US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL

STAFF COllEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT
Major General John J. Hennessey
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General James M. Gibson.
Editor in Chief
COL Q. W. Martin, Jr.
Associate Editor
COL Paul Goodman,
Army War College
Assistant Editor
LTC R.Glenn MeCue
Features Editor
MAJ Robert W. Hornaday
Production Editor
Helen M. Hall
SpanishAmerican Editor
LTCNestor L. Berrios
Brazilian Editors
LTCAlmeriaDini::
LTC Hoehe Pukherio
Publication Officer
MAJSteven E. Bartels
Art and Design
Jero11Ul F.Seheele
MilitaryReview
ProfessionalJournaloftheUS Army
The Growing Importance of Oil .
The Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel
ARTICLES
MAl John A. Berry, USA
Michael A. Krasner
2
17
Arab Guerrilla Problems .
The Vital Element in Vietnamization
MAl Edgar O'Ballance, British Army, Ret
. Jac Weller
27
35
Delusions of Grandeur .
Chinese Military Classics
West and the Middle East
Soviet "Marine Corps"
MAl Phillip W. Mock, USA
VADM Ko Tunhwa, Chinese Navy
John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso
MAl John F. Meehan III, USA
50
66
75
84
DEPARTMENTS
Military Notes
Military Books
95
105
COVER
Apolarized photograph by SP4 Raul Otero, 3d Infantry Division, shows division troops
during an exercise near Bad T61z, Germany.
MILITARY REVIEW Is published montllly In EngHs.h.l.Spanish and Portuguese by the US Anny Command
and General Staff College, Ft Leevenworth, lIS 660.:/. Use of funds for printing this publication approved
by H8lIdquarters, Department of the Anny. 24 MaY 1971. second class paid at Ft l8llvenworth,
lIS. Subscription, $5.00 per year US and APO/FPO; $5.25 in PUAS nati GO othelS. Single copies
50cents US. 60 cents foreign. Address all mall to Military Review. USAC leavenworth. lIS 66027.
Unless otherwise stated. the views herein are those of the euthors and are not necesserlly those of the
Department of Defense or any element thereof.
"WHAT HAPPENED TO THE FORUM IN AUGUST 1972 ISSUE?"
So writes a reader on the Military Review Reader
Survey form he carefully removed from his August
copy, filledin and returned for our considera-
tion and guidance. We certainly appreciate his
taking of his valuable time to do this.
The answer to this question issimple. The solu-
tion to the underlying problem isnot.
There was no Reader Forudin the August 1972 issue
because we had no material for that department.
Jo1hy we had no thought provoking rejoinders or ex-
tensions of authors' t:houghts from readers baffles
\
And another int:erest:ing relat:ed point-someof .
those responding 1::0 the Reader Survey hint broadly
that we follow some sort of directed or self-
inspired party line. Nothing could be further
from the truth. We publish much that we strongly
disagree with and much that we think will disturb
some readers and elate others. But all too little
response.
To reveal a prejudice--the Reader Forum isour
favorite department. Please help 1::0 make itan
interesting, useful feature. writ:e in your views.
While articles wri t:t:en by mili tary authors must: be
cleared, the only const:raint: on let:ters t:o publi-
cat:ions is propriet:y.
Will there be a Reader Forum next month? \llf
P.S. Without appearing to surrender 1::0 despair,
sometimes we ask ourselves "Is there really
anybody out there?"
,
T
HE news of recent upheavals
in the oil industry has attracted
widespread attention. For many, the
realization is spreading that the in-
ternational oil companies in their role
as independent agents for the produc-
tion of .oil may not survive the Sev-
enties. The events of 1971-72 clearly
show that the oil producing states of
the world-and primarily those of the
Middle East-intend to assume a
dominant role in the exploitation of
their principal natural resource. Such
involvement, whether under the guise
of nationalization, "participation" or
increasingly higher tax rates, can
only reduce the freedom and profits
of the major oil companies to the point
where they would function no longer
as independent concessionaires, but as
mere contractors to the oil producing
countries.
These matters, spectacular as they
are, hide a recent development of
Major John A. Berry. United States Army
major importance to the United States
and the world oil industry. This coun-
try, the one major consumer in the
West that has remained immune from
dependence on Middle Eastern oil and
the region's turbulent politics. may
lose this luxury within! a few years.
As recently as 1970, obe could argue
that US interest in Middle Eastern
oil would slowly decline. Nuclear en-
ergy and Alaskan oil seemed capable
of meeting future demand; the short-
fall, if any, would come from Canada
and Venezuela. In this view, Middle
Eastern oil, whose supply to the West
had twice been shut off, would slowly
decline as a source of US supply. The
more daring remarked that, if only
the Arab-Israeli question were re-
solved, US interest in the Middle East
itself might decline.
These predictions may yet prove
correct, but for the next decade or
two their validity is very much open
Military Review 2
to question. Not only should US need
for Middle Eastern oil grow steadily
in the near future, so also should the
United States find a new and unac-
customed restraint on its policy to-
ward the region. To show why this
is so, four major topics require inves-
tigation: the degree of reliance on
Middle Eastern oil .for domestic con-
sumption; the degree of reliance by
US allies, primarily North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, on Middle East
oil; the possibility of a reduction or
cutoff in this oil to the United States
or its allies; and, finally, the impact
of full or partial nationalization of
US oil companies operating in the
Middle East.
Optimism of the recent past on the
US ability to avoid reliance on the
Middle East for sizable quantities of
oil was based on estimates that the
Eastern Hemisphere provided only
20 percent of total oil imports. Of this
figure, approximately three-fourths
came from Arab countries and one-
fourth from non-Arab countries-
Iran for the most part. Eastern Hem-
isphere oil, therefore, constituted 3.8
percent of total US consumption, and
Arab oil, 2.8 percent of the total. 1
OIL
Until 1970, the approximately 15
million tons per year imported from
the Eastern Hemisphere could, if the
need arose, be replaced without seri-
ous difficulty by increased imports
from Venezuela, Canada, or Nigeria.
Additional backup was provided by
US reserve capacity, calculated as
high as 3.5 milIion barrels per day, 2
or 175 milIion tons per year.
To the surprise of many, it became
apparent by late 1970 that demand for
oil in the United States was growing
considerably faster than expected.
After increasing at a rate of 3 per-
cent from 1955 to 1965, oil consump-
tion expanded by nearly 5 percent
annually.3 As a matter of economic
advantage, the Government allowed
increasingly higher levels of imports
during the Sixties, with the knowledge
that the surplus capacity, although
costly to exploit, was always available
for an emergency. By the end of the
decade, however, these imports ex-
ceeded the available reserves, and the
gap has continued to widen. ' In plain
fact, the United States has not been
self-sufficient in oil for several years.
The 1970 report by the Cabinet
Task Force on Oil Import Control
Major John A. Berry, a 1972 grad-
uate of the US Army Command and
General Staff College, is aBsigned to
the Defense Attache Office in Cambo-
dia. He holds a B.S. from the US Mili-
tary Academy and lOas an Olmsted
Scholar at the University of Brussels
in Belgium from 196" to 1966. He has
aerved the Aa-uwtanCi'ti
Command, Vietnam, and lOith the So-
cial Sciences Department, USMA, aB
Assistant Prof688or of Middle East
. Studies.
October 1972
3
OIL
on the relationship of oil imports to
national security recognized that:
. . . this growth in energy demand
is such that imports will have to sup-
ply an increasing share of our market
even with import controls if present
real prices are to be maintained and
not increased. 5
The report projected that oil im-
ports would supply about 30 percent
of US needs by 1980 at present prices
and considerably more if oil were im-
ported at world market prices, which
have been consistently lower than US
market 'prices. This figure of 30 per-
cent has been subsequently revised up-
ward from a variety of sources. The
Office of Emergency Preparedness has
indicated that oil imports may account
for as much as 40 percent of US sup-
ply by 1980 unless forceful counter-
action is taken. 6 A valuable study
from the Petroleum Industry Re-
search Foundation cites a 44 percent
dependency on imports, 1 and the oil
companies go even higher.
If these imports could be limited
to oil from Western Hemisphere coun-
tries such as Canada and Venezuela,
both considered "secure" sources, the
inability of the United States to sup-
ply its own oil should cause little
alarm. There is considerable doubt
that the United States can do so, how-
ever, in which case the country would
find itself in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of relying for sizable imports on
the other major oil exporting region
of the world, the unstable and turbu-
lent Middle East and North Africa.
The magnitude of such dependency is
clearly critical to American freedom
of action in world affairs and requires
further comment here.
In brief, the United States can meet
its growing demand for oil in several
ways:
Develop production rapidly from
Alaska's North Slope.
Adopt specific policy measures to
stimulate domestic production of any
usable form of energy.
Increase imports from Canada,
Venezuela and other Western Hemi-
sphere sources.
Turn to Eastern Hemisphere
sources for the shortfall.
The contribution of each to the need
for oil will be examined.
Turning to the Alaskan reserves,
it is important first to focus on their
magnitude. Although reports vary on
the extent and exploitability of these
fields, both Government and industry
sources are in general agreement that
known reserves for the North Slope
reach at least 10 to 15-billion barrels.
By comparison, known US reserves
(lower 48) are measured at 35 to 40
billion barrels and those of the Mid-
dle East and North Africa together
are in the 400-billion-barrel range.
A 1970 Department of the Interior
report indicates that an increase in
Middle East imports can be avoided
only if the Alaskan fields are produc-
ing one million barrels per day by
1980. By the same year, US consump-
tion will have risen from approxi-
mately 15 million barrels per day for
1970 to somewhere between 19 and 25
million barrels per day. The difference
will obviously have to come from
sources other than Alaska.
A complicating factor in the Alas-
kan production centers on the ques-
tion of environmental damage result-
ing from the proposed heated oil
pipeline between Prudhoe Bay in the
north to the port of Valdez in the
south. Opposition to this form of
transportation has already delayed ex-
Military Review 4
ploitation of the oil to 1978, if not
beyond. Although months of court bat-
tles lie ahead, in all likelihood, the
combined weight of national security
considerations, Alaska's desires for
growth, and pressures from the oil
companies, with nearly $1 billion in-
vested, will eventually win out over
the environmental opposition.
A second contribution to the search
for new energy can be made by a
vigorous search for new sources of
fuel. Potential reserves are far from
exhausted. Tne American Association
of Petroleum Gcologists, in a 1971
report to the Department of Interior,
estimates that "... three to six times
the present U. S. oil reserves . and
two to four times the present natural
gas reserves . . . may yet be discov-
ered." 8
The oil that is left, however, is to
be found in increasingly inaccessible
places, requiring even more costly
processing at greater risk to the en-
vironment. For example, promising
oilfields are to be found offshore in
at least four locations-the Eastern
seaboard, the Gulf of Mexico, Califor-
nia and the Gulf of Alaska. An ac-
celerated program of leasing and
drilling would tap these reserves and
thus greatly alleviate the forecasted
dependence on Eastern Hemisphere
oil by 1980. Yet, after spills and blow-
outs from Santa Barbara to New York
Harbor, environmental opposition to
l\ny offshore oil production is strong.
Legislation has been introduced in
Congress to regulate oil exploration
tightly, and conservation groups have
gone to court in a number of eases to
delay the leasing of drilling rights.
These issues should require several
years or more for resolution.
Synthetic fuels are a possible sup-
plement to lagging domestic produc-
tion. These would include oil and gas
October 1972
OIL
produced from oil shale and tar sands,
as welt as coal. The reserves of oil
shale alone are lenormous: one of the
lowest e s t i m t ~ places them at 80
billion barrels which is double that of
present known ~ i reserves. The pri-
mary shale fields are located in Utah,
Wyoming and Colorado. Tar sands of
Athabasca, Canada, could also make
an important although relatively
smaller contribution.
National coal reserves are estimated
at over 200 billion tons, providing
either a direct substitute for oil or a
source of synthetic oil and gas. Po-
tentially, this quantity of coal could
yield at least 800 billion barrels of oil
after conversion. The missing ingre-
dient in the synthetic fuel picture is
the technology to turn these resources
into usable fuel in the quantity, qual-
ity and cost desired. Although this
technology will undoubtedly be forth-
coming, it will still be 10 years or
more before synthetic fuels begin to
supply significant portions of the
country's energy needs. Environmen-
tal questions of residue, pollution and
stripmining must still be resolved.
In retrospect, the domestic reserves
can be considered capable of ulti-
mately meeting future demand if the
Nation is willing to devote the money
and to risk the environment to this
end. Whether the increases come from
inland or offshore sources or synthetic
fuels, their impact still lies in the
decade of the 1980s and beyond.
A third source of new oil, imports
from Western Hemisphere countries,
will play an important role in reduc-
ing any future oil deficit. In the case
of Canada, many of the potential oil
producing regions are not yet fully
explored, especially those in the Mac-
kenzie Delta and the Arctic Islands.
The available geological data, never-
theless, inspire forecasts of a rise in
5
exports to the United States over the
next 10 years, from the relatively low
level of .7 million barrels per day in
1970 to approximately 2.2 million bar-
rels per day by 1980. As for Vene-
zuela, the trend is in the opposite di-
rection.
It is doubtful that Venezuelan pro-
duction can achieve any major and
permanent increase between 1970 and
1985 the country has stressed
the need for conserving its oil re-
serves, and has projected much lower
target growth rates for production
than have the other major oil export-
ing countries.
Production from 0 the r South
American countries, such as Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, may pick
up the slack from Venezuela, however,
helping to maintain a projected level
of imports into the United States of
a still relatively small 2.7 million bar-
8
OlIsbore drilling platform in Cook
Inlet of the Gulf of Alaska
rels per day. In any case, Western
Hemisphere oil, while still providing
an important share of US imports,
cannot provide the quantities needed
for the growing US demand.
What, then, of the shortfall be-
tween domestic production plus West-
ern Hemisphere imports and total de-
mand? Since the oil must come from
somewhere, the only likely alternate
source of supply is the Middle East
and North Africa, considered here as
one oil producing region. Between 70
and 75 percent of the world's known
oil reserves are found there.
The exact amount of this shortfall,
however, is difficult to forecast. De-
pending on how one wishes to measure
both total demand and the amount of
oil available from each major source,
it is possible to show that the United
States will need by 1980:
Imports of only .5 million bar-
MilitaIJ Review
rels per day from the Arab world. 10
Imports of 5.2 million barrels
per day from the Middle East and
North Africa. 11
A "gap" of 12 million barrels
per day that will have to come from
new oil sources in the United States
and the Middle East. 12
The second of these figures, show-
ing the United States heading toward
a dependency on the Middle East for
23 percent of its oil, is based on the
carefully researched Petroleum In-
dustry Research Foundation study al-
ready cited. A recent release from the
Office of Emergency Preparedness cor-
roborates this forecast with an esti-
mated dependency of 25 percent by
1980. Insofar as an exact figure is
possible, these two seem to be reliable
guideposts and form the basis for the
remarks that follow.
One quick remedy to avoid the po-
litical problems inherent in such a
dependency was recommended in the
Cabinet Task Force Report: restric-
tion as a matter of national policy of
all imports from the Middle East to
a level of 10 percent of total imports.
The problem here is that it would
take the incentive of a sizable increase
in the price of oil to stimulate US and
Western Hemisphere producers to
supply domestic needs. The cost of
this incentive would necessarily be
borne by the consumer.
One authoritative source predicts
that crude oil by the barrel must go
from $3.10 to $3.83 to make this in-
creased production possible. 18 With-
out this price rise, there will simply
not be enough non-Middle East oil
available on a competitive basis tq
make up for the shortfall in supply.
The full dime"sions of this dilemma
for the United States became clear
within the last year. The negotiations
at Teheran and Tripoli between the
Octner 1872
OIL
oil states and the oil producers only
punctuated the fact that the United
States was trapped' by a rapidly ris-
ing demand, declining domestic re-
serves, and insufficient quantities of
"secure" imports.
Two tentative conclusions seem pos-
sible at this point. First, like it or
not, the United States is about to
enter a period of increased reliance on
the Middle East for its oil supply. Sec-
ond, and the full development of this
point is beyond the scope of this
article, this period need not last in-
definitely if the United States is will-
ing to make the necessary sacrifices
and hard decisions to develop a coor-
dinated energy policy. The potential
of Alaskan oil, offshore deposits and
synthetic fuels have been discussed.
Other energy sources, primarily nu-
clear energy, but also natural gas,
coal and solar energy, can relieve the
pressure on oil. For these latter fuels,
it also will not be until the decade of
the 1980s before they can support a
significant share of the energy mar-
ket.
Domestic need for Middle Eastern
oil is far from the only consideration
in determining US foreign policy to-
ward the region. Of great importance
also are the needs of US principal al-
lies, the Western European (NATO)
countries and Japan. These states
have virtually no domestic production
of oil. They import well over 90 per-
cent of their total petroleum supply.
Persian Gulf oil accounts for 45 per-
cent of the European imports, while
North African oil provides another
33 percent. 14 Japan obtains 89 per-
cent of its oil imports from the Per-
sian Gulf. 18 In absolute terms, pe-
troleum is the most important energy
source for both, providing more than
half of the total demand.
In the event of a cutoff in oil from
7
OIL
Middle Eastern producers, denying
Europe and Japan their chief energy
source, the United States would suf-
fer also, although obviously not to the
same degree. US interests are inter-
twined with the economies of these
regions, and their military capacity
is vital to America. Serious damage
to the health of US trading partners,
limiting their ability to buy goods and
servic!es from the United States,
would have important repercussions
in this country.
The United States would, of course,
attempt to supply the needs of Europe
and Japan from other oil sources un-
der the control of US companies, as
it did following the Arab embargo on
oil after the June 1967 war. In the
near future, this practice may no
longer be possible. As already shown,
the United States will soon need every
barrel of its own. Excess domestic
capacity of approximately two million
barrels per day, always counted on as
emergency supply in crisis situations,
should be fully liquidated by the end
of 1975. In fact, the United States
may eventually find itself competing
with Europe and Japan for relatively
scarce non-Middle East imports.
Rationing is another recourse open
to the West in the event of an oil
cutoff. Figures from the Cabinet Task
Force Report show that, in the event
of a severe crisis involving all Arab
exporters for a period of one year in
1980, Free World needs could be met
by the imposition of 10 percent ra-
tioning on US consumption if all pos-
sible emergency measures were used.
If none of them were used, 23 per-
cent rationing would be required. In
short, the Western World might not
be strangled to death by an Arab
boycott of oil production unless it
could be prolonged for an extended
period of several years. In any case,
the experience, whose likelihood will
be investigated next, would not be a
pleasant one, and it is not inconceiv-
able that the outcry from the Ameri-
can consumer at the pain of prolonged
rationing would require the President
either to use force or to make impor-
tant concessions to maintain a steady
flow of oil.
Having established that direct US
dependence on Middle Eastern oil is
increasing, and that indirect de-
pendence through European and Japa-
nese needs is an important considera-
tion, it is next necessary to assess the
chances for a reduction or stoppage
in the oil flow from the Middle East.
Instructive in this regard are the
lessons of the 1956 and 1967 Middle
East crises in regard to the Arab's
ability to block transportation through
the Suez Canal and the oil pipelines-
a factor applying in both crises, and
their willingness to halt oil produc-
tion-important only in the 1967
crisis.
The effect of the 1956 Suez affair
on the European economy was not
catastrophic. A d jus t men t s were
quickly made to import excess sup-
plies from the Western Hemisphere,
and tankers were rerouted around
Africa. Although 80 percent of Eu-
rope's oil supplies had come from the
Persian Gulf region prior to the
crisis, only 20 percent of Europe's
energy needs were then supplied by
oil. The price of oil rose for a short
time, and internal revenue fell when
the quantity of oil products consumed
went down. Neither situation became
serious.
There was also a negative effect on
the European balance of payments as
a result of increased purchases of
dollar oil from the United States and
the increased cost of shipping. These
aspects of the crisis were likewise
Military Review 8
surmounted, and thecrisiswas short-
lived. Europe took warning from the
experience and initiated measures to
reduce itsvulnerabilityto any future
crisis. Petroleum reserves on hand
were gradually increased, alternate
meansoftransportandtransportation
routesweredevelopedandthesources
ofsupply were diversified.
Europe's problem in 1967 lay pri-
marilyinthematterofdiversification.
From 1966 to 1967, considerable geo-
graphic diversification was, in fact,
made in the sources ofoil. The per-
centage of imports coming through
the Canal or pipelines from the Per-
sian Gulf was reduced from 80 per
cent to approximately 60 percent.
Imports from Mediterranean sources
in Libya and Algeria were increased
enormously. Butthesesourcesofsup-
ply were still Arab, meaning that
there had been no political diversifi-
cation. Nigeriawastheoneexception,
butitsshareoftheEuropeanimports
was small atthattime as a resultof
the Biafran War.
OCtOb., 1m
In June 1967, Europe and the rest
of world were caughtbysurprise
at he initial demonstration of Arab
un inregardto theoilboycott. The
Ara were not unaware that Eu-
ropes dependence on Arab oil had
nearly tripled since 1956. It seemed
to them that Europe was absolutely
dependenton Araboil, andthatEuro-
pean production could be paralyzedif
itsoil flow were shutoff. Oil was to
betheirultimatepoliticalweapon.The
prevailing attitude, expressed by the
Algerian Foreign Minister in June
1967, was "The West needs Arab oil
much more urgently than the Arabs
need to sell itto theWest." 16
Attheoutbreakofhostilities, traf-
tie throughthe Suez Canalwas again
blocked. The major Arabproducers-
SaudiArabia,Kuwait,IraqandLibya
-ceased oil production. But it soon
became apparent that the producers
lacked a solid front intheirembargo.
One byone, exceptions were made as
individual European countries were
removed from the blockade. The

