People vs Exconde

Facts :Accused was convicted for violation of Central Bank Circular no. 37, limiting to Php100the amount of Philippine currency that an outgoing passenger could have on his person.Found in his possession are Php 5,090 in Phipippine currency, 50USD in cash, 100 USDtravelers check and a remitters receipt for BA in the amount of USD 350. Pursuant tothe circular, the import and export of Philippine coins and notes without the necessarylicense issued by the CB is prohibited, in excess of Php100 in currency. In connection tothe circular, sec. 34 of RA 265 (Central Bank Act ), a person who violates any orde,instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board shall punished by a fine of not more than Php20,000 an by imprisonment of not more than 5 years.On appeal, the accused argued that the Central Bank law does not grant authority to theMB to prohibit the exportation of Philippine currency, and if such is granted, the same isvoid as an invalid delegation of legislative power. ISSUES: 1. Whether there has been a valid delegation of legislative power. 2. Whether Cir. No, 37 comes within the penal sanctions of the Central Bank Act. HELD: 1.Circular 37 was a valid exercise of the regulatory power delegated by the CentralBank Act., and said Circular is in harmony with the objectives sought to be achievedby that law, particularly the control of any prejudicial expansion and contraction of themoney supply and the preservation of the international value of the peso.Unless the exportation of currency is curtailed, the value of the peso in terms of other currencies can not be maintained, for the increase of the peso supply in foreigncountries would tend to depress its value therein. How far the limitation should go maygive rise to honest differences of opinion, but the power to restrict the export of Philippinecurrency is undoubtedly there, and courts are only concerned with the question of authority, not the wisdom of the measure involved. 2. Yes, because a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued canconstitute a misdemeanor or a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute,and by virtue of the latter

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial committee on justice created pursuant to presidential order. That his membership in committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as executive judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATIONvs.LUCINA S. SENDINOG.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994KAPUNAN, J.: Facts: Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservationagreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meterlot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque. He paid the fulldownpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI tochange her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one monthto do so.For alleged noncompliance with the requirement of submission of theappropriate documents under the terms of the ori ginal agreement, REVI,informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract.Private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI withthe office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housingand Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)The HLURB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and orderedpetitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay privaterespondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages andP6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decisionwas taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision.The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President(OP). The OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. TheMotion for reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. Held: Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed bythe petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitionersto comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement.recognizing the HLU RB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers andfunctions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHAto the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resultedin the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included thepower to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate businesspractices . . . and cases of specific performance."

Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts,determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damageswhenever appropriate.

Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756

J. Gancayo Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied. Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was denied. In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they werent subject to immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of appellate

jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didnt make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses. Issue: 1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation? Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens Ratio: Section 37 of the Immigration act states: SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ... There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good. Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that: No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure. On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. VS.CA AQUINO, November 7, 1979 NATUREAPPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeals.FACTS-In Mines Administrative Case No. V227, DirectorGozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960wherein he dismissed the case filed by thepetitioners. In that case, they sought to be declaredthe rightful and prior locators and possessors

of 69mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.Director Gozon found that the petitioners did notdiscover any mineral nor staked and located miningclaims in accordance with law. Also in the order,Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of thegroups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloa, nowthe private respondents-appellees, were duly locatedand registered.-The petitioners appealed from that order to theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon wasappointed Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources and therefore he was the one who decidedthe appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16,1963.-He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned thedisputed mining claims, while, on the other hand, theMartinez and Pabiloa groups had validly located thesaid claims. Hence, be dismissed the appeal from hisown decision.-On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed acomplaint in the CFI Zambales, assailing SecretaryGozon's decision and praying that they be declaredthe prior locators and possessors of the 69 mineralclaims in question. Impleaded as defendants in thecase were the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources. the Director of Mines and the members of the Martinez and Pabiloa groups.-CFI: dismissed complaint, held that disqualificationof a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec.1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply toadministrative bodies; that there is no provision inthe Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding anappeal from a case which he had decided as Directorof Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground fordisqualification; that the petitioners did notseasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon fromdeciding their appeal, and that there was noevidence that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and withbias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to thepetitioners.-Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (6 th Division). CA reversed the judgment of the trial court,declared that the petitioners were the rightfullocators and possessors of the said 69 mining claims,held as invalid the mining claims overlapping thesame; that the petitioners (Nava group) haddiscovered minerals and had validly located the said69mining claims, that there was no sufficient basisfor Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claimsof the Martinez and Pabiloa groups were validlylocated.-The defendants (private respondents-appellees)filed a motion for reconsideration based on theground that CA should have respected the factualfindings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the theory thatthe facts found in administrative decisions cannot bedisturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic ActNo. 4388 which amended section 61 of the MiningLaw effective June 19, 1965; and several other cases. They also prayed that the appeal be dismissed,meaning that the decisions of the lower court and of Director and Secretary Gozon be affirmed.-Petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration.In their opposition, they reiterated the contentionthat Secretary Gozon's decision was void andtherefore, the factual findings therein are not bindingon the courts.-same CA 6 th Division in second decision of October13, 1978 set aside its first decision and granted themotion for reconsideration on the ground raised inpetitioners' opposition, namely, that SecretaryGozon's decision was void because he wasdisqualified to review his own decision as Director of Mines.So CA in its second decision remanded thecase to the Minister of Natural Resources for anotherreview of Director Gozon's decision. This was theprayer of the petitioners in their brief but in theiropposition to the motion for reconsideration, theyprayed that the 1 st

CA decision be reinstated.-The parties filed motions for reconsideration. Thepetitioners in their motion reiterated their prayer thatthe first decision be reinstated. On the other hand,the private respondents in their motion insisted thatthe trial court's decision be affirmed on the basis of the factual findings of the Director of Mines and theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. CAdenied both motions.-Only the petitioners appealed from the 2 nd CAdecision. While the petitioners (Nava group) intheir appellants' brief in the CA they prayed thatSecretary Gozon's decision be declared void and thatthe case be returned to the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources for another review of DirectorGozon's order, in their appellants' brief in SC, theynow pray that the 2 nd CA decision, referring this caseto the Minister of Natural Resources for anotherreview, be declared void and that its first decision beaffirmed.In contrast, the private respondents , pray for theaffirmance of the trial court's judgment, sustainingthe decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon. ISSUE WON Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion HELD YES Ratio In order that the review of the decision of asubordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,the reviewing officer must perforce be other than theofficer whose decision is under review; otherwise,there could be no different view or there would be noreal review of the case. Reasoning The palpably flagrant anomaly of aSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesreviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is amockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law,Commonwealth Act No. 137, Section 61 1 providesthat the decision of the Director of Mines may beappealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources. It contemplates that the Secretary shouldbe different from the Director of mines.Secretary Gozon should have asked hisundersecretary to preside over the case-Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process,meaning fundamental fairness, when SecretaryGozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesdated August 16, 1963 as affirmed by the trial courtas well as the first decision of the Court of Appeals.We affirm its second decision, returning the case tothe Minister of Natural Resources, with the directivethat petitioners' appeal to the Minister be resolvedde novo with the least delay as provided for inPresidential Decree No. 309. "establishing rules andprocedures for the speedy disposition or settlementof conflicting mining claims".We reverse the second part of that second decisionstating that "thereafter, further proceedings will betaken in the trial court". That portion is unwarrantedbecause the trial court does not retain any