Prepared by: J.

McCloskey Index: State-*-f2

Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOC Number: 888582
Job Code:320172

Record of Interview
Title State Department Exit Conference
Purpose To provide the preliminary findings for our review of the visa
revocation process. During this discussion State Department
officials provided additional information on policies and
procedures for the revocation process.
Contact Method In person
Contact Place State Department, Office of Visa Services
Contact Date May 7, 2003
Participants State/Bureau of Consular Affairs
Ms. Catherine Barry, Managing Director, Office of Visa
Services
Mr. Steve Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations
and Advisory Assistance
Mr. Richard Beer, Chief, Coordination Division, Office of
Legislation, Regulations, and Advisory Assistance
GAO
Mr. Jess Ford, Director, IAT
Ms. Kate Brentzel, Analyst, IAT
Ms. Mary Moutsos, Attorney, IAT
Ms. Judy McCloskey, Senior Analyst, IAT
Comments/Remarks:

• According to Ms. Barry and Mr. Fischel, the U.S. government has no overall written policy on
how agencies should use visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool. However, Ms. Barry and
Mr. Fischel told us they envision the revocation process as taking place before the visa holder
-—|
enters the country. This would allow State and other agencies more time to investigate and
determine whether a suspected terrorist is in fact ineligible for a visa on terrorism grounds
before allowing the visa holder to enter. As these officials explained, since the September 11
attacks, State's consular affairs bureau has been receiving a large volume of information on
suspected terrorists from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, overseas
posts, and other units within State, particularly Diplomatic Security. The department reviews
this information to determine if a suspected terrorist has a U.S. visa. If the identifying
information is incomplete, as is often the case, State may have difficulty in determining
whether a visa holder with the same or a similar name as a suspected terrorist is in fact the
I
suspected terrorist. It may also lack sufficient proof of a specific act that would render the i

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Prepared by: J. McCloskey Index: State 1.12
Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOC Number: 888582
Job Code: 320172

suspected terrorist ineligible for a visa, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). In these cases, State would revoke the person's visa under the Secretary of State's
discretionary authority, requiring the person to reapply for a visa if he or she still intended to !

visit the United States. State would then use the visa issuance process to obtain additional
biographic and other data on the visa applicant and make a determination on the person's /
eligibility. —1

• Mr. Fischel and Ms. Barry further explained that under the INA, the Secretary of State has
discretionary authority to revoke any visa that a consular officer has issued, including cases in'
which he believes that the visa holder may be ineligible for a visa under the INA's terrorism n/'^\' '
provision. They said that all 240 isa revocations in our review were revoked under the
Secretary of State's discretionary authority. All department revocations are prudential
revocations, i.e., they are done under the Secretary of State's authority. Thus, the wording in
the revocation cables that they are "prudential revocations" means only that they are done j
under that authority.

Ms. Barry said that there are no written procedures to guide the interagency process for
revoking visas on terrorism or other grounds. These officials explained that prior to
September 11, 2001, State revoked only a small number of visas for terrorism-related reasons.
This relatively small number resulted in State and INS operating in an informal manner when
Kf/
cooperating on denying admission to revoked visa holders at ports of entry. State officials said
that they and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had agreed to informal notification procedures
between the two agencies and crafted language for the visa revocation certificates several
years ago; however, they did not develop formal written procedures. Ms. Barry said that State
does not have any statistics on the number of pre-September 11 visas that were revoked on
terrorism grounds; the Visa Office does not these figures in its annual report.

Accordng to Mr. Fischel, State and DOJ lawyers carefully crafted the language of the visa
revocation certificates so that the revocations for people in the United States would only take
effect when they left the country. This language ensures that there will be no judicial review of
the Secretary of State's revocation decisions. Mr. Fischel said that revoking a visa while a

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, , / ! . , - • n • ,•; '' -^ • -- ^ •' y
L-k'l JCA/-M U-'~' -'
 Prepared by: J. McCloskey Index: State 1.12
Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOC Number: 888582
Job Code: 320172

person is here would be irrelevant, since the revocation would not provide any additional
weapons for the U.S. government while the visa holders are still in the country.

• According to Ms. Barry and Mr. Fischel, the policies and procedures contained in the Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM) apply only to situations when a consular officer revokes a visa and
explain under what conditions a consular officer may do so. The FAM instructs consular
officers to obtain a security advisory opinion from the department before determining that a
visa holder is ineligible for a visa on terrorism grounds. In practice this means that department
/) officials at headquarters acting under the authority of the Secretary of State—not the consular
v officers at overseas posts—revoke visas based on terrorism concerns. Because the FAM is
written for consular officers overseas, it does not include the standard operating procedures
that the Department uses in revoking visas. Mr. Beer and Ms. Barry said that the department
follows specific, but unwritten, operating procedures when revoking visas . They said that
once the Deputy Assistant Secretary signs a revocation certificate, the department is supposed
to take the following actions, as soon after the visa is revoked as possible:
(1) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the revocation certificate so that the unit
can enter the individual into its watch list, IBIS. State considers the faxed revocation
certificate to be the primary notification method for the INS Lookout Unit. State officials
told us that they try to send notification to the Lookout Unit the same day the revocation
certificate is signed. If a revocation is time sensitive, State will call the Lookout Unit as
well.
(2) notify consular officers at all overseas post that the individual is a suspected terrorist by
entering a lookout on the person into State's watch list, CLASS. This would alert the
consular officers that they need to ask for a security advisory opinion before issuing a new
visa to the person whose visa had been revoked.
(3) notify the issuing post via cable so that the post can attempt to contact the individual to
physically cancel his visa. Information-only copies of these cables are also sent to INS's
and FBI's main communication centers. State relies on INS and FBI internal distribution I

mechanisms to ensure that these cables are routed to appropriate units within the agencies.-'
State considers the cable was an additional backup method. Ms. Barry said that the cables

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Prepared by: J. McCloskey Index: State 1.12
Date Prepared: 5/23/03 DOC Number: 888582
Job Code:320172

are the only method State uses to inform the FBI of the revocation. State does not
coordinate its visa revocations with the FBI.

• Ms. Barry and Mr. Beer said they did not have fax transmission receipts to confirm that
sent revocation certificates for each of the 240 cases we reviewed, although they,- said this
•I !
would become a standard operating procedure for the Visa Office in the future/they also
said the State Visa Office did not keep a central log of visas it revoked based on terrorism
concerns, nor did it monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies.

All three officials attributed the breakdowns in the interagency and interagency notification
process to personnel changes in the INS Lookout Unit and FBI's reorganization and
expansion of its counterterrorism efforts.

Mr. Beer was not aware that the VRVK code was not being entered into CLASS. He said he
would check into it.

Page 4 Record of Interview