OIL
United States was not dependent on
Arab oil then, so was not affected.
Other producers, in the Trucial States
as well as Iran, continued to ship oil
as fast as tankers could load it, and,
consequently, turned a sizable profit.
Iran's production during the three
months of the stoppage actually
jumpeq by 23 percent.
The oil industry for its part made
massive efforts to supply Europe with
its needs. Oil production outside the
Arab world was sharply increased,
primarily in Iran and Venezuela, with
additional assistance from the United
States. The world's tanker fleet was
marshaled to bring the oil around the
Cape and, although severely strained,
found sufficient capacity to meet the
demand. No European country went
without oil. In the words of one ob-
server, the Arabs had taken the wrong
decision based on wrong information.
They lost several hundred million
dollars in revenue and were hurt more
than anyone else by the boycott. 17
Enough time has elapsed since 1967
to note several other effects of the
crisis. The oil industry's efforts to ac-
quire a fleet of supertankers have been
redoubled thus reducing the industry's
dependence on the Suez Canal. Ships
over 80,000 tons cannot pass through
the Canal in its pre-1967 state, and the
current generation of supertankers
ranges from 100,000 to 300,000 tons
in size. European efforts to diversify
the sources of supply away from Arab
countries have taken on new vigor.
Two areas that hold promise in this
regard are the oil and natural gas
fields in Holland and the North Sea,
although neither has the capacity to
end European dependence on Middle
Eastern oil. The American oil com-
panies operating both in Arab coun-
tries and elsewhere enjoyed substan-
tial profits as a result of the crisis
since much of the incressed produc-
tion came from the non-Arab hold-
ings.
Europe, and through it the United
States, has shown its ability to sur-
vive two oil stoppages from the Mid-
dle East within an ll-year period. In
both cases, the Europeans suffered,
but the Arabs suffered as much if not
more and were unable to make their
embargo stick. It is tempting to con-
clude on such proof that the likeli-
hood of a future Arab embargo is low
and its chances for success no better,
but the results of the 1971-72 oil price
negotiations render such a conclusion
foolhardy if not completely erroneous.
During these talks, the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), to the consterna-
tion of both the oil companies and
the Western consumer governments,
was able to raise both the posted price
of oil and the tax rate on this posted
price, effectively increasing oil reve-
nues to OPEC countries by nearly
50 percent over the next five-year
period.
The surprising ease with which the
OPEC countries achieved their de-
mands at Teheran and Tripoli would
seem to indicate a major shift in the
balance of power away from the oil
companies and the consumers toward
the oil producers. Indeed, the Geneva
negotiations of January 1972 rein-
force this conclusion. Seeking com-
pensation for the devaluation of the
dollar, OPEC had no difficulty in ob-
taining an 8% percent rise in the
posted price of oil agreed on by all
sides less than a year before. Admit-
tedly, the OPEC case had some merit,
but the unwillingness of the oil com-
panies to bargain the issue seriously
is further indication of the changing
balance of power.
The central fact explaining this
MilitarY Review
10
shift is the steadily increasing de-
mand for oil in the West compared to
the immensity of the supply of oil in
the Middle East. Also, Middle East
oil is cheap and easy to eJqlloit-heing
near a coast, in a favorable climate
and with cheap labor available. Of de-
cisive importance to the timing of the
shift was the rediscovery, almost by
accident, of the West's vulnerability
to oil cutoff. With the Suez Canal
closed as a result of the 1967 war, oil
tankers were forced to take the longer
and more expensive route around Af-
rica. The world's oil tanker fleet was
then taxed to the maximum to pro-
vide Europe's needs.
When the trans-Arabian pipeline
was closed by Syria, and the militant
Libyan regime decided to limit pro-
duction. oiLonce available in the Medi-
terranean with only a short haul to
Europe had to be obtained over the
far longer journey from the Persian
Gulf. The tanker fleet could not re-
spond to this new demand, shipping
rates skyrocketed, and the oil produc-
ing countries, sensing their new found
strength, successfully advanced their
demands for price rises in Teheran,
threatening an embargo if their de
mands were refused.
Although it would appear that the
Western consumers could respond to
this challenge by coordinating a uni-
fied energy policy, possibly through
the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development or the Euro-
pean Economic Community, or 1hat
the international oil companies could
form a producers' eartel, there is,
nevertheless, little that either group
can do in the short term to reverse
the shift toward a sellers' market and
the condition of oil shortage, as op-
posed to the buyers' market and the
oil surplus condition of the 1960s. The
West has already begun to diversify
Octoll.r 1872
OIL
both its sources of reserves and its
energy supplies, and the oil companies
are energetically searching for oil out-
side the Middle East. In any case,
these measures will not produce over-
night results. The sellers' market is
here for at least the next five to 10
Years.
One must guard against both ex-
cessive pessimism and optimism at
this point. Western resignation to an
Arab strangle hold on the West's oil
supply is not warranted. A community
of interests, if somewhat modified
over previous years, still exists among
the protagonists. The oil exporting
countries urgently need the revenues
from oil sales to support their plans
for economic development. And only
the West consumes and can afford to
buy oil in the quantity that the Arabs
and Iranians wish to sell.
The previous high rate of growth
in these count1ies, based on oil rev-
enues for the most part. has gen-
erated a wave of expectations that
could not be suppressed for long, and
then only with danger to the regime
in power. Mossadegh's ouster in 1954
is a pertinent example, and his fate
and the turbulent conditions in Iran
must weigh heavily in the mind of the
Shah. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait re-
ceive the bulk of their gross national
product from oil and likewise cannot
be expected to go to the brink over
questions of Arab pride or political
squabbles. Even revolutionary Iraq
and Algeria realize the importance of
oil revenues to their development
plans.
On the other hand, there is scant
cause for optimism either. As we have
already seen, the excess capacity
which the United States could call on
in 1967 in order to divert importa to
Europe will soon disappear. In addi- '
tion, the radical regimes are spread.
11
OIL
ing in the Middle East and may not
act rationally in oil matters. Libya,
one of the most revolutionary Of all,
was in the ranks of the conservatives
in 1967; Iraq and Algeria are the
other radical regimes, ranged against
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu
Dhabi. The leaders of this latter
group, each subject to overthrow in
the unstable Middle East, cannot af-
ford to be considered conciliatory in
oil negotiations. 18
Clearly, the oil companies have not
seen the last of OPEC's revolutionary,
hardnosed tactics. Perhaps the major
lesson to be drawn from these recent
and earlier events is that the Arabs,
conservative and radical alike, are
able to maintain unity in matters of
pricing which benefit all. They are
unable, however, to do so on political
issues involving retaliation against
the West for real or supposed wrongs
committed against their neighbors.
The validity of this lesson for the
future will be examined next.
One final but important considera-
tion for the United States concerns
the imp act of nationalization of
American oil companies operating in
the Middle East. Outright national-
ization-a full takeover of company
resources-if applied to all American
or Western oil firms, would change the
entire structure of the oil industry
overnight. There is little logic in sqch
action for the oil producing s t ~
however-a fact seemingly understood
by most moderate leaders in the re-
gion.
The authors of the comprehensive
Middle Eastern Oil and the Western
World conclude in their study of the
changing patterns of country-com-
pany relationships that:
The more sober minds in the oil-
producing countries tend to regard
nationalization within the calculable
The world's Illiest all desulfurlzinc plant In Venezuela
J
~
I
Military Review
12
OIL
future as a false goal, entailing duas-
troU8 consequences. 11
Fear over a sharp fall in the price
of oil, inability to market the oil, lack
. of technical and managerial expertise
and uncertainty over Western reac-
tion have been the strongest argu-
ments against such a move. .
The risk, of course, for the United
States is that Western logic may not
apply in Middle Eastern minds. Three
cases of full or partial nationalization
have occurred within the last 18
months: the French companies in Al-
geria, British Petroleum in Libya, and
in June of this year, the Iraq Petro-
leum Company (IPC) in Iraq. The
fact that American companies were
barely touched by these takeovers,
with only a one-quarterinterest in
IPC, is small consolation for the fu-
ture.
On the other hand, both Algeria
and Iraq have experienced difficulty
in bringing their oil to market. For
Iraq, especially, there is risk of a se-
vere drop in revenue. Neither country
seems to have inspired emulation by
the major producers in the Persian
Gulf, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
or by the non-Middle Eastern mem-
bers of OPEC for that matter. With
more at stake, these countries favor
a more cautious and deliberate ap-
proach.
"Participation" is now the pre-
ferred method for the moderate re-
gimes of OPEC to achieve majority
control of the industry. In its simplest
form, participation calls for nothing
more than partial and passive owner-
ship of the company by the host gov-
ernment through legal means. OPEC's
intentions go considerably beyond this
limited goal. The more restrained
voices call for participation in man-
agement decisions in order to control
more fully the exploitation of natural
OCtober 1872
resources. Others demand a direct
hand in downstream operations, in-
cluding transportation, refining and
marketing
OPEC members are not yet of one
mind on the extent of participation
that is to be achieved. Some, for in-
stance Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait, are urging an initial 20 percent
share; Libya demands an immediate
51 percent. Very little has been said
by OPEC on the crucial questions
of how and how much OPEC members
will pay for their partnership and
whether and at what price the oil
companies can buy back their part-
ner's share of the oil for marketing.
If one fact is certain, it is OPEC's
determination to push ahead on this
issue. A possible breakthrough for
OPEC came in March 1972 when the
Arabian-American Oil Com pan y
(ARAMCO) agreed "in principle" to
a 20 percent participation for the
Saudi Arabian Government in the
company. The specific terms of this
agreement remain to be negotiated by
the two sides over the next few
months.
If the negotiations break down, or
if other oil companies drag their feet,
OPEC has already announced its in-
tention to undertake unilateral action,
to include the application of sanctions,
to achieve at least 20 percent owner-
ship in the oil companies operating
in the Persian Gulf. 20 If successful
in these demands, OPEC can certainly
be expected to raise the ante over
time, probably to 51 percent. A key
date in this regard may be in 1979
when the Oil Consortium righta in
Iran terminate. In full legality, the
Shah could then demand a percentage
share that he feels appropriate. If be
obtains it, the demand is certain to
be echoed by others. 21
A full examination of the signifi-
13
OIL
cance of participation to the oil com-
panies is beyond the scope of this
article. For them, the issue was best
summarized by Walter Levy recently
in Foreign Affairs:
A major decision that the oil com-
panies will be facing over the years
ahead is, to what eztent and for how
long they can be held hostage by their
resource interests in producing coun-
tries. Will they, together with con-
suming countries, be able to moderate
the ransom; or alternatively, would it
be better to abandon the hostage?"
The producing countries will deter-
mine for the most part when partici-
pation arrives, based on their assess-
ment of their ability to master the
technical-managerial aspects of pro-
duction, as well as the competitive
forces that would drive down the price
of oil.
Not only are the oil companies
faced with participation, so are the
major consumers. What would be the
impact on the United States, for ex-
ample, of a 51 percent control of oil
production operations of US com-
panies by the oil producing states
sometime in the 1980s? Any answer
to this question must, of necessity, be
speculative in nature and dependent
upon one's assumptions on the im-
portance of the continued existence of
the oil companies. The response which
follows is based on the premise that,
for any consumer government, "The
major concern is oil availability-on
acceptable commercial terms, strate-
gically secure and not subject to po-
litical blackmail." 28 The profit mar-
gins of individual oil companies or
producer states are far less important.
On the surface it would seem that
the US or Western need for oil and
the Middle Eastern need for revenues
give the two sides a community of
interests that would ensure a rela-
tively stable flow of oil. There are two
problems here. First, one or more of
the major producing states could find
their producing operation shut off or
even destroyed as the result of a vio-
lent and prolonged revolution. While
this would be an argument for con-
tinued emphasis on Western diversi-
fication of sources, such an upheaval
would affect any system of oil pro-
duction and management, not only
state-company participation.
The second problem is more rele-
vant. Several of the major oil pro-
ducers might eventually conclude that
their greatly increased revenues free
them from dependence on oil sales for
a year or more. This should not be
the case in Iran, but Libya, with sur-
plus revenues somewhere over $2 bil-
lion, or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, un-
der revolutionary control, might be
so inclined. Further, any regIme con-
fident of its ability to control domestic
discontent could also be tempted to
exact unacceptable concessions from
consumer governments in return for
its oil.
Are the examples of previous fail-
ures of Arab and Iranian attempts at
politically motivated embargoes, dis-
cussed in the preceding section, ap-
plicable to a future under country-
company participation? Their rele-
vance to the problem seems certain,
but there can be no guarantee that
such embargoes will not occur, espe-
cially as the producing states realize
that the United States is growing
more dependent on their oil.
In the past, when these oil cutoffs
were attempted, the oil industry al-
ways managed to supply its embar-
goed customers by internally adjust-
ing the sources and destinations of oil
deliveries. The real threat of partici-
pation to the West, the United States
included, lies perhaps in the fact that
Military Review
14
Pert ef Kuwait elllaadin, faclliUes
produeing states which control 61 per-
cent of company operations could pre-
vent any future shifts of deliveries
among oil eompanies and, thereby, in-
crease the effectiveness of an embargo
in direct proportion to the quantity
of oil needed.
What, then, of our lesson of the
past, that OF-EC unity is possible
only in matters of prieing whieh bene-
fit all, and not on political issues in-
volving a limited number of nations?
OPEC's new found strength and the
mechanism of eontrol provided by par-
tieipation may well tempt the oil
states to try again, given, of course,
the proper issue to focus the attention
and emotions of the Middle East. At
present, only the Arab-Israeli issue
seems to qualify. No elear-cut answer
is possible here. To the extent that the
major OPEC produeers-not iinme-
diately in need of revenues, in strong
control at home, and trusting of the
others' not to seek an economie ad-
vantage--can unify on an embargo
OCtob... ,872
policy, the threat to the United States
will grow as US dependence on OPEC
oil grows. To the extent that the
United States can bring countervail-
ing political or economie power to
bear on OPEC members, gain assist-
anee from its allies, stockpile oil, di-
versify its sourees of oil and energy,
or, best of all, encourage eloser ec0-
nomic ties with and national develop-
ment of the oil states during the next
decade, the threat is reduced. Any
more precise answer would be entirely
too speculative.
Partieipation in itself then appears
to be almost a limited threat to future
US imports from the Middle East. In
terms of oil availability, it should not
reduce the desire of oil producers to
sell oil or inerease revenues. Although
useful in mounting new political or
economie offensives against the West,
it should not prove decisive if pre-
ceded by a thoughtful, far-sighted
policy toward the oil produeers. In
brief, the conditions which render
15
OIL
dangerous any sizable dependency on
oil imports from the Middle East
should not be further aggravated by
gradual participation of the oil pro-
ducing states in oil production opera-
tions.
On the other hand, America's grow-
ing need for Middle Eastern oil should
increase 'steadily as an important pol-
icy consideration during this decade.
This dependence can be reduced, if
not eliminated, by strong action at
the national level to develop all do-
mestic oil resources and other energy
sources in balance with protection for
the environment. The needs of our
allies in Europe and Japan further
emphasize the urgency of a coherent
national energy policy.
While it appears that the West has
a reasonable chance of obtaining Mid-
dle East oil to fill its energy needs,
the price may be a reduced freedom
of action in relations with the major
oil producing states. The price could
also include a restructuring of the
oil industry to allow participation by
OPEC members, with the full range,
speed and cost of this participation
to be determined. The situation could
be rendered even worse in the short
term by a wave of political instability
throughout the region or by unex-
pected Soviet successes. It could be
improved somewhat by the rapid de-
velopment of Alaskan, Canadian or
oft'shore oil resources.
The decade of the 1970s may re-
semble in many ways the immediate
postwar years when assurances on oil
supply were not available. It is only
in the longer term, beyond 1980 or
1985, that the optimistic predictions
of decreasing importance of Middle
Eastern oil in US policy formulation
begin to make sense.
NOTES
1 Cabinet Task Force on on Import Control.
Tlte oa Import Question. Superintendent of Doeu-
ments. US Government Printing Office, Waahing.
ton, D. C., 1970. P 48.
2 Sam H. Schurr and Paul T. HomaD, Middls
Eaatern Oil and the Western World. American
Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc.. N. Y., 1971. p 37.
:J The Economist. London. Eng., 23 January
1971. p 36.
.. Hollis M. Dole. "America's Energy Needs,"
Vital Speeches 0/ the Da.,I. 15 1tfareh 1971. p 828.
t. Cabinet Task Force on on Import Control,
01'. cit P 44.
o Remarks by the Honorable G. A. Lincoln.
Dlrec.tor. Office of Emergency Preparedness, at
University of Denver Graduate School of Inter-
national Studies. 2 April 1971, "Resource Con-
siderations In Global StrateaY:' Chart 10.
Of Henry B. Steele, "on Import Dependenee and
Domestic Oil Prices-A 15-Year Foreeut," Oil
Imports and the National Interat. Petroleum
Industry Researeh Foundation, March 1971. pp
4, 6.
8 Oil and GtUl Journal, '1 Februal7 1972. p 86.
8 Steele. op. cit. pIS.
10 Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control.
OPt cit., p 49. baaed on 1969 data and prepared
before the full dimensions of the US aU shortage
had become known.
11 Steele. op. cit.. p 7.
,
1St Thornton F. Bradshaw. "Power Crisis-
EI..trlelty. OD, Coal:' U.S. New. d! World R.
Jlo,.t. 10 May 1971. p 86.
1:1 Steele. op. cito, p 6.
U The NelD York Timu. 12 ,J'u1Y 1970.
1S World t r ~ m Report, Volume XVI, 1970,
pp 106-9.
10 John H. Lichthlau. "The Polities of Petro-
leum," TM Reportlr. 18 July 1967, P 26.
n Walter Z. Laqueur, TM Stf'1l.aa'ttt for tM
MicldU Ecut. The Macmillan Co.. N. Y.. 1970.
P 127.
18 Dankwart lL Rustow. "Dependabnity and
Dependence: Potitleal Prospects for Middle Eu-t
Oil." Oil Imporla OM t1l4 Notiomll Intn..t. OJ'.
cit.. pp 89-41.
18 Schurr. Homan. op. cito. P 189.
20 Oil and GtUl Jouf'K4l, 31 .lanuaIT 1972, PI'
66-67.
11 Walter J. Levy, "on Power," Forrian Af-
fain, July 1971. p 658.
:1 IbitL
II Ibid.. p 656.
MllitJry Review
16
P
OPULAR and professional jour-'
nals abound in articles proclaim-
ing the good in foreign policy-the
proper structuring of relevant agen-
cies, the proper conception of the na-
tional interest, and the proper word-
ing and transmission of messages to
friends and enemies. Comparatively
little attention has been paid to the
causes of foreign policy errors. Yet
all students recognize that, in the 20th
century, totalitarian and democratic
nations alike have made misinformed
and misguided foreign policy deci-
sions.
Thus, Hitler was confident that,
after the fall of France, the British
would soon concede the victory that
he would easily win if they offered
October 1972
resistance. At the close <ilf the Second
World War, ~ Unitj!d States at-
tempted to bribe tire SlWiet Union into
action against Japan, when, as Ray-
mond Aron has pointed out, we should
have been paying it to keep out. 1
Perhaps most convincing' are the de-
cisions which led to the First World
War; all were based upon a passionate
desire to preserve the peace. Com-
bined, they produced the precise op-
posite.
In view of the conspicuousness of
these examples and of the high stakes
of contemporary international poli-
tics, one would expect statesmen to
take pains to avoid misunderstanding.
The quotation at the beginning of this
article jndicates not only awareness
17
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
of the problem, but also the practical
difficulties of solving it. Ironically
enough, Dean Acheson, author of the
quotation, played a leading role in a
classic instance of misreading another
country's intentions.
Following the sudden, sweeping
success of the Inchon landings in Sep-
tember 1950, the Truman administra-
tion-hl which Acheson was the Sec-
retary of State-decided to cross the
38th Parallel and to unite Korea by
force. Two weeks later, the mainland
Chinese began to infiltrate troops
across the Yalu River in preparation
for the counterattack which produced
the longest retreat in US military
history and a costly, divisive war.
Since the United Nations forces had
already convincingly achieved their
original objectives-the repelling of
the aggressor and the re-establish-
ment of the status quo ante-bellum-
the drive northward was, on the face
of it, a singularly low-profit, high-
risk venture. The most that could be
achieved was the unification of Korea
-hardly a first-order priority. At
worst, the Chinese, supported by the
Soviets, would intervene, and a major
ground war, raising the danger of a
third global conflict, would ensue.
,In these circumstances, with a
great deal to lose and very little to
gain, the administration had the max-
imum incentive to proceed cautiously
and to take pains to understand Chi-
na's intentions. Sending only Republic
of Korea troops north of the parallel
would have been one way to test re-
actions, to minimize risks and to gain
2 This course was urged
on MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs,
but he invoked the prerogatives of the
field commander to overrule it. Stop-
ping at Korea's narrow neck, as the
British urged, would have been an-
other. Instead, the administration
chose a course of action which presup-
posed China's cooperative restraint.
In fact, the only rational basis for
the decision would have been the judg-
ment that the probability of Chinese
intervention was zero. Given the
heavy domestic and international
costs of a war with China, any chance
of a Chinese entry would have cre-
ated a danger sufficient to dictate
stopping at the border or, at least,
exercising one of the options noted
above. No administration would have
undertaken a policy of so little prom-
ise unless it had decided that inter-
vention was not merely unlikely, but
completely out of the question.
Logically, then, the failure to exer-
cise caution depends upon complete
confidence in Chinese inaction. Can
Mic1ule1 A. KraBfUJr is teaching a
course on American Foreign Policy
and Military Strategy at Queens Col-
lege of the City University of New
York. He received an A.B. degree in
1964 from the University of Chicago
and is currently studying for a Ph.D.
in Political Science at Columbia. Uni-
versity. From 1966-67, he '10M a Con-
sultant in the OfJice of Economic Op-
portunity.
MIlItaJJ Rlvllw 18
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
Beneral ."'i.' Ann{D......' fii C....., IINCo...d'.,Vf;its tile franUlnes
abIYe Suwon, Korel, acclmplnled by Mljtr Benerll Courtney W11lt1oy IIocend fro. lelll, L1eUlenlnl Ben,ral
Mltth,w B. Rid"IY (centerl. Ind Mljor General WiIIllm B. Keln Ir/Pt bacqnundl
it also be shown that such an assump-
tion was part of the actual decision?
Considerable evidence indicates that
it was. Five days before the Inchon
landings. Dean Acheson said:
1 should think it would be sheer
madness on the part of the Chinese
Communists to do tka,t [intervene]
and 1 see no adv(1,ntage to them in do-
ing so.'
After the crossing and intervention,
Acheson admitted in testimony before
the Congressional committee investi-
gating the dismissal of General Doug-
las MacArthur that the Chinese had
"fooled" the administration. He and
General Hoyt Vandenberg stressed
Octob,r 1972
that China's capability had been rec-
ognized all along. The problem was to
determine their intentions. 4 On this
point, the administration had gone
astray. The failure to adopt the more
cautious alternatives and the vulner-
ability of US forces at the time of the
Chinese attack are further evidence
of the administration's confidence that
China would stay out.
Under the circumstances, this con-
fidence was unusual. From the Chi-
nese viewpoint, potentially hostile
forces were marching' to the border,
obliterating a buffer state which pro-
tected China's vital industrial concen-
tration in Manchuria. How could US
19
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
policymakers be sure of Chinese equa-
nimity in the face of so threatening
an action?
In order to answer these questions,
it is necessary to examine US Far
Eastern policy generally and the at-
tendant domestic political situation.
In this context, the bitter conflicts be-
tween the two major parties, the
breakdown of bipartisan support for
Far Eastern policy and the ties be-
tween General MacArthur and the
Republican party were the major ele-
ments.
Historically, the last two are re-
lilted. Republicans had resented Dem-
ocratic handling of Far Eastern rela-
tions since the Second World War.
Franklin Roosevelt had incurred hos-
tility for his allegedly imperious,
European-minded conduct of that war.
In response, Arthur Vandenberg, the
senator from Michigan, led a move-
ment to secure the 1944 Republican
presidential nomination for Mac-
Arthur. Although the general him-
self destroyed the effort with some
extravagant remarks, Vandenberg's
regard for him was \Indiminished. The
ties and the symbol remained to in-
fluence later events.
More immediate and more impor-
tant to the growing Republican stri-
dency than the experience of the Sec-
ond World War were reactions to a
series of events, people and policies,
including the election defeat of 1948,
the "loss" of China, the Soviet acqui-
sition---ilonsiderably sooner than ex-
pected--of nuclear weapons, the Cold
War and containment policy, the New
Deal, Alger Hiss, Dean Acheson and
Klaus Fuchs. The theme that held to-
gether this disparate bag of issues
was that the policies and actions of
a few men-mainly Eastern, overed-
ucated and Anglophiliac-were sub-
verting our moral fiber at home and
the national interest abroad.
The most striking illustration of
the temper of the times was the me-
teoric rise of Senator Joseph Mc-
Carthy, the Republican from Wiscon-
sin, whose campaign against the
"traitors within" had been spectacu-
larly launched in the win t e r of
1949-50. The enormous public re-
sponse, so disproportionate to any-
thing the issue had generated pre-
viously, set McCarthy apart and made
him an influence on men and events.
Republican leaders embraced and
echoed him. Senator Robert Taft, af-
ter taking the measure of McCarthy's
following, advised him to keep trying,
hit or miss-"If one case doesn't
work, try another." G Senator Vanden-
berg was heard to wonder if "biparti-
sanship means more Chinas and more
Hisses and more messes with Russian
bombs hanging over us." 8
Vandenberg's comment is' particu-
larly significant since he, as the chief
Republican spokesman on foreign pol-
icy, had led the early shift away from
isolationism and had been the princi-
pal architect of bipartisanship-the
procedure which involved the opposi-
tion party in the policymaking process
-thus keeping foreign policy out of
par tis a n conflict. The crowning
achievement of this process was the
Marshall Plan and Senator Vanden-
berg had been instrumental in its de-
velopment and safe passage through
Congress.
Far Eastern policy, however, had
remained largely a matter for the ex-
ecutive. Vandenberg noted this differ-
ence in 1949 and disassociated him-
self from the administration's Far
Eastern policy. Thus removed from
the shelter of bipartisanship, the issue
was a natural for exploitation by the
aggressive Republicans.
In the winter of 1949-50, an inci-
MIlIlaIJ Rev!ew
20
dent occurred which illustrates well
the atmosphere and the politicaf
framework which shaped policy. Fol-
lowing a review of foreign and mili-
tary policy, the administration con-
cluded that Taiwan was not of suffi-
cient strategic value to warrant the
use of US troops in its defense. In-
stead, the State Department would try
by diplomatic means to keep the island
out of hostile hands. Since it was
thought that Chiang Kai-shek would
soon be overthrown by the Commu-
nists, the best chance to accomplish
this goal was to be on good terms
with Mao Tse-tung's regime. To do
this required minimizing ties with
Chiang's regime and allowing the
natural inclination of the mainland
Chinese for the United States and
their "natural conflict" with Soviet
imperialism to take effect. It should
be noted that Communist China's hos-
tility to the United States was not yet
plain, a point which will be discussed
later at some length.
Unfortunately, the administration's
attempts to implement this rather
subtle strategy were clumsy. In prep-
aration for Chiang's imminent down-
fall, the State Department distributed
a briefing paper which minimized the
loss as not vital to US interests. On
3 January 1950, the contents of the
paper were leaked from General Mac-
Arthur's Tokyo headquarters.
Republican party spokesmen re-
acted promptly and vehemently. Con-
struing the paper as a betrayal of the
Nationalists, they demanded a full-
scale debate. Vandenberg agreed and
led off with a mild statement. Bitter
attacks followed. The culmination was
an angry denunciation by Senator
Taft which invoked the names of Mac-
Arthur and of former President
Hoover against the State Department
and its "procommunist allies,"
OCtOIIlr 1872
8lnllllllrl.1 I:bllnl ~ l b l k
Most ominously from the admin-
istration's point of view, Senator Wal-
ter George-a recognized Democratic
spokesman on foreign policy-joined
the assault. Following his speech, the
Republicans threatened to cut funds
for the Marshall Plan if the admin-
istration recognized the mainland re-
gime. ,
In summary, the administration
was trying to pursue a policy of non-
interference which it believed would
encourage the mainland Chinese to
ally themselves with the United States
against the Soviet imperialism sup-
posedly being practiced against them.
In response, powerful and vocal lead-
ers of the opposition party, joined by
some Democrats and tacitly allied
with General MacArthur, rode the
crest of a shrill anticommunism and
demanded that the administration de-
fend the Chinese Nationalists, even
stating that failure to do so would
indicate Communist allegiance.
21
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOnPES
Members If the 3d Republic If Klrel DiYlsiln IRd the .
US Mllitlry Advlslry Group tl ROK were the first UN troops 10 cross the 38th Parallel
Withtheissuethusframed, thead-
ministration was unable to carry
through its policy. It could forestall
an active defense of Taiwan, but it
could not put into effect the plan to
courtthe Red Chinese. The ability of
Congressional Republicans to hinder
or even to hamstring the Marshall
Plan;and the atmosphere created by
attacks on the motives and loyalty of
administrationpersonnel,maderecog-
nition a threat to high-priority goals
inEuropeand virtualpoliticalsuicide
at home.
These relationships were further
delineated by episodes which followed
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea
and the interposition of the Seventh
Fleet between Taiwan and the main-
land.AlthoughPresidentTrumanwas
at pains to emphasize that only neu-
tralization for the duration was in-
tended, General MacArthur took the
opportunity to promote ties with the
Nationalists. Following a conference
with Chiang on the island, the gen-
eral issued a statement praising
Chiang's resistance to communism.
Chiang replied thatthe talks hadlaid
the basis of Sino-American military
cooperation and that victory was as-
sured now that the old comradeship
with MacArthur was re-established.
President Truman hurriedly dis-
patched Averell Harriman to inform
MacArthur of the administration's
policy and to get his allegiance. Har-
riman thought he had obtained the
general's support, only to have Mac-
Arthur issue, upon Harriman's de-
parture, a statement criticizing those
who had "misrepresented" his views,
Mllitlry Revllw 22
and who had "invariably in the past
propagandized a policy of defeatism
and appeasement in the Pacific" and
who were "10,000 miles from the ac-
tual events. . . ." 1
Two wee k s later, MacArthur's
speech, meant to be read at the an-
nual encampment of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, was sent to the news
media "as a routine courtesy," but
somehow never reached either the
White House or the Pentagon. In the
speech, MacArthur emphasized the
strategic importance of Taiwan, again
rebuked appeasement and defeatism,
sounded the trumpet for a policy of
strength and boldness in Asia, and
labeled Communist China an un-
friendly power.
Truman later wrote that he thought
of relieving MacArthur, but decided
against it so that the general would
not be hurt personally. 8 One may,
without doubting Truman's humani-
tarianism, speculate that matters
other than the general's career and
feelings crossed the President's mind.
Relieving MacArthur, the great war
hero, the symbol and unofficial spokes-
man for a strongly anticommunist pol-
icy in the Far East, would have pre-
cipitated a major foreign policy crisis.
The same considerations applied to
the decision to cross the 38th Parallel.
To stop at the border would have
caused the same kind of crisis, the
same cries of "traitor" and "soft on
communism," the same threat to the
Marshall Plan, the same bitter parti-
san conflict. Once presented with the
opportunity of an easy, total military
victory, that traditional prize whose
absence had made the containment
policy so unpalatable, the administra-
tion was under strong ,constraints to
press its advantage.
In the face of accusations of ap-
peasement from powerful domestic
October 1872
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
and military voices, it was difficult to
say that we had accomplished our
original objective and would let pass
this golden opportunity to win a com
plete victory, to punish aggression,
and to free a people from communism
and national division.
The costs of the war created an-
other pressure to cross the parallel.
In view of the lives sacrificed, the res-
toration of the status quo ante-bellum
did not seem enough; we would only
have been back where we started. The
US ambassador to the United Nations,
Warren R. Austin, spoke to this point,
asking for a living monu)Dent to
match the sacrifices made. 9
The discussion, thus far, indicates
why the choice of crossing the parallel
had become more attractive, but it
does not explain why the administra-
tion was wiIling to risk Chinese in-
tervention. Granted that halting Mac-
Arthur at the border would have made
Truman look "like the man who had
deprived General MacArthur of vic-
tory," 10 wouldn't Truman have done
so anyway if he had believed there
was a chance of Chinese intervention?
Granted that MacArthur and the Re-
publicans would have raised a great
hue and cry and would have caused
perhaps a foreign policy crisis,
wouldn't Truman have risked that in
order to avoid the risk of a ground
war against China and the possibility
of its escalation? The answers can
only be yes.
The costs of Chinese involvement
were so great that no administration
would have run even a slight risk of
incurring them. Reasoning backward,
the conclusion is inevitable that Tru-
man and the other high policymakers
considered the risks negligible.
To understand this assessment,
which seems highly unlikely in retro-
spect, it is necessary to examine the
23
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
administration's general outlook on
China. The "Mao Tse-Tito" theme
which colored the administration's
policy toward Taiwan was an im-
portant element in this perspective.
The conviction that conflict between
China and the USSR was natural and
inevitable because of their conflicting
national interests is clear and explicit
in all' of Secretary Acheson's public
statements during this period. Influ-
ential experts held similar views.
George Kennan offered the opinion
that the Soviets were the least likely
candidates for a partnership with the
Chinese. 11 The majority opinion in
round-table discussions at the prestig-
ious Institute of Pacific Relations was
that China under Mao was strongly
Nationalist, hen c e , potentially,
strongly anti-Soviet. The corollary to
the idea of inevitable conflict between
the Soviets and the Chinese was the
"keep-out-of-the-way" policy that the
administration had tried unsuccess-
fully to follow.
More fundamental was the admin-
istration's reading of the Chinese na-
tional character. This view had it that
the Chinese people cherished a warm
regard for the American people and
that this regard would restrain any
regime which conJemplated aggres-
sive action against the United States.
Of course, this sort of statement,
distinguishing peoples from their gov-
ernment, is virtually an international
ritual, obligatory on all sides in the
period just before battle. Nonetheless,
the frequency of its appearance in im-
portant official pronouncements, and
the frequency and apparent sincerity
with which it was put forth in private
by influential people, seems to indicate
that something more was involved in
this case.
Truman, for example, cited the his-
torical record of friendship between
the United States and the Chinese
people in his letter of 26 August to
Trygve Lie; iterated the idea in a
speech on 1 September, adding the
hope that the Chinese people would
not be misled or forced into fighting
against their American friends; and
reiterated the same sentiment after
the Chinese attack. Various high-
ranking spokesmen, including Ache-
son, followed much the same line. At
the aforementioned sessions at the
Institute of Pacific Relations, its most
active proponent was the representa-
tive of the International Missionary
Council. 12
In addition to being favorably
inclined toward the United States, the
Chinese people were held to be demo-
cratic. A State Department white
paper on the Far East proclaimed that
the "profound civilization and the
democratic individualism of China
will reassert themselves and she will
throw off the foreign yoke." 13 In vain
did John Fairbank protest that, so
far from being inherently Chinese,
"democratic individualism" translated
into Chinese with an antisocial con-
notation. 1.
In the context of this stereotyped
image of China, the administration's
reasoning becomes clear. The Chinese
liked us and shared our democratic
ideology. They would know that the
United States had no aggressive in-
tent toward China and would, there-
fore, feel no qualms about a US-dom-
inated army destroying the North
Korean buffer state and marching to
the Yalu. Furthermore, the Chinese
Government would realize that its
true interests lay with the United
States and against the Soviet Union.
Mao's regime would, therefore, re-
frain from acting against the United
States.
Thus, the mistaken conviction that
Military ReView
24
Tbe Yalu River witb the maunllins If Menchurlaln the blCkpeund
China would not enter the Korean
War was part of a more general mis-
conception. US policymakers seriously
misunderstood the feelings of the
Chinese Government and probably of
the Chinese people with regard to the
Soviet Union and the United States.
There remains the question: How
did men as acute and well informed
as Acheson form and hold tenaciously
such misconceptions? Little more than
speculation is appropriate on this
point, but some comments are pos-
sible.
The notion of a special relationship
between the two countries, a relation-
ship based upon US benevolence and
Chinese gratitude, is traditional in
American thinking, if not in Chinese.
George Kennan argues in his Ameri-
can Diplomacy: Nineteen Hundred to
Nineteen Fifty, that our Far Eastern
lIctIber 1872
policies have been based upon a sen-
timentality which turns in moments
of disappointment into blind petu-
lance. II This tendency is evident in
the "yellow-menace" rhetoric which
was first heard in connection with im-
migration controversies in the 19th
century and which reappeared in the
Vietnam debates as the specter of
"SOO million Chinese armed with nu-
clear weapons."
This attitude may have been in-
spired, in part, by the activities of
US missionaries. S p 0 n s 0 red by
churches largely based in the Mid-
west, they returned periodically to tell
eager congregations of the gratitude
and affection of the newly converted
heathen. This slightly updated version
of the "little-brown-brother" theme f
was extended by the State Depart-
ment to include a natural Chinese in-
25
FOREIGN POLICY STEREOTYPES
clination to American-style democ-
racy.
The impact of this stereotype on
policymaking may also have been in-
creased by the lack of good intelli-
gence. There are, after all, many pop-
ular stereotypes-the stolid German,
the supercilious Frenchman, the dour
Englishman-which do not seem to
have been so influential.
The difference is, as Roger Hilsman
has pointed out, that, while there was
an abundance of experts and informa-
tion on Europe, there was a compara-
tive dearth of such resources on
China. In a relative intelligence vac-
uum, stereotypes would have greater
influence and might overwhelm more
sober judgments. This would be es-
pecially likely when proponents of
sentimental images-in this case the
missionary groups--c 0 u I d claim
"first-hand knowledge."
The political situation, as outlined
above, may have created additional
pressures toward wishful, sentimentsl
thinking. Caught in a predicament
which offered no attractive alterna-
tive, policymakers may have been in-
clined to manufacture one. If stopping
MacArthur would produce a severe
.domestic reaction, and if the Chinese
were well disposed to the United
States, then surely the Chinese would
understand that the move to the Yalu
was not directed at them. Our confi-
dence in China's ability to understand
the complexities of our domestic poli-
tics was obviously misplaced.
From this analysis one can deduce
a rule of thumb for judging foreign
policy: Be skeptical of policies which
solve pressing political problems by
relying on another nation's benevolent
understanding.

NOTES
1 Raymond Aron. Peace and War: A TMOf1l of
International Relations. Praeger Publishers. N. Y.,
1967. p 82.
a Milita", Situation in the Far ElUt. Bearings
Betore the Committee on the Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate.
82d Congress. Firat session, Superintendent of
Documents. US Government Printing Office.
Washington, D. C. 1951, pp 1216.17. 1230 Bnd
8198.
I Department 01 State Bulletin. Volume XXIII,
p 468.
.. Militaru Situation in the Far Eest. OJ'. cit.
pp 2100-2106. 1468.

pp 109-10.
e Quoted by Eric Goldman. The Cn<cial Deeado
and Afkr: Am.erica 1946-1980. Vintage Trade
Books. Rand0J!1 Bouse Inc., N. Y., 1960J P 182.

