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Allied Free Workers' Union vs.

Compana Maritima (1967) FACTS MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business. AFWU is duly registered legitimate labor organization with 225 members. MARITIMA and AFWU entered contract of service. AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. No reply was made by MARITIMA. AFWU instituted proceedings in the Industrial Court praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the bargaining unit composed of all the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work in connection with MARITIMA's vessels in Iligan City. MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of employer-employee relationship between the parties. MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT because of the inefficient service rendered by the latter which had adversely affected its business. MARITIMA found itself charged before the Industrial Court of unfair labor practices under Sec. 4(a), (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Rep. Act No. 875. ISSUES Under the CONTRACT , was MARITIMA the "employer" and AFWU and/or its members the "employees" with respect to one another? (this is for purposes of determining employer liability under ULP) Is a certification election proper? RULE

1. there is no legal impediment for a union to be an "employer". 2. the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where neither party is an "employer" nor an "employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right. APPLICATION 1. AFWU was an independent contractor. And an independent contractor is not an "employee". Both were based on the "cabo" system. Under both, (1) the union was an independent contractor which engaged the services of its members as laborers; (2) the charges against the consignees and owners of cargoes were made directly by the union; and (3) the laborers were paid on union payrolls and MARITIMA had nothing to do with the preparation of the same. The union members who were hired by the union to perform arrastre and stevedoring work on respondents' vessels at Iligan port were being supervised and controlled by the general foreman of the petitioner union or by any union assistant or capataz responsible for the execution of the labor CONTRACT 2. Neither is there any direct employment relationship between MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the court a quo found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only possible connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly be in a better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA. 3. it is AFWU itself who is the "employer" of those laborers. 4. AFWU appears to be more of a distinct and completely autonomous business group or association. Its organizational structure and operational system is no different from other commercial entities on the same line. It even has its own bill collectors and trucking facilities. And that it really is engaged in business is shown by the fact that it had arrastre and stevedoring contracts with other shipping firms in Iligan City.

5. the real reason for the termination of the CONTRACT was AFWU's inefficient service. 6. There being no employer-employee relationship between the parties disputants, there is neither a "duty to bargain collectively" to speak of. And there being no such duty, to hold certification elections would be pointless. There is no reason to select a representative to negotiate when there can be no negotiations in the first place. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC (1998) FACTS Prefatorily, at the time the instant controversy started, petitioner was placed by the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) under a conservator for the purpose of protecting its assets. It appears that when the private respondents sought the implementation of Section 1, Article XI of the CBA regarding the retirement plan and Section 4, Article X thereof, pertaining to uniform allowance, the acting conservator of the petitioner expressed her objection to such plan, resulting in an impasse between the petitioner bank and the private respondent union. The deadlock continued for at least six months when the private respondent, to resolve the issue, decided to file a case against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and for flagrant violation of the CBA provisions. As stated earlier, the Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondent's complaint, on this premise: "Considering that the Bank is under conservatorship program under which the bank is under the rule of a conservator, the latter is under no compulsion to implement the resolutions issued by the LMRC. If he finds that the enforcement of the resolutions would not redound for the best interest of the Bank in accordance with the conservatorship

program, he may not be faulted by such inaction or action." ISSUE WON the conservator can rescind the CBA during conservatorship? No. WON the retiring employees have no personality to file complaint because there is no more employer-employee relationship? No. RULE 1. while admittedly, the Central Bank law gives vast and far-reaching powers to the conservator of a bank, it must be pointed out that such powers must be related to the '(preservation of)' the assets of the banks, (the reorganization of) the management thereof and (the restoration of) its viability.' Such powers, enormous and extensive as they are, cannot extend to the post-facto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise they would infringe against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. If the legislature itself cannot revoke an existing valid contract, how can it delegate such non-existent powers to the conservator under Section 28-A of said law? Obviously, therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power to revoke contracts that are, under existing law, deemed to be defective i.e., void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the conservator merely takes the place of a bank's board of directors. What the said board cannot do - such as repudiating a contract validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority - the conservator cannot do either. Ineluctably, his power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate valid obligations of the Bank. His authority would be only to bring court actions to assail such contracts - as he has already done so in the instant case. A contrary understanding of the law would simply not be permitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To rule otherwise would be to enable a failing bank to become solvent, at the expense of third parties, by simply getting the conservator to unilaterally revoke all previous dealings which had one way or another come to be considered unfavorable to the Bank, yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights nor vested interests of the third parties who had dealt with the Bank." 2. Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer

