Basic Jaina Epistemology Author(s): Jayandra Soni Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No.

3, The Philosophy of Jainism (Jul., 2000), pp. 367-377 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400179 . Accessed: 13/08/2011 07:46
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

BASIC JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

Soni Jayandra of Marburg of Indology,University Department

The Jaina contribution to philosophy in general, and to epistemology in particular, is often underestimated, if not completely ignored. Jaina thinkers also drew from a common pool of ideas (like the assumption of suffering as a characteristic feature of human existence, and the knowledge of reality as crucial for liberation and the possibility of liberation), and they couched these ideas in accordance with their own ontology, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics. In each of these branches of philosophy the Jainas have made significant contributions to the history and development of Indian philosophy as a whole. In this essay I am dealing with the basics of Jaina epistemology, not only to show that it has its own history and the differences that go with it, in certain respects depending on the thinker concerned, but also to demonstrate that the Jainas did not lag behind but kept up with the mainstream concerns in Indian philosophy. The presentation of basic Jaina epistemology here is based on selected aspects of the problem in the original words from the works of a selected number of thinkers: Kundakunda's (second or third century) Pravacanasara, Umasvati's (perhaps fourth or fifth century) Tattvarthasutra, and Manikyanandin's (ninth-tenth century) Parfksamukha. These writers have been chosen for their systematic clarity and because they are early thinkers who are generally regarded as authoritative by the Jaina tradition. Other thinkers like Siddhasena Divakara (fifth century), Akalamka (eighth century), and Vidyanandin (ninth century) have also made significant contributions, but their views will be referred to only in passing-to enter into a critique of the interesting details of difference and to make comparisons would go far beyond the scope of what can be done in an article like this one. Moreover, the later tradition, represented by renowned thinkers like Hemacandra (eleventh century), Vadidevasuri (twelfth century), and the erudite polyhistor Yasovijaya (seventeenth century), is also not taken up for discussion. A few words regarding the beginnings of Indian epistemology on the whole may not be out of place here at the outset in order to show that the Jaina tradition was not isolated in the Indian tradition and that its views did not evolve in a vacuum. On the Beginnings of Indian Epistemology The desire for knowledge, which basically reflects a philosophical inclination, is traceable in the Rgveda in a general way with what sound like inquisitive questions, for example about the origin of existence and about what can be known.1 By the time of the composition of the Upanisads these questions became more direct and systematic in the sense that, for instance, they show a specific desire for a knowledge

Philosophy East & West Volume 50, Number 3 July 2000 367-377 ? 2000 by University of Hawai'i Press

367

about the natureof the self (atman).Moreover,especially in the Upanisadsafterthe sixth centuryB.C.E.and in the sutraliterature fromthe period shortlybefore the beof our common the direct or indirect mention of different views era, ginning becomes the usual practice. Particularly in the commentariesof the sutraworksthe explicit mentionof Buddhistand Jainaviews becomes common, signifyingan interschools of thought.The historyof Indian esting and lively debate among the different in hand hand with the philosophygoes emergence and historyof this kindof debate all the of different schools of thought,and with it there is the among representatives necessity of dealing with epistemologicalcategories.The contributionof the Jainas here is perhapsalso uniquely based on their predisposition to collect and copy all kindsof literature for the sake of knowingthe other views.2 The emergence of philosophical debate in India, not only in the commentary literature on the basic worksof each school but also in the formof organizedpublic contests, contributedgreatlyto a sharpeningof the philosophicaltools and to the settingdown of rulesof debate that had to be adheredto strictlyin the courtswhere the debates mostly took place. That the theory of knowledge has been a favorite topic from very early times is evident from a work on Indianmedicine (perhapsin the firstcenturyof our era, but the ideas were surelyin vogue even earlier)compiled The author (in CS 3.8) advises medical by one Carakaand called Carakasamhita. to with others discussion increasesthe zeal for knowldebate because practitioners the clarifies increases power of speech, makes one famous, knowledge, edge, removes doubt, and establishesthe knowledge alreadygained. Moreover,one can learnnew things in a discussion,especially when carriedaway with enthusiasmin a that would otherwisebe discussion in which the other person discloses information in In of Indian this the debate it was also recsecret. history very early period kept ognized that a discussion that formsthe basis of a debate can be of differentkinds, and one that is "hostile."3 two kinds,one that is "friendly" and Carakadistinguishes In view of theirextremeemphasison nonviolence, the Jainaswere probablyexemplarydebaterswell-acquaintedwith theirsubject matter. Carakaoffers a list of forty-fouritems over which the physician should have a command before accepting an invitationto enter into a debate. Suffice it to mention a few termsfrom this list for the point made here:4perception, inference, comparison,the thesis, a statementof the prooffor the thesis, the reason,the example, and the doubt.The list becomes morecompact later,especially when the Nyaya school, whose favoritetopic was epistemology,includesthe listas a starting pointfor all the themes it deals with in its basic work.Sixteentermsare listedat the beginning to note here to show their relationto the of the NyayasOtra,and they are interesting emergence of philosophicaldebate in Indiaand for their special emphasis on episor means of knowledge, (2) the objects of temological issues: (1) the instruments (5) (4) (3) knowledge, doubt, purpose, example, (6) tenet, (7) membersof the argument, (8) deliberation,(9) conclusion, (10) disputation,(11) debate, (12) wrangling, (13) fallacious reasons, (14) quibble, (15) false objections, and (16) reasons for defeat. or meansof cognition,each Eachschool accepted a fixed numberof instruments