N. Y., 1956, p 875.
vlfn: &:
Doubleday ... Co. Inc.. Garden City. N. Y 1958,
pp 85856.
26
o Stats Deparlment op. pp 679-80.
10 "Testimony of Dr. Richard E. Neustadt!' in
Adminilt'rtdion of NoCion4l Staff Reports
and Hearings Submitted to the Committee on
Government US Senate, by Its Sub-
committee on National Security Staffing and
Operations. 88th COngress, Superintendent of
Documents. US Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C.. 1965. p 95.
11 Geonre Kennan. in Tranae of Round..
TabJe DtscussioDs ot American Polley
Toward. China in the Departmen , 6. 7
and 8 October 1959, Institute ot
Bearinge Betore the Subcommittee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and other Internal Seeurity Laws of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciar7. US Senate. 82d Conereas.
First Session. Superintendent of Doeuments. US
Government PrintinB' OfIlce, Washington, D. C.,
19610052, p 1668. Hereafter cited 88 "InaUtute
Bearings:'
"Ibid, p 1641.
11 State Department White "U.S. ReIa..
tions with China. 19U.....9: Superintendent of
Documents, US Government Printing Office. Wash-
ington. D. C.. 1949, p xv.
u "lnstitute Heari.na." op. pit.. p 1687.
15 George Kennan. Al'I'Uriean Diplom4ev: Ninl!-
teen BundNd Co NiMteen Fifty. Seeker ,& War-
bul'l'. London, Eng. 1953, p 53.
Military Review
So,me
Arab'Guerrilla
problems
The Lod Airport maB8/Jo/e took place after this
articlp W(1,8 written. The tragic attempt to take ho8tages
from\the 18raeli contingent at the XX Olympiad occurred
in Munich jU8t (1,8 this i88ue was going to pres8. This
article i8 published without further updating in the be-
lief that the8e appa,Uing fl1Jent8 do not alter--'1"/1,ther, they
reinforce-the author'8 the8is that the Arab guerrilla8
are sorely pres8ed and alienated from their surrounding8.
-Editor.
Major Edgar O'Ballance
British Army, Retired
W
ORLDWIDE publicity given to guerrilla and partisan ac-
tivities has tended to cause conventional forces to feel that
guerrilla opponents have the cards stacked, that their triumph is
inevitable, that their patience is inexhaustible, and that they are
not bothered with the multiplicity of normal military logistical
problems.
All too often, the disadvantages are overshadowed by overgild-
ing the advantages as in the case of the Arab guerrillas. For a
change, perhaps we should look at the other side of the Arab guer-
rilla hill to examine the thoughts, fears and speculations that run
through the minds of Arab guerrilla leaders as, with worried
frowns, they puff jerkily at their cigarettes while discussing how
to cope with their many problems.
One of their main topics is the Arab governments they have to
deal with-always ganging up against one. or the other, seldom able
to work together. 'The frequency with which the Arab states break
off and resume diplomatic relations with each other is like some
illogical game.
October 1972 27
ARAB GUERRILU PROBLEMS
Theirshiftingpoliciesandthecred-
ibility gaps between vainglorious ut-
terances and actual deeds are viewed
withdismay bytheArabguerrillas-
the fedalleen or freedom fighters.
Likewise, theinstabilityofthesegov-
ernments is noteworthy. Since 1948,
there have been some 27 successful,
and 39 unsuccessful, coups in Arab
countries. Despite lip service to the
aims and ideals of the fedalleen, no
Arab government has given them un-
qualified support nor, indeed, any
freedom of action other than that it
could not prevent the fedalleen from
taking.
Some Arab governments favor one
fedalleen organization and not an-
other, treating these with a studied
inconsistency, intent only on gaining
a servile body they can bend totheir
"own purpose or use to the detriment
of another Arab country. At times,
Israel hardly seems to come into the
picture. The late President Nasser
tended to approve of Al Fatah-Ied
byYassirArafat, who hadlived most
ofhislifeintheUnited ArabRepub-
lic (UAR) and was considered to be
a comparative moderate-butonly as
long as it operated in some other
A unit of Palestinian guerrillaa on
~ a mission. Palestinian u ~ r r i l l or-
ganizations have formed and then
floundered ineffectually ainee 1948.
country. He never allowed the Al
Fatah tobecome effectiveintheUAR.
President Sadat has the same view
and is also againstthemore extreme,
violent and, to some extent, uncon-
trollable left-wing Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
and the Popular Democratic Front
(PDF). The present Syrian Govern-
mentsharestheseviewsandnoweven
turns an eye of reprobation on the
Baathist-backed Syrian Al Saiqah.
In Iraq and Lebanon, the fedayeen
have been given similar chameleon-
like treatment.
Afternearly being toppled byarro-
gant and ambitious fedayeen, King
Hussein of Jordan struck back hard,
severely shaking them in the civil
war of July 1970. Progressively, he
MllitIry Review
28
drove them from his cities and towns,
and their strongholds, until he finally
crushed them in July 1971.
Verbal abuse hurled at Hussein and
vague diplomatic action was all the
support the fedayeen in Jordan got
from any Arab government. None of
them was prepared to raise a gun to
help them in battle. Except for Saudi
Arabia, the Arab governments with-
drew their subsidies to Jordan, but
only temporarily, and ineft'ectually at-
tempted to mount an economic block-
ade against Hussein-that was all.
Arab' states were lobbied by Arafat
to bring pressure to bear on King
Hussein once again to allow fedayeen
to operate in Jordan, but the trium-
phant king, backed by growing mili-
tary strength, was able to resist and
refuse.
Cynical lack of help for the feda-
yeen in adversity has been notable.
For example, the Iraqi division of
some 12,000 men stationed in Jordan
stood by while Hussein's army and his
Bedouins battered the fedayeen. When
he launched his four-day, all-out eam-
paign to eliminate them from his ter-
ritory in July 1971, the Syrians sealed
oft' their border with Jordan and
would not allow the fedayeen to send
supplies or reinforcements to their
I
I
I
ARAB $UERRILU PROBLEMS
comrades fighting the final/losing
battles.
MeanwhHe, it was reported that
Jordanian military personnel were al-
lowed to pass through to pick up Land
Rovers and guns from Latakia, the
Syrian Mediterranean port. Embit-
tered by lack of support, the fedayeen
leaders are trying to. resolve how to
persuade Arab governments to con-
vert their empty promises into active
help.
No Home Base
The fedayeen have no secure home
base in which they can build up their
strength. Instead, they are unpopular
lodgers, existing in Arab countries by
tolerance or the weakness of the gov-
ernment concerned. Originally setting
themselves up to be Pan-Arab or-
ganizations and owing neither alle-
giance to nor taking orders from any
individual Arab state, elements of the
fedayeen were able to enjoy a large
measure of freedom of movement in
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq-all
countries with weak regimes-at the
height of their fame and power, prior
to September 1971. But, they did not
have freedom in the United Arab Re-
public which had a large army and
strong government.
Major Edgar O'Ballance, British Army, Re-
tired, is Editor of the British Army News Serv-
ice, London, and has loritten numerous books on
modern military campaigns. He was a Territorial
officer witk tke 5th Battalion of the Sherwood
Foresters, Derbyshire, England. His assignments
include duty as a staff officer, on regimental duty,
and commander of a battalion in Burma against
the Japanese during World War 11. His article
"A Military Solution to the Suez Canal Im-
passe?" appeared in the July 1971 issue of
MILITARY REVIEW.
Octlber 1872 29
ARAB CUURILLA PROBLEMS
Originally, the fedayeen had ex-
pandedlargelyinSyria.Thatcountry
shelteredandencouraged themonthe
condition thatthey use only Lebanon
and Jordan as springboards for ter-
rorist raids into Israel, activities
which provoked massive and hurtful
Israeli reprisals thatallwereanxious
to avoid.
Some Arab countries would have
liked to have seen the fedayeen oust
the usually isolated and, in Arab cir-
cles, unpopular King Hussein ofJor-
dan. They would have liked his coun-
tryturnedintoa guerrillastatefrom
which terroristscould raidIsrael,and
on which the Israelis, in tum, could
vent their wrath. When the fedayeen
were crushed in Jordan, the govern-
ment insisted that fedayeen opera-
tions from Syria must be carriedout
not less than 15 miles inside Israel.
It drove nearly 100 fedayeen to seek
sanctuaryinIsraelas theSyrianbor-
der was closed to them.
Arab reaction to Hussein's drastic
action was comparatively mild. His
successes found an echo in Iraq and
Syria, which boldly clamped restric-
Palestinian perril
Iss on maneuvers
tions on fedayeen in their territory,
and even encouraged timid Lebanon
to do likewise.
Arab governments aJ:e not ready
to riska shootingwar withthe feda.-
yeen. Theycurbthemasmuchasthey
areable because they do notwant to
become the target for Israeli re-
prisals, and even less to become in-
volved in a warwithIsrael.Thisgen-
eral attitude of self-preservation and
securitymeansthatfedayeen freedom
ofaction and supplies have been pro-
gressivelyrestricted. Forexample,the
Syrian frontier with Jordan remains
closed to the fedayeen, but not to
others.
InSyria,therehave been purgesin
the 15,OOO-strong Palestine libera-
tion Army (PLA) and inthe Al Sm-
qah. In early July 1971, the govern-
ment seized a large consignment of
Soviet and Chinese arms, including
armored vehicles and guns shipped
from Algeria and destined for the
PLA. Syria was not anxious to pro-
voke Jordan. It appears that the
fedayeen areconsideredtobeallright
as long as they are in, and operate
MilltarJ Anlew 30
ARAB GUERRILLA PROBLEMS
from, some other Arab country.
To retain a capability to operate
against Israeland so make their case
credible, and to be able to prove to
the world they are achieving some-
thing, the jedayeen must have free-
dom ofaction in some adjacent state
--Jordan, Syria or Lebanon. The
jedayeen know they cannot fight an-
other civil war in Jordan or attempt
a similar action in either Syria or
Lebanon. They reason that Israel
would mostprobablyintervenetopre-
venta guerrilla statebeing'Bet up on
itsborder.InSyria,thejedayeen have
been brought under army control by
purges, by posting regular officers,
and by withholding money and sup-
plies.
Meanwhile, Lebanon, the only re-
mainingcountryallowing-ornotyet
being able to prevenfr--jedayeen op-
erations from its territory, is ignor-
ing the 1969 agreement between its
governmentand thejedayeen defining
areas in which the jedayeen could
havefreedomofmovement.Its12,000-
strongarmy,newly equipped with US
M16 rilles which areconsidered to be
equalinfirepowertotheSoviet K ~
of the jedayeen, has already com-
menced moving against them. The
problem besetting the jedayeen lead-
ers is how to resist these strangling
restrictions which are neutralizing
theirabilitytoraidfreely intoIsrael.
Ifnotovercome,theserestrictionswill
gradually reduce all jedayeen organi-
zations to toothless, passive shadOWS.
Alms and StrateD
The aim of all jedayeen is to re-
store an Arab Palestine and to oblit-
erate the state of Israel. But, the
strategy of the various jedayeen or-
ganizations isdiverse. Itrangesfrom
the placid PLA in Syria-vaguely
waitingtotakepartasa conventional
Ombll' 1972
military formation in an Arab war
.against Israel-to the PFLP which,
in September 1970, hijacked interna-
tional airliners and kept passengers
and crew as hostages and, in June
1971, attacked with bazookas a ship
bound throughtheRed Seafor Israel.
The underlying intention has al-
ways been to provoke a war between
the Israelis and the Arabs..Itstill is
with some jedayeen. But, the chances I
ofa favorableoutcomeofsucha clash
are considerably less than they were
inJune1967. Arabgovernmentsknow
this and are notkeen on having such
a warthrustupon them. Nonetheless,
they continue to raise their voices in
the "War of Popular Liberation"
chorus.
Arab governments, and, indeed, the
jedayeen themselves, would like to be
able to carry out terrorist activities
inside Israelwhilelivingunderground
in the Israeli-occupied Arab terri-
tories such as the Golan Plateau, the
West BankandtheGaza Strip,orthe
Arab-inhabited parts ofIsrael.While
thejedayeen havehadsomesuccessin
theGaza Strip,theyhavebeena rela-
tive failure on the West BaDk.
OntheGolanPlateau,theremaining
Druse are openly collaborating with
the Israelis. Arabs living in Israel
properhavealwaysbeenratherdocile.
It seems that Mao Tse-tung's dictum
that the guerrilla must be "the fish
thatswims in the sea ofthepeople,"
like some other revolutionary con-
cepts, does not always thrive when
transplanted. Planstosetupan Arab
West Bank statefor the Palestinians
are denounced by the jedayeen since
this would neutralize their main aim,
and also by King Husseinwho claims
that territory for himself. The prob-
lem the jedayeen leaders have is how
to dellne a new, single aim and how
to hammer out an effective strategy.
31
ARAB GUERRILLA PROBLEMS
'Feday8ln' Coalition
Palestinian guerrilla organizations,
with gloWing ideals of liberating their
country from the Israelis, have
formed and then floundered ineffec-
tually ever since 1948. None amounted
to any serious threat until Al Fatah
began operating inside Israel in Jan-
uary 1965. Given an impetus after the
Arab defeat in June 1967, others arose
until, by September 1970, at least 11
active organizations existed.
Each had ita own ideas, techniques
and political alignments, ran gin g
from the right-wing ones dominated
by the secret Muslim Brotherhood, to
the Marxist PFLP, led by George
Habbash, and the Maoist PDF, hesded
by Nayef Hawatmeh. Each, where
possible, was wildly independent of all
others, being in competition with
them for money, arms, recruits, pub-
lic acclaim and glamour. Circum-
stances occasionally forced them to
maintain liaison and sometimes to
cooperate. For example, during the 10-
day civil war in Jordan, Arafat be-
came the nominal fedayeen field com-
mander, perhaps only because Hab-
bash was absent in Korea at the time.
The PLA, Al Fatah, Al Saiqah,
PFLP and PDF survived the civil
war. Others either merged into the
PLA or withered away, like Iraq's
Arab Liberation Front and Popular
Struggle Front. The unstable Al Sai-
qah was led by regular Syrian officers.
The Egyptian-sponsored Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) , of
which Arafat had become chairman,
assumed the role of central guiding
authority. It briefly suspended the
PFLP when that organization hi-
jacked airliners and thus alienated
world opinion. Despite its small size
-probably less than 70o-the PFLP
was too powerful and vigorous to ig-
nore for long; it was soon reinstated.
In November 1970, proposals were
made to merge all fedayeen organiza-
tions into a Vietcong-like Palestine
Liberation Front, but these came to
little, as none would willingly surren-
der any independence or authority.
In July 1971, the executive com-
mittee of the PLO met under Arafat
who was confirmed as chairman and
field commander. Most representatives
favored a unifled fleld command for
all fedayeen, but not a merger into
one Palestine Liberation Front. Hab-
bash and Hawatmeh boycotted this
meeting. As restrictions bit in, dis-
sensions and bickering broke out
within the PLA, now starved of money
and supplies. Some of the officers sup-
ported the Syrian Government, some
the United Arab Republic, and others
Arafat.
Al Fatah is dwindling in numbers
from lack of funds and inactivity.
Habbash is making a bidfor fedayeen
leadership boasting that, in the month
of June 1971, his PFLP recruited an
extra 300 fighters. Hawatmeh is glow-
ering darkly at the moderates and
right-wing fedayeen. The fedayeen
are a quarrelsome coalition. It has
all of a coalition's weaknesses and few
of its strengths. The problem the feda,.
yeen leaders face is how to unite and
act in unity.
Countermeasures
Countermeasures against the feda,.
yeen have come from both the Arabs
and the Israelis. By restricting free-
dom of movement and curtailing sup-
plies, Arab governments have largely
removed the fedayeen power of black-
mail and terrorism in refugee camps.
With the exception of Lebanon, fron-
tiers with Israel are closed to feda,.
yeen, making it difficult for them to
make raids into Israel.
In August 1971, King Hussein
Militaly Rnl..
32
closed down all Palestinian Red Cres-
cent establishments in his country, a
move that is being followed in other
Arab states. This deprives the feda,.
yeen of medical facilities. Going far-
ther than any other Arab country,
Jordan has taken-the fight against the
fedayeen into Lebanon where Jordan-
ian commandos, ostensibly there to
guard the Jordanian Embassy, are
searching them out and hitting hard.
This has caused Al Fatah to go un-
derground hastily in that country. All
known Al Fatah offices and camps
were moved and hidden. Protesta by
Arafat to the Lebanese Government
were ineffectual.
The only Arab terrorism of note in
Israel has occurred in the crowded
Gaza Strip where, between July 1967
and July 1971, some 206 Arabs and
43 Israelis were killed, and some 1284
Arabs and 336 Israelis were wounded
by fedalleen bullets, grenades or
mines. Many of the incidents took
place in "Grenade Alley," a 12-mile
ARAB llUERRILU PROBLEMS
stretch of roadway from Gazi to the
Shati Refugee Camp near the coast.
Israeli reaction has been swift and
harsh. Schools and shops have been
closed, h 0 use s demolished, camps
sealed off and heavy-handed searches
made. In the eight refugee camps in
the Gaza Strip, old buildings have
been bulldozed away to enable broad
straight roads to be constructed to
make possible better control and sur-
veillance. The Israelis have openly em-
barked upon a policy of resettlement,
admitting they intend to remove at
least 20 percent from the refugee
camps. Some of the refugees have
already been transported to EI Arish
in the Sinai. Others have been tempted
away to work on the West Bank and
elsewhere.
Thus, the Israelis are weeding out
the hard-core guerrillas and depriving
the fedalleen of secure bases, hiding
places, recruitment areas and moral
support. Arab refugees in Gaza Strip
camps are at present administered
King Hussein of Jordan talks with the leader of an AI Flllala commando unit
October 1872 33
ARAB GUERRILLA PROBLEMS
and fed by the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA). It is
expected that the Israeli Government
will insist on taking this task over,
giving it a powerful lever over the
refugees. Additionally, it is probable
that the Israelis will declare all Arabs
in the occupied territories to be Is-
raeli citizens and thus deprive them
of Ii. political advantage.
Other successful countermeasures
against the I edaye6'll include elec-
tronic warning devices on the borders
where they usually attempt to cross,
and a high wire fence on the east side
of the 25-mile-Iong Gaza Strip to con-
tain the 390,000 Arabs within it. Is-
raeli success can be estimated by the
failure of a terrorist-inspired and
ledayeen-instigated strike of shop-
keepers and transport in the Gaza
Strip in August 1971. In fact, the
Israelis now seem so confident that
they are allowing a number of Arab
deportees to return to the West Bank.
The problem facing the ledaye6'll lead-
ers is how to thwart both Arab and
Israeli countermeasures.
Morale
Fedayeen morale was at its peak in
September 1970. Since that time, it
has declined with increasing rapidity
-restrictions by Arab governments
bringing listlessness, failures bring-
ing loss of prestige, inaction bringing
lethargy, and defeat bringing resent-
ment and a sense of being abandoned.
The fedaye6'll have a distinct feeling
that they are no longer universally
welcomed and that people do not want
to harbor them. The Arab press,
mainly government controlled, has
been increasingly critical of them.
These factors have brought a re-
cruiting problem. Heavy casualties
have hit morale hard. For example, in
the Jordanian civil war, a minimum of
750 fedayeen were killed and another
1250 wounded. In the four days of
fighting in JulY 1971, out of the esti-
mated 2500 fedayeen in Jordan, 200
were killed and 2300 were captured.
Although some 1556-mostly AZ Fa-
tah--were eventually released, at least
756-mostly PFLP and PDF-are
still detained. Only some 200 escaped,
of whom 91 were forced to give them-
selves up to the Israelis.
Casualties included a high propor-
tion of leaders, among them the dep-
uty commander of AZ Fatah. Screen-
ing and thinning out in refugee camps
has removed many key fedayeen per-
sonnel. Grandiose statements and
claims to the press have been revealed
to be utterly false. The Arabs as a
whole are disillusioned with the leila-
yeen. The only sympathy comes from
those distant Arab states not in the
direct Israeli firing line. The big
problem. perhaps the biggest, facing
the fedaye6'll leaders is not how to
raise morale, but how to prevent it
sinking any further.
Other problems include lack of over-
seas and especially Western support,
an efficient Israeli intelligence serv-
ice, shortage of money and arms, and
the difficulty in persuading outsiders
that they are achieving any results.
There are still some 20,000 fedayeen
in Syria and at least 2000 in Lebanon.
However, they are kept fairlY passive.
Their only future as glamorous guer-
rillas seems to be for them to operate
underground, but, if they do that,
every Arab government's hand would
be against them. Thus, paradoxically,
the Arabs would be protecting the
Israelis from them. Some of the prob-
lems facing anxious fedayeen leaders,
when carefully examined, may make
cheerful resding for the commanders
of conventional forces.
MllitaJJ Rellew 34
RVNAF To i n i n
PHOTOGRAPHS BY THE AUTHOR
T
HE Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) achieved significant
military successes in the period 196871. In spite of a progressive
disengagement of US forces, the South Vietnamese Government ap
peared on 29 March 1972 to be more secure than it had been since 1962.
Then, the Communists launched their Easter offensives. Months later, the
RVNAF had taken 50,000 casualties, but, during tIlat time, had chewed
up all 12 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions. In fact, tile Communists
may have lost more men-at least 40,000 killed-for less tangible gains
than they made in their 1968 Tet efforts. Notably, too, tIlis time the South
Vietnamese were fighting the ground battles tIlemselves.
The war in Indochina makes for a long and CllIIIplicated story, but
two facts stand out. In 1965, we had to go in on tile ground to prevent
a complete RVNAF defeat. In 1972, we were able to continue our ground
pullout in spite of the NVA attacks. Our allies are fighting much better;
- the foremost reason for this may be better training. There are improve
ments in facilities, professionalism at all levels, and military security.
New structures of all kinds are more numerous in some training centers
than in others, but all have them. Since 1968, every RVNAF military in-
stallation has improved its field fortifications. The training establishments
are well designed, secure and habitable.
lIctIbll' 1812 35
RVNAF TRAINING
More important, the RVNAF approach to training has also changed.
In 1968, most instructors, and even some training center commanders,
were essentially, school teachers with little combat experience. Now,
most of the instructors and all the commanders are combat veterans.
Most are proven professionals. Emphasis has shifted from the quantity
of men trained to the quality of training. Things like rifle marksmanship
are not perfect, but are much better than before.
The 1 September 1971 handbook for the 1400 US officers and men
assisting the Republic of Vietnam training organization stated:
US training ad'UiBor emphasis must be placed in four areas
of improvement: (1) facilities, (IB) professionalism, (8) leader-
ship, and (J.) management. Yours is a crucial task in assisting the
RVNAF to attain self-sufficienCY. The result of your efforts wiU
be measured in terms of defeat or victory for the Republic of
Vietnam.
A similar "advisor's handbook" published in June 1972 gives three
new goals: (l) perfect RVNAPs application of combined arms doctrine,
(2) improve motivation, and (3) increase professionalism. The changes
over a period of only nine months are an indication of the success of
this dedicated group of Americans headed by Major General William S.
Coleman.
Everyone knows that the Republic of Vietnam must' now sink or
swim largely on the results of its own efforts. US ground support ceased
months ago. Concurrent with this shift, US Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, placed increased emphasis on training advice. The principal
US agency now charged with improving RVNAF ground combat effective-
ness is the US Army Advisory Group headed by General Coleman.
Until the Communist Tet offensive in 1968, the RVNAF was not doing
well. This was especially true of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). No army in a newly developing country that tries to be a democ-
racy has done very well. There are many reasons for this, most of them
obvious. But, after Tet of 1968, the RVNAF did better. In fact, ARVN
improved so much since I visited Vietnam in 1968 that units were hardly
recognizable this time. Part of the increase in morale and efficiency
comes from four more years of experience in combat But better train
ing at several levels has also been beneficial.
Let me illustrate briefly from my own experience. In 1965, I saw
ARVN soldiers being instructed in rifle marksmanship by US Special Forces
personnel. Our men were conducting this like you would teach the boys
and girls in your neighborhood to fire an air rifle. An enormous and ex
tremely competent US Special Forces major said, "They just aren't inter-
ested. They close their eyes before they jerk the trigger." More bullets
hit the dirt in front of the butts than made holes in the targets.
MllitIrJ R"lew 31
In 1968, things were better. I spent some time with ARVN units
that had a part in the Khe Sanh fighting; they were tough, well led and
quite trustworthy. Also, they were better trained although their centers
for this were primitive, improperly staffed and wretchedly supported
logistically.
My next trip to Vietnam came in October and November of 1971.
So many things had improved that the sum total was nearly miraculous.
But rather than talk in generalities, let me tell you what I saw at three
of the 23 RVNAF training centers. All these have some improvements in
common although each center is different from the other.
Vietnamese recruits and other trainees are living better now than
in previous years. Many old and dilapidated buildings have been torn
down and replaced. While this effort depended on materials bought with
US dollars, the new buildings have been constructed mostly by South
Vietnamese soldiers themselves.
One of the anomalies of Vietnam is the high cost of construction;
simple structures cost more than the same thing in the United States.
But, if buildings are erected on a "selfhelp" basis using US-supplied
materials and RVNAF labor, training centers can improve their physical
plants greatly in a relatively short time. Many South Vietnamese soldiers
are astonishingly skillful, especially with concrete and plaster. The new
barracks are clean, airy, dry and ~ u i p p with beds and indoor plumb
ing. There are still some old shacks with leaking roofs, dirt floors and
no plumbing, but these are all to be eliminated soon.
Similarly, food has also improved. It is no longer issued raw for
-recruits to cook. A midday meal at most centers is carefully prepared
ahead of time and protected against flies. There is more rice for each
Omb., 1872 37
RVNAF TRAINING
man than an American can hold, but there are also other things includ-
ing fish, several kinds of sauce, and at least one vegetable which often
looks like across' between rhubarb and squash. Each student group, to
include recruits, has a representative on the camp mess planning council
-another radical departure from the past which has marked impact on
morale.
Organization, communications, and logistics have also improved.
No commanding officer operates in a vacuum anymore. The Central Train-
ing Command (CTC), RVNAF, now coordinates and supports not only the
training centers and schools, but also controls what is taught. Lieutenant
General Phan Trong Chinh, CTC Commander, runs a tight ship and knows
personally not only all his major subordinates, but all his centers and
schools through frequent visits. He is extremely diplomatic, but able
and firm as a rock underneath. He exemplifies the new approach in Viet-
nam and has solid credentials behind him. A parachute officer, General
Chinh commanded at every level from platoon to division.
I had the privilege of accompanying him to the Hoa Cam National
Training Center (NTC). We saw successively several classes that were
both interesting and well conducted. I thought at first that Hoa Cam
was an especially selected series of exhibits for journalists and others,
all well rehearsed.
Slowly, I realized that the new combat veteran instructors were not
concerned with whether I watched them or not-they were 100 percent
interested in the men they were training. Delivery by instructors at Hoa
Cam was every bit as good as it is at Fort Benning, Georgia. They and
their classes showed a military efficiency that I believed impossible in
ARVN, even in 1968. There is also a desire to learn on the part of those
being instructed, together with a commendable alertness and smartness.
Rifle marksmanship is the most important single basic military skill
being taught at Hoa Cam and elsewhere. All infantry recruits receive
instruction with the US M16 rifle. This training is as well conceived as
our own although slightly different. ARVN teaches more positions; there
is more emphasis on realism in firing lines and in target backgrounds
than on even the best US Trainfire ranges.
The targets are different from ours, usually crude outlines of Viet-
cong heads and shoulders mounted on sticks held by the soldiers of the
pit detail. But the slight movement and even the difficulty of picking up
targets against a natural background may have its advantages. All hits
are scored carefully. Those who fail to achieve a satisfactory score are
retrained with emphasis on their mistakes and are taken through the
record course again. The percentage of qualification is remarkably high,
in excess of 85 percent.
On a range adjacent to that being used for recruit rifle instruction,
I saw one of the most astonishing developments of the Vietnam War,
Military Review 38
RVNAF TRAINING
something that wasn't thought of before Tet in 1968. Civilians, most of
whom were no longer young, are being taught to shoot obsolete weapons
like US Ml carbines and Ml Garand rifles. These men are not soldiers
and never will be. Organized into People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF)
groups, they train mostly in civilian clothes. After the Communists came
out in the open and used terror indiscriminately in Tet, the common
people of many villages abandoned their neutrality and said spontaneously
to the government, "Give us guns/'
The old weapons were available; the Republic of Vietnam took a
chance and issued tens of thousands of them. In the main, this decision
has paid off. The old men I saw were the elected leaders and assistant
leaders of lOO-men village groups organized into protective societies
not unlike the vigilantes of our earlier days in the Wesl They learn to
shoot and then go back and teach those they command to do the same.
They are strictly amateurs and still have a shaky legal military status, but
their contribution to what is now their side is great both militarily and
politically. The decision to give them what they wanted has paid dividends
in terms of local security and loyalty.
The actual level of marksmanship attained by the PSDFs is not high,
but it need not be. Their training includes a few rounds -of live firing with
a variety of weapons, but they are taught dry fire techniques-like tri-
angulation on target boxes and trigger squeeze with partners-that can
be used in any village. When they do go to a range, t,lJe live rounds they
fire are mixed with dummy cartridges so a "coach" can detect any tend-
ency to jerk.
Back to ARVN, Regional Force (Rf) and Popular Force (Pf) recruits,
men in these three classifications now all look the same and receive
nearly identical basic instruction. After brief indoctrination, all are given
lIctlI'.r 1872
38
RVNAF TRAINING
eight hours of bayonet drill. This is carried out with enthusiasm. The
M16 is not a weapon that will withstand rough handling so some of it
is partly pantomime, but thrusts into sandbag dummies are jammed home
hard. The purpose of this instruction is, of course, to develop aggressive
ness rather than to provide the soldier with a practical skill to be used
often in combat.
All squads and platoons in RVNAF training centers learn to maneuver
in various ways. They move forward and to the rear; they ambush and
react to ambushes by the enemy.
I was unusually impressed at Hoa Cam by a training area itself.
Bleachers had been erected on a low cleared hill overlooking a small
natural valley where exercises are conducted. This instruction began
with a lecture to one platoon at a time. The instructor had before him a
well-constructed, reduced distance terrain board that duplicated the
area overlooked by the class. He could point to an objective on his map
and press a button that caused an explosion out in front precisely where
his pointer was on the diagram. This proved quickly to his students the
coincidence between the terrain board and the terrain itself.
Each platoon was briefed on exactly what it should do and, at the
same time, watched the platoon ahead do it. In actual practice, the first
platoon in the morning watched a demonstration group go through their
series of maneuvers during the lecture. The second platoon then watched
the first. Critical comments from the observing class were encouraged
and often voiced.
I was particularly well impressed by the way one PF platoon dem-
onstrated a withdrawal under fire. The platoon leader maintained control
of six units, each half a squad, and had them firing blanks and withdraw-
ing in accordance with his orders and in short increments. This is tough
to do anywhere and, in medium jungle, requires near-perfect subordinate
leadership at squad and fire team level. The virtue of the bleachers over-
looking the valley was that those who were observing could see clearly
while those who were maneuvering moved in near-natural terrain.
I should mention that the US M79 grenade launcher-issued one
to each PF squad-was extremely popular for use in an operation such
as this. The grenadier was attached directly to the squad leader who
then had two four-man fire teams remaining. The word semisquad may
be preferable to fire teams because these four-man units have no light
machinegun although an effort is being made to train one man per half
squad to fire his M16 rifle full-automatic and from a bipod.
In 1965, a PF platoon would have been lost if asked to execute a with
drawal under fire, but not in 1972. PF platoons were then like the PSDFs
are now. Plans for this year call for PF companies-this force has been
organized only in platoons until now. Even larger units are visualized
for 1973.
MllitIrJ Review 40
(
)
(
RWAF TRAINING >
All the NTCs now have several thousand men working in many1:ourses
every day. It is not possible to discuss them all. But one course put
together recently by the Hoa Cam Commander, Colonel Troung Nhu Phung,
deserves special mention. Phung obtained two special instructors who
are giving this course. One was originally aprofessional hunter and,
more recently, an ARVN longrange scout. The other is an exVietcong or
HoI Chan with eight years' experience on the other side.
These men are like the British trackers ofBorneo, or even American
Indians of the most efficient type acentury ago. One of them took each
squad of trainees along a 6QO.meter prepared route pointing out and
explaining physical evidence of the "enemy." Itis contrived; many squads
passed through in aday; but it was extremely well done.
I was not able to follow the entire dialogue, but understood easily
about vehicular tire marks, breaks in the bush, and running and walking
footprints. The marks left by human feet in boots, or in sandals made
from automobile tires, gave indications of speed and load carried. The
instructor was particularly exact in regard to bits of rice, tobacco, tin
cans and even human feces. These tell atrained obsj!rver alot. So do
the remains of fire and sleeping places, half dug mortar pits and equip
ment that has been thrown away.
The sortofthingwhich can be demonstrated in one hour is important
to any soldier anywhere, but doubly so in ajungle environment. The
instructor's punch line which was translated for me was:
Even if YO'llTe to() dumb and: Uwy to obB61'1Ie the signs the
enemy leaves, TemsmbST he ca.n Tead y()U like an 0Plln book if
you f/.iv,r him half a chance. Don't leave anything behind: fOT him
to WOT!f on, not wen ~ footprintB. If y()U do, you won't live
to enj01{ yOUT family. >
There were five US military advisors at Hoa Cam. They lived in their
own small compound where they had mostly\American food, beer and
similar things, but they were also part of the life of the RVNAF training
center. Phung and some of his officers came to dinner and invited the
Americans to their mess in return. Each group learned to respect and
like the other because they were working toward the same goal, the self
sufficiencyofRVNAF. Close coordination, both in planning and in execution,
marked the US-RVNAF relationship at Hoa Cam.
The Hoa Cam Netronal Training Center was overrun by the enemy
in 1965. During Tet in 1968, itwas cut off from Da Nang oilly 8miles
away. But it held out easily in 1972. Barring unforeseen developments
like aresurgent NVA offensive, or apolitical breakdown in the Republic
of Vietnam, the future seems secure. In the spring of 1972, the drive
in the I Corps area penetrated only through Quang Tri. Colonel Phung
and his team were ready to join the fighting instead of training-!nd
Octlblr 1872 41
RYNAf TRAINING
they still are-but their first responsibility is training. Those who know
them best are confident that they can do both well.
The National Training Center at Quang Trung is the largest in Viet
nam and located only five minutes from Saigon by helicopter. It has a
total capacity of 15,000 trainees at one time and has handled as many
as 18,500 in emergencies. In addition, there are 20,000 Reserve Officers'
Training Corps students from Saigon universities there during the sum
mer. The commander is Major General Hoang Van Lac.
Here, again, the NTC is situated in an area where the Communists
can make trouble. During Tet in 1968, the students and their instructors
fought so well that they received collectively the Cross of Gallantry
with Palm. Nuisance attacks continue sporadically around a "campus"
of 30 square kilometers, but Lac is a veteran and a capable combat com
mander with more than 20 years' experience. Before he assumed his
present job in 1969, he also led combat units of every size, platoon to
division. One gathers that Lac enjoys postponing his training for a day
or two now and then to clobber local Vietcong who get too venturesome.
After an enjoyable lunch, General Lac took me to visit first a large
antibooby trap training area. There were a lot of unpleasant things being
demonstrated by a chief instructor and a platoon of assistants. I have
never seen so many training aids anywhere. Several were in' miniature,
but there was no question of their principles of operation. When a device
was tripped or otherwise activated, a loud explosion was accompanied
by smoke, but to one side or the other of the "stage" and at a safe dis-
tance from both demonstrators and trainees.
There were also some nonexplosive booby traps like punji stakes,
man traps and dead falls, but these were not stressed since the enemy
MilltarJ Rmew 42
Octo.... 1872
RVNAf TRAINING
does not use them so much now as formerly. On the other hand, explosives
rigged around .habitations were given careful treatment because they
are gaining in popularity. There was a goodsized village store right "on
stage": its doors, things on the counter, and some floor boards were all
rigged to explode charges. General Lac says that booby traps are not
dangerous unless your own soldiers are poorly trained or careless.
I saw in detail marksmanship training with the M16 rifle and the
M79 grenade launcher. The M79 is popular with ARVN because they need
a light area weapon and have handicaps in regard to both range and
accuracy with hand grenades. Their training with the M79 is divided into
theory, demonstration and practice. There can never be enough of the
latter, but each recruit was firing 12 grenades over three days. Most
were hitting close to, or actually on, targets as far as 275 meters away.
Now, for a brief description of General Lac's latest alid surely one
of his best ideas. It is called Squad Battle Drill. Every senior profes-
sional, both US and South Vietnamese, who has seen it agrees on its
effectiveness. I quote three paragraphs that Brigadier General Stan L.
McClellan, US Army, wrote about it:
In Vietnam once thc rccruit is assigned to his di'lrision, there
is 'lW warmup period. With a short 10 weekB of recruit training
behind him, thc ARVN squad membcr is required to rapidly
demonstratc his grasp of thc techniques of tactical proficiency.
More often than not, the demonstration is given under enemy
fire. General Lac's disCU8sions with RVNAF commanders con-
vinced him that, while individual skills were weU learncd, the
ARVN recruit arrived at hiB unit with a lot to learn about battle-
field performance. Having isolated this as a critical training
shortcoming, General Lac spearhcatkd the efforts to fill the void.
The Central Training Command, RVNAF Joint General
Staff, gave the go-ahead and General Lac set about developing
the framework to swpport the transition of recruit to effective
squad membcr. In June 1911, thc 'Squad Battlc Drill Test' was
established at Quang Trung National Tmining Center and the
tmnsition began.
The Squad Battle DriU Test is taken by ARVN rccruits in the
final week of a 10-week tmining period. The test iB conducted
over varied terrain and is '1 kilometera in length. It includes both
a day and night phase. Each squad iB tested in its reaction to
enemfl situations which dmw on combat lessons of the Vietnam
battlcfield. Flezible in its makeup, the test is kept as current as
last week's after-action report by one of the RVNAF fighting
units.
This sixhour grind-five in daylight and one in darkness-includes
eight separate combat situations. It begins with the picking at random
of a trainee squad, but with a qualified leader, and the assignment of
43
RVNAF TRAINING
a numbered helmet to each man, along with blank ammunition. A detailed
briefing at a sand table follows. The squad will be on its own, but tested
to the utmost by problems that only total squad efficiency can solve
satisfactorily.
Each squad faces several different daylight problems in ascending
difficulty. An enemy sniper can be overcome swiftly with fire and move-
ment by a good group. A meeting engagement in a populated hamlet can
be handled by building up a volume of fire and assaulting from a flank.
Simulated Vietcong casualties must be searched properly for documents
and ammunition, and mined areas must be negotiated.
The fourth problem is tougher; each squad is ambushed by a demon-
stration Vietcong unit as it passes through a belt of banana plants. Top
marks go to a quick aggressive reaction. Then, there is a counterambush
triggered when a demonstrator Vietcong point man ambles along care-
lessly. An alert squad will sink into a rough line near the trail and bag
all three of the enemy with no harm to themselves.
The sixth problem differs from the first five in that it is done in
accordance with orders from higher up the chain of command, not in
reaction to the enemy. Araid is ordered into a"Vietconginhabited hamlet."
It looks easy, but there are booby traps and an alert enemy waiting for
the squad in a graveyard. The opposition can be knocked out perfectly
only when each squad leader makes the right decisions quickly and has
them carried out silently and efficiently.
The last daylight maneuver is an attack mostly in the open against
a dug-in "enemy" machinegun position. In this exercise, the squad is
assumed to be operating as part of a rifle platoon. The highest grades
go to squad leaders who use both their fire teams, but move them alter-
n t e y until time for an "all up, firing as you go" assault. The day I
watched, both General McClellan and General lac were displeased here.
Most squads had fired too many of their allotted 40 rounds per man be-
fore they reached this point. The fire teams tended to move too slowly
and to lack decisiveness. To stand up and walk slowly within 150 meters
of a protected enemy machinegun without fire superiority is SUicide.
It is possible to get high marks here, however, especially if the squad
leader has redistributed his rifle ammunition and has his two M79s-
there are two in ARVN squads as opposed to one in similar PF units-
properly situated and used. After capturing the machinegun, each squad
must consolidate; redistribute ammunition, including what it captures;
dig in; and report up the chain of command, including a request for am
munition resupply.
The first seven problems are then reviewed with each squad by a
debriefer who has all their grades. If the squad has failed as a whole,
it must repeat the course. Men who have done badly individually are
coached in their deficiencies.
MllitIIy Revi 44
RVNAF TRAINING
The last exercise is begun after full darkness. Each unit' receives
another briefing, an issue of ball ammunition, and assaults -an irregular
line of four targets using artificial illumination sparingly and only of the
types that would be available at ~ u level. Hits are counted and the
targets pasted after each unit has completed its night attack. There is
a final debriefing on an adjacent range and a welcome return to barracks.
This Squad Battle Drill is an innovation of real value. Lieutenant
General Chinh says:
The experiment at Quang Trung National Training Center
offers a solution to the problem of how best to prepare the retmdt
for the demands of battle. This test will be used as the model for
transition training at aU training centers.
The Lam Son National Training Center is located in from the coast
in the old II Corps area, now Military Region 2. In 1971, it received
an award from the RVNAF Chairman of the Joint General Staff as the best
training center in Vietnam. Colonel Phan Dinh Niem, the Commander
here, is one of the most talented soldiers I have ever met. He drives a
jeep like he was fighting it handta-hand, but we arrived quickly and
safely. He has a kind of a perpetual motion about him and a vigor that
is hard to deny. He had everything at Lam Son running beautifully.
After the inevitable, but extremely worthwhile, briefing, Niem took
me to see his kitchens which were cooking centrally for 8000 people.
Central cooking is rapidly replacing individual food preparation in all
ARVN bases, but Niem has gone further than anyone else. He had one
kitchen complex for his entire command.
Niem improved his booby trap instruction by adding an additional
demonstration range on which each squad learns to set Vietcongtype
Octollar 1172
RVNAF TRAINING
devices. The theory is that men learn as much by setting them as they .
