ENGR4810U Lecture 4

1
ENGR 4810U
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Reza Ghafouri,
Winter 2013
Lecture 4
Feb. 7, 2013 Reza Ghafouri ENGR4810- Nuclear Fuel Cycles 1
Enrichment Cascade
array of 'elements' organized in
stages
elements within a stage are connected in
parallel; all receive identical inputs and
produce identical outputs which are fed
into other stages.
By arranging many elements in this
way, large amounts of material can
be processed in a given stage
even though an individual element may
have a very small capacity.
width of the cascade (i.e., the
number of elements in a given
stage) is proportional to the total rate
of flow of material passing through
that stage.
Source: A.S. Krass et al, Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1983
2
Enrichment Cascade
w f
w p
x x
x x
P
F
=
Terminology
Single stage separation factor
Isotope abundance
Separation gain
Cut :
F, R
F
, X
F
P, R
P
,X
P
W, R
W
, X
W
i
i
i
W
P
X
X
R
R
R
q
=
=
1
1 = q g
F
P
= u
Enrichment
stage
3
Example
Assume enrichment plant extract 51% U-235 presented in
feed material. What is the separation gain?
for 100 atoms
isotope abundance in the product
isotope abundance in the tails
51 X
F
U-235
100 X
F
U-235
49 X
F
Enrichment
stage
F w
F P
R R
R R
51
49
49
51
=
=
Example
Single stage separation factor
Separation gain
g=q-1=1.0833-1=0.0833
0833 . 1 )
49
51
(
51
49
49
51
2
= = =
=
=
w
P
F w
F P
R
R
q
R R
R R
4
No. of stages
: enrichment factor
n: stage number
Total # of stages: S+T+1
n n
n n
R R
R R
.
1
.
1
1
o
o
=
=
+
n
m n
m n
n n
R R
R R
.
.
2
2
+
=
=
o
o
F
T
W
F
S
P
R R
R R
.
.
1
+
=
=
o
o
cascade Ideal
) ln(
) ln(
1
o
W
P
R
R
T S = + +
Example
for a gain of g=0.0833 and cut =0.5
q=1.0833 and
ln()=0.04
for X
P
=3% and X
W
=0.2%
0408 . 1 = = q o
stages 68
) 0408 . 1 ln(
)
002 . 0
0309 . 0
ln(
1
002 . 0
002 . 0 1
002 . 0
1
0309 . 0
03 . 0 1
03 . 0
1
~ = + +
~
=
=
=
T S
X
X
R
X
X
R
w
W
W
P
P
P
5
Example
Material flow rate (ideal cascade)
Flow rate in enriching section
Flow rate in stripping section
Total
Inventory
) 1 (
4
n n
n P
n
X X
X X
g
P
L
=
) 1 (
4
n n
W n
m
X X
X X
g
W
L
=
SWU
g
L
tot
.
8
2
=
SWU
g
t
I
h
.
8
2
=
6
A.S. Krass et al, Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 1983
F=1265 t/y
X
F
=0.007
P=235 t/y
X
P
=0.03
Enrichment
Facility
W=1030 t/y
X
W
=0.002
F=765 t/y
X
F
=0.007
P=4.41 t/y
X
P
=0.90
Enrichment
Facility
1000 tSWY/y
W=761 t/y
X
W
=0.002
7
Nuclear treats
Uranium and plutonium two main materials used in
nuclear weapons
Dual use nature of uranium for both peaceful and military
purpose is a major proliferation problem
Civilian reactors: 2-3% enrichment (LEU)
Weapons: 90% enrichment (HEU)
Nuclear energy applications have been classified as
Aggressive military purpose 1945-1960
Peaceful civilian 1950-1970
NPT divides its members to
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)
China, France, Russia, UK, US
Non-Nuclear Weapons states (NNWS)
inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purpose without discrimination.
8
Nuclear treats
Different motivations
Stimulation of industrial and technological innovations
Resource development strategy or energy independence
Weapon usage - deemed to have
Greater national security
International power and prestige
Terrorist activities
Governments are heavily in the operation of the nuclear
industry
regulation
political decision
international agreements
Uranium enrichment closely related to overall
development of nuclear industry
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA : International Atomic Energy Agency has been created for the
sole purpose of regulating and controlling the international nuclear
activities of its membership
assisting its members with the formation of the international agreement,
some examples,
Non-Proliferation Activity (NPT)
Australias policy of not exporting uranium
US restrictions on the export of fuels to the countries that have not signed NPT
9
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Nearly 190 parties
Almost all countries except India, Pakistan, and Israel (and North
Korea, withdrew) are parties to the NPT or comparable
commitments
Basic provisions:
Non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons
and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their civilian nuclear activities
Nuclear-weapon states agree not to provide nuclear weapons
technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, and to negotiate in good
faith toward disarmament
All parties to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy
Members of the IAEA(STI/DOC/010/425)
AFGHANISTAN
ALBANIA
ALGERIA
ANGOLA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
AZERBAIJAN
BANGLADESH
BELARUS
BELGIUM
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
