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Tam 1 Stephanie Tam Performance Studies 515: Performing Racial Exception 8 December 2011 The Politics of Representing the

Exceptional State

The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of real life breathes through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition. (Schmitt Political Theology 15)

As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state. (Schmitt Concept of the Political 53)

Declarations of emergency in the past century suspend normative political operations to harness extralegal powers for the reinstatement of the states most valued norms. It is therefore in examining the conditions under which states of exception are declared that we can discern what a state is invested in, and what it is willing to sacrifice its own system of rule to protect. As Schmitt reminds us, the exception proves the rule: implicit in the naming of deviant conditions is the state norm. Emergency decrees negatively define state expectations, carving out the anomalous to leave the footprint of the normative. By reversing figure and ground, torpid assumptions that have faded into the background are brought to the fore. Although states of emergency are declared internally within states, they speak to a states relationship with other states. Schmitts assertion that a state must exist in relation to another

Tam 2 points out that norms within states react and respond to norms in other states the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe (COTP 53). What states claim to be normal and deviant conditions are in fact international relation statements. They announce the states identity and its most prized values, signaling a states alliance with or differentiation from other states. Emergency decrees paint state portraits not only for the international community, but for state citizens. They define what the peoples normal life looks like, confirming popular ideals, and legitimizing populations that conform to declared norms while invalidating populations that fall outside of norms. They construct an image of a unified people and a unified set of values. The highly political character of emergency decrees lies concealed beneath the factual appearance of what Craig Calhoun calls the emergency imaginary (30). Emergency evokes a factual suffering or collapse of the norm that is material and seemingly indisputable. Urgency is putatively free of political manipulation. However, non-political emergencies have political consequences, and are framed within a thoroughly political state discourse. States are increasingly merging with society, conflating the political with the non-political so that formerly neutral domains take on political significance. In the collapsed distinction between state and society, states themselves are no longer defined as political entities. Although emergency decrees are intended to protect the state, they focus on the preservation of non-political elements such as goods and services. As Schmitt puts it, everything is at least potentially political, and in referring to the state it is no longer possible to assert for it a specifically political characteristic (COTP 22). Emergency decrees often declare moral values as state norms, appropriating the non-political to describe the political. They strategically represent the state within a discourse of progress, development, and good

Tam 3 governance, circulating state norms as ideal ways of governing and living to an international audience. Economics for one has become a political matter, its quantitative preoccupation with industry and trade transforming into a qualitative concern for power and social well-being. Schmitt observes: When it reaches a certain quantity, economic property, for example, becomes obviously social (or more correctly, political) power, proprit turns into pouvoir, and what is at first only an economically motivated class antagonism turns into a class struggle of hostile groups (COTP 62). Economic considerations in emergency decrees are statements of political hierarchy, claiming a states position within the international order. The merging of the economic and the political is most noticeable in the emergency decrees of the economically powerful. States of exception in England, Australia and the U.S. are bent upon preserving the economic well-being of the people rather than the political security of the state. They portray their citizens as economically privileged and sophisticated as developed, First World civilizations whose position of supremacy must be protected. They uphold a discourse of development and global order, and use emergencies as opportunities to declare their control of economic means as normal and rightful. In The State of Exception, Agamben cites Englands Emergency Powers Act (1920) as an example of modern states of exception. Section 1 states: if at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any persons or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the