do by disarming them. Enemy mines and booby traps constitute a real
hazard throughouf Vietnam today.
Lam Son's most interesting feature was the reception center. Niem's
recruits were met by him or by his personal representatives 24 hours
a day. Groups went through the reception center regularly and system
atically with an initial orientation. Niem first welcomed the recruits
personally and then informed them of what lay ahead for them. He was
followed by his executive officer who covered basic discipline. Four sepa
rate areas were discussed by different officers who told about pay and
finance, weapons and equipment, sanitation and health, and recreation and
political warfare activities.
Different groups of the recruits were then taken to a series of sta-
tions around the square reception center compound. In one area, they
were all vaccinated and shot with other disease preventives. In another,
they received their clothing, weapons and equipment and told how much
would be subtracted from their pay if they were to lose anything.
Soon after being assigned to training platoons at Lam Son, all young
soldiers were taught to sing patriotic songs by a choral director. The
director had four female assistants, obviously chosen for their good
looks and voices. Most recruits must have become desperately, if only tem
porarily, in love with one of these young women. Singing by 'platoons con
tinued throughout their time at Lam Son.
Colonel Niem insisted that his soldiers keep in touch with their
families. Characteristically, upon arrival at the reception center, they sat
down "in formation" and wrote to their parents. The commander also
wrote a letter of welcome to each of his recruits and one to his family
giving an account of each man's status and accomplishments.
Colonel Niem is only 41 this year, but has been a professional soldier
all his adult life. He was commissioned by the French in 1951 after being
one of the early cadets at their military academy at Da Lat. He rose from
rifle platoon leader ,through company, battalion and regimental command.
He was deputy division commander from June 1965 to September 1967
when he came to Lam Son. By March 1972, he had received 43 awards
for gallantry and professional efficiency; he had been wounded 11 times.
Still young and vigorous in body, he was warm and friendly in personality.
When the Communists attacked in 1972, Niem took command of the
22d ARVN Division and, in 17 days, "brought order out of chaos." But
Lam Son goes on in his image.
There are a total of 23 training centers of the type described at Hoa
Cam, Quang Trung and lam Son, and there are 28 service schools. Not
all of these installations are as good as those described; some are too
small to be efficient and are being combined with others, But things,
as judged by actual combat, are progressing well.
MllilIIY Rnle. 48
OClab.r 1872
RVNAF TRAINING
However, Vietnamization has produced special problems, especially
in regard to new heavy materiel. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam
learned to handle its lOS-millimeter and lS5-millimeter howitzers years
ago. There was no need for anything more powerful; supporting US ar-
tillery was equipped with 8-inch howitzers and 175-millimeter guns. Be-
sides, the enemy had no tube artillery at all.
In September 1971, four Soviet 13D-millimeter highvelocity guns
were destroyed by US and RVNAF action in northwest I Corps. By April
1972, hundreds of them were being used by the NVA. Midway between
105 and lSSmillimeter howitzers in projectile weight, they have a much
longer range-said to be as much as 28,000 meters. Obviously, RVNAF
needed something with equal or greater range. The only gun of this sort
immediately available was the US 175 millimeter with a 145-pound projec-
tile and amaximum range of 32,800 meters.
Steps were taken quickly to prepare South Vietnamese crews for
the larger artillery pieces. The necessity of keeping both men and equip
ment near the area of most likely use meant that training at the Artillery
School in the south would not be satisfactory. Instead, the instructors
and support personnel went to the area-mostly in I Corps-where the
guns were. Now that all US combat artillerymen are gone and the enemy
is using its effective 130s in quantity, the US 175-millimeter guns are
badly needed. They are much heavier and more complicated than anything
ARVN gunners had previously handled.
To say that all goes well would be an exaggeration. According to one
US advisor, ARVN firing is good once ranging-in is completed. Crews
who have handled ISS-millimeter howitzers can shoot 175-millimeter guns
effectively, but maintaining the more complicated equipment is not as
easy. The recoil blade on the rear of the self-propelled 17S-millimeter
gun must be properly emplaced before firing. Fire control is also more
difficult because of the longer flight times-small variables like barrel
wear and earth rotation are more significant Spotting the first round for
subsequent adjustments is also more difficult.
The situation in armor is similar to that in artillery. Our allies have
used US M41 Walker BulldOllight tanks for many years. Some have been
rebuilt in Taiwan seven, eight and even nine times. In one brief encounter
in Laos in 1971, an ARVN tank platoon from the 17th ARVN Armored
Cavalry with five of these veteran vehicles took on an NVA tank "bat-
talion" with 15 Soviet 154 plus 27 Soviet PnB tanks and won conclusively.
The 76-millimeter high-velotity guns of the M41s knocked out six of the
T54s and 17 of the pnBs, according to official sources checked by US
heliborne observers.
There were several reasons for this spectacular victory, including US
air support and NVA crews who had never been in action before. The
T54 appears to have a badly located forward fuel storage facility. Perhaps
47
most important, the old M41s are better tanks in combat than most of
their critics realized. But the fact that the NVA had IlJO.millimeter guns
on the T54s in Laos indicated a pressing need for something more power-
ful than 76-millimeter gun M41 light tanks in RVNAF.
McClellan and Chinh began equipping one ARVN tank battalion with
51 M48A3 diesel tanks, plus spares, late in 1971. Training paralleled that
of US armor units although there were problems, especially in regard
to the RVNAF grasp of the complicated fire control equipment and some
aspects of maintenance. The US colonel who commanded advisors to
RVNAF armor told me last November, "Right now our allies are more
effective with the M41s than with the M48s, but this will change."
Since leaving Vietnam, I heard more about this battalion of M48A3s,
called the 20th Medium Tank Regiment. It qualified 86.1 percent of its
tanks as combat ready in March 1972. The unit had its final "acceptance
maneuver" on Saturday, 1 April 1972, but was moved forward that night
west of Quang Tri. On Sunday, 2 April, a company of the 20th knocked
out seven Soviet tanks at ranges said to be between 2000 and 2500 meters
-good shooting anywhere. This battalion, reinforced by two ARVN in-
fantry companies and a 105-millimeter howitzer battery, stopped the
NVA attack that had defeated half the 3d ARVN Division. "Their perform-
ance was magnificent," a US general officer said.
At the time of this first combat, ARVN's Chief of Armor was strapping
Major General Nguyen Van Toan, former Commanding General of the effi-
cient 2d ARVN DiVision. He was with his M48 tanks in person in this first
combat.
M48 tanks do present problems for the Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam. They are vitally necessary now that the NVA uses TMs to spearhead
many pushes, but the M48 is complicated. Training crews may be easier
than training maintenance men. So often in RVNAF, the lack of a single
IInitIIJ .IVIn 48
RYNAf TRAINING
part can immobilize a fine fighting vehicle. The tank situation in .the NVA,
however, appears to be worse.
. Each ARVN M48 tank has, in addition to its own crew of four, a group
of six riflemen assigned to it-an innovation. These men act not only
as protection for the tank when stationary, but also to increase its fire
power when moving. Hopefully, they will ride on top most of the time
and can be cross-trained with the crew members so as to have 10, rather
than four, men available to run each M48. Extra men on a tank certainly
increase its capability to live in jungle environment, as well as providing
amore deadly combat team when tanks fight infantry.
As this article goes to press, Vietnamization-the taking over by
the South Vietnamese units of all ground combat missions-has had
its most severe test. All 12 NVA divisions launched attacks against RVNAf
using hundreds of tanks and heavy guns. The Communists achieved some
successes; the newly organized 3d Division gave up Quang Tri. But An Loc
and Kontum held. Most areas occupied by the enemy have now been
retaken. NVA units have paid dearly in men and laboriously transported
materiel for what appear to be minor temporary gains.
It is easy to overemphasize the value of training improvement, but
this factor has surely been important. Further, the US Army Advisory
Group in the Republic of Vietnam has a continuing function which may
become more important as other US forces are withdrawn. This group
never lost confidence in the men they were helping. When things looked
blackest stateside, their evaluation was reassuring. Within hours after
RVNAf deficiencies were noted and circularized, remedial training was
begun. Refresher courses for all ARVN battalions-those that needed
it most had priority-are nearing completion. Lessons from the field
have been introduced into all National Training Center schedules and
especially into staff school curricUla.
RVNAF organization and command structure based on at least 10
years of combat is now set and reasonably efficient. Motivation and train-
ing are still not perfect, but are improving. Chinh, Coleman and McClellan
are young vital leaders who work well together and get things done. If
the NVA finally do as badly in 1972 as they did militarily in 1968, there
will be lots of time for more training.
Jac Weller, a firearms consultant with ofjiceB in Princeton,
New JerBey, attended Georgia Military Academy and WaB grlld-
uated from Princeton UniverBity. He iB a frequent contrilnt.tor
to numeroue United StateB and foreign journalB and iB the author
of Beverol bookB, including Fire and Movement. HiB article "]B-
raeli Armor: LeBBOnB From the Biz.Day War" aV/Jeo.red in the
November 1971 edition of the MILITARY REVIEW.
October 1872 48
DELUSIONS OF
GRANDEUR
CAREER ASSIGNMENT
PATTERNS AND GOALS
OF ACTIVE DUTY MAJORS
IN USACGSC CLASS OF 1971-72
Major Phillip W. Mock, Unitetl Statell Armll
D
ELUSIONS of grandeur?! This
article is a summary of the
findings of a research project to de-
termine the perceptions and attitudes
of US Army Command and General
Staff College (USACGSC) majors
concerning career assignment pat-
terns and goals. The results reveal a
set of serious problems. with psycho-
logical implications. which confronts
the Army of the 1970s and its pro-
fessional officer corps.
Career Development System
The officer career development sys-
tem has been relatively static since
World War II. It calls for a highly
standardized and idealized progres-
sion of assignments. The officer is ad-
vised to avoid repetitive similar as-
signments and. instead, seek a variety
of assignments which include at least
one command at each rank. 1
This method of career development
appeared to be quite suitable for the
MllitaIJ Review 50
needs of the Army for two decades.
Even in recent years, key operators
of the system have been satisfied with
its results. An underlying assumption
of the Army 75 Personnel Concept
Study was that, "Today the carecr
djlvelopment program for officers is
performing as WillI as ever. There are
few c han g e s envisioned for this
area... !' 2
During the past decade, however,
a number of military analysts began
seriously to question the adequacy of
the system to meet the needs of the
Army or the members of its officer
corps. The growth of the Army in
size and complexity created two criti-
cal and seemingly confticting needs:
the demand for highly competent com-
manders with broad experience to
manage the larger and more compli-
cated institutions, and the demand
for expertise in a -wide range of ex-
tremely specialized areas.
The turbulence of the Vietnam
period has accentuated this problem in
the minds of career officers and has
led to increased dissatisfaction. Be-
cause of the indoctrination inherent
in the current career system, a sub-
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
stantial number of officers "have been
seeking future top-level command by
attempting to follow the accepted pat-
tern which would make them the
"whole" or ''perfect'' soldier. But they
find themselves changing assignments
so rapidly that they are unable to
make a significant contribution dur-
ing any given assignment. They be-
gin to realize that they are following
a program which is preparing many
officers for positions few will ever
attain.
At the same time, this long-term
career system appears to clash di-
rectly with the need for day-tIHIay
organizational effectiveness. Many of-
ficers are characterizing their frustra-
tion with the system in their criti-
cism of ''ticket-punching'' or "follow-
ing the stations of the cross," and of
"one-shot commanders" eager to re-
ceive high marks during brief com-
mand tours.
The rapidly i n r ~ i n dissatisfac-
tion with the "system" has been re-
flected in the equally rapid growth of
articles and research reports pre-
pared individually within the military.
For example, one US Army War
51
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
College thesis raised the question
whether the "system which reasonably
guarantees that those who purport to
be professionals are in fact profes-
sionally qualified," and whether the
typical career pattern is "assignment
rather than expertise oriented." 8
OPMS
At the institutional level, the Army
has begun to take actions unforeseen
little more than a year ago. The pri-
mary catalyst for these developments
has been the US Army War College
Professionalism Study which has not
yet been made available to the officer
corps, and was not available for this
study. The most significant change is
the Officer Personnel Management
System (OPMS) which is approach-
ing the initial stage of implementa-
tion. The stated objectives of OPMS
are:
(1) only the best qualified for com-
mand (14) enhance 81lecialimtion (9)
eliminate nonproductive competition
(4) give officer more control over his
career.
USACGSC Majors
Majors in the 1971-72 USACGSC
class are one of the best sources of
meaningful perceptions and attitudes
concerning career assignment pat-
terns. They have progressed success-
fully for more than 10 years with the
current system. They have received
recent and intensive orientations on
the proposed changes to the system,
and have been actively involved in the
development of OPMS. (They re-
ceived briefings on both OPMS I and
OPMS II and gave their reaction to
OPMS II in a lengthy questionnaire.)
They are also among the group of
officers who will be most directly af-
fected by any new career system.
Furthermore, their presence in the
CGSC environment allows for less re-
strained communication with their
peers. This increases the probability
that true perceptions may be recorded
because they are not subjected to the
kind of posturing that may occur in
a unit and lead them into more stereo-
typed thought patterns.
Objectives and Methodology
The fundamental purpose of my
recent study was to determine what
assignment patterns CGSC majors
ezpect to follow through the remain-
der of their careers and what patterns
they believe would best utilize their
particular professional skills and per-
sonality traits in the best interutB of
the Army. The research consisted of
in-depth interviews with 40 majors
and administration of questionnaires
to 219 majors.
The interview sample was struc-
tured to provide the same proportion
of officers by branch and source of
commission as existed in the CGSC
1971-72 class. Within this structure,
officers who did not have past or pres-
ent contact with the author were se-
lected at random. Interviews averaged
45 minutes in length.
Questionnaires were distributed to
293 majors in all branches except the
Army Nurse Corps, the Chaplain's
Corps, the Dental Corps, the Judge
Advocate General's Corps, the Medical
Corps, the Veterinary Corps and the
Women's Army Corps. A total of 221
were returned, and 219 were usable
(75 percent of original sample). The
composition of the questionnaire sam-
ple was almost identical to that of
the class (Figure 1).
The interviews and questionnaires
were complementary. The interviews
MilitarY ReYiew
52
DElUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
permitted an in-depth, controlled,
semistructured investigation of the
attitudes of a small sample. The ques-
tionnaires were less controlled and
more structured, but provided the
broad data base which could not be
achieved with interviews.
Generalist versus Specialist
The problem of specialization in the
Army> has received considerable at-
tention in recent years. Traditionally,
October 1872
the officer has been indoctrinated to
avoid specialization. Personnel ac-
tions, such as promotion and selection
for command, appeared to favor the
generalist. But military analysts and
top leaders of the Army have begun
to point to the inadequacies of the
current system and the critical need
for greater specialization. Ward Just
has probably been the most graphic:
There has never been e Clemewitz
in tke American Army became the
writing of Yom Kriege took time end
53
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
serious thought. An Army officer 1uuJ
no time to think, and imagiMtitl8 re-
/!ectirm is discouraged. Tours 'of duty
are rapid, and designed to thrust a
man into as many different situati01l8
as can be managed . It is the
theory of the utility infielder.'
The most convincing argument in
favor of the generalist philosophy has
been' that it prepares officers for high
command under all conceivable situa-
tions. But a recent US Army War
College survey of 178 generals has
undermined this argument.
Those generals who had commanded
in Vietnam ranked only 54 percent of
their brigade and battalion command-
ers in the outstanding category, 84
percent only satisfactory and 12 per-
cent unsatisfactory. Almost all of
these commanders had been recom-
mended for command by the Office
of Personnel Operations (OPO). They
represented a small percentage of
combat arms colonels with only the
most outstanding service records.
8
The conclusion that a sizable propor-
tion of the Army's finest are, at best,
only adequate in combat command
slots, even after they have pursued
generalist patterns, seriously adds to
the mounting doubts.
The development of special career
programs has been the Army's princi-
pal response to the specialization
problem. These programs provide the
structure needed to maintain pools of
qualified officers to per for m the
Army's specialized tasks. However,
despite the fact that these officers re-
ceive advanced civil schooling and are
sent to utilization tours, it is ques-
tionable whether they are truly al-
lowed to become specialists.
The complexities and uncertainties
of the generalist-specialist problem
have led the Army to a schizoid per-
sonnel system. omcers are told the
road to success is that of the gen-
eralist, but they are encouraged to
seek a specialty. If they join a spe-
cialty program, they are told that the
primary interest is to maintain their
branch qualification and serve as com-
manders. Department of the Army
(DA) statements have indicated that
specialists get more schooling and
favorable promotion opportunities,
but this is not consistent with over-
whelming intuitive evidence to the
contrary.
After years of generalist indoctri-
nation, the CGSC majors in the re-
search sample were SUddenly sub-
jected to an intense period of reverse
indoctrination favoring specialization.
OPMS briefers and members of the
DA stall:' told them each officer could
maintain a specialty as a secondary
skill or emphasize a specialty through-
out his career. An equitable promo-
tion system would now allow them to
get to the top as specialists. T
Results of research in the CGSC
study indicate that most of these of-
ficers still expect to be generalists
(Figure 2). Virtually alI of the of-
ficers who expected to be specialists
were already In special career pro-
grams. There was a major shift, how-
ever, when these majors Indicated how
they could be best utilized. About 40
percent of both samples believed they
would be best utilized as specialists.
A very similsr proportion (85 per-
cent) responded to the OPMS survey
in favor of an equitable promotion
system because it would increase the
recognition and opportunity of spe-
cialists.
8
Questionnaire res u 1t s from the
CGSC study also reveal that one-third
of the majors are or wiIl be in special
career programs, another third are
undecided, and one-third do not in-
tend to join them.
MllitIrJ Rnlew
54
DRUSIONS Of GRANDEUR
The student responses indicate that
the real specialist-generalist problem
is not one of convincing the officer
corps that specialization would achieve
best utilization of their skills and
traits in the best interests' of the
Army. Instead, it is a problem of con-
vincing the individual who is inter-
ested in specializing that the Army
truly intends to place greater empha-
sis on specialization, and that it' will
provide many routes to the top by
rewarding specialists in a wide va-
riety of career patterns.
october 187%
Command
Every officer knows that the single
most important assignment required
for career advancement is command.
The idea that the professional soldier
is a commander has been ingrained.
For many officers, the desire for
command is genuine, Command gives
them challenge, independence of ac-
tion, and the opportunity to work with
people and make a greater individual
contribution which is immediately
visible to themselves and other mem-
bers of the profession.
55
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Mlinf other officers, however, are
more ambivalent. They may have
doubts about their command interests
or abilities. But these doubts are sup-
pressed by the recognition of the exi-
gencies of career advancement, the
total command indoctrination they
have been subjected to throughout
their careers, and by intense peer
preBBure. Most of these officers also
actively seek command. They may
even have convinced themselves that
they are the command type.
This belief that command is the
one road to the top does assure that
the Army's finest seek leadership
positions. But it also has many ad-
verse results. Many officers who are
unsuited for command are actively
seeking command. Even though they
seek command, they are also keenly
aware that there is a risk of highly
visible failure. For this reason, they
seek only the minimum essential com-
mand time. While they are in com-
mand, they are reluctant to allow sub-
ordinates to exercise initiative or try
new ideas which could lead to mis-
takes. They cannot afford to place
their own fate in the hands of others
when they are in this brief but criti-
cal assignment.
These officers tend to adopt one of
two extreme sfrategies. They may
attempt to ride out their command by
maintaining the status quo. With suc-
cessful command behind them, they
may go on to make their names in
other areas where they have greater
interests or capabilities. If they really
want to assure their advancement,
however, they must establish a highly
visible mark while they are in com
mand. They must significantly change
the units they command, regardless
of the quality of these units.
Even the individuals who have a
genuine desire for command are af-
5&
fected. They know they cannot- get
ahead by command or troop duty
alone. They must also seek the other
assignments required for career ad-
vancement. If this is to be accom-
plished, they must carefully limit the
time spent with troops. They may
even avoid the kind of troop staff they
believe would help them to become
better commanders.
The Army has reinforced the im-
portance of command in its pro-
nouncements, in OPO career counsel-
ing sessions, and in the apparent use
of command records by promotion
boards as the crucial determinant for
further advancement. Simply stated,
the Army has been creating a far
greater desire for command than it
could ever satisfy. Rather than reduce
command aspirations, the Army has
attempted to minimize frustration by
creating "command equivalent" as-
signments and by rapidly. rotating the
maximum possible number of officers
through command positions.
OPMS offers hope for improvement.
If fully implemented, OPMS would
establish com man d identification
boards to designate a number of com-
manders consistent with require-
ments, formally notify individuals of
their command status, centralize and
increase the discipline of command
assignments, increase the stability of
command tenure, and attempt to
establish greater promotion equity
between commanders and noncom-
manders.
9
Both the interviews and question-
naires revealed that an extraordi-
narily high proportion of CGSC ma-
jors expect command (Figure 3).
These expectations are startling when
compared with current projections of
reality. A principal OPMS action of-
ficer estimated that one-third of the
combat arms Leavenworth graduates
Mllitaly Review
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Octobor 11172 57
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
will command battalions. 10 This
means that about 67 percent of the
combat arms officers in the question-
naire sample expect command, but
will not get it (or about three-fourths
of those who expect command will not
command!). In fact, the proportion
of combat arms officers who expect to
command divisions is more compara-
ble to the number who will actually
command battalions.
The number of majors who believe
command would achieve best utiliza-
tion is only slightly less than the
number who expect command. The
proportion who believe battalion com-
mand would achieve best utilization
is almost identical to the proportion
who perceived themselves as com'
manders on the OPMS questionnaire
(68 percent). 11
The number of officers who said
they seek command is comparable with
the number who expect command.
Furthermore, the number who seek
command for career advancement
rather than for enjoyment or to make
a contribution (16 percent) is similar
to the number who expect command
but do not believe it would achieve
best utilization.
The extraordinarily high propor-
tion of majors who seek and expect
command, and believe it would be best
utilization.. is a measure of the effect
of years of stress on command. Com-
mand is so important for career suc-
cess that most officers have been psy-"
chologically forced to equate command'
expectations with command aspira-
tions. To fail as a commander is to fail
as a professional soldier. It means
failure in one's career.
If OPMS is to be implemented, the
Army faces a reindoctrination prob-
lem of immense proportions. OPO has
begun the process by announcing the
low proportion who should expect
command. But this solution is inade-
quate. OPO must be more candid in
informing each individual of his com-
mand status. Until this is accom-
plished, the majority of individuala
will continue to convince themselves
that they are members of the small
segment who will command.
The OPMS proposal to designate
commanders at battalion level and
above, and notify all officers of their
command status, is the most direct
mesns of attacking the command prob-
lem. This policy must be supple-
mented with a policy of candidly keep-
ing the individual abreast, throughout
his career, of the likelihood that he
will be designated for command.
One area of CGSC student concern
is that of the methods of selecting
commanders. There appears to be a
widespread lack of confidence in board
or branch selection activities. The
only available and reasonably valid
means of estimating future command
potential is to measure current and
past command performance. This fact
has been acknowledged in OPMS plan-
ning. 12 Past command performance
must be given significantly greater
weight than other elements included
in the current order of merit listing.
Another area of concern is that the
commander who faila may be forced
to terminate his career. When the of-
ficer makes his contract with the
Army, he expects a measure of se-
curity, with reasonable tolerance for
failure. Under the proposed command
system, commanders must be allowed
to fail, and a release valve must be
available in the event of moderate
failure. To do otherwise would seri-
ously undermine the aggressive spirit,
initiative and integrity of the COrPs
of commanders. This consideration
favors the provision of a "dual track"
for commanders.
MllltarJ R"ln 58
Stall
A surprisingly low proportion of
the CGSC majors expect division staff
assignments or believe they would
be good utilization (Figure 4). Only
18 percent of the questionnaire sam-
ple both expects division staff and
believes it would achieve best utiliza-
tion. Even in the troop-oriented com-
bat arms, only 24 percent fell into
both categories.
With the high interest in command,
there appears to be an important in-
consistency. Why have so many who
perceive themselves as commanders
decided they are not also troop staff
officers? This appears to be even more
contradictory when one considers that
much of their effort at CGSC is in-
tended to prepare them for division
staff assignments.
Apparently, CGSC majors do not
believe the Army attaches as high a
value to, or provides as valuable a re-
ward for, division staff assignments.
While these officers may believe that
division staff assignmenta would pro-
vide additional experience for sUbse-
quent command assignments, they
know they must also serve on high-
level staff, and other assignments un-
related to troops, to further their ad-
vancement.
They know a successful career is
one that continuously progresses.
They recognize that they cannot speed
up this progression in command as-
signments. This does not apply to staff
assignments. The best way to advance
rapidly and reach the most visible
positions in the Army is to pass
quickly from division staff to high
staff. After one division staff assign-
ment, any further low staff assign-
ments become wasted time. In essence,
CGSC majors do not expect division
staff or believe it would achieve hest
October 1972
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
utilization simply because they do not
want it-it is no longer career en-
hancing.
In sharp contrast to division staff
expectations, the majority of CGSC
majors expect to serve on DA staff.
This expectation does not appear un-
realistic. It is important to note, how-
ever, that a much lower proportion of
these majors seek high staff or be-
lieve it would be best utilization. The
proportion who seek DA staff for
career advancement rather than for
enjoyment or contribution is the same
as the proportion who expect these
assignments, but do not believe they
would be best utilization (24 percent).
If only the officers who expect DA
staff are considered, 30 percent do not
believe these jobs would be best utili-
zation.
These findings parallel a 1970 US
Army War College study, Winn61'll
Lose: Dissatisfaction With the Army
General Staff, which concluded officers
at that level were dissatisfied with
DA staff for professional, economic
and social reasons. 18
Although few majors have been as-
signed to high stati', most already have
formed strong impressions. They be-
lieve DA assignments' are important
to the Army, and that they can expect
a high professional reward for duty
in these jobs. They are less sure of
day-to-day job satisfaction because
the grapevine says many officers there
are performing insignificant tasks.
But they are sure that they will lose
economically and socially in Washing-
ton. Although utilization is not di-
rectly related to economic or social
values, it is probable that prohlems"of
living in the Washington area, coupled
with doubts about the quality of DA
jobs, have caused CGSe majors to be-
lieve they would not be best utilized
in these jobs.
59
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
IlIlIt1ry RnI..
60
CGSC majors appear to be making
a tradeoff of professional values. Even
though the proportion who believe DA
staff is best utilization is low com
pared to expectations, it is still twice
that of the proportion who believe di-
vision staff is best utilization. This
appears to contradict what many of
them say when among contempo-
raries: As individual staff officers,
their efforts will have the greatest
operational impact at low staff levels.
Have they decided to sacrifice job sat-
isfaction for career advancement by
serving as "go fors" to get high-level
staff on their record?
Education
The announced goal of the Army
Civil Schooling Program is for all
commissioned officers to have a bacca-
laureate degree and 20 percent of all
career commissioned officers to have
a graduate degree. 14 About one-third
of both research samples and the
1971-72 CGSC class already have
graduate degrees. Another 30 percent
said they expected to get master's de-
grees. This would bring the total with
graduate degrees to about 60 percent.
This figure is not in line with the
Army goal. However, with the high
proportion of degrees already ob-
tained and the number of officers en
route to graduate school, it appears
realistic. A high proportion of degrees
in this group will be balanced against
the "undereducated hump" of officer
candidate school officera commissioned
during the Vietnam War to achieve
the overall Army goal.
While graduate degree expectations
are high, only about 20 percent of
CGSC majors believed these degrees
would achieve best utilization of them
in the best interests of the Army. This
does not mean they do not want these
Octobor 11172
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
degrees. Ninety-two percent said they
have or seek these degrees (72 per-
cent for its value to them as individ-
uals or to the Army, and only 20 per-
cent to enhance career advancement).
When these two responses are com-
bined, it is apparent that CGSC ma-
jolis believe advanced degrees' have
high personal value, but are of little
value to the Army. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that many re-
spondents voluntarily circled "value
to me" in their response. These offi-
cers are probably viewing degree utili-
zation in a narrow sense, without con-
sidering the broadening aspect of ad-
vanced education.
It does show, however, that they
do not believe the Army will make
the best use of their area of greatest
expertise. Furthermore, when these
attitudes are analyzed in conjunction
with career goals, it is apparent that
a number of officers are motivated to
get master's degrees to prepare them
for civilian jobs rather than for career
advancement or for their value on the
job.
CGSC majors believe the Army's
main interest is to enhance the pres-
tige of the serviee by improving the
educational statistics of its officer
corps. This is most obvious with pro-
grams such as the CGSC cooperative
degree program. It is worthwhile to
the individual enrolled because it gets
the advanced degree on his record.
But the real value of advanced study
is eliminated because the student can
study very little in depth in six
months or one year.
'Ii'lcllet Punching
"Ticket punching" may be applied
broadly to anyone who seeks career-
enhancing jobs. To some extent, this
activity is desirable in the Army .if it
1111
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
is compatible with the best interests
of both the service and the individual.
Ticket punching becomes a dangerous
problem if, for career advancement, a
significant number of officers avoid as-
signments for which they have strong
interests or capabilities, or seek as-
signments which are not compatible
with their interests or capabilities.
On the questionnaire, only 16 per-
cent of the majors admitted they be-
long to the first category, while 15
percent said they were in the latter.
This is probably a conservative re-
sponse. Because of professional ethics
and peer pressures, many officers do
not freely admit, even to themselves,
that career advancement is the pri-
mary motivation for some of their
critical assignment decisions.
Half of the officers who admitted
avoiding assignments for which they
have strong interests or capabilities
were avoiding special career pro-
grams. Another third were avoiding
intelligence assignments. One-third of
the officers seeking assignments for
which they have little interest or
capability said they seek DA staff
assignments. Another third were seek-
ing special career program assign-
ments. It appears that two different
segments have formed opposite opin-
ions of the career value of special
career programs.
Career Goals
The officers in both samples were
asked what rank they wanted to at-
tain and what rank they expected to
attain. About one-third of each sam-
ple expressed a limited goal: colonel.
Another third want to reach the
Army's highest rank. Two-thirds of
the officers aspire to be generala.
Less than 20 percent of the majors
expect to retire as lieutenant colonela.
About 60 percent expect to retire as
colonels, and about one-fourth expect
to be generala. More officers expect
to be generals than will actually ever
reach these ranks. If this proportion
were applied to the entire CGSC class,
250 officers would have to be promoted
to general from the 1971-72 class
alone.
These high expectations are not
surprising. These officers have already
demonstrated success before attend-
ance at CGSC. Their expectations have
been reinforced by rapid and predict-
able promotions which have destroyed
the meaning and value of rank. This
was caused by the Vietnam buildup
and the recent tendency of the Army
to substitute promotions for increases
in pay.
The expectations of these officers
will be even more out of line with
reality as the Vietnam. War winds
down and the number of Army gen-
erals is reduced. To some.extent, the
problem will resolve itself as the pro-
motion rate is reduced. Hopefully,
with more time between promotions,
the officer corps will become less pro-
motion conscious, and expectations
will automatically become more real-
istic.
But there is still a need for im-
provement within the Army. The
Army must develop other measures of
career success besides promotion to
general. One obvious requirement is
to rebuild respect for colonels. Since
this rank will be the high point in the
careers of most professional officers,
it must have the prestige which will
allow these officers' to feel their ca-
reers have been successful.
During the interviews, officers were
able to express career goals in terms
of rank achievement quite easily, but
most had difficulty expressing any
other goals. The obvious conclusion
MllitaIY Revin
62
was that few of these officers had
given long-term goals much thought.
The only accomplishment that they
were convinced was meaningful was
promotion to general or colonel.
Questionnaire respondents w ere
subsequently asked to list other ca-
reer goals besides rank. Job satisfac-
tion was the most frequent response
(25 percent). This orientation is in
line with c I ass i c a I management
studies. But the next most frequently
selected career goal was unexpected:
preparation for a retirement job or
second career (15 percent). This is
a startling result because it can hardly
be viewed as a professional goal (Jan-
owitz wrote, "Concern with a second
career undermines the value of the
original career choice and weakens
professional commitments"). 15
Why have so many stated that a
primary goal for this career is to pre-
'pare for a second career? One obvious
factor is that the major today does
not believe the Army will provide him
adequate retirement security. The
professional soldier of past years
could count on retirement benefits
and, therefore, elect to pursue a sec-
ond career voluntarily. But retirement
benefits have not kept pace with re-
tirement needs, and ongoing retire-
ment studies appear to be threatening
a further reduction of benefits. The
major believes that a second career
will be mandatory unless he is pro-
moted to general. Furthermore, most
officers have a strong desire to keep
working after SO years of service.
The retirement problem appears to
be one of the factors contributing to
the distortion of expectations in the
officer corps. The SO-year rule makes
promotion to general even more im-
portant. This only serves to increase
the demand for the "right assign-
ments."
October 11172
IIlELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Career Commitment
When asked about career commit-
ment, one-fourth of the majors said
they plan to retire at about 20 years.
Another 20 percent will serve at least
SO years. More than half (54 percent)
said they would serve more than 20
years if certain conditions were met.
With the high expectations (com-
mand, promotion, etc.) expressed in
this study, this conditional commit-
ment may pose a problem for the
Army. The problem is simply that
many of its officers are basing their
career commitment on conditions
which may never be met.
It appears that many of the CGSC
majors will stay for a SO-year career
if they believe they will be promoted
to colonel and have a chance for gen-
eral. But they often express their
commitment in terms of intermediate
'goals: "I will stay in if 1 get bat-
talion command and DA staff." So
much importance has been attached to
these assignments that many officers
use them as indicators of whether
they will attain their long-term goals.
These indicators will help them to
decide whether to retire at 20 years,
in time to begin a full second career.
But, if so many officers are to be
frustrated in their attempts to receive
these key assignments, the Army must
demonstrate that it will promote those
who do not receive them.
Conclusion
The initial purpose of the study
was to determine what differences
exist between the career assignment
patterns CGSC majors expect and
those they believe would achieve best
utilization of their individual profes-
sional skills and personality traits in
the best interests of the Army. Dur-
63
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
ing the interviews, it became apparent
that officers' attitudes toward assign-
ments are sharply influenced 'by their
values. It was also apparent that
these values have been developed
through years of institutional indoc-
trination. These observations were re-
inforced by the results of the ques-
tionnaire.
Because of these interrelationships,
the study provided not only an evalua-
tion of the Army's officer career man-
agement system, but also a measure-
ment of the "professionalism" of
CGSC majors. The values of the of-
ficer corps should be compatible with
the values of the Army. But these
values are compatible only when there
is effective communication between
the different levels of the officer corps,
and the Army's programs and organi-
zations reflect the values of the Army
and support them. For this reason,
any indication of a distortion of val-
ues, or lack of professionalism, con-
cerning assignment patterns in this
study is also an indication of a failure
of the officer personnel system to sup-
port the fundamental values of the
Army.
As the needs Qf the Army change,
so must its values. During a period
of drastic change, such as we are now
experiencing with the conclusion of
the Vietnam War, the Army en-
counters the difficult psychological re-
quirement to reorient the values of its
officer corps. This becomes a serious
problem if the existing values have
been reinforced by years of indoc-
trination. This is the fundamental
dilemma of the proposed OPMS. Its
success or failure will be determined
by how clearly it identifies the true
values of the officer corps and how
effectively it changes these values.
This study provides a measure of
the initial impact of OPMS proposals
on the attitudes of CGSC majors. It
also indicates which aspects of the
new program are most acceptable, and
which will encounter the greatest op-
position or be the most difficult to im-
plement.
Like the US Army War College
Professionalism Study, this study
points directly to the need for a dra-
matically new officer career manage-
ment system. The current system is
no longer adequate for the needs of
the Army. But it has helped to estab-
lish a set of professional values which
must inevitably lead to conflict with
the introduction of a new system. In
the final analysis, those who formu-
late OPMS cannot give the officer
corps what it wants. It wants just
what the outdated system has pre-
scribed (generalization, cOmmand, op-
erations, DA staff, etc.). This applies
equally to junior officers and the gen-
erals who have been passing judgment
on the OPMS proposal.
Ultimately, a firm central authority
must recognize the true needs of the
Army and establish a program which
will meet these needs. The values of
the officer corps may have to be re-
aligned accordingly. This will be the
real challenge of OPMS.
Military RUle. 84
DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Major Phillip W. Mock is with tks
Concepts and Force Design Group of
the US Army Combat Developments
CommandinAlezandria,Virginia. He
received. a B.S. from the US Military
Acatlemy and an M.S. in lnduatrial
Management from the Georgia lnstt-
tute of Technology, and is a 197B
gradJuate of the US Army Command
andGeneral Stat!CoUege.
NOTES
1 US Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-8.
Ca,reer Pla"ftitll1 for Armll Com-mitrioned Olfl,cere.
Waahinaton. D. C 1 August 1970, p 2-2.
JI US Departmentof the Anay, Deputy Chief of
Staff tor Personnel, Directorof Personnel Studies
and Research. TAe Amw 16 Peracmtul Concept
Sl1ulw. Volume n. Waahllllrlon, D. C.. 20 II&>'
1969. P 8-811.
LieutenantColonel WalterF.UlmerJr., "Con-
eepts of GeneraUsation and Specialisation In om..
cer Career Manaaement" thesis. US Army War
eolleae" Carlisle Barracks. P... 8 lfareh 1969, pp
'1 and 82.
US DepartmentoftheAimy. Officeof Pel'B01l-
nel Operations. t'OPMS n Introduction Outline,
ChiefofStaffoftheAI'III1' BrleO",,:'nndated, p 2.
Ward Just, Mil/lat'll M.... Alfred A. Knopf
Inc N. Y., 1970. P 109.
Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. O'Mary. "Generali
zation verBUB Speclallsatlon-Structured Ineq-
uity,., thesis. US ArmyWar eollese. CarUs1e Bar-
racks, P&., 80 Februat>' 1970. P 86.
t' US DepartmentoftheArmy. Office ofPenon-
nel Operations. OPKS U Briefing at US Army
Command and General Staff College. 16 November
1971.
8 USDepartmentoftheArmy. OfBee of Person-
nel Operations. Results ofOPMS n StudentOpin-
ion Survey. US ArmyCommandand General Staff
College. 16 November 1971. p 11.
"USDepartmentofthe Army. Oftlee of Penon-
nel OperatiolUJ. OPMSn Bridnl'.op. cit.
10Statement by Lieutenant Colonel Otto 8ehuls
(Plan and Programs Branch. DeputJ' for Career
PlanninB'. OfBcer Personnel DI OtBce of
Penonne1 Operatfo (tele-
phone). 1'1 llareh study
was completed. the conducted
a detailed an.aJye1s of this problem and revised
their estimate: 80 to 88 percent of aD active
dutJ' lieutenant colone1a in the combat arms will
command battaUODl in the torce
.truetnre (Lleotenant Colonel Paul Eo Supllzlo,
Chiefof theOPMS Task GronP. 16 A.....t 1972).
No precise estimate related to CGSC I<l'&c!uales 10
available. However. OfBee of Personnel Opera-
tlOIUJ stat ereent ot all
active du combat arms
(October 1971) bave a"""ded (provided by
Branch OfDeer ution. Ofllcer