368

Philosophy East & West

kind of knowledge, and for the majorschools of Indian of which yields a particular the number philosophy ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist as and reliablemeans of knowledge,the accepts only perception the most important Buddhistsand the Vaisesikaschool accept inference as well, the Samkhyaschool accepts verbal testimonyor scriptural authorityin additionto perceptionand inference, and so forth.There are certain implicitconditions on the basis of which the number of means of cognition were accepted by each school. At least four conditions need to be fulfilled:(a) the knowledge furnishedby one means of cognition mustbe new and not attainableby any other means;(b)one means of cognition may aid anotherin makinga particular knowledgepossible, but the means of cognition in should not be reducible to another-so, for example, when perceptionaids question fire by seeing the smoke in the distance, the knowledge inference, as in inferring cannot be reduced to the knowledge obtained by perceptionalone; (c) the gained obtained means of knowledge should not be concognition throughone particular tradictedby anothermeans of knowledge;and (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason, and in the case of verbaltestimonyor scriptural authority, for example, knowledge concerningthe revealedtruthmustappearprobableand be made intelligiblein termsof humanexperience, or otherwisesuch a means of cognitionwill fail in its purpose.5 Jainathinkersdid not lag behind in their concern with epistemological issues, and the relevant literature from the beginning of our era evinces this. What their basic theory of knowledge is will be seen with special referenceto Kundakunda, Umasvati,and Manikyanandin. JainaEpistemology The Jainatraditionrestson one fundamental fact, namelythat humanbeings are in a to be omniscient and that this view is based on the teaching of omniscient position who have the basic ideas afterhaving become enlightenedthrougha beings taught strict ascetic discipline. These beings are called "Jinas" or victors, who have conthe that bind human to life. Since such beings have quered passions beings worldly seen throughrealityas such, theirteaching is regardedas authoritative by the tradition, and Jainathinkersthroughoutthe ages have strivento reiteratetheir views in the hope of arrivingat the same insightas the Jinas.The Jinasare regardedas TTrthamkaras or "ford-makers" because their views are a bridge between the worldly and non-worldlybanksof the streamof life. The traditionmentionstwenty-four such teachers of humanity, the last two of whom were Parsva and, 250 years later, who was a contemporaryof the Buddha.The teachings of the Jinasare MahavTra, as and every basic idea concerning ontology, regarded reliable and authoritative, and ethics is traced back to a traditionstartedby such beings.6 epistemology, It must be noted that epistemological issues are in fact inalienablyconnected with the metaphysicsand ontology of a particular school. What is the intrinsicnature of the things of the world that are open to human knowledge?How can one define the subject,the knower?What is the natureof the instruments of knowledge,such as