Tam 4 essentials of life, His Majesty may, by proclamation (hereinafter referred to as a proclamation of emergency), declare that a state of emergency exists. (qtd. on 19) The sovereign decision to declare a state of emergency must be qualified by apprehension of a threat that is on so extensive a scale as to be calculated (19), the language of calculation pointing to an economic quantification of impending damage to the essentials of life (19). His Majesty no longer makes sovereign decisions as a political being, but as an economist who operates within the dictates of calculations, supply and distribution. He decides upon the enemy through a rational process that has little to do with the enemys unassimilable Otherness, moving away from Schmitts description of the political enemy who is existentially something different and alien (COTP 27). The enemy has become a disembodied economic threat that endangers the communitys access to commodities. What is at stake in the declaration of a state of exception is not the communitys political form, but the communitys consumption norms. While food and drink fit under a biological definition of the essentials of life (Agamben 19), fuel, light and means of locomotion are in no way essential to living, but instead exemplify items of economic prestige. Fuel was a luxury item in post-WWI England, its price reaching a record twentieth-century high as the consumer tax doubled from 3d to 6d (House of Commons Library 18). It was not valued for its ability to sustain biological life, but for the governmental income it generated, and the social status it conferred upon those who could afford to buy it. Similarly, lights were objects of status. Street lighting was regarded as a municipal necessity, an ally in encouraging civic advancement by its contribution to the safety, comfort, and convenience of the citizens (Haas 34). Lighting was associated with refinement, as gas lamps acquired the metaphorical power to enlighten the populace. The language of progress

Tam 5 pervaded discussions of lighting: England bemoaned how far behind other countries it was in installing ubiquitous street lamps (Adshead 292). As highly desired commodities, lights were integral to justifying Englands place among the leading economic powers. Locomotion was also deeply entrenched in economic interests, moving coal being central to the British rail system (Channon 190). As the primary source of energy in the early 1900s, coal was valued for enabling the British to pursue an industrialized lifestyle of comfort and convenience. Englands Emergency Powers Act declares a state of exception whose goal is to preserve a level of well-being premised upon a lifestyle of sophistication rather than biological survival, portraying such a lifestyle as essential to the people. Exception is no longer concerned with protection of the political state, but preservation of economic privilege. In 2004, section 1 of the act was repealed and replaced by the Civil Contingencies Act, which posits more overtly the move away from a political state of exception towards a more socioeconomic one. The Civil Contingencies Act posits three categories of emergencies: (a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, (b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, (c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom Human welfare and the environment are tellingly prioritized over the state as grounds for legal exceptionality, with welfare and the environment increasingly being articulated through each other. Environmental economics links the allocation of environmental resources to human welfare, shifting from commodified natural resources to ecological understandings of the

Tam 6 environment, such as climate change and water quality. The consequences of economic choices are not only weighed according to their direct impact upon consumer welfare, but according to their impact upon the resources that support human welfare. For instance, pollution may not be valued as a commodity, but it poses a cost to society at large, affecting present and future conditions of human life. Part of what has enabled the inclusion of the environment in economics is the consideration of human welfare as a question of well-being rather than financial circumstance. In expanding welfare into the ability to be and do rather than possess and produce, economics engages with questions of dignity and lifestyle that may not arise directly from the accumulation of capital. The broadened definition of human welfare as defined by The Civil Contingencies Act includes: (a) loss of human life, (b) human illness or injury, (c) homelessness, (d) damage to property, (e) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel, (f) disruption of a system of communication, (g) disruption of facilities for transport, or (h) disruption of services relating to health Human illness or injury, homelessness, and disruption of services relating to health are notable additions that pertain to lifestyle concerns exceeding utilitarian assessments of welfare. Illness, injury and health services impinge upon a persons ability to enjoy a certain quality of life, just as homelessness refers to a way of living rather than the economics of house ownership or the

Tam 7 physiological need for shelter. These are marks of privilege that speak to a societys standard of living, establishing the norms of British life which are so integral to the state that they cannot be disturbed without bringing about a state of exception. These lifestyle norms ignore segments of the population for whom homelessness, lack of access to money, food, water, energy, fuel, and health services are everyday experiences that do not merit a declaration of a state of exception. Julie Nices Poverty as an Everyday State of Exception points out how poverty is juridically treated as an everyday state of exception (68, original emphasis) that legitimates abandonment of the poor. Nice asserts that there is a difference between being included in the law, and being able to hold the law accountable to ones well-being. Although the poor are ostensibly legal subjects, they are excluded from legal protection in the states everyday proceedings, dwelling in an inclusive exclusion that Agamben calls exception. The Civil Contingencies Act extends Nices everyday state of exception by excluding the poor from the state of exception itself. This exclusion from a state of exception is a more decisive political statement about the states stance on poverty than the everyday exclusion of the poor. If we are to believe Schmitts assertion that [t]he rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception (PT 15), then it is in the Civil Contingencies Act that we find proof of the UKs desire to be an exclusive nation of the privileged. States of exception in Australia are legislated at the level of individual states, and combine a Schmittian concern for political enemies with a concern for personal well-being. Victorias 1986 Emergency Management Act gives exceptional power to the Minister during an emergency, which is defined as:

