In This Issue

May 71

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT
Major General John J. Hennesseg

DEPUTYCOMMANDANT
Brigadier General James M. Gibson

Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
MikitaryCreativity .

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Roger A. Beaumont

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Mikktary Profossionalksm .

., COL Donald F. Bletz, USA

Direct Support Logistics .

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LTC Morris C. Cannon, USA . . . . . Mark B. Schneider

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Safeguard, Sufficiency,and SALT The Demand for MifktaryHistory

Michael Howard 34 43 50

The Soldior,Battlefield, and Leadership .

The Role of the Mkktary Attache . .

LTC Ijaz Ahmad, PakistanArmy

. . . Raymond J, Barrett

Tho Army Evictstha Bonus Marchers .

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LTC John W. Price, USAR

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66 83

Operational Testing .

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Jacob A. Stockfisch

Korean Modernization .
MikitaryNotes . . .

Jomrgwon Alexander Kim . . . . . ...93

Mikitary Books ReaderForum .

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...104 ...111

Library of Congraaa Catalog CwdNo S4SS7WRev The VIEWS expressedin this ma asine ARETNEAUTNORS and not necessarilytlrosaof fha USArnrY or ttraCornrnand andGeneral !it.affCollege.

Editor in Chief COL Donald J. Deianey Associate Editor COL KeNh L. Monroe Army War Coiiege Assistant Editor LTC R. Glenn McCue 1 Features Editor MAJ Robert W. Hornaday Production EdNor Helen M. Hall Spanish-American Editor LTC Nestor L. Berries Brazilian Editors LTC Aivaro Galviio LTC Juarez A. Gomes Publication OfRcor MAJ Donald E. Tuman Art and Oaaign Charies A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW+hlkhed monthly by the U. S. Ann Semmend end6aneselstaff Collage, FostLeavenworth, i(eneas+ m ~nm SpanishandPortuguese.se i of famds for psinfing of this publiaetlon baa bssn approved by Haaquarters, Oe rtment of the Army, 25 July1%S. Seconrklosspostage&ar id et eraLeavwsnwth, Kansas. Subeaription reb $4.00 (USwrrOwY) e yesr in the United States, nitedStatesmilltary peatetrfcmendtboeawuntsieswhichsee members of the Pan-American PostalUnion(including Spain); $5.00 e yearin all othermuntkq d@E SW PCiW SO cants.Addresssubscription mailto the cook Dopartnsent, U. S. AmsyCommand amdtiearere! Staff Collage, FortLeavenworth Kansas 66027.

%mrilAriirk
The Military from the : March ARTICLE Review 1971 announces issue as the selection a MILITARY of the following REVIEW article AWARD

Where Does K!lling End and Murder Begin in War?

Colonel Robert B. Rigg, United St@ee Army, Retired 1970 Military accorded Review apbombcharges

A frequent Award

contributor

and author of the September in comba~the as contrasted

Article,

Colonel Rigg raises of civilians and artillery,

the issue of the double standard immunity to the punitive

plied to the killing ing, naval gunfire, levied against He examines

individual

ground fighters question

of the Army and Marine Corps.

the provocative

in terms of both history and the

combat environment.

COMING:
Roger A. Besumon~ in Airborne: Life Cycle of a Military Subculturefl maintains that the value of the airborne has been as close to transcendental as a military system is likely to get. He describes the image of triumph, eliteness, and elan dsspite all the failures and tragedies of World War II and its rare use since that time. The author is Associate Director of the University of Wisconsins Center for Advanced Study in Organisation Science in Milwaukee. United States Army, in System Under Preesure, Colonel Robert G. Hillman, says that dynamic change appears to be the essence of any system. He describes the US Army, Pacific, Standard Supply System and its constant state of flux as evidence that computer systems tend to be evolutionary and self-replacing. He says the W will become a third-generation system by evolutionary adaption rather than by being replaced by another system developed and designed elsewhere.

Military Creativity
Roger A. Besumont REATIVITY has grown into something of a cult in recent years. At a tiie when Americans are emerging into a pefiod of ~tive appreciation for cultural expression, and contemplating the opportunities of increased leisure, creativity seems exciting and glamorous. Behavioral science researchers have been identifying the dynamics of innovative behavior with increasing acmraey. While literally thoueande of books have been written on the subject, relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship of creativity to specific teaks and organizations. The military setting has been perhaps most overlooked, probably since many academic reeeerehere are afraid of the military context or believe it to be dewid of creative activity, even though some reaearchera have found that military groupe exceed civilian groups in creative eetivitv. Ignoring military craativi@ is surprising since the military, naval, and air cbronictee are full of axtunpka of the dialogue of harmony and inventio~ the dilemma faced by all administrator and creative people: how much to keep and how much to throw away. The urge of youth is to change; of age, to maintain. The reasons are fairly obvious. If youth can force change, it can hasten the departure of the aged from the emne of responsibility and involvement In a culture which treata ite aged like defunct domesticated aninmla, and which ignores the leaaone of history, this motivation is very strong. Aleo, when one q 1B7? s

ing youth from active reeponeibilit y far beyond the initial age of such ability. At Trafalgar, there was an 11year-old midshipman; David G. Farragut commanded a prize in the War of 1812 when only 14. The normal tensione between age and youth are eharply accented in age which ineiete on an artificially prolonged period of nonrezponsible puberty. In any case, the dynamics of creativity are not of idle intereet to the deeigner of military organization, training systems, and pereonnel policy. Basic operating principle are emerging in a large body of behavioral research. What has to be reconciled is the baby-bathwater continuum. Peak Productively Research conclusions on personal productivity hold that the top 10 percent of people in a given field produce more than the lower 50 percent. Thk substantiates top five percent rules. Studies of fighter pilots have shown that the top five percent were shooting down half the enemy planes. Harvey C. Lehmans broad study of historically creative people suggests that, outside speeific tielde like mathematics where geniue flowers and dies early, the years of peak productivity are from 30 to 49. WWe opportunity may generally be best for people in these age brackets, there also seems to be a relationship between experience, motivation, opportunity, and insight which produces the optimum field for output. The characteristics of creative paople have mixed significance for the military ezraariet: creative people tend to be leas anxious, to be more practical than spiritually oriented, and to seek responsible positions; they have several traite which do not mesh with a hierarchical, seniority, and Mllitmv Revi8w

Roger A. Beaumont holds a Maater8 degree in Hi8torp from the Univer8itg of Wzkeo?win and is A880ciate Director of the Univeraitzfs Center for Advanced Stndw in Organization Smonse in Milwaukee. He wae an iwatructov in American Militarp Historp at the University of Wiecoww-Milwaukee, and was aaaigned to the Department of History at Kansaa State Univer8itw and Wi8cowain State University. He served two years with the Active ArmII as a MilitaW Police o~er. His article, Proapecta for Nuclear NuL lification~ appeared ifi the October 1969 is8ue of the MILITARY Rmw: 4

MILITARY CREATIVITY stabSity-oriented organisation; they are more autonomous; they view themselves as different from their peers; they tend to be nonauthoritarian; they are markedly achievement oriented-that ia, toward money, promotion, and recognition; and they hesitate to make firm or quick judgments. The creative process also follows patterns which introduce problems in traditional military organisations. Experiments have ehown that novel solutions rarely come through overt, gradual, step-by-step processes; instead, they defy organisation and planning. A great deal has been written about the creative process. Some theorists use a rough model like the one shown in the sketch: , 1 solutions learned in one situation tend to impede or prevent the discovery of different approaches when . a new situation demande them. Education and experience may actually mask the problem el ents and block percepa configuration. tions of a ne This effect appears in the paradoxical outcome of creativity tests which indk?ate that comic strip authors are far more creative than graduate students, and that, while most creetive people tend to have high IQe, a smaller percentage of people with high IQs are creative. In short, verbal intelligence and academic achievement are not strongly linked. Successful Amateurs The success of amateure has confounded military students for years. The list of successful military amateurs-that is, those without formal military training for command-is impressive indeed: Julius Caesar Genghie Khan Oliver Cromwell Robert Clive Chaka Nathanael Greene Lawrence of Arabia Mohammed ben Ahd-el-Krim Adolf Hitler General Vo Nguyen Giap In addition, there is a long list of militarily creative types whose names are rarely heard outaide staff colleges: Sir Percy M. Scott William S. Sims Osker von Hutier B. H. LiddeU Hart Sir Alexander F. Cechrane and Robert Allison Sir G]ffard Martel Erieb von Manatein Sir Ernest D. Swinton Sir John de Hawkwood 5

Others suggest a kind of creative checfdist : Sensation. * Preparation. Incubation. Illumination. * Verification. Application. * One of the problems that emerges is that some people are gifted at one particular etage of the process. A model of military staff work could be imposed on the sequences in either model. The phases marked with an asterisk would be primarily the commanders; the othere would be those of the staff. All organicstions in times of marked change face the problem noted in Bernard R. Berefeon and Gary Stiners Human Behnvior: An Invento~ of Seisntifi Findings: specific May1971

MILITARY CREATIVITY These men achieved succese in formal concepts, but fell short of the glory given often more orthodox commanders. The side alleys of military history are also filled with the examples of the militarily creative who could not adapt well to tbe system in which they found themselves and who found themselves out in the coid or relegated to peripheral roles. General Giulio Douhet, Major General J, F. C. Fnller, General George S. Patton, Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur are some of the more dramatic cases. Rash Fanatics In any event, the careers of theee men serve as examples of some of the probleme posed by creativity in military organization. First, the innovator may be opposed to the parent organization and actually disaffected. Like Fuller and Mitchell, they may hold the old guard in open contempt and, by failing to screen the intensity of their convictions, appear as rash fanatics, especially to those in power. Mitchells disciples learned their lessons and went to journalism school. Creativity, too, involves a great deal of fantasizing and waste motion. There is a very high discard rate on new ideas which seem to be very promising. The tank destroyer battalion, the Army dive bomber program, the Air Forces flying wing, and the patrol torpedo boat all proved in World War II to be long on glamour and innovation, but far lese effective in the field than hoped. Glamour does not alwaya survive the crunch. The skepticism of the old salt has elements of survival behavior in it. Research by Robert K. Merton on 261 scientific discoveries showed that 6

nizing new patterns, but of applying them. The innovator is the last person to give the assignment of translating hie concept into reality, or to selling it. The number of inventors like Rudolf Diesel who have died in misery, watching their idea unfulfilled or co-opted, reinforces this problem. Creators leave a followthrough problem. While the tension posed by creativity in organizations is a constant problem, the examples of military reaish ante to change are more dramatic than most in their consequences: the gaudy slaughter of packed French chhairy by English longbowmen; Cromwells cavalry charging at the MilitaIY Ilukiw

/ \

MILITARY CREATIVITY rot and maintaining control while uperta gallants charged at the gallop and failed to regroup; the Light Brigade; General James W. Ripleys opwsition to breech-loading weapons in the Civil War; the Ruseian Fleets yellow funnele in Tsushima Strait; and the cavalry men versus tanks. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, in At Ease, recounted the stiff reprimand that he and Patten received when they wrote an enthusiastic atilcle on armor after World War I. He learned his lesson and held his fire. ward such situations. The generation of ideas by groups brainstorming is a weak substitute for individual creativity. what implications, then, doea the work on creativity have at the present time? Organizational analysta all the

Peacr4ime Bureaucracy The fate of the innovator, then, may be slow suffocation at the hands of a 1 peacetime bureaucracy. Prophets are often without honor. Nevil Shute, who worked on seeret technological warfare projects in World War II, noted that the greatest problem was to overcome senior officers who saw new projects in peacetime perspeetbes es expensive, and whose speed of thought was paced to a fiscally oriented bureaucracy, not a fighting machine. His group sought alliances with reserve officere of independent meane who acted ae change agents without the anxiety of careerists, producing the irony of moneyed men as radicals. The necessary communication between proliferating agencies in modern military bureaucracy necessitated the conference committee system. But the effect of the committee on suppressing innovation ia well documented. Fullers observation that a ,,s=ond+laee man wae better than a firet-class committee has been borne out by experiment. There is psychological comfort and freedom from reeponeibility in the group consensus. Cre@ivity research shows that the less creative personality gravitates toMay1971

way back to the Western Electric researches have noted that innovation is always threatening, but that change can be effected if people are made part of it, and if they are invohwd positively. The military innovator must, then, often think in terms of the indirect approach: presenting an idea without clear lines of authorship, or as the product of the situation. Suggestion systems can open an organisation up to innovative ideas, hut can also produce a heavy flow of irrelevant nonsense or abuee. Procaasing a euggeetion flow takes tire% and can act to alienate the suggester. The eyetem may be feared as an earmarking of troublemakers-es it is in come businesses where promotion may be 7

i
MILITARY CREATIVITY inversely proportional to contribution to the syetem. It is hard, and it may seem unfair, to teIl men who have suffered and sacrificed in battle that their experiences are irrelevant. Yet they have often been. At present, the detailed review of military campaigns, which forms the base of officers tactical education in many countries, often serves to bore, confuse, and alienate. The principles of war are studied over and over again, but the result may often be sheer tedium. The business schools may have something to offer here in their use of the case study approach, using actual experience, breaking it into a general background, a questioning of the student regarding probable outcomes, and a final solution. Some branchea have done this to a limited extent. But such employment of military history, built around creative principles, could be used to sharpen analytical tools, as well as merely to expose officer studente to drum and trumpet battle history. Testing of officer personnel for creativity might eerve as a rough means of detecting such ability. But structuring for from the ranks innovation should be eupported by eEtabliahing a research support screening function at the tactical unit level and an appropriate incentive. One current myth is that research and development must take place in a laboratory. Yet several analysts of the process of industrial invention have noted that half of tbe major inventive breakthrough etill come from individual totally unassociated with major research facilities. US troepa have long been vaunted for their ability to innovate and improviee. But continued reliance on ad hoc eokvtions and rumor transmission hardly eeems adequate. A regular publieztion of a readable and comic format like PS (The Preventive Maintenance MovztidII) could aid in stimulating the flow of innovative ideze. Whatever epecific solutions may be developed, there ie enough evidence available now to indicate that the process of creative innovation requires ineight on the part of troop leaders to a degree unrealized in the past. The restless, frustrated innovator can eaeily become a destructive, rather than a constructive, force, Creativity is a resource. It can be used and developed, or it can be wasted or perverted into a form of pollution. while mere spinning off ideas should not be confused with progress or achievement, the nature of the creative process should be recognized and evaluation and implententation procedures allowed for. The better mousetrap analogy in war takee on the dimensions of a Singapore or a Bataan. In epite of 24 hours warning, the air dieaeter at Clark Field in the Philippines paralleled that at Hickam Field in Hawaii. The roota of Ieuch disazters lay in fixed attitudes and sluggish thinking, not in an imbalance of resources. British arrqor in the desert took crippling lessee because cavalry regiments insisted on ignoring modern armor maneuver principles, con-., sciously and aggreeeively denying the validity of innovation. Materiel shortage ie only one side of the coin of defeat. Failure to adapkthat is, to innovate effectively-is the other. The bitter-won Ieasone of war abould be an adequate incentive to all commanders from eeetion to Army group to keep the scannere open, and to cloee when neeeeeary. Mllitmy Review

MILITARY FESSI(INAIISM

A Conceptual Approach
Colonel Deneld F. Blet% United Stute# .&mu

The views ezfpreaeed in thie article are the autho#e and do mrt meceasarilv rejlcot thoee of the Departtne+tt of Defen-ce or ita qwnciee. Editor. SOME, military Profe8sio~lism cleariy suggeeta a bread T understanding of the role of ndiitary power in the pursuit of national objeetivw. This kind of professionalism is normeiiy ewmeieted with more senior otticere with experience at tbe national Poiicymeking level and** tie highest level of miiitary and perhaps Mq 1971

civilian education. It borders, at times, on the abstract, and the etrongeet Proponents of tide view of profeaeionaliem may find themselves accused, often by their feliow profeesionale, of heving loet touch with reality and with being very unprofeeeionei. The implication here ie one of great breadtb of profeeeional underetsndlng but limited depth. This ie, of couree, one extreme point of view. The other extreme eccepta the word ~rofeeeionei in a more restricted eenee es one who pe~lcipatee for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of 9 ,

endeavor often engaged in by amateurs. In other words, any career military man is ip80 facto a professional. This view sees the military professional in somewhat the same light as the professional athlete, the professional entetilner, the professional television repairman, or whoever it may be who engages in some dlatinct activity as a vocation ae opposed to an avosation. The proponenta of this argument take what many would salt a narrow view of military professionalism. Here, the implication is one of great depth of professional understanding in a very narrow area at the expense of

breadth. DetractOre of this view qu-tion whether these military voeationiete have adequate broad experience and training to qualifY as Professionals. The two views suggested here are representative of the extremes, and certainly neither view by itself fully defines military profeesionalis.m es it exists today. We must search somewhere between the extremes for a meaningful solution to our problem. While much of whet follows is aePlieebla to the eniisted, es wall es the commissioned, ranks, tMe examination wiii be limited to the o!licer corps. A logical point from which ta launch Militaly Rwiow

10

this examination is the definition of a profession and eventually of the raSitary profemiona]. Webster defines profession in several ways. One definition, . . . a calling reguiring sPeciel~ lmowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation, seems ta lean primarily toward the first example cited. A second definition, . . . a principal calling, vecation on employment: would probably more closely relate to the second example. However, this is near the etarting point, placing the adjective %dlitzry before the noun professional narrows the concept somewhat. Lines ot Thought There are two descriptive definitions of the function of the military professional which are of interest here. The first, frequently quoted out of context, is by the political azientist Herold D. LeasweU who describes the function of the military professional, in the garrison statq as the %u+nagment of ~olence:~- I The second is by a British professional eoldier, Lieutenant General Sir John W. Heckett,
1 HuoLd Bdmm-or: A. venA4Y Pnss.

who calls it the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem. 2 The Laaswell wording impliek emphasis on the more narrow, technical aaPects of military affairs-how to bring combat power to bear on the enemy. The Hackett choice of worde implies a much broader role for the military professional in the use of military power in the pursuit of national objectives. A Component Psrt Aseuming the validity of both lines of thought, and they are by no means mutually exclusive, the more narrow lkezweU deAnition fits fairly neatly yithin the Hackett thinking ae one of ita component. In other worde, the military profession must poesess the highest possible level of expertiee at managing violence when it is called for, and, at the same time, be equally adept at bringing to beer the more ordered application of force called for in dozene of highly complex politico-military situations today. Bysyntheaizing the ahove thoughts, then, a military professional is: A commissioned ojtcm on active dutv who peeeessee the requisite level of trairaing, educatioa, szpcrisnce and inteUeot to perform the dutie8 which he might logiazllg be azs<gned. The parameters thereby constructed could lead to the conclusion thek by definition, ali mititary otEcera on active duty are professionals. while this would be a highly desirable state of affairs, it doea net seem to be true. At a time when most professions are tending strongly toward even greater apezialization to keep pace with the inereeeing compleaitiee of the environz L[aztiaut &nerd Sir John Hackett, British -, ~d, The P?UfeUiOn of Arms, lb Publishing Co.,Ltd. London, Ens., P X.

D. Lsnwell, Th .4aalv6i6 of Pditied Enwiric.d APPTOWA, Oxford Uni. N. Y. 1s49,D 162.

Cokmd Donald F. Blstz is a Fellow at the ?Iarvard L%ivzrsity C%mtsr for International Affairs. Hc hide a B.A. from th43 Univsreitg of OfnaAn; a Mastst% in International R6htiene from the AmsriznrJ thziVST8itV, Washhgton, D. C.; and is a grao%ate of the US ArmII Comnnmd and General Stiff t70Uege; the Armed Fame Staff IJollsge; and the National War College. He has asrved % varioua command and staff weition-r, including Aaeistant Sezretarg of the General Staff in the Owe of the Chief of Staff; Haadqaarter.v, US Military Aetitanoe Command, Vietnamj and Deputy Commands, 17Sd Awborne Brigade. thy 1971

11

PROFESSIONALISM ment in which they must operate, we in the military profession are still expected to be expcrta in the management of violence but, at the same time, to be equally competent generalists in the broader aspecta of the role of military power in the contemporary international scene. Must we really do tern, a given balance should logically be achieved. The chart shows this balance in the broadest terms. The veWlcel axis (technical miFitery) represents the Nationa demands on the professional oficer to be technically competent in his particular field. The horizontal .

MILITARY PROFESSIONAL DEMANDS

A

Ii
1!
r [

,/

rmmuuwm map axie (politico-military) represents the countrys expectation that the professional ollicer broaden hbI professional base well beyond pure military technology. The dotted diagonal line repreeente the midpoint-e balanc+between the two consisting demands. Finally, the solid curved line (C-R) represents what the United States may logically demand of an officer along the way from point C (commissioning) to R (retirement). Following the denwmd line (C-R), it ia seen that, in h]s early years, the otlicer is concarned with the technical aspects of hia profession. As he pregreeses along in Me career and is subject to etaff and command assignments which place broad demande on him, his professional base ie expected b broaden and he moves away from the technical military axis.
nOViEW Militwy

both ? The answer is yes, Are we capable of doing both adequately? The answer again is yes. How are we doing now ? The answer is surprisingly well, but not nearly as well as we should or could be doing. Accepting the basic assumption that thsre are no purely military and no purely political solutions to our national problems, it follows that professional military officers must be more than narrow military technicians. They must also fully understand military power as one of a number of elements of national power. If we further aseume that some logical balance is required between technical military eapertise and politico-military expe~lse in the military profeaeionel today, it has, then, to be de&mined what that balance should be and when, in a normal career pa~ 12

PROFESSIONALISM Sometime about midcareer, the average oillcer should reach the point where the demands on him come near the midpoint. This is the time when hie value to the Nation es a military professional ie es much in his understanding of the role of military force ae an instrument of netionel power ae in hie ability to perform or even directly eupervise specific technical functions. The line continues on rather graduelly until about the two-third point at which tiie it ewings abruptly in the politico-military direction. By this tire% the officers value to hw country ie far removed from hh technical ability to fire a particular weepon, pilot en airplane, navigate a ebip, or perform a basic military skilL His v&p is deepk seated in hie understanding of politico-military realities and hie abtity to bring the ney+eeery military skills to beer by ordered application of force in the resolution of a given problem. The newly commissioned lieutekent of infantry, with a deep academic understanding o~the theory of international politics and the role of military force in the affaire of state, but without the technical competence to perform the Mlc military skills neceeeary to cmmnend the ride platoon to which he is eaeigned, is not a military profeasiomd in any eenee of the word. He is, in feet, a ~Ician who may be capable of serving es a technician somewhere on a politico-military etaff. By the same token, a senior olllcer who uosseeeca a wealth of technical

Tbare are no ~ 1971

porelyIWtary or purely political solutions to netionrd prebletoe

13

9RO~10WM frmn, many years of experience, but who fails to understand the politkwrniIitsry implications of military force in the contemporary world, is eqnally nonprofeesiorml. He, too, is a mifitery teelmician with a narrow area of competence. The former tecknicien may be incapable of serving his country well at a given moment, but the shortcoming is correctable and he can probably be made into an effective profweional. The command influences in our bier. archical organization will likely serve at least to modify the impact of errors made while he ia learning. The latter technician, however, is in a position to do his country and Ma profession a great disservice. Because of his rank and experience, there is much ICES modifying influence on him. Often, be is in a position where his decisions will have great impact and his views will be heard and carry signitlcsnt weight. Career Pattam It must be understood that the chart illustrates what our country has the right to expect of its profwsional military officers and not how each officers career pattern should necessarily look. These are two separate matters. An officer may, for eaample, spend the bulk of his career with treops or in closely related assignments where h]s duties require greet expertke in the direction of the technical military axie. Tbie does not negate the requirement for him to have a deep appreciation for the realities of life along the politico-military axis. By the same token, the officer who has devoted much of his time to problems more closely identifi&d by the politico-military axis cannot be excused from keeping himself current and aware of the facts of life along 14 the technical military axis. This preparation of an otlicer to serve %hecountry most effectively at the wwioua Ievele of Ma career is a basic function of the military school system. The professional otllcer shares the reepoasiLdlity for MS own ~rofeeeional development. Muiti@Isi I.avats Whet baa rwdly been identified at this point is the requirement for multiple levels of professionalism with varying demands in each, The word level is used intentionally to connoto a vertical as opposed to a hmizontaI separation. For the purpose of developing this concept, two levels are identified. A good case can be made for poeeibly three or more levels by way of refinement. The firet level, that in which technical military expertise is the most demanding factor, is the one applicable primarily, but not limited, to the more junior and, consequently, Ieea experienced officer. It ie at tlds level of military professionalism that an 05cer is least likely to be celled upon to deal with poiitico-military problems. This is tbe level which is being addressed when we hear reference to a tactical operation I#ng conducted in a profeesionaI msnner~ or when we hear referenca to Major Doe as a truly profeeaional piIot~ This is the profemionalism associated with the how of the management of violence. It emphasises the application of miiitary akillz. The second level of prof~ionaliam has to do with the weaving of milRary skills into the politico-military equ& tion. It centers on whet is to be done with military power in the resolution of some national problem. This level is most applicable, but by no means limited, to the more senior, more exMilitmy Rwiew

perienced otbws who are more likely to be caUvd upon to wrestle with knotty polit~military problems than with the more narrow, but not necessarily lees important, technical military problems The question of whether a given tactical operation, no matter how professionally it may have @n wnducted, wee a valid ordered aPPli@iOn of military force in the resolution of the problem belongs at this level of professionalism. Whether military force should have been brought to bear against the Cambodian sanctuaries wee a politico-military deeieion of the greatest consequence. The professional military participation in mekhg that decision falls within the higheet category of the second level of profeesionaliem. It is Mcy1971

equally clear that the conduct of a professional milit.my operation in exeeution of the decision falls within the first level. The levels which have been suggested here can be identified on the chart in broad terms by a horizontal line, or preferably the wider shaded belt, through the point at wldch the diagonal line and the C-R line intersect. The tirat level is below that divider; the seeond above it, A precise division between these two levels is neither possible nor desirable. An understanding is essential, however, on the pert of military professionals that %vels~ by whatever name one wishes to identify them do exist and that the professional demands differ significantly in each. 15

FROF~lONMM The ehaUenge which our profession faces today is essentially one of the recently weU-worn term reIewmc& relevance in an increasingly cosnplex technglogieai world and relevance in an equally, or possibly more, complex world of politico.military interactions on the international leveI, AU this is set in a domestic environment in which our profession has sunk to the lowest level of esteem in many years. We cannot serve our Nation well by withdrawing into our own little world and concerning ourselves only with the technical aspects of our military trade. Neither can we aUow ourselves to become nothing more than a highly organized body of poiitiee-military philosophers who can eloquently propose what should be done with our Nations military power, but who have lost the ability to apply the necessary military skUls to put the recommendations into practice. Specialization Essantial The direction in which the military profession, in general, and the Army, in particular, will eventually move to mainti]n the requisite level and balance of professionalism hss yet to be determined, and even then, it will be an ever-changing element. The horns of the dilemma on which we find ourselves are drst cousins to those, not newly discovered ones, of apeeialisation veraua generalisation. If the which three of the title general: services assign to otlicera in the grades O-7 through 0-10, truly means generalist as opposed to specialist, we would logically have no 0-7 or Klgher gradea staying close to the technical military axis throughout a career. Of course we have, and muet continue to have our tecbnkal services and highly apeeialised officers in the 16 Army and their cnunterparte in the other aervieea. The ever-increasing demande of a growing technology make thk speeiaIisation more eeoential than ever before. There sre, and muet continue to be, flag and general oflcers who do not cross, or at least not by far, the center line on the chart and whose primsry orientation re. maina in the ares of h~ghly specialised technology. iltimr Sasvkas But what about the combat arms offtcer and his counterpart in the other services ? Are we reeUy doing the individual otllcer, the military profession, and the country a service by expecting all otllcers in this category to develop the level of politicomiiitary eompetemm which he may, or may no~ be celled upon to exercise? Cap we live with the profeasionsl troop commander who ie unequaled in his tactical skill, but bee no appreciation for the politico-military ramitleations of his actions any more then we can live with the political phUosopher in uniform who has no appreciation for the realities of combat operations ? while it would eolve, or more properly simply avoid, many problems by anewering yea to this test dualpart question, the answer must be an unequivocal no. It doea not follow that every senior military professional must be a politico-military specialist any more than he must be a epeeialist in any other of the many fields with which he deala constantly. It dose follow, however, that military profeasionala must fully accept the fact that military force can only be a means to an end and that end is, in the final analysis, the eventual resolution of some political problem. This fact wee clearly enunciated by one military professional in a eomMilitaly Roliow

PROFESSIOHALISM mentary on his experiences es a brigade commander in Vietnam. He said: First, the COUW)UWkT8 7w8t U?lderatand and alway8 be 8~tiVe to the potitied pmpoaea a??daime of the A.Uied e@rt in Vietnam and to insure that their milita~ operation support a?td 0dVatU3e tho8e g@Zk.a The higher the operational level, the more critical is that underetending. When the application of military force beeomee en end in iteelf, we are no longer profweionale, but only teehniciane at the management of violence, and we deserve to be 8trongly criticised. our country ha8 every right to expect more of ue. It ia, I am convinced, fully understood that the Department of Stetc ie reeponeible for the formulation and conduct of the Natione foreign policy while the Department of Defenee ie reeppneible for the formulation and conduct of our military policy, and that the integration of thoee two policies ie an absolute essential. The Foreign Service OSicer ie the profeaeional in the field of international polities, and it ie not euggested that the military officer develop the same type of expertiee 88 his civilian co]kegue nor is it 8uggeeted that the Foreign Service profeaeional attempt to match the military expertiee of the professional military 05cer. Both, however, muet be fully capable of participating in the formulation and implementation of viable politico-military policiee by appropriate weighting of the dynamic politico-military equation. Thie requires more than a superficial recognition of the entire problem. How each service might go about insuring that its officers who are contendere for tleg or general 05cer rank are professionals in the broedwt aenee of the word will vary with the semice. This is by no meane the most diilicult part of the problem. The truly essential element is the recognition that a valid requirement exiete and the determination to do sometldug about iti The future of our country depends, in great part, on true military professionalism in the broadest sense of the word. Some deep profsseional soulsea~hing on our part ie in order to determine what we can do to continue to eerve our country with the best possible military profession in a complex and dynamic environment. It ia aBrlmdie?Genemlemw B. Berm, Unitd eht5 Arm Wkrsatio. d a Brisde GmI- up to us to keep our profession relemamdor, 81nt Imfmtrr DtiIon i. Viebmm. US &n&I;f#J~D fpol, FortBemlias,m., m eeD- vant.