Soni Jayandra

369

All these questionsare basic to the concern with epistemology.It sight and hearing? the Carvakas, is also a well-knownfact that,apartfromthe materialists, the teaching and each has its own view of each school is aimed at liberation(moksaor nirvana), of the world, a knowledgeof which formspartof the disciplinethat leads to the goal. Jainismmade its own unique contributionto this mainstream development by also the nature of knowledge, how with the basic issues itself concerning occupying be reliable.Forthe in can said to is and what be way knowledge knowledge derived, main functions: it also served two with issues Jainasthe concern epistemological provided the basis for an intelligiblediscourse on mattersof common, everyday experience, and, secondly, even if indirectly, it demarcatedthis area from what how errorsoccur in human constitutesthe knowledge of ultimatereality.Explaining cognition was included in the epistemologicaltheories, and it is not often noticed thatepistemologydealt with theoriesof erroras well. Indeedthe success of a theory of valid cognition is commensuratewith the success in which errorin our cognition is also explained. In other words, grantedthat we can err in our cognition, a theory of cognition should also be able to explain the source of this occurrence,or at least be in a positionto account for it. Thispoint is implicitwhen, at the very beginningof of an object his ParTksamukha (PM),Manikyanandin says "the properascertainment of this the contrary arises out of a valid means of knowledge (pramana); happens when it is erroneous"(PM 1).7 In his Pramana-mTmarmsa (1.1.7), Hemacandrasays that error"is a cognition that definitelytakes a thing to be what it is not." One superficialrelationbetween Jainaontology and Jainaepistemology is that just as there are only two fundamentalontological categories,the principlesof senthere as soul and matter), and ajTva, tience and non-sentience(jTva usuallytranslated are only two basic means throughwhich we can know things:in a directway (pratyaksa)or in an indirectway (paroksa).For the Jainassentience intrinsicallypossesses unlimitedqualitiesof bliss and energy and, withoutthe detrimentalinfluence of matter,is omniscient. The association of the soul with the insentientprinciples hinders its capabilities, and therefore human beings possess limited knowledge. Unique to Jainismis the idea that direct knowledge in fact takes place throughthe soul.8 On the basis of the twofold classificationof a direct and indirectmeans of theoryof knowledge is built up concerningthe fundamental knowledge,an intricate of (suppliedbelow). The firstsystematicpresentation principlesor categories (tattva) it in the classical sutra style was given by Umasvatiin his Tattvarthasutra (TS1.6-31), Kundakunda's all Jainas. and his presentationis regardedas authoritative views, by his for with looked are also in Prakrit the great respect upon language, expressed pioneeringattempts. The sentient principle is responsiblefor the fact that knowledge takes place at all. Hence, for the Jainas,knowledge takes place in the soul; when the soul is freed or isolatedfromthe influence of matter,it has kevalajinna (omniscientknowledge, which beings like the Jinas have attained).In the case of the concern with epistemology in the context of human knowledge, it is necessary in Jainismto understandclearlythe context in which the followingtermsare used:jlnna, pramana,and with its twofold aspects the theory of manifoldness(anekantavada, naya. Further,