Tam 8 the actual or imminent occurrence of an event which in any way endangers or threatens to endanger the safety or health of any person in Victoria or which destroys or damages, or threatens to destroy or damage, any property in Victoria or endangers or threatens to endanger the environment or an element of the environment in Victoria including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing (a) an earthquake, flood, wind-storm or other natural event; and (b) a fire; and (c) an explosion; and (d) a road accident or any other accident; and (e) a plague or an epidemic or contamination; and (f) a warlike act or act of terrorism, whether directed at Victoria or a part of Victoria or at any other State or Territory of the Commonwealth; and (g) a hi-jack, siege or riot; and (h) a disruption to an essential service Rather than damage to a unified state, Victorias emergency consists of damage to individuals, property, and the environment, focusing upon goods and services. Since the focus is on preserving the well-being of Victorians, the state of exception does not require the presence of a political enemy: natural disasters are sufficient, as are fires, explosions and road accidents that may be caused by careless citizens or the climate. Compared to the environmental damage defined in the UKs Civil Contingencies Act, Victorias environmental threats issue from a realm beyond human control. The Civil Contingencies Act defines environmental damage as contamination of land, water or air with

Tam 9 biological, chemical or radioactive matter, implying that human action is the cause of contamination in introducing harmful foreign matter into an otherwise clean and safe environment. Victorias Emergency Management Act defines environmental damages that arise without and despite human actions, bush fires and floods being occurrences that the state can reduce the risk of but not obliterate the cause of. The environment and the state coexist, the former posing a constant threat to the latter that cannot be eliminated. Victorias state of exception is declared to mitigate events that harm the well-being of citizens rather than destroy the enemy. The very way that fires and floods are described on state websites reveals an understanding of environmental damage in terms of human cost. Fires are managed to prevent the destruction of amenities and economic resources such as parks and forests (Department of Sustainability and Environment). Floods are likewise understood in terms of substantial damages to homes and businesses, critical infrastructure and to farming, such as agriculture and crops (Flood Victoria). The cost of floods is estimated to be close to $450 million. It is within this framework of mitigating human cost that we can understand the rather incongruous inclusion of road accidents as cause for a state of exception. Victorias Transport Accident Commission represents road accidents in terms of cost and personal injury (road toll), responding to the publics sense of unease: the growing road toll and cost of accidents were causing widespread community concern (Transport Accident Commission). The state of exception is invoked to maintain citizenss well-being not only in material terms of cost and personal health but in terms of feeling safe and comfortable it answers to community concern. The concern for maintaining a certain level of personal well-being further manifests in the list of essential services that Victorias state of exception seeks to protect:

Tam 10 (a) transport; (b) fuel (including gas); (c) light; (d) power; (e) water; (f) sewerage; (g) a service (whether or not of a type similar to the foregoing) declared to be an essential service by the Governor in council under subsection (2) While some of the items are the same as those in the Civil Contingencies Act, there are notable omissions that support biological life, such as food. Shelter is not listed, nor is money. Instead, Victorias essential services are infrastructures that support privileged urban life. Power, water, and sewerage are regular services that pertain only to legitimate housing, being disrupted or unavailable to informal housing on an everyday basis. Victorias largest city, Melbourne, has a history of inner-city slums that continues today in the form of unregulated rooming houses. Moreover, sewerage and transport services are specifically urban services that do not occur in rural areas, where homes use septic tanks and citizens drive private vehicles. In claiming that these services are among the most important contributors to the social and economic wellbeing of all Victorians (Essential Services Commission), Victorias Essential Services Commission makes a statement about what kind of lifestyle is declared to be normative: that of well-off urbanites. As with the Civil Contingencies Act, the definition of essential services rests upon social and economic wellbeing instead of biological or political survival, and those who are poor or dwell in rural areas are excluded from consideration in both normal and exceptional states.