My 1971

Lieutenant Colonel Morris C. Cannon, United States Armu

IRECT support logistics, as employed in Vietnam, is an amalgamation of various past logistic praeticea evolving from experience and previous doctrine. The system which differs from current organisational doetrhe is working well and provides one-stop service to the cuetmmer. It should be examined not only in the light of experience in Vietnam, but also in regard to the requirements of other forms of conflict to detmrnine if it should be adopted es standard doctrine. During World War II, logistic organisations were commodity-oriented 18

units dealing in epecialised supply, maintenance, or eervice. Speeialiaetion went so far se to lead to the activation of fumigation and bath battaiiona. By the time of the Korean War and the North Atlantic lreaty Organization buildup in Eurow a deof functional organization bed been developed. Quartarmeeter battalio~ at tbii time coneiekd of a headquart%re and headquarters company and eaveral funtilonally reIat8d quartermaster companies. A typkel quartermaster battalion, providing nonditi~onal direct eupport during the 1950s in EnMMtsyRwim

W61ST12S rope+ coaeisted of a subsistence elemenk including a bakery end a petroleum element. Cleas II and IV eaPPIY and maintenance were found farther to the rear. From theee ahmmab evolved a quartermeetar direct eup~rt battalion containing a supply and eervice element and a light maintenance capability for quartarmeeter equipment. Ordnance battalions in dirwt support were oriented toward eupply and maintenance of ordnance equipment only. All support unite were organised on a technical service basis. New Approach In the pentomic reorganization of the 1950e, all eupply wee concentrated in one divisional element while all maintenance woe concentrated in another regardless of the technical service involved. This logietic concept, Combat Service to the Army, wae a preview of the development to come. The Administrative SUPPO~ Theater Army, 1970 (TASTA-70), concepts utilised thie functional-type orgeniaetion, eetabliehing direct eupport logistic battalions and creating eupply and eervice battalion and maintenance battalion located weU forward in the theater. Thie new organisational approach Liaatenant Colonel Morris C. Cannon ia Chief of the Logietice Division, US Arww Computer Sgatwna Cemrwmi Support GTOUP, Fort Hoed, Teane. A Won% War II vetem% he haa had variova aeeigmnwati in the logictiee @d, incMinP dwty wth the ??h US Armu; 8~d Airborne D@tkion; Ist (%VdW Division, Korea; btld mth the W7th Stq?plg and Service Bati ion (Divect Suppwt), Vietnam. He received hia B.S. in Management from the Univeraitu of h?inati at Vrbana, and L+ a g?udruzte of the US Army Command and G@ Sta17 CoUege. Mq 1971 eliminated etraight tachnical eervice orientation, and emphasised direct support fanctiona of eupply, service, and maintenance regardleee of technical service branch. Supply and traneportution battalion and meintenanca battalions were grouped in eeperate brigadee. Nondivisionel direct eupport unite were organimd and located to provide area coverage in the theater of operations for nondivieionel unite. Vietnam Srperimce During the buildup in Southeast Aeia, eupply and eervice battalions and maintenance battalions were cent to Vietnam. These were scattered throughout the operational araae to provide nondivieionel and backup divisional auppw% when required, along techniwd aemce Iinee. In thie type of eupport organiaetion, a direct support battaUon might have functional companies throughout a corps area. Dietance alone made the problems of command and control extremely difficult.. For example, one maintenance battalion provided direct suPport maintenance for both the 1st and 25th Infantry Divieion tactical arcw of rceponeibility (TAORS), se well ea beckap maintenance for both divisions. One eupply and eerviee battal- ion provided eimilar coverage to the same areas. Functional battdione ware coneolidatcd into cempoaita bettaliorw containing supply, service+ and maintenance elemente in an etYort to reduce areas of reeponeibility, improve the span of control, and eliminate duplication of eupport efforts. A typiwd bah talion contained a supply and eervice element and a maintenance element. TIIeee cornpeaite battalions could eupport completely the logietic needs of 19

divisional and nondivisional units in a smaller geographic area of operations. The two previously mentioned battalions were reorganized to provide total support, one for the Ist Infantry Division and the other for the 25th. Each area was supported by one logistic organization. A further extension of this reorganization would be a supply and service battalion operating on an area support basis consisting of a eupply and service company, a light maintenance company, a maintenance eempany (division, direct support), a magazine platoon, an engineer fortification and construction supply platoon, a military police sentry dog platoon, an ArmY postal unit, and an explosive ordnance disposal detachment. Composite logistic battalions operated dhctly with divisional and nondivisionel unite, sharing their base cempe, forward operating baaes, and tire support bases. 20

The development of these direct support logistic battalions revealed some inherent problems in baeic organization. Supply and service battalions and maintenance battalions, as their namas imply, were commodity. oriented, and, although they bed come commonality, there were significant differences in their prescribed organization, orientation, and outlmk. In particular, the headquarters and headqnartere companies were orgeniced along different lines. The maintenance battalion contained a materiel and a technical supply element wldle the supply and service battaKon had an operation section staffed with supply and service odicere, a bakery platoon, and a deconti]nation platoon. In amalgamating these differing headquarters units into logistic battalions, come swapping of expert pereonnel occurred, but neither type of heedquarters became fully staffed to accomplish the new total mission. AdMlibfy Review

LOGISTICS ditions to the staff could be obtained only by utilizing officers badly needed in the funtilonal companies. Few of these battalions operated within one concentrated area. Frequently, they maintained elemente in semipermanent locations within a prescribed geographkxd area usuaiiy coinciding with a divisional TAOR. Elements eeparated from the battalion headquarters ranged in size from two-men contact teems to reinforced companies spread out in widely diepersed camps. Additionally, mobile supply, service, or maintenance contact teams were sent wherever they were needed. Since the composite battalion supported fewer units than did the functional battalion, the commanders and their staffs were able to maintiln closer liaison with the customer. Vieite could be made on a daily or weekly .,. . ,.:. ., ,., .. ., .,.. ,.~ .,..,:., .,. : ..,.Tl .,.,. .. ,. bseii to forecast local needs. Cloee liaison enabled the support battalion to keep abreast of the tactical sitnation and anticipate many requirements. Direct support iiaison oilicers were often found at brigade and division level. During the Vlet Gong August 1968 offensive, a 176-millimeter artillery battery was cut off from normal ground support for an extended period. Due tn heavy firing, gun tubes had to be replaced frequently. Replacement tubes were flown in by heavy lift helicopter rather than over the mad. But without wreckers or cranes, there was no way to change the tube. Anticipating tids requirement, the dhect support logistic battalion designed A-framea capable of handling the tubea, had them constructed by a general support battalion, and arranged to airlift the A-

ment

d I?fi-millimeter gun tabee 21

Msy1971

frames to the fire support base. Close coordination between supported and supporting units thereby insured uninterrupted heavy artillery support along the Cambodian border during this critical period. Physical separation of the direct support battalions from their higher

arated not only from their subordinate elements, but also from their higher headquarter. One supported organization loaned a helicopter on a scheduled basis each week ta iti supporting battalion for command and control missions. Another support battalion received mior-

PROPOSEDHEADOUARIERS MGKUCf BAnAllON (DIRECI 5UPPOR0

I
Umm

I
r mfmw
I

1 I : 1
I

I 1 1

1 won 1

&
15i3

Gil

AWAW 1

t @:r EZJ:E
1 ,

~-+-~

1= 1 I
I

~..-.-..--~

headquarters and subordinate elements placed a heavy demand on the battalion for semi-independent oparation. Normal communications were not always reliable, forcing important decisions to a lower commend level. Command and control of logistic unite were more difficult than in previoue conflicts because of the requirement to utilise ecaree aviation assets to visit subordinate elements. Great r+ q.mneibility was placed on support battalion commanders who were eep22

it~ in air assets when problems occ&d. UsuaUy, eupport unite had to depend upon epace available transportation for normal command and control trips at the expense of much weeted time by the cemman dere and their limited staffe. Support groups, like their euberdinate battalions, changed. from a funetionei approach end, like their subordhata battnlione, covered the entire range of lo~atic support for a geograpbieal area. One general aupMiliWyReViR

LOGISTICS port group was composed of one eupply and semce battalion (direct support), one maintenance battalion (direct support), one maintenance battalion (general eupport), a composite supply and eervice battalion, a composite maintenance battalion, and two logistic eupport activities. The compoeite battalions each supported a divisional TAOR, one Labor Services Agency supported the Thailand forcee, and the other eupported forces in Saigon. The succeea of these unite led to the reorganization of the maintenance battalion (dhwt support) and the supply and service battalion into two additional composite battalions supporting forces in the Long Binh area. Composite battalions and groups furnished the elements in Vietnam which provided ,neceeeary logietic eupport to the customer. By concentr8& ing b8ttalion efforts in a emaller geograp~lcal area than wae envisioned under TASTA-70,. it was possible to provide direct support on an area basis. Much closer contact with supported unita was maintained. This concept of localized support worked so well in the field that, in my opinion, it ehould become Army doctrine. Elements of both the direct suPport battalion and the group need to be developed and formalized, The headquarters element should he baeed on a cellular concept. The operations section siiould be tailored to the composition of the battalion or group. ~Sinqe aIJ b8tt81iOna would contiln a supply, a eervice, and a maintenance element, part of the operations staff could be standardized. When other unite are 8dded to the basic battalion, however, additional expertiee is needed on the staff. For exzmple, if treneportetion truck companiee were assigned or attached, a movements control 8nd transportation stiff element should be added. If administrative area coverage wee added to the battalion, additional staff seetione would be needed such es finance and personnel. If the battalion were to operate in an isolated area, an aviation section should be attached for command, control, and light traneport support. In all caeee, aviation support would be required at the group level. The accompanying chart shows a proposed organization of a battalion headquarters which could command logistic unite of company size or smaller to support a force of 15,000 to 30,000. Normal support would include zervice and direct support maintenance. With thie new type of organization, complete logistic 8nd administrative support could be consolidated in a single support battalion (direct support) under the command of a direct support group. The composite battalion seems just as desirable in a nuclear conflict as it does in the rice paddiez and jungles of Vietn8m. Although the Iozs of one battalion wouid mean a complete loss of logistic support for one area, complete loze of command and control of one function or commodity over a greater area would not occur. Another composite support battalion could temporarily assume the mission of the loet unit until replacement unita could arrive. The logistics battalion (direct support) has proved itself in Vietnam and shows promise for the future.

May1971

23

Safeguard Sufficiency and SALT

S SECRETARY of Defense Melvin R. Laird hee repeatedly stated, we now face quite a number of hard decieions on our strategic weapona and Strategic Arrne Lbnitstion Talke (SALT) policy. Despite the recent elight slowdown in the Soviet rate of intercontinental ballistic missile construction, their strategic weaPons program etill continues at very high levels, and progress at SALT apparently has been far less than was expected a year ago. Title nhota. ..rtew Cmmande. 24
Dioe.L

SALT repreeenta a major advance in Soviet-United States diplomacy in the eense that the talks have been conducted in the normal businesslike manner of traditional diplomacy. Yet form should not be confused with aubatance. On vital iaeuee, there has been no change since the first HeWlnkl meeting. We now face the problem of how to protect our vital security intereeta while @king no action that will hurt the proepeeta of SALT because, ae President Richard M. Nixon ,pointed Milit$ry RWhW

SAFEGUARDAND SALT out, we are very far apart becauae our vital interesta are involved, but we are talklng. Like moat other problems, the anawer to this dilemma must be some form of compromise. Strategic Sutliciency The United States currently describes its vital national interest in terms of strategic sufficiency: the elements of which have been defined by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard as: Maintahring an adequate secondstrike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack. Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States in a crisis. Preventing tbe Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greeter destruction than the United States could inflict in a nuclear war. Defendhg against major damage from small or accidental leunch.1 Th&e objectives are being interpreted essentially along the lines of the doctrine of assured destruction. The efficiency criteria themselves do not represent that much of a change from assured destruction. Theee are similar to the claims for US strategic forces repeatedly made during the 1960s. To be honeat about it, in neither period were we fully meeting these criteria. The vulnerability to a Soviet surprise attack of the strategic forces LwAngprocured under the doctrine of assured destruction wee fully outlined by Secretary IArd in 1969. The changes that have been made in strategic defense programe after 1969 have endeavored to reduce these vulnerabilities. But the most significant limitation was financial. The funding for strategic forces actually declined from a recommended level of 9.4 billion dollara in Clark M. Cliffords Fiscal Year 1970 defense budget to 7.4 billion dollare in Secretary IArds revised budget. Requkements Not Met Tbe strategic forces being procured for the United States today-and, indeed, for the last five years-simply do not meet the efficiency requirements. In the that place, Congress has not yet funded the eight Safeguard sites whose major function is to protect againat a emall Chinese or unauthorised launch. In the second place, it is diillcult to see how a situation of tremendous disparity of war outcomes in the favor of the Soviet Union can fail to emerge in the middle to late 1970s, with the resulting temptation to the Sovieta to strike tlret in a crisis. Continuation of a limited assured destruction strategy, some experts have said, could create a situation in which: WhUe the U.S. wea struggling in. the face of a mat Sornet ABM defctwe to maintain ita aaeured deatnwtion capability to reduce the Soviat population from 240 miUion to abent 190 25

Mark B. SchneaUer received B.A. and M.A. d#grees in HistoW from the University of Southern California where he ia now a graduate student working toward his Ph. D. Dumng the summer of 1968, he wae a Rsaearch A88@tint at Stunferd Research Inctitute. A frequent contributor to US publications, hia article, Strategtc Awns Limitation: ap138a78din the March 1970 issue of the MrLm.mY REVIEW.

sAFEGUARD AND SALT

1974

PAR

MHOUSE
US PAR. The Soviet counterpart is much larger than %beflogho~. This radar, tits Henhrmse, is dapiox in six sites in the USSR end corers t?te mtilw periphy. Aocsrding tQDr. John S. Foster, Jrq Diswdor of Wfenae 3eseamh and Z!ngineering, these radars are the aim of three football fields lii Up and to end and standing on their sides and ~~They in the near term ?ravide tie same radar coverage which we will have some eight years from now if all the Safegasrd system is Completed. This is a defense system we cannot ignore, especially when more then 1,060 ferge SA-5 interceptor miaaib?e exist in the TaSin system and these may have signidcant ABM saPsb~fis Despite aU the telk about the spiraIing arms race, the 1960s sew a tremendous reduction in the deetroctive power of US strategic nuclear

comparative size of radar Srstema vdtion, the Soviets *h a growing oflense might be capable of reducing the U.S. population from $00 mfllh to about 46 rmlliaa.z Thus far, the Defense Department has been unable to dispel the m@h that the Soviet antiballistic miesik (A3Bf) is limited to the Moscow area. Actually, the Soviets have deployed a prototype ABM system in the Moscow arcs. The 60 or 100 GuZoeh interceptor missiles that are operational or under construction at the Moscow sites are not an accurate measure of its potentiil. Ak IWmcow, there are very large Doghouse radars, suppiementad by smaller traclciig radars. The illustration refeased by the Defense Department shows the size of the Doghou.w in reietion to the US Perimeter Acqnieition Radar (PAR), the Iargest in the Safeguard eystam. Yet the Doghouse is not really the counterpart of the
W COnm+ .-* Armed S.?CmAuthor@twn AW MSitaw Pnw-t, &mawzh and Dad@IIw@ Fiscal Im. iero, and lk#me Stm?wtk 91st C.&reES,

s mtttee,

First SemIoII, 11S Government Printtne 05ce Wnsblwtc.., D. C., 1969, P 1371.

Pat

sUS Comarew, Emse Ammwh%aa -ttce. 4. &f6@ f -%aT&/%7 o~t co~ us 00sanmaa PrintingOSice,Wdhwton, D. G., 1970,P 80. fmtsiytiuisw

28

SAFssms Ails SW weapons, BatweerI 1965 and 1070, there wee a 40-permnt cut in deliverable US megatonnage,l Ten yeArs ago, 1,000 tinw the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb repreaenbxi the explosive yield of a e.ingle, boraber-delivered mmker weapon,and it wee widely rthet -h Of the 600 E-.52S carried two or more of these. We have had to pay this price beceuee of the Soviet air and missile defense system. We have virtually guaranteed that we will not deploy heavy aermqwre defeneee, Thus, the Soviets ean meximics the capabilities of their

VWld Reducud In 1975,1,000 times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb will equal the yield of 520 Poseidon Multiple Independently Targeted Reemtry Vehicles (MIRV@. This represent about 20 percent of the alert force and poesibly a much higher perwntage of US megatonnage that would survive a Soviet attack in the 1976-80 period.5 This redutilon of megatonnage is the result of the enormoue progrese in miseile and bomber defenses. While .,, . . much ldgher yield weapons were dec~ P41wwt veloped for our missiles end bombers, TIMMIIWed PoreMm mteeile rsdecte rewe had to reduce their yield to obtain daction In nwgetonncge to obtain penetra. thm penetration. We went to smeller yield MIRVs in the Po8e&fon and developed strategic offeneive forces for destrucattack missile ehort-range the tion rather then penetration. (SRAM) for the B-62 for this rwon. : The old overkill myth is far from By way of illustration, it would dead and is a major inhibiting factor seem possible to design a five-tan in US defense planning. The persistbomb with a yield of at least 30 megaence of this myth is all the more retons today. A B-52 could carry three markable in view of the feet that the to six of them depending on the mieapproximate yields of US MIRVS have sion range. Instead, we will mount a appeared in virtually every major load of about 20 SRAMS with a total newepsper in the country. The effects yield of about three megetms and poseibiy a few emd bombe.c of nuclear weapons of varioua yields have never been clessided except in .&3&%l%r!&%%3.%%%.:i&% the early years of the nuclear era. The on &sOeMulPi-=% Wawvr Anti How, N. Y., 20 AP?U 1970Otlim of tha~nt Secmtmr of quantities of nucisar explosives neces~on.y ~Pnbue AI?*), WaohSnrtOn, D. C.. sary to inflict vsrione levels of deetruss 14evukSrown Nnchw Wa*: TIW 1.PsmUn9 tion on the Soviet Union were ou~ 9erd#L?k m5d4n&e Prseser PIMbhem N. Y.. 1SS4.D 4ti Nmkar An OkmUrr: Nmmak. lined in Secretary of DefeIM Robert 24 November 19s9,P 4%ad James,C. FalwY, TheShimad Afrc?sftof ti Wdfrd .%ob f%et, S. MeNemaras 1968 Posture StAteUS N*4 lMU$ute, AIUWQUS. 3fd., 1SSS, D 17. ment. There has never been any secret VKkis alum. W14AM PrLAI=4krI wsme@ln3 in MMJWO; Avfath Week MIS STechnokw, about the percentages of various US I ** le69, P 48. I&J 1s71 27

SAFE(UJARDAND SALT strategic forces on alert at any time. Yet the myth pereiete and has currently linked itself to the Pokwia sYstem. Those who argue that the 5,000 or more MIRVS we will deploy on Po.rekZorz missiles represent overkill ignore the fact that their yields are measured in tens of thousands of tons of TNT not tens of millions of tone as many of their predeceesora were. The Pokzrie force wee never constructed to be the sole element of the US dsterrent. If we let it become so, we will take the risk of losing it. The threat to our deterrent is reel, and we must take immediate eteps to preserve it. At the same time, we do not want to take atilons that would reduce the likelihood of a successful outcome of SALT. We are also acting under very severe financial limitations. Rsorganira Projeot Our best option today to accomplish this objective would be a fundamental reorganisation of the Safeguard project. In view of the unwillingness of Congress to fund the ares defense element of the system, that potilon of it should be postponed for the present. Indeed, we should divide the program into three distinct phases: o The four planned Safeguurd sites in the Minuteman fields, o The hard-point defense system now under development. Some form of national ABM to be developed later. The first two should be pushed to the maximum now. The batter should be delayed until we have more firm indications of tbe Soviet willingness to come to terms in SALT. Such a program will decisively increase our deterrent power in the middle to late 1970s without increasing strategic weapons costs above programed levels for the next five years. ln addition, we can expdta the development of the B-1A strategic bomber and the Undersea J&ng-Range Miesile System. These are really projects for the 1980s, and hence their development can continue without much effect on SALT. Moreover, the Soviets have already flown some rough counterperta to these two weapon systeme. The Soviet SmuJZ?, first shown in 1967, is one-third larger than our Poseidow, and an improved version has since been developed. The Sovieta already have a emall number of a new advanced, swing-wing medium auparsonic, bomber operational. This aircraft probably has three times the payload as our FB-111. If US counterparts are not developed, we will be under a severe disadvantage under SALT. Positive Inoentive The third phase of the program ehould be our means of giving the Soviets a positive incentive to sign a SALT agreement. The first two phases are designed merely to parry Soviet attempts to deny us a deterrent. If there is anything we should have learned from Vietnam, it is that eimply aimhg to deny an enemy a victory does not necessarily discourage his partkipation in the contest. When the aim ie eimply to avoid defeat, it ie dit?lcult to win and easy to lose. For a variety of reasons, the third phase of Safeguard ehould involve the maximum possible threat to the Soviet deterrent. It might range anywhere from an altered Safegtwrd-type area defanee to a heavy ABM. But before discussing this, an effort must be made to outlhe the current state of the art in ABM technology. Enough information has been released in the lest two years to at least give an idea of tha etate of the art, Militery Rev18w

SAFESUASD AND SALT capability to differentiate between different kinds of objects coming in, and when combined wth the appropriate computer progmming, the~ run do this job with a high &gree of succsee. Thti depsnds on the etnte of the art of the enemy davicen, and, oe Dr. Foster had pointed out, we have been working on ouch deceptive dewcee for oar own n4iseile8 fvr 10 gsare and we havent been able to make devices that wdl cvmpletelg fool this kind of a ayetem? Penetmtion Aids The mounting of penetration aids forces attrition of the miesile forcetbat ie, shifting of miseile payload from destructive eapsbitity to harmless deceptive device8. Chaff is a simple penetration aid, but it is effective only at altitudee above 260,000 to 300,000 feet While it is possible to include ao-eslled heavy chaff that will survive reantry for a longer period, the attacker faces the problem of atmospheric filtering. When tbe warheads reenter the atmosphere, the chaff is left behind. The radar ran then distinguish individual objects and direct intereaptore. Moreover, the uniform dispensation of chaff is quite a problem. Since chaff can be cut to reflect only some radar frequencies, rapid changing of radar frequencies c4mbe an effective counterm~sure.lo It is also possible to mount decoys, but, to build decoys that go much lower than 200,000 to 250,000 feet, requiree a very substantial diversion of payload weight away from the weapon load.