370

PhilosophyEast& West

of nayavada and syadvada) also has to be seen in an epistemological context because it is concerned with how we know things. The theory of manifoldness, however, applies in a different context: it is concerned with particular standpoints (naya), like the common, the general, or the practical standpoint from which an object may be perceived, and the seven kinds of statements or predications that may be made about an object where it is said that, depending on the perspective (syat), an object can be said to exist, not exist, and so forth.9 What the theory of manifoldness does not do is discuss the means or instruments of knowledge in the Jaina tradition. The word jnana, which is usually translated as "knowledge," is used in Jainism primarily in the context of absolute knowledge, which can be had only by beings liberated from the detrimental effects of matter in the form of karma clinging to the soul. In other contexts it could be used in the sense of valid cognition, in contrast to erroneous cognition. In this case jna,na is synonymous with the prama (also meaning "knowledge") of the thing to be known (prameya), obtained through a particular means or instrument of cognition (pramana). A theory of knowledge (pramanyavada), therefore, deals with all three of these aspects, and the Jainas say that there are two general instruments of knowledge (the direct and the indirect ones), that the objects to be known are the seven basic categories of Jaina metaphysics (supplied below), and that knowledge takes place in the soul. In Jainism the basic twofold classification of knowledge derived through direct and indirect means is as unique as the classification of the different kinds of instruments of knowledge that come under the rubric of these two. It seems that Kundakunda is the first independent thinker of the post-canonical period who dealt with epistemological issues. In this context his Pravacanasara ("Essence of the Scripture") (PrS)is an insightful work, regarded as one of his philosophical masterpieces. The three sections of the work clearly show the issues he deals with: knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and conduct. It is interesting to see how he deals with some aspects of epistemology that have become part of the tradition, so that it can also be evident how the problem was thematized differently in the later period:10 He who has manifestedpureconsciousnessand is free from... karmicdust, has become and fully comprehendsthe objects of knowledge. (PrS1.15) self-sufficient; The soul is co-extensive with knowledge;knowledge is said to be co-extensive with the object of knowledge;the object of knowledge comprisesthe physical and non-physical world;thereforeknowledge is omnipresent.(PrS1.23) The knowerwho is beyond sense-perception,necessarilyknows and sees the world neither enteringinto nor entered into by the objects of knowledge,just as the eye sees the objects of sight. (PrS1.29) He who knows is knowledge;the self does not become a knowerwith knowledge(as an extraneous instrument). The very self develops knowledge, and all the objects stand in the (reflected) knowledge. (PrS1.35)

Jayandra Soni

371

of thingsthrough a foreignagency is calledparoksa, indirect or mediate; Perception whatever is perceived the soul alone is direct or immediate. (PrS 1.58) by pratyaksa, Theobjectof knowledge is madeupof substances, whicharesaidto be characterised by and with are the modifications; thosewho are which,moreover, (associated) qualities, arefalsebelievers. 2.1)11 deluded (PrS by modifications, whichis endowedwithqualities andaccompanied Thatis calleda substance by modiand which is coupledwith origination, destruction and permanence without fications its nature. (PrS 2.3) leaving orthe otherit is stated thata substance to somemodification exists,does not According is both or otherwise. is 2.23) (PrS exist, indescribable, own This randomselection of the basic aspects of the problemin Kundakunda's words has been supplied so as to demonstratehow the treatmentof the theme changes with Umasvati. One of the basic differences is that Umasvati explicitly enumeratesthe differentmeans of knowledge that are grouped underthe rubricsof and the indirect (paroksa).When the Jainas speak about a the direct (pratyaksa) of knowledge objects they mean specifically a knowledge of the seven categories that comprisethe metaphysicsof the school. The seven categoriesare, as Umasvati the sentientand insentientcategories,the inflow mentionsthem in his Tattvarthasutra: (of matterinto the soul; matterturnsinto karmaparticles,which obstructthe innate energy of the soul), bondage (caused by this inflow), stoppage (of furtherinflow), burningaway (of the remainingparticlesof karma,throughasceticism),and liberation (as a resultof being isolatedfromthe influenceof matter)(TS1.4). In TS 1.6, Umasvati says that knowledge can be obtained through pramana and naya, and he goes on to say (in TS1.9-12) that knowledge is obtainedthrough five kindsof pramana,and of these the firsttwo-sensory knowledge and scriptural meansof knowledge,and the rest-clairvoyance, knowledge-are indirect(paroksa) means of knowledge. Not only direct omniscience-are and (pratyaksa) telepathy, but it also is this list much more differentiatedand explicit than Kundakunda's, is view since then: the Jaina sensoryperception defined as presents characteristically it all other schools whereas regard as the only direct means of being indirect, of knowledgedo not at all feature means knowledge;what the Jainasregardas direct as valid means of knowledge in the other schools.12 In elaboratingthe Jainaview, Umasvaticontinues to say that synonymsfor senall of and "deduction," recognition,"induction," sory knowledgeare remembrance, which are caused by the senses and the mind (TS1.13-14). Scriptural knowledge, which is based on sensory knowledge, is of two, several, or twelve kinds (TS1.20), The rangeof sentexts are regardedas authoritative. dependingon which scriptural and the five six substances all the to extends and (soul scripturalknowledge sory infernal and Divine modes in all their not but 1.20). insentient substances), (TS beings possess clairvoyance; if the karmathat hinders this kind of knowledge is obliterated,or if its influence is neutralized,then animals and human beings, too, can have it (TS1.21-22), and throughit all entitiesthat have formcan be known (TS