CAMEROON
CANADA
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CTE DIVOIRE
CROATIA
CUBA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ERITREA
ESTONIA
ETHIOPIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GABON
GEORGIA
GERMANY
GHANA
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
ICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAQ
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAMAICA
JAPAN
JORDAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KENYA
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
KUWAIT
KYRGYZSTAN
LATVIA
LEBANON
LIBERIA
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCAR
MALAYSIA
MALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MONACO
MONGOLIA
MOROCCO
MYANMAR
NAMIBIA
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGER
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
QATAR
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TAJIKISTAN
THAILAND
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UGANDA
UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
UNITED REPUBLIC
OF TANZANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
URUGUAY
UZBEKISTAN
VENEZUELA
VIETNAM
YEMEN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
10
Consistency isindicatedintables2.6aand2.6bby a'+' symbol whileinconsistency isindicatedby ano'. PositiveattitudetowardNPT +,
negativeattitudeo
11
Safeguards objectives
Objective as explained in the reference A.S. Krass et al, Uranium
Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, Stockholm
The objectives of an IAEA-administered safeguards system are the
timely detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear
material. A significant quantity is defined by the IAEA to be "The
approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking
into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of
manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded" . The
quantities given which are relevant to an enrichment plant are 25 kg
of U-235 in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more, 'highly enriched
uranium' (HEU), and 75 kg of U-235 in material enriched to lower
values, 'low-enriched uranium (LEU). The amount of U-235 is larger
in the second case because of the assumed difficulty of the
conversion process involved in further enriching it to weapon-grade
levels. The 25 kg value for U-235 in HEU is based on an estimate of
25 kg as the minimum critical mass of U-235 (90-95 per cent
enriched) needed to make a nuclear weapon.
12
Safeguards
prevent nuclear theft and violence
prevention of theft;
detection of theft;
recovery of stolen material; and
response to threats of violence
From IAEA "the timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material . . . , and deterrence of such
diversion by the risk of early detection
A significant quantity is defined by the IAEA to be "The approximate
quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any
conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear
explosive device cannot be excluded
The quantities given which are relevant to an enrichment plant
are 25 kg of
235
U in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more,
(HEU), and 75 kg of
235
U in material enriched to lower values,
(LEU)
Material accounting
detect of diversion involve " . . . Materials accountancy as a
safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with
containment and surveillance as important complementary
measures
Dividing nuclear material operations into material balance
areas (MBAs)
Maintaining records describing the quantities of nuclear
material held within each MBA
Measuring and recording all transactions involving the transfer
of nuclear material. . . from one MBA to another or changes in
the amount of nuclear material present due to nuclear
production or nuclear loss.
Periodically determining the quantities of nuclear material
present within each MBA through the taking of physical
inventory
13
Material accounting
Closing the material balance over the time period
spanned by two successive physical inventories and
computing the material-unaccounted-for (MUF) for that
period
Providing for a measurement control programme to
determine accuracy of measurements and calibrations
and correctness of recorded source and batch data
Testing the computed MUF against its limits of error for
indications of undetected loss
Analyzing the accounting data to determine the cause and
magnitude of mistakes in recording, unmeasured losses,
accidental losses and unmeasured inventory (hold-up)
Nuclear fuel design
In nuclear reactor the
performance of fuel is a of
paramount importance
major factors
1. fuel must not reach melting
point
2. no fission products should be
released to the coolant