Tam 11 Similar to the UK and Australia, the U.S.s deployment of the state of exception displays an investment in economic prosperity. In the wake of the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelts inaugural address treats the U.S.s economic difficulties as a political emergency, and declares that if Congress does nothing about it, a state of exception is in order: [] Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war, but at the same time, through the employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and reorganize the use of our natural resources (Roosevelt 13). As Agamben notes, Roosevelts address draws parallels between military and economic emergencies (22), using the metaphor of war to bridge the transformation of exception from being a response to a political crisis to being a response to an economic one. War is no longer waged against another state, but against a lower standard of living. Roosevelts National Recovery Act of June 16th, 1933 makes overt the anxiety over American well-being: A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. (Section 1) The description of standards of living as undermined colours the U.S.s economic decay with an insidiousness that is in keeping with the language of enmity deployed in war. The connotations of underhandedness, secrecy, and guile in undermined pass moral judgment upon the decline of living standards, ascribing to it malevolent intents that anthropomorphize and make more tangible the enemy. Notably, the other adverse consequences of the national emergency are described in more neutral terms: the industry is disorganized, commerce is

Tam 12 burdened, and public welfare affected. Living standards, on the other hand, are directly linked to the American people, pointing to their personal nature and their affiliation with Americanness. Labeled as an American concern rather than that of an anonymous public, living standards become a matter of patriotic pride. The First World lifestyle is portrayed as a patriotic concern that merits a state of exception in Patrick Buchanans State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America (2006). Shooting to the top of the New York Times best sellers list, Buchanans book gathered a significant following in its argument against immigration laws that permit a Third World invasion. Although Buchanan seeks to describe the difference between First and Third Worlds as a sociocultural issue, his comparisons between rich American and poor Third World communities belie a deep anxiety for preserving an American lifestyle of economic privilege. Rather than framing his argument as a U.S.-Mexico phenomenon, Buchanan articulates it as a predicament between First and Third World countries, invoking a larger history of imperialist economics and values. The Third World was invented in the late 1940s, when colonial powers gave way to a U.S.-dominated economic scene, and newly decolonized countries were labeled as underdeveloped and poor (Escobar 31-35). Third World countries were judged as backwards, and [i]ndustrialization and urbanization were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive roots to modernization (39). Modernizations social, political, and cultural refinement could only be reached by restructuring economies to resemble that of First World countries, which were represented as superior and desirable. Buchanan writes with this framework of First World economic and sociocultural superiority in mind as he gives example after example of Third World invasions of the First

Tam 13 World. He describes Arlington, Fairfax, and Montgomery as among the most affluent and finest counties in America in which to live (21), painting them as ideal First World places. Subsequent to the Third World invasion, these counties are now home to the most vicious Hispanic gangs in the hemisphere (21). First World well-being is portrayed as economically successful with refined living standards, whereas Third World well-being is mired in violence. Buchanan repeatedly portrays Third World immigrants as ruthless rapists, gangsters, drug traffickers, and perpetrators of subhuman acts of violence. States of exception that have been declared by states along the U.S.-Mexico border and in France are deemed to be patriotic attempts to preserve the First World nation from violent Third World terrorists and rioters (195-196). Such threats of violence from non-state enemies correspond to the non-political criteria of First World states of exception. They speak to a desire for stable living conditions rather than elimination of an enemy state a desire to secure the First World lifestyle from the volatility of Third World life. Health concerns that figure in both the UKs Civil Contingencies Act and Victorias Emergency Management Act reflect a First World prizing of sanitation and hygiene that marks Western superiority over the diseased Third World. Buchanan describes the Third World as impoverished nations [] where sanitation is often poor and health care nonexistent (29), and accuses Third World immigrants of contaminating the U.S. with [m]alaria, polio, hepatitis, tuberculosis, and such rarities of the Third World as dengue fever, Chagas disease, and leprosy (29). The UKs emphasis on health services and Victorias fear of epidemics are aimed at eliminating such contagious diseases that Buchanan labels as Third World. The infrastructural services that both emergency acts protect likewise declare the UK and Victorias First World status. The Third World lack of reliable water, electricity and sanitation services are deemed to

