G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982 DONALD MEAD, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL A.

ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.: The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission." On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the president and the general manager, respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly organized in accordance with existing laws, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the living plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the same vicinity. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was subsequently assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Caloocan City) presided over by the respondent Judge. On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case, filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court has no jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted information. The motion to quash was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5, 1975. A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the respondent Judge who allegedly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in issuing the same.

In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were required to comment on the petition and a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing his questioned orders until otherwise directed by this Court. It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") as created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution" before a criminal case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further avers that the Commission not having finally ruled that the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the petitioner for a violation of said law. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931 grants the power and duty to the Commission to investigate and prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other public prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions. Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to resolve a procedural question raised by the respondents in support of their prayer that the instant petition should not be entertained. Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused- movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599; Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.) There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969, 105 Phil. 3007: However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in Case No. 16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would violate one of this constitutional rights, and that, an appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice. To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co., vs. Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil., 930938, expressed as follows: While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was held not to be a proper basis for a petition for certiorari [Nico vs. Blanco, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131, or an appeal not certiorari is the proper remedy for correcting an error which a lower court may commit in denying a motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting aside an order of dismissal, [Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1265;

79 Phil. 243; Santos vs. Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1278; 79 Phil.754] however, in some instances, the Supreme Court has departed from the general rule and has entertained the writ notwithstanding the existence of an appeal. Thus, in one case the Supreme Court took cognizance of a petition for certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the accused could have appealed in due time when it found that the action was necessary to promote public welfare and public policy (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 880). In another case, a petition for certiorari to annul an order of the trial judge admitting an amended information was entertained although the accused had an adequate remedy by appeal "inasmuch as the Surplus Property cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. (People vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil., 627.) And still in another case, the writ was entertained where the appeal was found not to be adequate remedy, as where the order which is sought to be reviewed is merely of interlocutory or peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom can be interposed only after final judgment and may therefore be of no avail. (Rocha vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil., 355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182. See also Mendoza vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First Instance, 51 Phil., 36). For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for certiorari interposed by the accused against the order of the court a quo denying the motion to quash may be entertained, not only because it was rendered in a criminal case, but because it was rendered, as claimed, with grave abuse of discretion, as found by the Court of Appeals, it would be indeed unfair and unjust, if not derogatory of their constitutional right, to force the accused to go to trial under an information which, in their opinion, as was found, accuses them of multiple offenses in contravention of law. And so, in our opinion, the respondent court did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it, as claimed. The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the ground of double jeopardy. In Pineda vs. Bartolome, the ground invoked was duplicity of offenses charged in the information. In the case at bar, the petitioner assails the very jurisdiction of the court wherein the criminal case was filed, Certainly, there is a more compelling reason that such issue be resolved soonest, in order to avoid the court's spending precious time and energy unnecessarily in trying and deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety and embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in which could possibly be annuled for want of jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the court's jurisdiction is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the court to resolve the same as soon as possible in order to avoid the unwholesome consequences mentioned above. It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action, and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for review by certiorari, it would be premature because it seeks to have a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIA 51 O.G. 6636, 5638).

While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the trial and an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et al,50 Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et all 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, L-13748, 30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA, pp. 315-316.) An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the obvious merit We find in the same. Our reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 has convinced Us that the clear legislative intention is to vest in the Commission the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution" penalized thereunder and to prosecute violations of said law. The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931. More specifically, it alleges that the petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac Arivas, "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the same vicinity." Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed to the petitioner, reads as follows: SEC. 9. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to see or otherwise dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air. It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is to throw, run, drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or substance "that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air." Stated in simpler terms, the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner was the act of causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal). The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary signification. In Section 2, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3931, "pollution" is defined in these words: (a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical, chemical and/or biological properties of any water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or any such discharge of any liquid, gaseous or solid substance into any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the country as will or is likely to create or render such waters and/or atmospheric air harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or of her aquatic life. The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the Commission. Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the authority to "determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Section 6(a), No. 1); to "hold public hearings,