The SRAM etrengtbeae B+ penetration capabilities against tmprovcd Soviet air defame The primary reason for the rejection of the Nike Zecw in the early 1960s wea the inadequacy of the mechanically steered radara. Thie problem was quickly eliminated by the development of phase array radaraelectronieelly steered unita that could sweeP the sky in microseconds and which might track hundreds of objects almost simultaneously.? It waa found that the effectiveness of penetration aids againet the new radara had been considerably exaggerated. Despite our very heavy investmanta in penetration aid research-far larger then the Soviets-our efforts to produce a cheap, effective penetration aid haa failed.8 As Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard stated: . . . our rodare have cansiderabls 7J. S. Bu4x,Jr.. Wbe Csre For De&iae,,,Air 1987, D 48. aad smcn Dine& NooFLWW 8 Ricbud B. Foster,YbeMeemrd BMOPro. M d Arm Oonti Fmsmchfor & Ie7cs.s. h) & d: Wh uw ABM .WW 8mw, l?dited by W& R. I&tier, Fkvtkrne tilts, In.., N. Y., 1969,DD487-W. May f971

tion Array Radar (TAC$fAR) type phase array radars. The snmllj relatively low-powered Missile Site Badar (MSR) of the Safeguard system dose not have the advantages of the larger MAR-MSR or TACMAR-MSR deployment of a heavy urban defenee: ita capability for exoatrnospheric discrimination by radar cross-motion amdysie is limited; it dose not have multiple look anglee for the dieerimination mxiere; and it bee a nmeh Ieeeer capability against electronic counterineeeuree, But there are m,

loeatian to the defense avatem) bu barraging the satire almd or attacking each target to kill the RV. Beeauee chaff C1OUO?.S can be large, and many bqlioona can be eamied, a number of Spartan bursts maw be. required to inaare an RI? kiU. The exaet perfmvaanee depends cm the nature of the attnok @va, the number & balloons or langtle of chaff, ad the cwemned eaemy RV aud pewtmtian aid ha7d?U388. Spmtan burete mav be ueed to clear awagf penal-ration aide a.!lowing dirset attaok em RV. -S@aw

SAFEGUASOAND SALT

if enaqi W get8 ~t the Spavtan d8feWe, it wart be taken md.e-r &tWok ?qi $printe. Chaff and baiioons are hwfeotive agattt ~~nti.11 The Spartme primary kill maehaniem ie X-rays, and ita &iii radxue is enormous. Hardening the attacking warheads em tiuee this, but hardening is wry expensive ii terms of warhead yield redutilon. ~e I)r. Foster indioeted, the Spartan een be mad es a precursor b destroy daeoye-ite kili radiue againet Mmsa would be much greater than its kill radius against warheede. The long range of the Spmtkm permite the eonetruetkm of an area defense of the entire United state%
Grttat Aoodsration The other great advance in the Safeguard eystam has been the Sprint. TMe missile W only a limited range, but it has eo gI@t an acceleration tbet it can reach 50#00 feat in about 10 semmds. Former Secretary McNamara indicated that it ,ti intercept missiles es low, es 5,uOO feet. This permite delaying the I@rwb of the interceptor untii the attwc%ing warhead is VWII under 20 m~% if We beoomee naeaeeary for iiiecmimination pqmaae. Moreover, the ,Spr$nt is reia$ively ahaap-baing under one million dollal!e Wwh. AvIother prokkvn that wee found to ba@mMemiW W3ggerated ia that of radar hiealmut. Studies amdertsken in the lest aaveml years have indisated that an attempt to Macdmot &e PAR -@e long-range aowvisition and tmeking mder-wmrki require &be eataWiebmant of about 15 aiming points in tba sky atxme the northern perimeter of the United Statae, the tlmg.sting of dwvard warheads at

tie

each potnt, and their rapbwsment perhaps every 90 seconds es long ae the attack continuee}~ A#empta to blackout PAR againat 8ubmarine-lamwhed ballistic missile (SLBM) attacks would require *he establishment of several additional aiming points along cash coast. Thus, blackout ie a wry expensive teebnique in terms of missile payload invested. Moreover, notes Sematary Leird: Efiseii.e Sit% Radar (MSR) . . . the wii pevfemn Is4i8quatelg in epifie of interrupted Perimetw Aa@e&ion ROdar (PAR) dati during the engagement. The high aoesleratioa Sprint k%weptor can be hgld umti.! i?iw reentty vehisle enters the attnoepk&e. Beeauee the iWSR @i&we a higher frequawzp thm the PAR, the Maskout problem is dramatieoii~ ndueed. Parpemftd biaokout to &my MSR eawatmoepharic observation is wholly tmreasmmbb.1~ Urbm Meilm Rolo One of the major probiame the administration has had to face in its campaign to obtain congressional backing for Safeguard has been ite contention that ABM technology is good enough to defend missile bases, hut not ,zteod enough b defend urban cemtera. Critics of Safeguard have dwelled m the eiieged vuinambiiity of ita radar to precursor attack. Administration apokeemen have pointed to the high eowdaretion of the Sp@! whiob @vee it two or three ahote at each reentry Vehicie that gate pest the Spanhvns. Thuaj the probability of a weapon %king through the de-

H8JW7!

31

SAFEGUARBAND SALT fense before the interceptors are exhausted is very low, This probability will be further reduced by improvements to the Spartan now behg made. The improved Spmfam, with its 60-percent increase in terminal velocity and its much higher acceleration, will make possible both intercepts at a longer range and at very ehort rangee and low 81titudee with the same missile. It will have an improved cepabitity against submarine-launched ballistic missiles and frdiona~ orbits? bombs and, at the same time, increase the risk of an attempt to use blackout as a penetration technique. The emaller radar under development for the hardpoint system will make attempts to attack the radars lees profitable. Range improvements in the S~nt will further increaee the risk of counterradar attacks. Selective Befense With the combination of the improved Sprint8and Spartana and the new hard-point radar, a selective defense of various portions of the dfinutsman field will be possible. Thue, every segment of the field would beve to be attacked with enough warheads to assure its destruction, even if all available interceptors were aeeigned to it. This could become prohibitively expensive to theattecker. The smaller radar might eventually become adaptable for the urban defenee role allowing the terminal defense of cities much smesler than can bedefendedbyan MSR. It would also be poseible ta defend a smaller number of cities at a price substantially lees than was contemplated in the propoeed Nike X deployments of the 1960s. while it ie somewhat easierto defend a radar located in a miseile base 32 then a radar located near an urban area because lower altitude S@zt interceptions are possible in the former, this difference doea not appear to be decieive. The very existence of a defense forces the attacker to employ srnder, lower yield ~ffivs, and these can be intercepted at a lower altitude. Moreover, the Spartane in an urban area defense would probably be more effective because more radar capability would be provided. If a very limited phase I of Safe9wavd can protect 59 to MN rniasile sites (in effect, intercept 50 to 100 offensive warheads) es Secretary Leird bee indicated, and do it with only two emall MSR radare and a very limited number of interceptors, then a larger deployment of SO or 100 radare end a full complement of interceptor missiles would be able to intercept thousands of warheads. The decision not to deploy a heavy ABM would thus seem to be more political than technical in nature. Cest Effectiveness One of the greet ironies involved in the current situation is tbe~ in an effort to appease certain irreconcilable elements in the United States, we are designing the Safewazrd system to be far 1sss ethctive then it can be and to have far less growth potential. Only five of the 12 Missile Site Radars (four in the Minutenmn fields and one in the Washington, D. C., installation) will contah many Sprints. As it is now planned, the other seven sites will be located in erase where S~rsts cannot be deployed for urban defense. Thus, in an era in which we are matching our eighhbl~londotler strategic forces budget against the 16-M1. lion-dollar Soviet budge~ we are purpoeesy producing a syetem that is

SAFE6UASD AND SALT much less cost effectivs then it could be. Congressional opposition is strongest against these seven sites which are mainly deeigned to defend against a Chinese Communist attack or a Soviet SLBM attack on our bomber bases. Yet, by moving these sites nearer the citiee as they were in the original Sentinet proposal, we can add a third function-protection of some of our largest urban centers from all but extremely heavy Soviet attacks. If we do not do so, we are throwing away one of the most cost effective optione we now have to rebalance the strategic equation without the investment of billions of additional dollars. Adding Sprinte~ notea Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, though it costs significant money, is not a major cost compared with the radar itself.~ Interceptor missiles, according to the Defense Department, average only one million dollars each. The current Soviet SS-9 costs about 30 million dollare and the SS-11 about 10 million dollars each. Thus, adding about 100 Sprints at each of the seven MSR sites and locating them near major urban centers, es in the S.mztinet eystem, would mean the Soviete would have to divert 700 additional warheads from counterforce targets to aesure penetration. To do thie with SS-11e or three MIRV SS-9e would cokit about seven billion dollars or about 10 times as much as the additional Sprint8. Now, tbe Sovieta can cut their penetration costs considerably by developing a three-warhend package for the SS-ll or a 20-warhead package for the SS-9. But to do eo, notes Al@wt Woldstetter, would coet the Sovieta several billion dollars in research and development to obtiln such an advanced MIRV capability.11 It is difficult to see how the Soviete can nullify our 700-milliondoSar investment without expending about five b]llion dollars, even if they pick the most cost etfecttve alternative. By modifying tbe Safegunrd system es proposed here, we would by no means obtain a firstieti]ke capability; The Soviets would still have an assured destruction capability. However, such a modified Safeguurd would preclude the Sovieta from achieving a dieparity of war outcomes in their favor. By delaying the construction of the area shield for several years, we can introduce more advanced technology. One of the most significant technological developments on the horiaon today may be MZRV warheads for ABM interceptor. Thie could increesc ABM performance by a factor of several fold-end it should be remembered that the Safegnm-d syetem ia already more expeneive for the Soviets to penetrate then for us to build. To really put pressure on the Soviets to agree to an equitable arrangement in SALT, we ehould introduce the threat of a nationwide ABM if theee talks fail. Our minimum step should be to approve now tbe construction of a motUfied area shield in tbe mid-1970s if the talks fail.

May 1971

33

A* Mtvtjwe
From The Tbn3

Literary Supplement (Gwat.Brita@

Michael Howard

HE military historian can only contemplate the continued puhIic demand for his wares with gratifiad awe. His readers seem insatiable. No publisher, apparently, SISSPS sasily at night unleee he has in prospect a new series on greet battles, or greet captilns, or great eerapaigns, or at lseet one new study of the First or Second World Wars. Fresh battuee are constantly being organized over terrain which one would have thought long since striPPad of every new idee. Officials at tbe Imperial War Museum, hampered elightly 34

by the attantione of well-meaning incendiaries, work overtime to satisfy the demands of the television eompariies. A new breed of entrepreneurs has arisenBmry Pl& John Ttwraine, and Corelli B8rnett preeminent among them-skilled in blending reputable hietory with popular appeal, what doea tbia all portend? HOW long is it likely ta go on? Does it indicate a einister obseseion with violence on the part of our eocie~. or is it a healthy eubstituta for the wars which we am ourselves too exhausted and too seneible tu fight? Milit#BlievlW

MnllAuY Interest differs in kind with differing weneratiane. Zveryone over the age of 40 wee more or lace involved in WorId War II es participant or observer, and an event which made so cataclysmic an impact on our Iivec and our society is bound to retiln ita interest. Hew Pcrcpcctircc Successive Iayere of truth about it are revealed as more documents are released and more memoire written. New pcrepectivee are gained es we find out more about a condkt which was not just global in ita extank but which involved the social or political transformation of virtually every belligerent power. Detailed study of that war not only reveals more about what wcs happening to us then, it eneiiee us to understand a greet, deal more about whet hae happened to us since. For. the middie aged and elderly, the histiry of tbe Second World War provid~ both the surrogate excitements of military hbitory, in genera~ and makes possible the kind of introspective understanding of our own generation and our own attMudee to which not even the more braaerdy extrovert are wholly immune. However, interest in military bietory ie not condned to noctalgic senior cit@m.e and bellicose chMren of all ages, Adulte between tbe agea of Ill and 40 seem to be quite intareated in This artiek woo condenacd, ZW Special permieeion, fm?n the ~gi@ ~bltihed in TEE. TIMM LrrEaAaY Slmmmfalw(Great Brituin). Mr. Howard ic a PrOfm8cW a Ozford Univmtg in En#land. H8 ie the author of 8evc701 books, including The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. mf le71

tsslow

books and dime about military history, even if their interact eometiiee has a subtly different emphasis. For _ it is often compounded of feecinetion and diegoat with value, and habits of the past from which succeeding generations feel it nemeeery, at fairly regular interwde, to make prcIonged and ecnpbetic declarations of independence. Tradfticw~diCIikd The generation of the 1920s felt it necessary to make clear, by their literature and their habits, their emancipation from the Victorian Age. LAewiee, the generation of the 1960s feels, apparently, compelled to dance on the grave of the era of military imperialism which effectively ended with World War II-a dance inspired not simply by a joyful sentiient of liberation, but by a determination to tremple the cwtb down es bard as p08eible on tbe cotSn underneath. Such films es The Charge of the Oh what a Lovely Wary and How I Won the War: together with numerou8 instant bistoriwi of tbe First World War, eeem deeigned neither to provide tbe colorful excitement of popular military hietory nor a careful and eympethetic reconetrutilon of a bygone historical period. Their object ie primarily iconOcleetic. The traditionalist may find tbie ~enre ebccking, end the historian certainly dnde it silly, but the SOCiO]bgkt will probably expleii it as en inevitable end poecibly a eelutarg symptom in a generation which knows that it must feel ite way toward ita own veluea and bee to begin by clearing ite mind of much of the cant inherited from a doubtfuSy relevant past. Once it bae settled dowa, it will view ita predcceaeore with greeter underatand-

Light Br@@~~

MILITARY HISTORY ing if not sympathy. It has, in Oscar Wildes words, loved its parents and is now judging them. Ultimately, it may forgive them, especially when it hears the sardonic laughter of its own children mocking the values it has itself so painfully acquired. Not Pacifist One interesting point is to be noted: this iconoclasm is not essentially pacifist. The mockery is not of war as such, but of war as an institution within a psrtkdar kind of society. Lord Fitsroy J. Raglan, Lord Horatio H. Kitehener, and Lord Douglas Haig are held up as figures of fun not because they were soldlers, but because they are seen as representatives of a particular social system. In making fun of Raglan, in guying Kitchener, and in pouring contempt on Haig, the iconoclasts can express their distaste for the entire culture of which these men formed part; much as Lytton Strachey and his imitators expressed their rejection of Victorian values through their portraits of individual eminent Victorians. No one has yet mocked such classless professionals as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel or Lord William J. Slim. And they had better not try to mock Ernesto (Che) Guevara or Ho Chi-minh~ The poster of Kitchener and the photograph of Che wblch glare down from the walls of the students pad convey very different messages, and the boy in the Kings Road will wear a scarlet and goldbraided tunic for very different reesons from h]s friend who dresses, equally uncomfortably, in the fatigue uniform of the followers of Fidel Castro. Those who are most emphatic in their mockery and rejection of one form of militarism seem the most enthusiastic in their acceptance of 36 another. We have yet to see trendy blowups of Philip Noel-Baker or even U Thant. lhe devotees of Che Guevara would no doubt argue that there ie nothing illogical about embracing the Socialist concept of revolution and rejecting the bourgeois institution of war. In hietory, this distinction has tended to be one of aspiration rather than of fact: war and revolution have each merged into the other with monotonous frequency. But milihwy hkd.ory enthusiasta seldom estend their interest to the study of revolution, not at least until revolution has settled down into a discreet and easily identifiable war. Their interest is primarily in contXct between organized armed forces conducted according to certain commonly accepted principles. The revolutionary would argue that this, in itself, is symptomatic of an obsolete class approach to what is or is not legitimate in socisl behavior. Social Framework The wars in which the military historian is interested are fought within a social framework wh]ch all belligerents are ultimately concerned to uphold. Defeated powers are seldom totally destroyed and if they are, the victors reconstruct them in their own image. Revolution, in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, loomed as a specter even more frightful than defeat. All this is uncomfortably true. But what is aleo tru%and also uncomfortebl-is that it is far eaeier to write the h]story of wars than it ia of revolutions, and such hletories are very much eeeier to read. The actors are clearly identifiable, limited in number, and their actions are usually well, if not always reliably, docuMilitsry Review

mented. In a revolution, the actors are inchoate and innumerable. Acts of violence are random and inconclusive. There ia seldom a clearly defined beginning to a revolution and never a clearly dedned end. Historians are still trying to fid out what really happened in the French Revolution, and, the greater their knowledge, the greeter difficulty they have in communicating it. The task of the hietorian of Napoleon Bonapartee eampsigna ie indnitsdy eimpler. Actione are coordinated, decieive moments identifiable, and motives easy to understand. It is a great deal easier to follow the movement of articulated divieione than that of pessant fighting in the Vendee, or conMay1971

stantly changing groups of activists in the revolutionary Paris and Marseilles. But this very simplicity has its dangers for the student of military histnry. In a conflict in which military and guerrilla revolutionary activities are being carried on simultaneously, it is tempting to concentrate on the former at the expense of the ~atter. We have many histories of the Duke of Wellingtons campaign in the peninsula, but few attempta to analyce the guerrilla activity which accompanied it and made it poseible. The partisan campaigne in Yugoslavia and Greece between 1941 and 1944-part guerrilla war, part revolution-still await at Ieaet their British historian. 37

#lu141N

illmftlf ery% vieterks ~ in the T3niksl Arab B.epabVe today, to be se remote as those of ?kdiaerius? X was no fault in these idsterkma that they did not do SO: tlwy had idanty to 0c4upy their own !3p@aliMd skit% But the llbence of ally synoptic vision leads to the assumption that. military history is 8ti that needs to be writfxm about a war: to the depiction of the two work% War4 in pertiilsr, in terms of the triumph of the Aliied armies ratlter than of the disintegration and transformation of European eoeiety; and in eonacqnence to the bewildered cry, in the grey aftermath of victory, that one had won the war, but somehow lost the pwwe. stridshihlnrard U* The heyday of the rmthodox military historian was, in fact, really over before tbii csnkury bege% S?@ as hishmiogrepby goes, it was very brief. Eor military history in its traditional sense is concerned primarily with the maneuvers of armed forces within finite and essily eomprehemdble parameters of space snd time, leadhig to engagements in which is decided the straightforward issue of victory or defeet. So long as military activity of this kind was both eentr@l and deskdve in international emtliet, so long was the role of the milikwy hMorien botb significant and straightforward. But M wee a period, in the history of EUZ, rope at Ieae& which lasted for little mere than ZOO years: from the middle of the 17th century until the lstter part of the 19th. Before ItM&except for brief pcrkx-ls such ss the end of the 16th century or the meteoric appearance of GUStSWUSAdolphuemilitary OPWStione were long drawn out and inconclusive. They were affairs of sieges

How 93SZIYof the amnewhat wdfs&&d Anglo-Amarieeo hiiteriana wbo have d~ the campaigns in rmrthwest ihmepe in lff44-45 hiwe given enY account of the Freneh resistance mowsmente whieb comp% Xnented theJQ .@af t$eiz politieel con-

38

Wt##y Rwku

MlliMiY and marchea. of laying waste, and of sporadic srnalkeale engagement. States did not amnmand, the reeourcea to gaim decisive victeriea, and OXIly to. ward, khe end of the 17th century did they begin to acquire them. Modern campaign historg, the,atudv

WSWSY

state. And the field really waa a field, a stretch of country which could still be encompassed by a single ~eye, wherein were concentrated some hundreds of thousanda of men whose ekill and courage could and did, within a few hours,. quite literally change the course of hietory. 1$ ie a cold fish of a historian whose pulses do not stir,. even slightly, when he aontemplat.es such battledelde, Perhape we are now auiliciently adult to admit. that the Battle of Trafalgar really was more far reaching in itc reaulte even than the case of the T& puddle Martyra, and that Waterloo wcs a more significant event in European history than the emeute at Peterloo. * Negative, Approach But the era when the destiny of nations could be so conveniently crystallised in time and apace waa brief. A war of even greater aignitlcance for world history than those of Napoleon and Von Moltke was fought out in the middle of the 19tli century in the United States. But its Battlea, although dramatic enough to be refought at regular intervals by military Iiistory buffi, were deoisive only iu the negative armae, in that they prevented any deeision, beinE reached in: tlie field, wlietlien at! Bull Run, Antietam, or GettysbuW. Bkmkede, conscription, war pnodi4ction, attadtiom of manpower, and morale+lieee were tlie fkctom which were iieg@inK. to coun~ and Mese am proeeeees of whicli. tiiw traditional. mili~ histtmiam tiende, to, ber im> patientt StilL if Major General; George G. Mkadb%mero hadl iken swept away ati Gktt!yaiiurg+ the bistn~ ofi tiie

---Clhwdbee. pmfkaeionah such as L4ud WSliank.J. Sllnr have net bean attaelkst of aelfwontainedi and! dbcisive military opmatiomq. begins with tite age of Mamlial! I&kmi db l!umnne; tlie Duke o~ lifknlhorangh~, and Eugene of Sa+ voy.;:contitumh tlhxmglr ?@rahal Mauniae dts $tm~,andl Iit%deAok, tlie C&eatq andi raaalies, ite; climax in tie Mth aentu~ with NapeIkon Bonaparte amd (3Juti IWmuth von Moltke: B$7 thati time, the armed forms in the, fieltii dfdl Ijej@n:ta, eDIBod++@e. availb~lb neeomwes of tiie st&t& Ttte aommandex in, the field did,. or could, represenb the controlling will of the *lwal

MILITARY HISTORY United States and of the world might have.been very different, and the military historian still has the essential task of explaining to us why they were not. Once the industrialization of war was fully underway in the 20tb century, it besame increasingly difficult to bring abont a decisive encounter. Resources were too vast; their manipulation too difficult. Small-scale COUPS could be brought off in the World Wars in seeondary theaters with limited forces at the end of long supply lines, in Palestine or in North Africa. However, on tbe mainland of Europe, where armies confronted one another hundreds of divisions strong, not even a victory on the scale of Tannenberg or of Stalingrad was decisive in the usual senee of the word. Even with all the facilities of road, rail, air, and sea, resources could not be concentrated in sufficient strength to destroy tbe enemys forces beyond hope of recovery-with the briIliant exceptions of the German victories in 1940, and the US destruction of the Japanese battle fleet in Midway in June 1942. The very term battle wee transformed, to encompass monthlong, sometimes yearlong, conflicts of attrition in limited, but increasingly extensive, geographical areas: the Somme, Ypree, Britain, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. And success in the battles depended not only on the operational skill with which they were conducted, but on factors of resouree allocation, weapons tecbaology, civilian morale, and politieel leadership which made these struggles, huge as they were in their scope, themselves only incidents in a hietoricrd process whose complexity we are only now beginning to understand. If 20th-century war wee too serious a businese to be left to the generals, its study has become altogether too

The rise of Arab nationalism hss made Field. Marshal Bernard L Montgomerys battles in Egypt seem tike ancient history 40 Militwy Review

MiLiTAffY iiisTORY protean to be left to the miiitary hjstorians. As for the armed conflicts of the second haif of the present century, they are wen lees responsive to the traditional techniques of study than those of the first. The Korean War and the Arab-Israeii War of 1967 do lend themselves admirably to the normal techniques of the miiitary historian. But what about the civil war in China ? The Malayan emergency? The Borneo confrontation? Algeria? Indochina and Vietnam ? Changing Pattema of War The military historian is accustomed to deaiing with contlicts between iike and like between forces with broadly eimilar struetmw, weapon systems, and outlook. The pattern of the past 20 years bae been, rather, t~t of the Roman combat between one gladiator armed with traditional sword and shield and an antagonist armed with net and trident; . one who avoide pitched engagement, but harasses continuaw; who defends no ground, but allows none to be permanently occupied; and who fights not for control of territory, but for the legitimacy of popular support. To describe and analyze such condicta is as much the task of the economic, the social, and the political historian as of the miiitary, and it may be doubted whether the problem of writing their Idstury can be resolved by purely military treatment any more than tbe problem of waging such conlliet itself can be resolved by soldlerz. Not that there is anytbhg novel about th]s Kind of war. It ia likely to occur whenever an authoriw of questionable legitimacy occupies more territory than it can effectively control, whether the authority is that of an Bay m unpopular national government, a colonial regime, or a foreign invader. Marxiem bee provided a naw ideology and Maoism new methods, but the bazic motive is an older one: fzmri gli .rhwzieri (kick the foreigners out!) And if such wars have proliferated over the past century and a half, it ie not ao much because the level of political consciousness, national or ideological, has become higher, but because the increase in military mobility bas tempted goverumenta and armies to overreach themselves. With the cumbrous and slow-moving forces of the pre-Napoleonic era, such temptations could hardly arise. But Napoleons very successes led his troops into positions, in Spain and Ruseia, where they were hopelessly vulnerable to the erosion of partisan war. Poiitiaal Conflicts With the coming of, railways and motor transpo~ the situation became more comples stiil, Armies could penetrate ever more deeply into hostile territory and etey there. Governments pafi]cularly colonial govermaentacould impose a far more rigoroue degree of control over areas where they bad previously exercised no more than a vague suzerainty. Traditional patterns of bebsvi?r wera suddenly and brutaliy disturbed by these aiien incursions. The surprising thing was not that there was so much pertizan fighting, but that there was not more: that such vast areee of the world accepted these irruptions with a kind of dazed acquiescence. But where they did not-where local populations fought back against the invaders with ruthlessness, patience, and zkill-then it was shown how grave was tbe military problem with which the expanding powers had

MILITARY HISTORY landed themselves. Their forces might well be armed and disciplined, but there were not many of them, and they had to be very thinly spread. Their communications might be rapid, but they were highly vulnerable. The American Civil War may have given a foretaste of how the World Wars of the 20th century were to be fought. If so, the US experience in the Philippines, the Spanish in Cuba, and the British in South Africa at the turn of the century showed what lay in store for the great empires of the world if their subjeets decided to make life uncomfortable for their rulers, especially if these rulere were restrained by public opinion at home from exploiting their military technology to the full. Military historians have set to with a will to study insurgency and counterinsurgency. They have pored over the works of Mao Tse-tung and Che and General Vo Nguyen Giap with the care which an earlier generation devoted to Karl von Clausewita, Sir Edward B. Hamley, or Sir Bryan T. Mahon. Led by the French analysts of the 1950smen like Henri Bonnet and Trinquierthey have deduced from their studies principles as clear as those handed down by the great 19thcentury pundits. Yet no one can reed such studies-end certainly no one can try to write one-without reelizing how inadequate is such an approach to the understanding of the situations they attempt to describe. These wars are not simply military conflicts with a complea political background. They are, rather, political conflicts which involve an unusually high level of violence. To give coherent accounts of them for the generit reader is almoet impassible, and, even if it were possible, they would not be particularly agreeable to reed. Publishers are unlikely for some time to come to commission lavishly illustrated coffee-table volumes on the war in Algeria, the emergency in Malaya, or the conflict in Vietnam. No; the military hietory which sells beet is that which deals with events eafely past; which inspires nostalgia for the days when the military virtues were clearly relevant to the social and political order, and when force could be legitimately, skillfully, and decisively exercieed without aoeiety itself being destroyed in the process. It is perhaps because the West has little choice today between the continuing complexities of revolutionary war, on one hand, and nuclear destruction, on the other, that readers show such an insatiable appetite for studying simpler and leaa-a]arming conflicts. No publieher ia likely to commission a volume on Decieive Battles of the Third World War+r to find many readers if he does.