and the employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the former. the retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since these must be protected as though there had been no interruption of service. It must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of the employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services rendered, as well as an effective inducement for remaining with the corporation. APPLICATION 1. conservator had no authority whatsoever to disallow the implementation of Article XI, Section 1 and Article X, Section 4 of the CBA 2. Non-impairment clause 3. Jurisdiction by estoppel 4. When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement benefits be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but were merely demanding that their rights, as embodied in the CBA, be recognized. Thus, when an employee has retired but his benefits under the law or the CBA have not yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting his claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection of the Labor Code, one of which is the protection of the labor union. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PAL vs. PALEA (1967) FACTS PAL dismissed its above named four (4) employees, who are member of the Philippine Air Lines Employees Association hereinafter referred to

as PALEA and that on July 13, 1954, the CIR en banc passed resolution, in Case No. 465-V thereof, directing the reinstatement of said employess "to their former or equivalent position in the company, with back wages from the date of their reinstatement, and without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. employees were reinstated and subsequently their backwages, computed at the rate of their compensation at the time of the aforementioned dismissal, less the wages and salaries earned by them elsewhere during the lay-off period, were paid to them. The employees objected to this deduction and the CIR sustained them, in a Resolution dated May 22, 1960, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, on July 26, 1960, in G.R. No. L-15544. Soon later, or on November 10, 1960, the PALEA moved for the execution of the CIR resolution of July 13, 1954, as regards the "other rights and privileges" therein mentioned, referring, more specifically to: (1) Christmas bonus from 1950 to 1958; (2) accumulated sick leave; (3) transportation allowance during lay-off period; and (4) accumulated free trip passes, both domestic and international. ISSUES WON the employees, during the layoff period, are entitled to these benefits? RULE Republic Steel Corp. vs. NLRB: upon reinstatement the employees were to be treated in matters involving seniority and continuity of employment as though they had not been absent from work, and hence the reinstated employees were entitled to the benefits of the employer's vacation plan for the year in which they were reinstated and subsequent years upon the basis of continuity of service computed as though they had been actually at during the entire period from the date of strike to the date of reinstatement. APPLICATION 1. entitled to the Christmas bonus that PAL had given to all of its employees during said period, for said bonus, having been paid regularly, has become part of the compensation of the employees

2. With transportation allowance & sick leave privileges 3. No free trip passes: for the employees had no absolute right thereto, even if they had actually rendered services during the lay-off period. The -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ALPAP vs. CIR FACTS ISSUES RULE 1. "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the pourposes for which a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employeewhom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. APPLICATION -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc.

vs. Calleja (1992) FACTS a group of deck officers organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., (CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamen's Association of the Philippines (SAPI). On 10 June 1987, respondent CSAI filed its Answer/Position Paper alleging that the complainant union and CSAI are one and the same union; that Dominica C. Nacua and Atty. Prospero Paradilla who represented the union had been expelled as members/officers as of November 1984 for lawful causes; and, that its set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo has the lawful right to the remittance and custody of the corporate funds (otherwise known as union does) in question pursuant to the resolution of the SEC dated 22 April 1987. ISSUES who is entitled to the collection and custody of the union dues? Cebu Seamen's Association headed by Gabayoyo or Seamen's Association of the Philippines headed by Nacua. RULE It is the registration of the organization with the BLR are not with the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code. APPLICATION 1. CSAI, the corporation was already inoperational before the controversy in this case arose. 2. Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the labor group by virtue of his having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI.