October 1971). This does not account
tor lieutenant colone1a attending CGSC or wait-
inB' to attend. Even if all battalJon commanders
were CGSC graduates. only 88 to 41 percent of
the CGSO combat arms o16cen would command
battallons.
sttuf:i
Opinion survey. op. cit.. P 12.

18Lieutenant Colonels W. C. CouaJand and D.
M. Malone. Wi........ LoN: DilNCiofaetitm Wit/o
tAo A""" _ Slaff. US AI'III1' War eon.....
Carll8le Barreca.Pa.. 9 March 1970.
"US Department of lbe Army. Depnty Chief
of Staff for Personnel. A,.." Peraotanel Letter.
W..hIDJrtoD. D. C February18'1'2, p &.
S.'2t..r:.r
cae InCo. N. Y 1980. p 188.
III
October 1872 65
An Introduction to the ChinesE
Viee Admiral Ko Tun-hwa, Chine_ NtUJg
T
HE Chinese Armed Force Uni-
versity in Taipei is a unique
educational institution for military
officers of the Republic of China. It
is an integrated complex of four col-
leges: the War College, the Army
Command and General Staff College,
the Naval Command and General Staff
College, and the Air Force Command
and General Staff College.
All operate under one headquarters.
General Yu Pak-chuan, well-known
among the Chinese as a strategist, is
the commanding general. Lieutenant
General Chiang Wei-kuo (b e t t e r
known as Wego to his many American
friends and Leavenworth classmates>,
the second son of President Chiang
Kai-shek, is the Commandant of the
War College, while the author has
the honor to serve as the Commandant
of the Naval Command and General
Staff College.
Not long after joining the college
about a year ago, I came across a
collection of seven ancient Chinese mil-
itary books which had been made
available through the courtesy of Gen-
eral Chiang. The books were not new
to many Chinese military students
IUustrations courtesy Chinese National Pa.l.ace Museum and the author.
Military Classics
since some of them were written
many centuries before Christ and one
in King Solomon's time! What was
novel and unique was that the copy
I got was personally footnoted by a
very great Chinese scholar, Wang
Yang-ming (1472-1529). This had
been kept by a friend of Wego who
had brought it with him as a treasure
when he left mainland China to come
to Taiwan.
Except for the book of Sun-tzu,
the other six classics have not been
translated into any foreign languages
even though they are quite deeply
rooted in Chinese military minds, both
Communist and non-Communist. This
article will attempt to give a brief
account of the books and suggest their
influence on modem war.
According to the traditional his-
tories of China, the earliest ruler was
Huang Ti, or the Yellow Emperor,
from whom many subsequent Idngs
and princes of ancient China claimed
descent, The Yellow Emperor dwelt in
the modem province of Honan, south
hi Yellow River. He was said to have
waged 70 battles around 3000 B.C.
These were mainly against non-Chi-
nese tribes and took place before he
brought together the Chinese con-
federacies in China itself.
The Yellow Emperor had one Ni-
Moo as his general and chief of staff,
Ni-Moo was said to have written a
book of 15 chapters called On War or
Pin-Fa which, in the Chinese language,
means the principles of war. Ni-Moo's
book On War might be the very first
military treatise in the world. But
it is rather hard in modem times to
check the authenticity of such an
Oclor1972 67
CHINESE MILITARY CLASSICS
early book written long before print-
ing was invented in China.
From that time on, various military
writings are known to Chinese his-
torians. Most of these ancient Chinese
military books were written on what
is known as "Chun Chiu" or the war-
ring states period of Chinese history.
This period coincides with the found-
ing of Carthage in Western history.
The seven Chinese military classics
are: Book I, The Art of War by Sun-
tzu; Book II, The Principles of War
by Wu-tzu; Book III, Ssu-ma Milita1'1/
Treatises by Ssu-ma, Shen-soo and
others; Book IV, Dialogue of Emperor
Tang Tai-chung and his Chief of Staff
Li Tsin; Book V, On War by Wei Liu-
tzu; Book VI, Three Milita1'1/ Treatises
(or Three Strategies) by Yellow
Stone; and Book VII, Siz Articles of
War by Chiang Tai-kung.
The seven books are arranged not
according to their dates of writing,
but according to their popularity
among modern Chinese readers.
In order to help understand the
ancient books, perhaps it would be use-
ful to describe the historical back-
ground of their era and to outline
generally how wars were waged in
those times.
In the Chun Chiu period (722481
B.C.), the early Chinese feudal system
was verging on decay. The ruler of
China, or "The Middle Kingdom" as
we Chinese always call it, was the
King of Chou. This "Son of Heaven"
was, in theory, the supreme lord of
the land. However, his power was
being shattered by the feudal princes
of various rising states. The political
map of China in this era resembled
that of the Holy Roman Empire in ita
decadence.
Confueius wrote an aceurate ehron-
ological history of his native state
Lu, known as "Chun Chiu," meaning
"Spring and Autumn Annals." Even-
tually, this period of history was
known as Chun Chiu, after the title
of his book. This period extended from
481-211 B.C. and was also known 8S
the time of the warring states. The
latter title was derived from a fa-
mous boOk, The Strategies of Wamng
States.
The histories of those centuries are
intricate and confusing records of
wars and intrigue. Finally, out of the
numerous competing states and fiefs,
five states gained the power to exer-
eise suecessively hegemony over the
whole eonfederacy. These states were
known as "Overlord" (or pa in Chi-
nese).
By the warring states period, there
had become seven ruling states known
simply as the "Seven Strong States."
These were Chin, Chu, Yen, Chi, Han,
Chao and Wei. Wars were fought
among these strong states' almost con-
tinuously for 260 years until the
strongest, Chin, emerged as champion
in 222 B.C.
I am not trying to write here a his-
tory of aneient China, but, rather,
am trying to describe something about
the wars that were fought in the times
when the Chinese military classics
were written and also to show how
the books came into being.
During a war in 259 B.C., for ex-
ample, the army of Chao was starved
into surrender at Chang Ping in
Southern Shansi. Thereafter, this
Chin general, Pai-ehee, exterminated
the captive host by burying some
400,000 men. Nonetheless, these an-
cient wars were fought not only by
bloody violence, but, more often, by
stratagem or treachery. It was not
uneommon for a king to be invited to
a state dinner or diplomatic function
and then be kidnapped.
Weapons used in those periods were
MUItlIY RlYf 68
w
.
bows and arrows, spears, swords, dag-
gers, shields, iron hooks, iron headed
clubs, and also horse-drawn chariots.
The nobles fought in war chariots
ridden by three men-a charioteer
and a "right-hand man," with the
chief in the center. The chariots were
usually drawn by four horses. The
mass of the popular levy fought on
foot around their master's chariot as
"van"-at the right and left corners-
each echelon consisting of 24 men.
Supply wagons were drawn by four
oxen . . also surrounded by foot
soldiers, with five guards of wagons
in front, five guards of cargos on the
right, five waiters on the left, and
five cooks and water suppliers in the
rear.
In the Chun Chiu period, an army
consisted of 12,500 men organized into
five divisions, each with 2500 men.
There were five brigades in a division.
Each brigade had 500 men. The basic
element was a "Wu" meaning five men.
Five Wu, 25 men, were known as a
"Liang." and four Liang, totaling 100
October 11n
men, were known as a "Tzou."
In the early part of the Chun Chiu
period, battles were usually waged
with few troops on each side. When
the overlord Chi emerged into pre-
eminent position, he had an army of
only 30,000 men. By the time Tsin and
Chu contested for power, war had
assumed a slightly larger scale. In the
battle of Foo City, the allied troops of
Tsin, Chin and Chi totaled some ,90,000
men. Chu opposed these with an army
of 111,000 men. That was the first big
battle of the Chun Chiu era.
By the time of the warring states,
war had escalated to the point that
armies frequently had more than half
a million men. Ancient Chinese mili-
tary forces were basically infantry
with edged weapons generally. Gun-
powder was discovered by the Chinese
before 255 B.C., but there was no
record of its use for war in the early
periods except perhaps for the cele-
bration of victory.
Cavalry was not used much until
Wu Liang, King of Chao (325-299
89
CHINESE MILITARY CLASSICS
B.C.), brought about an innovation in
Chinese war methods by changing the
Chinese dress. Flowing robes were ex-
changed for the Hu costume to facili-
tate the riding of horses. Wu Liang,
who had lived in the northern part of
modem Shansi Province, had fre-
quently seen attacks by nomadic bar-
barian archers from the Mongolian
Steppes. These troops had impressed
him as being highly proficient.
War stimulated intellectual activi-
ties, and a new class of thinkers arose.
They were called "Wandering Schol-
ars," Confucius, who was born in 551
B.C. about 95 years later than Sun-
tzu, was one of these.
These men of different schools of
thought wandered through the various
states. Each would seek a prince who
would listen to his instruction and put
his doctrines into practice.
Although the warring states era was
a restless and ruthless age of political
disorder and military intrigue, it was
also the most glorious age in the
history of Chinese thought, both ethi-
cal and military. The writings pro-
duced have exercised a lasting influ-
ence on Asia similar to that of classi-
cal Greece on European culture.
Sun-tzu was one of the military
thinkers who presented his writings to
Ho Lu, the King of Wu in middle-
eastern China, west of Shanghai,
about 514 B.C. In doing this, he was
trying to help the King of Wu to at-
tack successfully his stronger neigh-
bor Chu in the south. A minister of
King Wu by the name Wu Tzu-hsu,
who must have been also a good friend
of Sun-tzu, told King Wu about the
ability of Sun-tzu in warfare. In
order to gain the confidence of King
Wu, and to keep his plans for attack-
ing Chu practical, Sun-tzu made his
writing brief, concise, fundamental
and straightforward.
Wu-tzu was, himself, the author of
the second book in the collection of
the classics. Wu-tzu wanted to get
himself employed by the Prince' of
Wei and to develop plsns for attacking
Chi. But Wu-tzu bad more difficulties
than Sun-tzu to get himself trusted
by an ambitious prince. Because the
wife of Wu-tzu came from Chi, the
Prince of Wei did not wish to use him
as general in a war against that king-
dom. In order to gain Wei's confidence,
Wu-tzu is said to have murdered his
wife.
What effect have these Chinese mili-
tary classics had on modern war?
I presume most readers have come
across Sun-tzu's work in one way or
another. Therefore, I will not spend
too much time on repeating his words
here. But I want only to point out that
his whole theory of winning a war
has but two major facets. The first is
not to allow oneself to be'defeated; in
essence, to make it impossible to be
defeated. The second is to seek ways to
defeat the enemy. Sun-tzu did not
believe it was always possible to de-
feat an enemy. He recognized that one
may know how to conquer without
being able to do it. But he believed
it quite possible to secure oneself
against defeat. Sun-tzu also believed
in breaking the enemy without fight-
ing.
To some, this may sound too much
like wishful thinking or dreaming.
However, in the nuclear age, all strat-
egists must think many times in the
manner of Sun-tzu's lines about how
to achieve the objective by not fIght-
ing. Sun-tzu said:
In war, the best thing of aU is to
take the enemy's country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not
so profitable. So, too, it is better to
capture an army entire rather than
to destroy it. Hence to fight and con-
Military Review 70
quer in all your battles is not supreme
excellence. Supreme excellence consists
in breaking the enemy's resistance
without fighting.
If war cannot be avoided, he pro-
posed only quick campaigns. Rapidity
is the essence of war, a lengthy cam-
paign should always be avoided. He
held that the chief things in war are
swift chariots used to deliver attacks
upon an unprepared enemy, using un-
expected routes to reach undefended
points.
Sun-tzu was not a dreamer; he
trusted only actual strength. He said:
In the practice of war, don't trust
in tke enemy not coming but in your
having the means to withstand kim.
Don't trust in his not attacking but
on your being in an unassailable posi-
tion.
If Sun-tzu were alive today, he
would understand the necessity of
building up a deterrent and retaliatory
force. He might, therefore, propose the
deterrent strategy.
October 1872
So much for Sun-tzu. Wu-tzu's book
was even shorter. It contained only
4773 words, only one-fifth the length
of Sun-tzu's. Wu dealt with the prac-
tical way of estimating the situation,
commanding the troops, conducting
the battles, and so forth. But, at the
same time, he taught people to discard
hard and fast rules. The important
art of war he tried to preach was to
accommodate oneself to the situation
and to the enemy. He proposed that
one should feign stupidity by appear-
ing to yield and fall in with the
enemy's wishes, and then counterat-
tack unexpectedly. He proposed to ac-
complish things by sheer cunning.
Wu-tzu, himself at the head of only
500 charioUl and 3000 cavalry troopers,
smashed the Chin army of 50,000 men.
Later, he broke the states of Chi and
Chu.
The third book by Ssu-ma was the
shortest one in the collection. It had
only five chapters of 3549 words. It
endorsed justified war by saying:
71
CHINESE MILITARY CLASSICS
destroyed his numerous competitors
and reunited the whole of China.
When at war, and also during peace,
he liked to converse with Li Tsin.
Tang asked the questions, Li Tsin
provided the answers. Their dialogue
forms a great book. Their style and
usage are more recent (7th century
A.D.). Therefore, they are more read-
able. This work itself is useful in un-
derstanding the ancient Chinese mil-
itary classics since prince and sage
discussed frequently the ancient prin-
ciples of war.
The thrust of the book might be
summed up, "The clever combatant
imposes his will on the enemy, but
does not allow the enemy's will to be
imposed on him," or, in other words,
Suntzu
'!> l' '. <t
\
1 .:
LI rain
, .;""
l'
It is righteous to kiU people, ifthe
-,'
.... ,
purpose is to comfort more people. It
")'