42

I&tenant

Colonel Ijez Ahmed, Pukiefen .4NYW

ffE history of the world is largely the story of man fighting man in groups of ever-increasing size with weapons producing greater and greater ejeughter and destruction. As soon as a weapon came into the hands of troope, tactics and methods of employment were evolved, on the one hand, to enhance the effects of the weapon and, on the other, to minimize them. Thue, the science of warfare continues to be a constantly changing phenomenon. Currently. the question which disTiti
MIy photo w.rtew Anmv New. Fe.t.ne.

turbs zhilitury thinkers is the degree to which future war will involve the use of nuclear weapene. It has somatimee been theorized that future contlict would maen the meeaive esnployment of miesike, nuclear weapons, and electronic meane, thereby making it a pushbutton type. But the attahunent of success by these means alone seems impossible. Armies will still remain the sheet anchor. The ma~ se in the peat, will continue to be the eupreme force on the battlefield, He cannot he replaced by any mechanical devices. However, 43

1971

recent developments in the technology of warfart? and the frightening effects and the destrutilve nature of the latest weapons are likely to influence hIs behavior. These will create mental and physical etresees which will consequently place greater premium on the ingenuity of military leadership. Lieutenant Colonel Ijaz Ahnmd, Pakistm Army, ie a student i% the 1970-71 Regular Comwe at the US ArmII Command and Gerund Stafl CoUege. He received hie B.A. from Punjab University and was com?niae;oned in infantw from Pakistan MiZitaqI Academy. A graduate of the US Army Infantru School and Pakistan Command and Staff CoUege, %uetta, he haa served in command, star, and instructional assignments. u

A glance at evente of past wars revesde that the outcome of battles has largely been dependent upon the kind of triangular relationship that axisted between combat conditions, the eoldier, and leadership. And within this indivisible linkage, the most eignifieant factors in achieving success have been the elements of Ieaderehip and moral power. These qualitiee have been illustrated by great military kmders of the peet in various ways: Genius Napoleon Bonaparte inspired greet confidence in his own genius. He wae an outstanding organizer, had a true conception of war, and wee thue able to vieualize grand strategy correctly-bringing him immenee victories. But what Napoleon MllltaIY Review

THE SOLDIER found most valuable was a thorough study of human nature under war condltione-mens behavior, impact of stresses and strains on discipline, effects of fear, hunger, lack of confidence, oppressions of responsibility, and reaponee to the call of demanding loyalty, patriotism, and sacrifice. He was able to work on the minds and emotions of hle own men and of h]e enemies-both at long and cloee range with sKI1l that few generals have equaled. . Audacity. Audacity and bold self-confidence were exhihited by some of the great Moslem generals like Khalid ibnal-Walid at the Battle of Yarmnk where he fought against overwhehning odds; Tariq ibn%yad during the invaeion of Spain when he burned MS boats on landing ashore to drive home the point that there wae no retreat; Mohammed Bin Qseim leeding an army at the age of 18 during the conquest. of (Sind) India; Salah-al-Dine magnificent victory at the Battle of Hattin, infliethg final defeat on crusadere of Europe; Sultsn Mohammed II during the prolonged seige and final capture of the fortrees of Constantinople; and Sultan Tipus gallant fight at Myeore in India against the mighty strength of the British East India Company and dissident Indian rulers. Theee leaders were immune to the fe&s and appreheneiona that beset lesser men. In fact, they had fulty proved what B. H. Liddell Hart bed to eay much later in 1929, in Thoughts oa Wer, that the ieeue of battles is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders. AdditionaUy, they dieplayed through cheer dint of their Leadership how inferior strength but superior quality can rout much larger armies on the battlefield. Mq 1971
Phgaical Fitness. According to Napoleon, the first quality of a soldier is fotiltutle in enduring fatigue and hardship, bravery but the second. Poverty, hardehip, and misery, he considered, were the school of a good soldier. The soldiers, led by MiltiadeS during the Battle of Marathon, were very tough, for all Greeks had an almost religious reverence for athletics. The Spanish troops of Hannibal and the Turkish Janizaries, enlisted in boyhood, were well developed physically by planned exerciees. Discipline. Many great eeptains accorded epecial attention to the attainment of mental and physical robustness by their armies because these factors reflected directly upon the general state of discipline. At the Battle of Austerlitz, French soldiers stood steady in their ranks for hours while hostile cannonballs tere through ~ their ranks. This was a stern teat of disciplin+both imposed and pereonal. e Morals and Faith. The successes obtained by the Moslem armies beginning with the holy wars under the guidance of Prophet Mohammed, and later during their conquests, stertJng in early 600, were founded mainly upon higher etendards of morality, firm discipline, and, above all, on religions be7ief. Lotwltg and SWtit. Karl von Clausewita ranked the military profeeeion eupreme. It wee, according to him, an intellectually detemnined activity of men tbet could force decisions. Therefore, an army which is never overcome by fear and fights for every inch of the ground, which even in the chaos of defeat doea not loee ite discipline or the reaped for, and confidence in, ita leaders, an army which regards every effort as a mesne teward victory, which is reminded of

45

THE SO1.OIER all these duties and virtues by the shoft catechism of one single conception, the honor of its weapons-such an army ie imbued with the true soldierly spirit. In essence, the strategy of battle is complex to the extant that its primary tools are men and not machines. An army is an organized mob beund together by discipline and mutual confidence. Ite capacity to produce a deeision has varied throughout history according to the operational eapabilitiee at the time. These, in turn, de pended upon the armament, equipment, and tactics of the opposing sides. Another essential feature of traditional military strategy has been the capacity to grasp changes in the art of war more quickly than the enemy and ao be in a position to foresee the effect which new factors will have. The changes have sometimes facilitated, sometimes prevented, a aucceesful outcome. There have been developing phases in whieb war has either been short and decisive or long and exhausting, incapable of producing any worthwhile results. The key to military strategy, therefore, is to understand the process by which the Capacib of force to achieve a decision evolves. In our present era, the battlefield has become vastly more complex than in earlier times. Nuclear strategy has resulted in a major upheaval in the entire concept of the use of force. The nuclear wenpon, linked to modem means of delivery, is nog as it has sometimes been termed, merely a more

TilE SOLOIER powerful weapon. Its power alone puts it in a separate category. Whereas a nuclear bomb of 20 kilOtons produces an explosion equivalent to a salvo from about four million field guns, a one-megaton thermonuclear bomb is equivalent to a salvo from 200 million field guns-affecting an area in hundrede of square miles. The range of the delivery means, half the circumference of the earth, makea it poseible to attack any point of the earthe surface with a considerable degree of accuracy. The two characteristics of power and range have produced an entirely new phenomenon. Furthermore, this vast destructive power ie abnost totally mobile. Conventional armed forces would, therefore, appear to be out of dat+ at leaet at firet sight. Tbe Soldier The advancement in science and teehnoloti bas not only revolutionised the arsenal of weaponry, but has, equally, had an un~recedented impact on the soIdler. The eoldier is fading out who, in the pttet, exhibited immense pride in wearing the sword, considered being in uniform or carrying colors as a distingrrished poeition of nobility, guarded the frontiers jealouely, and never thought it too great to lay down hie life on the command of bie superior. The new generation is more comfort orfented, attuned to divergent beliefe, socially end politicaiiy, so that it will become increasingly diilicult to fill the armies with loyal diebard warriors that the forces had in the pest. Heretofore, the bulk of eoldiere of roost countries came from the rural areas where the youth wee accustomed te a hardy life and adjusted easily to miiitary service and dieeipline. Today, in contrast, the urban youth lives in a Mef freer, more permissive and sophisticated society. He is bound to be influenced by a number of factore: A fast-growing concept of individuaiiem, due to neing standards in edueation, which may lead to the challenging of authority. Progressive attitudes and varying ideological and political attiiiatiorre may mean the questioning of validity of ware and the naceeeity of maintaining unproductive organizations of armed forces. Greater zest for accumulation of wealth. o Lack of martial inspiration due to negative attitudea toward hard physical work. Greater requirements for recreational facilities than the army may afford. Dislike for routine-a reeietance to the subtle sense of discipline. Diminishing allegiance to religion and country. and Increasing psychoiogicrd emotional tensions. e Addiction to drugs and such other vices. There is, therefore, in man a cbal]enge no leas important than the future strategy of employment of nuclear weapons. Tire leader The third piliar of our military triangle, the leader, comes from almost the same kind of etmek already diecussed. He wiil have to emerge se a personality at 1* the equal, if not ahaed, of h]a predeceeeors pr0fC8eionally. He will be faced with two major problems: to motivate and lead his modern command, and succeeefully to outwit and destroy the enemy who may be better equipped. No leas important would be the increcmd strains of the many imponder47

1971

THE SOLDIER ables pertaining to operations and logistice under the immenee uncertainties of war. We cannot conclude from the foregoing that war ie approaching its end. In an ideological age, the fundamental is that, in conventional warfare, stabilization of the front on the pattern of past World Wars will be impossible. The stratagic eituation will, therefore, be fluid. It can also be said that limited wars, with conventional meane, will continue to ariee, with the danger that the superpowers will be drawn in and decide to unleash the nucker wsapone. In recent yesrs, a few aucb sharp engagements have already eet the pattern. The war between Pakistan and India in 1965 has been a link in the same chain. MoldlRyFactor But significantly, it is the quality and not the quantity of soldiers that will determine the outcome of wars whether limited or not. Further, maneuver is becoming of greater importance owing to the greet mobility conferred on modern forces by motorization and high-speed communications, making it possible to achieve rapid deeieions. Air-transported forces will provide great depth to land battles, and battles may take place mostly on an area basis rather than along an extended front of a theater of operation. Experience has also ehown that new inventions allow passing advantages only, until they become general and the entire matter reduces itself to mere manpower. The art of warfare, therefore, sails for 8 gr~br extent of knowledge and talent. Neither can we lose sight of the increased importance of unconventional warfa~ and infiltration as a form of maneuver. Since 1945, these ware have occurred without ceeeation in one country or another. Under esrtain circumstances, infantry can saaily eeeume the role of guerrilla fighters, thereby maintekting its dominant place on the battlefield.

Sketch & Man

lfaior

Jack J. Kinu

will continue to be the supreme force on the battlefield

causes of war are profoundly psychological and cannot be eliminated either by a negation or an increase of pbyeicid force. All it means is that one form of war hae become obsolete and another is in the proceee of replacing it. However, a plausible limitation on the means of future war might be the enormous cost of sophisticated weap ens. In this regard, it may be noted that it no longer appears possible for even medium-sized nations to equip themselves with tbe full range of hardware. One conclusion that can he drawn from the study of the evolution of war 48

mew Militefy

TIIE SOLOIES War will continue to involve greet physical exertion and suffering. Since survival lies with the fittest, phyeical fitness would continue to remain essential. similarly, the other military virtue of importance for an army is moral power, and where it is wanting, it will be found that reaulta are not commensurate with the efforta mada The leader and the led being part of one whole, the greater ie the necessity that when a commander leane on hIs troops, the surer he should be that his demands will be answered. Psychologically, the fear of the unknown is the enemy of man on the battledeld. Realizing that even wellplanned operations during nonnuclear conditions have seldom unfolded as visualized, the nerves of commanders are likely to be heavily taxed during unforeseen situations, particularly under nuclear exchanges. In euch confused battle conditions, indecisiveness, especially at higher levels of command, could bring iiisasterous reaulte. Equally important will be the effect on young officers and inexperienced eoldiers of battle feare, vast destruction, unexpected eetbacke, and psychological depression. This will mean low morale. The problem of commanding and controlling such pereons will be greeter than dealing with the enemy. Every new war continues to add new dimension to the fields of tactics and weapons. Therefore, rigidity, complacency, or inflexible a&Itudee toward the art of fighting are sure to

aat away at the very roots of battle elTiciency. Human behavior will lacgely determine the course of battle. Therefore, judicious selection of leaders, as well as men, cannot be overstmwsed. The human element that may be available may not meet tha desired bill due to changing environmental conditions, but one has to depend upon the material available. What may appear prudent ia to ineure that appropriate laws are enacted concerning the educational systems, physical and social etandards, and other etandards of recruitment. lt may also be neceseary to so mobilize public opinion that future young men are equipped with the qualities of audacity and boldness, motivated to brave dangere and imbued with the epirit of patilotism and loyalty, free of unacceptable political affiliation and dangerous social vices, and have genuine reepect for authority and discipline. Once proper selection of troops and officers is made, the next important step is the undertaking of realistic, effective, objective, and progressive training of all ranks, professionally, under acute warlike mental and physical stresses. The qualities of audacity and leadership can be fostered by collective adventure training ae an enlightened aspect of army planning. Man remains the key element in warfare. How he is developed, trained, and led will determine the euccees. or failure of our arme.

May 1971

49

The Role of the Military Attache

Raymond J. Barrett

HE time has come to revitalize the military attache system. To say this means no derogation of the fine officers that staff the system. It is simply that the original role of the military attache is now of limited significance. The military attache was primarily conceivad of as a channel for contact with foreign military forces. Postwar developments, however, have raduced greatly the usefulness of military attaches in this area through no fault of their own. There is an important naed for politico-military adviw in the Country Tcame at our Embassies abroad. This need, again through no fault of the officers, is not adequately met by the military attache eystern as now oriented. Reorganizing the military attache sysiam can provide this vital po]itico-military advice. 50

The military attache system dates back primarily to the pre-World War II era. At that time, the US information from oversees was limited and frequently deficient. The mood in the United States was overwhebnhrgly isolationist; the US Armed Forces were small, woefully ehort of equipment, and strapped for fu@e. Meanwhile, military macbinee in Germany, Italy, and Japan wera growing; new weapons were emerging in many araas;, tactics were being developed and testad; and actual warfare, often involving trials of theee new waepons and tactica, was occurring in China, Spain, and Ethiopia. In tbeae circumstrmees, posting US military ofiicera at salected Embassies abroad made good sense. The military devalopmentw taking place obviously had fearaome implications for the orMilihlyRe?im

MILklAitY ATTACSE .ganiaetion and equipping of US Armed Forces and for the very seeurity of the United States. Part and parcel of this effort wee the need for attaches to develop working eontaeta with foreign military men. Close relations improved the chancee of obtaining useful information not made public; they helped establish channels likely to be useful, if those foreign forces should one day be US allies. Esrty Wsr Yesrs Many attachee-eaveral who served in Tokyo being particularly noteworthy~id an outstanding job of delineating attitudes and cultivating contacts that were of prime importance to the United States in the tense daya of 1941 and in tbe early war yeara. The military attache system thus provided a prudent and usefnl means for the US military forces, despite the domestic constraints on their ownsituation, to maintain contact with important military development elsewhere. A vastly different situation bee evolved in the postwar era. US equipment, doctrine, and organization are & Ra~ond J. Bawett ie assigned to US Air Fwce Headquarters (Directorate of Plans) in the Pentagon under the Department of Defenee-Departmcnt of State ezchange program. A US Fweign S-e o~er, he hue eerved at Amwican Embassies in iUadri?l, Mexico Citm Managaa, Dublin, and Cairo. He also hae held aseigw mente with the 0f7ice of International Conferences and the O@e of Eaet and Southern African Affairs, and ha-s been Seoretmy of the Permanent Joint Beard on Defene+United States aqd Canada, in Washington, D. C. His article, Arms Ditcmma for the Develowng Wwld. appeared in the Am-l 1920tkaue of the MILITARY ItEvn%w. Msy 1971 in use around the world. US military forces are in intimate contact with foreign military forces in a great variety of waya. In one sense, there is literatly 1sss need for the military attachea traditional functions. Prior to World War II, moat foreign armed forces developed their own equipment, tactics, and forroe of organisation. There wee, aa noted, a vitnl need for the US military forces to keep abreast of these developments. Now, military forces around the world are extensively outtitted with US equipment and organised along US lines in many respects. To the degree that other countries use US equipment, taetica, and organiaetion, the need for reporting from military attaches on such mattera is correspondingly reduced.

Importsnt links
Even more eignitieantly, the breadth and depth of contacts between US and foreign military personnel in ths postwar era substantially exceed those available to attaches. By their very nature, these contacte are generally much more intimate than those that can be developed or maintained by military attacbee. The Military Assistance Program providea an ongoing and pervasive link between the US military forces and those of other nations. The per-. sonnel of US Military AaeM.ante Advisory Gmupe (MAAGa) and military mieaiona work together with foreign military forcm on a continuing basia. Tbeee Americans are in daily contact with foreign mi7itary personnel; they work right with them on equipment and organization. US advisors generally e~oy close rapport with hundreds of foreign military personnel in a two-way working reletionehlp that a mititary attache cannot hope to dupli51

MILITARY ATTACIIE brought US and foreign military personnel in continuing contact. US personnel serve together with their foreign colleagues on alliance staffs, committees, reeearch projeeta, and in similar working r.?lationeldps. US units take part in exercises along with those from alliance membere or other friendly natione. Again, an important byproduct of these situations is a pattern of close and informative contacta between US and foreign military personnel that military attaches are unlikely to be able to duplicate. Overseas Bases Another postwar development that haa producsd a similar situation is the netmork of US oversaae bases and facilities. Oparating these bases involves continuing relations with the armad forces and other otlicials of the hoet countries. As a normal concomitant of their operation, Amarieane at these bases come to know a grsat deal about the methods, organisations, equipment, and facilities of the armed forces of the host countriaa. Even as a simple mathematical matter, the overseas deployment of ao many US personnel multiplies tremendously the number and variety of contaete betwernr US and foreign military personnel. The number of foreign military Peraonnel attending US military schools or other training facilities has increaead tremendously in the postwar period. Thie change, of course, is related to military aesietance, basea, and alliance commitments. But it is also a powerful influence by itself. Not only are foreign pereonnel trained in US military methods, but they are also exposed directly to US atWodea and ways of life. The instructors learn a great deal about the foreign studenta and the Military Review I

Amy

Dig..t

American advisors enjoy close rapport in a working relntionsh]p that an attache esrmot drrplisate cate. Over time, thousands of foreign military men get to know US military men and US military ideas and methods. In other words, examined pragmatically, the US advisory groups and misaiona provide an extensive pattern of contacts with the hoet armed forces. Thera ia nothing ainiater implied by this observation. The role of MAAGs and misaione is, and should be, training. The point is that the normal operations of these groupe have the effeet of fulfilling the sontact roles for which the military attache syatam was once the single, limitad chennel. In similar fashion, US participation in a postwar network of alliances hae es

standards and methods of the armed forcee from which their students come. Fairly frequently, continuing relationships are established betmeen US and foreign mititary personnel. In cum, a corollary of training of foreign military personnel is another pervasive pattern of contacts between US personnel and their foreign military counterparts. Many subjects of interest to military attaches-scientific and technological developments, highways, health facilities, communications, sanitation, and public works, among others-are often dealt with adequately in published sources. There is also an open interchange of scientific, tecbnkd, and economic information in the world that dwarfs that which obtained a few decades ago. Activities Limited In addition to these various pestwar developments that handle more effec: tively the intended functione of the military attache, .there ie usually anothbr irnwrtant lin&stion on the attachee activities. There is, in greeter or lesser degree, a certain suepicion of the attache. In many cases, the attache 5nds himself kept somewhat at arms length, sometimes requirad to work through a Iiaieon officer, and screened from much day-today contact with the host countrys. military personnel. He is viewed with complete suepicion in some countries where he may be denied permission to travel outside the capital city and ie restricted to little more than formal contact with the heel armed fonxe. The net result of these various development is a eituation in which there is a marginal return from the manpower invested in the military a* taehe system. TO reiteratq this obearvation implies no derogation of Msy1971

thoee now eerving in the system. Other developmeate have provided and in far greeter and more effect~ measures-the contact with fore]gn military forces that the military attache syetem wae intended to provide. Peliic&MiStssy Esperts The pressing need now is for firstrate, politico-military experts trained directly for this purpose. In meet countries of todays world, the military forces play a key role. The military run or dominate the government in many countries. In many more, the armed .forc@ have a direct or potential influence on the government. Violence and the threat of violence are constants in tbie troubled world. A primary US purpose is to help foster progress with a minimum of instabSity and violence likely to eecalate into threats to world peace. Clearly, this requires expert misitery advice, as well se talents in political and economic fields. A key element in the reporting, analyses, and recommendations from US Embassies should be politico-mititary rxpertke. But US Embassy staffe do not now include military otlicers specifically trained and knowledgeable in thk ares. It is no derogation of their, abilities to eay that military attaches eeldom can provide these skSSe. The military attache is not primarily trained and oriented in tbie direction. Politicomilitary expertise, of couree, includes a large measure of the mititary ability that any experienced misitary oltiker hse. However, politico-military perceptiveness ie much broader than this abSity; it is not aometbing that can be acquired in a spur-of-the-moment way. It requirea training and beekground, a eoneeiousty developed eensitivit.y to the interaction of political, economic, and social considerations S3

MILITARY ATIACtlE with the more directly military factors. Nor is the type of politico-military advice that is needed provided by understsndably, loath to imperil their relations with the host military forces on which depend the successful operatione of the bases. Even Joint US

The breadth and depth of sontacta between US end forefgn ndfitarg personnel exceed those available to attachen MAAG personnel are experts in training. In addition, they are understandably reluctant to compromise their training role by engaging, or even appearing to engage, in other activity at which the host military forms might look aekmme. US forces stationed at oversees bases are primarily involved in operations. Furthermore, they are, again 54 likefy to retlectthe concerns of the US fomra training or operating in the country rather than to * a source of over-sfl pofitico-military advice.

Reorientation of the military attache system thus seems to be the answer. The military attache should be
a trained, politico-military otlkem; his prineipel aeaignment should be to provide the Ambeeeedor with advice in

Nultelyuerfew

MILITARY ATTACIIE that field. The attache system probably should be run through the OtEce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs with appropriate administrative support provided by the military services. In some ees~, be+uee of the loeztion or the dominant role of one military service in a given country, it may be appropriate for the attache to come from a particular US military service. Bnt by and large, the branch of service would not be se important as aeeigning an oSicer with politico-military training, language ability, and demonstrated talante in those fields. The proposed reorganization would also make it poesible to reduce appreciably the size of the military afi tache eystem. At most poate, only a single defense attache, or an attache and an aesistant, would be needed. Idahlly, the attache would be colocated with the Embeaeye political section eo that both might work closely together. Tbia arrangement would also eliminate the present need for separate secure areas and administrative support and pereonnel for the attaches themaelvae. Only in a limited number of countriee would there be need for a staff of several assistant attaches and a possible requirement for continuing separate areas and administrative support. In short, the military attache system can play a positive role in meeting the perveeive politico-military problems that tha United Ststea faces around the world. To this end, it should be reorganized and revitalized.

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Mey 1071

The Army Evicts the Bonus Marchers

Lieutenant CAmel John W. Price, Lfm-tedStotes ArmIJIteaerve

N CIVIL disturbances, when the Regular Army is eslkd upon by civilian authorities @ put down s riot, the Army is placed in an uncomfortable position. By what methods can it restore law and order without being unduly repressive, and how een it save

itself from bscoming the target for much of the bitterness originally dirscted toward the civil authority? An instructive example of this military problem occurred in Washhgt.on, D. C., in 1932, when the Army was eelled out by PreeideM Herbert C.