3. the so-called set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo was conducted under the supervision of the SEC, presumably in accordance with its constitution and by-laws as well as the articles of incorporation of respondent CSAI, and the Corporation Code. That had been so precisely on the honest belief of the participants therein that they were acting in their capacity as members of the said corporation. That being the case, the aforementioned set of officers is of the respondent corporation and not of the complainant union. It follows, then, that any proceedings, and actions taken by said set of officers can not, in any manner, affect the union and its members. 4. Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private respondent Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo Machacon and petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of discontentment with the leadership of Nacua. This break-away group revived the moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution expelling Nacua from association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in February, 1987, it held its own election of officers supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It also filed a case of estafa against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p. 52, Rollo). The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being a member, has however, not affected her membership with the labor union. In fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was reelected as the president of the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree with the contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the labor group by virtue of his having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nestle vs. NLRC (1991)

FACTS to hold in abeyance the cancellation of their car loans and payments of the monthly amortizations thereon pending the resolution of their complaints for illegal dismissal. The private respondents were employed by the petitioner either as sales representatives or medical representatives. By reason of the nature of their work they were each allowed to avail of the company's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents availed of the petitioner's car loan policy. On September 14, 1987, private respondents Nuez, Villanueva, Villena and Armas were dismissed from the service for having participated in an illegal strike. On December 26, 1987, respondents Kua and Solidum were also dismissed for certain irregularities. All the private respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld the legality of their dismissal. They appealed to the NLRC where their appeals are still pending. ISSUES WON the NLRC may issue a writ of injunction against the enforcement of the car loan? RULE (1) "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. APPLICATION 1. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the

civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC. 2. The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to the company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding accountabilities to the company are matters related to the enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------San Miguel vs. Bersamira (1990) FACTS Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite (Annexes K and I, SanMig's Comment, respectively). These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). SanMig entered into those contracts to maintain its competitive position and in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no

employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective 1 July 1986 to 30 June 1989 (Annex A, SanMig's Comment). Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. The Union alleged that this group of employees, while appearing to be contractual workers supposedly independent contractors, have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months to fifteen (15) years and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It was then demanded that the employment status of these workers be regularized. On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting (Annex D, Petition). On 30 January 1989, the Union again filed a second notice of strike for unfair labor practice (Annex F, Petition). ISSUES The focal issue for determination is whether or not respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the resolution of that question, is the matter of whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute. An affirmative answer would bring the case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor

tribunals to the exclusion of the regular Courts. RULE While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. APPLICATION 1. what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE 2. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of

the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit; those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause's of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues. 3. The claim of SanMig that the action below is for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code would not suffice to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of regular Courts. That claim for damages is interwoven with a labor dispute existing between the parties and would have to be ventilated before the administrative machinery established for the expeditious settlement of those disputes. To allow the action filed below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS ISSUES RULE APPLICATION -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor (1981) FACTS Union filed a petition for certification election. During hearing for the petition, Union was required to submit payroll of employees.

Employer agreed to release payroll upon issuance of the registration certificate of the local union, from the Ministry of Labor. However, despite receiving a copy of the registration certificate, employer still refused to produce the payroll and list of rank and file employees. The Med-Arbiter ruled to proceed with the certification election. The employer filed a motion to suspend the proceeding on the ground that there is a pending proceeding for the cancellation of the registration of the union for allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities in violation of the laws, i.e. THE CONDUCT OF ILLEGAL STRIKES. Union files petition for mandamus to compel Minister of Labor, Bureau of Labor Relations, and Producers Bank of the Philippines to conduct a certification election. ISSUES WON it is proper to order a certification election despite the pendency of the petition to cancel union's certificate of registration? RATIO Unless there is an order of cancellation which is final the union's certificate of registration remains and its legal personality intact. It is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by law, including the right to represent its members and employees in a bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes including participation in a representation proceeding. This is especially true where the grounds for the cancellation of its union certificate do not appear indubitable. The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right more pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares that the State shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization ,collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work. Such constitutional guarantees should not

be lightly taken much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself. The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of herein petitioner union is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by the leaders and members of the intervenor union and petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a certification election, because there is no order directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said Dairy Queen case, one of the issues raised was whether the lower court erred and concomitantly committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact that therein respondent union's permit and license have been cancelled by the then Department of Labor and therefore could not be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of therein petitioner company. While the rationale of the decision was principally rested on the subsequent rescission of the decision ordering the cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal personality and an the rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate organization, this Court likewise declared: "There is no showing, however, that when the respondent court issued the order dated December 8, 1971, certifying the Dairy Queen Employees Association CCLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of the Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc., for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions for appointment, the order of cancellation of the registration certificate of the Dairy Queen Employees Association-CC-1,U had become final" 78 SCRA 444-445. supra, emphasis supplied). It may be worthy to note also that the petition for cancellation of petitioner union's registration certificate based on the alleged illegal strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification

election considering that the same was apparently filed only after the October 18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the holding of a certification election. Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union has not yet been finally resolved, there is another fact that militates against the stand of private respondent Bank, the liberal approach observed by this Court as to matters of certification election. In a recent case, Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local vs. Hon. Carmelo C. Noriel, et al. (No. 51005, May 26, 1981), "[T]he Court resolves to grant the petition (for mandamus) in line with the liberal approach consistently adhered to by this Court in matters of certification election. The whole democratic process is geared towards the determination of representation, not only in government but in other sectors as well, by election. Thus, the Court has declared its commitment to the view that a certification election is crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to the principle of majority rule as one ' of the basic concepts of a democratic policy" (National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 610). Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College vs. Noriel, et al. (L48347, Oct. 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497, 498), this Court citing a long catena of cases ruled: ... The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union to the latest, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, had made clear. The same principle was again given expression in language equally emphatic in the subsequent case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations: 'Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which

labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.' That is to accord respect to the policy of the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit (emphasis supplied). It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the Labor Code, cancellation of registration certificate may be imposed on the following instances: (a) Violation of Articles 234, 238, 239 and 240 of the Code; (b) Failure to comply with Article 237 of the Code; (c) Violation of any of the provisions of Article 242 of the Code; and (d) Any violation of the provisions of this Book. The aforementioned provisions should be read in relation to Article 273, Chapter IV, Title VIII which explicitly provides: Art. 273. Penalties. (a) Violation of any provision of this Title shall be punished by a fine of One Thousand Pesos [P l, 000.00] to Ten Thousand Pesos [P 10, 000.00] and/or imprisonment of one (1) year to five (5) years. (b) Any person violating any provision of this Title shall be dealt with in accordance with General Order No. 2-A and General Order No. 49. (c) Violation of this Title by any legitimate labor organization shall be grounds for disciplinary action including, but not limited to, the cancellation of its registration permit. xxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied). From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise convinced that as it can be gleaned from said provisions, cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of the Labor Code.

Certainly, the penalty imposable should be commensurate to the nature or gravity of the Legal activities conducted and to the number of members and leaders of the union staging the illegal strike. As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right is more pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares that the State shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work. Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the association itself" (p. 8, Annex "J"; p. 66, rec.). -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs. Confesor (2004) FACTS Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human Resource Manager, suggested to the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Unions President Eddie L. Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior to the commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Unions negotiating panel, and that during the first meeting, Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a family affair. ISSUES

whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice of negotiator
RULE

1. it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on selforganization and collective bargaining. 2. if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to e clude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union! and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free e ercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees! U"# under $rticle %&'(a) in connection with $rticle %&* of the "abor +ode is committed.
APPLICATION The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to selforganization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.

It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended meanings.[49] Such is what appears to have happened in this case. If at all, the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part of the normal relations and innocent communications, which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Heritage Hotel Manila vs. Pinag-isang Galing at Lakas (PIGLAS) (2009) FACTS Company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was required to submit the names of all its members comprising at least 20 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding that the signature and attendance sheets reflected a membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the company, amounted to material misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of the unions registration. ISSUE No. 1 Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union registration? RULE 1. The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny. It is serious because once such charge is

proved, the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered organizations. Consequently, charges of this nature should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding circumstances. 2. the Labor Code and its implementing rules do not require that the number of members appearing on the documents in question should completely dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration requirements. APPLICATION 1. Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or employees stated in the various supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union submitted to labor authorities can be explained. While it appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003 organizational meeting that only 90 employees responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected on the signature sheet for attendance. The meeting lasted 12 hours from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. There is no evidence that the meeting hall was locked up to exclude late attendees. 2. There is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the fact that only 127 members ratified the unions constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed that all those who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws. Any member had the right to hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the process. 3. this discrepancy is immaterial. A comparison of the documents shows that, except for six members, the names found in the subject list are also in the attendance and signature sheets. Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS union sought to represent consisted of 250 employees. Only 20 percent of this number or 50 employees were required to unionize. Here, the union more than complied with such requirement. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reyes vs. Trajano (1992) FACTS The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1 TUEU-OLALIA 95 NO UNION 1 SPOILED 1 CHALLENGED 141 The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections." The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . ." ISSUE Whether the competing unions may challenge the right to vote of nonunion members who voted for "no union" during certification of election on the ground of religious beliefs? RULE 1. the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join,

affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership. 2. Withal, neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form, join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. Besides, the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved, the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO," is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union in which case, no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point, and may not be inquired into at all. The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union

certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of selforganization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union. 3. In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit". APPLICATION 1. That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect. The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" "but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization" and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members

of a labor organization or not. 2. Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Pan-American World Airways vs. Pan-American Employees Assoc. (1960) FACTS The situation thus presented is the validity of the return to work order insofar as five union officers are affected, petitioner airline firm rather insistent on their being excluded arguing that since the strike called by them was illegal, and that in any event there was enough ground for dismissal, there was present a factor which might make them "lose all their incentive and motivation for doing their work properly" and which would furnish them "the opportunity to cause grave and irreparable injury to petitioner." To be more specific, the apprehension entertained by petitioner was in the petition expressed by it thus: "The five officers of the union consist of three (3) Passenger Traffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who in the course of their duties could cause mix-ups in the reservation and accommodation of passengers which could result in very many suits for damages against airline. Petitioner would attempt to remove the sting from its objection to have

the union officers return to work by offering to deposit the salaries of the five officers with respondent Court to be paid to them, coupled with what it considered to be a generous concession that if their right to return to work be not recognized, there would be no need for refund. ISSUES This is a review of the non-exclusion of 5 union officials in the return to work order for illegal strike? RULE 1. For it is the basic premise under which a regime of collective bargaining was instituted by the Industrial Peace Act that through the process of industrial democracy, with both union and management equally deserving of public trust, labor problems could be susceptible of the just solution and industrial peace attained. Implicit in such a concept is the confidence that must be displayed by management in the sense of responsibility of union officials to assure that the two indispensable elements in industry and production could-work side by side, attending to the problems of each without neglecting the common welfare that binds them together. 2. The moment management displays what in this case appears to be grave but unwarranted distrust in the union officials discharging their functions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the collective bargaining process itself is called into question. 3. It would have been different if there were a rational basis for such fears. APPLICATION 1. The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much less one clear and present, is to be expected from their return to work. Necessarily, the union officials have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid their salaries in the meanwhile they would not be considered as fit persons to perform the duties pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being generous such an offer could rightfully, be considered insulting. 2. The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of self-organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory

recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them. 3. If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented demand, the laborers in this particular union would thus be confronted with the sad spectacle of the leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible, possibly even constituting a menace to the operations of the enterprise. That is an indictment of the gravest character, devoid of any factual basis. 4. The fact that they would be paid but not be allowed to work is, to repeat, to add to the infamy that would thus attach to them necessarily, but to respondent union equally. 5. such an unwarranted demand, the effect of which would have been to deprive effectively the rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who should represent them. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Union of Supervisors (RB) -- NATU vs. Secretary of Labor and Republic Bank (1981) FACTS Employer is Republic Bank. Provident Fund was established pursuant to CBA. Administration of fund is left to 5-man committee in the Board of Trustees of the Bank. The fund is supposed to be managed by a Board of Trustees composed of five (5) members, of which three (3), including the chairman, are supposed to be designated by the bank president, and the other two are the presidents of the Republic Bank Union of Supervisors and of the