... make findings of facts and determinations all with respect to the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission." (Ibid., No. 3); to "institute or cause to be instituted in the court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act" (Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act whenever modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8 contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to determine the existence of pollution and to take appropriate court actions to abate or prevent the same. It provides: SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . The Commission may, on its own motion, or upon the request of any person, investigate or may inquire, in a manner to be determined by it, as to any alleged act of pollution or the omission or failure to comply with any provisions of this Act or any order of this Commission. Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation, that there has been a violation of any of the provisions of this Act or any order of the Commission, it may order whoever causes such violation to show cause before said Commission why such discharge of industrial wastes or any waste should not be discontinued. A notice shall be served on the offending party directing him or it to show cause before the Commission, on a date specified in such notice, why an order should not be made directing the discontinuance of such violation. Such notice shall specify the time and the place where a public hearing will be held by the Commission or its authorized representatives, and notice of such hearing shall be served personally or by registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and in the case of a municipality or corporation such notice shall be served upon the major or president thereof. The Commission shall take evidence with reference to said matter and may issue an order to the party responsible for such violation, directing that within a specified period of time thereafter, such violation be discontinued unless adequate sewage works or industrial wastes disposal system be properly operated to prevent further damage or pollution. No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission shall prejudice any action which may be filed in court by any person in accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code on nuisance. On matters, however, not related to nuisance, no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and no order of the Commission discontinuing the discharge of waste shall be stayed by the filing of said court action, unless the court issues an injunction as provided for in the Rules of Court. The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority to be exercised by the Commission and by the ordinary courts in respect of preventing or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only the determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law is considered pollution. It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the filing of civil actions, and not to criminal cases as is the one herein involved, there being no basis either in the context in law nor from a consideration of the purpose behind the enactment of the same upon which such a distinction

may be made. Indeed, respondents do not seriously question that the court action contemplated in the last paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal proceedings. Respondents merely aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the Commission is not exclusive of the power of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931. We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give concurrent authority to the Commission and Fiscals to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931. It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring that the authority vested in the Commission to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same logic, there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be concurrent or may be exercised jointly with Fiscals. The absence of an explicit declaration as to the exclusive authority of the Commission to prosecute violations of the subject law does not detract from the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law itself and as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible from the provision of Section 8 expressly declaring that no court action shall be initiated, except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall have finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution; and also from Section 6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the Commission to "initiate or cause to be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act." As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution requires investigation, public hearings and the collection of various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in itself connotes that the determination of its existence requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4 of the law, it is provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and other technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall be the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, one of the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of the Philippine Council of Science and Technology, and one of the two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer. The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to institute a criminal action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for administration or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecution service of the government, is not new in this jurisdiction. It is recognized in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the exclusive authority of the Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate and impose administrative fines upon violators of the provisions of Republic Act No. 751 for the reason that said official "has better facilities than the prosecuting officials to carry out the provisions of the said Act, the former official being the keeper of the records pertaining to aliens." The same principle has been recognized with respect to the prosecutions of violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic Act No. 1131.) In holding that the City Fiscal of Manila has no authority to prosecute such violations independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, it was said: Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the power or right to prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to prosecute violations of the AntiDummy Board, there would be no order, concert, cooperation, and coordination between the said agencies of the government. The function of coordination which is entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the above-quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as envisioned in the law unless the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control the city fiscal in the prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo, p. 118; 5 SCRA 428,433.)

In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365) involving the authority of the Bureau of Forestry over the management and use of public forests and the transfer of licenses for the taking of forest products, this Court has made this pronouncement: A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. (p. 124, Rollo.) It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information charging the petitioner with a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not file an information for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding or determination that the law or any of its orders had been violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there had been no prior determination by the Commission that the supposed acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged therein. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of the respondent Judge are hereby annuled and set aside. The respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991 POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents. Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner. Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:p Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED. 1

We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ; 2 and

b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"). The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was nonoperational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations. A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April

1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days. On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287. On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3

The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success. The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that: 1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and 2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances: P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides: (a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied) We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on anex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary. Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.'' Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of TullahanTinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part provides that: Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the following beneficial usages: (a) Fresh Surface Water Classification Best usage

xxx xxx xxx Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and processing. xxx xxx xxx (Emphases supplied) The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:

"Inland November September Waters 1986 1988 (Class C & D 7 Report 8 Report 9 Station 1 Station 1 a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125

platinum (Apparent cobalt Color) b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7 c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature ture in C (C) d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in mg./1. mg.1 e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80 solids in solids in mg./1. mg./1.