Hoover to quell the riot of the Bonus end of May, and, by mid-June, their Marchers. Journalist and historians numbers had swelled to approxihave noted certain exeeesee in milimately 15,000. tary action on that occasion and have Being poor, they encamped on US consistently laid the blame for these Government property acroee the river on Hoover, but new evidenee pute a in Anacostia (see map) and along large part of the blame on the Chief Pennsylvania Avenue in vac+nt buildof Staff, General Doughs MecArthur. ings owned by the Federa~ GovemAt the bottom of the Great Depresmen~ but echeduled for rasing. In sion, Representative Wright Patman both areaa, they built shacks from of Texae, lifelong advocate of an easy scrap lumber and heavy cardboard. These actions naturally made them money policy, introduced a bill in Congreee to pay a caeh bonus to vetunpopular with both local and Federal erans. Exercising their constitutional authorities. The Public Health officer right of peacaful assembly, thousands of the District of Columbia observed of veterans from all parts of the coun- . that conditions were ideal for an outbreak of typhoid fever and called the try converged on Washington to act veterans encampments the worst as a pressure group for passage of health menace in the history of the thie bill. They began arriving at tbe city. 1 Bonus 8ill Defested On 15 June, the House of Representative peesed the bonus bill by a vote of 209 to 176, knowing full well that the economy-minded Senate would probably reject it and that the budget-balancing President would certainly veto it. Two days later, with 10,000 veterans massed on Capitol Hill awaiting the result, the Senate defeated the bill hy an overwhelming vote of 62 to 18. Nevertheless, the Bonus Marchersnow under the leadership of Walter W. Waters, an exsergean~ecided to remain in Washington to press for reconsideration of the bill. By mid-July, their pressure ggoup tactics had increased to the extent of marching around tbe Capitol Grounds for five days. At one point, Vice President Charles Curtis, presiding officer of the Senate, called out tbe Marines, but sent them back a few minutes later when the Superintendent of Police gave assurances that his % Tha
New York Timed,

10 June 1982,D 1. 57

30N!JS MiMWHERS

men could protect the Capitol Building. Finally, near midnight of 16 July, Congress wound up its business and adjourned until December, leaving a crowd of 6,000 Bonus Marchers standing outside in the dark. Shortly after this event, thousands of veterans took advantage of interest-free loans for transportation and returned home, hut as many as 10,000 Lieutenant Colonel John W. Price, US Army Renerve, ie A8sociate Professor of Humanities at the University of Florida. He recaved his A.R. from Yalv Univereitg; hti MA. from the Univereitg of Florida; and hia Ph. D. from the Univereitv of Michigan. He is a mobiltmtkm designee to the Oee of the Chief of Militaru Historu, Dwuwtment of the Army, as weU ae a member of the tMneuL?ing Facaltg of the US Army Commuwd and General Stiff Coltege. s

remained in Washimzton to continue their pressure group-tactics much to the annoyance of local oflicials, the administration, and the Chamber of Commerce. During the third week in July, a group of 200 redkelz, who had been ostracized by the main organization of the Bonus Marchere, attempted two marchee on the Wldte Houee, but both times the police blocked their path and arrested their leaders. At thie time, the Treasury Deparh ment decided to demolish certAn structures downtown in order to make room for a new building, but ineurance companies threatened to cancel the insurance if demolition operations bagan while Bonus Merehers were still encamped on the property. After conferences, of which no record has been preserved, a decision wee made to evict the Bonus Marchers-not Mllitery Review

BONUS MASCNESS merely from these buildings (about 12 square blocks), but from all other Government property, as one can see in tlds rarely cited document from the National Archives: The Cemmineionera [of the Dktrict of Columbia] directed the Seoretarg of the Board to ieeue the foUowing inetrwctwne to the Major and Superintendent of Police: The proper Federal authmtiee kaving notified the Board of Commi8ebmere that the~ desire the early evacuation of the buildings and adjacent gretmde now occupied bu the Bonus Marchers, gou are herebg directeg to eecnre the emzouatkm thereof bg midnight, Ju@ 2Mh, and in the caue of the Government owned buildings located within the areu Penne@ vanin Avenue, Miseoum Avenue, Third Street and Sixth Street N. W., bg m&inight, JUZZI ,Wzd. The retnrn of the tentage and Tolling kitchens belonging to the National Guard, and temporhrilv loaned to the bonus marehere, will be accomplished by noon, Auguet lat. The evacuation of aU park areas including Anacoetia Park, Camp IKeige and Camp Simme, bg the bomw marcher8 wiU be completed by noon, August hth. You will inetruct all precinct concmandera to 88e that Wvate buiklinge are not occupted by bomw marchere without prevknw consent by the owner8, and then o?@ after thafl are . pronounced to be in eanitarv conaition and structurally cafe and f Tee of fire ?mzarde by the Board prevwusly appointed. You @ ese that the mfmb$w8 of the B.E.F. [Boncw Expsditionaw Forcej are notified of the above in orokm that theg may not re8t und+w the be7ief that theg will be permitted May 1971 to remain in their present umanita~ locations throughout the Summer. Whtis great latitude has heretofore been aUowed with reference to the enforcement of the regulations and ordinances of ths District of Co2timbia, not onlg police but GUothers, due to the umwnal circwnatancee of the awes, after the times @ed above for the evacuation of the varieue locatwne, you wiU make no ezceptiena in thmr enforcement in the ceee of bonue marchers. * EvIstimt Notices However, after the veterans had been notified, but before other stepe had been taken, Government lawyers discovered that the District of Columbia Commissioner had no authority over Federal property. Another eeriee of conferences led tn a eecond decieion: Treasury oficirds themeelvee would serve the eviction notices; Dietrict police would be on the epot to protect Treasury officials; and if really serioue disturbances eneued, the ArmY would been cd to back up the police. Tbia decision was ratified in a Widte House conference attended by Secretary of the Treasury Ogden D. Mine, Attorney General William D. Mitchell, Se+xetsry of War Patrick J. Hurley, and Chief of Staff Douglee MacArthur. On Thureday, 2S July, Treaeury officiale begen serving eviction notices. Angry Bonus Marchere gathered by the hundreds. In early afternoon, eeveral Bonus Msrchere assaulted a Policeman who lost Me head and Sred at them, killing one veteran and wounding a passer-by. The Superintendent of Police Pelham D. Gleeeford (an ex-brigtder general), happened to be in the same building. By shouting
Jdr

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19=, RGS61. 59

BONUS MARCNERS orders, he restored police discipline and kept tire veterans from retaliating; But emotions had been pushed to fever peak, rumors flew, and soon a crowd of thousands in an ugly mood ters company from the Military District of Washington at 1513; 2d Squadron, 3d Cavalry, with an attached tank platoon at 1550; and the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, at 1616; thus forming the 16th Brigade, comprised of 31 officers and 520 enlisted men. Upon arrival, they were iesued tear gas grenades. 4 Troops Move in Meanwhile, the Commissioners had sent a letter to the President confirming their request for troops; and Secretary of War Hurley had given to General MacArthur a handwritten order (time: 1552, obviously altered in the original to 1455) which read in part: Surround the affected area and clear it without delay. . . . Use all humanity consistent with the due execution of this order. h The last sentence sounded more like the Quaker Hoover than the flamboyant Hurley; the first sentence refleded the Seeretarys ignorance of proper methods of riot control. Having consulted General MacArthur, General Miles ordered the troops to approach from one direction (down Pennsylvania Avenue) and drive the Bonus Marchers southward away from the Wldta House and other Government buildings. The movement began at 1630, and, within a half-hour, the cavalry and tanks had cleared Pennsylvania Avenue as far as Capitol Hill with an overpowering show of force. So far, so good: But, then, the situation deteriorated. when Bonus Marchers refused to evacuate certain buildings south of Pennsylvania Avenue, the troops threw tear gas grenades. This infu

Staff, ordered troops from Fort Myer to assemble at the EfliPee (south of tbe White House) had gathered on Pennsylvania Avenue, less than a mile from the White House itself. When the District of Columbia Commissioners leerned of the shooh ing, they sent their secretary to the White House to ask for Army supPort. 8 The result was that General MacArthur, at 1340, ordered troops from Fort Myer to assemble at the Ellipse (south of the White House). As a precautionary measure, Brigadier General Perry L. Miles-in charge of these troops-had already established a headquarters in the Munitions Building nearby. The troope arrived es follows: a headquar-

Natloml Amhivea, -asr.D?t 0s O#iz AaWirm: M~ 4 Avmst 1s88. SNstionst khiws, R@ A4Mant General% *National Archks, Damrtment of Justice OentnlFilm,B14 94,NwA4fut8nt Gsnenl% Files, US AttomerGemerals B.wort,10SeDtember OSica Osree $!40, k 1180. 1988.
Wuhinabm,

30

Milltafy RWbW

BONUS MARCHERS riated the veterans, according to the battalion commandere afterection report, with the result that other troops moving eouthward from the main axis began receiving barrages of brickbata. Nevertheless, the troops bekived in exemplary fashion. They cleared the entire governmental ares downtown in about two hours, then halted for supper in an assembly ares south of the Capitol. Had they halted for good, there would have been no justifiable criticism of the Army. Fires Touched Off A minor event worthy of note was that a fire got started in one group of shacks, apparently from a defective tear gas grenade, whereupon several soldlers, seeing the smoke and presuming that orders had been given, put the torch to other ehacks. Then, a second lieutenant bad to set a backfire to cave a filling station. The fires themselves did no significant physical damage, but unwittingly a precedent had been eet. Afterward, the Army hurt iteelf publicity-wise by denying that ite soldiers had touched off any fires-until the Washington Herald printed a photograph showing an identifiable soldier igniting a downtown shack. An Army investigation subsequently established the above facte. WMle the troops were having supper, the Superintendent of Polihe consulted General MacArthur who wae then in an automobile at 4% Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. Glassford aeked the general whether the troops were going to cooperate further. General MacArthur told the euperinteadent to get word to the Camp Marks people at Anacoetia that the troops were coming. Two police Iieutenante received thb3 information at 1900 and relayed it ehortly thereMsy 1S71 after to the Bonus Marchers in the Camp across the river. 13This was the crucial decision of the day; MticArthur made it himself in the light of background knowledge of what Federal and District civilian leaders really desired. At 2015, some small units began moving toward the only bridge to Anacostk% and, at 2100, General Miles ordered all troops to proceed to Anacostia Flate and evacuate the Bonue Marchers from that property. The wvalry was assigned the mission of protecting the flank of the infantry attack and of securing the tentage belonging to the Dietrict of Columbia National Guard. Evacuation Oeadlins The commander of the encampment claimed that the police did not notify him until 2030, and when he saw the troops arriving at 2200, he personally aeked General MacArthur to allow one more hour so that the Bonus Marchere could tinish gathering up their belongings. 7 This requeet was granted. Soldiers moved across the bridge, lined up along the river bati and set fire to some ieolated shacks to illuminate the area of operations. Just before General MaeArthur left for the White House, one reporter asked him where these families were euppoeed to go in the middle of the night, and the reply allegedly was, I dont care where they go! Get them the hell out of here!8 Shortly before the 2S15 daadhne for evacuation, the Bonus Marchers began

. N8timsl Amhivm, Damriment cd Jdfm Fib Memomndmm of T*onr vrmmtedto jmy Dhtr&tof C4vmb& 4Amaud Oieannd 19ds to he&nte the am= Mmrdmm BiOt Tatimow cd BrLmdh OmarslPaw L. MU= and hb aide Lkutaunt ehernun, and Police ueate.mamti &Sme and KeUr. ~i<&w~ E.A., 19=9ny~ ~Bk
and the Siese of o P. C. Sprhmr, Ohmf.rd Wuhirlrtcm, Ilarua% Novemker 198s,P a

61

burning their own camp. In many journalistic accounts, the ArmY got the blame for this. Viewed from our day, however, the evidence seems to exonerate the Army. There are five items in thk+ body of evidence: journalistic reports must have confused the isolated fire eet by the Army with the general fire that burned the main part of the camp. A journalist h]ghly critical of the Army mentioned in hie dispatch that the soldiers left the river bank and marched across the fiery plain. u The Army was under orders to recover the tents, and no tear gee grenades were thrown except in cressing the bridge. In the National Archives, there is a photograph of soldiers folding a tent while tires rage in the background. . The camp commander stated in the B.E.F. N(3W8that troops had fired isolated shacks, but that he did not know who started the numerous fires in the camp. He, of all people, would be the least likely te try to cover up for the Army. Siding Facts Nevertheless, because soldiers had, indeed, set fires downtown and the Army had at first denied it, suspicions lingered that the Army was hiding bbuneworthy facta. The task of the Army in clearing its name was made more difficult by Secretary of War Hurleys statement that the fires at Anacostia had been started before the troops crossed the bridge. While the soldiers were driving the Bonus Marehere out of the DbMct of Columbia and into Maryland, General MacArthur wee holding a press conference in the War Department at DP. Y. Andmc.n,TkeNation,Aaem.t1s32. 82

2300 in which he announced that he had put down men with revolution in their eyes, 10 The defense of the Establishment continued with a statement by President Hoever to the effect that those Bonue Marchers who had remained after the Senate vote were largely Communists and men with criminat records. (Later, the Attorney General published statistics purpm%ng to show that 22.6 percent had police records, but a closer look by opponenta revealed that only 6.L? pereent had ever been convicted of an offense.) Other administration supporters unde.rwored the danger from the Communist element which had been encamped near the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. At the conclusion of his press statemeng Heever said this: There is no group, no matter what its origins, that can be altowed either to violate the laws of this city or to intimidate the Government. 11 Scholars %O@5t Despite this defense, there was an imme&ate proteet signed by 12 eeholars, including two from the Brookings Institution. They claimed that the administration bed done this in order to develop a political slogan for tbe eleetion in November: Keover versus Radicalism. Senator Kenneth D. McKellar of Tennessee introduced a resolution calling for an investigating committee that would seek the answers to 22 questions, for example: what were the lawful rights of the veterans? Who wee responsible for the riot ? Wee it really necessary to call out the Army? Who burned the shacks? Who ordered the cbeaing out of the femiliea in the middle of the night? No ,. ~ NW =* ~{>s9 Jab 19s% P 8. = E. C. Hoover, Sta& mew. Ed&d by WiL U8ma r&am Vohmen, Pp 24.4s. MilitslyRwisw

BONUS MARCHERS action was taken on thii resolution; instead, a grand jury investigated the entire affair, beginning on 4 August and collecting 200 pages of testimony. The names of Seeretariee MWa and Hurley were quietly withdrawn from tbe iist of Republican campaign sW-ekers, and sines the mesbenica of devision making in this episode were not made public at that timq nearly all the blame feii upon President Hoover. The opposition press iabeled him Geeem out Hmver, and the B.E.F. NSW8 printed a eartmn showing a mustachioed Hoover as the Kaiser, with the Capitol dome tipped with the Statue of Liberty es his Prussian helmet. The final question is, wbo did make the desieion to push the Bonus Marchera out of Anesostia? There are at least eight bita of evidence that can be piesed together to get a lirm anewer: In ide Memmrs, Hoover says that he did not wieh the men to be driven from their campe, and that it was the miiitary men who did it. 12 Hoovere private secretary, T. G. Joeiin, euggeeta in bie book 18 that General MaeArthur axeeaded bis written orders, and adds that Hoover was not a %mkpeeser. However, these two sources would naturally be interested in preming Hoovers image; thereforq it would be uneeholarly to accept them at face value. Joelin admits that he was on the phone all day long, relaying information to the President-but what information and from whom?
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 Secretary of War Hurleye biographer 14 says that Hoovere ordere to Hurley were verbal+ that Hurley rejected come ae impractk?eble, and that MacArthur was the one who made the decieion on Anacostia. o MacArthur, eaated in an automobile, thus out of communication with higher authorities, had sent word at suppertime that his troops were coming. Yet this might have been a bluff, and four hours elapsed between the word and the deed-time enongh to ask for and receive precise instructions from the White House or from the District of Columbia Commissioners. . During the grand jury investigation, the following question was put to the head of the District of Columbia Commissioners: Was it necessary to call the troops to evacuate them ,4 DC,II bh~, Pafrkk J. Hrley, Henw
Recnerr Co., Oh&am. IS., 1966. m 102-18.

from the camp over at Anacostia and to escort them beyond the District line? Hie reply was: I could not answer that. 15 . Recorde of the message center in the Munitions Build]ng, General Miles temporary headquarters at the outaeh show that at 2155 the commending oSicer of Boiling Field (two miles south of Anacostia Flats) tele. phoned to find out whether Anecostia Fiata wee to be evacuated and whether his troops would be needsd. The an. swer was that the plane were un. known. o The grand jury asked General Miles why the Army did not stop after its sction downtown. Inetead of simply saying thst the Army was obeying orders from higher authority, Miles stated that it was a mititsry axiom that the job should be completed

,. Eeichelderfer% Tatimony, Dewmtment of Justice Files, F-G 60, Box S297.

Miliiry Reslew

64

BONUS MASCNERS quickly, that time for reorganisation might mean renewed reaistanee, that the Army wanted to finish the tidng that night, and that since the ArmY had threatened to come, it bed to follow through. The moat convincing bit of evidence comes from MaeArtbura Rcminiecencee 18 in which he eaya: At Atmeo.st&z Flat I received word from the Secretmy of War, aa we were in the midet of eroeeing the river, to ewspend the operation at my discretion. I halted the command oa coon u we hod clenred the bridge, but at thnt moment the motera eet fire to their own camp. This concluded the proceeding for the night. The laat two eentencee reveal a faulty memory, if not an alibi. From what we now know about MacArthura strong-willed behavior ia Korea, it would seem that Hoovers or Hurleys instructions might have been firmer on behalf of suepending the operation. But in any ease, the fiat eentence definitely pine down the responsibility. In drawing up the balance sheet for the entire affair, on the plus aide we find: the Army was not caught un,0 &.eml .K tie ADmcb Ih.Arklvj,, Rmi%iamces, McGraw.Hill BookCo.,Inc.,N. Y.,
19s4, D w.

prepared; it wcs careful to have written ordera before it went into tilon; the ahow of force was succeaeful in clearing downtown atrcete without a single fatality; and troop discipline was good despite eeeualty-caueing brickbata from the Bonus Marchers. On the minue eide, we find: the tear gas grenadee were defective, with unfortunate aide effeeta; the use of tear gas against veterans brought forth counterviolence and a public outcry; the Army)a public information statement were often erroneous, creating a credibility gap; and the appearance of the Chief of Staff on the streeta in a uniform bedecked with seven rows of ribbons, pareonally directing one emall brigade against unarmed rioters, gave cause for quiet snickere. In summary, the move into Aneeostia wee clearly a prditiwd error. Fortunately, for the ArmY, an increasingly unpopular political leader wcs there to serve as prime target in an election year; and, indeed, hla handling of the detaile of the military operation appears to have been @x. Under other circumstances, however, the Army itself would have borne a much larger share of the general opprobrium for this nighttime deed.

May 1971

65

Jeeob A. %o&@eh

T IS not clear whether most current military operational and systems analysiswhich underlies much of the decision making affecting wezpons development and acquisitionhas more in common with the method of speculative philosophy or that of modern science. The r~son this assertion can be made lies in the poor etate of empirical data that aillicts the conduct of military research and analysis. Even more fundamental, little effort is made to eubject to independent tests thoee hypotheses that follow from theories or models of combat employed to analyze weapon concepts. Although the use of mathematical

techniques and the abundance of numbers that come out of computer models lend a patina of science to many contemporary military operational research and systems anelyeis etudiea, little concerted or imaginative effort is expended to conduct experiments to provide independent tests of whether the assertions that flow from the studies are right or wrong. This pert of the scientific process is whet experimentation is ahout. Operational research during World War H wee experimental and empirical insofar as operational data were related, by models, to gain new insights on how to conduct operations, NilitargReview

,-.
OPERATIONAL TESTING and how to guide the wartime weepons development process. Actual operations provided the laboratory, Moreover, with the pioneering endeavor that led to the development and deployment of radar as an operational system for aii defense, field experiment were employed by the British just prior to the outbreak of World War II. This same field-testing acthity may also lay claim to having been the invention of operational research. But today one may pose the queetion: Where is the operations r~ seereh in miSitary operations research ? Penel Recommcndetion A setting may now be at hand, however, to change the current situation in a salutary way. One of the strong reeonunendatioiw in the Blue Ribbon Defense Panels Wport was to urge more operational testing; and, epecificelly, to establish an Office of the Secretary of Defense apparatus to oversee such. testing. 1 The spirit of this 1Re2Lwt to the President ad UIa Smtam of of Def6iw6, ue oOv06fmlaa ox Un Demo-t amn.nt Printbc OMce, WMhinrtoII, D. C., 1 Jler 1970,DPse-91. Jacob A. Stockfich b with the Institute for Deftmee Analyees, Arlington, Virginia, where he ie Senior Research Associate and Member of the Resean?h CounoiL He received his A.B. from Pomona College, Claremoat, CaL ifornta, and hokfe a Ph. D. in Economies from the Umvereity of California. He acrved with the US ArraII Air Force during World War II; waa an Aeeociate Prof eeeer at the i3nivereity of CaJifornia; wee with the Ome of the Aeeiatant Secretara of Deferwe (Comptroller), Washington; waa ae8;9nSd to the US ArmII Combat Develepmente Command Expw+mentatien Center, Fort Oral, CaUfornia; and eerved with the Armge O@e of the Chief of Stiff in Washington flsey1s71 recommendation also eecme to have been accepted by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. IArd insofar as he has been quoted in the press as endoreing a fly before you buy phSoeophy as an alternative to the prevailing weapons acquisition process cbsreeteriaed by a high degree of concurrency in development end procurement. Some critice may contend, however, that one cannot tly until the development program ia completed, at which time large costs wiSS already have been incurred. ASthough this observation cent.ehw an element of troth, it miseea the mark relative to the major source of problems that presently plague the weapons development and ~uisition process, and the poseible contributions that operational testing can make toward reducing these problems. Pefformsnse Speoifisstions Very little operational testing is done by the Military Establishment. What is done is often poorly conceived or structured, poorly managed, and subjest to bureaucratic and political preasuree that degrade the objectivity of the testing or causes the testing to avoid addressing critical questions. Becauee of tbie eituation, there is inadequate operational deta for analytical and staff efforts that produce tbe etatementa of raiSitery requirements or performance specifications for new syeteme that become the object of engineering development proPS. The stage of writing the Psrfonoance specifications for new systems is crucial to the weapons development and acquisition process. Although the tly before you buy philosophy bee merit in its own right, it and its apparent pros and eons can gloss over many of the essential quslitiea of opS7

OPERATIONAL TESTINS

erational testing. The purpose of this article is to develop more clearly what operational testing entails, including the organizational and other conditions which must exist to get it done well. The concept of operational testing requires a definition of the actimty. Definitions can vary and, in part, depend upon ones viewe regarding methods of conducting inquiry. One way to approach the definitional problem, however, ie to indieete those areas; or questions, which are poorly treated in the contemporary reaeerch, development, testing, and evacuation proeeae. They are: Te&ing Operatkw@ Mode&. Much decision making, which affecte weapons aequiaition, now drawe beeviIy 60

upon theoretical models and associated computer simulations of combat or pafllcular pbeeee of combat operations. The use of theoriee or models is an integral phase of the scientific method. It is also cbaracteriatic of the scientific method that theories or models be independently tested. This requirement is moat demendlng, but meeting it is the hallmark of the scientific method. In the process, one conceives a theory and a model for that theory. Certain hypotheaee follow from the theory in the form of quen. titetive statements which are susceptible to measurement. Next, an experiment is conducted to verify or refute the tbeoretieel tindinga. The experiment must be done and reported in such a way that others MilitayRwhw

OPERATIONALTESTING may be able to repeat the experiment. In the physical sciences, a laboratory teat or ayatarnatic obsemationa of natural phenomena constitute the tcst.ing. In the eocial sciences, statistical methods applied to demographic, aconomic, and other social date are employed. However, these etendards are not consistently carried over into the work that members of the analfileel and scientific community do for the Defense Department. Because of this lack of testing to verify or refute analytkxd modele of combat or elements of military operations, the major contribution to the military dacision-making process by the intellectual and scientific communities is the product of theories or models and associated computer emulations. These translate t@mical performance charac@ristica into assertion aboyt system effectiveness. Political Proceaaes But since modele must nccaaearily abetract from reality, the abstraction are made through processes which are highly political and are motivated by advocacy or counteradvocecy. For these reaaona, it is not true that computer took over the decision-making procesy as some critics of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have asserted or seem to suspect. Judgment, indeed, was still a large part of the evaluation process. However, it was not revealed as the explicit preference of the senior decision makere or etaff elements. Rather, the judgment and subjective factors were, and etill are, injected by way of aseumptione made for many of the variables for which there ie no objective data, and the way that the thaoreticrd modele are structured. Since many of the computer simulations are etructurad to accommodate May 1971 primarily engineering or physical performance data, the technically superior and more costly eystam will generally appear to be the more effactive system. Hence, there ie no ngoroue check on the claims of tachnologieta or on the political efforts of military advocates who seek to get funds for new systeme. Tlraeretiaal Models To teat theoretical models, treating large-scale combat operations by empirical methods ia difficult, if not impossible. Recognition of the difficulty sugge&a that it might be advisable to scale down the scope of the model building itself. Model building for large, complex military forcee ie also questionable on methodological grounds. Such forces are composed of highly interdependent subsystems and are highly organized. A mathematical characteristic of highly interdependent systems is that there ie a priort> no distinction between independent and dependent variables. Yet dccieion making implies that there are independent variables wh]ch, when manipulated, will produce desired effects on dependant variables. The analytkal task becomes one of identifying self-contahad subsets of relationships which can be treated independently of the larger interdependent system. If, in fact, there is come degree of sparseness in the interdependence of elements composing the larger sy~tcm, it ie possible to identify meaningful cause and effect. relationships. For example, the ellectivencee of armor in actual combat is critically dependent upon infantry if only to protect onee tanks from enemy infantry. The effactivenaae of infantry, in turn, depends on the quality of its eroell arms. Thus, the effectiveness of

aa

OPEIWiONAl

TESllN& perimentation is aiao similar to experimentation designed to measure critical variabiee. Obtaiiaing Better Dafa on Critical Opsr&onaJ Z%eto?e. In the sneiysia of whet the performance cberacterietice of new systems shouid be, it often hecomea apparent that great uncertainty exists about critical operational variablea. There is aieo controversy about which variabke are criticaI. These are interrelated issues. %ensithity imaiysis A contribution that model building and simulations of combat can make to deeision making is that they provide a sensitivity aneiysie. For example, if it ie known that etratagic targete cannot be actually Iocated and tied wittdn an average of two miles because of impreciee date on target coordinates, the incremental elTeetiveneae of missike with a circuier error probable of 1sss t$an two miles declines sharply. More prmise target location ehould proceed, at least simultaneously, with trying to develop more accurate mieeiiee. Such an example may strike one as obvious comraonsene=nd it ie. However, there are numerous and more subtle interactions, many of which may be unknown, that are not systematically developed, iet alone measured. But after many combat models are designed, the anaiytkal use to which they are put reveaie that outcomes are highly sensitive to factors about which empirical evidence is iseking or unknown within a wide range. To reduce uncertahty with regard to such critical determinants of operational elktiveneee requiree a purposeful experimental end meeeurement process. For example, it is costiy to endow a new tank with a lower silhouette-by Nillte!y

tanks may ASO depend on the etfectivenese of small arms. However, it does not follow that it is necessary to develop a nmdel end to canduct an experiment which simultaneously treats small arms and tanks. Tanks and small arms can be evaluatcd seperiw%y. Moreover, unambiguous and economical field testing designed to test models will likely require that they be separately treated. Cambinedkn$ Operations Thie point, of course, is recognised in much current model buildzng which does separate out major syete-mm for analythl scrutiny-for example, tank versus tank or antitank. However, the two-sided quaiity of simuiatione and the focus on such measures as estimated kill ratios couch the model in terme of a combined-arms operation. Other important contributing combinsd-arms elements are either ignored or aggregated. The effectiveness criteria as expreeaed in terms of kiil ratios cannot tbemeelvoe be dwectiy verified or measured by independent tests or eaperimenta. These etTorta are thus poor forms of pafilai anslysie. They may have a facade of generality, but they are incapabie of being eubjected to the gamut of scientific rigor, inciuding independent tests. What is the alternative? The anawer to this question lies in taking seriousiy, and taking inteliectoal advantage of, the feet that military forces contain many speciaiiied subelements. Moreover, it is vital to recognize the further fact that a mans performance often dominates equipment performance rather than the other way around. Tbeee two facts lend themselves ta the notion that purpoeefu~ controlled tield experimentation provides a means of evaluating single systems one at a time. Such ex70

iview

OPERATIONAL mntw means of a thr~man crew and automatic loader and a complicated suepenaion ayatem+r to increase its rate of acceleration. Intuitively, these features would sean to improve i& true with regard to tactical air and antiaircraft systems, including air defenee acquisition and range-estimating radara at low altitude. The ability of low-tl@ng aircraft to avoid detection,

