TEAM NUMBER: 7

2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, PHILIPPINES

VICENTE DE LARA, JR., ET. AL.,

(APPLICANTS)
V.
GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ET. AL.,
(RESPONDENTS)

SUBMITTED IN THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

2730 WORDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF FACTS

VI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

VIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

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ARGUMENTS

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I. The Court of First Instance of Manila did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent company.

II. Respondent P & B Enterprises Co., Inc. had exhausted administrative remedies
before filing a petition of certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

III. There are no grounds for the motion to dismiss the writ of preliminary injunction due
to the fact that P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. obtained prejudice and irreparable injury

PRAYER

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II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Et Al.

(et) (alii) and others

Co.

Corporation

Inc.

Incorporated

SCRA

Supreme Court Reports Annotated

III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CITED CASES
Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap

Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad

Jariol v. Comelec

XI

Ampil, Jr. v. Comelec

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LEGAL BASIS

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court

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Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

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1961 granted License by Bureau of Forestry

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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Team 7 (legal counsels of Gaudencio Cloribel, et al.) on its own behalf have
approached the Supreme Court of Justice for hearing issues relating to principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies under Administrative Code of the Philippines.
Team 7 submits its jurisdiction to this Honourable Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

PORTION OF THE FOREST CONCESSION AREA

1. During Vicente De Lara, Jr.s period of non-renewal of timber license, a
similar forest concession filed by P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. was processed to
log over a forest area of approximately 25,000 hectares situated in Claveria,
Misamis Oriental.
2. Upon grant of the P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. timber license, the said company
procured heavy equipment and introduced substantial improvements thereon
consisting of access roads, base camps and fuel facilities and the like in
compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Bureau of
Forestry.
3. By virtue of authority granted by Bureau of Forestry which is to construct
logging roads within forest area (the approximated 25,000 hectares) covered
by the license.
4. When the renewal of license of Vicente De Lara, Jr. was approved, it included
a portion of forest concession area originally granted to P&B Enterprises Co.,
Inc. Such grant of license is in conflict with the area of concession of the said
company.
P&B ENTERPRISES CO., INC. AND THE CONFLICTING FOREST CONCESSION
AREA
5. Protest of P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. was overruled despite the fact that the
portion of forest concession area of Vicente de Lara, Jr. intercepted the
companys forest concession area.
6. The company (P&B Enterprises Co., Inc.) appealed to Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Despite the order issued by such agency
that Vicente de Lara, Jr. is prohibited from entering and operating within
contested area until after conflict existing between two loggers have finally
been decided, De Lara continued to operate and cut logs within the contested
area which the company incurred great damage and prejudice.
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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7. The Court in response to the companys request, issued ex parte the writ of
preliminary injunction prohibiting Vicente De Lara, Jr. and his aids in cutting,
hauling, shipping and exporting logs from forest area intercepting forest
concession area of P&B Enterprises Co., Inc.
8. P&B Enterprises Co., Inc., in response to the petition for certiorari and
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to maintain status quo of logging
operations of parties, admitted issuance by respondent court of ex parte writ
of injunction since such injunction was necessary to prevent bodily injury and
violence to employees of Respondent company in view of De Laras threat to
appropriate and utilize private logging road constructed by P&B Enterprises
Co., Inc. through use of force and political influence.

VII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The parties have placed before this Honorable Court the following questions
for its consideration:
1. Whether the respondent court has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent
company (P&B Enterprises Co., Inc.)?
2. Whether P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies in appealing to the respondent court?
3. Whether the praying for certiorari by petitioners justifiable in the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction?
4. Whether the prayer for the dismissal of the writ of preliminary injunction is
justifiable?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

It should be recalled that one of the grounds invoked by petitioner De Lara before
respondent court in his motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent
company is that the latter has failed to exhaust all its administrative remedies in
that it filed said complaint before the appeal taken from the order of Director of
Forestry allowing De Lara to use the logging road and constructed within
contested forest area could be finally acted upon by Secretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources, implying therefore such action was premature.
While as a rule of petition for cetiorari which is interposed to dispute the validity
of an order or decision that may be rendered by an administrative official in
pursuance of the powers and duties with which he is invested cannot be
entertained if the party in interest fails to avail of the administrative remedies
officials are the most competent to pass upon matters that exclusively come
within their jurisdiction, such rule may be relaxed when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by
taking the opportune appropriate court action. Stated otherwise, the rule is
inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be
suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action
of the administrative official concerned on the matter. This is the situation herein
obtained. Because of the conflict existing between petitioner and respondent
company regarding a portion of the logging area awarded to them, as well as the
use of the logging road constructed by the company, the case was taken to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for his final resolution, who in the
meantime directed petitioner "to refrain from entering and operating within the
contested area until the said case shall have been finally decided," but before
such resolution could come De Lara disregarded the directive and continued
operating within the contested area to the irreparable damage and injury of the
company. This act of defiance prompted the company to take the appropriate
action. In the circumstances, we find the action taken by respondent court proper
and justified even if no final decision has as yet been rendered by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent court did nothing but to
maintain and put into effect the directive issued by said official.

