AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No.

2 June 2001

Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism

JOHN P. MCCORMICK Yale University
his essaydemonstrates thatNiccolk Machiavelli'spoliticalthoughtaddressesthe deficienciesof two
oppositepoles of contemporary democratictheory:As do formal or minimalistapproaches,he
specifies electoral mechanismsfor elite control; and similar to substantiveor civic culture
approaches,he encouragesmoredirectand robustmodesof popularparticipation.On thesegrounds,I cull
from Machiavelli'sDiscoursesa theoryof democracyin whichthepopulaceselectsthe eliteswho willhold
officebutalso constantlypatrolsthemthroughextraelectoral institutionsandpractices,suchas the tribunes
of thepeople,publicaccusations,and popularappeals.Machiavelliadds to theseinstitutional featuresof
populargovernmentan importantculturaldimension:Thepeople shoulddespiseand mistrustelites,and
they should activelyconfrontthe injusticethat elite governinginevitablyentails.Finally,I explorethe
ramificationsof this theoryfor debatesovereliteaccountabilityin contemporarydemocratictheory.

he controlof elitesbythegeneralpopulaceis an elections are not enough.Machiavelliaddsprocedures

overlooked aspect of Niccol6 Machiavelli's for the popularindictmentof officials,popularjudg-
([1531] 1997) greatest work, The Discourses.' ment on many kinds of legal cases, and, generally,
Even scholarswho understandMachiavellias an advo- interpretsthe social and politicalinstitutionsof repub-
cate of popular government-as a "republican"-- lican Rome in more direct ratherthan representative
largely confine popular control in his theory to the ways.But this does not situateMachiavellineatlyin the
selection of magistratesfrom among elite candidates. camp of substantiveor participatorydemocracytoday.
This essay shows that Machiavelli theorized more Contemporarydemocratswho focus on civic culture
extensive,constant,and, especially,animatedmodesby renderthe minimalistmodel more substantiveby pro-
which the people might control elites. To this extent, moting politicalparticipationcharacterizedby civility,
his theorycombinesthe strengthsof two oppositepoles trustworthiness,deliberation,and reciprocity.Yet I
of contemporarydemocratictheory:As do formal or show that Machiavelli'spreferredsociopoliticalmilieu
minimalist approaches (e.g., Dahl 1971; Przeworski is one of intensesocioeconomicanimosityandpolitical
1991; Schumpeter 1942), he specifies and justifies contestationbetween elites and the people. According
electoral mechanismsfor elite control;and similarto to Machiavelli,elites cannotbe made responsiveto or
recent civic cultureand participatoryapproaches(e.g., held accountable by the people through elections
Gutmannand Thompson 1996; Putnam2000; Sandel alone;auxiliarygovernmentalinstitutionsthatfacilitate
1996),he encouragesmore directand robustmodes of direct political action and an antagonisticpolitical
popular engagementwith politics. What is more im- cultureare requiredas well.
portant,by combiningthe strengthsof each approach In the firstsectionof thisessayI layout Machiavelli's
Machiavelliovercomestheir respectiveweaknesses. understandingof the elite-populacerelationshipin the
In minimalisttheories of populargovernmentperi- Romanrepublicandevaluatehis descriptionof Roman
odic elections are the primary and often exclusive political institutions.I then sketch specific aspects of
methods for assessing the performanceof elites and that relationshipand the institutionsthat correspond
rewardingor punishingthem accordingly.But because with, and may perhapsfurtherinform,contemporary
Machiavelliarguesthat elites are motivatedby a will to democratictheory, in particularthe way that the Ro-
dominate,a positionthat I suggestcontemporarydem- man plebs renderedthe senate and nobilityresponsive
ocratictheoryshould adopt as fact or heuristicdevice, and accountable.Next, I considerMachiavelli'sassess-
ment of the drawbacksinherentin this model:Did the
John P. McCormickis AssistantProfessorof PoliticalScience,Yale people become too aggressive in their attempt to
University, P.O. Box 208301, New Haven, CT 06520-8301 control elites, such that they broughtabout Caesarism
(john.mccormick@yale.edu). and ultimatelythe end of the republic?Finally,I offer
This article was presented as a paper to the Departmentof some preliminaryconclusionson the place of Machia-
Politics, New York University,April 11, 2000; the Contemporary vellian
CivilizationsProgram,ColumbiaUniversity,October18, 2000;and republicanismin the evolutionof populargov-
the Toronto chapterof the Conferencefor the Studyof Political ernment,its advantagesand disadvantagesrelativeto
Thought,January26, 2001. For suggestionsand criticisms,I thank minimalistand substantiveconceptionsof democracy,
George Downs, StathisKalyvas,Alkis Kontos,David Mayhew,Gia and its potential as a resource for contemporaryde-
Pascarelli,JenniferPitts, Melissa Schwartzberg,Ian Shapiro,Ste-
phen Skowronek,Rogers Smith,Steven B. Smith,Nadia Urbinati, mocracy.
Anthony Valerio, Bruce Western, Leonard Wantchekon,James
Zetzel, and the editorand three anonymousreviewersat theAPSR.
MicheleKennedyprovidedinvaluableresearchassistanceand Har- ELITES,AND THE ROMAN
MACHIAVELLI,
riett Posnerindispensableproductionguidance. REPUBLICANMODEL
1 This work is henceforthcited with book and chapterreferences
withinparenthesesin the body of the text. Any emendationsto the Machiavelliis notorious for advisinghow to manipu-
cited translationare basedon the versionof the Discorsiin Machia- late the people. Indeed, many consider this the main
velli 1997. point of his most famous work, The Prince. But evi-

297
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
dence suggeststhat he consideredhis most important
andmostoriginalpiece of adviceto be somethingquite
different:how to controlelites. Readersof ThePrince
know that Machiavelliadvises princes to base their
power on the people ratherthan the elite, the nobles,
the "great"(grandi)([1532] 1998, Book IX). He cau-
tions against employingthe elite as a base of power
because they perceive a prince as merely one among
themselves.Consequently,theywill disposeof himvery
readilyshouldhe displeasethem.The people, however,
will supportthe princeas long as he protectsthemfrom
the elite. Theywant only not to be oppressed,whereas
elites have an appetite to dominate, to oppress, an
appetitethatis insatiable.The people'sdesirenot to be
dominatedcan be satisfied.Thus,a princeshouldbuild
his state on those whose demandshe can meet.2
Machiavelligives the same advicein TheDiscourses
but is morespecificabouthow a princeshouldtreatthe
elite and secure himselfwith the people. Machiavelli
provides the ancient Greek example of Clearchus
(1.16):He came to powerthroughthe influenceof the
nobles, who hoped he could serve their desire to
oppress the people. But once secure, Clearchus
switchedhis allegianceto the people and disposedof
the nobles by hackingthem all to pieces. This imagery
is used repeatedlyand seems to be Machiavelli'sfavor-
ite recourseagainstelites. In at least two other places,
in both ThePrinceand TheDiscourses,he recountswith
approvalhow a group of elites is explicitlyhacked to
pieces ([1532] 1998, XIII) or implies that they should
have been (1.27).If a groupof so-callednobles or best
do not live up to that name, they need to be un-
membered,dis-membered,fromthat association.Since
the elite are so consumed with distinguishingthem-
selves from "the multitude,"Machiavellisuggeststhat
when they do not justifysucha distinctiontheymustbe
rendered multitudinous-physically.The word with
which Machiavellirefers to the nobles,grandi,means
the great or, literally,the big. When they become too
big for themselves,they need to be cut down to size--
literally.This gives us an idea of Machiavelli'sgeneral
attitude toward elites. He resents, despises, and dis-
truststhem.3
2 There are at least two persuasive interpretations of these desires,
appetites, demands, or what Machiavelli calls humors (umoni). Parel
(1992) interprets them in terms of the effect of cosmological forces
on physiological or natural phenomena, and Coby (1999) views them
in terms of class motivations. The two interpretations are not
necessarily incompatible: Parel privileges the supposed cosmological
origins of the appetites that separate segments of society, whereas
Coby privileges the actual effects of these appetites, namely, inequal-
ities of wealth and political power. Because I am interested in
applying Machiavelli's theory to contemporary debates in democratic
theory, I follow Coby in focusing on the political ramifications of the
class divisions rather than their origins, which may be more firmly
bound to Machiavelli's context. Consult Parel (2000) for the draw-
backs inherent in ignoring the relationship of Machiavelli's theory to
Renaissance astrophysics or cosmology.
3This interpretation of Machiavelli's account of Clearchus and
attitude toward elites is justified when we consider how much
Machiavelli resented his inferior status in the Florentine republic
and, of course, his imprisonment and torture under the Medici
oligarchy. Although he was eligible to hold office in the republic that
he served faithfully in ministerial, diplomatic, and military capacities
298
June 2001
Nevertheless,the vivid exampleabove is only a last
resortfor renderingelites accountablein Machiavelli's
theory.Muchas Machiavellimay delightin the fate of
suchelites, the causesand consequencesof this kindof
outcome are preciselywhat need to be avoided.After
all, the principalactor in this case is a prince,and the
incident concerns elites who have become irredeem-
ablycorrupt.How shouldelites be controlled,or made
accountable,in a republic?What is their place in a
regime in which their power is both sharedwith and
perhaps better responsive to the general populace?
How should elites be treated when they have yet to
become so corrupt?Indeed, a unitary-executiveactor
who subjugatesor eliminatesthe nobilityin the name
of the people spells the failureand abolitionof repub-
lican politics. As an outcome it is advantageousfor
neither the nobilitynor the people, and it is reminis-
cent of the very developmentthat destroyedthe Ro-
man republic: Caesarism.In Machiavelli'sanalysis,
how did the Roman republic manage to distribute
powerbetweenthe people and elites in a mannerthat,
in particular,controlledthe latter?And how did the
republic do so while staving off the emergence of
Caesarismfor as long as it did?
PopularPrimacyand Machiavelli'sMethods
Machiavelli'sanalysisof Rome is both sociologicaland
institutional.As such,it promptsus to considerthat an
adequateanalysisof populargovernmentmustbe both.
Whendiscussingsocialclassin TheDiscourses,Machia-
velli asserts that the nobility ought to hold a dimin-
ished, not preeminent,role in a republic(1.5).Ancient
wisdom recommendedthat the nobles be given the
upperhand in a republicor mixedregime,a regimein
whichpower is sharedbetween aristocraticand popu-
lar elements(see Nippel 1980).Aristotle(1997, 190-1,
94) may have longed for a regimewith a middlestrata
so wide thatone couldnot discernthe line betweenrich
and poor, noble and popular,but absentthat develop-
ment,he assignsthe lion'sshareof powerto aristocrats
in his best regimeorpoliteia(1997,Book IV). For most
observers, Machiavelliincluded, Sparta and Venice
were the ancientand modernparadigmsof this kindof
noble-dominatedrepublicanarrangement.4
But MachiavellipromotesRome as a modelbecause
he understandsit to be a popularlydominatedrepublic.
