over petitionerEs complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. $ere there is an allegation in petitionerEs complaint that respondentsE occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. PetitionerEs cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondentsE failure to vacate the @uestioned premises upon his demand sometime in =112. 0t bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. 8ur ruling in Ao&as vs. Court of Appeals "1= )CAA "<= is applicable in this case9 DA person who occupies the land of another at the latterEs tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand failing which a summary action for e4ectment is the proper remedy against him.H +anila v CA Facts: Iioleta $errera filed += e4ectment complaints alleging that she owns :ot =++J of 5ordan Kuimaras and that she tolerated Kanila et al (=; persons and the /aptist Christian :earning Center) to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. When she as!ed Kanila et al to vacate they refused. /arangay conciliation failedG hence she filed the complaints. ; claimed that :ot =++J was formerly a shoreline. ; maintained that their houses stood on :ot =++1. " asserted that :ot =++J is a social forest area. Keodetic engineers surveyed the area and reported that all the houses were inside :ot =++J. %CTC rendered decision in favor of $errera and ordered Kanila et al to vacate. ATC dismissed the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial.

Issues: W8- %CTC erred in ta!ing 4urisdiction over and deciding the case and W8- ATC and CA erred in sustaining the %CTCEs 4udgmentF Held: -o. Kanila et al insist that $errera should have filed an action to recover possession de 4ure not a mere complaint for e4ectment because (=) they possessed :ot =++J in good faith for more than ", years and (+) there was no withholding of possession since $errera was not in prior possession of the lot. The )C agrees with $errera that there was no error in her choice of remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein not the allegations of Kanila et al. /esides Kanila et al have admitted in their preliminary statement that the complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession and not 4uridical possession. While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of

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possession they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. 0n unlawful detainer prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. 0t is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. Also the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or e&piration of his right to possess. Thus the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. #nli!e in forcible entry where defendants by force intimidation threat strategy or stealth deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. $ere there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts. An unlawful detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory action in that the first is limited to the @uestion of possession de facto. Aside from the summary action of e4ectment accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession ma!e up three !inds of actions to 4udicially recover possession. $erreraEs allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer9 (=) she owns :ot =++J (+) she tolerated Kanila et al to construct houses (") she withdrew her tolerance and (*) Kanilaet refused to heed her demand. The suit was well-within the 4urisdiction of %CTC. /esides Kanila et al raised their opposition only for the first time in their appeal they are now stopped from doing so. Petition is denied. ,)$$ ,ICA $A&%$ C%*T%, vs. $ $. )*+ +.,. *o. 65#69;. :<@64@#::" FACT$: The spouses 8ng are the original owners of " parcels of land which they occupy. They sold it to %andaue Prime(state Aealty which then sold it to Aoss Aica )ales Center 0nc. The spouses 8ng filed an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to %andaue Prime (state Aealty and at present the case is still pending.0n the meantime an e4ectment case was filed against spouses 8ng in the %TC which ruled against the latter. 8n appeal to the ATC the 4udgment was affirmed by a decision dated %arch = =11J. The spouses 8ng received a copy of the decision on April +; =11J. The spouses 8ng first filed a -otice of Appeal with the ATC (%ay ; =11J) but on the very ne&t day filed a %otion for Aeconsideration which was denied on 5une +" =11J. The spouses 8ng received a copy of the order on 5uly 1 =11J. 8n 5uly +* =11J respondents filed with the CA a motion for an additional =, days to file their Petition for Aeview which they would eventually file on 5uly ", =11J. The CA gave their petition for review due course and reversed the decision of the ATC on the finding that the action filed was not one for unlawful detainer based on two grounds9 that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force intimidation threat strategy or stealthG and that there is no contract e&press or implied between the parties that would @ualify the case as one of unlawful detainer. I$$U%$:

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=. Whether the complaint satisfies the 4urisdictional re@uirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cogni6able by the %TC +. Whether the case should be considered as one for accion reivindicatoria and thus the 4urisdiction would lie with the ATC H%&D: =. - '(). Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has 4urisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 0n 5avelosa vs. Court of the Appeals it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to ma!e out a case for unlawful detainer. 0t is e@ually settled that in an action for unlawful detainer an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. $ence the phrase Dunlawful withholdingH has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract e&press or implied and which later e&pired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. 0n Aosanna /. /arba vs. Court of Appeals the )upreme Court held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. /ased on this premise the allegation in the Complaint that9 D. . . . despite demand to vacate the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots thus unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lotsGH is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. :i!ewise the case of Co Tiamco vs. Bia6 provides for a liberal approach in considering the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer thus9 D. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and accordingly technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.H +. - -8. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de 4ure and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. 0n an action for unlawful detainer the @uestion of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. Petitioners in all their pleadings only sought to recover physical possession of the sub4ect property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the %TC of 4urisdiction to try the e4ectment case. (ven if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for e4ectment the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an e4ectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary 4urisdiction. This Court in Kanadin vs. Aamos stated that if what is prayed for is e4ectment or recovery of possession it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore the pending actions for Beclaration of -ullity of Beed of )ale and Transfer Certificates of Title and @uieting of title in Civil Case -o. %A-+"<2 will not abate the e4ectment case. 0n Brilon vs. Kaurana this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of