first constraint is absolute, if it
happens that is a major
accident and the reactor
needs to be shutdown
Picture from Canteach
14
Nuclear fuel design
Important parameters for an acceptable fuel
performance are:
nuclear reactivity and control
adequate thermal-hydraulic conditions
containment of materials
minimizing neutron absorbing impurities in the fuel material
cost competitiveness
long fuel residency
effective in-core management for high burnup
standardization of fuel design for efficient production
reliability
realistic specification
Nuclear fuel design
fuel performance is affected by
fuel material
design
fuel is consists of fuel itself and cladding materials that
surround it
both must be designed such that to function properly in the reactor
core environment
environment of high temp. & irradiation harmful to fuel
As soon as fuel (UO
2
) placed in the reactor and starts producing power
it is not UO
2
anymore
Objective of fuel design:
keep all of the fission products resulted from reaction inside the
cladding, preferably, inside UO
2
structure
15
Fuel types
Metal fuel
metal form of uranium was used first in reactors
features
highly reactive with most of non-metalic material
has a shiny platinum color surface which becomes black after 3 to
four days after being exposed to room temperature and air
exists in three allotropic forms
phase: orthorhombic crystal, stable up 600C
phase: tetragonal crystal, exists between 660C 700C
phase: BCC crystal, exists from 760C up with melting point of about
1130C
and phases are anisotropic; it expands in two direction and
contracts in the third direction. phase is isotopic
Results in: Irradiation affects micro-structure of uranium metal
causes growth problem
Fuel types
Ceramic fuel
currently UO
2
is in use
UC (uranium monocarbide) attractive for very high temperature
UN (uranium nitrate) attractive for space power systems
UC and UN have higher density than UO
2
- may suffer less
radiation damages
interatomic bounding is ionic or covalent so it is hard,
brittle material
advantages
oxygen has a very low thermal neutron capture
chemically and structurally very stable
many of the fission products are retained within the UO
2
crystal
fabrication cost is low
16
Properties of UO
2
Melting point
Density
Thermal conductivity
Thermal expansion coefficient
(per C)
Tensile strength
Modulus of elasticity
Cell type
2650C (5189F)
10.96 g/cm
3
4.77x10
-3
W/m.K at 20C
1.91x10
-3
W/m.K at 1000C
1x10
-5
/C (0 to 1000C)
6.9x10
7
Pa (10,000 psi)
1.72x10
11
Pa (25x10
6
psi)
Face centered cubic
Properties of UO
2
Undesirable feature
poor thermal conductivity extreme thermal gradient
causes to eventual grain growth in high temperature/temperature
gradient of the reactor resulting the cracking of fuel
cracking of UO
2
release of some fission products after high burnup
cracking has not adverse effect on the operation as long as cladding
contain the fission products
uranium dioxide is not a simple material
fabrication strongly affects its irradiation properties
17
18
Fuelling objectives
in all reactor the objective is to have
high burnup
40,000 to 50,000 MWD/MTU (typical value for LWRs)
7000-8000 (typical value for CANDU)
linear power density
10 to 17 kW/ft (typical value for LWRs)
maximizing these parameters may lead to fuel failure if
they exceed design values
19
Essential stages of fuel fabrication
1. purification of uranium
2. if enrichment is needed, conversion to hexafluoride,
and enhancement of
235
U content
3. conversion to the required chemical form, usually metal
or dioxide
4. formation into required shape
5. application of cladding
6. building into clusters
7. addition fittings or appendages
Fuel pellet
Production UF
6
converted UO
2
UF
6
is supplied in high pressure steel cylinder
steel cylinder is placed in oven
UF
6
gas bubble through water to form uranyl fluoride UO
2
F
2
UF
6
+ 2H
2
O UO
2
F
2
+ 4HF (hydrofluoric acid)
UO
2
F
2
is mixed with ammonia water and uranium precipitates as
ammonium diuranate (NH
4
)
2
U
2
O
7
(ADU)
2UO
2
F
2
+ 8HF + 14NH
4
OH (NH
4
)
2
U
2
O
7
+12 NH
4
F+11 H
2
O
20
Fuel pellet fabrication
the precipitate is dried and calcinated (dried at high temperature) to
form U
3
O
8
and further reduced with hydrogen to form UO
2
(NH
4
)
2
U
2
O
7
+ 2H2 2UO
2
+ 2NH
3
+3H
2
O
UO
2
ground to form fine, uniform powder
adhesive agent is added then pressed to cylindrical pellet
pellets are sintered at high temperature near the melting point in
hydrogen atmosphere (24 h at 1650 C)
Fuel pellet
21
Fuel pellet (CANDU) (process at port hope, Ontario)
uranium concentrate (yellow cake)
dissolution in nitric acid
solvent extraction purification
nuclear grade uranyl nitrate
precipitation of ammonium diuranate (ADU) with ammonium hydroxide