Unlikeotherrepublics,Rome assigneda specialrole to
the general populace:"the guardiansof liberty"(1.5).
for thirteen years, he was of insufficiently high birth or great wealth
to vote on, or stand for, the very best offices in the regime. Consult
the excellent political biography by Viroli (2000). As can be seen
from Machiavelli's reports to his supposed superiors in the republi-
can government, he often found it difficult to contain his contempt
for their arrogance and incompetence. As he writes in a letter from
1506: "Everyone knows that anyone who speaks of empire, kingdom,
principate, [or] republic-anyone who speaks of men who command,
beginning at the top and going all the way down to the leader of a
gang-speaks of justice and arms. You, as regards justice, have very
little, and of arms, none at all." Cited in Najemy 1990, 117.
4 Machiavelli's
relationship to the republican tradition both generally
and in the Renaissance specifically continues to be a puzzling issue.
See Viroli 1990, Nederman 2000, and Rahe 2000.
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
They are the ultimatearbiterson the freedom of the
regime.Accordingto Machiavelli,the people deserve
this positionsimplybecausethey are more trustworthy
than the nobility or the great. In accord with the
distinctionbetween elite and popularappetites men-
tioned above, the people will not use such a power to
dominate,but only to defend themselvesfrom domi-
nation(1.5;1.46).Moreover,since they are less capable
of usurpingthe libertyof a republicthan the nobles,
they will be more watchfulof those who are apt to do
so.
I addressbelow more specificallyMachiavelli'sun-
derstandingof how the people exercisedthe guardian-
ship of libertyin Rome, namely,the mannerin which
they containednoble ambition.It mustbe emphasized
here, however,that his view is ratherdifferentfromthe
evaluationsrendered in the very accountsof Roman
historythatwere Machiavelli'ssources,as well as from
the findingsof most contemporaryhistoricalresearch.
Polybius (1979, 314-5) emphasizes an equilibrium
among social and politicalforces in Rome; depending
on how you look at it, any of the social groups or
political institutions in Rome could be considered
dominant.Livy'saccount(1971, 1987)suggeststhat the
Roman senate had the ultimate say, that they were
more likely to manipulatethe people into doing what
the nobilitywantedthan the people were able to affect
the behaviorof the nobility.Moreover,historicalre-
searchemphasizesthe oligarchicand timocraticquality
of the Romanrepublic,the dominanceof the olderand
better propertied families (Jolowicz 1967; Nicolet
1980).
Machiavelliwas intimatelyfamiliarwith the ancient
accountsand certainlycould have anticipatedcontem-
porary assessmentsof power relations in Rome. In
light of this, The Discoursesshould be read as some-
thingother than straightforward historical-institutional
analysis.Rather,it is a combinationof historicalanal-
ysis of what was, in Machiavelli'sestimation,the best
republicin empiricalreality,on the one hand, and a
theoreticalconsiderationon what arrangementsmight
improve this particularmodel, on the other. As a
mergerof is (or was) and ought, Machiavelli'srepub-
licanismshouldnot be read as a mere recapitulationof
classical sources, or sloppy history, or an entirely
metaphoricalexercise. Defying a more recent social
scientific imperative to distinguish descriptive from
normative aspects of analysis-an imperativewhose
originis often creditedto Machiavelli-TheDiscourses
intertwinesthe two in a generallysuggestivebut often
analyticallyfrustratingmanner.5
5 Coby (1999) impressively details Machiavelli's faithfulness to Ro-
man history in The Discourses, whereas Sullivan (1996) treats the
discrepancies in great detail and with considerable care. I do not
follow Sullivan, who herself follows Strauss (1958), in attributing
these differences almost exclusively to Machiavelli's purported strat-
egy of promoting grand-scale epochal change, that is, the invention
of "modernity." I interpret Machiavelli to be engaged in "applied"
political philosophy addressed at more mundane practical problems,
such as control of elites.
Vol. 95, No. 2
PopularDocilityor Ferocity?
Machiavelliwantsto showthat the people are capable
of livelyandactivedefense of theirliberty,even if their
motivations are fundamentallypassive or negative:
Theywantonlynot to be dominated.But thispassiveor
negative dispositioncorrespondsratherwell with the
reactiverole that classicalauthors(Polybius1979,314)
and contemporaryhistorians(Nicolet 1980, 318, 320,
387, 393) ascribeto popularparticipationin the Ro-
man politicalprocess.Moreover,the people'spowerto
ratify policy and select officials but not initiate or
formulatepolicy also conformswell with arbitration
theories of popular government (Manin 1997, 47;
Wantchekonand Simon 1999). But Machiavelliwants
to go farther.Consequently,the passive/reactiveversus
active/spiritedqualityof the peoplebecomessomewhat
problematicin his accountof Rome'sdevelopmentas a
republicearly in TheDiscourses.How can the people
be activeguardiansof republicanlibertybut not exhibit
the aggressivelydominatingappetitethat is supposedly
the exclusivedispositionof the nobles?
In Machiavelli'saccount, the people had to earn
their place of prominence in the Roman republic.
Neither political founders nor political philosophers
had ever grantedthe generalpopulacesucha place. By
"people"Machiavelligenerallymeansthe plebs,thatis,
Romancitizenswhowere not of the patricianclass,and
excludingsuch noncitizensas women, slaves,and resi-
dent aliens. The interactionof chance and the plebs'
own actions-fortune and virtue, one might say-
gained the people their prominent position in the
republic.Rome was foundedas a monarchyby Romu-
lus and the early kings (1.1-2), and it only developed
into a republicthroughthe accidentsthatresultedfrom
the disunionof the plebs and the senate, the people
and the nobles (see McCormick1993). Machiavelli
recounts how together the plebs and the senate ex-
pelled the kings,but when the senate began to abuse
the plebs, the people institutedthe tribunesto act in
their interest. Machiavellidoes not acknowledgethat
the tribuneswere likely selected from the nobles as
well as the plebeians.
The tribunesfunctionedas intermediariesbetween
the plebs and the senate and, most important for
Machiavelli,they held backthe insolenceof the nobles,
thuspreservingthe free life of the republic(1.3,III.11).
The creationof the tribunesis importantfor Machia-
velli institutionallyand historically.Unlike the general
populace in the Spartanor Venetian model, the Ro-
man people actuallyparticipatedin the emergenceand
developmentof a mixedregimeby activelyhelpingto
eliminatethe monarchyand create the tribunate(1.6).
They were not assignedtheir positionsby the elites or
circumstances,before or after the fact. Popularpartic-
ipation in the developmentof the republicitself en-
sured that the nobles did not have an unhealthy
predominanceof power in Rome.
Livy'saccountsof how the tribuneswere createdand
later restored after suspension give credence to the
passive,negative,or reactivequalityof popularbehav-
ior that Machiavelliinitiallycontrastswith aggressive
299
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
proactive noble behavior. Machiavellidiscusses only
the second reinstatementof the tribunes(1.40, 1.44),
perhapsbecause the first is consideredin Livymerely
an allegoricalforeshadowingof the second. But both
incidentsbear mentioningsince they confirmMachia-
velli's early distinctionbetween the motivationsand
behaviorsof the nobles and the people. In 494 BCE,
after sufferingthe abuse of the nobles upon the expul-
sion of the kings, the plebs reportedlyleft Rome en
masse (Livy 1971, 141-2). The nobles, fearingfor the
defense of the city, called them back and agreed to
establishthe tribunes.In 450, towardthe conclusionof
the crisisinvolvingthe Ten, discussedbelow, the plebs
again repairedto the outskirtsand demandedreinsti-
tutionof the tribunes(pp. 240-2). On the basisof these
examples,we might conclude that, when threatened,
the people did not lash out or seek to dominatethose
who threatenedthem.Rather,they soughtthe best way
of avoidingdomination-they fled or secededfromthe
city.
In this spirit,the powersof the tribunes,createdand
restored as a result of these episodes, were, in many
ways,reactiveor preemptiveratherthan constructive.
The tribunescould veto most officialacts throughthe
intercessio;invoke the auxilium, a form of habeas
corpus,on behalfof individualplebs;and could not be
touched physically,since their bodily integrity was
declaredinviolable(sacrosanctitas). All these are pro-
tectionsagainst,or recoursefrom,aggressiveactionor
encroachmenton the part of the nobilityor the mag-
istrates.6Machiavellicertainlyassumesfamiliaritywith
these facts on the part of his readers.In particular,he
uses the second episode of "secession"to emphasize
the distinctivecharacterof the Romanpeople. But this
charactertransformsfromone of initialpassivityto one
of indignantaggressiononce the people have suffered
abuse by the nobilityor other elites.
From the "sacredmount"to which they retiredthe
plebs demandedof the senate not only the restoration
of the tribunesbut also the executionof those who had
offended them (1.44). Machiavellirestates the assess-
ment of the plebs conveyedby observersat the time:
The plebs resorted to cruelty in response to cruelty
(1.44). Moreover, they freely expressed their violent
intentions when threatened, rather than keep them
hidden (1.44). But the plebs were advisedby friendly
nobles to conceal their intentions until these were
more readily achievable.Thus, the episode confirms
that popularferocity,in contrastto noble aggressive-
ness, is reluctantor provoked.Moreover,it also dem-
onstratesthat the plebs are guileless:They are incapa-
ble of the deception and treachery advised and
practicedby the nobility.We will observebelow how
Machiavellilauds increasinglyaggressive manifesta-
6
I rely upon Jolowicz (1967) for legal and institutional details of the
Roman republic not laid out explicitly in Polybius, Livy, or Machia-
velli (1967, 52-3). There is considerable scholarly dispute among
historians regarding these facts, and valuable details have simply
been lost to history. Elster (1999, 253, n. 1) discusses the dilemmas of
analyzing the accountability institutions of Athenian democracy
given the lack of clarity over specifics.
300
June 2001
tions of the people's "negative"desire not to be
dominated.
The RomanConstitution
Like Polybius,Machiavelliidentifiesthe maturationof
the Romanrepublicwith the establishmentof its three
principalparts:a tamedprincelypowerin the consuls,
a somewhatchastisedaristocraticpowerin the senate,
and a virtuouspopularpower in the tribunes.Unlike
classicalsources,however,Machiavelliunderstandsthe
most beneficialresult of Rome's republicanstructure
primarilyin terms of the containmentof noble ambi-
tion (1.5). But, since Machiavelliis not specificabout
the functioning of these Roman institutions, some
explanationmay be necessary.The two consulswere
elected annuallyby noble-dominatedassembliesand
initiallycould only be membersof the nobility.The
consuls were executive magistrateschargedwith ad-
ministrativeandmilitarydutiesandmightbe swayedby
either noble or popular influence. The possibilityof
popular leverage against the consuls increasedwhen
the prohibitionon class intermarriagewas lifted (445
BCE) and when plebs were finallypermittedto serve as
consuls(300BCE).
