8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes

SUkLML CCUk1
Manlla
Ln 8AnC
G.k. No. 88211 September 1S, 1989
ILkDINAND L. MAkCCS, IMLLDA k. MAkCCS, ILkDINAND k. MAkCCS, Ik., IkLNL M.
AkANL1A, IMLL MANC1CC, 1CMAS MANC1CC, GkLGCkIC AkANL1A, ACIIICC L.
MAkCCS, NICANCk IGUL2 and nILIINL CCNS1I1U1ICN ASSCCIA1ICN
(nILCCNSA), represented by |ts res|dent, CCNkADC I. LS1kLLLA, peLlLloners,
vs.
nCNCkA8LL kAUL MANGLAUS, CA1ALINC MACAkAIG, SLDIkL CkDCL2, MIkIAM
DLILNSCk SAN1IAGC, IIDLL kAMCS, kLNA1C DL VILLA, |n the|r capac|ty as Secretary
of Iore|gn Affa|rs, Lxecut|ve Secretary, Secretary of Iust|ce, Imm|grat|on
Comm|ss|oner, Secretary of Nat|ona| Defense and Ch|ef of Staff,
respect|ve|y, respondenLs.

CCk1LS, !"#
8efore Lhe CourL ls a conLreversy of grave naLlonal lmporLance. Whlle osLenslbly only
legal lssues are lnvolved, Lhe CourL's declslon ln Lhls case would undenlably have a
profound effecL on Lhe pollLlcal, economlc and oLher aspecLs of naLlonal llfe.
We recall LhaL ln lebruary 1986, lerdlnand L. Marcos was deposed from Lhe presldency
vla Lhe non-vlolenL "people power" revoluLlon and forced lnLo exlle. ln hls sLead,
Corazon C. Aqulno was declared resldenL of Lhe 8epubllc under a revoluLlonary
governmenL. Per ascenslon Lo and consllldaLlon of power have noL been unchallenged.
1he falled Manlla PoLel coup ln 1986 led by pollLlcal leaders of Mr. Marcos, Lhe Lakeover
of Lelevlslon sLaLlon Channel 7 by rebel Lroops led by Col. Canlas wlLh Lhe supporL of
"Marcos loyallsLs" and Lhe unseccessful ploL of Lhe Marcos spouses Lo surrepLlLlously
reLurn from Pawll wlLh mercenarles aboard an alrcrafL charLered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manlla 8ulleLln, !anuary 30, 1987] awakened Lhe naLlon Lo Lhe capaclLy of Lhe
Marcoses Lo sLlr Lrouble even from afar and Lo Lhe fanaLlclsm and bllnd loyalLy of Lhelr
followers ln Lhe counLry. 1he raLlflcaLlon of Lhe 1987 ConsLlLuLlon enshrlned Lhe vlcLory
of "people power" and also clearly relnforced Lhe consLlLuLlonal moorlngs of Mrs.
Aqulno's presldency. 1hls dld noL, however, sLop bloody challenges Lo Lhe governmenL.
Cn AugusL 28, 1987, Col. Cregorlo Ponasan, one of Lhe ma[or players ln Lhe lebruary
8evoluLlon, led a falled coup LhaL lefL scores of people, boLh combaLanLs and clvlllans,
dead. 1here were several oLher armed sorLles of lesser slgnlflcance, buL Lhe message
Lhey conveyed was Lhe same - a spllL ln Lhe ranks of Lhe mlllLary esLabllshmenL LhaL
LhraeLened clvlllan supremacy over mlllLary and broughL Lo Lhe fore Lhe reallzaLlon LhaL
clvlllan governmenL could be aL Lhe mercy of a fracLlous mlllLary.
8uL Lhe armed LhreaLs Lo Lhe CovernmenL were noL only found ln mlsgulded elemenLs
and among rabld followers of Mr. Marcos. 1here are also Lhe communlsL lnsurgency and
Lhe seccesslonlsL movemenL ln Mlndanao whlch galned ground durlng Lhe rule of Mr.
Marcos, Lo Lhe exLenL LhaL Lhe communlsLs have seL up a parallel governmenL of Lhelr
own on Lhe areas Lhey effecLlvely conLrol whlle Lhe separaLlsL are vlrLually free Lo move
abouL ln armed bands. 1here has been no leL up on Lhls groups' deLermlnaLlon Lo wresL
power from Lhe govermnenL. noL only Lhrough resorL Lo arms buL also Lo Lhrough Lhe
use of propaganda have Lhey been successful ln dreaLlng chaos and desLablllzlng Lhe
counLry.
nor are Lhe woes of Lhe 8epubllc purely pollLlcal. 1he accumulaLed forelgn debL and Lhe
plunder of Lhe naLlon aLLrlbuLed Lo Mr. Marcos and hls cronles lefL Lhe economy
devasLaLed. 1he efforLs aL economlc recovery, Lhree years afLer Mrs. Aqulno assumed
offlce, have yeL Lo show concreLe resulLs ln allevlaLlng Lhe poverLy of Lhe masses, whlle
Lhe recovery of Lhe lll-goLLen wealLh of Lhe Marcoses has remalned eluslve.
now, Mr. Marcos, ln hls deaLhbed, has slgnlfled hls wlsh Lo reLurn Lo Lhe hlllppplnes Lo
dle. 8uL Mrs. Aqulno, conslderlng Lhe dlre consequences Lo Lhe naLlon of hls reLurn aL a
Llme when Lhe sLablllLy of governmenL ls LhreaLened from varlous dlrecLlons and Lhe
economy ls [usL beglnnlng Lo rlse and move forward, has sLood flrmly on Lhe declslon Lo
bar Lhe reLurn of Mr. Marcos and hls famlly.
!"# %#&'&'()
1hls case ls unlque. lL should noL creaLe a precedenL, for Lhe case of a dlcLaLor forced
ouL of offlce and lnLo exlle afLer causlng LwenLy years of pollLlcal, economlc and soclal
havoc ln Lhe counLry and who wlLhln Lhe shorL space of Lhree years seeks Lo reLurn, ls ln
a class by lLself.
1hls peLlLlon for *+),+*-. and prohlblLlon asks Lhe CourLs Lo order Lhe respondenLs Lo
lssue Lravel documenLs Lo Mr. Marcos and Lhe lmmedlaLe members of hls famlly and Lo
en[oln Lhe lmplemenLaLlon of Lhe resldenL's declslon Lo bar Lhelr reLurn Lo Lhe
hlllpplnes.
!"# /..-#
1h lssue ls baslcally one of power: wheLher or noL, ln Lhe exerclse of Lhe powers granLed
by Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, Lhe resldenL may prohlblL Lhe Marcoses from reLurnlng Lo Lhe
hlllpplnes.
Accordlng Lo Lhe peLlLloners, Lhe resoluLlon of Lhe case would depend on Lhe resoluLlon
of Lhe followlng lssues:
1. uoes Lhe resldenL have Lhe power Lo bar Lhe reLurn of former
resldenL Marcos and famlly Lo Lhe hlllpplnes?
a. ls Lhls a pollLlcal quesLlon?