Tam 14 be the cause of disease outbreaks, so that First World cleanliness becomes a defense against Third World chaos. Moreover, Buchanan tags Third World diseases as rarities: foreign, alien, and nonnormative. Even though the International Monetary Fund names 150 emerging and developing countries in contrast to a mere 37 advanced economies (IMF 172-175), from a First World perspective, the Third World remains an exception rather than the rule. It is in emphasizing the Third World as an anomaly that needs to be normalized that the First World is able to establish itself as the desired standard. Buchanan marvels at how Third World immigrants bring about the sudden reappearance of contagious diseases that researchers and doctors eradicated long ago (29), casting the Third World as behind the times. The language of progress and First World modernity is associated with knowledge and technology researchers and doctors are responsible for First World advancement. Arturo Escobar points out that the invention of the Third World was concomitant with the rising prestige of scientific knowledge and technology. There is a First World faith in scientific knowledge to bring about progress, civilization, and prosperity (36). As a result, First World states of emergency are concerned with the hallmarks of postindustrial development: the transfer of scientific knowledge. By decreeing the disruption of communication systems as cause for a state of emergency, First World states assert the importance of information and knowledge mobility. Without the means of disseminating scientific knowledge, First World states cannot produce its white-collar public and risk becoming populated with the poor. Buchanan portrays Third World illiteracy as the cause of socioeconomic decline (37), arguing that uneducated immigrants are lowering the U.S.s literacy scores (38-39).

Tam 15 Knowledge is integral to a First World model of socioeconomic progress, making any interference with knowledge propagation cause for a state of emergency. Scientific knowledge is supported by an urban economy with the surplus to produce an academic elite. The agrarian model of Third World economies, which traditionally only produced enough to biologically sustain the people, is associated with rural stagnation, while urbanization is hailed as the modern ideal. The urban life that Victorias Emergency Management Act protects through its stipulations regarding urban infrastructure, speaks to a First World investment in cities. The city has become the paradigm of advanced development, and it is urban America that Buchanan seeks to protect from the Third World invasion, not rural America. Buchanan focuses upon the degradation of cities like Los Angeles, the rise of inner-city crime, and the loss of low-level service sector jobs that imply an urban setting. The America that is being invaded by Third World immigrants is an urban one, allowing Buchanan to ignore the gap between rural and urban conditions within the U.S. The First World lifestyle that states of emergency protect is not accessible to all First World residents, but to those who dwell in specific localities. Similarly, states of emergency protect lifestyle norms that belong to those with money, power, and legitimacy, excluding the lives of the First World poor. The result of this selective self-representation is a portrait of First World life that is urbanized and prosperous the opposite of a rural and poor Third World. The environmental concerns of First World states of emergency subscribe to a First World/Third World binary that casts First World citizens as clean and responsible in contrast to dirty and negligent Third World residents. First World concerns for the environment feed into economic calculations for personal well-being, and the establishment of common resources that benefit the entire population. To protect the environment is to take a moral stance, to subscribe to