f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152 mg./1. mg./1 g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93 in mg./1/" mg./1. MBAS i) Dissolved 0 oxygen, mg./1. j) Settleable 0.4 1.5 Matter, mg./1. k) Total Dis 800 610 solved Solids mg./1. l) Total Solids 1,400 690 mg./1. m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO 3 70 The November 1986 inspections report concluded that: Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic). The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it

is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. . . . 10

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were: 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP). 2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed. Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .) 11

From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al., 12 the Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that: 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless

appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the business. 2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: xxx xxx xxx (3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition) 3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . . 4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition) xxx xxx xxx 6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community." In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public

threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations. It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated. Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. OnFebruary 16, 1989, they plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested thecompany to show to the office of the mayor some documents, -Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent ActingMayor, without notice, its operation.Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition, mandamus withpreliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower Issue: Whether of not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO. Ruling: 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determiningwhether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution ControlCommission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental ManagementBureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognizedthat the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a

permit to operate abusiness or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to controland/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions inthe operation of the business.2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted bythe fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but alsoaffect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop itsoperation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: a. Building permit; b. Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. 4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made.Itfound thatthe fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surroundinghouses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. 5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, butinstead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati. 6.While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then NationalPollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less toinstall any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of theresidents of the community. Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investmentand contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health,nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., INC. vs. The Deputy Executive Secretary Facts: After the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter datedMarch 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcosadministration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin PeaksDevelopment and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws,rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].Petitioner made the following allegations:(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No.87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then SecretaryJose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12,1965 until June 30, 1990;(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping alllogging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the loggingconcession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidentialinstructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena[Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TOSTOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASECONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENTAND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THEINVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF ACOMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED

 [Annex"4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau'sdirective, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forestconservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but nooperations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the areaformerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and RealityCorporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed PresidentFerdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda 21 issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilegewhich could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whoselicenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of loggingoperations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed onApril 2, 1986 Issue: Whether or not the petitioners cancellation of timber license was a violation of his right as forest product businessman and that no due process was observe Held: The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewedand growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern canhardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversibleloss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lastingeconomic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required bythe people seriously depleted. While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profitand to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensurefuture generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective andcircumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of theforest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutionalcommand to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987Constitution provides: SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused byunbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of casesestablish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to thesound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the presentcase, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large onthe pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the widelatitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to betaken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instrum ents by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forestresources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that theymerely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein.They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive

whennational interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause

G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992 SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, -versusHON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents. Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner. Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.: The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992. On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4 The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus: The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner. Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of Pagadian City. Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5). Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's request seven years back. The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation,6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible. The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides: Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines. This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7 where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases. The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9 As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when irreparable damage will be

suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo warrantoproceedings. 19 The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved. We rule for the petitioner. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review. As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR. In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows: DISTRICT FORESTER PAGADIAN CITY QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP. RED BATCAGA N The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23 In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted. There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice. In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.

3!!!

