People vs PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463 FACTS:In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil.

, 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. Inthis Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over thePhilippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, thedefendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: Act No. 292 of thePhilippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement. ISSUES:Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,is in force. HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government. Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated. Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in

business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"? Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its

incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary Facts: In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.] Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the

reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof? Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore). Case DigestPASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVIDG.R. No. L-6355-56August 31, 1953

Facts: Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias andJustice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salarywherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exemptfrom the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensationfixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellantCollector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not receivedfavorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussionin the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. Issue(s) Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 constitutional? Ratio Decidendi On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and wellconsidered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs.Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salariesof Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and soordered the refund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 isconstitutional, the court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of themeaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found insection 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicialofficer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof bythe Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of theJudiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or actdeclaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. Alegislative definition of a

word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates thedoctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income taxon the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, thecourt holds that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within theexclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislaturemay not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especiallywhen the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretationalready given in a case by the highest court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed,that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law,constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of theopinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principles underlyingthe separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissentingopinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income TaxLaw prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provisionin question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. Theascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judgessalaries Nitafan vs. CIR [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987] Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and

other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes. Held: NO. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of Judiciary The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David. The 1973 Constitution has provided that no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV) which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased),

negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision. The term diminished be changed to decreased and that the words nor subjected to income tax be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after decreased was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law. The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not

anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too. Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on November 17, 2010 Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the

election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986 Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." Issue: whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate Held: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that:

the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government In Re: Saturnino Bermudez on November 9, 2011 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . . ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. HELD: No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and VicePresident Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the

extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno Facts: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later

filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. Issue: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33. Held: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking. G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto March 2, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. HELD:

FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go. The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-today, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. DE LEON vs ESGUERRA Case Digest ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA G.R. NO. 78059 AUGUST 31, 1987 FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners. On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. ... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the Provisional Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or February 8, 1987, its announcement? HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline, the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: "Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC

Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite." Therefor, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2, 1987, the actual date of the voting and not February 8, 1987, the announcement of the resolution. MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same does not posses all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under. ISSUE: Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized. HELD: Yes, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 15 and 4, CA 473).

Djumantan vs. Domingo On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940. In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. Thus this petition for certiorari Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings Held : Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation. The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990. In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914 Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar. FACTS: April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinesecitizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has residedin the Phils July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filedan application to take the 98 Bar Examinations.

Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submitproof of his Phil citizenship Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert fromCOMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, LaUnion also from COMELEC. April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He wasfurther required to submit more proof of citizenship. July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenshipand his Oath of Allegiance. OSG commented that Ching being the legitimate child of a Chinese father and aFilipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen andcontinued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philcitizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyondthe reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence. Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG):1 st the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen2 nd election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means areasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayocase, and may be extended up to 7 yrs, from the Cuenco caseISSUES:1)WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time2)If affirmative, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.HELD: Court denies Vicente D Chings application for admission to the Philippine Bar (ouch!) RATIO:1& 2) No, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, theallowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he wasalready 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June 99.He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudencecompel the Court in its

decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayedhis election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process CO vs. HRET Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be

tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements. Bengzon Vs. HRET 357 SCRA 545 G. R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001 Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen. Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was

originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Tecson vs Comelec Facts: Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction. Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen. Ruling: 1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections. 2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that

having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father. Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Mercado Vs. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual

citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of

candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Republic vs. dela Rosa Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 andSection 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of theRegional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under theRevised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of th Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the saidorder and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks,the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing.On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall bedone on January instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office inthe May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February.Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the

assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization,thereby vesiting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appealdirectly with the Supreme Court.Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.Held:No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines andtherefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He isordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedingsof the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of thescheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petitionitself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner wasallowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period. Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245] Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office. Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship. Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation. Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such

through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago Doctrine: Reacquisition of citizenship FACTS: Petitioner Yu, originally a Portuguese national, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen on 10February 1978. However, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed PortuguesePassport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.The CID detained the petitioner pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition forhabeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship HELD: Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed whenrequired and suppressed when convenient. Petitioner, while still a citizen of the Philippines who hadrenounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreignprince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents hesigned, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime inApril 1980. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly andexplicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine

citizen resumed orreacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippinecitizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with hismaintenance of Philippine citizenship.WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediatelyexecutory.While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely andforever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality asPortuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount. In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank. HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso. MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Issue:

Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 DECISION (En Banc) BUENA, J.: I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus

attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC Case Digest AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001 Facts: Petitoners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections of new voters. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission under R.A. 8189. On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 requesting for a two-day additional registration of new voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. Subsequently, Comelec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request, it was the consensus. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, which seeks to nullify respondent Comelecs resolution and / or to declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said

provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 dated Feb. 8, 2001 as it denies petitioners right to vote. Held: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. The so-called stand-by powers or residual powers of the Comelec, as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commission shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law, cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not otherwise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the operational impossibility of holding the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may not apply. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners request.

Macalintal vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003] Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it

that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention: That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution Ruling: 1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee

voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. 2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. 3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.

The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law. Santiago vs comelec FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Tolentino vs COMELEC Facts The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. Issue Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s? Decision The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose

amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.