GABRIEL VS BILON FACTS: Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel.

They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees. The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M. On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy was resent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997. The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be reinstated. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal before the LA was made on time. Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. Whether or not there was a strained relation between Gabriel and the drivers. HELD: The appeal was made on time because when the promulgation was made Gabriel is already dead. The ten day requirement to make an appeal is not applicable in this situation because Gabriel was not yet properly substituted by the wife. The counting of the period should be made starting from the date when the copy was sent via registered mail. Therefore, the appeal filed on June 5 was made on time. There exists an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called boundary [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. The award of the separation pay is not proper. It was not shown that there was a strained relationship between Gabriel and the drivers so as to cause animosity if they are reinstated. The Strained Relations Principle is only applied if it is shown that reinstatement would only cause antagonism between the employer and the employee; and that the only solution is separation and the payment of separation pay.

JARDIN VS NLRC FACTS: Petitioner were drivers of private respondent driving the latters taxicabs every other day on a 240 hour work schedule under the boundary system where petitioners earn an average of Php400 daily and private respondent regularly deducts an amount for the washing of the taxi units. Petitioners decided to form a labor union. Later, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs. Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed the judgment stating that dismissal must be for just cause and after due process. Private respondents first motion for reconsideration w as denied. It filed another MR, which was the granted.

ISSUE: W/N an employee-employer relationship exists, thereby making the dismissals illegal.

HELD: Yes. The relationship between jeepney-owners and jeepney drivers under the boundary system is that of employee-employer and not that of lessor-lessee. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship from that of employer and employee. The termination of employmentmust be effectuated in accordance with law. With regard to the amount deducted for washing, such was not illegal as such is indeed a practice in the taxi industry and is dictated by fair play.

R. Transport Corporation VS Ejandra

FACTS: Private respondent Rogelio Ejandra worked as a bus driver of the petitioner corporation. On January 31, 1996, his license was confiscated for obstruction of traffic. He immediately reported the incident to his manager, Mr. Oscar Pasquin, who gave him P500 to redeem his license. The following day, he went to LTO, Guadalupe Branch, to claim it but he was told that it had not yet been turned over by the officer who apprehended him. He was able to retrieve his license only after a week. On February 8, 1996, Ejandra was told that the company was still studying whether to allow him to drive again and also he was accused of causing damage to the bus he used to drive. Denying the charge, private respondent blamed the person who drove the said bus during his absence, considering that the damage was sustained during the week that he did not drive the bus. Mr. Pacquin nonetheless told him Magpahinga ka muna at tatawagin ka na lang namin kung kailangan ka na para magmaneho. Magbakasyon ka muna, bata. When respondent asked how long he had to rest, the manager did not give a definite time. Petitioner denied private respondents allegations and claimed that private respondent, a habitual absentee, abandoned his job. To contradict private respondents allegation that his license had been confiscated, petitioner asserted that, had it been true, he should have presented an apprehension report and informed petitioner of his problems with the LTO. But he did not. Petitioner further argued that private respondent was not an employee because theirs was a contract of lease and not of employment, with petitioner being paid on commission basis. On February 23, 1997, the labor arbiter rendered his decision in favor of private respondent which was later affirmed by the NLRC. Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was instantly dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: 1. WON the appellate court erred in not finding that private respondent abandoned his work, that petitioner was not the lessor of private respondent; that, as such, the termination of the contract of lease of services did not require petitioner to respect private respondents rights to notice and hearing; and, that private respondents affidavit was hearsay and self -serving. 2. WON the petitioner is correct in saying that there is no employer-employee relationship and that the parties agreement was for a contract of lease of services. 3. WON the private respondent, an employee of petitioner, was dismissed for just cause? RULING: 1. No. The court did not agree. The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that private respondent worked as a driver of one of the buses of petitioner and was paid on a 10% commission basis. After he was apprehended for a traffic violation, his license was confiscated.

When he informed petitioners general manager of such fact, the latter gave him money to redeem his license. He went to the LTO office everyday but it was only after a week that he was able to get back his license. When he reported back to work, petitioners manager told him to wait until his services were needed again. Considering himself dismissed, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. We have no reason to disturb all these factual findings because they are amply supported by substantial evidence. 2. No. The court did not agree. The court ruled that an employer-employee exist between the petitioner and the private respondent. In its petition filed before this Court, petitioner invoked our rulings on the right of an employer to dismiss an employee for just cause. Petitioner maintained that private respondent was justifiably dismissed due to abandonment of work. By adopting said rulings, petitioner impliedly admitted that it was in fact the employer of private respondent. According to the control test, the power to dismiss an employee is one of the indications of an employer-employee relationship. Petitioners claim that private respondent was legally dismissed for abandonment was in fact a negative pregnant: an acknowledgement that there was no mutual termination of the alleged contract of lease and that private respondent was its employee. The fact that petitioner paid private respondent on commission basis did not rule out the presence of an employee-employer relationship. Article 97(f) of the Labor Code clearly provides that an employees wages can be in the form of commissions. 3. No. The private respondent was illegally dismissed. According to petitioner, private respondent abandoned his job and lied about the confiscation of his license. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. In the instant case, petitioner fell short of proving the requisites. To begin with, petitioners absence was justified because the LTO, Guadalupe Branch, did not release his license until after a week. Second, private respondent never intended to sever his employment as he in fact reported for work as soon as he got his license back. Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut these established facts. Third, labor arbiter Yulo correctly observed that, if private respondent really abandoned his work, petitioner should have reported such fact to the nearest Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in accordance with Section 7, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code). Petitioner made no such report. In addition to the fact that petitioner had no valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it violated the latters right to procedural due process by not giving him the required notice and hearing. Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9 provides for the procedure for dismissal for just or authorized cause: SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirement of notice. In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed: I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and (c ) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known address. II. For termination of employment as based on authorized causes defined in Article 283 of the Code, the requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department at least thirty days before the effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination. III. If termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required. If the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.