[G.R. No. L-9223. June 30, 1956.] EDUARDO BRILLANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LEONARDO CASTRO, doing business under the name and style of ALMACAS POLICE PROTECTIVE BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by Judge E. Soriano dated February 12, 1955, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the DefendantLeonardo Castro and dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff Eduardo Brillantes. For a statement of the facts of the case we adopt that made by the trial court which we reproduce below:
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It appears that on December 1, 1953, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendantbefore the Wage Administration Service for the recovery of alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay, the said case bearing No. C-1046; that on February 15, 1954; the Plaintiff and theDefendant entered into an ARBITRATION AGREEMENT whereby they agreed 1. That they submit their case to the Wage Administration Service for investigation; and 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office may render on the case and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive; that in accordance with the said agreement, the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the Wage Administrative Service; that on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a decision containing its findings and the following dispositive parts WHEREFORE, considering the evidence presented, the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but theRespondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant the amount of fifty pesos and eighty-eight centavos (P50.88) corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month of November, 1953 and to deposit the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof; that no appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant with this
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Court over the same subject- matter and cause of action litigated between them before, and decided by, the Wage Administration Service. (pp. 22-23, Record on Appeal.) In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observations and conclusions which we quote with favor:
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It is evident that the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service was pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor to delegate any or all of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally or through duly authorized representative Republic Act No. 602, The Minimum Wage Law, section 12(e). Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that Any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of Labor be modified or set aside in whole or in part The Jurisdiction of the Wage Administration Service to render the aforesaid decision, as well as the remedy of the aggrieved party against such a decision, is impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et als., G.R. No. L- 6409, wherein it was said: The point raised by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Respondent. Secretary of Labor that Petitioners remedy is to appeal to the President of the Philippines is not well taken. Section 7 of the law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expressly authorized any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court. In view of the failure of the herein Plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy marked out by said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602 within the time therein specified, the aforesaid decision of the Wage Administration Service became final and conclusive, not only by clear implication but also by express agreement of the parties That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office (WAS) may render on the case, and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive. To permit the herein Plaintiff to institute the present case before this Court, after the same had been finally and conclusively decided by the Wage Administration Service, is therefore to allow him to go back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the provisions of Republic Act No. 602; and to encourage duplication of work, if not conflicting judgments, by authorizing a party first to file his case with the Wage Administration Service and thereafter, in case of an adverse decision, to refile the same case with the Court of First Instance. This could not have been the legislators intention in the enactment of Republic Act No. 602. (pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal.)
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Attorney Manuel Y. Macias counsel for Appellant in his brief concedes that the decision rendered by the hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to Section 7, above quoted, of the Minimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the Wage Administrative Service. He, however, contends that the right to go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive, because according to him, under said Section 7 the review by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and that the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted. This is not entirely correct. The findings of fact made by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence. So that Plaintiff could well have appealed from the decision of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on question of fact, if he was prepared and in a position to show that the findings of fact of the WAS were not supported by substantial evidence. Then counsel forAppellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says the following:
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Appellant cannot accept the findings of fact in the decision of the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service because they are not merely contrary to the facts but a scandalous distortion of

them with no other end in view but to favor Appellee, the Respondent employer. The Hearing Officer, to promote this end, callously ignored Appellants evidence. His so-called decision is a mockery of justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair minded citizen can have any respect. (p. 5, Appellants Brief.) And of Judge Soriano who dismissed Plaintiffs complaint, the same counsel comments thus:
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The court a quo refused to perform the functions of a trial court and rendered the foregoing ruling without any evidence having been first presented pro or con. It decided an Issue in favor of one party and against the other upon the mere representations of the favored party and refused absolutely to hear the other. The court a quos act in so doing is a plain violation of the right to due process p. 8, Appellants Brief.) The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is an officer of the court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative official authorized to render decisions and especially to a Judge of the Court of First Instance. If Plaintiff-Appellantand his counsel were dissatisfied with the findings of the hearing officer of the WAS; if they believed that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the evidence, they should have appealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were really convinced that said hearing officer of the WAS deliberately distorted the facts to favor the employer, they should have prepared charges of partiality and malfeasance and lodged the same with the proper authorities for investigation. Now is neither the time nor the occasion to air said grievance, assuming for the moment that it is real and well founded. And as to the reference to the trial court, said court merely acted upon the motion to dismiss. It considered the complaint and the motion to dismiss. That was enough. There was no need for the presentation of any evidence. So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; which cannot be said of the comment and observations of counsel above reproduced. Said counsel is hereby admonished to use more temperate and respectful language and observe more proper conduct in the future.
chan roble svirtualawlibrary chan roble svirtualawlibrary

We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by prior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Plaintiff-Appellant with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a right; that the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. Not only this, but the parties before the commencement of the proceedings signed an agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever decision the WAS may render on the same, and that they recognized the decision to be final and conclusive. After signing that agreement or pledge, Plaintiff- Appellant may not now be heard to say that the decision rendered by the WAS has no legal effect on him. Besides, even assuming that despite the agreement the decision did not automatically become final, still Plaintiffs failure to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as provided by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act 602) rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the same parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues.
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In the case of Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 314, we held:

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a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action so long as it remains unreserved; or in the language of Mr. Justice Field in the opinion just cited:
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It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.