The senate functioned as the more or less direct
institutionalexpressionof the nobility.It was ostensibly
just an advisorybody,althoughit had substantialfiscal
control. Senatorial influence on the election of the
consuls,plus the prospectof formerconsulsjoiningthe
ranks of the senate, meant that this body held great
sway over the magistrates.The two (and eventually
more) tribuneswere chargedwith popularadvocacy.
They reflected popular preferences but not always
directly;Machiavellinotes how theyoften attemptedto
act in the interestof the populaceagainstthe people's
immediatelyexpressedwishes. Thus, even though the
tribuneswere not alwaysdirectlyor immediatelyre-
sponsive to the people's wishes, in delegative terms
theywere largely"representative" of them.As Machia-
velli asserts, the most importantfunction of the tri-
buneswas to keep noble elites accountable.As bearers
of the veto, and chief agents of accusations,the tri-
bunes had the means to block proposalsand sanction
the actionsof consulsor senators.Unlikelaterversions
of republicanism,or more specificallythe contract-
legitimatedarrangementsof liberal democracies,the
Romans also allowed for the participationof the
people in their collectivecapacitythroughthe council
of the plebs (conciliumplebis). All citizens minus the
noble class attended the council,where they decided
appealsand accusations,elected tribunes,and eventu-
ally made law. This formal assemblygrew in impor-
tance duringthe life of the republic.Togetherwith the
informallyconvened deliberating assemblies of the
plebs, the contiones,these councilspresumablyconsti-
tute what Machiavellimeansby "the people"(Adcock
1964;Millar1998;Taylor1990).
Rome did not rely extensivelyon one of the chief
mechanismsof elite control in contemporaryliberal
democracies:the incentiveof reelection(Manin,Prze-
worski,and Stokes 1999,34). The consulsandtribunes,
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
like most magistrates,were initiallyelected for one-
year,nonrenewableterms.Theycould standfor reelec-
tion only ten years after the end of their term. What
incentivesdid thisprovidefor magistratesto be respon-
sive to the people, and what account-renderingsanc-
tions could be invoked,if reelectionwas not an imme-
diate possibility?The publicaccusationandsubsequent
punishmentof officials,discussedbelow,were the most
powerful institutionalmeans in this regard.Through
the power of coertio the tribunes could attempt to
punish consuls for their conduct in office once their
termwas over,but thiswas only an ex post punishment.
In fact, the consulscould not be removedduringtheir
tenure; except by the dictator under the most dire
circumstances.Generally,the expectationthat former
magistrateswould become senatorsinduced a certain
degree of good behavior,but good behaviorpresum-
ably assessed accordingto the criteriaof the nobility.
The promise of being accepted by and the hope of
getting along with prospective colleagues must be
expected to incline a magistratetowardpleasing that
set of actors.This is no doubtwhy the Roman people
consideredthe consulsto be the agents of the nobility
and sought to have plebs elect and serve as consuls.
The case of the tribunesis more complicatedand
more importantfor Machiavelli.Since they were not
officiallymagistrates,there was no guaranteethat they
would enter the senate when their terms were over.
One might arguethat this tended to discouragecollu-
sion with the nobles. The opening of the senate to
former tribunes roughly coincided with the growing
power of the concilium,an assemblyin which former
tribuneslikely had considerableinfluence.Again, we
might speculate that these developmentsoffset each
other, such that the tribuneswere not coopted by the
nobility.In addition,reputationfor good behaviorin
officewas importantif formermagistrateswantedto be
consideredfor special positions in the future, such as
the dictatorship.In any case, in the generalabsenceof
eligibilityfor reelection,incentivesfor good behaviorin
the republicwere largelyinformal.We shouldnote that
Machiavelli never mentions the term limits of the
consulsor the tribuneswith respectto the inducement
of magistrateresponsiveness.Perhapsby omittingthis
fact Machiavelli leaves open the possibility of re-
electable and hence more controllableofficialsin the
ideal model that he derivesfrom Romanreality.After
all, reeligibilityfor officewas not ruled out necessarily
in the republicsof his own time.
When Machiavellidoes mention term lengths, he
condemnstheir indefiniteextension.In his estimation,
the prolongationof offices,such as the tribunateand
the consulate, contributedto the eventual demise of
the republic.He considersthe extensionof termsto be
one of the two causes of the downfallof the republic,
alongwith the crisesassociatedwith the agrarianlaws,
discussedbelow (111.24).The senate and the people
both wanted to prolong office tenure when they
thought a person particularlyadvantageousto their
own interestsheld the position. Generals-cum-tyrants
would later use extendedtenure to cultivatepersonal
loyalty from increasingly proletarianized soldiers.
Vol. 95, No. 2
Moreover,fewer and fewer people gained experience
in governing,which underminedthe overallcivic cul-
ture of the republic (111.24).These conflicts raise a
possible solution to the omissionof any discussionby
Machiavelliof eligibilityfor reelectionin the republic:
It was not so importantthat a particularindividual
retain an office, but it was desirable that another
memberof the same class take his place. This empha-
sizes the primacyof class over individualinterest in
republicanRome and in Machiavelli'stheory.
The Advantages of Social Discord
The combination of extensive participationby the
people in Roman politicallife, on the one hand, and
the nobility'sneed to dominate them, on the other,
necessarilyresultedin class discordand social tumult.
Accordingto Machiavelli,this tensionwas the principal
cause of Rome'sgreatness:Classrivalryresultedin the
active preservationof liberty at home and territorial
expansionabroad(1.6). To be sure, he concedes that
military expertise and good fortune contributed to
Rome's unprecedented,and still unsurpassed,success.
But Machiavelliattributes these factors to Rome's
order itself, which was "almostsavage"(1.4). He re-
countswith approvalhow the people protestedagainst
the senate, the senate closed down shops, the people
called for the exile of certainsenatorsand even evac-
uated the city. Machiavellinever fully concedes that
the senate initiated,and the consuls performed,most
of the day-to-daygoverningof the city, but he does
accentuatehow the people compelledthe creationof
favorablelaws throughpublic demonstrationsand by
withholdingmilitaryservice.7
Machiavelli argues that Venice and Sparta were
successfulnoble-dominatedand domesticallytranquil
republicsbecauseof theirsize (1.6).Smallrepublicscan
be sustained without the extensive inclusion of the
people; presumably,the proportionof nobles to com-
moners is so large as to keep the latter pacified.
Machiavellinotes how Venice formed its aristocracy
before a populace had developed there in any real
sense of the term.Thus,the people neverhad a handin
the formation of the regime as they did in Rome.
Sparta neutralizedclass conflict by maintainingeco-
nomic equalityand toleratingonly inequalityof status.
7 The ferociouspopulismof Machiavelli'srepublicanism is underes-
timated in most contemporaryinterpretations,especially in the
reigningCambridgeand Straussianschools. Skinner(1981, 65-6;
1990, 130, 136)acknowledgesthe originalityof Machiavelli'srepub-
licanismwith respectto social discord,but he interpretsthis discord
in termsof an "equilibrium"betweenequallydangerousmotivations,
those of the rich and those of the people. He normativelyequates
noble and popularmotivationsin a veryun-Machiavellian way, and
he rendersclosed and docile the open-ended,dynamic,and "wild"
qualityof social discorddescribedby Machiavelliin TheDiscourses.
Socioeconomicdiscordbringssalutaryresults,but these cannotbe
predictedandcertainlyare too volatileto be adequatelycapturedby
the notion of equilibrium.Skinneris much closer to the Polybian
view (Polybius1979,317-8) that Machiavelliis attemptingto radi-
calize.In a suggestiveinterpretationthat unfortunatelydefiesstan-
dards of falsifiability,Mansfield(1979, 45-8, 152-5) argues that
Machiavellidoes not reallymean what he says with respectto the
superiorpoliticalvirtueof the Romanpeople.
301
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
Moreover,the people there had no cause to defend
themselves actively against the nobles because the
kings took it upon themselvesto protectthem. Sparta
also inhibitedthe developmentof a diversepopulace
by excluding foreigners. Venice undermined social
dynamismby prohibitingpopularparticipationin mil-
itarymatters(1.6).
In total, Machiavelli'sendorsementof Rome over
Spartaor Venice does not disparagethe accomplish-
mentsof noble-dominatedrepublics.He acknowledges
thatthe lattermodelmayensureeven greaterlongevity
than that enjoyed by Rome (1.2). Sparta lasted 800
years as a republic;Rome lasted only 300. (Indeed,
Machiavellicould not have known that the Venetian
republicwould ultimatelylast twice as long as Rome.)
For Machiavelli,whateverlongevitymightbe gainedby
the noble-dominatedand sociallyharmoniousmodel is
lost in the substanceof politicalculture,the qualityof
public policy, and the extent of militaryexpansion.
These can only be achievedas a result of an antago-
nisticrelationshipbetweenelites andpopulace.Sparta,
no matter how successful,was not as great as Rome
becauseit did not have as richa civiclife, and it did not
acquire as much empire (1.6). The active civic life
enjoyedby Machiavelli's(perhapsromanticized)pop-
ularlybased Rome is not-contemporary neorepubli-
cans and communitarianstake note-a peaceful, bu-
colic, or tranquilarrangementof social interaction.8
Although Machiavelli never makes the distinction,
discordseems to be good for two reasons-as a pre-
ferredway of conductingpubliclife and as a means to
better policy and militarysuccess.
Machiavelli'semphasis on antagonismor discord
does not mean there was no place for politicalcoop-
erationin Rome. The tribunesand the senatecould act
together: For instance, Machiavelliadmires the way
they could compel the two consuls to agree when in
discord (1.50). He views intrainstitutionalconflict as
harmful, unlike cross-institutionaldiscord, which is
beneficial.He assertsthat one institutionshouldnever
possessthe sole authorityto performa functionin case
it should try to be obstructionist.There should always
be other means,perhapsmore arduous,of performing
a task, such as distributinghonors and rewards,or
creatinga dictator.Accordingto Machiavelli'saccount,
Rome practicednot onlywhatwouldcome to be called
a separationof powersbut also a rudimentaryform of
checks and balances(1.50) (Manin 1994).
The possibilityof institutionalcooperation appar-
ently motivatedby the commongood, as illustratedby
many accounts of positive interaction between the
people and the nobles discussedbelow, casts doubton
the sustainabilityof Machiavelli'sdistinctionbetween
the motivationsof the two classes. Machiavellidraws
the distinctionso sharplythat his subsequentexamples
8 I do not mean to imply that there is no emphasison conflict,
contestation,or "agonism"in contemporary, especiallypoststructur- vigilance over the nobles than might otherwise be
alist,critiquesof liberaldemocracy(see, e.g., Connolly1995;Honig
1993;Mouffe2000; Young 1990). While largelyunconcernedwith
control of elites, this literaturepromotes conflict over identity
"recognition"rather than economic "redistribution." For critical are good and bad nobles, or aristocrats and oli-
evaluations,see Barry2001;Benhabib1996;Fraser1997.