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title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the %TC of its 4urisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it the rationale being that while there may be identity of parties and sub4ect matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title andMor reconveyance the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same. The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be the sub4ect of a collateral attac!. 0n Apostol vs. Court of Appeals this Court had the occasion to clarify this9 D. . . #nder )ection *; of Presidential Becree -o. =<+1 a certificate of title shall not be sub4ect to collateral attac!. 0t cannot be altered modified or cancelled e&cept in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action e&pressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a @uo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.H %,A&TA 9&A(,AD), v s . (U+A,I* +.,. *o. 64"6;;. August #". #::" FACT$: Petitioner Peralta-:abrador was the owner of a *,, s@. m. parcel of land purchased in =1J2 from the spouses Pronto. 0n =11, the BPW$ constructed a road which traversed her lot and separated =,; s@. m. from it. )he was subse@uently issued Ta& Beclaration -o. ,+-+*2,A for the separated lot. )ometime in =11* respondent )ilverio /ugarin forcibly too! possession of the =,; s@. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. $ence on 5anuary =; =112 she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent before the %TC. 0n his Answer with Counterclaims respondent /ugarin contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the * *J" s@uare-meter lot covered by the 8riginal Certificate of Title (8CT) -o. P-=",== and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since =1<<. 0n his Amended Answer with Counterclaim respondent failed to allege that the @uestioned lot is covered by the 8CT -o. P- =",== and instead asserted that he planted fruit-bearing trees in the property. Aespondent further pleaded the defenses of lac! of cause of action and prescription. The %TC decided in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of the 8CT -o. P-=",==. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The decision was affirmed by the ATC. Petitioner further filed a petition for review before the CA but the same was denied for insufficiency of evidence and petitionerEs failure to adduce evidence to prove either ownership or prior physical possession. I$$U%: Whether petitioner has a cause of action for forcible entry against respondent H%&D: -8. 0n :ope6 vs. Bavid 5r. it was held that an action for forcible entry is a @uieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus the Court has nullified proceedings in the %TCs when it improperly assumed 4urisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had e&ceeded one year. After the lapse of

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the one year period the suit must be commenced in the ATC via an accion publiciana a suit for recovery of the right to possess. 0t is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. 0t also refers to an e4ectment suit filed after the e&piration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. :i!ewise the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. 0t is clear that petitionerEs averment ma!e out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the sub4ect lot way bac! in =1J2 and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint on 5anuary =; =112 the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the %TC had no 4urisdiction to entertain the case. Therefore petitionerEs complaint should have been filed with the proper ATC. 8n this point the Court held in /ongato vs. %alvar that9 D0t is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a @uieting process and that the restrictive time-bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. 0ndeed the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. $owever when entry is made through stealth then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of possessionG or an Accion reivindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.H

,egina DiAon et al v. CA and )verland %8/ress &ines. Inc. +.,. *o. 6##"44 2anuar0 #<. 6999 FACT$: 8verland (&press :ines 0nc. entered into a Contract of :ease with 8ption to /uy with petitioners involving a = J<<.;, s@uare meter parcel of land situated at corner %acArthur $ighway and )outh D$H )treet Biliman Lue6on City. The term of the lease was for = year commencing from %ay =2 =1J* up to %ay =< =1J<. Buring this period 8verland (&press :ines was granted an option to purchase for the amount of P" ,,,.,, per s@uare meter. Thereafter the lease shall be on a per month basis with a monthly rental of P" ,,,.,,. 3or failure of 8verland (&press :ines to pay the increased rental of P; ,,,.,, per month effective 5une =1J2 petitioners filed an action for e4ectment against it. The lower court rendered 4udgment ordering 8verland (&press :ines to vacate the leased premises and to pay the sum of P2+* ,,,.,, representing rentals in arrears andMor as damages in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises during the period of illegal detainer from 5une =1J2 to -ovember =1;+ at the monthly rental of P; ,,,.,, less payments made plus =+P interest per annum from -ovember =; =1J2 the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid the sum of P; ,,,.,, a month starting Becember =1;+ until 8verland (&press :ines fully vacates the premises and to pay P+, ,,,.,, as and by way of attorneyEs fees.