And in the case of Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494, 502-503, we equally held:

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only upon the questions actually contested and determined, but upon all matters which might have been litigated and decided in that suit; and this is undoubtedly true of all matters properly belonging to the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the issues . (citing 34 C.J., pp. 909-911.)
chan roble svirtualawlibrary cralaw

The authorities above cited on res adjudicata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. Are they applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS)? The answer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities:
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The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. This rule has been recognized as applying to the decisions of road or highway commissioners, commissioners of motor transportation, boards of audit, county boards, tax commissioners, boards, or officers, the federal trade commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewers commissioners, land commissioners or officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy court commissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmens compensation acts, and other like officers and boards. However, a particular decision or determination may not be conclusive, as where it was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative, executive, or ministerial, determination, or the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the officer or board . (50 C.J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690, pp. 148-149).
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There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 164, p. 910). (Italics Supplied).
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In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs

6!!!

G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent. This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of landlocated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69.Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the ownerof the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from theLID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from DemetriaCalderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30)years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer nomortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any personhaving any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . .filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither theapplicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of thelands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that themuniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do notconstitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisitionof the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of ed of . . .; and thatthe parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belongingto the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent CelestinaNaguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question anddecreeing the registration thereof in her name,With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trialcourt, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.37001.As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, respondent has not established with the requiredevidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of thesubject lots faultsthe appellate court o application for registrationand for not considering the fact that she has not established that thelands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone toalienable and disposable property.Issue: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have thestatus of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released asalienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the Stateremain part of the inalienable public domain. 13 Under Section 6 of thePublic Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and viceversa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not thecourt. 14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application forregistration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. 15 respondent never presented the required certification from the propergovernment agency or official proclamation reclassifying the landapplied for as alienable and disposable.declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, andtheir conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an expressand positive act from the government. 21 The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent andher predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive andcontinuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of littlemoment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverseoccupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered astitle. 22

7!!
Amunategui vs Director of Forestry 126 SCRA 69Facts: There were two petitions for review on certiorariquestioning the decision of the Court of Appealswhich declared the disputed property as forestl a n d , n o t s u b j e c t t o t i t l i n g i n f a v o r o f p r i v a t e persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the ProvincialFiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to theapplication for registration of title claiming thatthe land was mangrove swamp which was stillclassified as forest land and part of the public domain.Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed hisopposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885c o n t a i n i n g 1 1 7 , 9 5 6 s q u a r e m e t e r s w a s concerned and prayed that title to said portionbe confirmed and registered in his name. Issue: W O N t h e l o t i n q u e s t i o n c a n b e s u b j e c t o f registration and confirmation o f t i t l e i n t h e name of the private person. Held:

The opposition of the Director of Forestry wasstrengthened by the appellate court's findingthat timber licenses had to be issued to certainl i c e n s e e s a n d e v e n J o s e A m u n a t e g u i h i m s e l f t o o k t h e t r o u b l e t o a s k f o r a l i c e n s e t o c u t timber within the area. It was only sometime in1 9 5 0 t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w a s c o n v e r t e d i n t o fishpond but only after a previous warning fromthe District Forester that the same could not bed o n e b e c a u s e i t w a s c l a s s i f i e d a s " p u b l i c forest.A forested area classified as forest land of thepublic domain does not lose such classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may havestripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" don o t h a v e t o b e o n m o u n t a i n s o r i n o u t o f t h e w a y p l a c e s . S w a m p y a r e a s c o v e r e d b y mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also bec l a s s i f i e d a s f o r e s t l a n d . T h e p o s s e s s i o n o f forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripeni n t o p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p . T h e r e f o r e , t h e l o t i n question never ceased to be classified as forestland of public domain. 15!!! G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968Director of Forestry vs. MuozFacts:Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located inthe municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco'sevidence of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad and a deed of absolutesale. The controversy began when the Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F.Rivera required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Groundfor this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules andregulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina WatershedReservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminaryinjunction against the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquezand Nawasa, essentially upon the averment that their acts heretoforenarrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious." Thepreliminary injunction was granted and then he moved to declare theforestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time. Theforestry officials asked the court to dismiss the petition upon the avermentsthat said court had no jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet been exhaustedby Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said forestryofficial asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order grantingpreliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are the main source of water supply of the City of Manila and itssurrounding towns and cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dryup to the prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Theforestry officials were declared in default.Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco'scase against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa toPiadeco remaining revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaimagainst Piadeco was also withdrawn in consideration of P1,651.59 paid byPiadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to the latter. Thecourt approved of the amicable settlement.Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private WoodlandRegistration but was denied by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg butPiadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegallogging was denounced by some members of Congress thereby attractingnational attention. The Secretary of National Defense directed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief of Staff dispatched a task force of the army into the Angat area, which impoundedand seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedlyconducting illegal operations and they made a private quarters on a portionof Piadecos land and prevented continuation of logging operations, from cutting and gathering of timber and other forest products and enjoyment of said property. Hence, Piadeco filed a complaint but was denied. Issue:W/N Piadeco's title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry

Held:No. Piadecos title is not registarable with the Breau of Forestry. The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, viz:SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private ownerof land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shallregister his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of suchowners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall befurnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the sameshall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require.Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in whichany such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the titlethereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry.Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1,1941, as amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effecton January 1, 1963. It reads:7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering landscontaining timber, firewood and other minor forest products may beregistered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised AdministrativeCode;(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such ashomestead patent, free patent, and sales patent; and (b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land RegistrationAct (Act 496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, asamended). The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by ForestryAdministrative Order 12-2 consisted in theomission of one paragraph,paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuantto Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by theSpanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid titles underthe existing laws."In the case at bar however, Piadecos title was issued during the Spanishregime. And it is state in Section 1829, does not describe with particularitytitles that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Spanish titles arequite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system.Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thruprescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. Itshould not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,registration thereof can never be renewed 18!!!! G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNGFacts: The director of lands filed a criminal case against the defendants on theground of misrepresentation and false data and information. The defendantsin the three cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to thecomplaint in intervention. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the sameon the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirementsin the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of publicdocuments. Issue:W/N the defendants are entitled to ownership of the land. Held: Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land in question.Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states:A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupiedand cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, atract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall beentitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section:PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is not theowner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of thePublic Land Law.It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities whowere driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of thepublic domain.

III-6!!!!! G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner ,

vs . BALITEP O R T A L M I N I N G C O O P E R A T I V E a n d o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d ; a n d T H E HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents .FACTS:The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan -DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve known as the Diw alwal Gold Rush Area. Located at M t . Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land hasb e e n e m b r o i l e d i n c o n t r o v e r s y s i n c e t h e m i d 8 0 s d u e t o t h e s c r a m b l e o v e r g o l d deposits found within its bowels.O n M a r c h 1 0 , 1 9 8 8 , M a r c o p p e r M i n i n g C o r p o r a t i o n ( M a r c o p p e r ) w a s g r a n t e d Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which includedthe hotly-contested Diwalwal area. Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small -Scale Mining Act. The law established a Peoples Small -Scale MiningProgram to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the ProvincialMining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision andcontrol. The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small -scalemining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts tosmall-scale miners under certain conditions.On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran is sued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area asnon-forest land open to small -scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97 -03 whichd i r e c t s t h e D E N R t o s t u d y t h o r o u g h l y a n d e x h a u s t i v e l y t h e o p t i o n o f d i r e c t s t a t e utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold -Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering intom a n a g e m e n t a g r e e m e n t s o r o p e r a t i n g a g r e e m e n t s , o r b o t h , w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared p o l i c y o f r a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e m i n i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e D i w a l w a l G o l d R u s h A r e a ; s u c h agreements shall include provisions for profit -sharing between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small -scale miners,a s well as thep a y m e n t o f r o y a l t i e s t o i n d i g e n o u s c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s , a m o n g o t h e r s . T h e Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal andLegislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and G e o - sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x xPetitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before theCourt of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayedfor the nullification of the above -quoted Memorandum Order No. 97- 03 on the groundthat the direct state utilization espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n i s s u i n g M e m o r a n d u m O r d e r N o . 9 7 - 0 3 s i n c e t h e s a m e w a s merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the governmentfor solving the Diwalwal conflict. ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the ass a i l e d memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving theDiwalwal dispute. Held:W e a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s r u l i n g t h a t t h e c h a l l e n g e d M O 9 7 - 0 3 d i d n o t conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder wasmerely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it didnot grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale minersor to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned toundertake studies to determine its feasibility III-8 GR NO. 127882 DECEMBER 1, 2004 (MR)LA BUGALBLAAN TRIBAL ASSN., vs. DENR FACTS : This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court that challenges theconstitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) itsImplementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3)the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). ISSUE: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or financial assistance only? RULING : The Court did not see how applying a strictly literal or verbalegis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, thedrafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x xx involving either technical orfinancial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. Thedrafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial ortechnical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would bevery clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving"signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to dowith, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word"involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, thesense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring,""implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly,none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving,"when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance,necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In otherwords, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from suchassistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporationsare not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes veryapparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against"agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in averbalegis approach.Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations tofinancial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been sounmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their trueintent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutelyprohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures orwords of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, therewas a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks anintent not to use the expression "agreements x xx involving either technical or financialassistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner

III-11!!!
FACTS:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12 July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), of this Courts Decision dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e. , that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper M i n i n g Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submitevidence that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as ana g e n t o f t h e former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that thetransfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree N o . 4 6 3 , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e assignment of a mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed D e c i s i o n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t E P 1 3 3 e x p i r e d b y n o n - r e n e w a l s i n c e i t w a s n o t r e n e w e d before or after its expiration.T h e A s s a i l e d D e c i s i o n l i k e w i s e u p h e l d t h e v a l i d i t y o f P r o c l a m a t i o n N o . 2 9 7 absent any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under S e c t i o n 5 o f R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 7 9 4 2 , o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e M i n i n g A c t o f 1 9 9 5 , mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over thec o n t e s t e d D i w a l w a l G o l d R u s h A r e a a s h a v i n g b e e n o v e r t a k e n b y t h e s a i d proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that i t i s n o w w i t h i n t h e prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided thatthese private entities are qualified.SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.

Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, prayingthat the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining operations, aren o w , t h e r e f o r e w i t h i n t h e f u l l c o n t r o l o f t h e S t a t e t h r o u g h t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order th e Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.I n i t s M a n i f e s t a t i o n a n d M o t i o n d a t e d 2 8 J u l y 2 0 0 6 , B a l i t e e c h o e s t h e s a m e concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in thedisputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an exploration permit.Camilo Banad, et al ., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.ISSUE/S: Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested right over the disputed a r e a , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a p r o p e r t y r i g h t p r o t e c t e d b y t h e Constitution. HELD:NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected and c o m p l e t e d when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the operative law. Surely, it isimpossible for SEM t o s u c c e s s f u l l y a s s e r t t h a t i t a c q u i r e d m i n i n g r i g h t s o v e r t h e disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC, S E M s p r e d e c e s s o r - i n -

i n t e r e s t , f i l e d i t s d e c l a r a t i o n o f l o c a t i o n s a n d i t s p r o s p e c t i n g permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, r espectively, wereissued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no possibility that MMC or SEM couldh a v e a c q u i r e d a p e r f e c t e d m i n i n g c l a i m u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e B i l l o f 1902. Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, byany stretch of imagination, be considered mining rights as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining .SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its supposed r i g h t s a t t a c h e d t o t h e e x p l o r a t i o n p e r m i t w i t h t h e r i g h t s t h a t a p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y l a n d owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law. As earlier discussed,u n d e r t h e 1 9 3 5 , 1 9 7 3 a n d 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n s , n a t i o n a l w e a l t h , s u c h a s m i n e r a l resources, are owned by the State and not by their discoverer. The d i s c o v e r e r o r locator can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he has compliedwith all the requirements set forth by applicable laws and if the State has conferred onhim such right through permits, concessions or agreements. In other words, without theimprimatur of the State, any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over themineral land because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State,and the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution: All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all other n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s a r e o w n e d b y t h e S t a t e . W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated .(Emphases supplied.)Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM reveals thatMMC assigned to the former the rights and interests it had in EP 133, thus: 1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever r i g h t s o r i n t e r e s t t h e A S S I G N O R m a y h a v e i n t h e a r e a s i t u a t e d i n Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified asExploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the assig nmentwas an exploration permit. Clearly, the right that SEM acquired was limited toexploration, only because MMC was a mere holder of an exploration permit. Aspreviously explained, SEM did not acquire the rights inherent in the permit, as theassignment by MMC to SEM was done in violation of the condition stipulated inthe permit, and the assignment was effected without the approval of the proper authority in contravention of the provision of the mining law governing at thattime. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July 1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no right over the area