302
June 2001
raisea seriesof questions:Whatwouldmakeeliteswho
rise fromthe ranksof the plebs interactwiththosewho
come from the nobility?Or do plebs become "elites"
once they ascendto power,such that they develop an
appetiteto dominate,a will to power,that makesthem
part of the nobility?If this is so, then the distinction
betweenclasseswouldrevertto an argumentaboutthe
opportunityto rule, ratherthan a questionof disposi-
tion to rule. On this basis, Machiavelliwould be
suggestingthat the people are virtuousonlywhen they
are not ruling,or onlywhen they merelyaspireto rule,
not when they actuallyparticipatein governing.Once
they gain power,we might presumethat they behave
like nobles.
One wayto avoidor minimizesuchdifficultieswould
be to distinguishbetween socioeconomicand political
elites in the following way: Nobles who hold office
behavelike socioeconomicelites who seek to lord their
privilege over others and pursue a particularclass
agenda. Plebs might be conceived merely as political
elites who exercisethe powerof their officeto protect
their class and the overallgood of the regime.But, as
I suggestbelow, a distinctionbetween socioeconomic
and political elites is not sustainable:In republican
Rome, and in our own time as well, the formeralways
exert excessive influence on the latter. Therefore,
politicalelites need to be treatedwith the samedistrust
as socioeconomicones, no matterthe class fromwhich
they emerge.
Moreover, if Machiavelli'sinitial distinction is to
haveanyteeth, then thereshouldnot be anydisplaysof
good behavioron the part of the nobility.His distinc-
tion gives no accountof the appearanceof populace-
friendlynobles throughoutthe historyof the repub-
lic-not only those who would exploit the people in
Caesaristschemes,but also those who apparentlyhave
the people's best interestat heart.Why do the nobles
sometimesexhibita capacityfor moderationand com-
promise(as shownbelow)? Why do tribunesfaithfully
protect the people if they themselvesare membersof
the nobilityor once they become political elites? We
must concludethat some nobles are capableof resist-
ing their desire to dominatethe people.
Machiavellimay be exaggeratingrhetoricallywhen
distinguishingbetween the people and the nobles in a
way that even his own account cannot sustain. His
intention may be to obliterate any vestige of the
classical legacy that attributesgood motives to the
nobilitya priori.There is no categoricaldistinctionin
Machiavelli'swork between aristocratsand oligarchs,
such that the lattermaytake refugebehindthe illusion
of being the former. His approachseems to assume
that all elites are bad. By startingfrom there, Machia-
velli justifies three things:the populace'sunqualified
preeminenceover the nobilityin his model;the rather
nastyrelationshipbetweenthe two classes;and greater
required.If the nobles rise above Machiavelli'snega-
tive descriptionof them-that is, if it turnsout there
garchs-so be it. But republicanswill no longerbe put
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
at a disadvantageby claimson the partof "thebest"to
have better insightinto the commongood.
Whateverthe contradictionswithinhis "classanaly-
sis,"whichare still to be sortedout, Machiavelliclaims
that the ambitionof the nobilitywould have corrupted
the republiclong before the people themselveswere
corrupted, or long before the regime as a whole
corrupteditself. In otherwords,elites left to theirown
devices cannot manage themselves and thus are a
danger to themselves and their regime. Contraryto
conservative"wisdom"on the natureof the "masses,"
Machiavelliassertsthat it is not the people who have
base and unlimiteddesires. He interpretsRoman his-
tory to suggestthat the people are more keenly aware
of their own deficienciesthan are the nobles and are
more inclined to the common good of the regime.
Contraryto later republicanpractice, and especially
the practiceof liberaldemocracy,Machiavellisuggests
that a direct manifestationof the people within gov-
ernment,alongsidea representationof them, is neces-
saryto carryout successfullyan appropriatepatrolling
of elites. Whereasmost classicalpoliticalscience,con-
servativeand liberal,is concernedwith controllingthe
people-either first and foremost,or with equal vigi-
lance devoted to elites-Machiavelli gives highestpri-
ority to the control of elites.
In short, Machiavelli'stheorymay omit the criteria
by whichwe might distinguish,on the one hand,elites
who exertpowerwith the motivationto dominateand,
on the other hand, those, whether tribunesor well-
meaningnobles, who do so only to participatein the
people's effortnot to be dominated.But whateverthe
origins of his theory of the respective appetites of
the elites and the people-whether it be cosmology,
capabilities,or somethingelse-and whateverthe dif-
ficultiesin demonstratinghow the dominatingappetite
obtainsin reality-that is, how to explaingood nobles
and ferociousplebs-I argue that the theoryis never-
theless an excellent "as if' propositionfor contempo-
rary democratic theory. Ascribing to the people a
desire not to be dominated prioritizesas more just
their desire to be free, that is, undominated.At the
same time it facilitatesthe people's activecontestation
of elites lest their own libertybe threatenedor elimi-
nated. We might say that Machiavelli'stheory legiti-
mizes the people's "natural"disposition of passivity
and also justifies an "unnatural"active political pos-
ture. Conversely,the assumptionthat the elite appetite
to dominateis insatiable,whetherthis can be demon-
stratedas true in everycase, necessitatesextraelectoral
safeguardsagainstthem, such as accusationsand pleb-
iscites,andbeyondthese, it promotesparticipationthat
is not only active but also antagonistic.
Before proceedingany farther,however,it mightbe
asked:Shouldwe understand"elites"as the same thing
in Machiavelli'scontext and in our own? Is it appro-
priateto thinkof them as havinganythingin common,
such thatwe can drawinsightfrom Machiavellifor our
contemporarycircumstances?After all, in Rome there
was little or no distinctionbetweenpoliticaland socio-
economicelites:The senatewas effectivelythe nobility.
Contemporaryliberaldemocraciesexhibita more dif-
Vol. 95, No. 2
ferentiatedsocioeconomiccircumstancein which po-
litical elites are functionallyand often sociallydistinct
from economic ones. Theoretically, these political
elites, seeking votes, may serve the poorer or, more
likely, middle classes againstthe wealthyclasses.Yet,
one need not invoke Marxto observe that socioeco-
nomic elitesveryoften still are the politicalelites or, in
any case, control the latter to such an extent as to
renderthe distinctionproblematic(see Domhoff1998;
Lindblom1977;Mills [1956] 1999).
Machiavelliwould have consideredthe institutions
of contemporaryliberal democracyelective oligarchy
and would have found its social bases insufficiently
antagonisticalong class lines to make up for these
institutionaldeficiencies.Whethercontemporarypolit-
ical elites act on theirown motivationsto dominateor
merely carryout those of the economic elite (again,
they are quite often one and the same), Machiavelli
shows us that elections are an inadequatemeans to
direct,control,andcurtailtheirbehavior.Indeed,as we
will see, as far as Machiavelliis concerned, public
accusations and popular appeals are inadequate as
well; agents of will to domination,such as the Roman
nobilityin the past,or corporatemagnates,entrenched
bureaucrats,and governmentofficialstodaywill gener-
ally find ways to circumventthem. Therefore, wide-
spreadantielitistantagonismis necessaryas well.9
Exactlyhow do Machiavelli'sinjunctionsto subordi-
nate elites throughpopularmeans obtain in Roman
realityand/orin Machiavelli'sprescriptions?The next
section criticallycatalogs the many specific qualities
attributedby Machiavellito the people that contribute
positivelyto a republic,such as theirfairnessin distrib-
uting offices (1.47), their justice in deciding cases of
public accusations(1.7), and their abilityto recognize
the best argumentfrom amongpublicspeeches (1.58).
Generally,he identifiesin the Romanpeople a peculiar
capacitythat correspondsneatly with the function of
the electorate in minimalisttheories of democracy.
Whathe addsto these theoriesis a more animatedand
participatoryquality in the selection and control of
elites. Concretely,this means ensuring some active
governingrole for the people in theircollectivecapac-
ity, even if most popular control of the nobles is
exercisedthroughthe more representativeand reactive
institutionof the tribunes.
INDIRECT AND DIRECT POPULAR
MECHANISMS FOR CONTROLLING ELITES
Consideragainthe differencesbetween actualRoman
practicesas we knowthem andMachiavelli'ssomewhat
9 AlthoughMachiavellisharesMarx'sindignationover elite power
and classsubordination,he does not thinkthat elites as a groupcan
be eliminatedor classesin generalovercome(Marx[1848]1996).In
this sense, Machiavellianticipateshis fellow Italiantheoristsof the
"iron law of oligarchy"(Michels [1911] 1990; Mosca [1896] 1980;
Pareto 1987). But unlike them, and the Schumpeteriandemocrats
with whom they have so much in common, Machiavellidoes not
provideelites the expansivespace withinwhich to carryout their
dominationof the rest of the peopleby celebratingtheirsupposedly
inevitableand irresistibleascendance.For critiquesof elitistdemoc-
racy,see Bachrach1967,Skinner1973,and Shapiron.d.
303
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
free interpretationof them. A few general issues
demonstrateMachiavelli'snormativepreferencefor a
republicmore extensivelyinclusiveof the populace,a
republicthat allows greater direct popularcontrol of
policy formation,lawmaking,and magistrateactivity.
His republicfostersthe expressionof a popularwill not
alwaysmediated throughrepresentativesor curtailed
by exclusionaryprocedures.In this regard,Machiavelli
never mentionsthe Roman practicesof weighingand
orderingvotes in ways that favoredthe better proper-
tied in such assembliesas the comitia centuriataand
comitia tributa.In addition, he fails to acknowledge
how difficultit was for plebs to gain office.Instead,he
consistentlyexpresseshis admirationfor theirdesireto
hold an increasingnumberof officesand for eventually
winningthe privilegeto do so. Although the nobility
held vast agenda-settingpower over issues that were
presented to the people, Machiavelliemphasizesthe
way that the people could influencewhat elites initi-
ated.
Machiavellihas a habit of speakingof the populace
at large when describingthe functioningof specific
popularassemblies.He remarksthat the tribunespro-
posed laws before "the people,"who could speak out
one by one for or againstthem (1.18).More accurately,
the tribunes conductedwide-open popular delibera-
tions in bodies known as contiones, which could not
enact law. The republicmaintaineda strictseparation
between deliberativeand legislativebodies. The plebs
eventuallyobtainedlawmakingpowerfor their assem-
bly, the concilium plebis, but this is a much more
complicatedstorythan Machiavellilets on. The conci-
liumexcludedthe nobles,beganlife outsidethe bound-
aries of official politics, and gained parity with and
ascendancy over other institutions only with great
difficultyand only very late in the history of the
republic.Machiavellispeaksas if the law producedby
the concilium,the plebiscita,was alwaysgenerallyap-
plicable throughout Rome. Actually, the plebiscita
originallyapplied only to the plebs, may in fact have
required senatorial confirmation,and was extended
over the whole populationratherlate, in 287 BCE.