solid/liquid separation
calcination and reduction of dried ADU
conditioning
ceramic UO
2
powder
Fuel pellet fabrication
After sintering pellets are ground
to the dimension required
pellet end is cupped or dished to
accommodate the fission
products
prevents pellets from touching
the cladding after power
production begins and pellet are
distorted because of uneven
thermal expansion
pellets are stacked in desired
length and weight
placed in a vacuum oven to
remove moisture and organic
contaminations
22
CANDU pellet design
Objective
maximize the amount of fissile material present in the fuel element
minimize the pellet volumetric changes during fuel life in reactor
gas release in acceptance limit
pellet design meets production and economy requirements
minimize circumferential ridging of the sheath
Fuel cladding/Fuel Sheath
Purpose:
prevent corrosion of the fuel by the coolant media
retain the fission products resulting from the splitting of uranium
nuclei during power generation
accommodate the fuel volume change
provide a surface for the heat transfer from the fuel to coolant
cladding material must satisfy all of above requirements
while being change its properties due to the radiation
must have a small thermal neutron absorption cross
section (do not affect neutron economy)
candidate cladding materials must have certain special
mechanical, physical, chemical and nuclear
characteristics
23
Fuel cladding
Main requirements for cladding material
small neutron cross section
compatible with fuel
corrosion resistance
strength
Cross section
Materials Barns Materials Barns
Magnesium 0.0063 Iron 2.6
Beryllium 0.01 Molybdenium 2.7
Zirconium 0.18 Chromium 3.1
Aluminum 0.23 Copper 3.8
Tin 0.63 Nickel 4.6
Niobium 1.1 Titanium 5.8
Fuel cladding
candidates having cross
section similar to zirconium
beryllium
magnesium
aluminum
zirconium
is relatively abundant
high melting point (1845 C)
problem:
inadequate corrosion
resistance
lack of ductility
expensive
produce helium gas during
irradiation
do not have adequate
strength
24
Fuel cladding
Fuel pellets cupped at the
ends
Distortion of fuel pellet due
to uneven heat generation
rate
Fuel cladding
Some of early cladding materials were stainless steel
type 304 SS was used in sodium cooled reactor
it has high thermal neutron cross section compare to zirconium
alloy
Zircaloy is used in the LWRs
zircaloy-2 in BWRs
zircaloy-4 in PWRs
improved Zircaloy-4 is called ZIRLO used in VINTAGE-5 fuel
can reach temperatures as high as 454C with no visible corrosion
Zircloy-4 is used in CANDU fuel cladding (fuel sheath)
25
Fuel rod dimension
CANDU 28 37
Pellet Dia(mm) 14.3 12.16
Sheath thk(mm) 0.42 0.38
Sheath OD (mm) 15.3 13.12
Fuel pin (PWR & BWR)
dry fuel pellets are loaded in
clean, dry zircaloy tube which
one end is welded
tube are backfilled with helium
gas
PWR fuel 2000 psi
BWR fuel 1000 psi
fuel rods are provided with
additional volume at both top
and bottom ends for collection of
fission products
a spring hold the fission product
in contact
26
PWR Fuel Element
PWR Fuel Element
Depend on type of PWR fuel
assembly may have
burnable poisons installed at
some position
water hole to satisfy the reactor
core power distribution
vacant place for control rod