'..>
is proper to attack the other state if
. ,
itis to bring welfare to thepeople of
that state. To fight a war for the
sake ofstopping warsis justified.
The author of Book IV was General
Li Tsin, or, to be more correct, the
book records conversations between
General Li Tsin and his great em-
peror Tang Tai-chung.
The Tang dynasty existed in China
from A.D. 618 to907. Tang Tai-chung
was the founder of probably the great-
est throne that ever existed in China.
He began his business of revolting
against the ruling power when he was
a 16-year-old boy. He, in seven years
of violent and intricate civil war,
MIIItaJJ Rill.. 72
Chlalll ~ k u n l
"One should hold the initiative."
Wei Liu-tzu's book treated military
organization, combat, discipline, train-
ing, and even signaling and communi-
cation. Under each topic, he wrote an
essay of a few hundred words.
The Three Military Treatises is a
quite different book. Written by a
mysterious old Chinese named Yellow
Stone, this work discusses "observa-
tion," "analysis" and "application."
In addition to military affairs, it at-
tempts to teach rulers how to rule
and to maintain their power. In this
respect, it resembles The Prince by
Niccoli> Machiavelli (1469-1527).
Yellow Stone gives as the formula
for success: "To control your men by
craftiness, to unite them by faith, and
to use them by rewards." He ends
modestly: "He who reads his book
October 1872
could be the teacher of a prince."
Who wrote the last book in the col-
lection was hard to determine. How-
oj
ever, its authorship has been attrib-
uted to Chiang Tai-kung who lived
J
earlier than all the other writers
mentioned here. Chiang Tai-kung, ac-
cording to legend, became a general
at 81 when he was fishing on a river
bank and was called upon by his King
Wen.
His book is not divided into num-
bered chapters as we do in modern
times, but, instead, chapters are en-
titled Dragon, Tiger, Leopard, Dog,
and so forth. In his book, he empha-
sized psychological warfare heavily.
And, strangely enough, he called it
"Wen-Far" or cultural combat. Now
we use the term "cultural revolution,"
but Chiang Tai-kung wrote about his
concept of cultural revolution in 1000
B.C., and this was in King Solomon's
time!
The effects of these Chinese ancient
military classics are still to be felt
in modern wars, at least this is so in
wars in Asia. Because from genera-
tion to generation, not only all the
leading soldiers, but statesmen, politi-
cians, diplomats and businessmen in
Asia like reading these classics. There-
fore, their infiuences continue strong.
Not only the top policymakers have
read Sun-tzu, but also the guerrilla
fighters in the jungle who are also
well-indoctrinated with Sun-tzu's con-
cepts such 8S:
If he is taking his ease, give him
no rest.
If his forces are united, separate
them.
Attack him where he is unprepared,
appear where you are not ezpected.
If he is in superior strength, evade
him.
When able to attack, we must seem
unable, wken using our forces, we
73
CHINESE MILITARY CLASSICS
mustseeminactive,whenwearenear, What makes these Chinese military
we must make the enemy be{ieve we classics endure so long is that they
are far away, when we are far away, are marked by common sense and deal
we must make them believe we are with basic human nature. Further-
near. more, the ancient military thinkers
Hold out bait to trap the enemy. were rich in power of imagination.
War is to be waged at the enemy's Sun-tzu said:
expense in forage. The enemy's sup-
plies,are worthSO ofone's own. The general who is skilled in de-
A force 10 times as numerous as fense hidesin the mostsecretrecesses
the enemy's wiU surround him, one of the earth; he who is skilled in at-
five times will assault him, one twice tack flashes forth from the topmost
may divide against him, one equal to heights of heaven.
himis capable ofa pitched battle, one
slightly inferior must evade him, one This was not a pure metaphor or
quite unequal must retreat. figure of speech. Sun-tzu must have
perceived the possible advance in
The Chinese Communists have long weapons, the possibility of attack from
observed Sun-tzu's concept in guer- sky and space, and the use of under-
rilla warfare. The Vietcong guerrillas ground tunnels and shelters.
are also known to have published If there is anything else about these
seven principles of tactics which do masterpieces, it isthat they are very
not differ too much from those of the well-written, each word if! well-chosen
Chinese Communists. and well-distilled.
ViceAdmiralKo Tun-hwa,ChineseNavy,
is presentlyCommandantoftheNavalCom-
mand and General Staff College, Armed
Force University, Taipei, Taiwan. He is a
191,0 graduate of the Naval Academy in
mainlandChina,andhasattendedtheRoyal
Naval CoUege in Greenwich, England, the
BritishSubmarineSchool,andtheUSNaval
WarCollege.Hehas servedon bothChinese
andBritishships,has commandedtheNaval
Logistics Force, has served as Chief in-
structorandAssistantChiefofStaff(Plan- !.
!:t--"
ning) inNavy Headquarters, andas Chief
of the Liaison Bureau of the Ministry of
> ~ ; _
Defense. :,:4Jll ~
MIlItarJ Review
74
All II~ "Dife4t
~ r Council Papers on International Affairs
the WEST and the
MIDDLE EAST
John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso
L
OOKING at the whole problem
of security in the Mediterra-
nean-Middle East-Indian Ocean re-
gion, the Western Nations share three
requirements: (1) maintenance of
the global deterrent; (2) maintenance
of a military balance to Soviet armed
forces in the region in order to pre-
vent use of the latter to establish
positions of domination at the expense
of important Western interests and
of the independence of local states;
(3) development of political and other
relations with local states and with
outside powers toward understand-
ings and settlements which in time
can replace the military balance as a
basis for security.
On the first point, the main respon-
sibility rests with the United States
both to maintain the deterrent and to
negotiate limitations on the strategic
arms race with the Soviet Union, a
reality which is_ recognized by the
October 1972
Western European nations and by Ja-
pan. They need not enter into detailed
calculations with the United States on
how to cope with a general war aris-
ing in the Middle East. This is a con-
tingency which both superpowers
have strong reasons to avoid. If they
allow it to happen, it will occur be-
cause of their own failure of sanity
and statesmanship in handling a local
conftict or their relations with each
other. All that other nations can do is
help to temper or settle disputes which
could possibly lead to that result.
The second and third points are
related. Under present conditions, the
Western Nat ion s have to decide,
singly or in cooperation, what are
their min i mum needs in military
forces and deployments. At the same
time, they should explore all possibili-
ties of using other than military
means to attain the desired results.
They need not assume for all time
75
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
that the only relevant factors for
security in the region are the number
and location of ships and bases or the
definition of security commitments.
But these things are importsnt now,
and the requirements of security pose
a practical question: How much is
enough?
We need not make the assumption
that Ii Soviet lunge for domination of
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean,
or the land areas surrounding them is
likely, or would have much chance of
success if it were tried. Yet we must
assume that the Russians intend to
make the most of the extension of
their military reach. They might
decide to use their forces to intervene
in one country or another, to support
a friendly regime or to help over-
throw an unfriendly one. These pos-
sibilities touch the interests of all the
advanced nat ion s: their political
standing, their need for freedom of
access and communication, and their
continued supply of oil.
This article wetS reprinted
from ChaJpter IV of the original,
one of a series of COUNCIL PA-
PERS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
P'Ublished by the Council on For-
eign Rela.ti01lll' Inc., New York.
COP1/right 1975 by the Coun-
cil on Foreign Rela.ti01lll Inc. All
Rights Reserved.
Mr. CampbeU, Senior Research
Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Rela.tions, served in the Depart-
ment of State for 1S years and
has written widely in the field of
international rela.ti01lll.
Ms. Caruso is Research Asso-
ciate at the Council on Foreign
Rela.ti01lll, specializing in Middle
East affairs.
The main military question for
those nations is whether the Soviet
buildup of military power should be
answered in kind. They cannot force
its removal or reduction by ultimatum
or direct action. They can perhaps,
over time, work on the political situa-
tion so that the Soviet military forces
are not welcomed by local govern-
ments or cease to serve Soviet political
purposes. They can attempt to work
out with the Soviet Union arrange-
ments for stabilizing or limiting arms
levels in the region, or for political
settlements which would have the
same result. In the absence of any of
these positive developments, it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that a
balance of nonnuclear military power
must be maintained as a background
for political and diplomatic action.
There is no one-to-one correspond-
ence between military power and po-
litical influence or advantage. In some
cases, the psychological effect of the
direction in which things are moving,
the impression that Soviet power is
increasing and that of America going
down (even though the latter is still
greater in absolute terms), can have
significant political consequences. If
there is a generally accepted situation
of equilibrium, then the erosion of
Western interests and the danger of
Soviet political primacy in the region
may be avoided.
The Mediterranean will not again
be an American lake, but neither can
it be allowed to become a Russian
lake. The US Sixth Fleet, at this junc-
ture, is an indispensable part of the
balance, and a marked reduction, such
as withdrawal of an aircraft carrier
and supporting units, could have ad-
verse political as well as military
effects.
Perhaps American power in itself
is enough to check Soviet power, but
MUItlIJ Revllw
78
it would be better for the general
security if elements other than the
two superpowers had a significant
part in maintaining it. Naval forces
of France, Italy, and Great Britain,
cooperating under a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization label so long as
NATO has commitments there, could
provide that element.
For the future, a European label
would be more effective by taking the
edge off the strictly bilateral confron-
tation of the two biggest powers.
Such forces would have the possibility
of gaining the active or passive co-
operation of those of nonaligned coun-
tries such as Spain, Yugoslavia, and
perhaps even the Arab countries of
the Maghreb.
At the present time, the idea that
both the American and the Soviet
Fleets should withdraw from the Med-
October 1872
iterranean is fanciful. What is im-
portant is that other actors appear on
the scene, with naval forces and a re-
sponsibility for security more propor-
tionate to their real political and eco-
nomic interests in that area.
The presence of European forces,
of course, would require some under-
standings with the United States
about purpose and policy. The Euro-
peans are aware of the twofold mis-
sion of the Sixth Fleet which is in the
Mediterranean to fulfill NATO obliga-
tions but also to uphold American
interests in the Middle East that may
have little or to do with
NATO or Europe. If the United
States, for example, wanted to posi-
tion the Sixth at some point in
the eastern Mediterranean to deter a
military move ag/linst Israel or Jor-
dan, it could expect British or
77
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
Italian or French units to cooperate
unless those governments supported
the political objective. The military
factors, accordingly, ought to push
the Western Nations toward closer
coordination of policy.
Similar considerations apply to the
Indian Ocean although there the stra-
tegic factors are more attenuated. The
question is again one of balance in
which a minimal Western military
presence is necessary to provide a
counter to the Soviet. If the Suez Ca-
nal is reopened, one can expect that
the Soviet presence will expand, re-
quiring some further buildup on the
other side.
Here, too, a combination of Western
forces, including Australian, is pref-
erable to an assumption of the task
by anyone of them. Europe's interest
is clear because of its interest in oil
although the idea that military power
alone can guarantee oil supply has
rightly been abandoned. Japan's in-
terest is also apparent although the
time has not come for a Japanese mili-
tary presence in this region. The pur-
pose of the desired equilibrium is to
give scope to peaceful trade and to
the political and economic develop-
ment of the countries of the region
without their being affected by mili-
tary pressure or intervention on the
part of any outside power.
On a broader basis, the primacy of
the political factor emerges from a
review of how the Soviet Union
gained its present militsry position
in the Mediterranean. It did so not
just by sending in vessels, but by ea-
tablishing a pattern of military col-
laboration with certain states which
then provided naval and air facilities.
The Soviets' relationship with the
United Arab Republic (UAR), which
includes de facto naval bases and a
number of airfields wholly controlled
by Soviet personnel and adds tremen-
dously to their military capabilities,
was attained by diplomacy, military
and economic aid and, finally, a formal
treaty.
Similarly, east of Suez, the posses-
sion of force is less likely than the
use of political positions gained by
diplomacy to secure the entrenchment,
or the withdrawal, of militsry power.
Thus, the regime in Southern Yemen
opens the base at Aden to Soviet use
because Soviet policy has generally
supported that regime against those
it takes to be its enemies.
The new Soviet treaty with India
may provide the foundation for a mili-
tary cooperation not unlike that be-
tween the USSR and the UAR. Ceylon
may be receptive to military coopera-
Israeli soldier patrolling an.oll pipeline
MIlItarJ RlYlew