Tam 16 a good life that is harmonious with nature and civically responsible. Third World residents are portrayed as recklessly exploitative of nature, and concerned only with immediate accumulation of wealth to the detriment of the future. Buchanan describes how Third World immigrants leave their garbage and debris on the great trek north (87), leaving the U.S.-Mexico border the most polluted strip of land in the entire country. He asserts that the influx of Third World poor will have a devastating impact on our air, land, and water (87). First World states of emergency are invested in establishing lifestyle norms that are portrayed as morally superior to those of the Third World. Buchanan breaks out into moral adulations that make explicit the First Worlds selfproclaimed supremacy: But was not the arrival of the West of immense benefit to the colonized peoples? Can Western civilization not claim credit for having advanced all of mankind morally, politically, culturally between 1492 and 1960? Was not Western civilization vastly superior to the indigenous civilizations it encountered and crushed [] (199) It is these advanced standards of life that the First World seeks to protect in its states of emergency standards that set it apart from the Third World, shore up its crumbling economic and sociopolitical stability, and confirm the model of development that was devised in the late 1940s. Buchanan gives voice to the First World fear of becoming Third World. He predicts that by 2050, Los Angeles and the cities of the Southwest will look like Juarez and Tijuana (37), warns that already extremes of wealth and poverty mirror those of the Third World (46), and states that California is becoming indeed, has become a Third World state (49). America is

Tam 17 on an inexorable decline and will soon reach Third World status (46), a socioeconomic deterioration that threatens the state more so than any political enemy. It is the fear of becoming the Third World that drives his call for a state of emergency, a call that makes explicit the anxieties belying First World states of exception. The First World state is no longer a political entity but a socioeconomic status that needs to be maintained. The American dream is what sustains the American state: living the good life is what binds together the nation and confirms the discourse of progress, which structures the country economically, socially and culturally. Living standards prove that the values of national development are true that we really are progressing despite socioeconomic precarity and fluctuating political regimes. In contrast to First World preoccupations with the good life, Third World states of exception are bent upon preserving political sovereignty. They are intent upon establishing Third World states as stable and independent political regimes with strong moral standards. Many are decolonized states that have experienced extensive external interference from First World countries and First World non-governmental representatives in the form of multilateral organizations, like the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. As such, exceptionality is invoked with a lot more political caution and with more defined goals than First World states of exception. While First World states of exception stipulate what conditions under which they can be declared, they do not clearly spell out the goal of declaring states of exception. Third World states of exception, on the other hand, are often careful to define what a state of exception is expected to achieve, tying the exercise of exceptional powers to specific goals to minimize the risk of permanently disrupting political norms.

Tam 18 Third World caution in invoking exceptionality is also seen in stipulations of necessity: declaring a state of emergency is often required to answer to necessity. In contrast, First World decrees permit exceptional measures that are deemed necessary to handle particular situations, but do not stipulate that the declaration of a state of emergency itself be a necessity. In doing so, First World decrees are removed from the law and force-of-law logic that Agamben finds central to states of exception. First World emergency powers suspend the law, but do not subscribe to the force-of-law: they bend the suspension of juridical norms to the service of non-juridical goals. Law is no longer suspended to preserve the ultimate ground and very source of the law (Agamben 26), but to preserve elements outside of the law, such as economic well-being. By grounding states of exception in legal necessity, Third World decrees remain rooted in the preservation of juridical norms. Having experienced more recent constitutional reforms than First World nations, Third World countries seek to preserve their hard-won state apparatuses and are more appreciative of the force-of-law that permits the law to exist. Although Thailand, South Africa and India occupy different positions on the developmental ladder and have varying relationships with the First World community, their state of exception decrees register similar anxieties for state security. Despite having reached middleincome status according to the U.N. (U.N. Thailand), and being labeled by the IMF as an emerging rather than developing economy (IMF 175), Thailands state of exception decree shows a preoccupation with presenting itself as a democracy. The Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation (2005) defines emergency as: [] a situation, which affects or may affect the public order of the people or endangers the security of the State or may cause the country or any part of the country to fall into a state of difficulty or contains an offence relating to terrorism