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I$$U%: W8- 8verland (&press :ines actually paid the alleged P",, ,,,.,, to 3idela Bi6on as representative (agent) of petitioners in consideration of the option H%&D: -o. CA opined that the payment by 8verland (&press :ines of P",, ,,,.,, as partial payment for the leased property which petitioners accepted (through Alice A. Bi6on) and for which an official receipt was issued was the operative act that gave rise to a perfected contract of sale and that for failure of petitioners to deny receipt thereof 8verland (&press :ines can therefore assume that Alice A. Bi6on acting as agent of petitioners was authori6ed by them to receive the money in their behalf. CA went further by stating that in fact what was entered into was a Dconditional contract of saleH wherein ownership over the leased property shall not pass to the 8verland (&press :ines until it has fully paid the purchase price. )ince 8verland (&press :ines did not consign to the court the balance of the purchase price and continued to occupy the sub4ect premises it had the obligation to pay the amount of P= J,,.,, in monthly rentals until full payment of the purchase price. 0n an attempt to resurrect the lapsed option 8verland (&press :ines gave P",, ,,,.,, to petitioners (thru Alice A. Bi6on) on the erroneous presumption that the said amount tendered would constitute a perfected contract of sale pursuant to the contract of lease with option to buy. There was no valid consent by the petitioners (as co-owners of the leased premises) on the supposed sale entered into by Alice A. Bi6on as petitionersE alleged agent and 8verland (&press :ines. The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is put upon in@uiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. As provided in Article =;2; of the -ew Civil Code there was no showing that petitioners neither consented to the act of Alice A. Bi6on nor authori6ed her to act on their behalf with regard to her transaction with private respondent. The most prudent thing private respondent should have done was to ascertain the e&tent of the authority of Alice A. Bi6on. /eing negligent in this regard private respondent cannot see! relief on the basis of a supposed agency. (very person dealing with an agent is put upon in@uiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. 0f he does not ma!e such in@uiry he is chargeable with !nowledge of the agentEs authority and his ignorance of that authority will not be any e&cuse. Persons dealing with an assumed agency whether the assumed agency be a general or special one are bound at their peril if they would hold the principal to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but also the nature and e&tent of the authority and in case either is controverted the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.

&i1itations on )Bners!i/ >Art. 45"9454? ?.. United $tates v. Caus70. 5#< U.$. #"4 >6944? FACTS: Aespondents owned a dwelling and a chic!en farm near a municipal airport. The safe path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondentsN property at ;" feet which

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was 2J feet above the house 2" feet above the barn and =; feet above the highest tree. 0t was used *P of the time in ta!ing off and JP of the time in landing. The Kovernment leased the use of the airport for a term of one month commencing 5une = =1*+ with a provision for renewals until 5une ", =12J or si& months after the end of the national emergency whichever was earlier. Iarious military aircraft of the #nited )tates used the airport. They fre@uently came so close to respondentsN property that they barely missed the tops of trees the noise was startling and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This destroyed the use of the property as a chic!en farm and caused loss of sleep nervousness and fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims to recover for an alleged ta!ing of their property and for damages to their poultry business. The Court of Claims found that the Kovernment had ta!en an easement over respondentsN property and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement ta!en was Q+ ,,,G but it made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the easement. Held: =. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which respondents are entitled to compensation under the 3ifth Amendment. Pp. "+; #. ). +2,-+2J. (a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land e&tends to the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world. Pp. "+; #. ). +2,-+2=. (b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part of the public domain as declared by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of =1+2 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of =1";. Pp."+; #. ). +2,-+2= "+; #. ). +22. (c) 3lights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which Congress placed within the public domain even though they are within the path of glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Pp. "+; #. ). +2"-+2*. Page "+; #. ). +<J (d) 3lights of aircraft over private land which are so low and fre@uent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the en4oyment and use of the land are as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. Pp. "+; #. ). +2=-+2+ "+; #. ). +2*-+2J. +. )ince there was a ta!ing of private property for public use the claim was .founded upon the Constitution . within the meaning of R =*=(=) of the 5udicial Code and the Court of Claims had 4urisdiction to hear and determine it. P. "+; #. ). +2J. ". )ince the courtNs findings of fact contain no precise description of the nature or duration of the easement ta!en the 4udgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may ma!e the necessary findings. Pp. "+; #. ). +2J-+2;. (a) An accurate description of the easement ta!en is essential since that interest vests in the #nited )tates. P. "+; #. ). +2J. (b) 3indings of fact on every .material issue. are a statutory re@uirement and a deficiency in the findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. Pp. "+; #. ). +2J-+2;. (c) A con4ecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence would not be a proper foundation for liability of the #nited )tates. P. "+; #. ). +2;.

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=,* Ct.Cls. "*+ 2, 3.)upp. J<= reversed and remanded. The Court of Claims granted respondents a 4udgment for the value of property destroyed and damage to their property resulting from the ta!ing of an easement over their property by low-flying military aircraft of the #nited )tates but failed to include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature or duration of the easement. =,* Ct.Cls. "*+ 2, 3.)upp. J<=. This Court granted certiorari. "+J #.). JJ<. Reversed and remanded, p. "+; #. ). +2;. &unod v. Meneses 66 !il. 6#< FACT$: Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a la!e. %eneses owns a fishpond and piece of land between the la!e and a river. The plaintiffs claim the e&istence in favor of their rice fields of a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over %enesesE land. This allowed water collected upon their land and the la!e to flow through %enesesE land and into the river. PlaintiffsE lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed. ,uling: %eneses cannot bloc! the flow of water. Art. <<+ (A2"J -CC)9 :ower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from the higher estates as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them. -either may the owner of the lower estate construct wor!s preventing this easement nor one of the higher estates wor!s increasing this burden. 0n addition under the land of waters %eneses had no right to construct the wor!s which bloc!s the passage through his land and the outlet to the river. $aving done so to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate he violated the law.

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