spacer to restrain the fuel pins
upper nozzle can be detached
for removing defected fuel pin
27
BWR Fuel Element
BWR is in four cluster formation
with a cruciform control rod
7x7 array experienced difficulties
due to PCI ( pellet/cladding
interaction)
this problem required the power
follow a strict ramp during operation
to minimize the effect due to heat
generation
in 8x8 and newly improved 9x9
arrays the heat generation rate
were decreased
in 9x9 array design 20% in fuel
burnup with increased capacity
factor
28
PWR and BWR fuels
29
Fuel assembly Identification
US Unique identification code based on ANS N18.3-1972
Six character
A prefix of two alphabetic characters identifying fabrication facility
Four alphanumerical characters: Arabic numbers 0 to 9 and letters of
English alphabet except I and O (34 different characters)
Machined, engraved,
1156x1156=1.336x10
6
combinations
0000, 00001,0003,,0009, 000A,000B,,000Z,.,0010,
Very last one ZZZZ
CANDU reactor
30
Fuel bundle
28-element fuel bundle
1. Zircaloy bearing pad
2. Zircaloy Fuel Cladding
3. Zircaloy End Support
4. Uranium dioxide
5. Canlub graphite interlayer
6. Interelement spacer
7. Zircaloy end cap
8. Pressure tube
9. Calandria tube
31
Fuel bundle
28 element fuel bundle
32
CANDU fuel
Length of bundle 495mm
diameter of bundle 102.5mm
weight of bundle 23.9 kg
pellet dia 12.16 mm
length 16 mm
dish depth 0.11 mm
sheath OD 13.12 mm
sheath wall thk 0.38 mm
graphite Canlub thk
3-20
microns
UO2 mass 21.6 kg
zircaloy-4 mass 2.3 kg
average maximum bundle
power 786
number of bundle per channel 13
channel power 6.26 MW
coolant flow 25.2 kg/s
pressure drop in the channel <725 kPa
37 element fuel bundle
CANFLEX fuel design
has 43 elements
outer two rings of elements
being of smaller diameter
than the inner 7 elements.
improved thermalhydraulic
properties and 20% lower
maximum element-power
ratings than 37-element
fuel, for the same bundle
power.
33
LWR fuel problems
Fuel swelling: creation of fission products in the fuel
Fuel growth: irradiation growth directly related to anisotropy of fuel
uranium crystal
neutron irradiation: causes swelling, fission products interspersed
inside fuel lattice decreases the density of UO2 (increasing volume)
neutron bombardment knock atom out of their normal positions
creating vacancy states (swelling)
LWR fuel problems
Fuel densification
density of UO
2
increases during the first few month of operation
results in reduction of pellet diameter and length
this is of a more problem of BWRs than PWRs
Thermal expansion
nonuniform heating rates
to prevent touching with cladding cupping or dishing of the pellet is
used
34
LWR fuel problems
Pellet/Cladding interaction
experience with LWR and CANDU fuel shown that the cladding
failure may happen after sufficiently high burnup (about 15000
MWD/TU) as a result of a power ramp
stress corrosion cracking describe this phenomenon
Formation of hydrides
hydrogen is generated in the reactor from radiolysis of H
2
O or from
hydrogen absorbed by the pellet surface during pressing or
grinding lead to ZrH
2
cause large reduction in strength and ductility of zircaloy
LWR fuel improvements
Barrier fuel
reduce BWRs failure due to PCI