2. Assumlng LhaL Lhe resldenL has Lhe power Lo bar former resldenL
Marcos and hls famlly from reLurnlng Lo Lhe hlllpplnes, ln Lhe lnLeresL of
"naLlonal securlLy, publlc safeLy or publlc healLh
a. Pas Lhe resldenL made a flndlng LhaL Lhe reLurn of former resldenL
Marcos and hls famlly Lo Lhe hlllpplnes ls a clear and presenL danger Lo
naLlonal securlLy, publlc safeLy or publlc healLh?
b. Assumlng LhaL she has made LhaL flndlng
(1) Pave Lhe requlremenLs of due process been complled
wlLh ln maklng such flndlng?
(2) Pas Lhere been prlor noLlce Lo peLlLloners?
(3) Pas Lhere been a hearlng?
(4) Assumlng LhaL noLlce and hearlng may be dlspensed
wlLh, has Lhe resldenL's declslon, lncludlng Lhe grounds
upon whlch lL was based, been made known Lo peLlLloners
so LhaL Lhey may conLroverL Lhe same?
c. ls Lhe resldenL's deLermlnaLlon LhaL Lhe reLurn of former resldenL
Marcos and hls famlly Lo Lhe hlllpplnes ls a clear and presenL danger Lo
naLlonal securlLy, publlc safeLy, or publlc healLh a pollLlcal quesLlon?
d. Assumlng LhaL Lhe CourL may lnqulre as Lo wheLher Lhe reLurn of
former resldenL Marcos and hls famlly ls a clear and presenL danger Lo
naLlonal securlLy, publlc safeLy, or publlc healLh, have respondenLs
esLabllshed such facL?
3. Pave Lhe respondenLs, Lherefore, ln lmplemenLlng Lhe resldenL's
declslon Lo bar Lhe reLurn of former resldenL Marcos and hls famlly,
acLed and would be acLlng wlLhouL [urlsdlcLlon, or ln excess of
[urlsdlcLlon, or wlLh grave abuse of dlscreLlon, ln performlng any acL
whlch would effecLlvely bar Lhe reLurn of former resldenL Marcos and
hls famlly Lo Lhe hlllpplnes? [Memorandum for eLlLloners, pp. 3-7,
8ollo, pp. 234-236.1
1he case for peLlLloners ls founded on Lhe asserLlon LhaL Lhe rlghL of Lhe Marcoses Lo
reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes ls guaranLeed under Lhe followlng provlslons of Lhe 8lll of
8lghLs, Lo wlL:
SecLlon 1. no person shall be deprlved of llfe, llberLy, or properLy wlLhouL
due process of law, nor shall any person be denled Lhe equal proLecLlon
of Lhe laws.
xxx xxx xxx
SecLlon 6. 1he llberLy of abode and of changlng Lhe same wlLhln Lhe llmlLs
prescrlbed by law shall noL be lmpalred excepL upon lawful order of Lhe
courL. nelLher shall Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel be lmpalred excepL ln Lhe lnLeresL
of naLlonal securlLy, publlc safeLy, or publlc healLh, as may be provlded by
law.
1he peLlLloners conLend LhaL Lhe resldenL ls wlLhouL power Lo lmpalr Lhe llberLy of
abode of Lhe Marcoses because only a courL may do so "wlLhln Lhe llmlLs prescrlbed by
law." nor may Lhe resldenL lmpalr Lhelr rlghL Lo Lravel because no law has auLhorlzed
her Lo do so. 1hey advance Lhe vlew LhaL before Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel may be lmpalred by
any auLhorlLy or agency of Lhe governmenL, Lhere musL be leglslaLlon Lo LhaL effecL.
1he peLlLloners furLher asserL LhaL under lnLernaLlonal law, Lhe rlghL of Mr. Marcos and
hls famlly Lo reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes ls guaranLeed.
1he unlversal ueclaraLlon of Puman 8lghLs provldes:
ArLlcle 13. (1) Lveryone has Lhe rlghL Lo freedom of movemenL and
resldence wlLhln Lhe borders of each sLaLe.
(2) Lveryone has Lhe rlghL Lo leave any counLry, lncludlng hls own, and Lo
reLurn Lo hls counLry.
Llkewlse, Lhe lnLernaLlonal CovenanL on Clvll and ollLlcal 8lghLs, whlch had been
raLlfled by Lhe hlllpplnes, provldes:
ArLlcle 12
1) Lveryone lawfully wlLhln Lhe LerrlLory of a SLaLe shall, wlLhln LhaL
LerrlLory, have Lhe rlghL Lo llberLy of movemenL and freedom Lo choose
hls resldence.
2) Lveryone shall be free Lo leave any counLry, lncludlng hls own.
3) 1he above-menLloned rlghLs shall noL be sub[ecL Lo any resLrlcLlons
excepL Lhose whlch are provlded by law, are necessary Lo proLecL
naLlonal securlLy, publlc order (order publlc), publlc healLh or morals or
Lhe rlghLs and freedoms of oLhers, and are conslsLenL wlLh Lhe oLher
rlghLs recognlzed ln Lhe presenL CovenanL.
4) no one shall be arblLrarlly deprlved of Lhe rlghL Lo enLer hls own
counLry.
Cn Lhe oLher hand, Lhe respondenLs' prlnclpal argumenL ls LhaL Lhe lssue ln Lhls case
lnvolves a pollLlcal quesLlon whlch ls non-[usLlclable. Accordlng Lo Lhe SollclLor Ceneral:
As peLlLloners couch lL, Lhe quesLlon lnvolved ls slmply wheLher or noL
peLlLloners lerdlnand L. Marcos and hls famlly have Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel
and llberLy of abode. eLlLloners lnvoke Lhese consLlLuLlonal rlghLs ')
0+1-( wlLhouL reference Lo aLLendanL clrcumsLances.
8espondenLs submlL LhaL ln lLs proper formulaLlon, Lhe lssue ls wheLher
or noL peLlLloners lerdlnand L. Marcos and famlly have Lhe rlghL Lo reLurn
Lo Lhe hlllpplnes and reslde here aL Lhls Llme ln Lhe face of Lhe
deLermlnaLlon by Lhe resldenL LhaL such reLurn and resldence wlll
endanger naLlonal securlLy and publlc safeLy.
lL may be conceded LhaL as formulaLed by peLlLloners, Lhe quesLlon ls noL
a pollLlcal quesLlon as lL lnvolves merely a deLermlnaLlon of whaL Lhe law
provldes on Lhe maLLer and appllcaLlon Lhereof Lo peLlLloners lerdlnand
L. Marcos and famlly. 8uL when Lhe quesLlon ls wheLher Lhe Lwo rlghLs
clalmed by peLlLloners lerdlnand L. Marcos and famlly lmplnge on or
colllde wlLh Lhe more prlmordlal and LranscendenLal rlghL of Lhe SLaLe Lo
securlLy and safeLy of lLs naLlonals, Lhe quesLlon becomes pollLlcal and
Lhls Ponorable CourL can noL conslder lL.