Tam 19 under the Penal Code, a battle or war, pursuant to which it is necessary to enact emergency measures to preserve the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State of the Kingdom of Thailand under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, independence and territorial integrity, the interests of the nation, compliance with the law, the safety of the people, the normal living of the people, the protection of rights, liberties and public order or public interest, or the aversion or remedy of damages arising from urgent and serious public calamity. While protection of the democratic regime does not figure in First World emergency decrees, Thailand prioritizes the preservation of its political form. The countrys democratic disposition is emphasized by its concern for a public regime: public order of the people and public interest are reiterated throughout the decree. The state of exceptions investment in democracy follows from the countrys 1997 instatement of the Peoples Constitution, which focused upon creating a stronger democracy (Kuhonta 374). The new constitution was concerned with avoiding the historical pitfalls of Thai politics, namely bureaucratic-authoritarian dominance and the cycle of corrupt, provincial politicians exploiting the state for personal interest (378). The impetus to adopt systems of good governance and the election of good men responds to an international discourse that relates Third World poverty to weak, corrupt governance (Escobar 28). Governance is posited as the source of and remedy for all state problems: Violence, corruption, and chaos result from deficient governance, and the techniques of good governance provide a panacea (Pandolfi 157). References to the people reflect Thailands concern for appearing responsible to its residents, disclaiming stereotypes of Third World corruption and totalitarianism. Invocations of democracy display the countrys alignment with progressive First World politics, announcing Thailands accession to modernity. Indeed, Thailands

Tam 20 ambitions to leap frog the developmental ladder and reach First World status are clearly stated on the U.N. Thailand website. Alongside democracy, Thailand adopts the First World rhetoric of equality and freedom in asserting the protection of rights, liberties and public order or public interest. In doing so, it claims the moral values that First World nations venerate and invoke to set themselves apart from Third World countries. Moreover, in doing so it fends off potential accusations of political inadequacy that have in the past justified foreign interventions. In 1997, Thailand fell under the IMFs thrall subsequent to the economic crisis, and experienced the invasive nature of First World assistance. Forced to sign agreements with anywhere from 50 to 80 detailed conditions covering everything from the deregulation of garlic monopolies to taxes on cattle feed and new environmental laws (Kapur 123), the government lost economic sovereignty and underwent humiliating disempowerment. The apprehension of falling prey to foreign powers in an emergency situation is reflected in the emergency decrees protection of state independence and the nations interest. The decrees oscillation between the interests of the nation and the interests of the people results from Thailands double-pronged goals. One the one hand, it seeks to protect its democratic values by attending to the public order of the people and dispersing sovereignty among its citizens. On the other hand, it seeks to preserve the security of the State and the sovereignty of the government. In 2006, a military coup ousted the Thaksin Shinawatra regime that had instated the 2005 emergency decree, threatening to destabilize the political regime that the decree sought to protect. However, the decree was never rewritten and was invoked again in 2010 in response to protests in five Thai provinces. Despite political volatility internal to the country, Thailands commitment to sovereignty is seen in its insistence upon being recognized as

Tam 21 a partner in U.N. development programs (U.N. Thailand). Although Thailands state of exception seems to concern issues internal to the state, its continued existence through explosive political changes confirms that its primary concerns reside in its relationship to other states. The same insistence upon political sovereignty is seen in South Africas State of Emergency Act (1997): a state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency and the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order. Dispensing with any mention of the people and even the form of political regime that it seeks to protect, the foremost concern of South Africas Emergency Act is maintaining the integrity of the state. At the end of the apartheid in 1994, South Africa was ready to reintegrate into the international community (UNDP 4), but it was anxious about letting the First World take over and impose its standards for good governance. In the same year as the Emergency Acts enactment, the country laid out its first Country Cooperation Framework with the UNDP, which demanded recognition of South Africas prerogative in matters of development. Development efforts are also required on the part of its partners to ensure that their procedures are compatible with those of South Africa (5), and the Government counts on UNDP to ensure that the programmes that benefit from UNDP cooperation are executed with a reasonable degree of procedural flexibility (5). South Africa expected to be heavily involved in programmes, stipulating that all projects will involve a wealth of national and local partners, in Government and in civil society (4), and that they must adapt to a local context characterized by a wealth of well-established institutions (5).