pure zirconium is metallurgically bounded to zircaloy cladding inner
surface
Vantage-5 fuel
reduce PCI by using ZIRLO
TM
(Nb-modified zircaloy) cladding
material which has lower corrosion rate
Axial and radial blankets
objective is to improve the neutron economy in the reactor by
capturing escaping neutron
axial blanket; placing pellets of natural uranium at both ends of fuel
rod (about 6in)
placing assemblies with certain burnup at the core periphery
35
Fuel Sipping in LWR
Defective rods release fission products into the coolant which in turns
increase the radiation exposure to the personnel
The quality control for fuel fabrication is excellent
For 40,000 to 50,000 with a 0.1% failure rate we may expect about 40 rods to
fail
Sipping: examination of the fuel for defect is performed during
refueling outage using process of sipping
Wet sipping:
monitoring leaching of fission products to the container filled with water
Dry sipping:
expulsion of fission gases from the defected rod into container exposed to air. Decay
heat of fuel raises the temperature and causes the release of fission gases
More sensitive than wet sipping
Vacuum sipping
Combination of high sensitivity of dry sipping with inherent safety of wet sipping
ECHO-330:
using ultrasonic probe
36
Failed fuel detection in CANDU
Fuel Failure is a breach of the containment boundary of
the Zircalloy clad
results in the release of radioactive fission product directly to the
PHTS
performance target
less than one in 2000 irradiated bundle
During Fuel Failure events typically only 1 element in the bundle
fails
Methods
Gaseous Fission Product Monitoring System (GFPMS)
Delayed Neutron Detection System (DNDS)
Scanning of outlet feeders during off-power cold shutdown
Failed fuel detection mechanism
Gaseous Fission Product (GFP) monitor
gross radioactivity monitoring system detect the presence of failed
fuel
two sample lines from each loop of PHT are taken and pass
spectrometer
look for isotopes
131
I,
133
Xe,
135
Xe,
88
Kr and gamma activity
DNDS
extracts on demand a coolant sample from each channel exit
feeder to sample room
scan for delayed neutrons emitted by
137
I,
87
Br
37
Fuel failure causes
Manufacturing Flaws
like incomplete welds & End-Cap porosity

Operational defects
Stress Corrosion Cracking in abnormal operating Conditions
Debris fretting
Imposed load/stress and impact during refueling
Mechanical damage
Flow induced vibration
Dimensional change due to operation

Fabrication price
FF: cost of fabricated fuel ($/kgU)
PU: price of natural uranium ($/kgU)
PC: cost of conversion of U
3
O
8
to UF
6
($/kgU)
PS: price of SWU ($)
PU: price of enriched uranium ($/kgU)
l
c
: fraction of uranium lost during conversion (<1%)
l
f
: fraction of uranium lost in fabrication
PF SF
l
PS
P
F
l
PC
l l
PU
FF
f f f c
+
+

= .
) 1 (
)
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
(

ENGR4810U Lecture 4

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ENGR4810U Lecture 4

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

dissolution in nitric acid

solvent extraction purification

nuclear grade uranyl nitrate

precipitation of ammonium diuranate (ADU) with ammonium hydroxide

calcination and reduction of dried ADU

You might also like