1here are Lhus gradaLlons Lo Lhe quesLlon, Lo wlL:
uo peLlLloners lerdlnand L. Marcos and famlly have Lhe rlghL Lo reLurn Lo
Lhe hlllpplnes and reesLabllsh Lhelr resldence here? 1hls ls clearly a
[usLlclable quesLlon whlch Lhls Ponorable CourL can declde.
uo peLlLloners lerdlnand L. Marcos and famlly have Lhelr rlghL Lo reLurn
Lo Lhe hlllpplnes and reesLabllsh Lhelr resldence here even lf Lhelr reLurn
and resldence here wlll endanger naLlonal securlLy and publlc safeLy? Lhls
ls sLlll a [usLlclable quesLlon whlch Lhls Ponorable CourL can declde.
ls Lhere danger Lo naLlonal securlLy and publlc safeLy lf peLlLloners
lerdlnand L. Marcos and famlly shall reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes and
esLabllsh Lhelr resldence here? 1hls ls now a pollLlcal quesLlon whlch Lhls
Ponorable CourL can noL declde for lL falls wlLhln Lhe excluslve auLhorlLy
and compeLence of Lhe resldenL of Lhe hlllpplnes. [Memorandum for
8espondenLs, pp. 9-11, 8ollo, pp. 297-299.]
8espondenLs argue for Lhe prlmacy of Lhe rlghL of Lhe SLaLe Lo naLlonal securlLy over
lndlvldual rlghLs. ln supporL Lhereof, Lhey clLe ArLlcle ll of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, Lo wlL:
SecLlon 4. 1he prlme duLy of Lhe CovernmenL ls Lo serve and proLecL Lhe
people. 1he CovernmenL may call upon Lhe people Lo defend Lhe SLaLe
and, ln Lhe fulflllmenL Lhereof, all clLlzens may be requlred, under
condlLlons provlded by law, Lo render personal, mlllLary, or clvll servlce.
SecLlon 3. 1he malnLenance of peace and order, Lhe proLecLlon of llfe,
llberLy, and properLy, and Lhe promoLlon of Lhe general welfare are
essenLlal for Lhe en[oymenL by all Lhe people of Lhe blesslngs of
democracy.
8espondenLs also polnL ouL LhaL Lhe declslon Lo ban Mr. Marcos and famlly from
reLurnlng Lo Lhe hlllpplnes for reasons of naLlonal securlLy and publlc safeLy has
lnLernaLlonal precedenLs. 8afael 1ru[lllo of Lhe uomlnlcan 8epubllc, AnasLaclo Somoza
!r. of nlcaragua, !orge ublco of CuaLemala, lulgenclo baLlsLa of Cuba, klng larouk of
LgypL, Maxlmlllano Pernandez MarLlnez of Ll Salvador, and Marcos erez !lmenez of
venezuela were among Lhe deposed dlcLaLors whose reLurn Lo Lhelr homelands was
prevenLed by Lhelr governmenLs. [See SLaLemenL of lorelgn Affalrs SecreLary 8aul S.
Manglapus, quoLed ln Memorandum for 8espondenLs, pp. 26-32, 8ollo, pp. 314-319.]
1he parLles are ln agreemenL LhaL Lhe underlylng lssue ls one of Lhe scope of
presldenLlal power and lLs llmlLs. We, however, vlew Lhls lssue ln a dlfferenL llghL.
AlLhough we glve due welghL Lo Lhe parLles' formulaLlon of Lhe lssues, we are noL bound
by lLs narrow conflnes ln arrlvlng aL a soluLlon Lo Lhe conLroversy.
AL Lhe ouLseL, we musL sLaLe LhaL lL would noL do Lo vlew Lhe case wlLhln Lhe conflnes of
Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel and Lhe lmporL of Lhe declslons of Lhe u.S. Supreme CourL ln Lhe
leadlng cases of 2#)& 03 4-55#. [337 u.S. 116, 78 SCL 1113, 2 L Ld. 2d 1204] and 6+'7 03
87## [433 u.S. 280, 101 SCL 2766, 69 L Ld. 2d 640) whlch afflrmed Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel and
recognlzed excepLlons Lo Lhe exerclse Lhereof, respecLlvely.
lL musL be emphaslzed LhaL Lhe lndlvldual rlghL lnvolved ls )(& Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel from
Lhe hlllpplnes Lo oLher counLrles or wlLhln Lhe hlllpplnes. 1hese are whaL Lhe rlghL Lo
Lravel would normally connoLe. LssenLlally, Lhe rlghL lnvolved ls Lhe rlghL Lo reLurn Lo
one's counLry, a LoLally dlsLlncL rlghL under lnLernaLlonal law, lndependenL from
alLhough relaLed Lo Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel. 1hus, Lhe unlversal ueclaraLlon of Pumans 8lghLs
and Lhe lnLernaLlonal CovenanL on Clvll and ollLlcal 8lghLs LreaL Lhe rlghL Lo freedom of
movemenL and abode wlLhln Lhe LerrlLory of a sLaLe, Lhe rlghL Lo leave a counLry, and
Lhe rlghL Lo enLer one's counLry as separaLe and dlsLlncL rlghLs. 1he ueclaraLlon speaks
of Lhe "rlghL Lo freedom of movemenL and resldence wlLhln Lhe borders of each sLaLe"
[ArL. 13(l)] separaLely from Lhe "rlghL Lo leave any counLry, lncludlng hls own, and Lo
reLurn Lo hls counLry." [ArL. 13(2).] Cn Lhe oLher hand, Lhe CovenanL guaranLees Lhe
"rlghL Lo llberLy of movemenL and freedom Lo choose hls resldence" [ArL. 12(l)] and Lhe
rlghL Lo "be free Lo leave any counLry, lncludlng hls own." [ArL. 12(2)] whlch rlghLs may
be resLrlcLed by such laws as "are necessary Lo proLecL naLlonal securlLy, publlc order,
publlc healLh or morals or enLer qqqs own counLry" of whlch one cannoL be "arblLrarlly
deprlved." [ArL. 12(4).] lL would Lherefore be lnapproprlaLe Lo consLrue Lhe llmlLaLlons
Lo Lhe rlghL Lo reLurn Lo one's counLry ln Lhe same conLexL as Lhose perLalnlng Lo Lhe
llberLy of abode and Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel.