Tam 22 Although South Africas relationship with First World nations emphasizes the authority of the South African government, the emergency decree evinces nervousness in concentrating exceptional power in the hands of the government. The state of emergency must be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, dispersing sovereignty powers to popular representatives outside of the elected government. Although democracy is not mentioned in the emergency act, it is implied in the conditions that govern the emergency declaration. Like Thailands concern with presenting itself as a politically progressive and morally sound state, South Africas emergency act is premised upon a political form that appeals to First World nations, albeit more covertly than Thailands. It is in South Africas Country Cooperation Framework with the UNDP that we find an ample elaboration of South Africas commitment to sound governance via democratization and decentralization (7-9). Good governance as well as the unimpeachable moral value of restoring peace and order (Emergency Act) assert South Africas right to political sovereignty, as well as establish that it is morally deserving of First World goodwill. Indias Proclamation of Emergency (1950) offers another example of Third World concerns for state preservation: If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation. (Section 352) Enacted as part of the Constitution that declared India a sovereign republic, the emergency provision guards against a repetition of the foreign invasion that ruled the region for almost a

Tam 23 century. It seeks to protect India from internal and external enemies, positing political security as the most crucial aspect of the state. Section 360 adds financial security to the emergency proclamation, stating that: If the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, he may by a Proclamation make a declaration to that effect. Although it resembles a First World concern for economic well-being, financial stability is phrased as a matter of the state, not of the citizens. Financial security is therefore a corollary to political security, not a concern for the peoples standards of living. Indias 1991 financial crisis sheds light on the political import of financial independence and economic sovereignty. The New York Times reports how accepting an IMF loan was considered an embarrassment and viewed as bowing to Western conditions of economic change (Weinraub). India regards First World interventions with suspicion: The experiences of dealing with the IMF and the World Bank in the 1960s and 1980s had reinforced the sense that India should be self-reliant (Ghosh 416). The sovereign emphasis that underlies the state of exception illustrates Indias anxiety about losing self-reliance and autonomy. The omission of economic and welfare stipulations in Third World emergency decrees is intentional: even in Indias financial emergency proclamation there is no indication of what a stable, normal financial situation looks like. In refusing to represent their states in terms of economic power, Third World nations are refusing to be placed on the international developmental ladder, which is strongly biased against Third World countries. They are sure to lose if they play the development game by subscribing to First World economic models and competing on First World terms. The trail of devastation that the IMF has left in its wake is

Tam 24 evidence of the damage that Third World countries suffer in the misguided emulation of First World economic structures (Kapur). By portraying themselves in terms of sovereignty, Third World countries activate a political discourse that the First World has been wary of entering into. They bring to light the unease with which democracy and sovereignty sit side by side in First World countries the capitulation of the state to individual demands on the one hand, and the rhetoric of patriotic pride and unified nationhood on the other. Even as Third World countries pander to First World idealizations of democracy, they retain a political consciousness that First World countries have lost in the conflation of democratic rights with neoliberal values. Third World emergency decrees represent peace and state stability as the conditions of an ideal life, challenging people to enjoy lives that do not involve the endless pursuit of a consumerist good life. Political security is appreciated in and of itself rather than becoming a setting for the accumulation of wealth. In becoming democracies, Third World countries disrupt the developmental discourse that named them Third World in the first place. The original Cold War politics that designated decolonized countries as Third World posited them as politically unaligned with the democratic First World and the communist Second World (Wolf-Phillips 1313). According to the original definitions, Third World countries have become First World by dint of their political form. It is perhaps due to the Third Worlds political claim upon First World status that we find such an emphasis on lifestyle and economic prosperity in First World emergency decrees. The conditions that govern states of exception are ways for states to construct ideal images of themselves, and project their ideal relationship with other states. Underneath emergency decreess veneer of political imperative lies a nebulous realm of status anxieties and selfconsciousness, as states struggle to stake out their positions among each other.

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