Machiavellidevotes most specific attention to the
institutionof publicaccusations,presumablybecauseit
was most democratic.Any citizen could level a public
accusationagainstanother,especiallya magistrate.But
for reasons discussedbelow, this may have been the
least attractivepopular institutionin the Roman re-
public by contemporarystandards.Finally,I will ob-
serve that Machiavelli'smode of interpretingRoman
historyplaces him in a particularlyawkwardposition:
By demonstratingwhat he sometimes calls the many
"sins"of the nobles, he often reveals how successful
theywere at manipulatingthe verypeoplewhosevirtue
andtalentshe generallyextols.Yet, whenhe focuseson
the spiritof the people, he is forcedto raisethe specter
of the "popularlylegitimated"way that the republic
was eventuallydestroyed.
The Beneficial Collective Action of the
Populace
Recall that Machiavelliclaims the people have less
desireto usurpfreedomthando the elites and addsthe
304
June 2001
qualificationthatthey also haveless "hope"of doingso
(1.5).The populacehas neitherthe inclinationnor the
abilityto threatena regime.Devoid of elite direction,
in fact, the people are "headless"and thus harmless
left to themselves(1.44).They are weak and cowardly
when isolated,thinkingonly abouttheirown individual
fears, but they are mightywhen united under leaders
(1.57). The ideal arrangementis one in which elites
governbut are preventedfrom manipulatingthe peo-
ple into helping them carry out their more sinister
designs.The tribunateis the institutionthat generally
serves as a "head"for the people; it is responsiveto
popularconcernsexceptwhen the people seem unrea-
sonable. It also serves as a direct check on noble
machinationsto enlist the latter in uncivilschemes.
Machiavellialso observesthat the people recognize
the truthin assemblies(1.4).This impliesthat they are
able to choose the better argumentsamong elite pro-
posals,whethersubmittedby the consulsin the noble-
dominatedcomitiaor by the tribunesin the concilium
and those airedon theirown in the contiones.Machia-
velli understandsthe popularabilityto discernbetter
policies in terms of their desire not to be dominated.
An elite proposing a policy may have a hidden and
self-servingagenda,but the populaceevaluatesit to see
if it conformswith the common good. A cynic might
wonderwhetherthis aptituderesultedfrom their legal
exclusionfrom full participationin government:They
developeda capacityto select policypreciselybecause
they were cut off from makingit. This may be largely
true, but we can think of the popularelement within
mixed governmentin Machiavelli'sformulationas it-
self a mixture of direct participationand popular
representation,such that the people do make policy.
Machiavelliseems to read back into the earlyrepublic
a more general directly popular element from its
middleandlate periods.In thisway,he mayexaggerate
the policymakingpowersof the plebs.The fact that he
seldom specifieswhether the assembliesof which he
speaks are the wealthy-dominatedcomitia or the ex-
clusivelyplebeianconciliumfurtherblursthe issue.
Popular Distribution of Offices
Machiavelliargues that the people are better than
elites at distributingoffices:"A prudentman ought to
never depart from the popularjudgmentsespecially
concerningthe distributionof ranksand dignities,for
in this only does the people not deceiveitself.If it does
deceive itself at some time, it is so rare that the few
[i.e., the nobles] who make such distributionswill
deceive themselves more often" (1.47). The Roman
populacedid not fullygovernitself as do the people in
a simple democracy,but it did select the officerswho
ruledbetterthanthe candidatesfor those officeswould
haveif left to choose amongthemselves.As we will see,
Machiavelli'sRoman examples show that the nobles
could be confidentthat they would be given officesby
the people when they were qualified,and even when
plebs themselves were eligible for the same offices
(1.47).Accordingto Machiavelli'saccount,the people
chose to let nobles serve as magistrates;theywere not,
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 2

as empirical evidence generally suggests, compelled could be leveled for politicalplansor proposalsas well
legallyto do so. as concrete actionsand on groundsof malfeasanceas
Machiavelli explains that elites have no humility well as treachery (see Elster 1999). Fear of public
regardingtheir governing abilities, and they seldom exposurewas as much a deterrentas exile, imprison-
defer to other elites and neverto the populacewhen it ment, and fines. In particular,Machiavelliadmiresthe
comes to officeholding.Theymustbe forcedto do so by way that accusationscrushed uncivil action instantly
placing the distributionof offices in the hands of an and "withoutrespect"(1.7). Since the threat of elec-
arbitratinggeneral populace. The comitia selected toral sanctionhas much less force when reelection is
magistrates,such as the consuls, and the concilium not likely, accusationsare an efficient and relatively
chose such officersas the tribunes.Machiavellinotes immediatewayof holdingelites to account.Mostof the
that the tribunesmediatedrelationsnot only between nobilitycouldbe targetedat anytime, and magistrates,
the nobles and the people but also among the nobles such as the consuls, had immunityfor only a year or
themselves(1.50).When senatorsor consulscould not less.
reach agreementthey were knownto consultwith the In Athens, direct democracyand the practiceof lot
tribunes.Thus, the people arbitratedamong elites at renderedclass divisionsrelativelyless salient in gov-
two levels: not only by selecting officersbut also by ernment.But in the mixedRomanregime,magistrates
having their own officers actively mediate conflict might not be inclined to express the interest of the
among the elites while in office. general or poorer portion of the populace, which
Machiavelliacknowledgesthat when disputes over necessitatedadditionaland immediatemeans of com-
offices between the nobility and the people become pelling them to do so. Along these lines, Machiavelli
especially intense, autocratic means of distribution believed that accusationshave a benefitbeyonddeter-
have an allure of efficiency.It is importantto empha- rence and punishment;they providean outlet for the
size here that he specificallyrulesout empoweringone, ordinaryventingof social"humors"generatedby class
purportedlyneutral, person to split the difference antagonism(1.7). If such conflicts are expressed ex-
between the nobility and the plebs in such disputes traordinarily,that is, extralegally,they bringrepublics
(111.34).Selectionof officersby a unitaryexecutiveis as to ruin. Machiavelliis adamantthat the "alternating
bad as, or worse than, the selection of magistratesby humors" of the people and the nobles should be
nobles themselves,and it is certainlyinferiorto popu- ordered through laws, such as those providing for
larly inclusive methods. Machiavelliclaims that the publicaccusation(1.7).We againobservethe entwine-
people are a better distributorof officesthan a prince, ment of social conflict and institutional design in
because they base decisions upon a candidate'sgood Machiavelli'stheory.
reputationuntil they learn otherwisefrom his deeds. The importanceof accusationsis illustratedby Co-
Unitaryexecutives,in contrast,tend to fear a man of riolanus,who was compelledby the tribunesto reveal
good reputation as a rival. Furthermore,they are and explainpubliclyhis plan to starve the plebs into
inclined to remain stubbornabout their decisions on submittingto the nobility (1.7). Were it not for this
such matters, but when the people lean toward an display, Machiavellisuggests, the plebs would have
inappropriatechoice they can be dissuadedby good killedhimimmediatelyoutsidethe senate,whichwould
argumentsand a trustworthyspeaker(111.34). haveset in motiona disastrouschainof eventsresulting
Machiavelli adds that a good populace does not in excessivelyviolent class warfare.Machiavellicom-
allow officials to get away with bad behavior just plainsthat in his own republicof Florencetherewas no
because they have performedtheir duties well in the way for the multitudeto "vent its animusordinarily"
past. This prevents certain figures from becoming againsta citizen (1.7). He claims that the Florentines
excessivelyinsolent. The best method for preventing should have been able legally to check an ambitious,
suchinsolenceis the subjectof the nextsection.Finally, audacious, and spirited would-be usurper such as
Machiavelliinsiststhat the people are inclinedto give FrancescoValori, but they were forced to deal with
rewards, even if from meager resources, for good him extraordinarily.That led to the developmentof
service (1.24). Thus, magistrates,even without the factions on both the popularand noble sides and the
promiseof reelection,may be inducedto good behav- eliminationof manynoblesratherthanjust Valori,who
ior by the expectationof monetaryor honorificrewards was the guiltyone (I.7).
from the people. The specific case of accusationsraises the general
issue of the requisitesize and diversityof an effective
Accusations, Calumnies, and Capital politicalarbitrationbody. Machiavellipoints to a Flo-
Appeals rentine exampleto show that an appellatebody must
be sufficientlylarge and diverse, even if it cannot
Machiavellitreats the institutionof publicaccusations encompass the whole populace: Piero Soderini was
as a direct form of popular participation,one that accusedbefore a body of only eight citizens,an insuf-
renders all citizens, but especiallyelites, accountable ficient numberin a republic(1.7). The judges need to
(1.7). He identifies this as the best instrumentfor be manybecause "the few alwaysbehave in the mode
guardingfreedomin a republic.In Rome, anyone,but of the few" (1.7). An insufficientnumberwill reflect
most often the tribunes,could accuse citizens before only the interest of some elite group and cannot
the general populace or before a diverse institutional arbitrate fairly, that is, outside their own interest.
body. In Rome, as in democraticAthens, accusations Machiavelliasserts that if the Florentines had been

305
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism June 2001

able to judge Soderiniinstitutionally,the Spanisharmy Machiavellialso admires the Roman practice of

need not havebeen broughtinto Italyto settle matters placingthe final decisionover capitalexecutionin the
definitively.This event led to the restorationof the hands of the people. Again, he makes no distinction
Medicifamilyand the demise of the republicin 1512. betweenthe people as a whole and theirassemblies,or
There is, for Machiavelli,an inverse relationship amongthe very differentkindsof assembliesin Rome.
betweenthe abilityto appealto a sufficientlylargeand It appearsthatcapitalcaseswere triedat variouspoints
preferablydiversedomesticbody and the necessityto before the more oligarchic comitia centuriata and
to
appeal foreign arbitration.Unlike the Florentine eventuallythe more popularconciliumplebis. It is not
parties, who had imperfect internal institutionalre- clear to which of these assembliesthe "appealto the
course,neitherthe senate nor the plebs in Rome ever people,"orprovocatio,was directedspecifically.In any
availedthemselvesof foreign forces (1.7). Machiavelli case, capitalcases are especiallyimportantin a mixed
addsthatthereis no need to worrythataccusationswill regime:The people are inclined to interpreta death
be madecasuallyso long as accusersfearbeingindicted sentence against one of their own as an act of class
themselvesshouldthe chargesbe revealedas frivolous. oppressionby the nobility.They need the opportunity
Thus,Soderini'saccuserswouldnot haveactedcasually to overturnor reduce such sentences, and in Rome
for fear of being accusedthemselves. they could do so in a varietyof ways.Capitalsentences
Later designers of popular government dispense pursuedor renderedby consuls,the comitiacenturiata,
with the practiceof accusationsbecauseof the demog- and even, afterthe fact, the dictatormightbe overrid-
ogic or factionalexcessesto whichtheybelieve it tends. den or commutedto exile by invocationof the provo-
Whateverretributionmay awaitsomeonewho levels a catio and/orthe decisionof the concilium.