1he rlghL Lo reLurn Lo one's counLry ls noL among Lhe rlghLs speclflcally guaranLeed ln
Lhe 8lll of 8lghLs, whlch LreaLs only of Lhe llberLy of abode and Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel, buL lL
ls our well-consldered vlew LhaL Lhe rlghL Lo reLurn may be consldered, as a generally
accepLed prlnclple of lnLernaLlonal law and, under our ConsLlLuLlon, ls parL of Lhe law of
Lhe land [ArL. ll, Sec. 2 of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon.] Powever, lL ls dlsLlncL and separaLe from Lhe
rlghL Lo Lravel and en[oys a dlfferenL proLecLlon under Lhe lnLernaLlonal CovenanL of Clvll
and ollLlcal 8lghLs, l.e., agalnsL belng "arblLrarlly deprlved" Lhereof [ArL. 12 (4).]
1hus, Lhe rullngs ln Lhe cases 2#)& +), 6+'7 whlch refer Lo Lhe lssuance of passporLs for
Lhe purpose of effecLlvely exerclslng Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel are noL deLermlnaLlve of Lhls
case and are only LangenLlally maLerlal lnsofar as Lhey relaLe Lo a confllcL beLween
execuLlve acLlon and Lhe exerclse of a proLecLed rlghL. 1he lssue before Lhe CourL ls
novel and wlLhouL precedenL ln hlllpplne, and even ln Amerlcan [urlsprudence.
ConsequenLly, resoluLlon by Lhe CourL of Lhe well-debaLed lssue of wheLher or noL Lhere
can be llmlLaLlons on Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel ln Lhe absence of leglslaLlon Lo LhaL effecL ls
rendered unnecessary. An approprlaLe case for lLs resoluLlon wlll have Lo be awalLed.
Pavlng clarlfled Lhe subsLance of Lhe legal lssue, we flnd now a need Lo explaln Lhe
meLhodology for lLs resoluLlon. Cur resoluLlon of Lhe lssue wlll lnvolve a Lwo-Llered
approach. We shall flrsL resolve wheLher or noL Lhe resldenL has Lhe power under Lhe
ConsLlLuLlon, Lo bar Lhe Marcoses from reLurnlng Lo Lhe hlllpplnes. 1hen, we shall
deLermlne, pursuanL Lo Lhe express power of Lhe CourL under Lhe ConsLlLuLlon ln ArLlcle
vlll, SecLlon 1, wheLher or noL Lhe resldenL acLed arblLrarlly or wlLh grave abuse of
dlscreLlon amounLlng Lo lack or excess of [urlsdlcLlon when she deLermlned LhaL Lhe
reLurn of Lhe Marcose's Lo Lhe hlllpplnes poses a serlous LhreaL Lo naLlonal lnLeresL and
welfare and declded Lo bar Lhelr reLurn.
9:#1-&'0# %(;#<
1he 1987 ConsLlLuLlon has fully resLored Lhe separaLlon of powers of Lhe Lhree greaL
branches of governmenL. 1o recall Lhe words of !usLlce Laurel ln 8)7+<+ 03 95#1&(<+5
=(**'..'() [63 hll. 139 (1936)], "Lhe ConsLlLuLlon has blocked buL wlLh defL sLrokes
and ln bold llnes, alloLmenL of power Lo Lhe execuLlve, Lhe leglslaLlve and Lhe [udlclal
deparLmenLs of Lhe governmenL." [AL 137.1 1hus, Lhe 1987 ConsLlLuLlon expllclLly
provldes LhaL "[Lhe leglslaLlve power shall be vesLed ln Lhe Congress of Lhe hlllpplnes"
ArL vl, Sec. 11, "[L]he execuLlve power shall bevesLed ln Lhe resldenL of Lhe hlllpplnes"
[ArL. vll, Sec. 11, and "[Le [udlclal power shall be vesLed ln one Supreme CourL and ln
such lower courLs as may be esLabllshed by law" [ArL. vlll, Sec. 1.] 1hese provlslons noL
only esLabllsh a separaLlon of powers by acLual dlvlslon [Angara v. LlecLoral
Commlsslon, .-><+] buL also confer plenary leglslaLlve, execuLlve and [udlclal powers
sub[ecL only Lo llmlLaLlons provlded ln Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. lor as Lhe Supreme CourL
ln ?1+*>( 03 =+@+)7'. [13 hll. 626 (1910)] polnLed ouL "a granL of Lhe leglslaLlve power
means a granL of all leglslaLlve power, and a granL of Lhe [udlclal power means a granL of
all Lhe [udlclal power whlch may be exerclsed under Lhe governmenL." [AL 631-632.1 lf
Lhls can be sald of Lhe leglslaLlve power whlch ls exerclsed by Lwo chambers wlLh a
comblned membershlp of more Lhan Lwo hundred members and of Lhe [udlclal power
whlch ls vesLed ln a hlerarchy of courLs, lL can equally be sald of Lhe execuLlve power
whlch ls vesLed ln one offlclal Lhe resldenL.
As sLaLed above, Lhe ConsLlLuLlon provldes LhaL "[L]he execuLlve power shall be vesLed ln
Lhe resldenL of Lhe hlllpplnes." [ArL. vll, Sec. 1]. Powever, lL does noL deflne whaL ls
meanL by execuLlve power" alLhough ln Lhe same arLlcle lL Louches on Lhe exerclse of
cerLaln powers by Lhe resldenL, '3#., Lhe power of conLrol over all execuLlve
deparLmenLs, bureaus and offlces, Lhe power Lo execuLe Lhe laws, Lhe appolnLlng
power, Lhe powers under Lhe commander-ln-chlef clause, Lhe power Lo granL reprleves,
commuLaLlons and pardons, Lhe power Lo granL amnesLy wlLh Lhe concurrence of
Congress, Lhe power Lo conLracL or guaranLee forelgn loans, Lhe power Lo enLer lnLo
LreaLles or lnLernaLlonal agreemenLs, Lhe power Lo submlL Lhe budgeL Lo Congress, and
Lhe power Lo address Congress [ArL. vll, Sec. 14-23].
1he lnevlLable quesLlon Lhen arlses: by enumeraLlng cerLaln powers of Lhe resldenL dld
Lhe framers of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon lnLend LhaL Lhe resldenL shall exerclse Lhose speclflc
powers and no oLher? Are Lhese se enumeraLed powers Lhe breadLh and scope of
"execuLlve power"? eLlLloners advance Lhe vlew LhaL Lhe resldenL's powers are
llmlLed Lo Lhose speclflcally enumeraLed ln Lhe 1987 ConsLlLuLlon. 1hus, Lhey asserL:
"1he resldenL has enumeraLed powers, and whaL ls noL enumeraLed ls lmplledly denled
Lo her. /)15-.'() -)'-. #.& #:15-.'( +5&#<'-.[Memorandum for eLlLloners, p. 4- 8ollo p.