78
tion with Moscow when it receives So-
viet arms to use against domestic
enemies. The Soviets, by backing some
East African state like Somalia in its
local quarrels, may also get a foothold
there. Western military power has
not prevented such developments in
the past and cannot easily do so in the
future. But Soviet power, conversely,
cannot easily make itself felt in coun-
tries where Western diplomacy has
been successful.
And so the argument comes back to
the point that the security of the ad-
vanced nations of the West depends
only in a general way on what armed
forces they keep on the spot or in
readiness to move there. It depends
more on the attitudes of local states
and on the policies of Western Na-
tions affecting those attitudes. There
is a necessary minimum of physical
presence, certainly, to show that the
West is neither impotent nor indiffer-
ent. But beyond the military measures
necessary to counterbalance Soviet
power and to rule out disaster, the
main effort must be political.
The clearest lessons of recent years
are that Western Europe can be more
effective in its own intereat by devel-
oping common policies of its own, and
that it can best support the general
purposes it shares with America by
seeking, at the same time, both an
independent role and a practice of co-
ordination with Washington where a
true basis for it can be found. The ac-
cent of European policy should be on
Europe. In that way, the policies of
France may lose some of their nation-
alistic bite and be reconciled with
those of its European partners.
No more eloquent European appeal
for such a vision has been made than
that of Edward Heath speaking to a
German audience before he became
Prime Minister and before Britain's
October 1872
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
decision to enter the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC):
The single most important thing to
make an impact on public opinion
would be if Europe could speak with
one '/loice on an important gJroblem.
: In the Middle East we aU have
the same interests. We do not want to
see Israel go under. And we aU de-
pend on good relations with the Arab
countries for the oil vital to our in-
dustrial life. We do not want Soviet
encroachment in the Mediterranean,
nor a clash between the Big Powers.
If in Four-Power talks on the Middle
East, Britain and France spoke with
the weight of a united Europe behind
them, much could be achieved. The
Common Market must be more than
haggling over butter and coal. 1
Analysis of the Arab-Israeli prob-
lem also shows that Western Europe
has played a' role well below the mag-
nitude of its interests in the area. The
main European concern, of course, is
that no war break out and that the
conflict be somehow settled or ap-
peased so that it has a minimum ad-
verse effect on security and on the
flow of oil to European markets. Dif-
ferent schools of thought exist on how
to bring about that result. Some think
that only the two superpowers, each
exerting influence on its own clients,
can bring about a settlement; some
look to the United States, as the only
power able to persuade or coerce Ia-
rael, to do the trick; and others would
like to see the parties left alone to
make their own terms.
None of these courses offers great
possibilities of success. The nations
of Western Europe, accordingly, have
1 Adapted from Tile 2'1..... 9 May 1970. wb_
Heath. remarks are reltOrted In Indirect quota.
tlon.
78
IsraeU massed tanks In review at Hebrew UniversitY
to consider what they themselves can
do in facing up to an extended period
in which no progress is made toward
an Arab-Israeli settlement. They are
frustrated today in the Middle East
because they have so little to say,
whereas historically and geographi-
cally and in basic interests they are
very close.
One reason for their ineffectiveness
is the lack of unity. Great Britain has
tended to support American initia-
tives, while France has sought a role
of its own, and Italy and Germany
have hung back. Together, they could
provide both Arabs and Israelis an-
other partner to look to and listen to.
The Big-Four concept cherished by
General de Gaulle actually provided
the British and French with no great
influence either on the other two of
the Big Four or on the Arab states
and Israel.
Their presence, with others, as
"Europe," carrying out the intention
behind the initial effort of the mem-
bers of the EEC to work out a policy
resting on interests common to all,
may be quite a different proposition.
Western Europe as a whole, with the
power it would have and the oppor-
tunities it could offer, represents an
economic partner of great importance
to both sides, as well as a possible
modifier of the rigidities of Soviet
and American policies.
Israel, which is engaged in trying
to make US policy more rigid than it
presently is, will not be attracted by
that second point. But as the conflict
goes on, Israel may find some greater
prospect of security with Europe in
the picture than in a total reliance on
frontiers supposedly secured by geog-
raphy and the continuing inflow of
American arms to maintain them in-
definitely. Should the United States
object? Thus far, it has not welcomed
French attempts to find compromise
solutions. But.a European rather than
a French polley, instead of helping
the Soviets, could help cut the ground
MllitaIJ Review
80
under their feet in their relations
with the Arabs.
The fact of the matter is that there
cannot be any compromise or settle-
ment unless Isrljel is prepared to
soften its own rigid policies. Perhaps
only the combined' influence of the na-
tions of North America and Western
Europe, all of them desirous of normal
and fruitful relations with Arab
states and fundamentally dedicated as
well to Israel's right to live in security
but unwilling to support present Is-
raeli policies and tactics, can bring
the possibility of a settlement to
reality.
That Arab leaders and governments
wiJI have to compromise'their extreme
positions is also clear. The world com-
munity, in the long run, cannot permit
small nations in the Middle East to
keep the world forever on the edge of
war, and neither Israel nor the Arab
states can easily contemplate the con-
sequences of persisting indifference or
hostility on their part toward the
unique community which the economi-
cally advanced nations of the West
represent.
A deeper perspective on these pos-
sibilities may be obtained from the
relation of these political and security
matters to the ever-present subject of
oil. There, the analysis leads even
more strongly to the conclusion that
the advanced nations, especially those
of Western Europe, should forge as
solid and lasting a relationship as they
can with the producing countries.
These should be broad relationships
encompassing an expansion of exports
by the industrially advanced nations,
investment, technical assistance, col-
laboration in development, and also a
renewal and expansion of cultural ties
which still exist despite years of po.
litical struggle. To build up a complex
of such relationships is to create mu
October 1972
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
tual i n t ere s t s which Can outlast
changes of regime and thus minimize
th'e effect of chronic political insta
bility in the Middle East since any
regime would have something to lose
by disruption of the framework of
collaboration.
The idea that grand schemes of
regional economic development will
produce the solution to political con-
flicts has a great attraction, especially
for Americans. But there are some
lessons in the fate of the Eric John-
ston plan for the division and develop-
ment of the waters of the Jordan
River, the idea of Dag HammarskjClld
to find a solution for the Palestine
refugee problem in the context of a
broad economic advance in the Middle
East, and the Eisenhower-Strauss
plan for large nuclear desalting plants
to make the desert bloom in Israel and
in neighboring Arab states and thus
bring peace out of conflict.
Specific and more modest projects
offering concrete mutual economic
benefits, such as the planned oil pipe-
line across the UAR from Suez to
Alexandria to be financed by Euro-
pean interests and used for Europe-
bound oil, illustrate a sounder way to
build up the desired network of co-
operation.
The United States and Japan have
every reason to support and con-
tribute to the creation of that net-
work. They also have every reason to
work together with Western Europe
toward a long-range energy policy
which will lessen their dependence on
the oil of the Middle East and North
Africa.
Individually, all the advanced na-
tions have been working out their own
long-range plans, with emphasis on
national security and the undesira-
bility of d ep end e n c e on outside
sources. That has been the main diffi-
81
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
culty since separate national plans be-
come set as they are put into practice
and tend to shut off the avenues to
international planning and agreement,
and competing natiogal plans will not
serve any nation well.
President Nixon has spoken of the
need for a long-range US policy, in-
cluding coal, oil, gas, and oil-shale, as
well as atomic, solar, geothermal,
tidal, and other forms of energy. 2
American officials have also thought
in terms of North America or the
Western Hemisphere, thus one or two
stages beyond a national plan; and
the EEC has at least talked about a
common policy for Western Europe.
All these endeavors should go for-
ward, but in some rational relation to
each other, not only to meet future
needs, but to face the crucial question
of continued precarious dependence
on an unstable and unpredictable Mid-
dle East.
There is nothing inherently incon-
sistent between that aim and a policy
of broad collaboration with the Mid-
dle Eastern countries. It is merely a
matter of simple prudence. It is pos-
sible, with active and coordinated pol-
icies on energy, that the critical de-
pendence of the West and of Japan
on Middle East oil is a temporary
state of affairs that will endure only
for some 10 to 15 years until atomic
energy (which may supply up to 15
percent of the industrial nations'
needs by 1980) and other sources of
power can replace it, and that all we
have to do is baby along the produc-
ing countries until then.
But to look on a broad policy of col-
laboration between the advanced na-
it Message to Congreu, " .lune 1971 (Wukl1l
Compilation. of PruitWtttiGl DOCICtMftA, 7 lane
1971. pp 866-68). The message Is a .tatement of
J)OSBibilities rather than an intearated plan.
tions and those of the Middle East and
North Africa as a temporary device
for the sake of oil alone is to under-
estimate its importance and its poten-
tial. For it can help to ease or to con-
tain political conflicts, to permit
rational attack on the area's economic
problems, and to create a state of af-
fairs to which the Soviet Union will
have to accommodate and might find
advantage in so doing.
What of the negative side? What if
the advanced nations do not concert
their policies? The United States is
likely to be left alone with a big and
unmanageable military assignment,
trying to maneuver among the Is-
raelis, Arabs, and Russians without
much chance of success and no easy
way out, and questioning the wisdom
of trying to protect the interests of
others with no help in return from
them.
The Western European nations,
each looking primarily to its own con-
cerns, would tend to shy away from
US policies which to them smack more
of the Cold War and of overconcern
with Israel than of common Western
interests, but would be unable to re-
place them with anything better. They
might tum to making their own ar-
rangements with the Arab states at
the expense of both Israeli and
American interests.
On oil matters, the probability
would be for friction between Ameri-
can oil companies and those of Europe
and Japan, and between Washington
and its allies. Opportunities for ex-
ploitation of these differences by Mid-
dle Eastern governments and by the
Kremlin would inevitably follow.
The lesson to be drawn from such
neg a t i v e predictions seems clear
enough. Yet the developments since
August 1971 in relations among the
advanced industrial nations scarcely
Military Review 82
augur well for efforts to apply that
lesson in the Middle East. The evi-
dence of shocked sensibilities, mutual
ill will, and resurgent nationalism is
to be found just about everywhere. It
is anyone's guess when the current
tensions and controversies over cur-
rencies, trade, and the opening to
China will shake down and permit
common interllsts in a reordered sys-
tem to make themselves felt.
The case for greater cooperation
and common action among the ad-
vanced nations of North America.
Western Europe, and Japan has been
WEST AND MIDDLE EAST
made frequently on general pounds.
The supporting reasons are many and
cogent. It is difficult to conceive of a
sound world order in the absence of
such cooperation. In our analysis of
Middle East problems. the argument
runs more from the particular to the
general. A search for mutually sup-
porting policies in a region outside
the direct relations of the advanced
industrial nations among themselves,
while needing no extraordinary justi-
fication, might help in restoring a
sense of common purpose none can
afford to lose.
MILITARY REVIEW COVERS NEEDED
MR needs ettractive CDvers. For tIIese, pbotograpbs, artwDrk,
Dr Ideas for our artists are a must CDvers can be printed In
any two cOIDrs but nD more. Please dD net ask us wbat we want.
If we knew. we wDuld ID abead wltb It at full speed. Originality
is tbe gDal.
October 1872
83
The
Soviet
\\M'
arlne
C "
orps
The 50th ennivellllry parade held in Red
Squera in Moscow on 7 November 1967 was a
remarkable displey of Socialist military might,
and it was during this parede that the new
version of the Soviet merines
1
mede its public
debut. Beginning with the parade, both Western
and Soviet press sources heve devoted increes
ing attention to the Soviet marines, but their
actual beginnings were visible at 'east 10 yeell
befora. By 1964, Soviet merine units ware an
accomplished fact-a fact which had been lerge
Iy ignored in the Western prass.
The evolutionary procass that culminated in
the public appearanca of Soviet marine units in
1964 began during <the .early years of Khrush-
chev's reign. During these years, Soviet military
strategy gradually lost its traditional continen-
tal flavor and began to concam itself with arees
not directly contiguous to the land area of the
Soviet Union. Khrushchev's appointment of
S. G. Gorshkov es Admiral of the Soviet Fleet
in 1956 was to be an important fector in this
reorientation of Soviet strategy.
During World War II, Gorshkov had
conducted over 25 amphibious esseults, one-
fourth of the Soviet total
2
and he was an early
advocate of a trained amphibious forca. Pre
sumably, as a rasult of Gorshkov's influence,
the Soviet Union began limited construction of
amphibious vahicles in the mid1950s. In the
Mljor John F. Meehan III, Uniud States Army
late 19501 and early 19601, detailed analyses of
US amphibious operations in the Pacific began
to eppear in Soviet military journals. These
analyses heva continued to appear, and the
Soviet military press subjects these US opera
tions to an exhaustive critique, with special
emphasis on '1essons learned,"
Events in the late 19501 and early 19601
rainforcad the views of Gorshkov and others
who wara striving for the creation of a perma
nent amphibious force. The US intervention in
Lebenon in 1958 illustrated to the Soviet
leaders the effectiveness and flexibility of am
phibious forcas. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis
was, to a lesser degree, also an argument in
favor of building Soviet intervention forces
slnca here the limitations of "rocket diploma-
cy" became apparent However, it was not until
1964 that the pro-marine argumant carried the
day. From then on, evants moved rapidly.
In the euthor's judgment, two major con-
siderations prompted the Soviet Union to cre-
ate marine forcas in the 19601. The first was
political-the Soviets desirad an intervention
capability, and, to a limited extant, existing
marine strength provides this capability. The
second consideration is connected with tha
Soviet strategic view of a futora nuclear war es
including convantional operations to seize criti-
cal points.
Military Revl.w 84
In the summer of 1984, just before the fell
of Khrushchev, the fim references to merine
units eplIB8rBd in the Savitt prea, ..nd, et the
I8me time, work on the ;ntlsubllllllne warfal8
helicopter carrier MoskVII WII bBgUn. In Sep-
tember 1984, Bulgerie, Rumenie end the So-
viet Union conducted joint maneuvars In Bul-
garia, and Soviet pl8a reports of the. ma-
neuvers flm made public the IXlstance of
Soviet marine unib. Published pictures indicate
thlt the amphibious landing in this exercise WII
small SClla, probably lea than company size.
The Westarn prea ovarestimated the signifi-
cance of this event. In July 1984, it was
reported thet tha Sovieb had creeted an am-
phibious corps of 80,000 men in tha Baltic
8188,3 and, by september 1985, this estimate
had grown to 198,000.
4
Currant lItimates are
thllt, et tha and of 1985, Soviet amphibi-
ous forces consisted of 3000 to 4000 men,S
which pub things in perspective, but the initial
ovel8ltlmation of the size and importance of
tha Soviet marines halps explain the decreasing
WeSl8rn ettention to the development of the
Soviet merines during the nIXt few years.
The initial /ll'Dwth of marine forees WIIS, in
fact, slow and systamatic. By December 1987,
they had an estimBtBd strength of 5000 men
and, by October 1989, hed achiavad a strength
of 8000. At the beginning of 1970, tha merine
units presented no militery threat to the Wilt,
but their presence did indicate a change in
attitude, a change In Soviat military thought.
The slow growth of the marines WIIateom-
panled by a rapid upgradillg of Soviet airborne
forces, and those two evenb together indicate a
Soviet desira to heve expeditionary forees
evailable In ordlr repidly to inject Soviet p0W8r
In distant 81'881. Evenb had taught Soviet
strategists that Intemntion forces are a n_
lity in thl conduct of graet-p_ politics. Thl
pl8S8nce of these forces, offensive In natura, .
hes given the Soviet Union the ability to
conduct a mora aggraaive foreign policy.
HinorlcaJ Ties
The appearance of Sovllt merine units rap...
sentall a merkld innovation In the Soviet
military stRIctura. However, a major afton hes
bBBn meda in the Soviet Union to trace the
lineage of these units back to ib historical
roots. Soviet military historians sel a historical
continuity bBtw8Bn the fim Russian marine
elemlnb and those of tha presliilt.
Czar Peter the Great 11672-1725), a stu-
dent of Westarn military affelrs, WII the first
Russian advocate of amphibious warfara. In
1704, he issuld the royal deem thet led to the
formation of the first merlne units. The fim 10
companils of merines 11385 min total) were
orgenized on 18 November 1705, a dBtB which
the Sovilb now recognize as tha merlne blnh
day.S Marina ellmanb first fought on 27 July
1714 during a Russian neval victory over the
Swedes, but it was not until 1717, whln a force
of 900 men seized a Dutch island, thet thlse
units ware used in their amphibious roll.
Russian marines wera not to be used for the
Major John F. Meehan 11/ received a
B.S. from the USMA in 1962, an M.A. in
Political Scienca from the Univenity of
Colorado in 1970, and is a recant gradu-
ate of the US Army Institute for Ad-
VllncadRussian and East European Stud-
ias in Garmisch, Wast Garmany. He has
served in Korae and is currendy en route
to Vietnam for a second tour of duty
thera. He is the author of "Soviet Maneu-
ven: Summar 1971" which appearad in
tha April 1972 Military Review.
October 1872
85
next 52 yeers, but, in 1798, a force of 1700
marinas, and an additional 7400 saitors, can
ducted an amphibious assault on the island of
Corfu and conquered its French garrison. In
1814. at the end of the Nepoleonic Wars. all
Russian marina units were disbanded? not to
reappear in the Russian militery structure for
100 years.
During the Crimean War, 17 naval infantry
battalions participated in the defensa of Savas'
topol, and, in 1904, during the Russo.Japanese
War, naval infantry units helped defend Port
Arthur; howaver, all of these units were impro
vised and do not represent a continuity of the
marine tradition.
In 1914, a marine battalion was activated in
the Baltic Fleet, and, at the end of 1915, this
small forca (536 man) conducted an amphibi
ous assault, the first Russian amphibious assault
$inca 1798.
8
During the period Merch-July
1916, over 50,000 men took part in amphibi
ous operations in the Baltic area, but only three
small landings of approximately 2100 men each
were made by troops trained for amphibious
warfare. Under tha pressure of wer, the Russian
marines gradually diminished in size and impor
tance, and, in the chao\of the Civil War, they
complataly disappeared.
Soviat historians make frequent reference to
the exploits of the naval infantry in the civil
wer. Howavar, these forces were not merines
but simply sailors forced by circumstances to
fight on land.
In June 1939, a Soviet marina brigade wes
again formed in the Baltic, and this force
conducted an amphibious assault during the
RussoFinnish War. During World War II, over
500,000 naval infantryman fought'O in virtual
Iy all of the mejor bettles of the war, but these
units, as was the cese during the civil wer, were
comprisad of surplus sailors used es infantry."
They were not marines. That they fought well
is not in dispute; these sailors were wellmoti
vated and well-led, jultly desarving the reputa
tion of bravery Soviet historians attach to
them.
During the wer, the Soviet Union conducted
114 amphibious assaults, involving 330,000
troops and 2000 werships,,
2
but these opere
88
tions were improvisad (61 were planned and
executed in less than 24 hours) end, in many
cases, are best categorized es river-crossing
operetions. This chapter of Soviet history does
not include the marines; it does include many
highly successful assaults made by whatever
troops were available.
The claimed historical linkage of the present
marines with their Russian and Soviet predeces-
sors is highly tendentious. That Soviet writers
invariably emphasize thesa ties is understand
able, and Soviet attempts to show the historical
continuity of their marine units is interesting,
useful to them, but not valid. By 1964, the
Soviets had created a new force-a marine
force.
Stretegy
The appearanca and growth of Soviet marine
forces have been entirely consistent with the
evolution of Soviet strategic thinking since the
deeth of Stalin. Soviet strategic thought has
generally paralleled US strategic thought (with
a typical time-lag of from two to three years),
and, from Soviet writings, a rather clear concap'
tion of any future general war emerges. The
basic premise of Soviet thought is that, even in
a ganeral nuclear wer, convantional forces will
play e major rote in determining the outcome.
In the Soviet view, the next wer will be truly
globpl es the "area occupied by the enemy is
five times that of World War I, and three times
that of World War 11.,,'3 This geogrephic
factor, plus the use of nuclear weapons, will
effectively preclude the continuous fronts of
World War II. Sokolovsky, in his classic, Military
Strategy !third edition), succinctly summerized
this view when he wrote:
If before the stracking forces had to seize a
whola strip of territory on tha attack front now
it is sufficienr for them to seize vital regions
and cenrerr which hava 'lor been destroyad by
the nuclaar rocket strike.
14
The characteristics of a nuclear wer es
devalopad in Soviet thought also call for the
employmant of conventional forces es the only
effective means of population and territorial
control after a nuclear exchange.
l5
In a future
war, Soviet military thinkers estimate that the
presenca of tactical nuclear weapons will pre
Military Review
clude the concentretion of conventlonel forces
end piece e premium on secrecy. Surprise in the
employment of forces will be of even gllleter
significence then in the past (Soviet doctrine
has elweys emphasized the principle of sur
prise). All of these feetol1 fevor the employ.
ment of highly mobile lending forces, both eir
end see.
In e limited nucleer wer, es well es in e
conventional war, these mobile forces would
heve utility, but it is in the lower renge of the
spectrum of militery opellltions thet these
forces can pley their most importent role. In
the modem context, intervention, end e cllldi-
hie thlll8t of intervention, is e plllreQuisite for
the conduct of greetpower politics. In Soviet
strategy, mobile forces heve their greetest utili-
ty et the extremes of possible militery ection.
These forces ere seen by the Soviets es basic to
the conduct of militery interventions and to tha
conduct of a pnellli nucleer war.
Doctrine
Landings, eir end see, are recognized by the
Soviets as "one of the mOIll activa fOlms of
militery ection, corresponding to the echieva-
ment of more decisive objectives in modem
conditlons."t6 The existence of seven eirborne
divisions in the Soviet Union, end the concur-
Illnt maintenance of a comparatively small
amphibious capability, is an obvious indicator
October 1872
that the Soviets heve felt a mejor role in e
future WlI' would be pleyed by airdrops end air
landinlJ$.
A Illcognition thet en airboma oparetion
cennot, by its nature, have the striking power
of a sea _ult hes led to one of the basic
tenets of Soviet emphibious employment: in
tha future, tha joint employment of sea end air
lendings will be the norm-air alone or see elone
will be the exception.
17
CUl/llnt Soviet litera-
tulll end Illcent meneuvel1 document this prin-
ciple.
As a Illllllt of a thorough study of US and
other countries' amphibious operations, the
Soviets heve identified five tYpes of amphibious
operations: strategic; operational; tacticel; ra-
connaissence; and demonstration.
1S
These
types are consistent with Soviet cetegorization
of land operations, and undemanding them
presents no difficulty to the Westerner except
in differentiating between strategic and opera-
tional landings. The meening of the rameining
terms is identlcel to the US navel definitions.
The concept of en "op818tional" employ-
ment of fol'Cft has no diract counterpart in
Western military terminology, and it is difficult
to distinguish between this seele of operation
and a strategic operation on the basis of
definition alone. Historicel iIIustretions, how-
ever, clearlV show the difference. Tha invasion
of Normandy was a strategic amphibious opera-
87
tion; it opened e new theBtBr of militery opel'll-
tions. The lending at Inchon was an operational
emphibious assault; it hed a major influimce on
the outcome within e mDitery theeter.
Tactical assaults In Soviet terminology are
those that influence the outcome of a battle,
end the Soviet utilization of reconneilSBnce end
demonstration or diversion types of assaults is
totally consistent with the US naval concepts.
Amphibious assaults may elso be dey or
night, with no preference being eXPr8lSBd by
doctrine. They are further cetagorized as being
opposed or unopposed.
The aetuel conduct of an amphibious asseult
is divided by Soviet doctrine into five distinct
stages, the first being the preperation stage. In
spite of the fact that 61 of a total of 114
iBndings mede by the Soviet Union in World
War II were planned and executad in less than
24 hours, the Soviets have an BWBraness of the
complexity of a modem amphibious assaUlt and
cell for the preperetion pariod to be as long as
possible. Using the illustration of the US assault
on Sicily19 as e negative example, it is streSSBd
that communicotions and coordination must
receiva at least as much emphasis during the
preparetion phBSB as does the plan for the
aetuelassauit.
Tha second stage, sea movement, includes
loading opBrBtions, possibly bacause all the
Soviet amphibious assaults in World War II were
of the shoreto-thore variety. Today, the Sovi
ets continue to emphasize shol'll-toshore opel'll-
tions. Loeding of the _ult creft from the
shore is to be done at night end over the beach
to assist in mBintaining secrecy.
AccordIng to doctrine, night is the prefarred
time for movament,2O and, throughout the
movament stage, redio discipline Is strongly
emphasized.
The third stage is the "battle for landing and
the lending of troops." Here, the high tampo of
landing operetions end the dBsirebility of land-
ing on as wide a front as possible has been
incorporatad Into doctrine. Locel air superiori-
ty is recognized as a prerequisite for a su_
ful lending,21 end this recognition implies an
lICCBptence by tha Soviets of limitation on the
ilpllBlilms, es
for an amphibious _ult prBSBntly are land
basad.
The fourth stage is the battle for position on
shore, end, whan sufficiant terrein has been
seized to avoid ObseMd fires on the landing
beach, the emphibious operation is ovar. At this
point, motorized rifle troops are to be landed
and the marines withdrawn.
The fifth stage of the Soviet emphibious
assault epplies only In cose of tha failure of tha
assault end involves the "decreasing of forces
and backward loading," a euphamism for I'll-
treat end withdrawal.
In the conduct of an emphibious _ult, tha
Soviets anvision the forming of a tesk force
similar in concept to thet of the US concept of
task forces. This tesk force will include the
marine assault units, their transport, and tha
navel and eir elements supporting the landing.
The principle of unity of command for this task
force is recognized, end, while the commanding
officer mey be a naval officer, it is preferred
that tha tesk force be under the command of
the senior land commahder. In any CBSB., the
SBCond in command will 'be a naval office,..2 if
tha commanding officer is a "lend" officer.
But, in all CBSBS, once the aetuallanding begins,
control will be exercised by the '1and" com-
mander.
The command post will initially be on board
ship, but is to be transfarred to shore as soon as
the tecticel situation permits in order to facill-
tete control. An eltemBtB command post is to
be mainteined at all timas end will normally
accompany the _It_.
Standard communication procedures to be
used during an amphibious assault hava been
worked out and certein guidelines enumeratad.
As a principle, redio communicotions are to be
held to a minimum, for SBCurity, for reliability,
and to prevent the airwavas from becoming
cluttered with nonessential traffic. Redio sl-
lence is the rule during SB8 movement,23 and,
avan during the _ult itself, the Soviets fael
that visual signals should be the primary means
of shlp-to-thore communlcetions. Once they
have IIndBd, the _ult troops will use wire
communications as much 81 lIOSSihlt, tea.iliii
mil\} mIU me f{lf ltBlll$ lmpof
MIlItI" Revllw
88
tance and for fira control.
Provisions ara mada for a saparate tectical
air support n ~ (in amergencies, air support
raquests can ba processad through the tactical
command nats). and requests are processad
through the "post of control of tactical aviation
of the command post of the bettalion" (pre-
sumably similar to the Battalion S3 Air of the
US structure) and from there to the "special
aviation officer at tha point of control for fire
support" who will remain on board ship.
Organization
The basic organizational structure of the
Soviet marine force is the battalion which is
further subdivided into compenies, pletoons
and squads, and follows the triangular organiza-
tional pattern of the Soviet Army. Marine
battalions are organized into brigades rather
than ragiments, as is the normal Soviet practice.
In Soviet terminology. a regimant has three
battelions while a brigade consists of three or
more battelions. and the Soviets have adopted
this latter, mora flexible organization in their
marina structura. There are indications that at
least one of the Soviet brigades consists offive
battelions. Marine officers and enlisted men
wear the rank insignia of the Soviet Army
rather than that of the Soviet Navy.
The command structure of Soviet marinll
forcas represants an enigma to any obsarver
restricting himsalf to unclassified sources of
informetion. The Soviet press frequently refers
to the marines as a "branch of the naval forces"
(rod vo,nnomorskikh sil) which would indicate
that. organizationally, the marines are on the .
same level as the other fiva branches of the
nevy. However. each of the other five branches
has an identifiable commander in Moscow.
while the marines do not. at least as reported
by the Soviet press.
On the marine birthday, for example. the
articles in the Soviet press that glorify the
marines. their combat readiness, are written by
naval officers from the various ragional naval
commands. For the other nevel brenches, this
October 1972
function is carried out in the name of the
branch commander. Based on .such facts, it
saems probable that the marines do not have a
cantralized command structure. but are opera-
tionally subordinate to the nevel command in
which they are located. There may be a
cantralized organization dealing with such met-
tars as training and doctrine which justifies the
Soviet appellation of ''branch'' without afford-
ing its commandar operational control.
Equipment
The uniform of the Soviet marine is meant
to be distinctive in appearance and to contrib-
ute to the feeling of elitism. but it rapresants a
combination of the uniform worn by the Soviet
soldier and the Soviat sailor. The field uniform
of the Soviet marine is a black fatigue with a
"bush"-type blouse (similar in appearanca to
the US Army jungle fatigue). Calf.fength. black
leather boots are the standard footW88r, and
each marine WArs a black leather belt, the
buckle of which has the insignia of the fleet to
which he is assignad.
At the bend of his left sleave. there is a small
circuler patch with an emblem of an anchor.
The neck of the fatigue jacket is worn open.
allowing the characteristic blue and white
striped tee shirt to be saan. The standard
h88dgnr is a black beret with the anchor
insignia on the laft and a red star on tha front.
The parade uniform of the marine is the same
as the field uniform just described. but of
batter quality. For a dress uniform. the Soviet
marines WAr the seme uniform as the Soviet
sailors. distinguishable only by the insignia
worn.
The Soviet marina forces are equipped with
the same basic waapons in usa by the Soviet
ground forcas. The basic individual w88pon of
the marine is the 7.62-millimeter AKM. Each
marine squad is armed with one light machine-
gun (the 7.62mm light machinegun Kalashnik-
ov HPKI. Some photographs have shown ma-
rines carrying the AKM in a folding stock
version, but this does not saem to be standard.
89
The basic antitank weapon, the RPGl.V, is
found at all levals, presumably on the basis of
about ona to evary fiva men. The 1.62mm
generalpurpose machinegun Kalashnikov PKS
is found at company level, as wall as mounted
on _Itvehicles.
Soviat claims that all marine artillery is
selfpropelled cannot be acceptad, as there heve
been pictures published recently showing ma-
rinas landing with the standard field artillery
pieces being towed by amphibious vehicles. The
basic fire support weapons, howavar, are self
contained. One of the mainstays of marine fire
support is the 141J.millimater rockat launcher,
BM14-17, mountad on the GAZ63 truck. Mor-
tars, mountad in the BTR60P amphibious
carrier, hava also been pictured, and these
weapons appear to be the beckbone of the
merine orgenic fire support.
Mobility for the marines is based on exten-
sive utilization of the PT76 (Model III and
various configuretions of the BTR60P and the
BTR40P, the basic personnel carriers of all
SJlviet forces. Both the BTR60P and the
BTR40P are apparently being replaced by the
newer BMPl6PB-an armored personnel carrier
mountad on a modified PT76 chassis.
All of these vahicles have excellent mobility
on land and in the water end appear in various
configuretions as raconnaissence, communica-
tions, repair and supply vahicles. The BTR60P
carrias 14 fully armed marines, and indications
are that eight of these vehicles are normally
utilized by a merine company in the assault.
The PT76 appears in the Soviet press frequently
in clustars of three, which would conform to
the standard organization of a Soviet platoon.
Two platoons of tanks may be the normal
support for the marine infantry company in tha
attack.
Landing craft are probably not organic to
marine units, but presumably ara assigned to
the fleet. In tha Wast, there is no consensus as
to the total number of landing creft evaUable
for marine use, nor as to a breakdown by type.
W8St1lrn sources generelly credit tha Soviets
with 230 "anding craft" 1105 of which are
landing shiPll.
26
As the US Marine division of
20,000 men has 97 '1anding ships" and 42
'1anding craft," thare is an obvious difficulty in
defining just what is a "anding craft." The
Soviets heva not published their figures, but it
appears that they do have an adequate numbar
of creft for their marine forces to conduct
shore-to.sIJore operations.
The 'argest creft in the Soviet emphibious
inventory is the Alli(J8tor class, with a capacity
of 500 men plus vahicles, but thasa are rere and
seldom seen. The most numerous type in use is
the Polnocny class, with a capacity of eight to
10 tanks. The Soviets are credited with heving
over 40 of these
26
with more being built.
The workhorse of the Soviet emphibious
fleet is the trecked amphibious trensport PTS,
with e cepacity of 50 men and eight to 11 tons
of cargo, which hes replaced the older K61.
Numerous ships end vehicles of World War II
vintage are still listed in the inventory,2? but
have not appeared in press reports since the
"reactivation" of the marines in 1964. Thasa
vehicles may be employed with the river forces,
ifatall.
Western sources frequently assQciate the two
relatively new antisubmarine warfare cerriers,
the Moskva and the Leningrad, with marine
operations. Both displace 20.000 tons and carry
a complement of 20 to 30 Hormone helicop-
ters.
28
Theoretically, thasa helicopters could
lift a battalion or more of marines in support of
an amphibious assault, but such amployment is
estimated by this writer to be unlikely and
would be naeessery only in the event of a
Soviet long-range, shipto-shore amphibious es-
sault-an event for which the Soviets are not
prepered by doctrine or training. Such utiliza-
tion would represent an improvisation since
ships hava not bean designed, nor are they
suited, for this role.
Preparation of the Individual
Soviet marine units are elitist. All aspects of
the life of the marine in the Soviet unit reflect
this-from the unit designations, to the clothing
and equipmant issued, to the intansity of the
treining conducted. All Soviet marine units are
"guard" units,29 an official designation of
~ s units with an illustrious combat history,
Military Review
90
and ona intended to conwy a sense of elitism.
Entry into "guard" units is restricted by
rigid requirements to ensure high physical
fitness and political reliability. Not all marines
ere volunteers, as a dreftee meeting the prereq
uisite standards can be assigned to a marine
unit. But, presumably most are volunteers,
either true volunteers or draftees who have
volunteered for the marines. For all, the term
of service is two years.
The new inductee is constantly barraged
with slogens designed to make him aware of his
elite status, as well as the philosophy of the
marines. The most frequently used slogan sum-
merizes this philosophy: "For the merines there
is no retreat. Only forward-there is victory."
As they hit the beach, all give the traditional
shout of the merines, "Po/undTa'" which can-
not be precisely translated, but meansroughly,
"Wetch Out Belowl"
Slogans such as these are meant to instill in
the individual marine an awereness of the
conduct expected of him in order to uphold the
tredition of the merines. Soviet sources define
the marine tradition as "the presence of high
militery spirit, the spirit of attack, audacity in
battle, physical strength, and 10ya118 to the
party, the Homeland, the People," Marine
training is designed to davelop these qualities.
The basis for marine training is that of the
training recaived by motorized rifle units, but,
in addition to this, the Soviet marine receives
appropriate naval training. He becomes familiar
with naval vessals, naval terminology and sig-
nals, and, aven though he lives ashora, he
remains oriented to the sea.
Marine training in the Soviet Union is best
described as rugged; it has consciously been
made so in order to contribute to the esprit of
tha marine units. Soviet Army units may take
thair physical training tests in the "sports
uniform," but not the marines-"We think they
!these testsl must be fulfilled in full militery
dress as it would be in battle,',3t The daily
routine of the marine (Sunday through Friday)
begins with physical training at 0600 and often
includes the negotietion of an obstacle course.
Forty percent of the physical training program
is dedicated to "Sambo," the Soviet version of
October 1912
hand-tohand combat, and to the techniques of
knife attack.
32
/
Emphasis is on achieving high 'standards of
individual performance. If the individual does
not know how to swim when he enters the
service, this is the first training he receives, as
all marines are required to swim an unspecified
distance in full battle gear, including weapon.
Weapons cross-training is standerd, and each
marine must be an "expert" on all organic
weapons. All are given parachute training.
33
Great stress is placed on map reading, as Soviat
doctrine assumes marines will be employed in
unfamiliar areas.
Physical training of the marine officer is
identical to that of the enlisted marine, but his
professional training has represented somewhat
of a problem. Until 1970, there were no schools
for the preparation of marine officers, and even
now the only formal training given is a special
course in the program for naval cadets.34 From
1964 to the present, the Soviets have relied on
a rether formal version of onthejob training
which, given the smell number of officers
involved, appears edequate. Under this system,
the commander of a new marine officer is
responsible for his treining. Senior commenders
are encouraged to give the young officer special
attention es they "come streight from general
military schools and don't haw a knowledge of
landing oparetions.,,35
In practice, the new officer works out a
program of selfstudy that must be epproved by
his immediate commender. This program must
include certain raquired subjects ("technology,
weapons, military ships"), end elso includes
scheduled hours of studies, specified textbooks
and examinations. At the seme time, the new
officer servesenapprenticeship under an experi-
enced officer and, through these procedures,
acquires the professionel knowledge which he
needs.
Tactical Employment
Press coverage of Soviet maneuvers conduct-
ed in the lest several years hes reflected a
consistency between doctrine end practice and
provides an excellent opportunity to analyze
tectical principles in operation, especially dur-
ing the execution of the essault.
91
SOVIET HELICOPTER CARRIER LENINGRAD
In September 1969, the Soviet Union and
Poland conducted joint exercises in the Baltic
which included an amphibious assault. Soviet
press accounts of this landing provide a remark-
ably clear look at the tectical procedures,
and sequence of events of an am-
phibious assault.
36
The landing force was rather small, probably
a reinforced battalion, and tha assault itself was
of the shore-to-more variety. For several hours
before the landing, shore.IJased jet eircraft
bombed the shore defenses, and, during this
time. minesweepers cleared a series of lanes to
the beach. "Antisubmarine boats" then moved
into the lanes and dropped depth charges to
clear the lanes of underwater obstacles. Armed
helicopters then dropped divers into the water
to complete the tesk of cleering the underwater
obstacles end also placed seppers ashore where
they clearad lanes through the beach obstacles.
The first wave of the assault landed ebout an
hour after dawn and consistad of PT76s. an
amphibious tenk with the capability of firing
while in the water, and BTR60Ps, the standard
amphibious carrier of the Soviet forces.
The second wave in the assault was not a
marine element. but e motorized rifle unit
whose troops ferriad ashore in their organic
BTR60s while the supporting tanks snorkeled
along the bottom after from the
transport ships.
A heliborne assault was made to the rear of
the defending forces while they ware being
subjected to a frontel assault from the sea.
Published reports of other exercises indicate the
identical sequence of avents, and virtually the
only discernible variance is whether the sup-
porting operation is heliborne or airborne. These
supporting operations are usually conducted by
shore-based elements. In the example just cited,
the heliborne assault was conducted by a mao
rine element, but employed shore.lJased heli
copters and facilities.
General 1.1. Yakubovsky, the Soviet Com'
mander of Warsaw Pact Forces, summed up the
Soviet concept when he remarked to a corre-
spondent that "contemporary landings present
a good combination of sea and air landings,
complementing one another.,,37
Capabilities and Limitations
In assassing the possible employment of
marine forces, it must ba borne in mind that
the Soviet marines' ability for sustained opara-
tions is minimal. Marina axercises normally
employ motorized rifle units in tha second and
succaeding assault waves. Thus, the mission 'of
the marines per se appears quite limited, but, at
Military Review 92
the same time, the ,Soviets' cepability for
amphibious assaults is incraased by the usa of
ground forces in an amphibious role.
Soviet military publications have racantly
davotad a graat deal of attention to tha US
employmant of amphibious forces in Vietnam.
Several articles have appaarad concerning the
US usa of "air boats," and the authors laud the
dacreased vulnerability of thesa vehicles. In
Soviet amphibious doctrine, both speed end
surprisa ara emphasized, and "air boats" effec-
tively contribute to both. Soviet commercial
usa of hydrofoils and a proliferation of proto-
types of "air-cushion" vehicles ara obvious
indicators that the Soviet Union possassas the
technology to produce such craft, and their
appearance in the marine invantory should be
expected.
A similar interast is expressad by the So
viets concerning vertical take-off and lending
(VTO LI aircraft. The US ecquisition of the
Britishdesigned Harrier has been commented
on in tha Soviat prass. Becausa of the existing
doctrine of shorato-shora assaults and the lack
of amphibious lift cepability for long-range
operations, the development of VTOL aircraft
is prasumably of only peripheral interast to
Soviet marine forces.
The lack of aircraft cerriers in tha Soviet
naval inventory is tha clearest indicator that
Soviet marine forces are, and will continue to
ba, effectiva only within ranga of land-based
aircraft. This, however, is not as severa a
limitation as it would seem. In the Baltic and in
the Mediterranaan, the Soviets already possass
adequate shore facilities for supporting aircraft.
Considering the Soviet doctrine of m p h i ~
ous warfara, the employment of marines strict
. Iy as a means of securing a bridgehead; tha lack
of long-range lift cepability, and the prasant
marine strength of 15,000, significant growth in
the size of the Soviet marine structura is not
expectad. Existing strength is adequate, and a
qualitative upgrading is more desirable from the
Soviet viewpoint. Any mejor incraase in marine
strength, any significent increase in long-range
lift cepability, or the construction of aircraft
cerriers would signal a change in Soviat stretagic
doctrine and goals. The simultaneous achieve-
October 1972
ment of all three would indicate a radical
change in the balance of forces.
In conclusion it may be said:
Soviet marine forces created in the 19605
indicated the incorporation of a new element
into the Soviet generalpurposa forces structura.
Thera has been no continuity in the Soviet
experience with amphibious warfare, and Soviet
attempts to show continuity era useful to them
only as a tool in the development of esprit in
the units.
Soviet amphibious doctrine is based primari
lyon the study of US amphibious operations
during World War" and differs only in empha-
sis. The Soviet insistence on a supporting
airborne or heliborna operation is, however. an
integral part of the doctrine.
Soviet marine forces ara relatively small, but
wallequipped. trained and led.
The Soviet practice of using their merines
only to sacura the initial beachhead, and the
usa of motorized rifle units in amphibious
warfare, gives the Soviet Union a much greater
amphibious cepability than would be apparent
from the size of the marine force itself.
The absence of aircraft cerriers and suffi
cient long-range lift capability limits the em
ployment of Soviet marines. Prepositioning of
amphibious equipment and dependence on
shora.IJased tactical air support provide only a
partial amelioration of this problem.
Soviet amphibious intervention is presantly
possible in the Baltic araa, on the shoras of the
Black Sea, and in the Mediterranean. A major
employment by the Soviets in other araas
would be clearly signaled by a radeployment of
marine forces.
The Soviets, in all probability, will upgrade
rether than expand their marine forcas in the
forasaeable futura. es the prasant force level is
adequete for their requiraments.
NOTES
1The term "marine" does not exist in the
Russian langualJll' The usual term is "Monka;a
PalrhotB" (naval infantry I, and this term is
being used bV tha Soviets to describe tha
present units. In this article, the term "marine"
will be used to denota a unit organiZed and
trained for the conduct of amphibious warfare,
93
while the term "naval infantry" will denote
unitsformed fromsailorstofight on lend. but
which do not have speciel training,or equip-
ment. In Russlen endSovietliterature.itis not
possible to make this distinction on terminol-
ogy elone, end only e careful enelysis of the
facts in given circumstences makes such e
distinction possible. In the euthor's judgment.
these twoterms have beenutilizedconsistently
intheworkthatfollows.
2KA. Stalbo, "Voenno-Monkoe /slcusstvo
v Velikol Oteehenvennoi Volne," (Military-
Nevel Art in the Greet Fatherlend War),Mor
slcoiSbornik, (Militery Periodical oftheSoviet
Navy), Volume53, March 1970,p29.
3"Military Notes," Military Review, July
1964,p105.
4"Military Notes."MilitaryReview,Septem-
ber1965.p106.
5Thomes Wolfe, "The Projection ofSoviet
Power,"Survival, May 1968,p160.
6B.I. Sergeenko,SOV8t11kala Morskala Pel<
hora (Soviet NavalInfantry),OOSAFFPublish-
ingHouse,Moscow, USSR,1971,p3.
7B I. Sergeenko. "0 Razv/r;; Oesentnykh
SII"("Concerningthe Development ofLending
Forces").MorskoiSbomik, March 1971,p 24.
SL.M. Vasilev, et al., Monkie Oalantnye
Sily(NavalLandingForces), Militery Publishing
House, Ministry of Defense, Moscow, USSR,
1971,p12.
9Sergeenko.op.cit.,p25.
10"Soi Vedet Morskeie Pekhota" ("The
Navel Infantry Conducts Bettie"), Kralnaya
Zvezda(RedSrar),24July1964,pl.
I'StelbO.oP.cit p29.
12
/bid

13
0
.A. Tuz, "Rol 'Morskikh O/l$8nrnykh
Operat11i1i v. Raketno-Vadernoe Voine" ("The
Role ofSee Landing Operations in a Rockat-
Nuclear War"'. Monkoi Sbomik, June 1964,
p 27.
14
V
D. Sokolovsky, Voennaya Strategia
(Military Stfllragy), Third Edition, Ministry of
Defense Publications. Moscow, USSR, 1968.
p246.
op.cit.,p 29.
16
,bid
.,p 26.
17,bid..p 29.
IS
Sta1bo
,0p.cit.,p23.
19
V

I
. Solovev, "Sviaz 'v MonkikhOesen
("Communications in Naval Landings
U
),
94
MonkoiSbomik,September1966,p22.
20AA. Laletin, "Sovremennsia Monkaia
Pekhota" ("Contemporary Navel Infentry"'.
November1965,p30.
21F,O. Smlrnov, "Aviatsiie vBorbeI Mor-
IkimiOesenrami"("Avletion intheBattlewith
Nevel Landings").MorskoiSbornik, May 1969,
p34.
22
L
P. Pronichin. "Nekotorye VoprolY
Vpfllvleniie v Morskikh Oesentokh" ("Several
Questions About Control in Sea Landings"),
Morskoi Sbomik,October1964,p26.
230,S.Sigel, "Sviez'v Desantnykh Destvii-
akh" ("Communications in Landing Opera
a
tions"),MorskoiSbomik. Merch1970.p38.
24Solovev,op.cit.,p24.
25
The
Milirary Baiance, 7977-7972. The
Internationel Institute for Strategic Studies,
London,Eng..1971,p7.
26
Jane
'lWeapon Sysrams, Edited by R.T.
Prettyand O. H. R. Archer. McGrawHiII 800k
Company,N. Y.,1970,p9.
27
,bid

28petri Kruzhin, "The Soviet Fleet in the

Mediterranean," Sulletin, Institute for the
Studyofthe USSR, February '969,p 38.The
Soviet designation for theHormone helicopter
is' Ka-25A. Estimates of the number of heli-
copters on board range from a low of20toa
high of36. How manytroop-trensponhelicop-
ters could be accommodated by the carrier is
unknown.
29Joseph Beritz, "The Soviet Strategy of
Flexible Response." Bulletin, Institute for the
StudyoftheUSSR,April 1969,P32.
3OSergeenko,op.cit..p14.
31A. N.Sunaev,"NadezhnyiPomoshchnikv
Boiu" ("A Trustwonhy Assistant In Sattle"',
MorskoiSbomik,May 1971.P38.
32Sunaev,op.cit.,p38.
33LN. Roitenburg, "PodgotovkaOflt11erov
MonkoiPekhoty"(Preparation of theOfficers
of the Nevel Infantry"'. MoTSkoi Sbomlk,
November1969,p54.
34A.I. Koromkov. "Uchebnaie, Praktike,
Voprolyi-Vzg/tKlyProblemy"("Training.Prac-
tica, Questlons-Viaws ofthe Problem"),Mor
slcolSbornik,March 1971,p 40.
35Roitenburg,op.cit.,p52.
36s.A. 8orzenko, "Oesentniki" ("Landing
Personnel"'.MorrkoiSbomik,May 1970,P34.
37/
bid
,p 35.
Military Review
_ .. MIliiiILiiITiiliAiiiRiIiIY