frivolouscharge, accusations could be leveled strategi- Finally,for Machiavelli,the imperativeof efficiency
cally at certaintimes to preventparticularpolicies from is no argumentagainstthese kindsof populararbitra-
takingshape and/or being enforced. Moreover, charges tion mechanisms.In Rome, if the hearingof popular
that may neverbe definitivelyprovenmightstill smear accusations or the appeal process in capital cases
or damage a public official.Machiavellidistinguishes provedto be too slow for especiallypressingcases, the
between accusationsand calumnies,which are frivo- consulsand senate appointeda dictatorto handle the
lous charges leveled anonymouslyand unconfirmed matter."1But never did they enlist a foreign power.
factuallyby witnesses(1.8).He focuseson the example Thus,for Machiavelli,time constraintsmaybe factored
of MarcusManlius,who was jealous of the glory that into the deployment of popular arbitrationmecha-
Camilusgained by defeatingthe Gauls (1.8). Manlius nisms: Neither adhere to them so firmly that the
spread rumors that Camilus hoarded war booty for general securityof the republicis put at risk, nor use
himself rather than use it to alleviate the economic expediencyas a pretextfor invokingforeign interven-
burdenof the plebs. The senate was forcedto appoint tion (Wantchekenand Nickersonn.d.). Whateverthe
a dictatorand confrontManlius.Had his chargesbeen institutionalspecificsof the Roman practice,Machia-
madethroughofficialchannels,publicly,andsupported velli lamentsthe fact that Florenceput accusationsin
by witnesses, the senate would not have needed to the handsof the elite andcapitalappealin the handsof
resortto more drasticmeasuresto addressthem.Thus, purportedlyobjective foreigners (e.g., the pope, the
high standardsfor evidence and widespreadpublicity king of France). In reality, elites and foreignersare
are antidotesfor calumnies. easily influencedand corruptedby particularinterests
Machiavelliassertsthat calumniesonly cause anger in the city (1.49).
rather than punish citizens legitimately.They often
enable demagoguesto exploit the people's prejudices Elite Persuasion or
Manipulationof the
againstthe noblesin an illegitimateandunhealthyway, People?
whereas accusationsalways serve the republic as a
whole. Machiavellirefersto the contemporaryFloren- Machiavellidoes not suggestthatthe people'sabilityto
tine example of Giovanni Guicciardini,who was ac- discernpoliticalrealityis alwaysclear and prudentor
cused of acceptingbribesfrom the Luccheseto refrain that the nobility'sinclinationto show them what is in
from attackingtheir city. If Guicciardinicould have theirbest interestis in all cases malicious.The Roman
appealedto the people, instead of the chief executive nobility often misled or manipulatedthe people in
of Florence alone, Machiavelliargues, he would not Machiavelli'saccount.In one instance,fear of the gods
have mobilized the impassionedpartisanshipof the was used to frightenthe people into electingnobles as
nobles in his cause (1.8). This suggests that, despite tribunes(1.13).On anotheroccasion,when the nobles
class animosity,the general publicwill give a noble a
more fair hearingthan a magistrateactingin the name 10 The Roman
dictatorship was a temporary emergency measure to
of the people. The Florentinerepublic,whichMachia- preserve the republic, not a permanent authoritarian opposition to
velli served as citizen and official,is consistentlycriti- institutional diversity and turnover of offices. On the distinction see
cized in The Discoursesas insufficientlyequipped to Rossiter 1948 and McCormick 1998. Twentieth-century analysts of
accommodatepopularnecessities and is the constant Roman dictatorship emphasize that it was a device by which the
senate and consuls brought the plebs back into order (Fraenkel 1969,
foil for Rome's greatness.In these examples,Florence 10, 213; Kirchheimer 1969, 42). This charge must be taken seriously,
is guiltyof being susceptibleto calumnies,not allowing since the dictator was appointed without the consultation of popular
populararbitrationof accusations,and invitingforeign institutions and in practice temporarily revoked the popular right of
powersto settle domesticdisputes. appeal.

306
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
were forced to give the plebs a stipend to marchfar
afield and besiege towns for long periods, they made
this appear to be a result of their own magnanimity
ratherthan sheer necessity(1.51).The people rejoiced
with gratitudefor the nobles, even thoughthe tribunes
argued that it would mean higher taxes. Machiavelli
recountshow the senate often manipulatedthe people
into lettingnobleskeep positionsthatthe plebswanted
(1.48), usuallyby putting first-ratenobles or second-
rate plebs on the slate. The plebs would defer to the
excellence of the former or would be too ashamedof
the incompetence of the latter to select them. This
examplebetraysa certaingullibilityon the part of the
people but confirms their virtue: They do not see
through the nominationstrategybut cannot bear to
elect inferiormagistrates-especiallyif theywill reflect
poorly on their own class.
Yet, the nobles do not have the monopolyon unfair
or dangerous intentions. Machiavellinotes that the
people sometimesdesire their own ruinwhen they are
deceived by false conceptionsof the good (1.53). For
instance,the plebswantedto move half the population
of Rome to Veii as a way to maximizethe city'swealth
in theirfavor(1.53).Machiavellireportsthatthe nobles
would rather have suffered death than accept this
alternative.He does not say why, but presumablythis
eventuallywouldhave createda city to rivalRome. But
the peoplewere so enthusiasticaboutthe idea thatthey
wouldhaveobligedthe nobleswith deathhad the latter
not used "as a shield"some old and esteemed citizens
for whom the people had deep respect.Despite their
animosityfor the nobilityas a whole, they had faith in
and reverencefor some of them. We only learn these
seriousqualificationsof Machiavelli'sinitialcharacter-
izationof noble maliceand intransigentclass hatredin
the course of his narrative.
Machiavellimaintainsthat the people can be misled
not only by false notionsof materialgainbut also by an
overlyactivespirit(1.53).For instance,they decriedas
cowardiceFabius'smoderatestrategyduringthe Punic
Wars, a strategy that Machiavelliendorses. Conse-
quently,they riskeda crushingRoman defeat at Can-
nae underthe more recklessleadershipof Varro.The
senate acquiescedto a similaroverlyaggressivepolicy
proposed by Penula because it feared an uprisingby
the people, who were alwayssuspiciousof weaknessin
the face of Hannibal(1.53).In otherwords,the people
could coerce the senate into conformingits agendato
the popularwill. The senate could not dismissScipio's
ambitious appeal to the people for an invasion of
Africa for similarreasons (1.53).Machiavelliadds the
contemporaryexample of the Florentines,who were
mistaken about the conquests of Pisa by Ercole and
Soderini (1.53).
All these examplesillustratehow the people can be
misled in dangerousways by the seductionsof grand
enterprises.This, in and of itself, is less unsettlingfor
Machiavellithan the popularresponseto the resulting
failures:He notes that when such enterprisescollapse,
the people do not blame fortuneor incompetencebut
the purportedmalice of their leaders. They may im-
prisonor kill them, irrespectiveof past success,as did
Vol. 95, No. 2
the populace in Carthage and Athens (1.53). It is
nevertheless unsatisfyingthat Machiavellimakes no
attempt to reconcile these tendencies toward excess
with the passivityand benevolence, or even the pro-
voked or defensive ferocity,that he attributesto the
people earlierin TheDiscourses.
Machiavellialso cites numerousepisodes in which
both the people and the nobles demonstrate their
virtue in the midst of crises:Esteemed senatorsoften
persuadethe people not to follow a courseruinousfor
them and the republic (e.g., 1.53). During the Punic
Wars,the plebs of Capuaweighedthe option of killing
their entire senate and restaffingit from their own
ranks (I.47), but they demurredwhen presented the
concrete opportunityto do so by Pacuvius Calanus
(Calavius).Theyeven laughedat the prospectof filling
senatorialroles themselves(1.47).In the same chapter,
Machiavellidescribeshow the Romanplebswantedto
seize consularpower for themselves on the grounds
that theywere greaterin number,foughtthe wars,and
protected freedom. But when it came time to supply
individualsfor these positions, they selected nobles
because they were better qualified(1.47).
In otherwords,the people have a sense of theirown
limitationsand their need for the governingexpertise
of theirclassantagonists.As Livy(1971,277) notes, the
people really wanted the opportunityto stand for
office,even if they ultimatelydecidedto choose nobles.
In one sense, this conformswith modern liberal de-
mocracy- everyoneis nominallyeligibleto runbut few
are interestedin doing so, and the "best"of those so
inclined are selected. In another sense, in contrastto
contemporaryrepresentativedemocracy,the Roman
citizenryat large may have been eager to hold office.
Unlike later consent or contractmodels, Machiavelli's
model seems to suggestthat class antagonismsand the
genuine possibilityof direct participationinspireden-
thusiasmamongthe people.
Machiavellireinforcesthe argumentconcerningthe
populace'sgood judgmentwith ancientand contempo-
raryexamplesof a changeof mind for the better.The
people of Rome and Florence eliminatecertaininsti-
tutions after wronglyblaming them for mismanaged
war efforts (I.39), but both groups demonstratethe
abilityto learnby later restoringthese veryinstitutions.
Machiavellialso notes that the plebsultimatelyrefused
SpuriousCassius'sattemptto gain their allegianceby
distributingenemypropertyamongthem (111.8).They
were not yet corruptible and susceptible to such
"Caesarist"temptation.They also condemnedManlius
Capitolinusto death for similarreasons;in fact, the
people, the tribunes,and the senate all resistedpow-
erful inducementsto help him (111.8).
There is an obvious danger that great citizens in a
republicwill put their skills to less than republican
ends. Nevertheless,"a republicwithout reputed citi-
zens cannot stand, nor can it be governedwell in any
mode" (111.8).But such reputationcan serve as the
genesis of tyranny.Machiavelli'sproposed solution is
to favorreputationearnedfor publicgoods over those
earned for privategoods (111.28).Yet, it is not clear
how this criterion rules out, for instance, a Julius
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MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism June 2001

Caesar,who gained a reputationpreciselyfor "public" canism,for it underminesthe institutionaldiversityof

goods, such as militarygloryand economicredistribu- mixed regimes that had developed over time in the
tion. ancient world and Rome in particular.The results
hearkenbackto the kindof politicalcorruptioninher-
in the regimetypesfamouslydescribedby Polybius,
DRAWBACKSOF POPULARMECHANISMS ent and they anticipate the simple people = one-man
FOR CONTROLLING ELITES
arrangementof Caesar'styranny.