233.1 1hls argumenL brlngs Lo mlnd Lhe lnsLlLuLlon of Lhe u.S. resldency afLer whlch
ours ls legally paLLerned.**
Corwln, ln hls monumenLal volume on Lhe resldenL of Lhe unlLed SLaLes grappled wlLh
Lhe same problem. Pe sald:
ArLlcle ll ls Lhe mosL loosely drawn chapLer of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. 1o Lhose
who Lhlnk LhaL a consLlLuLlon oughL Lo seLLle everyLhlng beforehand lL
should be a nlghLmare, by Lhe same Loken, Lo Lhose who Lhlnk LhaL
consLlLuLlon makers oughL Lo leave conslderable leeway for Lhe fuLure
play of pollLlcal forces, lL should be a vlslon reallzed.
We encounLer Lhls characLerlsLlc of ArLlcle 11 ln lLs openlng words: "1he
execuLlve power shall be vesLed ln a resldenL of Lhe unlLed SLaLes of
Amerlca." . . .. [!"# %<#.',#)&A ?BB'1# +), %(;#<.C DEFEDGHEC >>3 IJK3]
8evlewlng how Lhe powers of Lhe u.S. resldenL were exerclsed by Lhe dlfferenL persons
who held Lhe offlce from WashlngLon Lo Lhe early 1900's, and Lhe swlng from Lhe
presldency by commlsslon Lo Llncoln's dlcLaLorshlp, he concluded LhaL "whaL Lhe
presldency ls aL any parLlcular momenL depends ln lmporLanL measure on who ls
resldenL." [AL 30.]
1hls vlew ls shared by Schleslnger who wroLe ln !"# /*>#<'+5 %<#.',#)1L:
lor Lhe Amerlcan resldency was a pecullarly personal lnsLlLuLlon. lL
remalned of course, an agency of governmenL sub[ecL Lo unvarylng
demands and duLles no remalned, of cas resldenL. 8uL, more Lhan mosL
agencles of governmenL, lL changed shape, lnLenslLy and eLhos accordlng
Lo Lhe man ln charge. Lach resldenL's dlsLlncLlve LemperamenL and
characLer, hls values, sLandards, sLyle, hls hablLs, expecLaLlons,
ldlosyncrasles, compulslons, phoblas recasL Lhe WhlLePouse and
pervaded Lhe enLlre governmenL. 1he execuLlve branch, sald Clark
Cllfford, was a chameleon, Laklng lLs color from Lhe characLer and
personallLy of Lhe resldenL. 1he LhrusL of Lhe offlce, lLs lmpacL on Lhe
consLlLuLlonal order, Lherefore alLered from resldenL Lo resldenL.
Above all, Lhe way each resldenL undersLood lL as hls personal obllgaLlon
Lo lnform and lnvolve Lhe Congress, Lo earn and hold Lhe confldence of
Lhe elecLoraLe and Lo render an accounLlng Lo Lhe naLlon and posLerlLy
deLermlned wheLher he sLrengLhened or weakened Lhe consLlLuLlonal
order. [AL 212- 213.]
We do noL say LhaL Lhe presldency ls whaL Mrs. Aqulno says lL ls or whaL she does buL,
raLher, LhaL Lhe conslderaLlon of LradlLlon and Lhe developmenL of presldenLlal power
under Lhe dlfferenL consLlLuLlons are essenLlal for a compleLe undersLandlng of Lhe
exLenL of and llmlLaLlons Lo Lhe resldenL's powers under Lhe 1987 ConsLlLuLlon. 1he
1933 ConsLlLuLlon creaLed a sLrong resldenL wlLh expllclLly broader powers Lhan Lhe
u.S. resldenL. 1he 1973 ConsLlLuLlon aLLempLed Lo modlfy Lhe sysLem of governmenL
lnLo Lhe parllamenLary Lype, wlLh Lhe resldenL as a mere flgurehead, buL Lhrough
numerous amendmenLs, Lhe resldenL became even more powerful, Lo Lhe polnL LhaL
he was also Lhe de facLo LeglslaLure. 1he 1987 ConsLlLuLlon, however, broughL back Lhe
presldenLlal sysLem of governmenL and resLored Lhe separaLlon of leglslaLlve, execuLlve
and [udlclal powers by Lhelr acLual dlsLrlbuLlon among Lhree dlsLlncL branches of
governmenL wlLh provlslon for checks and balances.
lL would noL be accuraLe, however, Lo sLaLe LhaL "execuLlve power" ls Lhe power Lo
enforce Lhe laws, for Lhe resldenL ls head of sLaLe as well as head of governmenL and
whaLever powers lnhere ln such poslLlons perLaln Lo Lhe offlce unless Lhe ConsLlLuLlon
lLself wlLhholds lL. lurLhermore, Lhe ConsLlLuLlon lLself provldes LhaL Lhe execuLlon of
Lhe laws ls only one of Lhe powers of Lhe resldenL. lL also granLs Lhe resldenL oLher
powers LhaL do noL lnvolve Lhe execuLlon of any provlslon of law, #373, hls power over
Lhe counLry's forelgn relaLlons.
Cn Lhese premlses, we hold Lhe vlew LhaL alLhough Lhe 1987 ConsLlLuLlon lmposes
llmlLaLlons on Lhe exerclse of.>#1'B'1 powers of Lhe resldenL, lL malnLalns lnLacL whaL ls
LradlLlonally consldered as wlLhln Lhe scope of "execuLlve power." Corollarlly, Lhe
powers of Lhe resldenL cannoL be sald Lo be llmlLed only Lo Lhe speclflc powers
enumeraLed ln Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. ln oLher words, execuLlve power ls more Lhan Lhe sum
of speclflc powers so enumeraLed,
lL has been advanced LhaL whaLever power lnherenL ln Lhe governmenL LhaL ls nelLher
leglslaLlve nor [udlclal has Lo be execuLlve. 1hus, ln Lhe landmark declslon of M><')7#< 03
N(0#<)*#)& (B &"# %"'5'>>')# /.5+),., 277 u.S. 189 (1928), on Lhe lssue of who beLween
Lhe Covernor-Ceneral of Lhe hlllpplnes and Lhe LeglslaLure may voLe Lhe shares of
sLock held by Lhe CovernmenL Lo elecL dlrecLors ln Lhe naLlonal Coal Company and Lhe
hlllpplne naLlonal 8ank, Lhe u.S. Supreme CourL, ln upholdlng Lhe power of Lhe
Covernor-Ceneral Lo do so, sald:
...Pere Lhe members of Lhe leglslaLure who consLlLuLe a ma[orlLy of Lhe
"board" and "commlLLee" respecLlvely, are noL charged wlLh Lhe
performance of any leglslaLlve funcLlons or wlLh Lhe dolng of anyLhlng
whlch ls ln ald of performance of any such funcLlons by Lhe leglslaLure.
uLLlng aslde for Lhe momenL Lhe quesLlon wheLher Lhe duLles devolved
upon Lhese members are vesLed by Lhe Crganlc AcL ln Lhe Covernor-
Ceneral, lL ls clear LhaL Lhey are noL leglslaLlve ln characLer, and sLlll more
clear LhaL Lhey are noL [udlclal. !"# B+1& &"+& &"#L ,( )(& B+55 ;'&"') &"#
+-&"(<'&L (B #'&"#< (B &"#.# &;( 1().&'&-&#. 5(7'1+5 7<(-), B(< 1()15-,')7
&"+& &"#L ,( B+55 ;'&"') &"+& (B &"# <#*+')')7 ()# +*()7 ;"'1" &"#
>(;#<. (B 7(0#<)*#)& +<# ,'0',#, ....[AL 202-203, Lmphasls supplled.]