RUGA VS NLRC FACTS: Petitioners were the fishermen-crew members of 7/B Sandyman II, one of several fishing vessels owned and operated by private respondent De Guzman Fishing Enterprises which is primarily engaged in the fishing business with port and office at Camaligan, Camarines Sur. Petitioners rendered service aboard said fishing vessel in various capacities, as follows: Alipio Ruga and Jose Parma patron/pilot; Eladio Calderon, chief engineer; Laurente Bautu, second engineer; Jaime Barbin, master fisherman; Nicanor Francisco, second fisherman; Philip Cervantes and Eleuterio Barbin, fishermen. For services rendered in the conduct of private respondent's regular business of "trawl" fishing, petitioners were paid on percentage commission basis in cash by one Mrs. Pilar de Guzman, cashier of private respondent. As agreed upon, they received thirteen percent (13%) of the proceeds of the sale of the fish-catch if the total proceeds exceeded the cost of crude oil consumed during the fishing trip, otherwise, they received ten percent (10%) of the total proceeds of the sale. The patron/pilot, chief engineer and master fisherman received a minimum income of P350.00 per week while the assistant engineer, second fisherman, and fisherman-winchman received a minimum income of P260.00 per week. On September 11, 1983 upon arrival at the fishing port, petitioners were told by Jorge de Guzman, president of private respondent, to proceed to the police station at Camaligan, Camarines Sur, for investigation on the report that they sold some of their fish-catch at midsea to the prejudice of private respondent. Petitioners denied the charge claiming that the same was a countermove to their having formed a labor union and becoming members of Defender of Industrial Agricultural Labor Organizations and General Workers Union (DIALOGWU) on September 3, 1983. During the investigation, no witnesses were presented to prove the charge against petitioners, and no criminal charges were formally filed against them. Notwithstanding, private respondent refused to allow petitioners to return to the fishing vessel to resume their work on the same day, September 11, 1983. On September 22, 1983, petitioners individually filed their complaints for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay, emergency cost of living allowance and service incentive pay, with the then Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration Branch No. V, Legaspi City, Albay. They uniformly contended that they were arbitrarily dismissed without being given ample time to look for a new job. Issue: Whether or not the fishermen-crew members of the trawl fishing vessel 7/B Sandyman II are employees of its owner-operator, De Guzman Fishing Enterprises. Ruling: Disputing the finding of public respondent that a "joint fishing venture" exists between private respondent and petitioners, petitioners claim that public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and/or abused its discretion when it added facts not contained in the records when it stated that the pilot-crew members do not receive compensation from the boat-owners except their share in the catch produced by their own efforts; that public respondent ignored the evidence of petitioners that private respondent controlled the fishing operations; that public respondent did not take into account established

jurisprudence that the relationship between the fishing boat operators and their crew is one of direct employer and employee. We have consistently ruled that in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. 8 The employment relation arises from contract of hire, express or implied. 9 In the absence of hiring, no actual employer-employee relation could exist. From the four (4) elements mentioned, we have generally relied on the so-called right-of-control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. The test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right. The petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May 30,1985 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioners to their former positions or any equivalent positions with 3-year backwages and other monetary benefits under the law. No pronouncement as to costs.

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTOR CORPORATION VS PAGALILAUAN Facts: Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its Legal Assistant and received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well. Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban. Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorneys fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorneys fees. A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employees conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.

RAMOS VS C.A. FACTS: Sometime in 1985, Erlinda Ramos, petitioner, was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon. Dr. Gutierrez was likewise appointed as anaesthesiologist. During operation, complications arose resulting to injury to Ramos. ISSUE : Is there an employee-employer relationship between the hospital and visiting consultants? HELD: There is no employee-employer relationship. 1. As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC's medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee. 2. Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their respective patients.3. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. For these reasons, DLSMC is absolved from liability and Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez are hereby declared to be solidarily liable.