372

Philosophy East & West

1.27). Telepathyis of two kinds,distinguishedon the basis of purityand infallibility (TS1.23-24), and its range is infinitelygreaterthan that of clairvoyance (TS1.28). The scope of omniscience, on the other hand, extends to all substances in all their modes simultaneously (TS 1.29). Sensory knowledge, scripturalknowledge, and of knowledge that can also be to as instruments clairvoyanceare explicitly referred erroneous(TS1.31). (PM) Manikyanandin begins his treatmentof epistemology in his ParTksamukha that is valid of itself and of not before" proved things knowledge by saying "pramana (PM 1.1),13 and goes on to say that the validity of pramana "rises from itself or to the basic kinds of knowlthroughanother (Pramana)" (PM 1.13). Afterreferring in with the tradition as direct and (PM2.2), he says that direct indirect, keeping edge knowledge is knowledge "which is clear" (PM 2.3), with clearness meaning an "illumination without any other intermediateknowledge or illuminationin details" (PM2.4). Direct knowledge is then divided into two kinds:one that is currentin everyday life and which is partiallyclear (PM 2.5), and the other, which is "supreme,"not dependenton any sense organ,and is devoid of any kindof obstruction (PM2.11). The indirectmeans of knowledge consists of memory,recognition,logic, inference, and scriptural testimony (PM3.2). These are then defined, and the final the resultsof inferthree chaptersof the work deal with universalsand particulars, ence, and, finally,the fallacies of inference. the specific means of knowledge that One of the notable differencesregarding are direct is given by Akalamkawhen dealing with sensory perception. Itwas seen which takes place in the soul, above that for Umasvatidirectperception(pratyaksa), occurs throughclairvoyance,telepathy, and omniscience and that sensory knowledge and scripturalknowledge are indirect (paroksa).According to Akalamka's classification,direct knowledge is basically of the two kinds that Manikyanandin takes over from him, namely the direct knowledge that takes place through the senses and that which takes place throughmemory,which is regardedas synonymous with remembrance,recognition, "induction,"and "deduction." In another classificationAkalamkaidentifiesmemory (and the other things regardedas synonyms of it) with sensory perceptionas direct knowledge and anotherkind of direct knowledge not derived through the senses, namely clairvoyance, telepathy, and omniscience. The differencesare not merelya matterof classification.Inview of the high regardand impact his views have in the Jainatradition(inspiringmasterssuch as Vidyanandinand Manikyanandin), a detailed study and furtherresearchof his works are still needed to assess their epistemological implicationsin the context of the Jainaview as a whole.14 In conclusion, the relationbetween epistemologyand logic needs special mention here. These two areas are closely linked in the Indiantraditionbecause logic in India primarilyinvolved an investigationinto the validity of inference, which, in turn, is regardedas a means of knowledge.The preoccupationwith abstract,logical ideas related to inference was a favorite topic of the Nyaya school, and Jaina thinkersadopted its language and method, using naturallanguage, not symbols, to present their abstract ideas.15 Siddhasena Divakara(fifth century) deals with the

Soni Jayandra

373

issues regarding the major,minor,and middle termsof an argumentwithin a Jaina context in his Nyiayvatara.Here, too, the Jainashave kept up with the majorissues within the Indiantradition. The following points have hopefullyemergedout of this shortpresentation of the basics of Jainaepistemology:(1) the Jainatraditionevinces insightful views that can be regardedas their contributionto the development of Indian philosophy as a whole, for example theirown definitionof what constitutesa valid means of cognition and their classificationof the means or instruments of knowledge;(2) it is possible to speak of a historyof epistemologicalideas withinJainismitself,for example when one comparesthe views of the thinkersreferred to above; and (3) a greatdeal of research is still requiredbecause not all significantworks on epistemology are works. easily available,as in the case of Akalamka's