We are noL unmlndful of !usLlce Polmes' sLrong dlssenL. 8uL ln hls endurlng words of
dlssenL we flnd relnforcemenL for Lhe vlew LhaL lL would lndeed be a folly Lo consLrue
Lhe powers of a branch of governmenL Lo embrace only whaL are speclflcally menLloned
ln Lhe ConsLlLuLlon:
1he greaL ordlnances of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon do noL esLabllsh and dlvlde
flelds of black and whlLe. Lven Lhe more speclflc of Lhem are found Lo
LermlnaLe ln a penumbra shadlng gradually from one exLreme Lo Lhe
oLher. ....
xxx xxx xxx
lL does noL seem Lo need argumenL Lo show LhaL however we may
dlsgulse lL by velllng words we do noL and cannoL carry ouL Lhe dlsLlncLlon
beLween leglslaLlve and execuLlve acLlon wlLh maLhemaLlcal preclslon
and dlvlde Lhe branches lnLo waLerLlghL comparLmenLs, were lL ever so
deslrable Lo do so, whlch l am far from bellevlng LhaL lL ls, or LhaL Lhe
ConsLlLuLlon requlres. [AL 210- 211.]
!"# %(;#< /)0(50#,
1he ConsLlLuLlon declares among Lhe guldlng prlnclples LhaL "[L]he prlme duLy of
LheCovernmenL ls Lo serve and proLecL Lhe people" and LhaL "[L]he malnLenance of
peace and order,Lhe proLecLlon of llfe, llberLy, and properLy, and Lhe promoLlon of Lhe
general welfare are essenLlal for Lhe en[oymenL by all Lhe people of Lhe blesslngs of
democracy." [ArL. ll, Secs. 4 and 3.]
AdmlLLedly, servlce and proLecLlon of Lhe people, Lhe malnLenance of peace and order,
Lhe proLecLlon of llfe, llberLy and properLy, and Lhe promoLlon of Lhe general welfare are
essenLlally ldeals Lo gulde governmenLal acLlon. 8uL such does noL mean LhaL Lhey are
empLy words. 1hus, ln Lhe exerclse of presldenLlal funcLlons, ln drawlng a plan of
governmenL, and ln dlrecLlng lmplemenLlng acLlon for Lhese plans, or from anoLher
polnL of vlew, ln maklng any declslon as resldenL of Lhe 8epubllc, Lhe resldenL has Lo
conslder Lhese prlnclples, among oLher Lhlngs, and adhere Lo Lhem.
laced wlLh Lhe problem of wheLher or noL Lhe Llme ls rlghL Lo allow Lhe Marcoses Lo
reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes, Lhe resldenL ls, under Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, consLralned Lo
conslder Lhese baslc prlnclples ln arrlvlng aL a declslon. More Lhan LhaL, havlng sworn Lo
defend and uphold Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, Lhe resldenL has Lhe obllgaLlon -),#< &"#
=().&'&-&'() Lo proLecL Lhe people, promoLe Lhelr welfare and advance Lhe naLlonal
lnLeresL. lL musL be borne ln mlnd LhaL Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, aslde from belng an allocaLlon
of power ls also a soclal conLracL whereby Lhe people have surrendered Lhelr soverelgn
powers Lo Lhe SLaLe for Lhe common good. Pence, lesL Lhe offlcers of Lhe CovernmenL
exerclslng Lhe powers delegaLed by Lhe people forgeL and Lhe servanLs of Lhe people
become rulers, Lhe ConsLlLuLlon remlnds everyone LhaL "[s]overelgnLy resldes ln Lhe
people and all governmenL auLhorlLy emanaLes from Lhem." [ArL. ll, Sec. 1.]
1he resoluLlon of Lhe problem ls made dlfflculL because Lhe persons who seek Lo reLurn
Lo Lhe counLry are Lhe deposed dlcLaLor and hls famlly aL whose door Lhe Lravalls of Lhe
counLry are lald and from whom bllllons of dollars belleved Lo be lll-goLLen wealLh are
soughL Lo be recovered. 1he consLlLuLlonal guaranLees Lhey lnvoke are nelLher absoluLe
nor lnflexlble. lor Lhe exerclse of even Lhe preferred freedoms of speech and
ofexpresslon, alLhough couched ln absoluLe Lerms, admlLs of llmlLs and musL be
ad[usLed Lo Lhe requlremenLs of equally lmporLanL publlc lnLeresLs [Zaldlvar v.
Sandlganbayan, C.8. nos. 79690-707, CcLober 7, 1981.]
1o Lhe resldenL, Lhe problem ls one of balanclng Lhe general welfare and Lhe common
good agalnsL Lhe exerclse of rlghLs of cerLaln lndlvlduals. 1he power lnvolved ls Lhe
resldenL's resldual power Lo proLecL Lhe general welfare of Lhe people. lL ls founded on
Lhe duLy of Lhe resldenL, as sLeward of Lhe people. 1o paraphrase 1heodore 8oosevelL,
lL ls noL only Lhe power of Lhe resldenL buL also hls duLy Lo do anyLhlng noL forbldden
by Lhe ConsLlLuLlon or Lhe laws LhaL Lhe needs of Lhe naLlon demand [See Corwln, .-><+,
aL 133]. lL ls a power borne by Lhe resldenL's duLy Lo preserve and defend Lhe
ConsLlLuLlon. lL also may be vlewed as a power lmpllclL ln Lhe resldenL's duLy Lo Lake
care LhaL Lhe laws are falLhfully execuLed [.## Pyman, !"# 8*#<'1+) %<#.',#)&, where
Lhe auLhor advances Lhe vlew LhaL an allowance of dlscreLlonary power ls unavoldable ln
any governmenL and ls besL lodged ln Lhe resldenL].
More parLlcularly, Lhls case calls for Lhe exerclse of Lhe resldenL's powers as proLecLor
of Lhe peace. 8osslLer!"# 8*#<'1+) %<#.',#)1L].1he power of Lhe resldenL Lo keep Lhe
peace ls noL llmlLed merely Lo exerclslng Lhe commander-ln-chlef powers ln Llmes of
emergency or Lo leadlng Lhe SLaLe agalnsL exLernal and lnLernal LhreaLs Lo lLs exlsLence.
1he resldenL ls noL only cloLhed wlLh exLraordlnary powers ln Llmes of emergency, buL
ls also Lasked wlLh aLLendlng Lo Lhe day-Lo-day problems of malnLalnlng peace and order
and ensurlng domesLlc LranqulllLy ln Llmes when no forelgn foe appears on Lhe horlzon.