Machiavelliunderstandsappropriatepopularferocity Machiavellidescribeshow Appius Claudiusbecame
to be any animositytowardelites that stops short of the leader of the Ten throughpopularconsent, even
enlistingeither a Caesaror a foreign power to subju- thoughformerlyhe had been quite cruel to the people
gate or dispose of them. The Roman people never (1.40).The nobles tried to curbhis growingpowerbut
resortedto the latter but ultimatelysuccumbedto the to no avail. Eventuallywar and Appius's crimes re-
former.This sectionis devotedto momentsin Machia- stored the authorityof the nobles,who initiallywould
velli's Discourseswhen the people of Rome flirt with not eliminatethe Ten. Theypreservedthe institutionin
abandoningtheir methods for controlling elites or the hope of forestallingindefinitelythe reestablish-
seem to go too far in pursuingclass conflict against ment of the tribunes.It is noteworthythat Machiavelli
them. The crisisassociatedwith the Ten raisesinstitu- focuses on the bad behavior of the nobility in this
tional questions,and that of the agrarianlaws raises instance,althoughthere is quite a bit of unrulybehav-
issuesof politicalculture.Both episodesdrawattention ior on the part of the people to consider (Livy 1971,
to the circumstancesthat establishedthe precedentfor 236-49). After the second evacuation of the plebs
the collapse of the republic and the emergence of from the city, Appius is arrestedand commitssuicide,
JuliusCaesar.It is importantto note that the Roman the Ten step down, and both the consulsand tribunes
populace undermined its methods of elite control are restored.
because of animosityfor the nobility.Contemporary Machiavellifinallyconcedes, on the basis of these
civic-cultureor neorepublicancritics of minimalist events,that the people are a better supportfor tyranny
democracycomplain about the apathytowardpublic such as Appius'sthan the nobles becausethey provide
matters that might eventually corrode and corrupt the potentialfor moreviolence (1.40).But for Machia-
popularinstitutionsand perhapslead to unfreeresults velli, despite its dangerousimplications,the episode
(e.g., Barber2000;Putnam2000). In anycase, the issue illustrateshow the mechanismsof popularparticipa-
of Caesarismcontinuesto be a serious one. Tocque- tion in Romeworkedwell in bothcontainingthe nobles
ville, most notably,pointed out the dangerof modern and preventing the rise of demagogues (1.40). He
populacesthat become so ferociousin their quest for arguesthat a magistratecreated by the people needs
equality that they endorse militarilyor plebiscitarily some institutionalcause for hesitationaboutbecoming
legitimated tyrants (de Tocqueville [1848] 2000). a criminal;there needs to be recourse to modes of
Tocquevillehad in mind a Bonaparte,but we could accountabilitysuch as the consuls, tribunes, accusa-
imagineworse (see Baehr and Richtern.d.). tions,or the popularappeal.But these are preciselythe
institutionsthat were suspendedwith the consent of
the people. With these out of the way, there was no
The Temptationto Forsake Institutionsfor effectivewayto checksomeonelike Appius,who would
ControllingElites exploit the people's animosity toward the nobility.
Machiavellirecounts an alarminginstance when the Short of war and Appius's excessive behavior, the
people of Rome temporarily abandoned key mecha- nobilitythemselvescould not touch him. Machiavelli
nismsbywhichtheykept elites responsiveandaccount- suggeststhat everyonerealizedthese institutionsought
able. Because of the "disputesand contentions"be- not to be suspendedor abandonedso readilyin the
tweenthe noblesandthe people, Rome triedto imitate future. Because the nobles and the people wanted so
Athenianlaw,and createdthe Ten (the decemvirate) to badlyto removethe institutionalagentsof their rivals,
codify Roman law (1.40). Livy explainsthat the insti- they were tempted to eliminate the very buffersthat
tutionof the Ten andthe legal reformsthattheyset out prevent tyranny(1.40). Machiavellipresents the epi-
to enact were motivated by the popular desire for sode as an anomaly in the history of Rome, even as it
greater participation and equality: The people wanted foreshadows the republic's ultimate demise. But it is
a system of laws "which every individual citizen could hardly an isolated case, as we will see.
feel he had not only consented to accept, but had
actually himself proposed" (1971, 221, emphasis add- The Agrarian Laws
ed). The people no longer wished merely to acclaim or
consent to law that was presented to them but wanted Early in The Discourses, Machiavelli remarks that
to take part in its formulation. Machiavelli never "every city should have modes by which the people can
impugns their motivations but does express concern vent its ambitions" (I.4). Neither are the people always
over the attempted means for realizing them. The Ten so passive nor are their desires so inherently benign as
diminished the power of both the tribunes and the a superficial reading of his account might suggest. He
consuls and abandoned direct appeals to the people admits that one advantage of noble-dominated repub-
(1.40). This streamlining of institutions appears to be a lics like Sparta and Venice is that they keep authority
historical regression from the perspective of republi- away from "the restlessness of the plebs that causes

308
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
infinitedissensionsand scandals"and thatwearsdown
the nobles andmakesthem "desperate"(1.5).Once the
plebs were grantedthe tribunes,they wanted one and
then both of the consuls, as well as all kinds of other
magistrates.
Is this a repudiationof Machiavelli'sascriptionof a
benignly passive disposition to the people? Or are
these merely manifestationsof the defensivelyfero-
cious posture of the people? Machiavelli later de-
scribes how difficult it is to distinguish aggressive
behavior that is appropriatelydefensive from that
whichis dangerouslyoffensive(1.5).In either case, the
people's appetite not to be dominatedby the nobles,
combined with their attempt to seize institutional
guaranteesagainstthe latter, eventuallyleads to Cae-
sarism and the downfallof the republic.Machiavelli
recountshow the plebs"furiously" beganto adoremen
such as Marcus Marius, who could beat down the
nobility,and therebyhastenedthe ruinof the republic
(1.5). He notes that the two Marcuses were made,
respectively,dictator and master of the horse by the
people to surveille ambitiousnobles (1.5). Thus, the
people were not satisfied with simple freedom from
oppression; or rather, it is not easy to guarantee
"negative"freedom from noble dominationwithout
the "positive"freedomexercisedby securinglegislation
and offices againstthe nobles. Machiavellipoints out
that the establishmentof the tribunesand accessionto
the consulatewere not enoughfor the plebs;they also
wantedto sharein the honorsand spoilsof the nobility
(1.37).
In particular,the agrarianlaws of the fifth century
threatenedthe nobles by limitingthe amountof land
one could own and by distributingamong the plebs
land seized from vanquishedenemies (1.37,111.24-5).
This legislation enraged the nobles, for it sought to
take what they alreadyhad and denied them access to
the means of gettingmore. Machiavelliclaimsthat the
senate respondedby sending armies fartherafield to
places the plebs would not covet, thus ensuringthat
these spoilswere the exclusivepleasureof the nobility.
Machiavellineed not point out that this practiceleads
to Caesarismas steadilyas does the popularworshipof
"one man" who will beat down the nobles. As the
armies were sent farther and farther from Rome,
generalsand not the republicbegan to take responsi-
bilityand creditfor the army'smaterialsustenanceand
hence commandedits ultimate loyalty. Accordingto
Machiavelli,were the noblesor the plebs more respon-
sible for layingthe groundworkof Caesarism?
Machiavelliemphasizesthat the agrarianlawsled to
a cycle of excessivedisorder:civilconflicts,recourseto
"privateremedies"by individuals,the establishmentof
partyheads (e.g., Mariusfor the people, Sulla for the
nobles),andultimatelymoreblood andviolencethanis
healthyfor a well-orderedrepublic(1.37).The nobles
initially gained the upper hand, but the way was
establishedfor a popularpartyleadersuchas Caesarto
emerge as tyrant.Yet, Machiavellidoes not condemn
the people throughthese examples;he concludesthat
the nobility caused the agrarianlaw crisis and the
300-year decline that it set in motion (1.37). The
Vol. 95, No. 2
ambition of the nobles needed to be checked and
would have broughtRome down much sooner if the
people had not sought to halt them. According to
Machiavelli,it was the nature of elites to behave in
such a way as to provoke the people to undertake
harmfulmeasureslike the agrarianlaws.Therefore,we
must understandpopular ferocity as the righteous
indignationof a normallypassiveinclinationnot to be
dominatedthat has been violated, abused,and threat-
ened. The people's aggressivebehavioris revealed to
be a legitimate response to the nature of elites and
their inevitablebehavior.1'
HISTORICAL
MACHIAVELLI'S PLACEAND
RELEVANTLESSONS
Does my reading of The Discoursesalter our assess-
ment of how Machiavellifits into the historyof reflec-
tions on populargovernment?Clearly,he is neitheran
epigone of classical republicanismnor a pioneer of
modern antimoralism,unconcernedwith institutional
form. Machiavellimay pose the questionof elite con-
trol and populargovernmentas forcefullyas anyother
political philosopher, yet contemporarydemocratic
theory generallylooks to the contract traditionas a
resource for holding elites accountable.Why? One
reason is that Machiavelli'sanswersseem imprecise
analytically:The combinationof normativeprescrip-
tion, historical description,and textual commentary
renders his conclusionsless than readilytransparent.
Moreover,his conclusions,when specified,do not seem
immediately transferable to contemporary circum-
stances in an obvious way. Considerthe example of
public accusation.The institutionof "specialprosecu-
tors," for instance, seems to serve elite as much as
popularinterests.
If we think about these issues historically,in the
classicalage therewere the sociallyspecificinstitutions
of the simple regimes:monarchies,democracies,and
oligarchies,or rule by the one, the poor, or the rich.
Today there are the completelyagnosticsocioinstitu-
tional arrangementsof modern liberal democracy.In
between reside the socially reflective institutions of
Rome and Machiavelli'sinterpretationof them. In his
model, the popular element is represented by the
tribunesand the largelytimocraticpopularassemblies.
But it is also embodied by the concilium,which is
composed of all nonnoble citizens and directly ex-
pressed throughsuch practicesas the accusationand
the provocatio.In general, most Roman institutions
were socially specific in a way that is intolerableby
modern representativestandards.Those institutions,
11 In an excellent recent work, Baehr
(1998, 287ff) details the
socioeconomicchangesthatmadeJuliusCaesara successfulusurper
of the republic,whereasthe earlier attemptsof Cassius,Marius,
Appius,and otherswere failures.The increasingdebt and diminish-
ing propertysharesof the urbanand especiallyruralplebs encour-
aged them to seek sustenancein militaryventuresalone. Consistent
with Machiavelli,Baehr demonstratesthat the ensuingcorruption
could have been minimizedor forestalledby the senate had it
adoptedprogramsof debt relief and land distribution,which they
consideredbut dismissed(p. 289). The senators,after all, were the
primarylendersand landowners.
309
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
whetherrepresentativeor direct,were identifiedwith
particularsocial classes. Liberaldemocracies,in con-
trast,presumethat all citizensare "equal"and assume
the general influence of all on the institutions of
government.
In a sense, Machiavelli'sreinterpretationof Rome
combinessome of the more directelementsof classical
politics and the nascent representativequalityof Ro-
man practice.It is importantfor Machiavellithat the
popular element be both mediated and expressed
institutionally.His republic is a mixed regime that
holds withinthe popularelement a furthermixing-a
mixingbetween representationand direct expression.