PHILAM LIFE VS ANSALDO Facts: Ramon M. Paterno sent a letter-complaint to the Insurance Commissioner alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of the Philamlife as a result of certain practices by said company. Commissioner requested petitioner Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as Philamlife's president, to comment on respondent Paterno's letter. The complaint prays that provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract of Agency executed between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions as published in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared as null and void. He also asked that the amounts of such charges and fees already deducted and collected by Philamlife in connection therewith be reimbursed to the agents, with interest at the prevailing rate reckoned from the date when they were deducted Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant to the President, asked that the Commissioner first rule on the questions of the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner over the subject matter of the letters-complaint and the legal standing of Paterno. Insurance Commissioner set the case for hearing and sent subpoena to the officers of Philamlife. Ortega filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the Insurance company has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that there is no complaint sufficient in form and contents has been filed. The motion to quash was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the insurance commissioner had jurisdiction over the legality of the Contract of Agency between Philamlife and its agents.

Held: No, it does not have jurisdiction. The general regulatory authority of the Insurance Commissioner is described in Section 414 of the Insurance Code, to wit:

"The Insurance Commissioner shall have the duty to see that all laws relating to insurance, insurance companies and other insurance matters, mutual benefit associations and trusts for charitable uses are faithfully executed and to perform the duties imposed upon him by this Code, . . . ."

On the other hand, Section 415 provides: "In addition to the administrative sanctions provided elsewhere in this Code, the Insurance Commissioner is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon insurance companies, their directors and/or officers and/or agents, for any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of any provision of this Code, or any order, instruction, regulation or ruling of the Insurance Commissioner, or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Insurance Commissioner, the following: a) fines not in excess of five hundred pesos a day; and b) suspension, or after due hearing, removal of directors and/or officers and/or agents."

A plain reading of the above-quoted provisions show that the Insurance Commissioner has the authority to regulate the business of insurance, which is defined as follows: "(2) The term 'doing an insurance business' or 'transacting an insurance business,' within the meaning of this Code, shall include (a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; (b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2 [2]) Since the contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not included within the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

ABANTE JR. VS LA MADRID FACTS: Petitioner was a salesman of respondent company earning a commission of 3% of the total paid up sales covering the whole area of Mindanao. Aside from selling, he was also tasked with collection. Respondent Corporation through its president often required Abante to report to a particular area and occasionally required him to go to Manila to attend conferences. Later on, bad blood ensued between the parties due to some bad accounts that Lamadrid forced petitioner to cover. Later petitioner found out that respondent had informed his customers not to deal with petitioner since it no longer recognized him as a commission salesman. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent company and its president, Jose Lamadrid. By way of defense, respondents countered that petitioner was not its employee but a freelance salesman on commission basis. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as a commission salesman, is an employee of respondent corporation. HELD: To determine the existence of an employee-employer relationship, we apply the four fold test: (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. Applying the aforementioned test, an employer-employee relationship is notably absent in this case. It is true that he was paid in commission yet no quota was imposed therefore a dismal performance would not warrant a ground for dismissal. There was no specific office hours he was required to observe. He was not designated to conduct services at a particular area or time. He pursued his selling without interference or supervision from the company. The company did not prescribe the manner of selling merchandise. While he was sometimes required to report to Manila, these were only intended to guide him. Moreover, petitioner was free to offer his services to other companies. Art. 280 is not a crucial factor because it only determines two kinds of employees. It doen;t apply where there is no employer-employee relationship. While the term commission under Article 96 of the LC was construed as being included in the term wage, there is no categorical pronouncement that the payment of commission is conclusive proof of the existence of an employee-employer relationship. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB VS IAC & FERMN LLAMAR FACTS: A petition for certification was filed with the Labor Relations Division of the Ministry of Labor by PTCCEA in behalf of the caddies of petitioners. The petition was resolved in favor of the caddies. The same union later filed for SSS coverage but the Social Security Commission denied them for absence of employee employer relationship. ISSUE : Whether or not persons rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and their guests in said clubs courses or premises are the employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory coverage of the SSS. HELD: The caddies are not employees for the following reasons:-rules and regulations are permissible means to impose order where the caddies are allowed to pursue their profession within the clubs premises-they do not observe a particular working hour and are not at the call of the club-the club has no measure of control over the incidents of the caddies work and compensation-the group rotation system is only an assurance that the work is distributed fairly. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.

PHILIPPINE Global COMMUNICATIONS VS DE VERA FACTS: De Vera and petitioner company entered into a contract where respondent was to attend to the medical needs of petitioners employees while being paid a retainer fee of P4,000 per month. Later, De Vera was informed y petitioner that the retainership will be discontinued. Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not de Vera is an employee of PhilComm or an independent contractor. HELD: Applying the four fold test, de Vera is not an employee. There are several indicators apart from the fact that the power to terminate the arrangement lay on both parties: from the time he started to work with petitioner, he never was included in its payroll; was never deducted any contribution for remittance to the Social Security System (SSS); he was subjected by petitioner to the ten (10%) percent withholding tax for his professional fee, in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code, matters which are simply inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship; the records are replete with evidence showing that respondent had to bill petitioner for his monthly professional fees. It simply runs against the grain of common experience to imagine that an ordinary employee has yet to bill his employer to receive his salary. Finally, the element of control is absent. Petition granted.