Republic Bank Employees' Union. Norberto Luna is president of Union for supervisors. He was fund administrator. at the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the RB Provident Fund, Mr. de Vera proposed a reorganization of the fund in order to carry out the instruction of the (respondent's) Board of Directors, which wants to have control of the fund so as to tie it up with the Investment Money Market Operations of the bank (p. 296, NLRC rec.). Mr. Luna vehemently objected to this, saying that the Provident Fund does not belong to the respondent bank but to the officers and employees. A heated discussion followed. The reorganization move was carried by a 3 to 2 vote, with all management-appointed trustees voting for it. To protect the interests of the fund, Mr. Luna moved that a trust agreement be executed between the trustees on the one hand and the members of the provident fund on the other, and that the trustees should execute a bond. It was during the ensuing discussion that Mr. Luna allegedly uttered the libelous remarks as follows: The basis of my apprehension is that if management wig run the RB I feel that the management of the RB are experts in distressing the RB and it's a known fact that for the past 10 years the RB has been in distress for which there is no reason why the RB should be controlled by management. Furthermore, the latest that Mr. de Vera is harping on is that he has good intentions. The present Board of Trustees decided against giving out a loan to Mr. de Vera who was considered a poor credit risk. Now how can we expect a person who cannot be given a loan and who will now have a say in the PF I don't think the PF will allow that. xxx xxx xxx As I have said before the personal standing of a trustee is very important so that if a man has a very poor standing and crooked (sic) at that he will be very bad for the interest of the PF. I repeat that the trustees had in the past denied a loan application of Mr. de Vera for the reason that his salary is under garnishment and for a man to be appointed as trustee when his records show that his salary was under garnishment, definitely, the intention of the RB is to appoint unscrupulous people (pp. 300-301,

NLRC rec.). Then Board appointed a new administrator. The 2 representatives of the unions walked out. ISSUE WON this constitutes ULP? Yes. RULE In Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R. (21 SCRA 226 [1967] cited with approval in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc., 51 SCRA 189 [1973], involving the same bank where eight (8) union officials were dismissed for having written and published a patently libelous letter against the bank President, WE held: It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of selforganization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ... ). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]). APPLICATION 1. There is evidentiary doubt as to the truth that Luna uttered the libelous remarks because the records are under control of the opposing party. 2. Assuming the libelous remarks were indeed uttered, the communication is privileged. 3. His protests could even be treated as union activity by the Industrial Peace Act, which assures the employees' right "to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining

and other mutual aid and protection ... " (Sec. 3, Rep. Act 875). This is so because Luna's membership in the PF Board of Trustees was by virtue of his being president of the RB Union of Supervisors. The Provident Fund was itself created as a result of the union's collective bargaining agreement with the bank. Luna was therefore acting out his role as protector of his constituents when he voiced out his apprehension and protests over the plan of management. It matters not that he acted singly or individually. What is important is that he had been selected by the supervisors of respondent bank to be their president and representative in the PF Board of Trustees. His actuations as such should therefore be considered as legitimate exercise of the employees' right to self-organization and as an activity for their mutual aid and protection, aside from being privileged communication protected by the constitutional guarantee on free speech. His remarks were in defense of the interest of the Provident Fund, part of which comes from the contribution of the rank and file employees. Moreover, his remarks had factual basis. As heretofore stated, the Central Bank took over the management of the respondent Republic Bank because it became distressed due to mismanagement. And his remarks were addressed to the Board of Trustee which has jurisdiction over the matter. In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, Identified as an interference with the employees' right of selforganization, or as a retaliatory action and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(e) of the Industrial Peace Act. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation vs. Trajano (1987) FACTS Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation Foundation union filed a similar petition for certification election with the

Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied by the MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code; that foundation union filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-49771) assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code; that pending resolution of the aforesaid petition, or on May 1, 1980, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice; and that in the exercise of such right, foundation union filed another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (NCR-LRD-N-2-050-86). ISSUE whether or not respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification election, despite the pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 49771) which involves the same parties for the same cause? No. RULE 1. Art. 244 Labor Code on "Coverage": there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions (as herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. 2. Rule on res judicata APPLICATION 1. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees ( 2. any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-49771) will not constitute

res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration, for while in the former, the foundation union questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the latter, the foundation union invokes the same article as already amended. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (1974) FACTS Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction ISSUES Validity of R.A. 3350 on the religious exception clause. RULE 1. the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 2. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. 3. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 4. CLOSED SHOP PROVISION. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,

provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. 5. EXCEPTIONS TO CLOSED SHOP. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. 6. NON-IMPAIRMENT. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. 7. NON-ESTABLISHMENT. 8. religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right 9. Discriminatory legislation: favors some sects 10. Against social justice APPLICATION

1. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. 2. Impairment of obligation of contract is REASONABLE. Religious freedom. 3. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. 4. The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. 5. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. 6. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions. 7. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. 8. Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.