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ARGUMENTS
I.

The Court of First Instance of Manila did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by respondent company.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of

our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules.

In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, the Court enumerated

the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e)where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to
be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k)
where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.

Also in the case of Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad, 206 SCRA 482,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to

the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy

falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the
courts of justice for review.
To which in application to this case, P&B Enterprises has exhausted all
administrative remedies, first to the Director of Forestry then to the Secretary og
Agriculture and Natural Resources and lastly to the respondent court.
And in Jariol v. Comelec (80 SCAD 910, 270 SCRA 255), the aggrieved
party must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief, but must also pursue to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
In Ampil, Jr. v. Comelec (344 SCRA 358, 372 [2000], it has long been held
that in a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that before a
part is allowed to seek intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative process afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought.
Which again to reiterate, the P&B Enterprises Co., Inc. did this in compliance and in
respect to the doctrine.
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended provides that:
If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined,
except as herein provided.
Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show
cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The
court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala
court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two
(72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the

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next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served

therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventytwo hours provided herein.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbyan or the Court of Tax Appeals
that issued a writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or
quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main case or petition within six (6) months
from the issuance of the writ.
II.

Respondent P & B Enterprises Co., Inc. had exhausted

administrative remedies before filing a petition of certiorari in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT (as amended December 2007)

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency.

LEGAL REASONING:
While as a rule of petition for cetiorari which is interposed to dispute the
validity of an order or decision that may be rendered by an administrative
official in pursuance of the powers and duties with which he is invested
cannot be entertained if the party in interest fails to avail of the
administrative remedies officials are the most competent to pass upon
matters that exclusively come within their jurisdiction, such rule may be
relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage
which cannot otherwise be prevented except by taking the opportune
appropriate court action.

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The rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and

injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court
action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the
matter.

APPLICATION ON THE CASE:

Because of the conflict existing between petitioner and respondent

company regarding a portion of the logging area awarded to them, as well
as the use of the logging road constructed by the company, the case was
taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for his final
resolution, who in the meantime directed petitioner "to refrain from
entering and operating within the contested area until the said case shall
have been finally decided," but before such resolution could come De Lara
disregarded the directive and continued operating within the contested
area to the irreparable damage and injury of the company.

This act of defiance prompted the company to take the needed

appropriate action. In the circumstances, we find the action taken by
respondent court proper and justified even if no final decision has as yet
been rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Respondent court did nothing but to maintain and put into effect the
directive issued by said official. Indeed, before the protest lodged by the
company could be decided regarding the conflicting interests it is best that
the status quo be maintained as was done by respondent court. Therefore
there is no abuse of discretion by the respondent court.

III.

There are no grounds for the motion to dismiss the writ of

preliminary injunction due to the fact that P&B Enterprises Co., Inc.
obtained prejudice and irreparable injury.

There are no grounds for the dismissal of the issued writ of preliminary
injunction because in the first place, the performance of land improvements
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was made on the forest concession area granted upon P&B Enterprises Co.,
Inc. in its license. It clearly shows that it was De Lara, Jr. who made fault in
this case for he was the one who intercepted the concession area not his.
The portion of the intercepted concession area belongs to P&B Enterprises
Co., Inc. as stated in its granted license by Bureau of Forestry. As stated in
the 1961 granted license to respondent P&B Enterprises Co., Inc.

PRAYER

In light of the questions presented, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, legal
counsels of Gaudencio Cloribel et.al respectfully requests this court to adjudge and
declare that:

1. The respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction.
2. The respondent company has exhausted all administrative methods before
appealing to the respondent court.

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On behalf of Gaudencio Cloribel et al,

Agents for the Respondent.

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