Notes 1 - See, for example, Rgveda1.164 (especially4 and 37) and X.129 (especially 6 and 7). Eventhough doubts have been raisedabout the authenticityof certain are certainly"veryearly" philosophical ideas in this work, the interpolations and depict an intrinsically philosophicalattitudeeven in the earliestrecordsof Indianthought. 2 - Jaina monasterieswere and are centers of learning,and from early times the of all disciplines has been seen as an act that brings copying of manuscripts librariesstill contain a wealth of materialthat merit. Jaina Hence, religious is only graduallycoming to light, with obvious implicationsfor the whole of Indianphilosophy. 3 - For a detailed description,also concerning the differentkinds of assemblies that decide the outcome of a debate, see Dasgupta 1952, pp. 378-388, and "Ein Frauwallner 1984, p. 66. Useful in this context also is G. Obherhammer, in Wiener Zeitschrift die Kunde fur zu den Vada-Traditionen Indiens," Beitrag Sud- und Ostasiens(Leiden:E.J. Brill)7 (1963): 63-103. 4 - Forthe complete list see Frauwallner 1984 again, pp. 69-70. it was Vrsagana(or Varsaganya,perhaps300 5 - Accordingto ErichFrauwallner the renowned Samkhyateacher, who was the first to investigateepisC.E.), (available temological questions at the beginning of his work, the Sasttitantra others. See his a tradition followed in and by thereby began only fragments), in ErichFrauwallner des klassischenSamkhya-Systems," "Die Erkenntnislehre Kleine Schriften(Wiesbaden:FranzSteinerVerlag, 1982), pp. 223-278. See Indoalso D. SeyfortRuegg, "Note on Varsaganyaand the Yogacarabhomi," IranianJournal(Hague: Mouton) 6 (1962): 137-140, and G. Oberhammer, WienerZeitschriftfur die KundeSud"The Authorshipof the Sastitantram," und Ostasiens4 (1960): 71-91. I thank my friend and colleague Dr. Roland

374

PhilosophyEast& West

Steinerfor suggestingthat I include these referenceshere, and for other useful comments. 6 - The issue concerns the notion of apta, one who can be regarded as an "authoritative person";cf. Soni 1996. 7- I am using the edition mentioned in Manikyanandin1940. The text is also embodied in the two main commentariesto the work:(1) the Prameya-kamalamarttan.da by Prabhacandra,ed. with introduction, indexes, etc. by Pt. Mahendra KumarShastri,2d edition (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1941), and (2) the ParTksamukka-laghuvrtti and (also called ParTksamukha-panjika ed. Satis Chandra (eleventh century), Prameya-ratna-mala) by AnantavTrya Vidyabhusana (Calcutta:Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909). To this second commentarythere is a commentarycalled Prameya-ratnalahkara by Abhinava CarukTrti ed. Panditaratnam A. Sastri Oriental Shantiraja Panditacarya, (Mysore: ResearchInstitute,1948). 8 - Any standard work on Jainismdeals with the basics of Jainaontology and does not have to be explained here. The point of direct knowledge taking place throughthe soul can be compared,e.g., with the functionof cic-chaktiin Saiva Siddhanta.Forthe similarities and differencessee Soni 1996, pp. 9-13. 9 - Any standardwork on Jainismsupplies the details. Forthe philosophical significance of the Jainatheory of manifoldness,which is omitted here, see Soni 1997. 10 -The translationsare taken from Kundakunda's work given in Kundakunda 1984. 11 - The reference here is to a fundamentalissue in Jaina philosophy concerning substance,quality,and mode. Forthe philosophicalcontext of this far-reaching problemsee Soni 1991. 12 - Umasvatisays that knowledge can also be obtained throughother means: by and division (TS description,ownership, cause, restingplace (or substratum), 1.7); and by existence, number,place of abode, etc. (TS1.8). These lists only broaden the scope of epistemology. I have chosen to deal only with those aspects that are clearly comparablewith epistemology in the other schools. 13 - The translations are fromManikyanandin's workgiven in Manikyanandin 1940. 14 - The firstclassificationis contained in his Pravacanapravesa (a work that forms the other two contained in this are Prapartof a trilogycalled Laghfyastraya; and Nayapravesa). The second classificationis contained in his manapravesa All these works have been published in a single volume: Nyayaviniscaya. ed. MahendraKumarSastri,SimghT JainaGranthaAkalamka-grantha-trayam, mala, no. 12 (Ahamadabad-Kalkatta, 1931). The reference to these classifications is taken from K. K. Dixit,JainaOntology (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology,1971), p. 146.