NOTES
UNITED STATES
OPMS Colonels
New officer personnel management
has gone into effect for colonels.
Known as the Officer Personnel Man-
agement System (OPMS), it will
eventually include all officers with the
rank of colonel or below.
A deadline of 15 August 1972 was
set for colonels and lieutenant colo-
nels selected for promotion to colonel
to choose at least four areas of career
preference.
The areas of career preference
from which the officer may choose to
specialize are: atomic energy, auto-
matic data processing, branch pecu-
liar functions, comptroller, education
and individual training, foreign area
officer management system, informa-
tion. intelligence, logistics, opera-
tions/plans/readiness/force develop-
ment, operations research/systems
analysis, personnel, procurement, re-
search and development, troop com-
mand, and others specified by the
officers.
Future assignments of colonels will
be oriented to jobs where they can
utilize functional and specialized skills
rather than feeling compelled to seek
troop command duty in order to ad-
vance. All assignments will be made
subject to Army requirements.
Department of the Army Troop
Command Selection Boa r d s were
scheduled to convene in September
1972 to consider eligible colonels and
lieutenant colonels selected for pro-
October 1972
motion to colonel for assignment to
troop command positions at the bri-
gade level for Fiscal Year 1974.
Officers will be notified by letter of
the results of the OPMS selection sys-
tem. No lists or circulars will be pub-
lished.-DA release.
NCO Course
The first senior level course for
NCOs will begin in early 1973 at Fort
Bliss, Texas. The course will train
first sergeants and master sergeants
in the duties of command sergeants
major and other responsible positions.
This senior level course completes the
three-level instruction concept of the
Noncommissioned Officer Education
System (NCOES). Basic and ad-
vanced level courses for junior NCOs
have been previously announced.
Selection guidelines for the senior
course will be rigid. Those selected
must have between 15 and 23 years
of service and a current enlisted eval-
uation score of at least 100. Four per-
cent of those eligible will be selected
for the course. Two classes lasting 22
weeks will be conducted each year.
Initially, each clsss will number 160
students, increasing to 200 as space
becomes available.
The course will consist of 680 hours
of academic instruction emphasizing
leaderShip, management and the com
municative arts. Other phases of the
curriculum will include Army policies,
administration and logistics, military
85
III NOTES
justice, command and staff functions,
division operations, combat service
support and joint and combined oper-
ations. Guest speakers, field trips and
small-group discussions will be used
to make the course intellectually chal-
lenging.
Some first sergeants and master
sergeants with over 23 years of serv-
ice will receive constructive credit for
the course. The senior level NCOES
course is comparable to the Army War
College course for officers. Excellent
housing will be available at Fort Bliss
for both bachelor and married NCO
students.-Army News Features.
Missile Evaluation
Cro'GIe missile ready for launch
The US Army has completed evaluation of the French
Crotale low-altitude surface-to-air missile. Testing of the British
Rapier and German Ro14nd systems is continuing. North Ameri-
can Rockwell Corporation will market the Crotale system in the
United States and will produce all Crotale systems purchased by
the US Department of Defense.-News release.
The IIILJTARY REVIEW aDd the U. S. ArlD7 Command and General Staff CoUel'! auqme no re-
aponll!lbUlt,. for accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES nctJon of thl. pub--
lie-don. Ite.. are printed .ervlee to the readers. No oflieial endonement of the Tie opinions,
or faetual ...tements I, fntended.-The Editor.
Military Rule. 96
III NOTES
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS
As specified in
project request
As designed by As programed by
senior analyst senior programmer
-, ~
As installed at What the
user's site user wanted
October 1872
97
8.C NOTES
'F15' Figbter
The first F15 air superiority fighter was presented by McDonnell
Douglas Corporation in June. The aircraft is designed to outfly and
outshoot any current or projected enemy aircraft in the post-1975
period. The F15 will be able to acquire, identify, engage and destroy
enemy aircraft in either contested or enemy airspace and in an enemy-
controlled radar environment.
The Air Force says that the F15 will have a clear advantage over
potential adversaries at speeds ranging from less than 200 knots to
speeds in excess of Mach 2 and at altitudes from sea level to above
60,000 feet. While the F15 is extremely fast, high-speed and high-alti-
tude capability is not the most important factor in an air superiority
fighter. Even high-flying supersonic aircraft must descend and engage
in combat at lower altitudes to be effective. Once in this arena, large,
less maneuverable aircraft cannot compete with the small, agile F15.
Initially, the F15 will be armed with medium and short-range mis-
siles and an internally mounted 20-millimeter M61 Vulcan cannon.
Development is under way on a new 25-millimeter gun which fires
caseless ammunition. If the new gun, the GAU7A, is successful, it will
replace the heavier Vulcan system.
The F15 is a single place aircraft in the 40,OOO-pound (1815-kilo-
gram) class. It is about 64 feet long (21 meters) and has a wingspan
of 42 feet (14 meters). Two FI00 advanced turbofan afterburniilg
engines power the aircraft.-US Air Force.
VENEZUELA
'AMX30' Tanks
Venezuela has ordered 142 French-built AMXaO tanks at a cost
of $60 million. Previously, Venezuela purchased 15 Mirage fighter-
bombers, 20 Alouette 11 helicopters and several Ezocet sbip-to-ship
missiles from France.
The AMXaO is the main battle tank of the French Army. Proto-
types of the AMX90 were delivered in 1963, preproduction models in
1965, and the tank is now in mass production.
Operated by a crew of four, the AMXaO weighs about 40 tons
combat-loaded and has a cross-country speed of 22 to 25 miles (35 to
40 kilometers) per hour. It has a radius of action of 350 miles (600
kilometers) on roads and an average battle endurance of 18 hours
without refueling. Capable of negotiating a 55-inch (.9-meter) ob-
stacle, the AMXaO can ford 85 inches (2.2 meters) of water without
special equipment. Powered by a 720-horsepower HiBpano-Suiza multi-
fuel, water-cooled engine, it features an excellent power-weight ratio
of 20 horsepower per ton.
The AMXSO is armed with a 105millimeter semiautomatic gUn
without a muzzle brake or bore evacuator which can fire either anti-
tank or antipersonnel rQunds. S,econdary armament consists of either
a coaxial 12-millimeter macbinegUn or a 20-millimeter automatic gun.
The commander's cupola is equipped with a 7.62-millimeter machine-
gun.
Fire control equipment includes a coincidence range finder op-
erated by the tank commander and a jointed sighting telescope op-
erated by the gunner.-News item.
October 1872 .8
IIR NOTES
FRANCE
Nuclear Testing
France reportedly tested four miniaturized nuclear warheads
at the Papeete test center near Tahiti during the summer of
1972. The warheads are probably designed for the Pluton sur-
face-to-surface missile, as well as some air-to-surface missiles.
The photograph shows the Pluton missile mounted on an AMX80
tank chassis.-Government Business Worldwide.
Nayal Modernization ates, 89 patrol and gunboats, as well
The French Navy has released an as numerous support vessels. The de-
outline of naval plans for the 1970-85 terrent force will consist of five nu-
period. The new 15-year defense plan clear-powered submarines (SSBN)
makes it clear that the navy will play with 16 nuclear missiles each. The
a major roll in French deterrence fifth SSBN is scheduled to be opera-
policy. The surface fieet will consist tional by 1980. The underwater fieet
of 2 aircraft carriers, 2 helicopter will also include 20 attack submarines.
carriers, 80 destroyer escorts, 5 frig- -Government Business Worldwide.
MUItlIJ IBYI.. 100
IIC NOTES
CHINA
stratelY Shift
us analysts believe that a basic
shift in Chinese defensive strategy
is under way. For years. the Chinese
have planned to meet any Soviet in-
vasion with poorly equipped militia
and paramilitary units, allowing the
invaders to be drawn deep into China.
After the Soviet lines of communica-
tion were extended, the Chinese
planned to engage them with first-rate
regular troops and harrass with guer-
rilla units.
Recently, firstline Chinese Army
divisions and Air Force squadrons
have been moved to forward positions.
This may signal an intent to challenge
any Soviet advance at an early stage
before it could penetrate the indus-
trial areas of Manchuria. Such a
strategy would force the Soviets to
mass their forces and present a good
target for tactical nuclear weapons.
China has tested small nuclear war-
heads in the 10 to SO-kiloton range.
These small weapons can be delivered
by the F9 Chinese fighter-bomber
which is being produced at a rate of
15 per month. In the last two years,
300 F9B have been built, and 200 of
USSR
Satellite Reconnaissance
The movement of the US Seventh
Fleet in the Indian Ocean during the
Indo-Pakistan War was shadowed by
Soviet reconnaissance satellites. On
short notice, the, already orbiting
KOB1nOB 1,56 satellite launched KOB1nOB
1,69 to observe the naval movements.
Another satellite, KOB1nOB 1,61" was
launched from the ground for a five-
day mission.
KosmoB 1,66 was ground-launched
on 16 December 1971 and its payload
October 1872
them are in operational units. In ad-
dition, it is thought that China has
15 to 80 medium-range missiles with
a range of 600 miles and five to 15
intermediate-range missiles with a
range of 1500 miles. Apparently,
China has not tested an interconti-
nental ballistic missile system at full
range. Thus, China will not be able
seriously to threaten the cities in the
western Soviet Union. The Chinese
nuclear capability threatens cities
such as Vladivostok in Soviet Asia,
but this may not be enough of a de-
terrent to satisfy the Chinese.
The 45 Soviet Army divisions along
the Chinese border are a tempting
target for tactical nuclear weapons.
Representing nearly one-fourth of the
Soviet ground forces, this large force
must be supplied by air and the vul-
nerable trans-Siberian Railroad. To
penetrate a defense prepared by first-
rate Chinese divisions, the Soviet
forces would have to concentrate their
forces, creating targets for the F9
carrying nuclear weapons. The F9 is
believed to have a combat radius of
500 miles.-News item.
returned on 27 December. When US
naval units departed the Indian Ocean
in January 1972, the Soviets retrieved
the last reconnaissance satellite ob-
serving the area, KOBmoB 1,70.
Reports indicate that this was the
first time that the Soviet Union had
tested a complete reconnaissance/sur-
veillance system in orbit. The system
is apparently designed to shadow US
Polaris submarines.-Weh,. und Win-
BCluJ,ft.
101
IIlIIOTES
'TB2' DeploJlllent
Within the next few years, 52 Soviet divisions win be equipped
with the T811 main battle tank. First priority will be to the 82 Soviet
divisions in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Next
win be the divisions in the western part of the Soviet Union. The
Polish People's Army has apparently already been equipped with the
T811. A few Bulgarian units also have the new tank.
Introduced in 1968, the T811 is the successor to the T51,/55 series.
of Soviet tanks. Similar in appearance to the older tanks, the T811
features a 115-millimeter smooth barrel gun which fires fin-stabilized
rounds.-Truppendienst. 1972.
Tank Development
West German sources report that a new main battle tank is being
tested by the Soviet Union on the Kalmuck Steppe. Tentatively desig-
nated the T81" the new tank is thought to weigh about 45 tons and
mount a 120-millimeter gun/launcher. With a crew of four, the new
tank has an estimated speed of 25 miles (42 kilometers) per hour.-
Wehr und Wirt8CMft.
MIlItaJJ InI
102
IIIIIOTES
Howitzer Batteries
In the last few years, the 12o-millimeter mortar companies assigned to
motorized rifle regiments in Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions have been
converted to howitzer batteries equipped with M08 122-miIlimeter light field
howitzers. These weapons were previously assigned to division artillery units.
They were replaced at the divisional level by new M68 122-millimeter gun/
howitzers. .
The picture shows the howitzer battery of a motorized rifle regiment
going into action. The guns are being pulled by BTR67 armored personnel car-
riers which use the same chassis as the PT76 tank.-Truppendien8t, 1972.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
World War II Mlsslnl
At the end of World War II, 1,788,- men. Only a few thousand German
000 Wehrmaeht soldiers were officially soldiers were listed as missing on the
declared missing. Since then, only Western Front, and most of those
758,000 have been accounted for. For cases have been solved. The last of-
nearly 80 years, an organization in ficially registered German prisoner of
Munich called the Search Service war was released from a Soviet prison
Center, working with the Interna- in 1955. Many Eastern Front cases
tional Red Cross, has been trying to will likely never be solved. However,
trace these missing men. the center reports that Soviet authori-
In 1972, the center hopes to dis- ties have been cooperative in recent
cover the fate of an additional 85,000 years.-News item.
October 1872 103
8.1 NOTES
MIlIt8IJ ',nonnl'
In Fiscal Year 1972, the West German armed forces had 271,250 career
military personnel, including 214 general officers, 12,981 field grade officers,
25,902 company grade officers, 156,800 noncommissioned officers and 75,858
enlisted men. There were 214,750 recruits and reservists on active duty, bringing
the total military strength to 486,000 men.
Young reserve officers are being sought by the Bundeswekr to serve for
eight to 12 years. If they are qualified, and apply, they can become career
officers. Promotion for eligible reserve officers who have already served two
or three years and are under 27 is rapid. They also receive promotion list credit
for time spent at a university. Promotion to first lieutenant comes after two
and one-half years' service-to captain after five and one-half years. If a reo
serve officer has the West German equivalent of a master's degree, he can enter
the army as a captain and expect promotion to major within three years if his
military specialty requires technical training.-News item.
MllilaJJ Revle. 104
BOOKS
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
IN U.s. FOREIGN POLICY. By Donald F. Bietz.
320 Pages. Praeler Publlsbers, N. 'Y., 1972.
$18.50.
This is a prime example of a valu-
able national asset neglected for far
too long-the hidden reservoir of
scholarly talent among our profes-
sional military personnel.
The military profession 1TUJ,kes it
di/licUlt for members to disseminate
views and might do some hard think-
ing whether they reaUy mean it when
they say they welcome and encourage
original thought.
The bibliography bears mute testi-
mony to the fact that "the bulk of
original writing in the area of na-
tional security policy comes out of ci-
vilian educational institutions and not
the military." (Equally unfortunate is
the fact ~ the tactical military voice
is heard almost exclusively through
the writings of nonprofessionals or
foreign "experts.") It is a delight to
see the publication of this construc-
tively critical book by a military pro-
fessional. It is doubtful whether it
would have been possible 10 years ago.
We are closing out a period of a
quarter of a century during which the
quality of our professionalism has left
something to be desired. We are enter-
ing a new era when different and un-
familiar demands are again going to be
placed on the military profession. Ij; is
an opportune time for soul searching.
This book provides an excellent start.
The author's analysis is built around
October 1872
four themes: (1) The political-mili-
tary equation provides the foundation
for our foreign policy. (2) The politi-
cal and the military factors are mu-
tually dependent variables. (3) There
is a continuing, everchanging need to
maintain the equilibrium. (4) Undi-
luted professional military counsel is
essential to the proper determination
of this balance.
Colonel BIetz' account of the growth
of the requirement for military par-
ticipation in the balancing process
from colonial times 'to the present
makes it clear that this responsibility
was not one deliberately sought by the
soldier, but a requirement logically
thrust upon him by the developing de-
mands of the country's elCpanding in-
ternational role.
He recounts the experience of the
recent past which "made it increas-
ingly difficult for the military profes-
sional to gain a hearing in the national
policymaking levels," He cliutions that
"civilian officials have a compelling ob-
ligation to exercise their power over
the military with wisdom and reo
straint." He warns that those who reo
peat the mistakes of the past will be
"toying with the national security."
Broadening General MacArthur's
credo that there is no substitute for
victory, BIetz advances that "there
can be no substitute for a clearly enun-
ciated national policy." He urges the
professional military officer "to con-
stantly press his civilian superior for
a political objective if one does not
exist or is not clear."
105
Ife BOOKS
It would profit those who fear the
military mind to read the
on that subject. The military mind is
presented as a deterrent to the very
thing it is popularly assumed to foster
-militarism. Civilians must fully
comprehend that the military mind is
one of the most meaningful safe-
guards against militarism. "Milita-
rism is incompatible with military
professionalism."
On the military side of the fence,
the author pulls no punches. After
acknowledging that "the American
military profession has mastered the
technology of war to an unprecedented
degree," BIetz warns, "The United
States is still possessed of a military
profession that is prepared to fight
the last war." The military must know
and understand the nature and atti-
tudes of the society it represents and
which sets its goals, particularly from
the viewpoint of youth and of the aca-
demic world which so extensively in-
fluences public opinion. He warns also
that there is a generation gap in the
military which should be recognized.
The chapter on military education
could well be lifted in its entirety to
provide a policy statement on profes-
sional military education. The expla-
nation of the levels of professionalism
is eminently sound as is the goal the
author envisages at the top level, i.e.,
to produce "a military expert pos-
sessed of a meaningful understanding
of international political affairs."
Perhaps, as BIetz suggests, a whole
new organizational setup would be de-
sirable to handle the problems of the
impending era. Certainly, personnel
policies have long needed a revamping.
Among these is our obsession with
pTa formtJ, command experience and
pursuit of generalists contrary to the
trend toward specialization. Happily,
change now seems to be in the wind.
Obviously, I think highly of this
effort. At the same time, I join the
author in his repeated cautions that
balancing the political-military equa-
tion is but a portion of the profes-
sional military man's responsibilities,
and, in the last analysis, the principal
goal of the military professional re-
mains that of becoming an effective
combat commander.
This book guides the way to a major
improvement in our military profes-
sionalism. It is comprehensive, well-
balanced and objectively critical. Its
quality merits reading and considera-
tion at the top levels by military and
civilian authorities alike. It is the kind
of work which deserves general public
distribution and certainly should not
be lost, as too often is the case, under
the dust of "the archives to which they
are relegated." The author richly de-
serves an emphstic WELl., DONE.
LTG GARRISON H. DAVIDSON, USA,
Retired, Comm14nda.nt, USACGSC,
from July 195"- to July 1956.
DECISION BY DEFAULT: Peacetime Conscrip
, lion and Brltish Defense, 1919-39. By Peter
Dennis. 243 Pages. Duke University Press,
Durham, N. C., 1972. $9.75.
"Morally, compulsory military serv-
ice in a democracy could not be justi-
fied, and was positively dangerous."
So argued Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the
eminent military historian, at the
heigbt of the controversy which pre-
ceded the introduction in Britain of
National Service in May 1939, and
whose views reflected those who felt
that peacetime conscription to build up
a large army smacked of commitments
to a continental strategy. "Memories
of the western front in the Great
War," Peter Dennis reminds us ''were
still strong."
Military Rarle.
108
But it )Vas eventually sueh com-
mitments, undertaken in the faee of
Hitler's insatiable greed for Lebens-
raum, to Poland, Rumania and Greece,
whieh foreed the Chamberlain Govern-
ment to introduee eonseription against
the advocates of a limited liability and
the strong opposition of the Labor
Party and the trade unions. Henee,
the reason for the title of this admi-
rably succinet aeeount of the events
whieh led up to this unique occasion
in British history.
It would appear, however, that al-
most equally strong was the pressure
of the French Government, whieh en-
eouraged the gibe that Britsin was
"ready to fight to the last Frenehman."
As it was the Freneh also who first
ereated the military eommitments
with the Eastern European eountries,
it would appear we can blame the in-
troduction of eonseription firmly on
them!
Although Peter Dennis conelud,s
that the significanee of the e i s i ~ n
was the "symbolie commitment of
Britain's manhood to the Continent
whieh united the Western allies and
appeared to give them, for the first
time sinee Munich, the initiative in in-
ternational affairs," he makes no con-
clusion about the timing of the event
other than the indirect indication from
the title that it was late.
What if Chamberlain had given way
to these pressures earlier and the
trade unions had carried out their
threats to reduce the aireraft and anti-
aircraft gun productions? Would the
United Kingdom have won the Battle
of Britain on whieh rested the future
of the whole world? Perhaps Welling-
ton's remark after Waterloo provides
a suitable eonelusion: " the nearest
run thing yOU ever saw in your life."
COL PHILIP S. NEWTON, British
Army
Octo.., 1872
III BOOIS
OSS: The Secret Hlsta.., of America's First
Central Intelligence Agency. By R. HaiTls
Smith. 458 Pages. University of California
Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1972. $10.95.
This book, despite the flamboyant
title, is intended as a serious researeh
effort into the organization and aetiv-
ities of the intelligence community 88
represented by the predecessor of
the Central Intelligence Ageney
(CIA). The author contends that the
academicians, together. with journal-
ists, should provide the Ameriean
citizenry with a reasonable and
thoughtful eritique of the "clandestine
bureaucracy" that plays a major role
in foreign policy.
The book is based on extensive re-
search of the open literature and in-
terviews with those involved in Office
of Strategie Serviees (OSS) opera-
tions. Moreover, the author did serve
with the CIA for a very short time,
but in an unimportant position. Ap-
parently, his assoeiation with the CIA
only served to provide the idea for
the book which probably was orig-
inally a Ph.D. dissertation.
The author describes the origin of
the OSS and its wartime aetivities in
North Africa, France, Germany, Italy,
China and Vietnam. The writing style
is superb, and the book reads like a
thriller. The analysis is eredible and
well-balaneed. What comes through
very clearly are the inherent difficul-
ties of coordinating eoalition intel-
ligence activities during a global
struggle when the nations of the
eoalition have a common enemy but
differing national interests. These
- diffieulties are further eompounded
when the "friendly" elements of the
nations overrun by the enemy have
their own political interests.
Although the book does deseribe
high adventures by a fascinating
107
IIIBOalS
group of people, it also provides a
vivid picture ofthe difficulties in the
management and execution of stra-
tegic intelligence. This book shOUld
be of interest to all military readers.
It willbeinvaluabletothoseconcerned
with strategic intelIigence, military
assistance and Special Forces opera-
tions.
COL IRVING HEYMONT, USA, Retired
THE KENNEDY DOCTRINE. By Leuise FItz
Simons. 275 Pages. Random House Inc.,
N. Y., 1972. $7.95.
Louise FitzSimons is well-qualified
to write this revelatory, thoroughly
documented study. Foreignaffairsan-
alyst for 15 years in the Federal ex-
ecutive and legislative branches,
former US Embassy Officer in Paris,
and much traveled behind the Iron
Curtain and in Vietnam, FitzSimons
evaluates the Presidency of John
Kennedy with remarkably responsible
candor.
Kennedy, FitzSimons documents,
transformed the Eisenhower passive
policyofmilitarycontainmentofcom-
munism into an active counterrevolu-
tionary (orcounterinsurgency) global
policy in Europe, Latin America and
Southeast Asia. Using this Kennedy
political and military doctrine as her
basis, FitzSimons presenta the thesis
that the great tragedy of Kennedy's
Presidency was not only his shocking
assassination, but also his inability
to comprehend and use wisely his
unique capacity for leadership.
Usingsuperiordocumentation, Fitz-
Simons discusses the Bay of Pigs
fiasco, the summit meeting with
Khrushchev in Vienna, the eyeball-to-
eyeball missile crisis, the arms race
withtheSovietUnion,andthepitfalls
of counterinsurgency. FitzSimons, as
does General Maxwell Taylor in
Swords andPlowsoores, considersthe
US involvement in the Bay of Pigs
invasion unbelievably bungled atboth
executiveandmilitarylevels. Further,
in Chapter 5, she asks and answers
the disturbing questions: "Was the
Cuban crisis neCessary?" And, "Was
PresidentKennedyjustifiedinrisking
a nuclear holocaust?"
And,justasTaylordoesinhislatest
memoirs, the author calls critical at-
tentiontothecomplicityoftheUnited
States in the assassination of Ngo-
dinh-Diemandhisbrother,a collusive
disaster that both FitzSimons and
Taylor believe shattered future gov-
ernmentalstability inthe Republic of
Vietnam. To FitzSimons, the US
decision to overthrow Diem was a
"significantwatershed intheVietnam
involvement under President Ken-
nedy," and, as a result, "we became,
to a large extent, morally.as well as
politically responsible for the future
ofthe Vietnamese government."
This is an important document for
Americans, one thatwill be useful to
military and political analysts alike.
Theauthorhaspresenteda convincing
inspection of the Kennedy global
political doctrine about which The
Wall Street Journal has written that
there were executive mistakes which
involved "too much eloquence and too
little thoughtfulness," and also ''too
muchllexibilityandtoo littlepatience,
too muchbrillianceandtoo littlecom-
mon sense."
Included in The Kennedy Doctrine
area helpful index, 12 pagesofcare-
fully researched footnotes, and anex-
cellent bibliography thatcontains un-
published material from the John F.
Kennedy Library, to include inter-
views with Dean Acheson, Charles E.
Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, Robert
F.LovettandGeorgeF.Kennan.
LTCGLENN O. CAREY, USAR,Retired
MllitIrY RlYlew 108
pnAIN: A Biograph, of Marshal PhlUppe
P6taln of Vlch,. B, Richard llrlftltbs. 379
PaglS. Doubleday .. Co. Inc., Garden City,
N. Y., 1972. $10.00.
One of France's greatest heroes in
World War I, Marshal Philippe Pe-
tain, died an imprisoned, convicted
traitor in 1951. In this biography,
Richard Griffiths attempts to reconcile
the apparent contradictions in the
marshal's career by a close examina-
tion of the 1914-45 period of this sol-
dier's life.
In 1914, Petain, age 58, was a bri-
gade commander, a colonel with no
prospect of promotion before retire-
ment two years hence. An infantry of-
ficer with a reputation as a teacher of
ritle marksmanship and tactics, the
tall colonel was out of step with the
current French doctrine of heedless
offense. He emphasized the impor-
tance of firepower and the necessity
for defense as well as offense. The
war proved him right and brought
him, in 1917, to the command of the
entire French Army. Intelligent and
adaptable, he understood logistics,
how to use artillery and infantry, and
appreciated the necessity for good
morale. Unquestionably, he was one
of the best generals of the era.
Logically, one would expect the
story to end at this point with only a
few pages relegated to old age, honors
and the ceremonial funeral. After all,
Petain was 63 when the war ended.
During the next two decades, how-
ever, he played a leading role in
;French military affairs. At the same
time, he developed a political follow-
ing which included people from the
left, center and right of the political
spectrum.
In the debacle of 1940, the 84-year-
old marshal assumed that Germany
had not just defeated France, but had
Octaber 1812
llllOOIlS
won the war. The best course for
France, then, was not only to come to
terms quickly with the Germans, but
also to consider this travail as a neces
sary prelude to a renaissance of the
virtues of the nation. The Germans
did not win; the marshal's National
Revolution faltered. What see m e d
reasonable in the summer of 1940 ap-
peared to be not only unwise, but also
treasonable in 1944. At 89, the mar-
shal stood trial and then spent the last
six years of his life imprisoned in a
castle. +
The author, a British scholar, has
not written a full-length biography.
He spends only five pages on the first
58 years. But he has done an excellent
service in researching, describing and
analyzing the critical three decades in
Petain's career. I
He holds that Petain did not change
nor did he becoll\e senile. A pessimis-
tic realist, the Imarshal's judgment
was correct in World War I. In the
Second World War, his prejudices
against politicians and Englishmen
caused hini to misjudge the situation.
Griffiths believes that Petain was be-
yond his depth in politics. He gives
him credit for acting sincerely in
what he believed to be the best inter-
ests of France, admitting that Pe-
tain's decision 1940 did save the
French some suffering. Nevertheless,
events proved th, Vichy movement a
mistake for whic\1 the marshal bore a
major share of the responsibility.
This book, together with P. C. F.
Bankwitz'Mar;:ime Weygand and Civ-
il-Military Rei a ti 0 n, s in, Modern
France (which Griffiths curiously
fails to cite), should be required read-
ing for anyone who wants to under-
stand French military and political
affairs ol the last half century.
EDWARDM:. COFFMAN,
Uni1Jersity of Wisconsin
108
lit BOOKS
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUER
RILLA WARFARl By Baljit Singh and Ko
Wang Mei. 133 Pages. Asia Publishing House
Inc., N. Y., 1971. $7.50.
Guerrilla warfare interpreted as a
source of social and political change
is the major theme of this important
book. Baljit Singh, a Professor of Po-
litical Science at Michigan State Uni-
versity, and Ko-Wang Mei, President
of the Central Police College in Tai-
pei, Taiwan, have written a compre-
hensive analysis of partisan wars, em-
phasizing those since 1945.
The authors present their research
in a series of tables, the purpose of
which is to develop theoretical propo.
sitions concerning the social and eco-
nomic origins of insurrectionary war-
fare aimed at national independence
or the circulation of indigenous elites.
Typical of the maxims put forward is
the statement that "guerrillas tend to
develop under young regimes." Never-
theless, the authors caution that the
technique of the coup d'etat is pre-
ferred over revolutionary war in most
of the countries of Asia and Africa.
The conceptual framework of the
book limits the discussion to develop-
ing countries and ,thereby imposes an
important limitation to the case
studies considered. For example, the
utilization of partisan groups in sup-
port of a field army, as was attempted
during the Korean Conflict, receives
little attention. Similarly, the prob-
lem which an industrialized state like
Israel faces in dealing with guerrillas
conducting a campaign of systemic
sabotage across international fron-
tiers calls for further atudy.
The strength of this book lies in
the successful effort of the authors to
deal analytically with the phenome-
non of guerrilla warfare as a force
for political mobilization. In a thor-
oughgoing fashion, they have syste-
matically organized a vast amount of
data gathered from memoirs, histo-
ries and political tracts, and succeeded
in developing a model describing the
function of irregular warfare in the
process of political change. Their
theoretical propositions are both de-
scriptive and prescriptive.
The social environment conducive
to the outbreak of guerrilla activity
is presented in a clear perspective.
This description is followed by a set
of detailed maxims for the conduct of
a successful counterguerrilla cam-
paign. Specifically, in addition to a
prompt military response, the authors
advocate social and political reform
as the most effective countermeasures
against guerrillas. Finally, an excel-
lent bibliography rounds out this
penetrating study of the predominant
form of warfare in emerging political
communities.
JAMES H. WOLFE,
Ph.D., University of Maryl4nd
THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION. By Abra
ham F. Lowenthal. 246 Pages. Harvard UnI-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.
$10.95.
This book is probably the best avail-
. able account of the actions preceding
and during the 1965 US military in-
tervention in the Dominican Republic.
Mr. Lowenthal, a long-time student of
Dominican affairs, who was living
there at the time of the intervention,
had unusual access to people and in-
formation which has enabled him to
clarify motives, as well as many baf-
fling events, connected with the inter-
vention. He draws primarily on some
150 interviews which he conducted
with the key participants and consid-
erable other data still not available
to the public.
.nitaly Review 110
The end result is a weU-written
book that examines what happened
and offers an explanation of why it
occurred. The author clearly differen-
tiates between probable facts and per-
sonal conclusions. He contends that
the intervention was not due to indi-
vidual errors, as often aUeged, but
rather to the established premises and
procedures of US policies of the time.
This volume will be of great in-
terest to the military reader who
wishes to examine in depth a recent
case history of the use of US Armed
Forces to intervene in the political
processes of a small country. To the
veteran of the intervention, it will
help place into focus the role of the
military.
COL IRVING HEYMONT, USA, Retired
THE CANADIAN MILITARY: A Profile. Edited
by Hector J. Massey. 290 Pages. The Copp
Clark Publishing Co., Vancouver, Toronto,
Montreal, Canada, 1972. $4.95.
The Canadian Military: A Profile
is well titled as the book contains a
number of papers each forming part
of an overall study of the Canadian
military system. In compiling his
book, the editor sets the stage with an
introduction which emphasizes the
role of the military in the develop-
ment of Canadian society. He has not
been shy in observing that the mili-
tary has been neglected as a field of
study by most social scientists. Yet
Canada owes much of its history to
the personal sacrifice, the bravery and
the never-failing call to the colors of
its citizen soldiers.
Like many books which attempt to
compile a collection of writings by
separate authors, the reader must
wade through a considerable amount
of duplication in background detail.
October 1972
.,r 1001S
By itself, each would have been
incomplete such background
or leadin material.
Canadian national strategy and de-
fense objectives llre well presented,
provided the reader places some credi-
bility in: !
. the notion that military i1llltnv
ments are alwlUJ/s I careftdly and sys-
tematically tailored by decisionmakers
to the achievement of specific foreign
policy objectives i8 simplistic in the
extreme. The real world of defence
departments is much less tidy.
A fair application of these words
might be the political decision to leave
a Canadian ground force in NATO
Europe and then find a role to fit their
organization and equipment.
Mr. R. B. Byers, the author of
Chapter 7, "Canadian Civil-Military
Relations and Reorganization of the
Armed For c e s: Whither Civilian
Control?," must see an interesting
postscript to his article in the recently
announced decision to increase the
number of Assistant Deputy Ministers
in the Department of National De-
fense from three to five-"Whither
Civilian Control?"
Statistical studies such as Chapter
5, "Social and Cultural Composition
of the Canadian Armed Forces," leave
many questions ullanswered. With
only 5.3 percent of lall senior officers
classified in the Francophone category
-and, of these, two-thirds being in
the land forces-it; would seem that
the Anglophone lieutenant colonel in
the land forces will virtually stand
still while his Francophone coUeague
races past to general officer rank. Will
the Canadian armed forces end up
with Francophone army generals and
Anglophone admirals and air force
generals? I
LTC JAMES A. COWAN,
Canadian Liaison Qi/icer, USACGSC
111
11110015
NEW BOOKS
NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. A Skeptical
View ef the United States EntJy Into World War /I.
By Bruce M. Russett. 111 Pagn. Harper & Raw
Publishers, N. 1972. $8.00.
THE HIGERIAN ARMY, 1958-1988: studies in AfrI-
can History. By N. J. Miners. 290 Paps. Barnes
& Noble Inc., N. Y., 1971. $5.00 paperbound.
NElSON THE COMMANDER. By Geaflrey Bennett.
322 PailS. Charles Scribner'S Sans, N. Y., 1972.
$12.00.
NASSER. By Anthony NUlIinl. 493 Pales. E. P.
DUlIan & Ca. Inc., N. Y., 1972. $10.00'.
THE MILITARY AND POLITICAl POWER IN CHINA
IN THE 197Ds. Edited by William W. Whitson. 390
PillS. Praepr Publishers, N. Y., 1972. $20.00.
THE MEDIEVAl SOLDIER. By A. V. B. Norman. 278
Plies. Thomas Y. Crewell Ca., N. Y., 1971. $7.95.
CAlCUTTA. By Geoffrey Moorhouse. 378 Pales.
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc., N. 1971.
$8.95.
DARK AND BLOODY GROUHO. A Guerrilla Diary of
the Spanish Civil War. By F. Perez Lopez. 275
PaPs. Little. Brawn & Ca Baston, Mass., 1972.
$8.95.
THE ART AND HISTORY OF PERSONAl COMBAT.
By Arthur Wise. 256 Plies. New York Graphic
Society ltd., Greenwich. 1971. $16.50.
THE AllVOLUNTEER ARMY, An Analysis of De-
mand and Supply. 8y It H. KIm, Susan Farrell
and Ewan Clape. 2D8 PillS. Praepr Publishers,
N. Y., 1971. $12.50.
THE WAR OF THE RUNNING DOGS, The Malayan
Emelllncy, 1948-1960. By Noel Barber. 284
Paps. Weybrllht and Talley Inc., N. Y., 1971.
$7.95.
.

.
fAcs nAil .
_' 0, ,"'
1 '., '.
Military Rlliew 112