US

Armu

Engineering testing answers whether end how weU technical performance requirements are met mush these more demanding performance characteriatica might actually improve survivability. Estimates that have heen made have been derived u wori from computer simulations: These kinds of questions, however, can be systematically and rigorously teated under condRions that realistically correspond to actual operational conditions. Similar uncertainties center around the performance of countless other eyatema in their respective operational environment. This is particularly May1971 tics tu achieve the avoidance, is a suhjcct which contains many unknowns. The resolution of this subject could have important implieationa for future aircraft design specific&.ions. Nor is much lmown about the ins and outs of pilots identifying and dnding targets, particularly in the performance of a close air-support role, and ldttii those tar@s when they are identified. This phase of operations is importantly affected by the tactics pilots employ in order to avoid being acquired and hit by opposing 71

l)PEft?mosAL TE2TSM air defense weapons. Yet literally bilItow of dollars have ahedy been spent on several generations of coetly avionics despite the amertion of some critics that cIose air support for ground troops might not be as good today as it wee in the days of the A-1 Skgwaider or even the Stuhm. The leak of knowkdge regarding these types of interrelationships is the principal reason that the present process of writing specifications for new systems is as bed of the many developm@ fiasco Y that have gained so much unfavorable publicity for the Defense Department, Performance requirements are presently constrained mainly by what seems feasible within the state of the tee@ical arts. Engineering Development The engineering development process becomes subject to extreme demands that ean seldom be met, or, if met, at costs which usually exceed expectations, and often with slippages in time availability. It is here that operational testing mm make a great contribution toward a more rational development strategy. Through operational testing, it is possible to discern whether a high-performance characteristic, like speed, provides an increment of effectiveness that ie worth the cost of getting that speed, and whether tbe teshniaal attribute of speed might be profitably traded for come other cbarasterietics like 1sss weight or agility. With this kind of knowledge, it should, then, be possible to specify more intelligently what is needed. Thue, there might not need to he a %~uirement for a 60-miles-per-hour tank at all. The pros and cons over the fly before you buy miss this point, and concurrently the merits of operational testing are not fully grasped. 12 Testing of Doctrine. Current US Army infantry macbinegun doctrine suggests that gunners fire six @ nineround bursts. For tank-mounted, coaxial, 7.62-miSimeter or .20-ssdiber meehinegane in en anti-infantry roIe, a 2& to 30-round burst is recommended. The empirieel basis for such doctrine or decision rules is unknomi, unclear, and most Mcely nonexistent. In the case of infantry meehinegun tactice, it is ~*ely that the eix to nine-round burst tigure has its origin in World War I meehinegun taetka. At that time, a heavy, tripcd-mountad machinegun wee the standard weapon, and it wee fashionable to use mechinagune for long-range grazing and plunging fire. The current standard machlnegun, however, is a light weapon that een be fired in either a tripod or biped mode. The six to nine-round buret may be appropriate in the tripod mode in certahi tastieel situations. But a sixroimd burst in a biped mode may be poor firing doctrine given the guns recoil and tbe lack of etabSity. Issues like these, however, are wide open since no systematic testing against a variety of target systems has been undertaken. Deficient Doctrine Limited field testing which wee direeted to different questions does suggest that the dostrine in this ares is very deficient. One suspeete that the doctrine governing the use of vehicular-mounted weepone ie also deficient. One compensating feature is that troops in the fietd often evolve their own praeticae, which may he more appropriate to tastieal condition. However, there is no way of knowing whether these ad hoc taztics themselves are optiial. Bemuse of the leek of adequate operational testing, Militmy Revhw

OPERATIONAL lEsTiN6 there is no way of knowing whether maximum effectiveness is obtahd ffom existing syetems, or whether troope receive the best possible training in use of their systemz. Mire%! of Weufmne. In US Army and Marine infantry squads, there is a mixture of riflemen and grenadiers. Grenadiers employ an M79 launcher that fires a 40-millimeter fragmenting grenade that weighs eight ounces. The launcher is single shot; maximum range is about 400 meters. In the 10man Army infantry sqnad, there are two grenadiers, or 20 percent of the unite strength. In the 14-man Marine Corps squad, there is one grenadier slightly over seven percent of squad etrangth. identical Proportions There is, of couree, no necessary reason why both the Marines and the Army should have identical proportion of weapons in their organization. They specialize in different missions, and have differing mixes of eupport weapons at platmon, company, and battalion levels. Yet a difference of a factor of three with which the staple of an Army and of a Marine Corps is armed ie striking. However, it ie not snrprieing in view of the fact that such weapon-mix decisions are generally baeed on judgment and intuition. It is poseible to go through the entire organizational structure and equipage of Army and Marine Corps infantry unite, to ineinde the battalion, to determine the best mix and how to employ equipment most effectively. It may be that the existing mix and doctrine are optimal. But if it is, no one knows, and it is due to pure chance. On the other hand, it is plansible that combat effectiveneae of US infantry might be improved substantially kses te7f merely by means of different mix- of equipment and more efftilve do@inal employment. If so, it ie a somber thought to ponder with regard to our operations in Vietnam over the past several years. The military services undertake much activity that can be characterized as testing. Much effort is expended in maneuvera and field exercisez, and engineering testing. But both of these endeavors differ from the kind of operational testing that is needed. Maneriver Oisadvantsges Maneuvers and axercisee are mainly ueeful to demonstrate the adndnistrative feasibility of new organizations. They can surface possible logistic constraints that might afflict new organizational concepts or new types of equipment. But they have serious disadvantages for purposes of teeting and evaluation. Commanders in maneuvers are primariSy interested in training both of troope and, especially,,. etaff. They regard with dismay any attempt to restructure an exercise to test a particular idea. A further dieadvantage of maneuvers ae a laboratory is that they provide, at beet, a one-ehot demonstration. Single events, partkularly when they are part of a highly complex activity like a maneuver or major exercise, can be interpreted many ways. For example, in 1936, at Fort Benning, truel-mounted infantry ~ and horse-mounted cavalry commenced an axerciee. The trucks enabled the infantry to get to a poeition at which they laid an ambueh? Az the troopers enterad the objective area, eamouflagad soldiers rose from their poeitions, shouting and waving bedeheets. The effect on the horses was dramatic. From the experiment, the infantrymen 13

OPEWIOHAL

TESTIN6

were convinced that trucks enabled them to outmaneuver cavalry; the outragyid horsemen concluded that i@antrymen were practiwd jokers. 2 The principal shortcoming of maneuvers or similar two-sided field esercises as a device for conducting operational tests ie that they seldom provide numerical data usable for operational evaluation or estimating weapon effectiveness. Most of the information gathered is compiled tim tbe referees and headquarters staff observers who wander around the maneuvering elements and who register their impressions on forms attached to clipboards. Such evaluations

have chnmmteriitice of a tnibal ritual and mairilv eerve the function of spritiing holg water OILa new oEgsnizationall preposai or principle that is favored ati the higher lavele. of the hierarchy. Engineering testing should nek be confused with openatiomd testing. Engineering testimg tieata the question of whether, and $he degree to which, technical performance requirements are met. It slim addheeeee vita{, queetione treatirtg teohnical performance trade offs, se well es p~ovidhw emPirieal, verification or refutation of hypotheses. derived from engineering or physical equatiens and! modelh. Teete condtictid for quality control zSewunted i. ECIwatxh L. Kakenlmch, Jr., Wweatietb CentmY HomeCavml?r: in Public by CaII J. S%dfiob and the acceptability of production POSCC Yearbook, 1868, Edited andSwnmur E. HmriiI, 5?vard IJ.ivemUv P?esm, lots are ales a species efi engineering Cambridm, Maw.,1S5S, II 1S6.

0PEM7UML lEsNn6 terns in an operational context. The empbseie OKImeasurement also snggests instremenkWon. Rapli@Ion of an activity of a eystems bebevior ie neceeesry ~ minimise the possible error inherent in bee teats are entMae like tk&nase of ehet group, mean tii to faiiure, attaching too much importance to the one-shot experiment in which pure and soil bearing. TOO often there is a tendency to chance can play an inordinate role afequate mwh measurm with effeetivefecting the ebeerved outcome. In eddinesa. They are not msssurea of e&wtii~ operational testiig muet be designed and controlled eo that meaeuree tiwenees nor are they maaningfui proxies for eITacthv3nsss rm?aaurea. of critical variables can be taken. Some physical performance msaaures Wwmn Factcm might bseome good proxies for ei7ecsin-w operational Ming is not entiveness provided suSicient independgineering testing, or testing to deterent operational evaluation were &ne mine whether physical performance or so as to furnish a basis upon which physical cberscterietic requirements to eatablieh COIZd@iOl18. are m% the engineering laboratory or evsn the proving ground is not the f@re S#WatiM But lack of the independent operasuitable environment in which to conduct it, Nor are operational tests tional evaluation process nwane that aeaertiinp whiih imply cerrelstiona substitutes for engineering tests. Operational teats should normaUy employ are mere speculetiom Much of this ordinary troops and crews Wbeee mwsuletion is eeldem identided se proficiency resemblvs those of the peometaphysics. More common Iabele are ple who will have to employ the ayecombat miedele, computer simulations, teme in combat. fold systems analyep. Thet Stocwic Engineering testiig, on the other tecbn@ea are an integral part of many efforts dow net altar the specubenx is uauaUy conducted by technicians in order to minimii the effwt lative content. Rather, it may even of human factors on obssrved test mask the point-to enhance the aeie results. C@eratiensl tests ehould seek of computer tiie and to permit mstbto approximate or encompass the efematiciane to improve nwnericel technfects of etraas due to tim~ fatigue, iques. The product ie, therefore, not and dwtrsctien upon eyatem iMfiOlWIatl bed; however, the net secial benante. Engineering teets properly try etitmsy, over all, be negative since it to minimice these induencee. festers the illusion that tecbnicd peroperational tests msy be generally formance end effectivenaw are C1OSS1Y broken down into two major type: correlated if not identititw.. Operational tedtSng requires meas- these wluwe it k poeeible to take a specidc operction and directly meaeurement and replication or repetition ure system performance in terms of of ecthitise or acensrioe, Both are criterSe that is judged to be the effecnemeaery to previds knowledge that or a good proxy for minimizee ths role of fmpreeaimdam. tiveness criti ei%etiveneee, or both; and teats deSuch knowledge is quantitative and signed to measure variables, the behsvmessurss physical behavior of eysMay 1971 7s testii. This type of testing nequires thot the ilDPs!% of OwMtii, doctrinal, and fdipilsr Senetrahtte he a~ted fmm the endeavor. The measurable or derived outputs of

OPERATIONAL TESTING ior of which is critical to a systems operational performance. Live-fire tests are examples of the kind of test that focuses directly on an operation in its entirety. It is possible, for example, to construct a target system composed of elements that can be made to behave like targets encountered in actual combat. Infantry targets are one such caee. BY means of instrumentation, a given scenario can be replicated. An experimental matrix, balanced with regard to time of day, troop proficiency, and other factors, can be played against such a target syetem by actually firing at the target system. Performance Measurements Groups of friendly ftrere, like an infantry squad, can be employed against the target eyetem. Hits and nearmieses can be recorded in real time. Thus, it is possible to compare an M16 rifle with an Mlb or AK.$7 rifle, or rifles with machinegune, under conditions that more closely resemble combat than does, for example, Olyrapicstyle shooting matches. Similarly, live-fire tests can be made against vehicle-type targete by crewserved antitank and antiaircraft wespons to test for the effectiveness of changes in the design characteristics of vehicles or weapons and the use of alternative firing doctrines. Performance in other operations can also be measured. For example, eearch patterns employed by small patrols under conditions of darkness might be tracked to determjne how they can detect targets or how such patrols might be detected. The processing and filtering of information from modern sensors by headquarters staffs can be objects of experimentation to determine whether and how the information can be employed. 76 Teete which focus on $ritical variables are undertaken either because it is impossible to treat an operation ae a whole, or because it may be undesirable to do eo. For example, with aircraft and antiaircraft systems, actual combat engagements are out of the question in peacetime. Moreover, actual combat operations are generally so confnsing that there may be literally too much to measure. Even the conduct of wartime operational research focuses on attempting to meeeure only at most a few variables that prior analysis suggests to be critical. For this reason, purposeful field testing can, in some cases, be an even better laboratory than actual warfare. Elements of Behavior For example, with antiaircraft sYstems, the elemente of behavior can be broken down into two major parts. First, ie the ability of a wespone sensing system (men, or radar, or a combination of both) to detect, acqnire, and track hostile aircraft. There is also an identification problem if one chooses to operatea friendly air force. Upon completion of these tasks and the order to tire, there is the qiiestion of hitting the target; this involves another complex set of interactions. In the case of air defense, it is not only impractical to try to shoot down friendly aircraft, but also it would probably be undesirable to do so even if it were ~rqctical. The two sets of operations, or the two equipment subsyetems~etection, acquisition, and tracking, and the firing-each warrant operational evaluation and system design based on careful evaluation. Thus, for many purpoees, the most usefnl operational testing involves separating out critical and major subMilitary Review

OPERATIONAL TESTING operations of complex tasks. The meesuremente derived can then be used as inputs to computer simulations and combined with relevant technical performance data. Operational teeting, as an experimental process, requi,res interdependent and simultaneous consideration of a model, or theory, instrumentation, and the specification of effectiveness criteria or the critical variables to be measured. Instrumentation Systems Instrumentation, to include target eystems, ie a key element. Modern technology provides much scope for imaginative development of instrumentation ayetems adaptable to conducting field-type experiment. For live-fire experiments, it is possible to construct target systems that not only record hits in real time, but also miss dietences which provide indication of fire dia$ribution. Target behavior can be controlled and thus replicated, and event behavior can be recorded in real time. The most progress that has been made in thk3 area ie with infantry targets. LMtle has been done to design and develop vehicular targeta despite the large amounts epent on ground combat vehkles and ways which seem theoretically attractive to defeat euch vehicles. Aircraft dronee have been developed to facilitate firing guns and especially niMsilee for training purposes. Available target drones, unfortunately, b&have like friendly airliners; and thousands of air defense missiles have been fired at them. Such firings serve to verify empirically the hit probabflitiee that miseile manufacturers promise the Government, to impreee important persons who visit Plecea like Fort Bliee or who are gueeta at fleet exercisee, ,and to buttrees the morale of the Mey 1971

US Amy

Operatioml tests should seek to inwrporste human factors which engineering tests seek to minimize troops manning the missile eyetems. However, attacking and penetrating aircraft do not behave like friendly airlinere. Little effort has been expended trying to develop dronee that can maneuver although some progress may be expected as a result of recent efforts. For many kinds of experiments, instrumentation for peeition location and event recording is critical. Several approaches, some of which draw upon aircraft navigation systems, are employed and capable of further development. But generally, instrumentation muet be configured, adnpted, and, in come cases, specifically deeigned for the needs of a particular experiment. Thk is also fairly standard practice for experimentation that addressee baaic research in the physical sciences. An important implication of this point ie that instrumentation engi17

OPEi!ATiONAL TESTiN6 neers must be part of the team that designs the experiment. The analytical members of the team, for their pert, mnet formulate the model wh]ch identifies the critical variahlee to be measured. Such model formulation need not be a new development of a theory. U can be an adaptation of someene elses theoretical findings. But the model employed by the operational analysis teem must be tailored to the capability of instrumentation aysteme. The instrumentation eyeteme, in turn, must be calibrated or attuned by way of accuracy to the critical questions of the experiment. For example, it makes little sense to try to ecbieve a resolution of miss distance measurements within six inches if the critical operational questions turn upon a leas yefined estimate, of say two or three feet. Military profeasionala ueually poesess the best understanding of whet is tactically relevant. Their knowledge is essential to place the experiment in tbe proper operational context. Moreover, they posseas knowledge about terrain and operational procedure that most civifian anelyete lack, The effort mu~t, therefore, be a joint ecientfficmilitery one. Such was also the characteristic of the pioneering World War II operational research. StrdgetaryProcess But putting together euch teams, with their diverse mixture of &hnical, analytical, and operational sktis, ie difficult. Even under ideal circumstances, tbe actual conduct of operational experimentation ia etreesful and exasperating. Present circumstances are far from ideal, and may even render extensive field experimentation impossible. These adverse circumstanoea have their source in the budgetary procees. The budgetary proeeas is one by which military depertmenta and specialized milihmy components advocate new systems in order to sustain and enhance their share of a total development and procurement fund. New weapon concepts become a means of obtaining dolla~. Aa long as this ie so, it ie difficult for military users to take a critical view of syaterne, including conceptual systems, tbet embody costly improvements in technical performance. Operational teeting, however, is critical in ita nature, and it often shows the worth of some costly performance feature to be limited. For this r-on, technologists are also temperamentally disinclined to advocate operational testing. Sinmltaneonely, important, if not dominating, elernenta of the operations research Mlftay Rerbm

ErrorTolerances
The error tolerances in instrumentation will aleo bean important determinant of the number of replications required for an experiment. The mathematicians and statisticians who lay out the experimentation matrix must, therefore, be able to communicate and work with the instrumentation engineere, and vice verea. Analysts, identifying and specifying effectiveness criteria or variables to be measured, must also be cognizant of instrumentation capability. It ie of little use to say that a ceti]n variable ie critical and should be measured if, in fact, it ie technically unfeasible to do so. mathematical statiztiAnalyetz, ciane, and instrumentation engineers must therefore, work es a team to conduct operational experiment. It ie also imperative that military officers be part of the team. This is bacmma operational testing focuses on system behavior in an operational context. 78

OPERATIOSA1.TESTING

community am strong advocates of larg+scde model building and corn. puter simulations, and use these techniques as a type of intellectual alchemy by which technimd performance attributea, such ae single-round hit probability, are translated into measures of effectiveness like kill ratios. Activities like field experimentation can 81s0 refute the assertions that flow from these thecmetical endeavore. Hence, it is convenient for the military, the techniaal community, and a portion of the enalytiual community not to have any operational testing. For th?military cervices, there is also a powerful budgetary inventive not to have operational testing. Shrce there is often a meaningful probability that a teat may show or suggest that a new item. might not provide improved ef* IsPa,

festiveness, or a meager improvement relative to the systems procurement cost, the service would lose dollars. This prospect ie painful to contemplate. It is better not to have a test. Should a higher authority insiet that a test be undertaken, a strong incentive. nevertbelees, existe to rig its outcome, or to make its results ambiguous, in order to minimize the rick of losing procurement or development dollars. Only if this incentive system is changed is it realistic to hope or expect that better tasting may be done. And only then. is it worthwhile to turn to the epeeitic task of designing and creating an operational teeting apparatus. Tb eliminate these incentives, it is neeeeemy to sever the relationship between dollar funding, and perhaps manpower authorisation, from deci7R

sions to procure specific weapons. In general, it requires that annual funding be based upon and related to brosd aggregate in the force structure, like division forces or air wings. For example, the Army might be allowed 500 million dollars a year for a division force to include an allowance for amortizing its equipment. Separate allowances or adjustments maybe made for wartime consumption stocks and for different degrees of unit readiness which are specified for foreign policy reasons. A lower allowance would be warranted for elements in the force that are in a reserve status. Budget Adjustment By such an approach, a service budget would be adjusted wheu policymakers decide to change the total force or make major reallocations within the over-all force structure which would be called for because foreign policy is changed. A military service, in turn: would find its total budget explicitly constrained, Under euch a broad budget constraint, the incentive of the military professionals to maximize effectiveness should come to dominate their decision making. Thus, a new weapon which costs more per unit than a less sophisticated one would force the service either to have fewer weapons or to give up something else. Conversely, if a service found a way to diepense with come of its support or maintenance units, it ehould be free to use the savings to acquire something elee. In such a budgetary setting, bigher authorities could insist that the services do rigorous operational testing. Moreover, it would be to the best interest of the user components of a service to do the testing. It should be noted that eteps have already been taken that can nicely set 80

the stage, for creating these incentives. In part, this change has resulted from budgetary constraints dictated by bigher level policy considerations. But the so-called %acal guideline approach promulgated by Secretary Laird, in January 1970, is a decisive further step in the right direction insofar as it can afford the military departments a strong incentive to seek ways to get the most effsctiveneas per dollar spent. Initially, the military services will approach this course gingerly, especially if there is no clear sign from the Otlice of the Secretary of Defense that a poesible dollar to be saved on one program or system can be epent elsewhere. Such a signal might hopefully be forthcoming. ProposedCommand With the right budgetary and financial incentives, it is perhaps easiest to envisage what the Army could do in the area of operational testing. There could be an Operational Tssting Command, the commander of which should report to the Chief of Staff. He should be of equal rank to the commander of the US ArmY Materiel Command. Its working end would consist of a headquarters, preferably away from Washington, and several experimentation centers. Experimentation centers might specialize in particular areasone for infantry, one for armor and antiarmor, and one for Army-type aviation and air defense. Eaeb center might consiet of a small headquarters staff, plus a group of about 200 professionals divided roughly equally between military otlicers and civilians. The civilian professionals would be analysts, mathematicians, and instrumentation engineers. They probably ehould not be civil servante. Rather, they should be supplied by contract
MMtefs RWi@W

OPEI?AIIONAL lESTtN6

with a study organization, profit or nonprofit. The contracting firm should not be a hardware manufacturer because of cotilct of intereat problems. One type of conflict of intereat arises from instrumentation procurement. A more subtle, but fundamental, one centars around the advantage that one weepons manufacturer might have, relative to his rivals, by virtue of Me organization being privy to the detailed workings, findings, and deliberations of a military operational testing laboratory.

QualityControl
The activities of such an Operational Testing Command and its individual centers should be monitored by the Office of tbe Secretary of Defense for quality control purposes. The quality control function is vital. It can beet be performed by a higher authority. The higher authority% monitorehip can provide the teeters and evaluator some protection from political pressure which their own immediate superiors might inject to influence tbe outcome of a study or test. Reports should automatically go to service secretaries and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To help keep the Office of the Secretary of Defense watchdogs honest, boards of vieitors should overwatch the activity, and their reporta, in hum, should be submitted to the service secretary and chief and the OfSce of the Secretary of Defense. The visiting boards could be partly composed of distinguiehed scientists and analysta drawn from universities, study organisations, and business firms. The other component part of tbe vieiting boards could be selected retired military officers. The present weapon testing and evaluation procese is plagued

by both a lack of scientific integrity and a failure to addreas questions of tactical and operational relevance. Both scientific and military expertise should be complementary in performing the review function. Vkiting boards could establish ad hoc review panels for each experiment to review and advise regarding the experimentation plan and the final test reporta. The reporta and reviews of these groups should be accessible to the same partks that have access to the visiting boards reporta. The ud hoc review panels ehould be composed of individuals the majority of whom have no conflict of intereat in the outcome of an Operaflonal test.

Intellectual Oepartnmnt
Consideration should also be given to extending the concept of conflict of intereat to the intellectual department. If a man has been an advomte of a specific, technical solution to a particular operational problemfor example, an infrared trackbig system for an antitank missil+he might not be entirely detached in a review of a testing program that might rev-l such an approach to be unsound. One such individual can be of good service to tbe review panel because he can provide useful knowledge and axpertise. Bnt a review panel should not be dominated by individuals with the same technical interests. The purpose of the external review apparatue is not to direct. Rather, it is to perform a quality control-inspector general funtilon, Ita operation should provide those who do the testing and evaluation a protective sh]eld from any residue of inter or intraservice political pressure that may remain even under a system devoid of existing budgetary incentives. It is important that the operational 81

Mq1B71

testing and evaluation organizations have a etrong capability in inatrnmentation, and that they not be dependent upon the materiel or systems commands for expertise in the design and development of instrumentation systems. Nor is it a good idee for the operational test facilities to be oPerated by such a command, as ia the case with the Air Force feeility at Eglin Air Force Beee which ie operated by the eystama command. The relationship between the tasting commanda and the materiel or systems commands should be that, where the testing commands are the ueer, they thereby epecify their requirements for instrumentation syeteme. Instrumentilon, including range lacilities, could be operated and raanaged by private contractors Who have hardware expertise much in the way that the Atlantic Missile Range is operated by Pan-American Airwaye. For land forces and Klr Force teatiag activities, every effort should be made to develop mobile instrumentation syeteme so that experiments are not 3onfined to partkmlsr geographic locations. Finally, a etaff section could be eet up in the &lice of the Secretary of Defense that could function as a central tae?mical information @earinghouee on operational testing instrumentation 85 a service tn the military degartmente. Such a staff seotion, however, should exerciee no diive role on either instrumentation pro~ or testing pr0gr8m%

The problem of joint tasting, to include taqtical air and air defense, poses epecial problems. Given the preeent data deficiencies in this area, there ie perhape an immediate need for two task force field organizations. However, special attention and extra effort WM have to be made to assure that a joint teet@ effort, particularly ss batwwm the Army and tie Air Fores, wiil be conducted rigorously but with detachment. Since the reeulte of any findings in euch a joint testing effort could have implioetione with regard to budgetary allocations between military depertmente, the guarantee that each deparh ment should operate under a dxed budget could not be made in thie area. Thie is because a complex of ieeuea ie at stalm including alternative air defenee mwiea, present Army-type aviation vereue tied-wing Air Force aircraft, and the problem of aircraft ~ersue artiilery es a means of providing fire enpport for infantry and armor. M ie tasting which has a high potential for possible reallocation of dollars between two or more services, or which has a heavy joint doctrine content on which the proposed Oilice of the Secretary of Defense testing agency ehmdd concentrate its substantive efEo& es contrasted with its quaIity amtrol function. The joint aireurfaoe issues appear resolvable only by oiviiii leadership, and are the kirui of issues worthy of careful deliberation by the higheat authority.

