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Villarroel vs. Estrada,71 Phil. 140, GR No. L47362 December 19, 1940 On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F.

Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years (Exhibito A). Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant. Spouses Mariano Estradaand Severina also died, leaving as sole heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9,1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibito B) by which the applicant must declare inthe amount of P1, 000, with an interest of 12 percent per year. This action relates to the recovery of this amount. The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this action, condemn the defendantto pay the claimed amount of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year since theAugust 9, 1930 until full pay. He appealed the sentence. It will be noted that the parties in the present case are, respectively, the only heirs andcreditors of the original debtor. This action is brought under the defendant's liability as theonly son of the original debtor in favor of the plaintiff contracted, sole heir of primitive loacreditors. It is recognized that the amount of P1, 000 to which contracts this obligation isthe same debt of the mother's parents sued the plaintiff. Although the action to recover the original debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit wasfiled in this case, the question raised in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstandingsuch requirement, the action taken is appropriate. However, this action is based on theoriginal obligation contracted by the mother of the defendant, who has already prescribed,but in which the defendant contracted the August 9, 1930 (Exhibito B) by assuming thefulfillment of that obligation, as prescribed. Being the only defendant in the original herderodebtor eligible successor into his inheritance, that debt brought by his mother in law,although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for a moral obligation,that is consideration enough to create and make effective and enforceable obligationvoluntarily contracted its August 9, 1930 in Exhibito B. The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prrescrita must be made by the same personobligated or otherwise legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case is notrequired in compliance with the mandatory obligation orignalmente but which would give itvoluntarily assumed this obligation.It confirms the judgment appealed from, with costs against the appellant. IT IS SO ORDERED.Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., Concur

G.R. No. L-13667

April 29, 1960

PRIMITIVO ANSAY, ETC., ET AL., vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., PARAS, C. J.: On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the following order: Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning; considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because: (a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal; (b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.). IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. pronouncement as to costs. No

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal. Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation. Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they discussed in their brief,

this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof". It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance. At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278) xxx xxx xxx From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation. And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that: Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases. still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action. Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. DBP v. Confessor, 161 SCRA 307 (1988) Petition for review on certiorari GANCAYCO, J. FACTS: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from DBP, in the sum of P2,000, as evidenced by a promissory note, whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay

the account in amortizations.

ten

(10)

equal

yearly

After ten years, the debt remained unpaid. Confessor, now a Congressman, executed a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and promising to pay the same before June 15, 1961. Still not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a complaint against the spouses for the payment of the loan. ISSUE: W/N prescription had barred the complaint. HELD: No. Prescription was renounced when Confessor signed the second promissory note. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired. The Court ruled that when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a debt barred ... will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.

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