The modern republicancum liberal-democraticblue-
print, The FederalistPapers(Madison,Hamilton,and
Jay [1788]1998),eschewssuch an arrangementfor two
possiblereasons.The firstis a postfeudal/preindustrial
faith in the emergenceof a variegatedsocial pluralism
that presumablywould outstripcategories of two, or
even three, opposingclasses.The second is a Hobbes-
ian distrustof anykind of sociallyspecificclaimsupon
institutionsof government.The Federalistslikelywere
aware of exactly what Machiavelliknew and cele-
brated:Institutionalclass specificityencouragespoliti-
cal class conflict.
The crucialdifferencebetweenMachiavellianrepub-
licanismand contractarianliberalism,however,is not
simplya preferencefor class conflictper se but for a
particularkind of institutionalfacilitationof it. Mach-
iavelliseeks to controlelites firstand foremost,despite
the riskof allowingcertainexcesseson the part of the
populace. His frequent omissions and equivocations
regardingtheirbehaviorsuggestas much.Contractari-
anism seeks to control both elites and the public
throughconstitutionaland electoralarrangementsthat
exclude the populace as such from governance
(Holmes 1995). The resultof the latter arrangements,
civic-cultureor participatory-minded criticscharge,is a
stultificationof the populace,a structuralencourage-
ment of their disinterestin politics that includes the
concernfor holdingelites to account.How seriouslywe
evaluatethis chargewill inevitablydependon whether
we judge the supposed passivityof the electorate in
contemporaryrepresentativedemocracyto be a result
of the commercial/privateattentions of citizens in
capitalistsocieties, or whether we judge political ar-
rangementsto be the principalcause of sucheconomic
fixationsand political passivity.This is, of course, a
recurringdebatein democratictheory(see, e.g., Barber
1990;Gutmann1991;Przeworski1991;Shapiro1996).
As an heir to contractariantheories, minimalist
democracycertainlyappearsstunted or sterile by cri-
teria that favorhigh levels of substantiveparticipation.
From such a perspective,the propositionthat a popu-
lace or electorateshouldserve merelyas an arbitrator
among elite actors seems to be a rather stultified
frameworkfor populargovernment.If it has a ready
correlatein traditionalpoliticaltheory,the Hobbesian
scenarioseems the most apt, if normativelyunflatter-
ing,comparison:Subjectsconsentto a particularpower
among others to impose order upon society at large.
When we add to that formula merely the periodic
310
June 2001
reaggregationof consent throughelections,we have a
fairapproximationof minimalistdemocracy.Yet, mini-
malist democracymay be underminedwithout a di-
verse and attentive populace,which may, in fact, be
homogenizedand infantilizedby a lack of more sub-
stantive and direct participation.Machiavelli'sDis-
coursesraises serious questionsfor advocatesof mini-
malist conceptions of democracy along these lines:
Does elite control requireclass conflictin additionto
general elections?Is social or liberaldemocraticpoli-
tics sufficientlyconflict-engenderingto sustainvigilant
controlof elites?
Civic-participatory and neorepublicanprescriptions
for renewing substantive democracy (e.g., Macedo
1998;Rosenblum1998;Warren2000) seem to offer a
culturalsupplementthat would renderminimalistde-
mocracymore sustainable.But such approachesare
ratherpacificin comparisonwith the ferociousnessof
Machiavellianpopulargovernment.It is not merelythe
fact that Roman citizensbelonged to differentgroups
that renders republicanpolitics healthy and dynamic
for Machiavelli;rather,they belongedto fiercelycom-
petitivegroups.In this sense, the constructivelypartic-
ipatory and tranquillity-inclineddisposition of civic-
culture approaches may not generate the requisite
animosity to encourage better responsiveness and
greater accountabilityamong elites. Contentiousness
over differentconceptionsof the common good, over
more or less just formsof domination,providesthis in
Machiavelli'sRome. In his account of the rise and
decline of associationsin the United States, Putnam
(2000), for instance,does not substantiallydistinguish
between the social benefitsort of associations,such as
those involvedin the civil rightsmovement,and those
devoted to hobbies or sports. Yet, it is precisely
attentionto or pursuitof socialjustice,which is often
underemphasizedin civic-cultureapproaches,that may
promotea more vigilantpopulace.
As Shapiro (1999, 30) argues, in addition to the
practicesof collective self-government,which is rela-
tivelywell servedby electoralpolitics,democracymust
be concernedwith diminishingthe arbitraryexerciseof
domination and with ameliorating asymmetriesof
power. The imperfectlyjust, that is, inevitablyunjust
exerciseof powerby politicaland social elites can only
be checked by a populace with a dispositiontoward
distrust,suspicion,and even resentmentof them. The
Roman people in Machiavelli'saccount realize that
theywill neverbe remotelyfree fromnoble domination
without remainingsuspiciousof, and making claims
upon, the wealthand politicalauthorityof those elites.
In this spirit,Shapiro(1996, 10; 1999, 15) arguesthat
democracy is not sustainable if it does not breed
democratichabits of interactionand does not reduce
injustices of common institutions-interactions and
reductionsachievedthroughdissensus,not necessarily
consensus.
A Machiavellianparadoxperhapslost on civic-cul-
ture theoristsof democracyis that socioeconomicand
political conflict may breed stronger allegiance than
the active pursuitof a consensuallyderived common
good (see Shapiro1996, 108). Along these lines, how
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
might our political and perhaps socioeconomicelites
be handledmore aggressively?How mightwe begin to
fashion Machiavellianmechanisms of participation,
responsiveness,and accountability?Manin, Przewor-
ski, and Stokes (1999, 5, 13, 49-50) propose the
developmentof multiple"accountability agencies"that
could supplement elections in the effort to control
elites more directly; these might take the form of
independentcampaign,information,and auditingbod-
ies. Pettit (2000) theorizescontestatorypractices,such
as the veto or better appellate institutions,through
which electoratesmight reviewor amend decisionsof
elected elites. These institutionscould function in a
manner reminiscentof the tribunes,the accusations,
the appeal,and the conciliumin Machiavelli'saccount
of Rome. In more general terms, Shapiro (1999)
proposesextraelectoraldemocraticproceduresto deal
with social issues often considered"private,"such as
child rearing; gender, sexual, and marital relations;
issues of the workplace;and health care, retirement,
and death.If renderedmore democraticallyaccessible,
these policy spheres might no longer be the free
domainof quasi-autonomouselites.
Machiavelli'sDiscoursesraises questions and pro-
poses solutionswith respect to the adequacyof mini-
malist democraticarrangementsin achievingone of
their most importantgoals-control of elites. More-
over, it does so withoutan appealto consensusover a
common good that is voiced or presupposedby con-
temporaryadherentsof civic participationand neore-
publicanism.In thisway,Machiavellicontributesto the
prospect of taking advantage of the respective
strengthsof both formal democratictheory and civic
participatoryapproaches.
CONCLUSION
Minimalisttheorists of democracynow concede that
elections might not be sufficientto render elites re-
sponsive and accountable,in particular,and to make
democracy self-sustainable,in general (Przeworski
1999). Althoughthey do not appealfor more substan-
tively participatorypractices characteristicof civic-
culture, civil-society,and neorepublicancritics of lib-
eral democracy,democratic minimalistsdo call for
more direct "accountabilityagencies"throughwhich
elites mightbe made more controllable.I have shown
that a theoristwho mixes representative-electoral in-
stitutions with more direct forms of elite control is
Niccolb Machiavelli.
Machiavelli'sdemocratictheory of elite control can
be summarizedas follows.In some respectsthe people
are confined simply, if not exclusively,to selecting
elites for office and choosing among their policy pro-
posals. In other respects, they are active competitors
with the establishedelites for such offices, and they 12 An importantcontinuityin the metamorphosisof ancient into
constantlypatrol the latter throughthe institutionsof
the tribunesand practicessuch as public accusations In this light, Pocock's (1975) otherwise magisterialstudy of the
and popular appeals. Moreover, the Roman plebs been
could meet collectivelyin the contionesand concilium haps oughtappropriately
plebis to discussand make laws, respectively.Machia- cally indulgentcontemporaryand interlocutor,FrancescoGuicciar-
velli adds to these institutionalfeatures of popular dini, and not the populist,elite-despisingsubjectof this essay.
Vol. 95, No. 2
governmentan importantculturaldimension:The peo-
ple should despise and mistrustthe elites, and they
should be wary of and activelyconfront the injustice
that elite governinginevitablyentails.This disposition
servesto fuel populareffortsto renderthe elites more
fully responsive and accountable.When Machiavelli
calls the Roman people the "guardianof liberty,"he
has in mind this fuller conceptionof their control of
elites. The merelyreactive,ratifying,and manipulable
quality of the Roman plebs presented in classical
histories and contemporaryhistoricalresearchis not
commensuratewith the kind of virtue necessary to
keep the cravenand unscrupulousRoman nobilityin
check. However much elites may have changed their
forms, historydoes not provide any solid evidence to
suggest that their dispositionhas altered very much
since Machiavelli'stime.
Machiavelliconfirmsfor us, quite simply,that elec-
tions are not enough. Popularprimacyin his republic
meansmore thanjustchoosingelites throughelections.
Merelyelectoralstandardscertainlymakeit possibleto
interpreta republicaccordingto the traditionalAris-
totelian/Polybiancriterion: A good republic should
appear to be both an oligarchy and a democracy,
dependingupon howyou look at it. Electoralstandards
of democracyallowus to saythatelites rulebut thatthe
people choose which elites do the governing. The
systemis thereforeoligarchicand democratic.In Ma-
chiavelli'sestimation,the electoralstandard,like most
of the great standardsof political philosophy,tradi-
tional or modern,humanisticor formal,only serves to
favor the elite. Machiavelliadvocates an unambigu-
ously popularlydominatedrepublic.Accordingto the
standardsof his day, that would not have meant a
democracyper se but a democraticallytilted mixed
regime. By today'sstandardswe could do worse than
call such a regime a democracy.12
Ultimately,Machiavelliandemocracycan be charac-
terized concretely as an institutionalmix of popular
representationand directpopularparticipation,as well
as a political culture driven by an active rather than
passive sociopoliticalorientation.At first blush, con-
temporaryliberal democraciesseem wantingin com-
parison.Whatform mightinstitutionsand practicesof
Machiavelliandemocracytake today? Strategies fo-
cused on democraticjustice, accountabilityagencies,
and contestatoryrepublicanismare certainlyappropri-
ate startingpoints for bridgingthe gap, in a Machia-
vellian manner, between minimalist democracyand
approachesto popular gov-
civil-society/participatory
ernment.
modernrepublicanismhas been socioeconomicand politicalelitism.
Renaissance-Florentine
conduitof this transformationwould have
more titled The Guicciardinian Moment.It per-
to have been namedafter Machiavelli'smore oligarchi-
311
MachiavellianDemocracy:ControllingElites with FerociousPopulism
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