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my ml

69

KOREli forts. No organized traditional religiort holds sway. Above all, the experience of the Korean War makes Korea unueual, for the entire fabric of the society was dierupted by the experience in which perhaps 10 percent of the population lost their Iivee, and the continued high draft level of the armed forces makes it impossible for any area of the society to escape the impact of the perpetual external threat. Extent of Influence In 1961, a military coup detat in the Republic of Korea placed the government in the hands of a military junta which took over the reins of power from a more traditionally oriented generation of politicians. However, it is difficult to measure the impact of the military government upon subsequent developments. The reasons for thk are several: The government was civilianized in 1963, and, while retaining key military figures and several military-type institutions within the political structure, it presente a mixed milieu in which it becomes nearly impossible to ,olate purely military influence. . Because of the vast sise of KoThis article was comfenesd from the miginal, publiehed in the JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ADMINISTSATION, Novsmbsr 1970, uflder the title, Korean Kundaehwa: The Militarv ae Modernizer. Co-p@ght @ 197o by the JOUBNAL OF COXPASATNE An?dXNISTEATION. Mr. Kim is a Senior Fallow at ths Reeearch Institute en Communist Affairs at Columbia Vniveraitg, and ia alao cunrentlg a Reeearch Fsllaw, Eaat Atin L~gd Studies, Harvard Univermtg. 34 progressed in the absence of military rule. The military coup detat of 16 May 1961 introduced a military junta ae the supreme governing body of Korea under the title, Supreme Council for National Reconetrutilon (SCNR). The junta undertook eix pledges on coming to power, among them the building of a eelf-suebdning economy, relief for the poor, elimination of corruption, and strengthening national power. Finally, it pledged: . . . ae soldiers, after we have cempletsd our mieeien, ws ehall reetere MiliteIY Review reae armed forcesthe fifth largest standing army in the world (600,000 men)and their perpetual states of mobilization, the impact of military personnel throughout Korean society would be great, even in the abeence of any period of military rule. . It ie impossible to determine to what extent modernization would have

KOREh the government to honest and conamentioaa civilians, and return to our proper miMaw duties. Two years after the coup, General Chung Hee Park the Chairmen of the SCNR, ieeued a statement deelaring that the junta had failed to achieve its objectives. Yet a few months later, in turning over the government to civilian hands, the President and key personnel in the new regime turned out to be former members of the junta who had retired from the armed forces and were hence civilians. When President Park and his entourage returned to ollice in nationwide elscticme, it became difficult to characterize the Third Republic as either military or civilian. to characterize the government as being heavily dominated by milita~ personnel. Miiitsry institutions In addition to the individual of military background involved in the civilianized government, the new regime also carried over come militarytype institutions into the nsw era, prominent among which was the Koreen Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created by former members of the armed forces. WIdle the major officials of the CIA are former professional soldiere of rank (the CIA has generally been the preseme of those former officers bslow the rank of genera]), service in the armed forces is a prerequisite for even minor posta. The function of the Korean CIA is ostensibly to check North Korean infiltration, but ita tentacles reach into all aspecte of political life in the south, including, sometimee, promoting and even financing political candidates. On. the other hand, while the network of former military personnel in the government is extensive, there is no evidence of direct influence of the military services as an organization, or of active duty pereonnel upon government. In view of the peculiar military heritage of the present government and ite mixed military-civilian character, it bscomee difficult to ascertain to what extent the military influence is reeponeible for ach]evemente that have come in the nineyear period since the military coup. However, it would certainly be wrong to dismiss the present administration as outside the realm of concern of studka on the impact of military pereonnel upon politics. The government has managed to achieve a semilegitimecy by submit-

FormerPrefessionafs
The participation of former military oficars in the ensuing years of the Third Republic has been exteneive. As an illustration of this point, of all general oftkers who had retired from the armed forces since the beginning of the First Republic (1946-60), and who were still living in 1968, more than half were actively employed in the government. Of the eight eurviving four-star generale, all were in the government, including the President and the Prime Minister. In 1968, it was estimated that former generals alone made up half of the Cabinet, one-fifth of the National Assembly, two-fifths of all ambassadorial appointments, and twothirds of the heads of the state-run firms. In addition, other former military men were prominent in the government party, on the presidential staff, in the higher bureaucracy, and on the economic planning board. Although the military men employed in the government were no longer on active duty, it would not be inaccurate May 1971

ting to national elections in which opposition parties have participated by separating the military services as an organization from politice, and by requiring the former military personnel who partkipatc in government to retire from active duty. However, the present government is, nonetheless, still very clearly a lineal successor to the military government of 1961-63. While the armed forces themselves today are somewhat inenlated from direct impact on day-to-day policymakhg, it would be impossible in Korea-even in the absence of any period of military rul+to consider the process of modernisation without examining the role of the army. Be-

cause Korea posaw+aes tbe fifth largest

standing army in the worla its very existence affects the entire fabric of tbe society. Men from every village are drafted into the army, then dis88

charged back into the eociety at the rate of ZOO,OOO per year, with a total now of about 2.5 million veterans. In addition, 2.27 million men, or twofifths of all men between the ages of 18 and 40, are members of the militia. During their stint in the army, men learn to handle and operate modern equipment, to drive vehicles, and to relate in new ways to new forms of organization. In addition, they come into contact with urban life. They become geographically mobile. lbie has certainly been one of the factors contributing to tbe tremendous pace of urbanisation which bee cbsnged Kerea from an W-percent rural society to one which is 50-pereent urban in a period of 20 years. Young men dismissed from the armed forces are more likely to eeek to remain in urban centers than those who never left the farms. And when a Wit#lg Ilavii

Konm miIitary mobilinstion level is ss high as idwt of Korea, this one factor alone ereatee a revolutionary elumge in KoTefm life. IMmthmUnora,men are not only drawn out of mmal Iif+ but they may fmd themealves on foreign coil. bWo@ M) percent ,Of the army has been in Viiiiam for the past tive yews. TtiesliiWoltt meetimatethe cQnaa4nances of this on life irl KOree. dan and sharp deoEne during its last two yesra. This deeline was related to a eudden ,aml sharp cut of 100 reilIion sMare in US aid. A thesis might be developed that the wary pressure for change within the Korean eoltore itself would be didieolt for a government to restrain: studies InWCindioatad that the basic eeuesa for the overthrow of the Rhee government were economic grievances when the govarmn ent proved unable to sustain a Wi level of growth after dliding with the United States on ir@rm31 policy matters.

EcmmlIM&euflll l%eiqpac to fthemilitwyanthe emmnny ie also marked. Whfle the government SPW16Sabut 300 million ddlars of its 15&illirm-d@w budget earhyewk olneiatairlt llearmed Majj WtOr forit is estimeted thak the Korean That the sultural pm.ssure for eeononw gains about %50 million &dchange could be a major fsetor in 1ST5per yew from the pFeeenee of us Koreas growth might be supported tmqte intire OcSmlay. by the fast that the levels of nrbanb additinn,. Kores has been receiizatkm, eduoetion, and aldft of emvingabout IMl milhn ddere in miH. ployment out of agrieuitur% among tarp as5i5hinM b ths Untia other messoree, have been almost identiesl in both North Korea and States. Rmther, Koree earns a?mmt 160 mmion &liars per yem from vk?t- the Republic of Korea over the same period of time although the two sraee nemand Tkak@ #Irectly related have ,kn governed by very db%ent to the preeenra of its tmoope in southpolitical systems. east Asia. IMiiitary involvement in The feet that tbe military coup wee Viiextends iteimpestinttl the eivilianeconom ybyvirtaeofthemnngreeted without public resistance ean be attributed to the dismei faihme her of Civsien fmterprieee and C&ilian of the Seeend Republic (1960-61) to wvrkere invoked in mdertakinga in organirx! for canying out developthe Repnbiic of Vietnam. ment programs. As one scholar bee The considerable development that noted, tbe tmmendons public demand has taken pleee during the period sines for a govermnent-sponsored dwelopthe1961rnilitary wupoftceltendsto mant program made the decision of 6bseure the eignidcanse of ~ develthe Semnd Republics leadership, to oxt tiCh tad @sea before the postpone impkmentation of plane by military @me to lwwxu-. Because economic growth is cumulati% the devalonly a f- montlm fatal to its hopes of awvival. The impatience of the opmeat prior to 1961 appears emeiL miitary personnel who moved in to indeed, in comparison with peet-1961 pre?afor rapid ehengea was matched leveis. Yet the rate of growth of the by popular desires. Kereen economy had rekehed seven end eight percent per year imder the Dor& the period 1910-60, trenda in urbwdastion and education in Koree period of the Syngmen Rhee governwhich have made Koreans not only ment before being faced with the audthy ml 87

KOREA receptive to, but eager for, developments-began about the time of independence, and the growth under the Third Republic has been only a continuation of previoue patterns. Furthermore, even the rates of industrial growth, the most marked area of development since 1961, have their base in the post.-Korean period. To attribute the developmental successes of the Third Republic to the military government, then, may be misleading, even though mifitery Ieeders have taken the policy initiatives. The basic receptivity for changaindeed, the driving force for cheng+ is a characteristic which has permeated the society to its deepeat foundations. cruitment and training of officers. The first class of officers trained received only six weeke of preparation before being commissioned; the length of training was then increased to three months, six months, and, finally, one year. It was not until the Korean War was in progrese that the four-year military academy came into exietence. Consequently, younger otticere were more thoroughly trained; nonetheless, seniority in the service took precedence over the professional quality of training. The first few classes, however, from which the most senior officers arose, had eomething of an advantage in that many of the members were graduates of Japaneee military academiea. It was the segment of officers between the first few clessee and the four-year graduates of the academy who received the least training; yet they had been the ones to bear the burden of field command during the war. Promotions Blocked In an army created so rapidly, the difference in age levels between junior and senior officers was slight. During the war, most of the senior officers had been in their early thirties. As these officers were still far from mandatory retirement in the 1960s, they blocked the promotion opportunities of the junior officere. The military coup of 1961 was led by the officers just junior to the general levelthose holding the rank of colonel and lieutmmnt colonel. These were the officers caught in the squeese between the senior officers with previous Japanese training and the acedemy graduates moving up the ranks behind them. For the most part, the conapiratore were drawn from the enormous eighth cleee of the officers training school which had finished Milit8ry Review

Elementof Control
Given these underlying conditions, the task of leadership in Korea has not been to create a receptivity to change, but to keep the excessive demands for change under a semblance of control iri efforts to channel scarce resources in the most urgent direction. It is thie element of control, then, perhaps more than any other, which has been characteristic of the Third Republic government as opposed to its predecessors, and has enabled the regime to promote economic development. The Korean Army was not a carryover from the colonial pariod, but had been created by the US Military Government in Korea (1945-48) and then expanded under the United Nations Command during the Korean War. BY 1950, it was a force of 100,000, and, by 1954, it included 600,000 men, a level which hse been maintained eince that time. The rapid expansion of the armed forces had led to a very rapid, and sometimes haphaaerd, process of re-

8s

KOREA training before the outbreak of the war and developed an e~t de corps during the years of the war which wae reinforced by their shared frustration over the blocked promotion structure. Although the junior o!licere initiated the coup, consolidation of political control required the cooperation of the eenior military pereonnel. BY the time the new regime became civilianiced in 1968, the junior personnel were already being shunted into behlnd-thescene roles, largely ae operators of the ubiquitous Korean Central Intelligence Agency, while eenior personnel moved into the public post. Senior otiicere received considerable advanced training at such centere sc the US Army War Co~ege and the US Army Command and General Staff College, as well se on training assignment in the United Stetea. More than 4,000 odicere had gone for training in tbe United Statea by 1960. Yet, ironicaUY, it wee the junior officers who were the meet achievement oriented, feeliig the trcmendoue pressure for change in the society. There are few etatistieal measures by which the Republic of Korea can be shown not to have moved closer to the coveted goal of modemiaation during the nine years ehme the military coup. By 1970, 50 percent of Koreas population lived in urban centers; the percent of population in school wcc comparable ta Weetem European nations, and the literacy rate had reached 95 percent; and there was one radio for every five people and one copY of a daily newspaper for every 10 people. Slower than the phenomenal communications growth wee the development of transportation facilities, for there were only 104,000 motor vehicles in Korea in 1969. However, automobile production was initiated in Korea in

my 1971

1970 at the rate of 65,000 vehicles per year, expected to reach 400,000 per year within the next two or three years. To help meet the tratiic problem the eudden growth of automobile production ie expected to create, a major superhighway was opened between Seoul and Pusan. Representing the trunkline of a projected highway syetem, the new road now enablee vehicles to travel from the capital city of Seoul, which is juet 20 miles south of the demilitarized zone, to the eoutheast coaet port city of Pusan in four and one-half hours driving time. With Koreae urban areae absorbing half of the population, the plight of the city dwellers became intense. While an urbanite has an average income of 66 percent more than the average rural dweller, hie eoet of living is 94 percent higher. Furthermore, cities face a phenomenal 4S-percent housing ehortage, 48 percent of familiea or houee20

holds in cities do not possess separate dwelling unite, but share with other families, as oppoeed to a 13-percent ehortage in rural areas. There are, of course, advantages to urban residencwne-third of all Koreas 12,269 doctors live in the city of Seoul which contilns one-sixth of the nations population. Attempts to meet the housing demand in the cities have led to unfortunate shortcuts, including the tragic collapse of an apartment building in Seoul causing the death of many of ita occupants. Despite all efforts to overcome the chronic problem of food, Koreae foodgrain production has not heen able to outpace the population growth rate. This is despite the fact that Korea hae had one of the most sueceaaful family planning etTorts, reducing the population increase-it is e&imsted by nearly one million during the peat 10 yeare. Beumse of the food shortage, agriculture commodities continue to MiOteIY Reriee

KOREA
be imported-160 million dollars worth from the United States in 1968, es compared with 60 million dollars worth in 196S and 76 million dollars in 1961. Even with population control pregrams, the Korean population is expected to increase from 30 million to 35 million during the next six years. which, during the Second Republic (1960-61), had become chaotic. This prcwedure becomes lcsa feasible .in an increasingly complex economy where the problems esdend beyond controls on excessive demands and cutting through botilenecke to channel scarce resources effectively. Furthermore, much of the growth can be attributed to timely external developments, foremost among which has been the Vietnam War. It had not only a dhct economic impact-in terms of economic incom+but also an indirect impact in the fact that, duriing the early ycare, it incraesed international confidence in Koreas security and brought an influx of foreign capital.

Growth Rates
But Koreas marked economic growth rate, which enables the country to finance the food gap, has come from indue~]alization. Despite the slow pace of agriculture, which constitutes one-tMrd of the gross national product, Korea has echleved phenomenal growth ratea. Its rate of growth of the groes national product in 1969, the highest to dae was 16.5 percent, following upon 13.3 percent in 1968. The 1970 growth rate ia expected to meet, or even exceed, that of 1969. Changes in the economic structure have contributed to the underlying social changea as wen as vice versa. In the period since the military COUP, employment in agriculture has daciined from 7S percent of the labor fome to 56 percent; employment in industrial labor force increased from three percent to 15 percent. The axtraordhary growth in exports alone is an indicator of the success achieved by the regime in industrialisation efforts, in view of the fact that the majority of exports are manufactured goods. Another measure of the amount of growth derivative of the tremendous industrial development wee the increase in per capita income from $86 in 1961 to $220 in 1969.

Multiple Crises
That external conditions cannot be eternaiiy favorable has been illustrated by the multiple crises now facing the economy from external Korean sources. These include: o A threatened congressional imposition of US quotas on Korean textilee,tbe major national export, which would cost the country an estimated 100 million dollars per year. A withdrawal of US troops whose presence is tmtimated to contribute, directly and indirectly, perhaps as much as 260 mi~lon dollars annually to the Korean economy. o The previously anticipated end of US economic assistance, and the unanticipated, but probable, end to US food easietance. US pressure to bring the Koreen troops in Vietnam home to replace withdrawing US forces in Korea, entailing an annual loss to the Korean economy of about 150 million dollars. Added together, these external prmsures, if all imposed, would mean an annual economic lose to Korce of per-

The ability of the Third Republic government to stimulate economic growth may well be attributable in
W@ to the involvement of military personnel and the immsition of a wmmand procedure upon an economy Hsy 1671

haps as much as 500 million dollars or one-third the 1970 national budget. Thle raises the queetion of the viability of the present regime if faced with seriously adverse economic conditions, a question which has not been presented during the flourishing years of prosperityfor the government in Korea continues to have a major problem of legitimacy. So long as achievement hae been all that could be asked, the iesue has easily been skirted or brushed aside. But the fact that the government is the successor to a military COUP,that its leaders not only have no claim to legitimacy in the independence movement, but were trained in Japanese military academies during the colonial period, that the government enjoys popular tolerance, not popular enthusiasm, and that it has not gone out of its way to create an effective base of support or to win international approbation

means that a serious challenge could arise under adveree conditions. It is the international image of the regime ae uncolorful and undemocratic, perhaps more than anyth]ng, that has led to the multiple chaUenges with which it is now being faced in ita external economic relation% No one is willing to go out on a limb to defend the interests of an unattractive regime. Upon seizing power in 1961, Chung Hee Park likened the military intervention to a au gical operation, designed to cut ou[ the decayed residue and get Korea.on the path to recovery and rapid modernization. By aU statistical meeeuree, the operation has been a success, The serious problems now facing the government, however not the least of which is a real threat from the north-bring out into the open the question of legitimacy which was eaeily overlooked in the dazzle over the realities of performance.

ERRATA
In Systems Anelyeis: A Purely lnteUeetuel ActivitY by Seth Bonder (February MILITASY ICSWEW), we regret that seveml emOrzunintentiOnallYcrePt into the published article. Page 16, second aokumh 8h0u@ r8ed: M the ~alyst is creative, ml the problems ars relatively simple, he might then invent some alternative future eyeteme to alleviate the prebleme prior to performing enY an.elyeie per se. Page 19, ji?et column: Commee should be inserted to separate . . . operational, eyeteme engineering, and cost mcdele . . . . Page s1, Footnote z, Ehoukl read: A. Hamilton, Defeaes: Laird Daeentrelization Alters CiviUan, MUitery ~k% Seimee, volume 167, 13 Febmary 1970, pp 966-67.

bulhly Itwiew

UNJTED STATES
Depmsisent of Defense Budget The Department of Defense has proposed budget outlays of 76 billion dollars for Fiscal Year 1972. The tQtal Federal budget for Fiscal Year 1972 is 229.2 billion dollars. Wltbin the new Defense Department budget are requeate to provide modernization and improved readiness of small, active forces, as well se for development of advanced wwpon systerns to ass & re future national accurity, atrengtb, and war deterrence. Defense programs in the Fiscal Year 1972 budget continue to be strongly influenced by military and civilian pay increases. For the first time, the amounts proposed for futmw pay increase supplemental are ehown in the defense eection of the Federal budget rather than in the Government-wide contingency amount. These increases are programed at 945 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1971 and 2.4 billion dollara in Fiscal Year 1972. The new budget reflects an increase of 1.6 billion dollars over that of Fiscal Year 1971. The Fizcal Year 1972 defense budget also refleets the first frill rears cycle under the new planning-pregraming-budgeting philosophy.DOD release.

MILITARY NOTES

Commander

Dim.:

mitter in the sensor to a receiver in an aircraft circling the ares, The signals are usually relayed from the aircraft for analyeis in a fixed installation using computerized equipment. At times, the transmissions are analyzed in the relay aircraft. After the signale are analyzed to determine the nature, size, location, direstion of movement, and speed of the target, information is relayed to strike aircraft. Some targete are etruek immediately. If not, information received from the eensora is ueed to establish movement patterns or to identify lucrative targets for preplanned strikes.DOD releaee.

Air Oefense
The Army has announced that, by 30 June 1971, it will eliminate 27 AWe Herczdee firing unite and 11 Nike Hereulee headquarter elements. The Air Force will eliminate three air defense fighter-interceptor bases and one radar station. F-IOI fighters presently flown by the Air Force will be transferred te the Air National M Guard. The remaining F-106 Air Dafense Command interceptors wiil be etationed at small satellite airdelds. Aeeording to the report, the reductione reflect the change in air defense coneepte from broad area coverage to perimeter defense of the northern, eastern, and western regions of the United States.-News item. MliibryReview

trol stations, one on each side of the pilot. The helicopter would have five crew stations: pilot, copilot, aft-facing pilot, flight engineer, and crew chief. It also would have a cabin in hack of the cockpit for carrying 12 combat troops. Both cockpit and cabin would be air-conditioned. The helicopter would ,JMpowered by three engines producing a maximum of 7,000 horsepower each. The helicopter would be able to operate from aircraft carriers. It would be need for logistics, carrying heavy cargo, including weapons. With rotor folded, it could bs carried within a C-5A transport airplane. Newe releeee. my 1#71 85

MILITASY NOTES AlaskanCommunications System

The Air Force has turned over operation and ownership of the ACS (Alaskan Communication System) to RCA Global Communications, Incorporated. The Radio Corporation of America purchased the etatewide telephone and telegraph syetem from the Government for 31.4 million dollars under an authorization approved by Congrese in 1967. Assets acquired by RCA include the four major toll centers which serve as the long-lines interconnection points for all Alaekan 10CZSY owned telephone exchangee. Included also are 15 stations operated by ACS personnel in nine statione providing over-thecounter telegraph and booth longdistance telephone facilities. Also acquired are 11 marine radio and bueh radio etatione servicing some 400 private land-baee eubecribers and more than 1,100 registered marine stations with ship-to-shore facilities, es well aa about 740 miles of open wire Iinee and 368 milee of underwater cables. The Air Force will also lease to RCA use of the Government-owned circuitry in Alaekz. The basic Alaeken Communications Syetem was constructed by the Army Signal Corps in 1903 under an act of Congreee which authorized the Government to provide commercial service over military telegraph lines. The Air Force has administered the system since 1962. Since the 1950s, the Defenee Department and the Federal Aviation Administration considered selling the system to commercial interests and leasing the communications services they needed from the commercial operatir. But it was not until 1967 that Congrese authorized eale of the 6yatem.Newe item. 33: SA 330 Puma The SA 830 Puma has been entered in the US Army competition to eelect the Utility Tactical Traneport Aircraft System ( i7TTAS). Proponents say the SA 9.90 in its present configuration very nearly meets the Armye projected UZTAS requirements and deecribd the helicopter as the most advanced tactical transport helicopter in production today. Production would be in either of two Government-owned facilities, both of which are adaptable to SA 9S0 production: the Wlchigan Army IKkeiles

Nc.rd

Aviation

SA 330 Puma with Israeli markings Plant in Warren, Michigan, where the Lance miesile presently ie under production, or the Naval Weapons Reeerve Plant in Dallas, Texas, where the A-7 Corsair II is in production for both the US Navy and Air Force. The SA $90 is used by the French and Britieh armed forces. The initial flight of the production SA $$0 helicopter was made in September 1968, and, since then, more than 50,000 flight-hours have been accumulatid.-News release. MllitslyReview

MILITASY NOTES

TOW FiredFrom M113

The US Armys new TOW antitank miesile, which has rwently been deployed to infantry unite, is caught by a high-speed camera es it leaves the launch tube during drhg from an

The Dragon uses an automatic command-to-line-of-sight guidance system. A soldier aims through a. telescopic sight, launchee the missile, and holds his sight on the target until impact. The missile is automatically and continuously guided by a sensor device which tracks the missilee course and transmite corrective signals through a wire link.-Armg h7ew8 Feature8.

Grenadelauncher
The 40-millimeter M%OS grenade launcher has been released to the field. Initial delivery has been made to Vie& nam and to training bases in the United States, The device affords the rifleman a dual capability of point and area fire. It ia designed for attachment to the M16A1 rifle. It replaces the former M79 grenade launcher. The attachment weig@ lees then

Hugh Ahm& COwwanm Mll$ armored personnel carrier. TOW is currently in production. The missile can deetroy any known enemy armor at rangea of over a mile, and esn be fired from ground tripods, a variety of vehicles, and helieopters. News release. armed with a high-eaplosive warhead has been shoulder 5red for the first time during a development teat at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The antitank missile scored a direct hlt on a stationary target. Weighing less than SO pounde, the Draflon ie man portable, Yet powerful enough to deetroy enemy tanks and other battlefield targeta. May1971

DragonMissile . A Dragon miesile

U9 Army

three pounds, comae with sights adjustable to 400 meters, end fires the standard family of ammunition available for the M79 grenade launcher. It has been aucceaefuUy tested at 156 degrees Fahrenheit above and 66 below zero temperature for six hours prior to 5ring.News item. e7

MILITARY N81ES

REPUBLICOF KOREA
Demilitarized Zene Duty South Korean troops will assume responsibility for guarding tbe lt?mile stretch of the demilitarized zone north of SeouI formerly guarded by the US 2d Infantry Division. Reporta indicate that, by July, US troop strength in Korea will be cut from 62,000 to 42,000. US troops wilI continue to participate in the security guard at the armistice village of Panmunjon.News item.

Training Ship For approximately two years, the Engadhze has been used for the training of helicopter crews in the British Navy. The helicopter eupport ship is

GREAT BRITAIN
Parachute A new type of parachute has recently been tested in Great Britzin during a demonstration of the Army

Sd&: nd TeAik 426 feet long and 60 feet wide. The quarterdeck has a large hangar and ample space for the takeoff and landing of six helicopters.-News item.

MEmo
Draftee Training The Mexican Government is making a radical change in the training of Mexicos draftees, emphasizing ., sports se well ae military matters. All Is-year-able attend 260 houre of military claesee witbout pay. Thie is ueualiy done by attending five-hour meetings one day a weak for a year. Under the new syetem, drafteez will receive 52 houre of military instruction and devote 204 hours to eporta, civic instruction, and social work. Newe item. MilitaryhVi@W

Sddat

sad

Teehmik

Parachuting Association. The new parachute reportedly insures accurate landing in high winds.News item. 69

MILITARY NOIEs

THAILAND
Camp Friendship

The Slet Field Hoepital at Camp Friendship in Thailand

Ascording to press reports, the United States will turn over a large part of Camp Friendship, a 500-million-doIlar base at Kora~ to the government of Thailand. The six-year-old facility is the heedquartere of the US Army Support Command in Thailand which supplies Army and Air Force nnite operating in Thaiind. Parts of the samp to be transferred include a fully equipped military hospital and a large harraeke complex.-News item.

REPUBLICOF VIETNAM
Destroyer

In Februav, the USS Camp was turned over to the south Vietnamese Navy. The Camp, commissioned in 1943 and first assigned to the US Coast Guard, ia the first destroyer claee ship operated by the Repnblic of Vietnam. News item. my la71 %9

MILITARY NOTES FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY New Weapons

Defense officiale of the German Federal Republic have recently removed security wraps from three novel weapons. Unveiled were two typee of sophisticated landmines and one advanced, cluster-bomb device. All are area-type weepons and can be air dropped or delivered by ground-launched rockets or conventional artillery ehells. . Pandora: an antitank mine about the size of a fist. A PwzdonzAoaded warhead of a rocket or artillery shell acattera the emall mines over a large area, The mine will not injure the occupanta of armored vehicles, but will destroy tredke and rip off bogey wheele. Wheeled vehicles or personnel on foot will not detonate the device. . Meduea: a magnetic, hollow-charge mine capable of penetrating the bottom plates of an armored vehicle. Larger than the Pandora, the mine ie suitable for air drop, or it can be shot in bundles of five from a etandard rocket launcher. Medusa is not yet operational, but should become available this year. Dragon Seed: an advanced vereion of the cluster bomb. The bomblete are loaded into containers attached to the wings of fighter bombers or to ground-launched, free-flight rockets. They are expelled by ram air forced

through an opening in the container tip. Flying at a low level, the bombleta can be ejected in a steady etreem over the target. Both antipersonnel and arsnorpiercing, hollow-charge bombleta are available. ltww%ra, Msdwea, and Dragow Seed are complementary systeme beat employed in a mix.Air Force Magazine, @ 1971. 100 MilitasyRovhw

MILiTARY NOTES Raconnaissaoce VcMclo

In 197S, the West German Bun&awehr will be equipped with a new eightwheel armored reconnaissance vehicle, A turretlees version will be used as an infqn~ carrier. Both vehicles have water-cooled, 400-horsepower, multifuel engmea and are amphibious. Production of 400 of the reconnaissance veldcles is planned, followed by 1,500 of the carriere .MitteUungen fuer den Soldaten, @ 1971.

NORWAY
Antiship Missiie The new, two-stage, solid propellant Penguin missile is now in an advanced stage of teeting. one Psngwin antiehip miesile sye@m wee installed on a peeetimated range of 12 milw, the miesile is believed to have an inertial guidance eyetem with an infrared terminal homing device.

m
Mq ml

trol boat of the Stem class foi task. The Penguin, en effective weepon for small fighting ships, is approximately nine feet long; .hea a di=wter of 260 millimeters; and a wingspan of four and one-half feet. Launching weight ie 770 pounds which includes the 2&-pound TNT warheed. With an

class are expected to be armed with the Pengwn mieeile system.-sotdd und Technik, @ 1971. 101

MILITARY NOTES

FRANCE ACILV Miaaile

The ACRA missile has heen designed to become the main armament of all French armored vehicles. Fired from a 14Zmillimeter gun launcher, the supersonic missile is guided by a laser beam. Supplement@ gun ammunition has been developed for use against personnel and lightly armored targets. Teats from a chaasia of the AMX90 and AMXIO have been suecessfuL Soldat und Techrzik, @ 1971.