Wlde dlscreLlon, wlLhln Lhe bounds of law, ln fulfllllng presldenLlal duLles ln Llmes of
peace ls noL ln any way dlmlnlshed by Lhe relaLlve wanL of an emergency speclfled ln Lhe
commander-ln-chlef provlslon. lor ln maklng Lhe resldenL commander-ln-chlef Lhe
enumeraLlon of powers LhaL follow cannoL be sald Lo exclude Lhe resldenL's exerclslng
as Commander-ln- Chlef powers shorL of Lhe calllng of Lhe armed forces, or suspendlng
Lhe prlvllege of Lhe wrlL of "+@#+. 1(<>-. or declarlng marLlal law, ln order Lo keep Lhe
peace, and malnLaln publlc order and securlLy.
1haL Lhe resldenL has Lhe power under Lhe ConsLlLuLlon Lo bar Lhe Marcose's from
reLurnlng has been recognlzed by memembers of Lhe LeglslaLure, and ls manlfesLed by
Lhe 8esoluLlon proposed ln Lhe Pouse of 8epresenLaLlves and slgned by 103 of lLs
members urglng Lhe resldenL Lo allow Mr. Marcos Lo reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes "as a
genulne unselflsh gesLure for Lrue naLlonal reconclllaLlon and as lrrevocable proof of our
collecLlve adherence Lo uncompromlslng respecL for human rlghLs under Lhe
ConsLlLuLlon and our laws." [Pouse 8esoluLlon no. 1342, 8ollo, p. 321.1 1he 8esoluLlon
does noL quesLlon Lhe resldenL's power Lo bar Lhe Marcoses from reLurnlng Lo Lhe
hlllpplnes, raLher, lL appeals Lo Lhe resldenL's sense of compasslon Lo allow a man Lo
come home Lo dle ln hls counLry.
WhaL we are saylng ln effecL ls LhaL Lhe requesL or demand of Lhe Marcoses Lo be
allowed Lo reLurn Lo Lhe hlllpplnes cannoL be consldered ln Lhe llghL solely of Lhe
consLlLuLlonal provlslons guaranLeelng llberLy of abode and Lhe rlghL Lo Lravel, sub[ecL Lo
cerLaln excepLlons, or of case law whlch clearly never conLemplaLed slLuaLlons even
remoLely slmllar Lo Lhe presenL one. lL musL be LreaLed as a maLLer LhaL ls approprlaLely
addressed Lo Lhose resldual unsLaLed powers of Lhe resldenL whlch are lmpllclL ln and
correlaLlve Lo Lhe paramounL duLy resldlng ln LhaL offlce Lo safeguard and proLecL
general welfare. ln LhaL conLexL, such requesL or demand should submlL Lo Lhe exerclse
of a broader dlscreLlon on Lhe parL of Lhe resldenL Lo deLermlne wheLher lL musL be
granLed or denled.
!"# 9:&#)& (B O#0'#;
under Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, [udlclal power lncludes Lhe duLy Lo deLermlne wheLher or noL
Lhere has been a grave abuse of dlscreLlon amounLlng Lo lack or excess of [urlsdlcLlon on
Lhe parL of any branch or lnsLrumenLallLy of Lhe CovernmenL." [ArL. vlll, Sec. 1] Clven
Lhls wordlng, we cannoL agree wlLh Lhe SollclLor Ceneral LhaL Lhe lssue consLlLuLes a
pollLlcal quesLlon whlch ls beyond Lhe [urlsdlcLlon of Lhe CourL Lo declde.
1he presenL ConsLlLuLlon llmlLs resorL Lo Lhe pollLlcal quesLlon docLrlne and broadens
Lhe scope of [udlclal lnqulry lnLo areas whlch Lhe CourL, under prevlous consLlLuLlons,
would have normally lefL Lo Lhe pollLlcal deparLmenLs Lo declde. 8uL noneLheless Lhere
remaln lssues beyond Lhe CourL's [urlsdlcLlon Lhe deLermlnaLlon of whlch ls excluslvely
for Lhe resldenL, for Congress or for Lhe people Lhemselves Lhrough a pleblsclLe or
referendum. We cannoL, for example, quesLlon Lhe resldenL's recognlLlon of a forelgn
governmenL, no maLLer how premaLure or lmprovldenL such acLlon may appear. We
cannoL seL aslde a presldenLlal pardon Lhough lL may appear Lo us LhaL Lhe beneflclary ls
LoLally undeservlng of Lhe granL. nor can we amend Lhe ConsLlLuLlon under Lhe gulse of
resolvlng a dlspuLe broughL before us because Lhe power ls reserved Lo Lhe people.
1here ls noLhlng ln Lhe case before us LhaL precludes our deLermlnaLlon Lhereof on Lhe
pollLlcal quesLlon docLrlne. 1he dellberaLlons of Lhe ConsLlLuLlonal Commlsslon clLed by
peLlLloners show LhaL Lhe framers lnLended Lo wlden Lhe scope of [udlclal revlew buL
Lhey dld noL lnLend courLs of [usLlce Lo seLLle all acLual conLroversles before Lhem. When
pollLlcal quesLlons are lnvolved, Lhe ConsLlLuLlon llmlLs Lhe deLermlnaLlon Lo wheLher or
noL Lhere has been a grave abuse of dlscreLlon amounLlng Lo lack or excess of
[urlsdlcLlon on Lhe parL of Lhe offlclal whose acLlon ls belng quesLloned. lf grave abuse ls
noL esLabllshed, Lhe CourL wlll noL subsLlLuLe lLs [udgmenL for LhaL of Lhe offlclal
concerned and declde a maLLer whlch by lLs naLure or by law ls for Lhe laLLer alone Lo
declde. ln Lhls llghL, lL would appear clear LhaL Lhe second paragraph of ArLlcle vlll,
SecLlon 1 of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, deflnlng "[udlclal power," whlch speclflcally empowers Lhe
courLs Lo deLermlne wheLher or noL Lhere has been a grave abuse of dlscreLlon on Lhe
parL of any branch or lnsLrumenLallLy of Lhe governmenL, lncorporaLes ln Lhe
fundamenLal law Lhe rullng lnP+).+)7 03 N+<1'+ [C.8. no. L-33964, uecember 11, 1971,
42 SC8A 4481 LhaL:]
ArLlcle vll of Lhe [1933] ConsLlLuLlon vesLs ln Lhe LxecuLlve Lhe power Lo
suspend Lhe prlvllege of Lhe wrlL of habeas corpus under speclfled
condlLlons. ursuanL Lo Lhe prlnclple of separaLlon of powers underlylng
our sysLem of governmenL, Lhe LxecuLlve ls supreme wlLhln hls own
sphere. Powever, Lhe separaLlon of powers, under Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, ls
noL absoluLe. WhaL ls more, lL goes hand ln hand wlLh Lhe sysLem of
checks and balances, under whlch Lhe LxecuLlve ls supreme, as regards
Lhe suspenslon of Lhe prlvllege, buL only lf and when he acLs wlLhln Lhe
sphere alloLed Lo hlm by Lhe 8aslc Law, and Lhe auLhorlLy Lo deLermlne
wheLher or noL he has so acLed ls vesLed ln Lhe !udlclal ueparLmenL,
whlch, ln Lhls respecL, ls, ln Lurn, consLlLuLlonally supreme. ln Lhe exerclse
of such auLhorlLy, Lhe funcLlon of Lhe CourL ls merely Lo check - noL Lo
supplanL Lhe LxecuLlve, or Lo ascerLaln merely wheLher he has gone
beyond Lhe consLlLuLlonal llmlLs of hls [urlsdlcLlon, noL Lo exerclse Lhe
power vesLed ln hlm or Lo deLermlne Lhe wlsdom of hls acL [AL 479-480.]
