9/11 Personal Privacy

Prepared by: Kate Brentzel Index: Type bundle index here

Date Prepared: May 20, 2003 DOC Number: 886033
Reviewed by: Type reviewer name here DOC Library: Type library name here
Job Code:320172

Record of Interview
Title Interview with Tom Ruocco on visa revocation cables
Purpose To discuss the internal distribution of visa revocation cables
within FBI
Contact Method \e
Contact Place
Contact Date May 16, 2003
Participants FBI: Tom Ruocco, Acting Special Assistant to Steve McCraw,
Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence
GAO: Kate Brentzel
Comments/Remarks:
I spoke with Tom Ruocco to establish which FBI unit receives State's revocation cables and
whether that unit then distributes the cables to other units. We had been trying to find an FBI
official with this type of information since early March but had not found someone knowledgeable
about this until we spoke to Tom Ruocco. Mr. Ruocco's boss, Steve McCraw, asked him to look
into cable distribution for us. Mr. Ruocco did some investigating to find out where these cables go
in the FBI and passed along the following information to me.
'• !
Mr. Ruocco said that all cables that are addressed to the FBI go to the FBI's main communication 1 •
center first in electronic format. Cables that are not secret or top secret (revocation cables are ! '
unclassified) become part of the Automated Case Support (ACS) database. A paper copy of the
cable goes to the country desk unit relevant to the cable (for example, if a Saudi man's visa is
revoked, then the Saudi Arabia country desk would receive this cable). He said that some country
desk units were located within the Counterterrorism Division. The unit that analyzes Saudi Arabia,
for example, is in Counterterrorism.

I had sent Mr. Ruocco a spreadsheet with the names of the 240 individuals whose visas were
revoked, along with all of their relevant biographic data. I highlighted the individuals who
appeared to still be in the United States so that Mr. Ruocco could look into these cases first. He
said that he only had time to look into six cases but in all of these six cases he could verify that the ,
revocation cable had been logged into ACS. He did not confirm whether hard copies of the cables ;
were received in relevant country desks. /•

For example, Mr. Ruocco said that he had entered the data that I had given him for #3 on our
spreadsheet (see data binder D-2) into ACS. He said that the cable, which was dated July 23, 2002,
was entered into ACS on July 23, 2002. In ACS he saw a copy of the whole revocation cable
document. He said that he also saw another entry in ACS on July 27, 2002 from the Legal Attache
in Riyadh stating that Legal Attache had contacted the individual's family in Riyadh and that the
family confirmed that the individual was in the United State, studying.

In the case of #10, the cable was dated July 22,2002 and was entered into ACS on July 22, 2002. Mr.
Ruocco saw another entry on Sept. 30, 2002 from the Legal Attache at the post saying that he had
contacted the individual's family and that they said the individual was in the United States.

Pagel Record of Interview

Prepared by: Kate Brentzel Index: Type bundle index here
Date Prepared: May 20, 2003 DOC Number: 886033
Reviewed by: Type reviewer name here DOC Library: Type library name here
Job Code:320172

In the case of #14, the cable was dated July 23, 2002 and entered in ACS on July 23, 2002. There
was also an entry from the Legal Attache on August 3, 2002 saying that he was checking into the
case and another entry from the Legal Attache on Oct. 21, 2002 saying that the individual's family
had been contacted and they said he was in the United States, studying.

In the case of #31, the revocation cable was dated August 1, 2002 and entered into ACS on August
3, 2002.

In the case of #34, the cable was dated July 23, 2002 and entered into ACS on July 23, 2002. Another
entry from the Legal Attache on August 8, 2002 said that the family had been contacted on July 24,
2002.

Mr. Ruocco said that the cables must reach the Legal Attaches overseas because they are
responding to the cables and they are responding quickly.

Mr. Ruocco said that all FBI units use the ACS database; it is the bureau's main database to tell
investigators if there is a case open on individuals. I asked Mr. Ruocco if the presence of these
cables in ACS would instigate action by investigators here in the United States. He said that there
would have to be a "lead" set in order for investigators in various units around the United States to
take action. He said that he didn't see any "leads" in the six cases he looked into, although he only
searched ACS for teletype (cable) responses, not for other types of information on the individuals.

Mr. Ruocco said that since the cables do not specifically say "terrorism" that he thought it was less
likely that the cables would set off alarms if received by FBI units. (Auditor's note: the cables say
that the visas are revoked for 212a3 or 212a3b, the sections of the INA which stipulate that the
person is a national security or terrorist risk, but FBI analysts would have to know their
immigration law to know this).

Mr. Ruocco said that BICE (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) would take the
lead on revocation cases. He said he thought that even if an investigative unit saw the visa
revocation cable in ACS, that the unit would probably not do anything unless there was already a
case open on this person. He said that he would have to look through case files to see if there were
any open investigations on any of the individuals on our list. Mr. Ruocco gave the list to the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to see if the task force had all 240 names in their
Consolidated Tracking List. He said that the task force had hits for at least 86 names. 86 were in
their TIPOFF list (which they get from State) and 5 in VGTOF (an FBI list). He said that the 5 in
VGTOF may also be in TIPOFF, so we cannot assume that the number is 91 total. Mr. Ruocco said
that this meant that the FTTTF already knew about 86 of these individuals. He was not able to
confirm whether the FTTTF knew that the individuals' visas were revoked.

Mr. Ruocco said that FTTTF is only a tracking team - it supports investigators by compiling
information and alerting investigators if necessary. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTTF) are the
units with the actual investigators.

Page 2 Record of Interview