Loading en ACRA missile

I ACRA TECHNICAL DATA

I
Length: Over-all During flight 92 91 142 57 6.6 25 3,300 2.3 7 492 1,640

Missile inebei inches millimeters pounds pounda matera maters eeconds eeeonds feat per second feet per second

Ammunition 23 16 142 44 4.4 10 8,000 1.4 25 inchee inches mi~]metera pounds pounds meters meters seconds saeonde

Diameter Weight Weight of exgdoaive Minimum range Maximum range Time of flight-1,000 metere at maximum range Initial velocity Maximum speed,

1,660 feet per

Rate of dre

4 per minuts Exarciaas rier. The exercises, eade-nemed Swuz~ Sea, were among the largest undertaken recently by NATO. France had participated in NATO activities, including meneuvere, on only a limited scale eince removal of the defense alliances headquarters from Paria.Newe item. Mt&!y Review

NATO Naval France participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Orgeniaation naval exercises in February, off tbe Portuguese coast, reverein~ a trend established under the late President Charles A. de Gaulle. France sent eight warships to the maneuvera, including an aircraft car-

102

MILITARY NOTES JAPAN xc-1 The first teat flight of Japans.XC-l medium jet transport was eucceasfully completed in November 1970. The XC1 is echeduled to replace the aging C-46 transports now operated by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. The aircraft ie scheduled for operational

Itelntq

use in 197S. Present pleas call for production of 50 aircraft. The XC-I ie the first jet transport developed by Japan. It is designed to carry 45 paratreepers or eight tons of eargo and mu operate from short, unimproved aiffields. The XC-I has a cruising speed of over 400 knots and featurea high-lift devices, including four multislotted Saps and leading edge slats. Powered by turbofan jet enginea, it has a range of 1,200 miles with a six-ton payload. News release.

,.

May1271

103

STILWELL ANO TNE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911-1945,By Barbara W. Trrahman. 621 Pagea. Tha Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1970. $lam. MAJ ROBERT W. HOItNAOAY, USA In the end, China went her own way as if the Americans had never come. So ends this engrossing view of US involvement in China centered on the life of Joeeph W. Stilwell. Vinegar Joe was unique among US high commanders of World War 11., He served in an area in which he was considered an expert and lds mission was considered a failure. Why and how it failed, according to Mrs. Tuchman, is illustrated in the difference between two cultures, two views of history, and two men-stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. Many have said that a different US policy would have kept the Communieta from ruling China. Not so, saye Mrs. Tuchman. Any US action to cave China implied that the United States exercised a measure of control over tbe policy of China. Her argnment is that no such control ever exieted. Mrs. Tuchmans conclusion is that US military aeeistance, no matter how well intentioned or effectively administered, could never have succeeded in forcing China into an active role againet the Japanese. The Nationalist had other thinge on their minds which took priority. The gulf between East and West was too great. Not even Stilwell, backsd by George C. Marshall, could bridge the abyss. 104

GUERRILLAS IN POWER: The Course of tha Cuban Ravebrtien.By K. S. Karel. Tranalatad fJy Arneld J. Pomarana. 024 Pagea. Nill & Wang, N. Y., 1970.$12.50. BY LTC JAMES R. JOHNSON, USA Thie comprehensively researched book is written by a highly qualified reporter of the Communist ecene, The author was horn in Poland, and lived in the USSR es a etudent and soldier. Since World War II, he has maintained a home base in Paris from which he travels and reporta on Communist affairs. Written from an involved and sympathetic point of view, the book is based upon four visits to Cuba, extensive travel and remmwh, and lengthy visits with tbe major figures of the Cuban revolution. It provides a detailed history and criticism of the Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro. Examining Castros political, economic, and swial experiments, the author presents the positions and relationships of the significant Communist nations, as well as thoee of the United States and Letin America. In so doing, he providea an inside view of international Communist politics. The hook concludes with an eeeessment that Castro has edopted a modified version of Joeeph Stalins policies of the thirtke and advises him to pay more attention to the Chhreee Great proletarian Cultural Revolution. This book ehould be a valuable reference for studenta of Letin America, Military Review

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? Shapingthe Oefanse Pregram, 1B61.19S9.By Alain C, F,rrthoven and K. WaysraSmith. 304 Pages. Harper & Rew Publishers, ins., Scranten, Pa,, 1971. $6.95. BY LTC NORWOOD W. FLEMING, USA what is the proper role of the Secretary of Defense? The early seeretariee eaw their role aa referee, letting the servicee plan and execute their programs aa they saw fit, and etepping in to settle a dispute only when necessary, Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who came to the poet in 1961, instituted a highly centralized management system which gave the Secretary of Defense far greater power to plan and direct the defense programa of the United States. The two principal tools used in this new approach were the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting (PPB) Syetem which cut across service Sines and related force etTectiveneas to coate, and systems analysie which used analytical techniques to evaluate and compare competing force structures and weapon systems. The application of these tools caused an immediate cry of protest from the services and many memberd: of Con. gress. The sharpest attacks were reserved for the way in which systems analysis was used by the group of analyets in the Office of the Assietant Secretary of Defense for Systems .Analysis, Dr. Alain C. Enthoven. To many critics, the experience and expertise of the services were being usurped by McNamaras whiz-kids, as they were derisively called. Much of thie criticism, which persista today, was caueed by a basic misunderstanding of what syatema analysis is and what it is intended to do. This long overdue hook aeta out to eliminate this misunderstanding, and MaY la71

make a persuasive argument for why the PPB System and eystems analysis are neceseary to effective defense planning and decision making. The authors were key assistants in the McNamara Defense Department and personally participated in the actiona and evente they describe. Becauae of their involvement, only one side of the debate is presented, Con. veniently omitted ie any meaningful discussion of the failures of systeme analyais. This does not diminish the significance of the contribution they are making, Although we ehall have to wait for the other side in this debate, th]a excellent book is by far the clearest statement of the McNamara approach t~ defense management published to date. TYPHOON OF STEEL: The Battie for Okinawa. By James H. Baiote and William M. Belete. 303 Pages, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., Soranton, Pa., 1970.$10.00. BY lLT C. ROBERT THOMAS,USA This book examinea the offensive etrategy of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pacific commanders, as well as the defensive plane of the Imperial Japanese Heedquarters, providing a detailed picture of the part which Okinawa played in the eventual defeat of Japan. The battle for Okinawa ia clearly described in accounts of air, sea, and land engagement. Kamikaze atrikes of Operation !lWV-go, naval engagement involving the Ymmzto and Task Force 58, ground attacks and withdrawals, logistic support, and individual heroism are all included, The bibliography indicates liberal use of research material from official sources, both in Japan and the United Statee. This is a useful book for the military historian. 10s

MILITARY BOOKS THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: Its Impacts on American Society. By Adam Yamrolinaky. 434 Pages. Narper & Row Publishers, Inc., Scrantcn,Pao,1971.$10.00. BY MAJ CLEVECUNNINCEAM, USA Former Deputy Assistant Seeretary of Defense for International Affairs, Adarn Yarmolinsky, and MS team of contributors, say that the Military Establishment has grown too big and that it pervades every nook and cranny of our national life. No professional soldierin his role as a dedicated patriot-citizen-can deny that thesis. Sponsored by The Twentieth Centuru Fund, Mr. Yarmolinsky has put together a team of contributors really coauthorswhose intellectual standing is unassailable, even when one disagrees with some of their academic propositions. The book ehould be read in a slightly jumbled order. After reading the foreward, preface, and introduction, the reader should move ahead to the concluding chapter, How Much is Enough ?; then return to the other 24 chapters knowing what ie in store. Some of tbe authore personal biases creep through to flaw the book. He is still enthralled by the esoteric theories of operations research-systems analysis. And he is haunted by the case of Major General Edwin A. Walker. Three chapters deal with the services information and education programs. Professional information officers will find these comprehensive, enlightening, and supportive. The author finds the programe faulte are caueed by a dHfused bureaucracy. Senator J. William Fulbright notwithstanding, the tinding is that: . . . notiowa about the deferwe establishments public relations tend to lea be 8implietie. Ne(os management is di8cu8.sed as if it is a practical and workable reality, when manageability whether because of the complezitg of the eubject or the uncontrollability of cevtain individaale or factions within the def enee establiehmente is even more obvioue. The book gives frequent and welcome cred]t to the military services for their historic noncombat contributions to society. The chapter on Military Service and the Social Structure ehould be read by anyone who wiehes to discuss tbe Volunteer Army intelligently. THE DRAGON WAKES: China and the West, 1793-1911. By Christopher Hibbert. 427 Pages. Harper & Rew Publishers, Inc., Scrantcn,Pa.,1970.$1000. BY MAJ HARRYG. SUMMESS,Jr?., USA Christopher Hibbert, British historian, author of almost a score of military histories, biographies, and social histories, has done a maeterful job of bringing the unique past of China to life. Concentrating on what is known in China as The Era of National Humdiation: he has drawn a lifelike picture of the decline and fall of the Chinese Empire. Avoiding the jargon and obfuscation of professional sinologiets, Hibbert hae written an immeneely readable account of these crucial years. In these days when the cry is to make history relevanh this history is relevant indeed. The Dragon Wakee lays the foundation for an understanding of the curr-ent Chhese world view. It is on such a foundation that we must build our foreign policy in the years aheed. Thie book is recommended for all those who are concerned with US policy in east Asia. Miliiry Review

MILITARY BOOKS TNE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: The Rank and File in Todaya Military. BY Charles C. Moskos,Jr. 274 Pages. Ru;seli Sage Foundation, N. Y., 1970.$7.95. BY LTC THOMASA. REHM, USA Just as the book, The Professional Soldier, by Morris Janowitz, is considered the most important book on the modern officer corpe, it appears that this volume will be the most important discussion of the enlisted man. Both authors were themselves soldiers and sociologiete. Present interest in the All-Volunteer Army makes this book of patilcular importance. Moskos covers a broad range of subjeet matter, including Vietnam and tbe racial situation. His research includes all the major military studies made since World War II. The author concludes that the gap between enlisted man and officer during World War II is in todays Army less a point of issue than the differences between regular and draftee. This cendition is the result of the contemporary climate in which tbe basic legitimacy of invohmtery military service is being questioned. Logical development and careful analysis make tbie an exceptional book. TNE NEW LEFT READER. Edited by Carl Ogleaby.312 Pages. Grove Press Inc., N. Y., 13s9. $3.50. =BY LTC DONAUI B. VOUGHT, USA The Nero Left Reader is an exceSJent source of instant insight to New Leftiem and may, with clear conscience, be recommended to the philosophical dilettante or the military professional concerned with the philosophlcal motivations of tbe New Left. Mr. Oglesbys selections deal with political philosophy or mens relation to man in society rather than mane
khY fe7f

relation to gods, eternity, his immortal being, or tbe cosmos which surrounds him. Mechanically, tbe book is divided into three parts. The first is devoted to depicting the modern industrialized state es a self-destructive monatroeity, partkularly if it assumes the shape of a practking democracy. Part two provides a multifaceted rationale for revolution with emphasis on those aspects applicable to modern US eociety. The third portion addresses more specifically the grand tactics of revolution. It is unfortunate that the spread of contributors ranges from MilSe and Kolakowski to Huey Newton and Mark Rudd, thereby reeling the Readsr qualitative inconsistent. DECISION OF DESTINY. By Walter Smith Schoenberger. 330 Pages. Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1969.$9.95. BY MA~ WILLIAM S. I@OMSSt, USA This well-researched book traces the decision to use the nuclear bomb in World War II. In the first nine chapters, the author develops in great detail the varioue aspecta of the decision from the development of the theory of fission in December 1938 to the Potadam Declaration in JulY-Augost 1945. He has portrayed objectively tbe various proceedings and positions of members of the War Department, State Department; and various committees with respect to the decision. One of the more interesting aepects ie how the author deals with President Harry S Trumans role in the decision. Underlying all of his diecuseion is the contention that the decision wee made in a passive manner, that ia, President Frenktin D. Roosevelt made the deoision before his death and Truman saw no reaeon to change it. 107

NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain. By Narlan Cleveland. 204 Pages. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., N. Y., 1970. $B,B5. 13Y COL JOHN B. B. TRUSSELL,JR., USA This beok is not a primer for beginning students. Rather, it is an incisive and witty discussion of the actual operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the North Atlantic Council level for readers already familiar with NATOs organization and history. Few, if any, obeervers are better qualified to address thie subject. In addition to his extensive academic and operational experience in international affairs, Mr. Cleveland spent the years 1965-69 as US Ambassador to NATO, occupying a key position during some of the most crucial events of NATOs recent existence. The authora central theme is the value of consultation and the increasing care with which it must be employed if NATO is to play the vital role in developing events that it has played in the past. He makee a convincing case for the argument that there ie, indeed, a future role for NATO and, while in no way subordinating the essential military element of the alliance, emphasizes the value of ite potential in nonmilitary fields. He might be faulted for glossing over rather lightly the military difficulties resulting from the French withdrawal from NATOe integrated military organisation, but foeusing on the political aspects of the association, he is fully justified in pointing out that the political consequences of the withdrawal were not all bad. The exposition of the NATO concept of deterrence could hardly be matched for ite lucid and convincing quality.

A stimulating insight is the assessment that, despite much lip service, the Soviets have no desire for any genuine detente, that the occupation of Czechoslovakia proves that they will take forceful action to maintain the statue quo, and that, consequently, NATO attempts to achieve genuine detente represent a valuable offensive initiative. All in all, this is a first-class analysie of a vitally important subject. APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS. BY J. H. Fremlin. 303 Pages. Hart Publishing Co., Inc., N. Y., 1970.$15.00. BY LTC HOWARD C. JELINEK, USA Increasing numbers of workers in all branches of research are using the technique of nuclear physics. Few of them wish, or have the time, to take a full course in the subject. Some understanding of the principles, however, is invaluable if a proper choice is to he made of the best means to solve a given problem. The author presents a nonmathematical summary of our present knowledge of nuclear physics and a quantitative discussion of radioactivity. Further, he explains the prin- , ciples, capabilities, and limitations of the instruments ueed for radioactivity measurements. One section encompeeaes a worthy dlecussion on the production of radioieotope. The principles of operation of the nuclear reactor and the cyclotron are explained in simple terms. The book is well supplemented in the form of teblee with range-energy relations for the patilcke in various materiale which are quicker to use and more accurate than graphs. Thie book is well worth the attention of all individuals interested in the applications of nuclear phyeice.
Militwy Review

XERXES AT SALAMIS. By Peter 6reen. 326 Pagaa. Praeger Publiahara, N. Y., 1970. $10.00. BY LTC DANDINDGE M. MALONE,USA The author has delivered, in remarkable faehion, a broader perspective then is usually applied to major battles of the pas~broader in time, in geographical space, and in the antecedents and implications of the Battle of Salamie. In Greens scholarly and critically researched work, the Battle of Marathon, occurring some 10 years (490 B.C.) before the Salamis naval battle, ie seen as prelude and predictor of the outcome at Salamis-where the balance of Mediterranean power and the direction of European development wae determined in the narrow watere of the Salamis Channel. The book eklllfully integrates all of tbe elements of power in such a fashion that the Battle of Salamis is seen from many viewpoint other then military. One can see foreign politics at play es the Athenians eeek the aid of SpaMh at Marathon. Domestic politics bring about the imprisonment and death of Miltiades, victor at Marathon, scarcely a year after his immortal triumph over the Pereiane. The geographical importance of the Dardanellea is strongly evident in Xerxes campaign plane ae Xerxes, employing to the fullest the tech~ology of the time, spans the famoue straits with a great ponton bridge built across the decks of more than 600 Persians chips. Xerxe8 at Salami8, pitthg Persian against Greek, Xerxes against Themistoclee, Eeet against West, in perhape the meet significant. naval battle of all time, is an outstanding study of the strategy rather than the tactics of one of the great battles of history. May1971

TRUTH AND POWER: Esaaya of a Decade, 1960.70.By Hana J. Morgentfrau. 449 Pagea. Prseger Publishers, N. Y., 1970.$12:50. BY COL WALLACEF. VEAUDRY, USA From the authors viewpoint, the holders of power are the leaders in Government and. their advisors. The truth ie the authors beliefs, attitudes, and philosophy. The period covered by thie series of essays is one of conflict, hope, frustration, and despair for the people of the United States. The essays are arranged under three broad categories: The Philosophy, The Men, and The IS8USS. The Phi20soPhv discusses intellectuals versus politicians and appa~ntly assumes that the intellectuals are the only holders of truth. Also included are several essays, although under different titles, which baeically express the authors viewa that the war in Vietnam is morally wrong and the cause of most of our problems. Part II, The Men, includes brief capaulea on both world and domeetic leaders. The brief on John Foster Dunes is an interesting analysis of a complex and h]etorically important individual. Charles A. de Gaulle and Nikita S. Khrushchev are not covered in any depth, rather, the North Atlantic Treety Organization alliance and the dilemma of destroying the Joseph Stalin myth are the major topics under these headings. But Mr. Morgentheus personal analysie of political headers is interesting, and reflects the thinking of many intellectuals of the pact decade. The Iesues containe a range of essays that are, in some inetences, book reviews of other authors with whom Morgenthau disagrees. In his epilogue, the author painta a gloomy and bleak outlook for the future of American society.
loe

MILITARY BOOKS NEW BOOKS RECEIVEO SPEAR ANO SCEPTER: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa. By Ernest W. Lefever. 251 Poges, The Brookings institution, Washington,D. C., 1970.$6.50. STALIN, HITLER, ANO EUROPE. Volume N. The Imbalance of Power, 1636-1941. By James E. McSherry. 357 Pages. World Publishing Co., N. Y., 1970.$12.50. VIOLENCE AS PROTEST: A Study of Riots and Ghettos. By Robert M. Fogelson.265 Pages. Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1971.$6.65. THE WOODEN F16HTIN6 SNIP IN THE ROYAL NAW, A,tt. 667-1660.By E. H. N. Archibald. 174 Pages. Arco Publishing Co., N. Y,, 1666. $14.95. The Americon System in Crisis. By Lawrence R. Velvel. Foreword by Richard A. Falk. 405 Pages. The Ounellen Co., Inc., N. Y., 1970. $6.65. EOITORS MAKE WAR: Southern Newspapers in the Secession Crisis. By Donald E. Rey nolds. 304 Pages. Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, Term.,1670.$10.00. MILITARY ROWER AND POTENTJAL: Studies in International Development and Econonrics. By Kfasw Knorr. 150 Pages. O. C. Neatb & Co., Lexiirgtrrn,Mass.,1670.$10,00. THE HEARTLANO: A Chronicle, From 1000 B.C. to the Present, of the Nomadic Tribes of Central hsia Who Ravaged Europa and the Far East and Chsngod History Wherever TheY Went BY Stuart 1sss. 350 Pages. Farrar, Straus & 6imrrx, H. Y., 1970.$3.95. IMPERIALISM. v tieorge Lfcbtheim. 103 Pages.Preeger PubNsfrers,N. Y., 1671.$7.50, TNE PRISONER ANO THE BOMB. By Lsurens van der Post 152 Pages. William Morrow & Co., fns., N. Y., 1970.$5.00. DECEITFUL PEACE: A New Look at the Soviat Threat. By Gerhart Niemeyer. 201 Pages. Arlington House, New RocbeNe,N. Y., 1971. $6.65. BABf YAR: A Oocrrment in the Form of a Novel. By A. Anatofi fffrrsrretcov). Translated by David Floyd. 477 Pages. Farrar, Strarrs & Biroux, N. Y., 1670.$10.00. TNE BATTLE STALIN LOST: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 16464653. By Vladimir lle~er. 341 Pages. The Viking Press, Inc.r N. Y,, 1971.$6,50, THE FALL OF EBEN EMAEL: Prelude to Dunkerqrre. By Colonel Jsmes E. Mrasek, US Army, Retirad. 204 Pages. Robert B. Lute, Inc., Washington, O. C., 1670.$0.65. STRIKE TERROR: The Story of Fatah. By Ehud Yaari. Translated From the Nebrew by Esther Yaari. 367 Pages.Sabrs Books, N. Y:, 1670.$7.65. U.S. CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN. By Jordan C. Schreiber. Foreword by Kerrneth W. Sparks. 133 Pages. The OuneNen Co., Ino., N. Y., 1670.$6.65. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: The First Twenty. Five Years. By George N. Quester.327 Pages, The DuneNen Co,, Inc., N. Y,, 1670.$10.00, HEINRICH HIMMLER: A Nssi in the Making, 16fNW2B. By Bradley F.SmNh.211 Psges. Tha Noover frrctftsrtfon on War, Revohrtfon, and Passe, Stanford, CaNf., 1671.$0.65. CONTROLLING THE WEATHER: A Study of bW and Regulatory Processes.EdNed by Howard J. Taubenfeld.275 Pages. The DuneNen Co., Inc.,N. Y., 1970.$10.00. LIBERlk Black Afrfcs in Microcosm. By Chsrlea Morrow Wilson. 249 Pages. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,Scranton,Pa, 1671. $6.65.

110

Ssmsary lresrsw

FORUM
ROTC: White Elephant I disagree most emphatically with lieutenant
Colonel Albert N. Garland in his Reader Fomm comments Uanuaryl. Granted thet the Reserve Officers Training
Corps (ROTC) system has many faolts, it also has . produced many reliable officers who have served well and dcne great credN to the service, both as Regulars and reservists. As I sae it, university ROTC is primarily a Ion&term peacetime affair which cen add officer training sion for the graduate to academic training in many fields and make possible aa well as a commis-

Bundeswehr Infantry
I usually admire Jac Wellers reporting and analytical skills, but I believe that, in MS article on the West his enthusiasm objectivity. German infantry [Februsryl, he let his of is for all the hardware he failed override

Consequently,

to question

and properly analyze the whether, in fact, the West suitably organized

basic premise German infantry

and equipped

for its mission

and the terrain in which it would have to fight. Fortunately, Wellers enthusiasm isnot shared by the present West Gemmn defense planners, and, as the Federal Rapublic of Germanys 1970 white

a diplcma.

It is true that traditionally many of the ivyIeague universities have not been interested in ROTC and only adopted it when ROTC was popular. It is true that from institution sublime there is a variety of standards to institution, ranging from the This can be corrected. to produce peacetima ReseNe Army Reto not lose sight of . . . ia the for the

paper on defense peints out, afar.reaching reorganization of the West German field army ia cur. rently underway. The gist of these refcrms army to the countrys is to adapt the fiald which will ra-

geography,

to the ridiculous.

One thing we must baeic purpme officars, especially

sult in, among other things, the transformation of two of the six armorad infantry divisions into rifle divisions. Uaegarbrlgcdan) erously equipped Additional light infantry brigades will also be acfivatad, gan. wi~h antitank waapons, and sup-

of the ROTC:

serve aod National Guard, and not merely produce Villars for the active service. . . .

. . . I attended a atate university, a Iand.arant institution, with four years ROTC from 1931-35. Most of itsgradoetes serve end the Army went infe the US Army R& Netiooal Guard. A few rein the Regular became Regular Army Arery in the

ported by cmrventlonal artillery and multiple. rocket Iaunchars. Ona of the many beneficial side effects of the efructurel ratio of one vehicle five men, which Weef German reforms will be tha reto one per the duction of vehicles in the army from the previous per 3.5 soldiers degree to some has given

ceivad cNract commission and the Marines. Some through tha Tomaeen

Amry the appearance

of an expedi.

Act. Most remained

Army Reserve, and almost allserved with diafinc~on in World War N, many reaching field officer andgenerel I believe all figures cupied and gancy. . . . COLFrsnk W. MsrebaN, Jr. U3AR officer rank. . . . Colonal still Garland occupies completely in national ignores emer. and dofa on the place ROTC has ec-

fionary corps. Wellers shortcoming us, including quently guilty

is one of which many of that we have bean

myself as an armor oNicer, are fre. of, principally

tee deeply impressed by the spectacular actions of armor and armored infantry in World War N, and [heve forgotten] that these limitations. operations have also their geographic

An infantry war ia a great deal lees glamorous, although no less important, . . . the names of tha great amror commanders are still remembered well in Gawrrany, as well as in the United Statea. Hewaver, if we take a leek at ttra Federal Republics terrain, we note that roughly 30 percent 111

Contrlbntlom to tbe fSesderFomm sh.nfd be addressed to: EdSto, III Chief. Milieus Reriew. US Asmy C.rnmmd WISCwwml StsSf Cdkee, Pars Leawwortb. Kmsu s6e2z.

May 1971

READER FORUM
is covered cent wi~ are even 15,000-man of committing ground terrain. 7his armor North is not to say that there and armored infantry will in German low plains ia no room for Germany. The certainly require action with forest villsgas more and heavily and an additional towns. wooded. The zonal 20 par. areaa was equipped roughly 40 with 4,800 vehicles percent of the which raquired manpower

divisions

But tha presant ia capable by such

panzergrerradier which

division

just to keep the division frequently disastrous. In August 1950, for

moving. The result was inetance, tha 7,000mran

less than 2,500 men to dismounted ia often dictated

North Korean 4th Oiviaion attacked the US 24th Infantry Oivision, with ifs strength of 14,500 men. Oaapite the fact that the attacker had to make a night creasing its troops panatrating destroying process. of the Naktong raw recruits, Siver and 2,000 of he succeeded in were

such units since armor

is still king in open ter-

rain. However, in the central and southern sec. tore of the Federal Republic, with thair hilly and compartmentalized will dramatically tririty. N would of the Mikschea Korean War terrain, improve the the proposed infantrys reforms capa-

deeply into tha division rear area, part of the division artillery in the reinforcement of the US divibattalion, an anginear

Through

sion first with an infantry

battalion fighting as Infantry, two additional infantry regiments, and, finally, a 4,70il.rrrmr Marine brigada, the attack was rapulsed. N seems to me, then, that tha lessons to be learned from our own experience are that we should not be blinded by the advantages successes A continuous of tech. of one nology, and by the spectacular type of organization. made, the combat sion. as the Garmans organization

be well at this point to recall soma lessons, and Ferdinand fteviaws Otto article in MiliirY Oecember

1970 iaaue in which ha warns of the dangera of technological escess. The US Armys own official history of the Koraan War, published in 1961, ilIustratas numerous examples where our emphasis on mobility and firepowar and tha neglect of sufficient combat infantrymen led to some tragic experiences. The 16,000-man US infantry division

effort must be and misUSA

are now doing, to adjuat to the terrain

MSS Ronald A. Hofmann,

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