Accordlngly, Lhe quesLlon for Lhe CourL Lo deLermlne ls wheLher or noL Lhere exlsL
facLual bases for Lhe resldenL Lo conclude LhaL lL was ln Lhe naLlonal lnLeresL Lo bar Lhe
reLurn of Lhe Marcoses Lo Lhe hlllpplnes. lf such posLulaLes do exlsL, lL cannoL be sald
LhaL she has acLed, or acLs, arblLrarlly or LhaL she has gravely abused her dlscreLlon ln
decldlng Lo bar Lhelr reLurn.
We flnd LhaL from Lhe pleadlngs flled by Lhe parLles, from Lhelr oral argumenLs, and Lhe
facLs revealed durlng Lhe brleflng ln chambers by Lhe Chlef of SLaff of Lhe Armed lorces
of Lhe hlllpplnes and Lhe naLlonal SecurlLy Advlser, whereln peLlLloners and
respondenLs were represenLed, Lhere exlsL facLual bases for Lhe resldenL's declslon..
1he CourL cannoL close lLs eyes Lo presenL reallLles and preLend LhaL Lhe counLry ls noL
besleged from wlLhln by a well-organlzed communlsL lnsurgency, a separaLlsL movemenL
ln Mlndanao, rlghLlsL consplracles Lo grab power, urban Lerrorlsm, Lhe murder wlLh
lmpunlLy of mlllLary men, pollce offlcers and clvlllan offlclals, Lo menLlon only a few. 1he
documenLed hlsLory of Lhe efforLs of Lhe Marcose's and Lhelr followers Lo desLablllze Lhe
counLry, as earller narraLed ln Lhls >()#)1'+ bolsLers Lhe concluslon LhaL Lhe reLurn of
Lhe Marcoses aL Lhls Llme would only exacerbaLe and lnLenslfy Lhe vlolence dlrecLed
agalnsL Lhe SLaLe and lnsLlgaLe more chaos.
As dlvergenL and dlscordanL forces, Lhe enemles of Lhe SLaLe may be conLalned. 1he
mlllLary esLabllshmenL has glven assurances LhaL lL could handle Lhe LhreaLs posed by
parLlcular groups. 8uL lL ls Lhe 1+&+5L&'1 #BB#1& of Lhe reLurn of Lhe Marcoses LhaL may
prove Lo be Lhe proverblal flnal sLraw LhaL would break Lhe camel's back. WlLh Lhese
before her, Lhe resldenL cannoL be sald Lo have acLed arblLrarlly and caprlclously and
whlmslcally ln deLermlnlng LhaL Lhe reLurn of Lhe Marcoses poses a serlous LhreaL Lo Lhe
naLlonal lnLeresL and welfare and ln prohlblLlng Lhelr reLurn.
lL wlll noL do Lo argue LhaL lf Lhe reLurn of Lhe Marcoses Lo Lhe hlllpplnes wlll cause Lhe
escalaLlon of vlolence agalnsL Lhe SLaLe, LhaL would be Lhe Llme for Lhe resldenL Lo sLep
ln and exerclse Lhe commander-ln-chlef powers granLed her by Lhe ConsLlLuLlon Lo
suppress or sLamp ouL such vlolence. 1he SLaLe, acLlng Lhrough Lhe CovernmenL, ls noL
precluded from Laklng pre- empLlve acLlon agalnsL LhreaLs Lo lLs exlsLence lf, Lhough sLlll
nascenL Lhey are percelved as apL Lo become serlous and dlrecL. roLecLlon of Lhe
people ls Lhe essence of Lhe duLy of governmenL. 1he preservaLlon of Lhe SLaLe Lhe
frulLlon of Lhe people's soverelgnLy ls an obllgaLlon ln Lhe hlghesL order. 1he resldenL,
sworn Lo preserve and defend Lhe ConsLlLuLlon and Lo see Lhe falLhful execuLlon Lhe
laws, cannoL shlrk from LhaL responslblllLy.
We cannoL also lose slghL of Lhe facL LhaL Lhe counLry ls only now beglnnlng Lo recover
from Lhe hardshlps broughL abouL by Lhe plunder of Lhe economy aLLrlbuLed Lo Lhe
Marcoses and Lhelr close assoclaLes and relaLlves, many of whom are sLlll here ln Lhe
hlllpplnes ln a poslLlon Lo desLablllze Lhe counLry, whlle Lhe CovernmenL has barely
scraLched Lhe surface, so Lo speak, ln lLs efforLs Lo recover Lhe enormous wealLh sLashed
away by Lhe Marcoses ln forelgn [urlsdlcLlons. 1hen, We cannoL lgnore Lhe conLlnually
lncreaslng burden lmposed on Lhe economy by Lhe excesslve forelgn borrowlng durlng
Lhe Marcos reglme, whlch sLlfles and sLagnaLes developmenL and ls one of Lhe rooL
causes of wldespread poverLy and all lLs aLLendanL llls. 1he resulLlng precarlous sLaLe of
our economy ls of common knowledge and ls easlly wlLhln Lhe amblL of [udlclal noLlce.
1he resldenL has deLermlned LhaL Lhe desLablllzaLlon caused by Lhe reLurn of Lhe
Marcoses would wlpe away Lhe galns achleved durlng Lhe pasL few years and lead Lo
LoLal economlc collapse. Clven whaL ls wlLhln our lndlvldual and common knowledge of
Lhe sLaLe of Lhe economy, we cannoL argue wlLh LhaL deLermlnaLlon.
WnLkLICkL, and |t be|ng our we||-cons|dered op|n|on that the res|dent d|d not act
arb|trar||y or w|th grave abuse of d|scret|on |n determ|n|ng that the return of former
res|dent Marcos and h|s fam||y at the present t|me and under present c|rcumstances
poses a ser|ous threat to nat|ona| |nterest and we|fare and |n proh|b|t|ng the|r return
to the h|||pp|nes, the |nstant pet|t|on |s hereby DISMISSLD.
SC CkDLkLD.