Soni Jayandra

375

15 - Forthis point and a surveyof the issues in Jainaphilosophyas a whole see Soni 1998.

References Calcuttaand New HariMohan. 1994. Jaina Logicand Epistemology. Bhattacharya, Delhi: K. P. Bagchiand Co. 1952. A Historyof IndianPhilosophy.Vol. 2. Cambridge: Dasgupta,Surendranath. CambridgeUniversityPress. Erich.1984. ErichFrauwallner: Frauwallner, Nachgelassene WerkeI:Aufsatze,BeiAkademieder Wissenschaften. (Translated trage,Skizzen, Wien:Osterreichische PosthumousEssays.Delhi: from the German by J. Soni as ErichFrauwallner's 1994.) AdityaPrakashan, Text Hemacandra (eleventh century). 1970. Hemacandra's Pramana-mimamsa. and translationwith critical notes by SatkariMookerjee.Varanasi:Tara Book 1986. Agency. Reprint, 4th edition. Kundakunda (second-thirdcentury).1984. Pravacanasara (Pavayanasara). Editedwith commentariesand Englishtranslationof the text alone by A. N. Ashrama. ShrimadRajachandra Upadhye.Anand(Gujarat): (with (ninth-tenth by ManikyanandT century).1940. ParTksamukham Manikyanandin Edited with introduction, notes, translation, AnantavTrya). by Prameya-ratnamala and an original commentary in Englishby Sarat ChandraGhosal. Lucknow: Central JainaPublishingHouse. Y. J. 1963. A Comparative Studyof the Jaina Theoriesof Realityand Padmarajiah, Motilal Banarsidass. Reprint,1986. Knowledge.Delhi: Lahore: MotilalBanarsidass. Prasad, Jwala. 1939. IndianEpistemology. Randle,H. N. 1930/1937. IndianLogic in the EarlySchools: A Studyof the Nyayadarsanain Its Relationto the EarlyLogicof OtherSchools. Oxford:OxfordUniManoharlal. Delhi: Munshiram versityPress.Reprint, Soni, Jayandra.1991. "Dravya,Guna and Paryayain Jaina Thought."Journalof IndianPhilosophy19: 75-88. . 1996. "The Notion of Apta in Jaina Philosophy."The 1995 Roop LalJain Annual Lecture,Toronto,25 November 1995. Toronto:Universityof Toronto, Centrefor SouthAsia Studies. In . 1997. "PhilosophicalSignificanceof the JainaTheoryof Manifoldness." = PerIntercultural from an Sicht interkultureller Philosophy Philosophie aus spective, edited by N. Schneideret al., pp. 277-287. Studienzur Interkulturellen Philosophy(series),edited by H. Kimmerle Philosophie= Studiesin Intercultural and Atlanta,Georgia:Rodopi. and R. A. Mall, no. 7. Amsterdam

376

PhilosophyEast& West

. 1998. "Jaina Philosophy, Issues in." In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig. New York and London. Umasvati (fourth or fifth century). 1994. TattvarthaSutra: That Which Is: With the Combined Commentaries of Umasvati/Umasvamin, Pujyapada and Siddhasenagani. Translated with an introduction by Natmal Tatia. United Kingdom: HarperCollins.

Soni Jayandra

377